Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Veuillez vous asseoir. La Cour se réunit maintenant afin d'entendre les conclusions de la France dans l'affaire portée par la Yougoslavie contre la France, et j'ai le plaisir de donner la parole à l'agent du gouvernement de la France, Monsieur Abraham.

Mr. RONNY ABRAHAM: Mr. President, Members of the Court, France, whom I have the great honour to represent before you today, is brought before the Court by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for "violation of the obligation not to use force" (title of the Application filed on 29 April 1999).

It is out of respect for the International Court of Justice that the French Republic, represented by myself, makes this submission to you today. But I have to say, with regret, that this respect seems not be shared by the opposing party, so evident is it from the outset that the Application of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against France falls outside the Court's jurisdiction, that the Court is inevitably bound in consequence to reject it, and that the Applicant State cannot be unaware of this. Why then make the Application in the first place?

I have the clear impression, Mr. President, that Yugoslavia in reality seeks to use the Court as a political forum, rather than as what it is, an essential judicial institution, charged pursuant to Article 38 of its Statute with the task of resolving, in conformity with international law, the disputes submitted to it, subject to the limits of its jurisdiction.

For the Respondent, this case, doomed as it is to failure and instituted for ends flagrantly at odds with those of true justice, is perhaps no more than an annoyance; but for the Court it is most certainly an insult.

It is unnecessary to recite at length the events which led up to this case, namely what the world knows as the "Kosovo crisis". As the Heads of State and of Government attending the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington on 23 and 24 April 1999 emphasized, this crisis poses a fundamental challenge to the values defended by those States which are participating in NATO's military operations and which are the Respondents to these proceedings by Yugoslavia: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This crisis is "the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by the Belgrade régime . . ." (*Declaration on Kosovo*, adopted at the conclusion of the Washington Summit). The Declaration states that:

> "NATO's military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supports the political aims of the international community, which were reaffirmed in recent statements by the UN Secretary-General and the European Union: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis."

France does not seek to enter in any way whatever into a discussion on the substance of the alleged dispute which the Application aims to resolve. Instead, she will limit herself to showing that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain that Application. She associates herself completely with the arguments in this sense which have been and will be developed before you by the Respondents in the other cases to be considered by the Court at these hearings.

Mr. President, in its Application against France, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia relies on two bases of jurisdiction: Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. Both of these bases of jurisdiction are totally inapplicable, but for different reasons.

(a) Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

> "When the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a consent thereto

yet to be given or manifested by the State against which such application is made, the application shall be transmitted to that State. It shall not however be entered in the General List, nor any action taken in the proceedings, unless and until the State against which such application is made consents to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the case."

This provision represents, as you know, an offer to resolve a dispute by judicial means, which the State against whom the Application is made is free to accept or to reject. Seisin and jurisdiction of the Court both depend - and I need not dwell on the point - on the existence of consent by the Respondent. Your case-law is quite extensive on this point: see, for example, the case concerning *Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America* (*United States of America* v. *Hungarian People's Republic*). The Court explains, in its Order of 12 July 1954, that it "can take no further steps" on the Application filed by the United States of America in the absence of an "acceptance by the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the dispute which is the subject of the Application . . ." (*I.C.J. Reports 1954*, p. 101). The Court's reasoning was identical in the case of the *Aerial Incident of October 7th, 1952* (*United States of America* v. *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*) (*I.C.J. Reports 1956*, p. 9), in the *Antarctica* case (*United Kingdom* v. *Argentina*) (*I.C.J. Reports* 1954, p. 14) and in the case concerning *the Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954* (*United States of America* v. *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*) (*I.C.J. Reports 1959*, p. 278), etc. I need not burden you with further examples.

Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court does not apply quite simply because, in this case, France does not accept the Court's jurisdiction. It is clearly understood that her participation in the present phase of the proceedings instituted by Yugoslavia's Application does not constitute an acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court under that Article. Moreover, no one can fail to be aware that the *forum prorogatum* doctrine can have no application in such circumstances. In its Order of 13 September 1993 in the case concerning *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (*Bosnia and Herzegovina* v. *Yugoslavia*), the Court stressed that "the Respondent has constantly denied that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, on the basis of that Convention [Genocide] or on any other basis". The Court went on to hold that, in this context, the presence before it of the respondent State (Yugoslavia) and the measures requested by it could not be seen, even prima facie, as an "unequivocal indication" of that State's wish to accept in a "voluntary and indisputable way" the Court's jurisdiction (*I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 325, para. 34).

In the absence of consent by France under Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the Application by Yugoslavia cannot be entered on that basis in the General List of the Court and no action may be taken in the proceedings.

Accordingly, the applicant State, which cannot be unaware of these considerations, has resorted to the ploy of invoking an additional basis of jurisdiction for the Court: Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

(b) However, this provision is not a valid basis of jurisdiction either, and this is absolutely manifest. Moreover, if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had really thought that Article IX of the Convention of 1948 provided a legal basis for the claims which it seeks to bring before the Court, it would not also have invoked Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court.

With your permission, Mr. President, in a moment Professor Alain Pellet will show you that the Convention of 1948 has no connection with the arguments and submissions contained in the Application.

What we are dealing with here is no more than a device, by which no one should be deceived.

Will the Court allow this device to have any impact, any effect whatever, even in purely procedural terms? I believe and hope not.

It follows from the basic principle of the respect due to a court, and in particular to the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, that no party may derive any benefit, however minimal, from a procedural device.

This is why the French Republic is asking the Court, for reasons of law which I will explain a little later, purely and simply to order that the Application of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against France be removed from the General List.

But before that, with your permission, Mr. President, Professor Alain Pellet will demonstrate to you that the Court has no prima facie jurisdiction to entertain that Application.

Thank you for your attention.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je donne la parole à Monsieur Pellet.

Mr. PELLET: Mr. President, Members of the Court,

1. It is an honour for me to speak before you again on behalf of my country, even though I would have preferred to do so under different circumstances, so manifest is the Court's lack of jurisdiction, and so insulting is the wholly artificial ground on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia claims to base the Court's jurisdiction, namely Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

Mr. Ronny Abraham has just sketched out the position of France. It falls to me to show that the Court does not have the prima facie jurisdiction which is necessary for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute.

2. In accordance with your now well-established jurisprudence, the indication of provisional measures is subject to three conditions:

- irreparable damage must have been caused to the rights - not to the interests, Mr. President, but *to the rights* - of the Parties, in the context of the dispute before the Court;

- indication of the provisional measures requested must be a matter of urgency;

- the Court must have at least prima facie jurisdiction to hear the principal dispute.

I shall not dwell on the first two conditions, since the third is so manifestly absent, making consideration of the other two superfluous and truth to tell impossible; for it is abundantly clear that jurisdiction is the preliminary condition for any consideration of the matter.

3. Mr. President, long ago the Permanent Court of International Justice warned against the idea that an application was enough to create a justiciable dispute, establishing a common-sense rule:

> "It is clear that the Court's jurisdiction cannot depend solely on the wording of the Application; . . . The Court must, in the first place, consider . . . whether the clauses upon which the decision on the Application must be based, are amongst those in regard to which the Court's jurisdiction is established." (*P.C.I.J.*, case concerning *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, Judgment of 25 August 1925, Series A, No. 6, p. 15).

The Court must therefore assure itself that the dispute brought before it indeed falls within the category of disputes corresponding to the basis of jurisdiction invoked. The Court recently repeated this in its Judgment of 12 December 1996 in the *Oil Platforms* case:

> "the Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains that such a dispute exists [in the case concerned the dispute related to the interpretation or application of the 1955 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran], and the other denies it. It must ascertain whether the violations of the Treaty of 1955 pleaded by Iran do or do not fall within the provisions of the Treaty and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one which the Court has jurisdiction *ratione materiae* to entertain, pursuant to" the compromissory clause contained in the Treaty (*I.C.J. Reports 1996*, p. 810, para. 16).

This echoes the positions which the Court has adopted more specifically with regard to provisional measures: on the one hand, the provisional measures requested must coincide with the subject-matter of the dispute as defined in the Application - as the Court recalled in its Order of 2 March 1990, in the case concerning the *Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989* (*I.C.J. Reports 1990*, p. 70, para. 26); on the other hand, the Court has always rejected requests for the indication of provisional measures falling outside the scope of the instrument invoked as the basis of the Court's jurisdiction (see *ibidem* and the Orders of 8 April and 13 September 1993 in the case concerning *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*).

4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia claims to found the Court's jurisdiction on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court - which is one way of recognizing that your distinguished Court has no jurisdiction - and on Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention - which is perhaps another way of recognizing the same thing, so absurd is the implied allegation that France is committing genocide.

The Convention is expressly mentioned twice in the Yugoslav Application, once as the basis of the Court's jurisdiction (page 2); and again among the legal grounds on which the Application is based (page 5). It is cited in the Application alongside various principles, or so-called principles, of customary law and alongside treaties to which in some cases France is not even a party, such as the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions or the 1948 Danube Convention. The Genocide Convention is not once mentioned in the request for the indication of provisional measures.

The most that can be said is that Yugoslavia refers, among the "legal grounds" on which the Application is based, to the fact that the acts imputed to France are such that "the Yugoslav population is deliberately imposed conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction of the group, in whole or in part" (p. 16). The Applicant had previously used the same expression, with regard not to a group, but to *ethnic groups* in the plural (p. 1). The procedure is the same in the Application itself in which, in two places, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia paraphrases but does not quote Article II*(c)* of the Genocide Convention, which extends the definition of this crime to "deliberately inflicting" on a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, with intent to destroy it, "conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" (pp. 3 and 4). The Agent for Yugoslavia did the same this morning.

5. It is understandable, Mr. President, that the applicant State hesitates to use the word "genocide": use of the word would merely emphasize the incongruity of its Application, whose very title, the title which the applicant State chose to give it, shows that it has nothing whatever to do with genocide. Moreover, Members of the Court, you did not mistake the matter when you gave this case the title *Legality of Use of Force*.

This title corresponds to that chosen by the Applicant: "Application of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the Republic of France *for Violation of the Obligation not to Use Force*" - not " . . . for Violation of the Obligation not to Commit Genocide". No: for the alleged violation of the obligation *not to use force*.

This sole objective is confirmed by the submission, also a sole submission, which closes the request for the indication of provisional measures. Its wording leaves no doubt as to its object:

> "The Republic of France shall cease immediately its acts of use of force and shall refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (p. 17).

Moreover, the Application and the request for the indication of provisional measures, taken as a whole, concern exclusively the loss and destruction caused by acts related to the current armed conflict, whereas not once has the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia made the slightest allusion to any "genocidal intention" on the part of the authorities of the French Republic. The same can be said about the oral arguments which we have heard this morning, the only exception being the statement by Mr. Mitic, who restricted himself to an isolated affirmation without making any attempt to back it up by argument.

6. Now, Genocide, as defined by the 1948 Convention, has two elements. One is objective: the destruction of all or part of a national or religious group as such. The other is subjective: an intention to achieve this result, which is in conflict, as you said in your 1951 Opinion, with "the most elementary principles of morality" (I.C.J., Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, p. 23). There is no trace of either of these elements in the present case.

With regard to the first of the two, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia invokes, as I have said, only - but this is already going far too far - Article II*(c)* of the Convention, "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part" and it "substantiates" the allegation by accusing France of causing "enormous environmental damage" and of using depleted uranium (Application, p. 3).

Mr. President, these allegations have no basis in fact:

> - the NATO forces are taking every precaution to cause as little damage as possible to the environment and are making all efforts to ensure that the civilian population suffers no needless harm;
>
> - as to the allegation of the use of depleted uranium, it is completely groundless, as French armed forces have no weapons of this kind. Also the use of any given weapon, especially when the weapon is in no way illegal, has no relationship with the definition of genocide, even when viewed in terms of its objective element.

7. It goes without saying, Mr. President, that the element of intent is also entirely absent, as the Court recently stressed forcefully in a case which itself involved the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:

> "it appears to the Court from the definition of genocide in Article II of the Genocide Convention, (. . .) that its essential characteristic is the intended destruction of 'a national ethnical, racial or religious group'." (Order of 13 September 1993, para. 42, *I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 345).

The use of armed force is not covered as such in the provisions of the 1948 Convention on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia claims to found its Application.

In this connection we can only agree with the interpretation given to Article II*(c)* by the United States when it ratified in 1988:

> "That acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Convention" (in *Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General - Status as at 31 December 1997*, ST/LEG/SER.E/16, p. 88).

It is also revealing that there were no objections or negative reactions to this interpretative declaration from other countries, notably Yugoslavia. It would have been very surprising if there had been: a straight reading of Article II of the 1948 Convention shows clearly that the intention to destroy a human group as such lies at the very heart of the definition of genocide. I would add, in passing, that the concept of deliberate intent is doubly present in Article II*(c)*: the perpetrator of the genocide must have the *intention* to destroy the group *and* he must *deliberately* inflict on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.

8. The Court was particularly clear in this connection in its Order of 13 September 1993 indicating provisional measures in the case concerning *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. It took the view that, of all the rights which Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed were violated by Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro), only the right of the people and of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be protected against acts of genocide and other acts equivalent thereto, perpetrated by the Respondent acting in concert with its agents or surrogates in Bosnia and elsewhere was "such that it [might] prima facie to some extent fall within the rights arising under the Genocide Convention" (*I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 344, para. 39).

On the other hand, the Court considered that none of the other Bosnian requests "fell within the scope of the Genocide Convention" (Order of 8 April 1993, *I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 19, para. 35). In particular, it found that the measures requested by the applicant State in respect of legitimate defence did not come within the scope of "the jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention" (Order of 13 Sept. 1993, *I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 345, para. 41). And the Court rejected requests the object of which was to conserve "the right of the people and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be free at all times from the use or threat of force directed against them" by Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) (*ibid.*, p. 343, para. 38).

9. Now, Members of the Court, this is exactly what the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is asking for in this case, and this is *all* that it is asking for. It is asking you - and I quote once again the actual text of its sole submission, this time in French - purely and simply to indicate that *"la République française doit cesser immédiatement ses actes d'emploi ou de menace de la force contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie"* ("The Republic of France shall cease immediately its acts of use of force and shall refrain from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"). It takes as its basis the very words used at the time by Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose requests you unequivocally refused in 1993, having found that they did not come, even prima facie, within the jurisdiction of the Court under the 1948 Convention.

There is no reason, Mr. President, why you should change your view in 1999. Nor does the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia offer one.

France is therefore firmly convinced that the Court cannot indicate a provisional measure of any kind in the proceedings instituted against it by Yugoslavia, there being no prima facie jurisdiction. But France also believes that we must go further. The Court has no prima facie jurisdiction; but, over and above this, it is already quite clear that Yugoslavia's Application is manifestly incapable of coming within any of the heads of jurisdiction of the Court under the provisions of the Statute. That should lead the Court not only to reject the request of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the indication of provisional measures but also, as of now, to remove the case from its List.

This is what Mr. Ronny Abraham will now show, Mr. President, if you would be so good as to hear him briefly.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you most kindly for your attention.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Pellet. Monsieur Abraham, s'il vous plaît.

Mr. ABRAHAM: Mr. President, I should like to end by recalling briefly what Judges Badawi and Winiarski said in their opinion appended to the Court's Order of 5 July 1951 in the case concerning the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (United Kingdom* v. *Iran)*, which well reflects the current state of your jurisprudence, and which appears to me to be highly pertinent to the case with which we are concerned today:

> "(...) in municipal law, there is always some tribunal which has jurisdiction.
>
> In international law it is the consent of the parties which confers jurisdiction on the Court; the Court has jurisdiction only in so far as that jurisdiction has been accepted by the parties. The power given to the Court by Article 41 is not unconditional; it is given for the purposes of the proceedings and is limited to those proceedings. If there is no jurisdiction as to the merits, there can be no jurisdiction to indicate interim measures of protection."

The two Judges went on to explain that:

> "if there exist weighty arguments in favour of the challenged jurisdiction, the Court may indicate interim measures of protection; if there exist serious doubts or weighty arguments against this jurisdiction, such measures cannot be indicated" (*I.C.J. Reports 1951*, p. 97).

Furthermore, as Sir Hersch Lauterpacht emphasized in his separate opinion appended to the Court's Order of 24 October 1957 in the *Interhandel* case:

> "it is one thing to say that action of the Court under Article 41 of the Statute does not in any way prejudge the question of its competence on the merits and that the Court need not at that stage satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits or even that its jurisdiction is probable; it is another thing to affirm that the Court can act under Article 41 without any regard to the prospects of its jurisdiction on the merits and that the latter question does not arise at all in connection with a

request for interim measures of protection" (*I.C.J. Reports 1957*, p. 118).

Mr. President, I must stress that, in order to indicate provisional measures, the Court cannot ignore the issue of its jurisdiction on the merits. France is entitled to expect that the Court will take no action under Article 41, since its lack of jurisdiction on the merits is manifest. Moreover - and I again cite Sir Hersch Lauterpacht - States must not be discouraged from accepting judicial obligations

> "as the result of any justifiable apprehension that by accepting them they may become exposed to the embarrassment, vexation and loss, possibly following upon interim measures, in cases in which there is no reasonable possibility *prima facie* ascertained by the Court, of jurisdiction on the merits" (*ibid.*).

However, we should take this reasoning still further, and follow the situation presented to you today to its logical conclusion.

Not only are there in this case, to repeat the phrase used by Judges Badawi and Winiarski, "serious doubts or weighty arguments against the jurisdiction" of the Court, which would suffice to justify rejection of the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by the Applicant, but we are entitled to assert here and now that there is no reasonable doubt as to the Court's lack of jurisdiction; or, if you prefer it, the Court's lack of jurisdiction is manifest.

The basis of jurisdiction invoked by our opponents is more than just erroneous: it is non-existent, for it is purely artificial.

It seems to me that in these circumstances we should reason as if the applicant State had founded its case solely on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, and disregard, ignore or deem null and void its reliance, made in bad faith, on Article IX of the 1948 Convention.

What would have been the situation if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had relied - as it would have done had it been acting in good faith - solely on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court? Under that provision, the Application would not have been entered in the General List, and no action would have been taken in the proceedings, until such time as the Respondent had given its consent - which it does not do - to the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the case. And indeed this is exactly what happened when previously, in 1994, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lodged an application against France for the same purposes as these present proceedings.

This time, since the applicant State had indicated a different basis of jurisdiction in its Application, the Registry of the Court doubtless had no option but to enter the case in the List, and the Court felt itself obliged to decide to hold the present hearings on the request for provisional measures. However, once it has been shown that this basis of jurisdiction manifestly does not exist, we necessarily revert to the legal position which would have obtained if the Application had relied only on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules. We are then bound to draw the logical consequence: the Application must be removed from the List and the proceedings must go no further. This is exactly the reasoning adopted by the Court in the case concerning the *Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the* Nuclear Tests *Case* between New Zealand and France, which resulted in the Order of 22 September 1995. Since New Zealand's Request relied on a basis of jurisdiction other than Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules (the provision relied on in that case was in fact drawn from a previous decision of the Court and not from a treaty text, but that makes no difference here), the Request had been - and I quote the Order - "entered in the General List of the Court for the sole purpose of allowing the Court to determine whether the conditions laid down in that text have been fulfilled in the present case"; then, once the Court had found that such was not the case, it instructed the Registrar - and again I quote - "to remove that Request from the General List as of 22 September 1995, i.e. the date of the Order (*I.C.J. Reports 1995*, para. 66).

Similarly, in the cases which I had occasion to cite earlier (*Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America (United States of America* v. *Hungary)*, and the cases concerning the *Aerial Incident [s]* of 1952 and 7 November 1954, or again the *Antarctica* case), the Court, having found that there was no basis of jurisdiction capable of enabling it to accede to the applicant State's Request, decided to remove the cases in question from its General List.

The same solution must apply in this case.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will say it one last time: a party which employs bad faith and artifice may not derive any gain or benefit therefrom.

To permit the proceedings to continue beyond the order which you will make on conclusion of the present hearings would be to allow a benefit - albeit that it might be symbolic - to a State which seeks flagrantly to abuse the rules defining and limiting the conditions for judicial proceedings.

And what would be the point of thus continuing with the proceedings, if it is already clear at this stage that the Court has no basis of jurisdiction?

Mr. President, Members of the Court, in conclusion, France considers that the Court cannot proceed upon the Application filed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since neither of the two bases of jurisdiction relied upon is pertinent. Neither of them is capable of constituting a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. In France's view, for the reasons which I have just explained to you, this case should be removed from the General List of the Court.

Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, for being kind enough to hear France's observations.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant fonction de président : Je vous remercie, Monsieur Abraham. La séance d'aujourd'hui est close. Les audiences reprendront demain, à 10 heures.

L'audience est levée à 17.55.