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היועץ המשפטי

*The Legal Adviser*

6 Shvat 5764  
29 January 2004

Sir,

In accordance with the Court's Order of 19 December 2003, and Article 66, paragraph 2, of Statute of the Court, I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed Written Statement of the Government of the State of Israel.

The statement sets out detailed objections to the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter and the propriety of the Court responding to the request. As an element relevant to the Court's discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute, the statement also details the on-going terrorist threat faced by Israel from Palestinian terrorism directed at Israeli civilians.

As final arrangements are being made to transmit this document to you – and as these words are being written – news has just broken of yet another terrorist atrocity on a public bus in Jerusalem only a few kilometers from this office. In these first few minutes, the news is that ten people have been killed and a further 45 injured. It seems likely that the numbers of dead and injured will increase in the next hours as the news becomes clearer. The television images of the scene are deeply distressing.

Israel has been the target of these kinds of murderous attacks from Palestinian elements, unhindered by those exercising executive responsibility, for the past 40 months of violence and beyond. Israeli civilians are literally being slaughtered – on buses as they go about their daily lives, in their homes, in restaurants and elsewhere – by those who operate from under the protective umbrella of “Palestine”. Nothing is being done by those in positions of responsibility in “Palestine” to bring these attacks to an end. On the contrary, there is compelling evidence of official Palestinian engagement with those who perpetrate these attacks.

Mr. Philippe Couvreur  
Registrar  
International Court of Justice  
Peace Palace  
The Hague, The Netherlands

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
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It is inconceivable to the Government of Israel that a court of law, seized of a request for an opinion on Israel's actions in constructing the fence – a non-violent measure designed to prevent precisely the kind of attack that we are at this very moment witnessing – could think it proper to enter into the question in isolation from consideration of the carnage that is being visited on Israeli civilians by its principal interlocutor before the Court in these proceedings. Yet the resolution of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly requesting the advisory opinion is absolutely silent on the matter. It is a travesty, and reflects the gravest prejudice and imbalance within the requesting organ. Israel trusts and expects that the Court will look beyond the request to the wider issues relevant to this matter. There are compelling reasons why the Court should refuse to become engaged in this matter.

I would be grateful if you would bring this letter expressly to the attention of the Members of the Court and treat it as an integral part of Israel's statement for purposes of transmission to other interested parties.

Please be assured, Sir, of my highest considerations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Alan Baker', written in a cursive style.

Alan Baker

Ambassador

Deputy Director General and Legal Adviser

## **International Court of Justice**

Request for an Advisory Opinion from the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session  
of the United Nations General Assembly on “the legal consequences arising  
from the construction of the wall being built by Israel”

*Written Statement of the Government of Israel*

*on Jurisdiction and Propriety*

30 January 2004

## OPENING STATEMENT

**0.1** The reality of Israel today is that of an ongoing terrorist threat of the gravest proportions. Israel faces 40 to 50 significant security alerts every week, each one threatening an attack such as that carried out at the Park Hotel in the coastal town of Netanya on 27 March 2002 in which 30 people were killed, most in their 70s and 80s, and 145 others injured, by a suicide bomber from Tulkarem. In that same month, March 2002, by suicide bomb and other attacks, 135 people were killed and over 721 injured in 37 separate incidents. Over the past 12 months, as a result of more stringent security, the number of casualties have begun to decline. Yet terrorist attacks have still killed 218 people in this period and injured around 850 others. In one of the most horrific of these attacks, at Maxim's restaurant in Haifa on 4 October 2003, two families lost 5 members each, across three generations, to the suicide bomber.

**0.2** On 8 December 2003, the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the International Court Justice on the legal consequences arising from the construction by Israel of a "wall" in "Occupied Palestinian Territory". The resolution requesting the advisory opinion is silent on the reasons why such a barrier is necessary. Twenty paragraphs of text preceding the request for an opinion say nothing – not a single word – about Palestinian terrorism directed against Israeli civilians and the ongoing reality of such attacks which have left 916 people dead and over 5,000 injured, many critically, in the past 40 months of violence. The extensive dossier of 88 documents provided to the Court by the United Nations Secretariat to assist the Court in its work is likewise silent on the subject. The dossier purports to provide all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. Yet noticeable by its absence is any reference to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) in which the Council reaffirmed that acts of terrorism, like those which have become the Palestinian *modus operandi* against Israeli civilians, constitute a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 1373 (2001), as do other resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly which are omitted from the dossier, also reaffirms the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts.

**0.3** Israel is called to the bar of the Court by a resolution which was crafted and nurtured by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation ("PLO"). The PLO, as "Palestine", has been invited to participate in the proceedings of the Court and assail Israel on questions of law which challenge



Israel's right to defend its citizens from attack. Yet it is the PLO, through Fatah, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and its wider authority in the West Bank and Gaza, that is behind many of the most murderous attacks directed at Israeli civilians. In the most recent of these, on 14 January 2004, a young woman from Gaza, pleading illness and a prosthetic limb, managed to evade Israeli security to detonate her bomb to cause maximum casualties. Four Israelis were killed in that blast. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, closely associated with Yasser Arafat's Fatah party, was involved in the attack.

**0.4** These acts of terrorism violate all established rules of customary and conventional international law. Yet responsibility for and the legal consequences of these attacks are not part of the request for an opinion from the Court. Those most responsible for the attacks are effectively given free rein in the proceedings. There is a travesty of imbalance in the exercise in which the Court is now engaged.

**0.5** Israel's written statement addresses the jurisdiction of the Court and the propriety of any response by it on the substance of the request. It does not address the legality of the fence, legal consequences that flow from it or other matters pertaining to the question of substance presented to the Court. Israel considers that the Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the request and that, even were it to have jurisdiction, it should not respond to the requested opinion.

**0.6** The request for an opinion is *ultra vires* the competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly by reference to the very rules by which the session was convened. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Emergency Special Session is only competent to act in circumstances in which the Security Council has failed to do so on the matter in question. Yet the Security Council did act, adopting, by unanimous vote, resolution 1515 (2003) endorsing the Quartet co-sponsored Roadmap just 19 days before the request for an advisory opinion was made. Moreover, any opinion from the Court on the substance of the request will without doubt upset the balance of the Roadmap and make any meaningful resumption of negotiations more difficult to achieve.

**0.7** The Court has a discretion whether to give the requested opinion. In the past, it has emphasised that it would refrain from giving an opinion when to do so would be incompatible with its judicial functions. This is just such a case. "Palestine" does not come to the Court with clean hands. The process is tainted. It is an abuse of the advisory opinion procedure. The

question is unbalanced. The Security Council has acted to different effect. And any response on the substance of the request would undoubtedly cut across the Roadmap initiative. In Israel's submission, the Court should decline to give a response on the requested opinion.

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**PART ONE**

**PRELIMINARY MATTERS**





## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 On 8 December 2003, the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 by which it requested the International Court of Justice “to urgently render an advisory opinion”. The question referred to the Court was as follows:

“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?”

1.2 This written statement of the Government of Israel (“Israel”) addresses only questions of jurisdiction and propriety affecting the Court’s treatment of the advisory opinion request. Israel does not deal, and does not intend to deal, with the substantive question put to the Court which, in Israel’s submission, the Court does not have jurisdiction to examine. Moreover, and in any event, the Court should exercise its undoubted discretion to decline to give an advisory opinion on a matter that takes it deeply into the political arena.

1.3 In the following Chapters, Israel develops a number of objections of law going to jurisdiction and propriety. A more detailed scheme of this statement is given below. A number of common threads run through these objections. First, the advisory opinion request is at odds with the approach adopted by the United Nations Security Council for addressing the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United Nations is a co-sponsor, as a member of the Quartet with the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, of the “Roadmap” (the short title of the proposal entitled *A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*). The Roadmap was expressly endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, less than three weeks before the adoption by the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the advisory opinion request. The Roadmap has been accepted by both sides. It represents a concerted effort by the international community, endorsed by the Security Council, to get back to meaningful negotiations. The objective of the Roadmap is a two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first step in that direction – by the express terms of the Roadmap – is an end to violence and terrorism.

1.4 It is difficult, indeed impossible, to see how any response by the Court on the substance of the request can fail to cut across the scheme of the Roadmap. Elements pertinent to this appreciation are addressed throughout this statement, most directly in Chapters 3, 4 and 9. The Roadmap sets out an agreed sequence of conduct and negotiations. The acknowledged first step is that Palestinian terrorism and incitement against Israel must end. Israel affirms its commitment to the two-State vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian State living in peace and security alongside Israel. It has been agreed that negotiations on borders, settlements, the status of Jerusalem and other “permanent status” issues will follow in Phase III of the Roadmap once the basic building blocks of peace are in place. The reference by the Court to such matters – even incidentally – would be problematic and unhelpful.

1.5 The Roadmap was the product of careful discussion between the co-sponsors and the two sides. It represents the best efforts of the international community to restart a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. An opinion of the Court on the substance of the question now before it would exacerbate rather than ease relations between the two sides.

1.6 Second, Israel considers that, as a matter of law, the advisory opinion request is *ultra vires* the competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The Emergency Special Session was convened in April 1997 on the basis of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Under this Resolution, the General Assembly is competent to act where “the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. There is, however, no failure by the Security Council to act. On the contrary. The Council has acted; just nineteen days before the adoption of the advisory opinion request. The actions of the Security Council may not sit comfortably with the objectives of the co-sponsors of the advisory opinion request. But the Council has not failed to exercise its responsibility in this case. It is not for the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to set down a path which would without question cut across the Security Council initiative.

1.7 Third, there is a wider factual context of considerable importance which informs Israel’s objections. The advisory opinion request ignores half of the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is striking that, in the twenty preambular paragraphs of the resolution that precede the advisory opinion request, no reference is made to the on-going Palestinian terrorism that is

directed against Israel and its citizens. These attacks, through suicide bombings and other indiscriminate attacks against Israeli civilians, have left 916 Israelis dead in the past 40 months of violence and many others injured and scarred. The Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organisation (“PLO”) have done nothing to assert control over the groups perpetrating these attacks. Indeed, some of these groups act pursuant to the direction and control of the Palestinian political establishment. These acts, by reference to established principles of attribution and responsibility, engage the responsibility of “Palestine”, the principal motivator and co-sponsor of the request to the Court. By reason of this, the advisory opinion request is a travesty, challenging Israel’s right to defend itself against on-going attacks but saying not a word about the perpetrators of the terrorist violence.

**1.8** Israel has said time and again that the fence is intended solely as a temporary, non-violent, defensive measure to guard against suicide and other attacks against Israel and Israelis. The fence does not, and is not intended, to prejudice the outcome of political negotiations on borders, Jerusalem, settlements or any other issue. Israel expects, in due course, when the terrorist threat has ceased, that the fence will be moved to reflect any agreement between the two sides. Israel is fully committed to doing so. It has moved such fences before – on its borders with Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon in the context of peace agreements or other arrangements.

**1.9** These and other issues are developed in detail in this statement. To the extent that issues of a factual nature are addressed, they are directed solely at questions of jurisdiction and propriety. This statement does not address issues of detail relevant to the fence – routing, military necessity, fabric of life concerns and other elements. These are not matters which are properly before the Court or on which the Court should give an opinion.

**1.10** This statement proceeds as follows. **Chapter 2** addresses issues of fairness and natural justice in relation to the advisory opinion request and the Court’s Order of 19 December 2003. **Chapter 3** then sets out some essential contextual material relevant to the Court’s consideration of Israel’s submissions on jurisdiction and propriety. This includes in particular material on the search for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the scheme of the Roadmap, and the nature and extent of the terrorist threat against Israel and Israelis from Palestinian suicide bomb and other attacks. Israel submits that the fact that these are attacks for which “Palestine” bears responsibility is a matter that the Court should take fully into account in any exercise of discretion by the Court in accordance with Article 65(1) of the Statute.

**1.11** Chapters 4 to 9 then develop Israel's objections on jurisdiction and the propriety of any response on the substance of the request under the following headings:

- the request is *ultra vires* the competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session and/or the General Assembly (**Chapter 4**);
- the request does not raise a legal question within the scope of Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute – it is uncertain and incapable of response within its terms (**Chapter 5**);
- the considerations relevant to the question of propriety and the exercise by the Court of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute exclude the examination of the request (**Chapter 6**);
- the request concerns a contentious matter in respect of which Israel has not given consent to the jurisdiction of the Court (**Chapter 7**);
- a response to the question would require the Court to speculate about essential facts and make assumptions about arguments of law which it cannot properly make in the context of advisory proceedings (**Chapter 8**); and
- other compelling reasons why the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should decline to examine the question (**Chapter 9**).

**1.12** These Chapters are followed by a short summary of argument and statement of conclusions (**Chapter 10**), and a list of annexes.

**1.13** Before turning to these issues, it is appropriate in an introductory statement of this kind to sketch a broad picture for the attention of the Court. Israel, more than any other country in the world, faces today a distinct, declared and ongoing threat of terrorism aimed at all levels of its society. It is an existential threat by the declared intention of its authors. It goes to the heart of Israeli society. Israelis live daily with fabric of life constraints ranging from personal searches in public places to the daily expectation of the next suicide attack at the local community hall or

university cafeteria or teenagers' discotheque that will take from them their children or parents or grandparents.

**1.14** Looking at Israeli society today as a passing visitor, one has a sense of solidity and normality and self-confidence. This, however, belies a more fundamental reality. It is the reality of the thoughts of a parent who, when unable to reach the teenager out with her friends, thinks immediately of the Tel Aviv Dolphinarium in June 2001 when 21 were killed, mostly 15 and 16 year olds, and 120 injured, at the hands of a suicide bomber at work late on a Friday night. It is a reality in which the elderly, gathering to celebrate the festival of Passover, think of their friends in Netanya in March 2002 when 30 were killed, most in their 70s and 80s, by a suicide bomber in the Park Hotel. It is the reality that, when one stops for a snack at a restaurant in Haifa, one is vulnerable to an attack like that which, in March 2002, killed 15 in the Matza restaurant in Haifa. It is the reality, too, of wondering, every time one steps onto a bus, whether one will see one's family again in the evening, something denied the 17 killed on the bus from Tel Aviv to Tiberius at the hands of a suicide bomber in June 2002, as well as to countless others on similar journeys. The roll call is long. It reaches into the very heart of Israeli society. No one is unaffected by it. It unites the political spectrum.

**1.15** The dates of these attacks in Netanya and Haifa have a particular significance. In March 2002, largely as a result of indiscriminate suicide bomb attacks directed at Israeli civilians, 135 Israelis were killed and 721 injured, many critically. As a ratio per head of population, that would correspond to terrorist attacks killing in a single month over 25,000 people in China or around 5,700 people in the United States or around 2,900 people in Russia or around 1,200 people in France or the United Kingdom.

**1.16** In direct response to this murderous onslaught, the Government of Israel, in April 2002, approved the plans for the construction of the fence as a non-violent and temporary measure of last resort. At the time of writing this statement, Israel is faced with 40 to 50 security alerts each week, many of these threatening another Dolphinarium or Park Hotel or Haifa restaurant or Tel Aviv bus. The fence, for all its controversy and difficulties, is aiding this fight against terrorism. No one, on any side of the political divide in Israel, whatever their views on the fence, thinks otherwise.

**1.17** Fabric of life concerns exercise Israel greatly. Questions of necessity and routing are constantly addressed by Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice (“High Court”), has been seised of a series of petitions concerning various aspects of the fence. Israel, being a society based on the rule of law, abides scrupulously by the decisions of its courts.

**1.18** There is also a broader dimension to the request now before the Court which is germane to questions of jurisdiction and propriety. Following the request, if the Court responds on the merits, where does it stop? Armed with an advisory opinion on this request, will “Palestine” and others proceed to reconvene the ongoing 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session for purposes of requesting yet further opinions? Is the Middle East dispute to come for resolution piecemeal to the Court by way of expedited requests for advisory opinions at six monthly intervals? And what about other conflicts – the security fence currently under construction by India along the Line of Control in Kashmir, or Russia’s involvement in Georgia or Chechnya, or China’s in Tibet? There are significant risks down the path which the present request urges upon the Court.

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## CHAPTER 2

### ISSUES OF FAIRNESS AND NATURAL JUSTICE

2.1 The present Chapter sets out a number of aspects of the treatment that the Court has already given the request which raise serious questions about the fairness of the Court's approach and its compliance with the requirements of natural justice. It also addresses questions concerning the Secretary-General's Report attached to the request and the Secretariat's Dossier submitted to the Court in this case.

2.2 Resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 was communicated to the President of the Court by the Secretary-General by letter on the day of its adoption, ie, 8 December 2003. On 11 December 2003, Israel, through its Ambassador in The Hague, wrote to the Registrar of the Court. A copy of that letter is annexed to this statement.<sup>1</sup> The letter reserved Israel's position in respect of the proceedings but raised a number of issues for early consideration by the Court. It noted Israel's position that the Court should not entertain the advisory opinion request for reasons of jurisdiction and admissibility. It also noted that sufficient time would have to be allowed for the preparation and exchange of written statements, and comments thereon by others. Given the seriousness of the issues raised by the request, Israel observed that the written phase of the proceedings could not be "adequately, or fairly, achieved in the space of weeks but would have to allow at least a number of months".

2.3 In the circumstances, mindful of the potentially prejudicial effect of impending proceedings on attempts to restart the process of political negotiation, Israel proposed that the Court should bifurcate the proceedings to allow an early response to the question of whether the advisory opinion request should be entertained by the Court. Israel also drew attention to Article 17(2) of the Statute and Article 34 of the Rules of Court which address circumstances in which Members of the Court who have had some connection with a matter under consideration should recuse themselves from the proceedings.

2.4 Israel's request was disregarded. On 19 December 2003, the Court issued an Order in respect of these proceedings. Four aspects of the Order may be noted. First, the Court named the

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<sup>1</sup> Letter from H.E. Eitan Margalit, Ambassador of Israel, The Hague, to H.E. Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 11 December 2003. (**Annex 1**)



case *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. In doing so, it adopted the language of the question, although with some variation. Second, the Court fixed an exceptionally short time period of six weeks for the filing of written statements and fixed 23 February 2004 as the date for the opening of the hearing. Third, the Court, “taking into account the fact that the General Assembly has granted Palestine a special status of observer and that the latter is co-sponsor of the draft resolution requesting the advisory opinion”, permitted “Palestine” to submit a written statement in the proceedings and to participate in the hearing. Fourth, the decision of the Court was taken by the full Court after the deliberation of all of its Members.

2.5 In response to the Court’s Order, Israel sent a letter to the Registrar of the Court on 31 December 2003. A copy of the letter is annexed to this statement.<sup>2</sup> In that letter, and specifically in the light of the Court’s Order, Israel again reserved its position. The object of the letter was to place on record Israel’s disquiet with the four elements of the Order noted in the preceding paragraph. These concerns are as follows.

#### **A. The Title Given to the Case**

2.6 The question asks the Court to address the legal consequences arising from the construction of the “wall” by Israel. In his report prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/13 to which the requesting resolution makes reference, the Secretary-General refers to Israel’s decision to “build a system of fences, walls, ditches and barriers in the West Bank (‘the Barrier’)”. A footnote to this sentence notes that “Palestinians often call this system the Separation Wall and Israelis use the term Security Fence. For the purposes of the present report, the more general term ‘the Barrier’ is used.”<sup>3</sup>

2.7 The use of the term “wall” in the resolution requesting an opinion is neither happenstance nor oversight. It reflects a calculated media campaign to raise pejorative connotations in the mind of the Court of great concrete constructions of separation such as the Berlin Wall, intended to stop people escaping from tyranny. The reality, however, is different. Along a 180 kilometre route of the fence so far constructed, 8.8 kilometres, or less than 5 percent,

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<sup>2</sup> Letter from H.E. Eitan Margalit, Ambassador of Israel, The Hague, to H.E. Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 31 December 2003. (**Annex 2**)

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/13, A/ES-10/248, 24 November 2003, at paragraph 2. (**Dossier No.52**)

is made up of a concrete barrier, generally in areas where Palestinian population centres abut onto Israel.<sup>4</sup> This barrier, mostly comprising a system of wire fences, with access and crossing points, has as its intention achieving security for Israel while trying as best as possible to facilitate access. Neither objective is assured, as recent suicide attacks in Israel have sadly attested.

**2.8** Given the intentionally pejorative use of the term “wall”, and the ready availability of the neutral term “barrier” used in the Secretary-General’s report, Israel in its letter of 31 December 2003 objected to the Court’s adoption of the term “wall” in the formulation of the name of the case. In this statement, Israel will use the term “fence” to describe the barrier in general terms and the terms “fence” or “wall” as appropriate to the context to describe particular elements of the barrier.

**2.9** An additional element of terminology raises similar concerns. The question put to the Court refers to the “Occupied Palestinian Territory”. The underlying assumption appears to be that the so-called “Green Line” or Armistice Demarcation Line (“ADL”) is the presumptive and immutable border of a putative Palestinian State. This, however, is to prejudge the outcome of a settlement between the parties in a manner that has never before been accepted – by the UN, by the parties themselves, or by the sponsors of the Roadmap.<sup>5</sup> The sponsors of the request seek the imprimatur of the Court merely by having the Court accept the validity of the question itself. It is not the formula of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It is not the formula of the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed by Israel and the PLO, which defers discussions on borders to the permanent status negotiations.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps most important of all for present purposes, it is not the formula of the Roadmap, co-sponsored by the United Nations,<sup>7</sup> and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1515 (2003),<sup>8</sup> which likewise envisages negotiations on borders as part of Phase III of the plan. For the Court now to adopt, by design or default, language of the kind used in the advisory request, is inconsistent with carefully crafted formulations aimed at facilitating the search for peace over more than 3 ½ decades of conflict. It would also be to elevate a highly contentious and politicised resolution of a General Assembly Emergency Special Session over a UN co-sponsored, Security Council endorsed, plan

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<sup>4</sup> See the Report of the Secretary-General, at paragraph 11. **(Dossier No.52)**

<sup>5</sup> This is addressed further in Chapter 3 below.

<sup>6</sup> Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993, at Article V.3. **(Dossier No.65)**

<sup>7</sup> A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, S/2003/529, 7 May 2003. **(Dossier No.70)**

<sup>8</sup> S/RES/1515 of 19 November 2003, at operative paragraph 1. **(Dossier No.36)**

for the resolution of a dispute that continues to engage the Security Council in the exercise of its primary responsibility under Article 24 of the Charter.

### **B. The Fixing of Time-Limits**

**2.10** The Court has fixed time-limits that are so short as significantly to affect the ability of Israel to put its case. Time-limits of comparable brevity to those in this case are the exception rather than the rule, even in priority advisory opinion requests. For example, in the advisory proceedings in *Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights*, the Court fixed an 8 ½ week period for the filing of first round written statement and a further 30 days after that for second round written comments on the written statements.<sup>9</sup> The subsequent procedure was reserved for further decision, once the extent of the written statements was known.

**2.11** In other priority cases, such as the *Namibia* advisory proceedings, time-limits were significantly longer than those fixed in this case.<sup>10</sup> Yet, if the Court proceeds with the present case, it will be entering into matters that are considerably more complex than most, if not all, advisory proceedings to come before the Court. The underlying issues go to Israel's essential security and defence interests. Moreover, in the letter sent to the Court before the Court's procedural deliberations, Israel explicitly noted that, given the seriousness of the issues raised by the question, sufficient time would have to be allowed for the preparation of initial written statements.

**2.12** The peremptory constraints of time under which the Court has required written statements to be prepared gives rise to very serious concerns about the fairness of the procedures in this matter. Even if Israel had considered it appropriate to address the issues of substance, the procedure adopted by the Court would not have allowed it properly to do so. The same point may also be made as regards:

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<sup>9</sup> *Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights*, Order of 10 August 1998, *I.C.J. Reports 1998*, p.423.

<sup>10</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, Orders of 5 and 28 August 1970, *I.C.J. Reports, 1970*, pp.359 and 362.

- (a) the exclusion of a written reply phase and the fixing of a date for the opening of the hearing without regard to the number or volume of written statements to be submitted by others;
- (b) the facility left open to Member States, “Palestine” and international organisations to present oral statements and comments at the hearing regardless of whether or not they have submitted written statements. This procedure would leave Israel no or only limited opportunity to address such oral statements and comments with no prior notice at all.

**2.13** The Court in this case has been asked, at the insistence of many in the General Assembly who would deny Israel’s very right to exist, for an opinion on Israeli policies that go directly to Israel’s most fundamental security needs. For the Court to set a timetable for the proceedings to unfold with such expedition raises serious questions as to the fairness of the process.

### **C. The Participation of “Palestine” in the Proceedings**

**2.14** The presence of “Palestine” before the Court signals clearly the contentious nature of the proceedings. Israel is nevertheless constrained to observe that the Court’s decision inviting “Palestine” to participate has no basis in the Charter, the Statute or the Rules of Court. On the contrary, Article 35(1) of the Statute provides that the Court shall be open to “states parties to the present Statute”. The remainder of the Article addresses the conditions under which the Court shall be open to other States – conditions which do not operate in the present circumstances. Article 66 of the Statute, addressing advisory proceedings directly, refers to “States entitled to appear before the Court” and international organisations.

**2.15** Whatever may be the status of “Palestine”, it is neither a State entitled to appear before the Court, nor an international organisation. Furthermore, it is quite clear from the General Assembly resolutions, which, in the language of the Court’s Order, have “granted Palestine a special status as observer”, that they can in no way form the foundation for the direct participation of “Palestine” in the proceedings. Quite to the contrary:

- (a) By resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, the General Assembly invited “the Palestine Liberation Organisation to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer”.<sup>11</sup>
- (b) Resolution 43/160 A of 9 December 1988 addressed certain administrative details regarding PLO participation as observer in the work of the General Assembly.<sup>12</sup>
- (c) By resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988, the General Assembly decided that “the designation ‘Palestine’ should be used in place of the designation ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ in the United Nations system, without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system, in conformity with relevant United Nations resolutions and practice”.<sup>13</sup>
- (d) Finally, by resolution 52/250 of 7 July 1998, the General Assembly decided “to confer upon Palestine, in its capacity as observer, and as contained in the Annex to the present resolution, additional rights and privileges”.<sup>14</sup> An examination of the Annex to the resolution, however, discloses no extension of rights and privileges to Palestine as regards the International Court of Justice, which in any event would not be within the competence of the General Assembly to confer.

**2.16** Israel does not seek to deny to the Palestinian people a voice of their own. It is concerned, however, that in a matter as delicate as the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, the Court, *en passant* and without discussion in a procedural Order, considered it appropriate to take a decision that accords “Palestine” a status that has been highly contentious amongst UN Members for many years. The Court’s Order on this aspect reinforces Israel’s wider concerns about the fairness of the process in which the Court is engaged, and the Order itself is already being viewed as an additional substantive factor in the political debate about Palestinian statehood.

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<sup>11</sup> A/RES/3237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974, at operative paragraph 1 (emphasis added). (Annex 3)

<sup>12</sup> A/RES/43/160 A, 9 December 1988. (Annex 4)

<sup>13</sup> A/RES/43/177, 15 December 1988, at operative paragraph 3. (Annex 5)

<sup>14</sup> A/RES/52/250, 7 July 1998, at operative paragraph 1. (Annex 6)

#### **D. The Application of Article 17(2) of the Statute**

**2.17** In its letter of 11 December 2003, Israel drew attention to Article 17(2) of the Court's Statute and Article 34 of the Rules of Court concerning the participation in the decisions of the Court in this case by Members of the Court who have a prior involvement in the underlying dispute. The Court's Order of 19 December 2003 was nonetheless made by decision of the full Court after deliberation of all of its Members.

**2.18** Israel, with reluctance, has felt obliged to pursue the matter further as regards the participation in the proceedings of one Member of the Court whose previous involvement manifestly raises questions of the application of Article 17(2) of the Statute. By its letter of 31 December 2003, Israel observed that it was inappropriate for a Member of the Court to participate in the decisions of the Court in this case in circumstances in which he had previously played a leading role in the very Emergency Special Session from which the advisory opinion request has emerged, and had also acted in an official capacity as an advocate for a cause that was in contention in the proceedings. Israel went on thereafter to write to the President of the Court confidentially on this matter, pursuant to Article 34(2) of the Rules, challenging Judge Elaraby's participation in the proceedings.

**2.19** There is little reasoned jurisprudence of the Court on the application of Article 17 of the Statute and Article 34 of the Rules. In the past, in cases like *Namibia*, the Court showed a reluctance to acknowledge that the previous involvement of a Member of the Court in a political role on the matter that was subsequently referred to the Court was a reason requiring that Member to step down. More recently, however, in a number of cases, Members of the Court have *proprio motu*, pursuant to Article 24(1) of the Statute, chosen to step down where there has been some previous involvement with the matters in contention.

**2.20** Absent authoritative guidance on this matter from the Court, Israel submits that the appropriate test is to be found in the practice and jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals, including municipal courts, faced with similar issues. A review of this practice and jurisprudence shows a remarkable consistency of approach.

**2.21** For example, after examining both international and national decisions on the matter, the general principles of law in this area were addressed by the Appeals Chamber of the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case of *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija* in the following terms:

“189. ... the Appeals Chamber finds that there is a general rule that a Judge should not only be subjectively free from bias, but also that there should be nothing in the surrounding circumstances which objectively gives rise to an appearance of bias. On this basis, the Appeals Chamber considers that the following principles should direct it in interpreting and applying the impartiality requirement of the Statute:

A. A Judge is not impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists.

B. There is an unacceptable appearance of bias if:

i) a Judge is a party to the case, or has a financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of a case, or if the Judge’s decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in which he or she is involved, together with one of the parties. Under these circumstances, a Judge’s disqualification from the case is automatic; or

ii) the circumstances would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to a reasonably apprehended bias.”<sup>15</sup>

2.22 This principle is echoed in a wide range of other municipal and international cases.<sup>16</sup>

2.23 Judge Elaraby, in both his previous professional capacity and in his private statements, has been actively engaged in opposition to Israel on matters which go directly to aspects of the question now before the Court. Israel contends that Judge Elaraby’s involvement in the case raises an unacceptable appearance of bias and, with respect, that the Judge should therefore not take part in any aspect of the present proceedings.

#### **E. The Secretary-General’s Report and the Secretariat’s Dossier**

2.24 Israel is also compelled to note its concerns with both the Secretary-General’s Report attached to the advisory opinion request transmitted to the Court and the Secretariat’s Dossier prepared pursuant to Article 65(2) of the Statute. As regards the Secretary-General’s Report,

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<sup>15</sup> *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija*, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of 21 July 2000, at paragraph 189. See also paragraphs 164 – 215.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, *In re Pinochet* (House of Lords), Judgment of 15 January 1999, [2000] 1 AC 119; *In re Murchison et al.* (US SC), 349 U.S. 133 (1955); *Liteky v. United States* (US SC), 510 U.S. 540 (1994); *Miglin v. Miglin* (SC of Canada), 2003 SCC 24; *Webb v. R* (High Court of Australia), 122 A.L.R. 41 (1994). The growing body of international jurisprudence in this area is surveyed in Brown, C., “The Evolution and Application of Rules Concerning Independence of the ‘International Judiciary’”, in *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals*, 2 (2003) 63 – 96.

Israel notes that Annex I of this Report, described as “Summary legal position of the Government of Israel”, is both materially inaccurate and failed to take account of information expressly provided to the Secretary-General’s envoy in the region. It does not reflect Israel’s position. Moreover, the language of the Annex, by comparison to Annex II representing the Palestinian position, raises questions of balance which are prejudicial to Israel’s position.

**2.25** In the main body of the Report, Israel considers that the passing acknowledgement, immediately qualified, of Israel’s right to protect its citizens,<sup>17</sup> fails to accord sufficient weight to the now accepted appreciation that stands at the core of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and other related resolutions in the response against terrorism. That resolution reaffirmed that terrorist attacks of the kind faced by Israel “constitute a threat to international peace and security”. It reaffirmed “the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence” in such circumstances. It reaffirmed “the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”. The Report is entirely one-sided in its treatment of these issues.

**2.26** The Report is also fundamentally misleading on the question of the Roadmap. It condemns Israel’s position but fails to reflect the Roadmap’s principal requirement, that “the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence”. These are its opening words. The Report’s “Observations” are simply not credible in the face of such glaring omissions.

**2.27** As to the Secretariat’s Dossier, Israel addressed a letter to the Secretary-General dated 26 January 2004 on the subject. It is set out here in full in its operative parts:

“Israel must register its dismay and concern at the dossier submitted by the Secretariat to the International Court of Justice, in the request for an advisory opinion on Israel’s security fence. The dossier is rife with what we hope are oversights, and cannot, in any way, be said to present a balanced picture of the relevant United Nations documents salient in this case.

The context in which the security fence was constructed – Israel’s exercise of its legitimate right of self-defence in accordance with principles of international law and the UN Charter – has been entirely overlooked. Indeed, those resolutions which speak not only of a right, but rather of an obligation,

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<sup>17</sup> Secretary-General’s Report, at paragraph 30. (Dossier No.52)



to fight terrorism have not been included in the dossier. The most relevant of these are undoubtedly Security Council Resolutions 1269 and 1373.

At the same time, various documents have been included whose relevance is questionable, at the least. For example, the inclusion of General Assembly Resolution 194, as well as the Rome Statue of the ICC, could only be considered 'relevant' in the context of a broad political campaign against Israel. At times, the lack of balance in the dossier borders on the absurd. I am at a loss to understand the justification for the inclusion of reports written by the Special Rapporteur of the CHR to the territories, while no mention is made of detailed responses by Israel, themselves circulated as documents of the United Nations.

I must protest these shortcomings in the strongest of terms. Both the inclusion of irrelevant materials, as well as the exclusion of salient documents, may have effect upon the work of the Court. I would therefore ask that these oversights be urgently corrected."<sup>18</sup>

**2.28** Israel does not consider that the involvement of the Secretariat in this matter to date has been in the best traditions of fairness and impartiality. It adds to the concerns about due process and natural justice in the conduct of these proceedings.

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<sup>18</sup> Letter dated 26 January 2004 from Ambassador Arye Mekel, Charge d'affaires a.i. of Israel to the United Nations in New York, addressed to the Secretary-General. (**Annex 7**)

## CHAPTER 3 ESSENTIAL CONTEXTUAL MATERIAL

### A. The Relevance of Context

**3.1** A limited factual presentation is necessary to enable the Court to undertake a meaningful assessment of Israel's objections to jurisdiction and the propriety or otherwise of a response on the substance of the question. This concerns in particular the on-going attempts to find a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including at the level of the United Nations, and the realities of the Palestinian terrorist threat against Israel and Israelis. These issues go directly to such preliminary questions as the *vires* of the advisory opinion request, the contentious nature of the matter brought before the Court by way of the request, the factual and legal issues not before the Court but which would be essential to any proper assessment of the substance of the request, and the exercise by the Court of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute. Key elements of this factual context are addressed in the following sections of this Chapter.

### B. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Attempts to Find a Settlement

#### *(i) Initiatives within the United Nations*

**3.2** The resolution requesting an advisory opinion locates the request squarely in the context of the wider Arab-Israeli / Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Reference is made, for example, to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) which were respectively adopted following the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars. These resolutions, which have formed the cornerstone of the search for peace in the Middle East subsequently, and have been accepted by both sides, call for a negotiated settlement of the conflict in which each side has the "right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force".<sup>19</sup> Reference is also made to Security Council resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002 which, in its preambular paragraphs, affirms "a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side with secure and recognised borders". That resolution goes on, in operative paragraph 1, to demand an "immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction".<sup>20</sup> Resolution 1397 (2002) is particularly important as it

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<sup>19</sup> S/RES/242 (1967), 22 November 1967, at operative paragraph 1(ii). (Dossier No.24)

<sup>20</sup> S/RES/1397 (2002), 12 March 2002. (Dossier No.35)

sets the agenda for the Quartet initiative which resulted in the Roadmap, itself endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1515 (2003).

***(ii) The Madrid Process***

**3.3** A concerted initiative to find a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East conflict was launched in October 1991 at the Madrid Conference co-sponsored by the United States and the then Soviet Union. The purpose of the Conference was to establish a framework for the resumption of negotiations in the Middle East that had seen relatively little movement since the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. The form of the arrangements agreed upon in Madrid was to encourage separate rounds of bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbours. The Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of 26 October 1994 was the outcome of the Israel-Jordan track of the Madrid negotiations.

**3.4** In the immediate aftermath of the Madrid Conference, negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians took the form of negotiations between Israel and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee. These talks were subsequently overtaken by direct, secret talks held in Norway between Israel and representatives of the PLO. These negotiations led in turn to a series of agreements between Israel and the PLO as the recognised representative of the Palestinian people. These agreements are commonly referred to as the Oslo Accords.

***(iii) Exchange of Letters Between the Prime Minister of Israel  
and the Chairman of the PLO, 9 – 10 September 1993***

**3.5** An important preliminary step to the Israel-PLO agreements was the *Exchange of Letters* between Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, and Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, on 9 – 10 September 1993. The letter from Chairman Arafat, in material part, bears setting out at length:

“The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments:

The PLO recognises the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.

The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

**The PLO** commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and **declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.**

The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, **the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.**<sup>21</sup>

**3.6** The salient points for present purposes are the renunciation by the PLO of terrorism and others acts of violence, its commitment to assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to ensure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators, and its commitment to resolve all outstanding issues regarding permanent status issues through negotiation. These commitments were and remain fundamental to any dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian leadership. They are commitments that have been systematically and consistently honoured only in the breach by the PLO and Palestinian authorities.

*(iv) Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,  
13 September 1993*

**3.7** The *Exchange of Letters* was followed some days later by the *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements* (“DOP”) which was signed at the White House in Washington on 13 September 1993 by the two sides and witnessed by the United States and the Russian Federation as the co-sponsors of the Madrid Process. The DOP provided for the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

**3.8** Pursuant to Article V of the DOP, “permanent status negotiations” were to commence as soon as possible. By Article V(2) of the DOP, the permanent status negotiations were to

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<sup>21</sup> Letter dated 9 September 1993 from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, The Palestine Liberation Organisation, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel (emphasis added). (**Annex 8**)

“cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest.”<sup>22</sup>

*(v) Israel – PLO Agreements and Undertakings, 1994 - 1999*

**3.9** Following the DOP, in the period May 1994 to September 1999, Israel and the PLO entered into a series of agreements and undertakings designed to facilitate and ultimately achieve a permanent status agreement. Key elements of these texts have a bearing on the issues of jurisdiction and propriety that the Court is now required to consider.

**3.10** The principal agreements of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in this period were the following:

- (a) *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area*, 4 May 1994. This was a provisional agreement for “an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho Area” in accordance with a detailed arrangement set out in Annex I of the Agreement.<sup>23</sup> Article IX and Annex I of the Agreement addressed issues relevant to security;
- (b) *Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities*, 29 August 1994;<sup>24</sup>
- (c) *Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities*, 27 August 1995;<sup>25</sup>
- (d) *Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 28 September 1995 (“Interim Agreement”).<sup>26</sup> This Agreement superseded the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 4 May 1994 and the earlier agreements on the transfer of powers. Pending the conclusion of a permanent status agreement, the Interim Agreement is the principal agreement governing relations between the two sides. The Interim Agreement addresses various

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<sup>22</sup> *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements*, 13 September 1993. (Dossier No.65)

<sup>23</sup> *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area*, 4 May 1994, at Article II.  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q20>

<sup>24</sup> *Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities*, 29 August 1994.  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q90>

<sup>25</sup> *Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities*, 27 August 1995.  
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ru0>

<sup>26</sup> *Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 28 September 1995. (Dossier No.68)

matters ranging from the redeployment of Israeli forces, the transfer of powers to detailed commitments by the PLO on matters of security, incitement to violence and related issues;

- (e) *Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron*, 17 January 1997.<sup>27</sup>

**3.11** As all those involved in the process are acutely aware, a commitment by the PLO or any other party acting for the Palestinians to take effective measures of control to forestall violence is, always has been, and will continue to be, a *sine qua non* for any permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

**3.12** In the face of on-going violence – including horrific suicide attacks on buses in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem – the United States attempted to bring the two sides together at various points in the process to maintain the momentum of the negotiations. These meetings led to a number of additional undertakings and documents of the two sides, including:

- (a) *Note for the Record*, 15 January 1997.<sup>28</sup> In the light of continuing terrorist attacks, the Palestinian side expressly reaffirmed its previously unfulfilled commitments to:

- “2. Fighting terror and preventing violence
- (a) Strengthening security cooperation
  - (b) Preventing incitement and hostile propaganda ...
  - (c) Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organisations and infrastructure
  - (d) Apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists
  - (e) ...
  - (f) Confiscation of illegal firearms.”

- (b) *Wye River Memorandum*, 23 October 1998.<sup>29</sup> This was focused on addressing *inter alia* continuing Israeli concerns regarding the unfulfilled Palestinian security commitments in the earlier agreements. By this Memorandum, the Palestinian side undertook to “make known its policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence” and to take effective measures “to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organisations and their infrastructure”.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> *Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron*, 17 January 1997.

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00ql0>

<sup>28</sup> *Note for the Record*, 15 January 1997. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00qm0>

<sup>29</sup> *The Wye River Memorandum*, 23 October 1998. (Dossier No.69)

<sup>30</sup> *The Wye River Memorandum*, 23 October 1998, at Section II.A.1. (Dossier No.69)

- (c) *Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum*, 4 September 1999.<sup>31</sup> In the face of continuing concerns about the failure of the Palestinian side to abide by its security commitments, the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum witnessed the Palestinian side undertaking yet again “to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation and other issues emanating from the prior agreements”.<sup>32</sup>

**3.13** Notwithstanding the continuing violence and the reluctance of the Palestinian Authority to act decisively to stop such attacks, the two sides entered into extensive and serious negotiations in an attempt to address core issues of the conflict and achieve a permanent status agreement. The efforts culminated in talks held at Camp David in July 2000. Israel went equipped with a genuine desire for a final status agreement, even at the cost of painful concessions. The Palestinian side, however, went with a different attitude. Once it became apparent that the negotiating process was unlikely to see the realisation of all of the Palestinian political goals, the talks stalled. Violence followed, erupting at the end of September 2000. Amidst the violence, attempts were nonetheless made to recover the initiative towards peace in late 2000 and early 2001. These attempts failed. Subsequent attempts to find a path back to the peace process were taken by the international community, led by the United States. These included the establishment of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell. This reported on 30 April 2001.<sup>33</sup> Various attempts were made thereafter to achieve a ceasefire, notably by the Tenet Cease-Fire Plan on 10 June 2001 brokered by CIA Director George Tenet.<sup>34</sup>

**3.14** Before turning to address these developments, key elements of the Israeli-PLO agreements of 1993 – 1999 merit recollection.

First, a cessation of terrorism by the PLO and, through them, by associated Palestinian groups, was the cornerstone of the agreements and a *sine qua non* for Israel’s participation therein.

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<sup>31</sup> *Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum*, 4 September 1999. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0fo30>

<sup>32</sup> *Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum*, 4 September 1999, at paragraph 8(b).

<sup>33</sup> Report of the Sharm Al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, 30 April 2001. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jz50>

<sup>34</sup> Tenet Cease-Fire Plan, 10 June 2001. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0khz0>

Second, by the express agreement of both sides, questions concerning borders, Jerusalem and settlements, amongst other matters, were to be settled only through the framework of the permanent status negotiations.

Third, the two sides expressly committed themselves to resolving all outstanding issues between them by negotiation. This is the approach consistently adopted in the Israel-PLO agreements and in the Roadmap.

Fourth, one of the key reasons for the breakdown of the arrangements agreed upon by the two sides in this period was the failure by the Palestinian side to abide by its commitments to take effective steps to prevent and counter terrorist violence by Palestinian groups against Israel and Israelis. This was the bargain. The Palestinian leadership, however, now uses violence as a strategic tool in the peace process. It is culpably in breach of its commitments under the earlier agreements.

#### ***(vi) The Mitchell Committee Report***

**3.15** On 17 October 2000, following three weeks of escalating violence, US President Clinton, speaking on behalf of the participants at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit – Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union – announced the establishment of “a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence”.<sup>35</sup> As subsequently established, the Committee was chaired by former US Senator George J. Mitchell. Other Members of the Committee were Suleyman Demirel, formerly President of the Republic of Turkey, Thorbjørn Jagland, Foreign Minister of Norway, Warren B. Rudman, former United States Senator, and Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

**3.16** Following detailed written submissions by both sides, the Committee reported on 30 April 2001. The first item in its recommendations was that the violence must end. Under the heading of rebuilding confidence, the Committee recommended:

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<sup>35</sup> Statement by US President Clinton, Sharm El-Sheikh Summit, 17 October 2000.  
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/mid022.htm>



“The PA [Palestinian Authority] should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA’s jurisdiction.”<sup>36</sup>

**3.17** Both sides accepted the Mitchell Committee Report. Israel has seen no movement at all by the Palestinian side to adopt the recommendation just noted on terrorist violence. On the contrary, the terrorist attacks against Israel and Israeli civilians intensified dramatically in the period since the Mitchell Committee reported. It is the failure by the Palestinian side to take – or even to attempt to take – any meaningful measures to stop such attacks that has led Israel to search for effective means to protect its citizens. The fence now in issue is a temporary, non-violent means of doing so. Whatever the claims of its detractors, it has been effective in achieving this end. Whatever the claims of its detractors, it is not intended to, and does not, either prejudice or prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations on such matters as borders, Jerusalem and settlements.

#### ***(vii) The Roadmap and Related Developments***

##### ***(a) Background Issues and the Involvement of the United Nations Security Council***

**3.18** In the face of escalating violence following the report of the Mitchell Committee and the Tenet Cease-Fire Plan, the Security Council became actively involved in the attempts to find a path back to negotiations. By resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, the Security Council affirmed “a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognised borders”.<sup>37</sup> The resolution went on to welcome and encourage:

“the diplomatic efforts of the special envoys from the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United Nations Special Coordinator and others, to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East”.<sup>38</sup>

**3.19** In operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, the Security Council demanded an “immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement

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<sup>36</sup> Report of the Sharm Al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, 30 April 2001.

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0jz50>

<sup>37</sup> S/RES/1397 (2002), 12 March 2002, at the second preambular paragraph. **(Dossier No.35)**

<sup>38</sup> S/RES/1397 (2002), 12 March 2002, at the sixth preambular paragraph. **(Dossier No.35)**

and destruction”. By operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Council called upon “the Israeli and Palestinian sides and their leaders to cooperate in the implementation of the Tenet work plan and the Mitchell report recommendations with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political settlement”.

**3.20** Resolution 1397 (2002) was followed 18 days later by resolution 1402 (2002) of 30 March 2002 which came at the end of a month of the most murderous Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. By operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Security Council again reiterated “its demand in resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002 for an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction”. By operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Security Council expressed its “support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and the special envoys to the Middle East to assist the parties to halt the violence and to resume the peace process”. By operative paragraph 4, the Security Council decided to remain seized of the matter.

**3.21** Resolution 1402 (2002) was followed a few days later by resolution 1403 (2002) of 4 April 2002 by which the Security Council demanded the implementation of resolution 1402 (2002) without delay and welcomed “the mission of the U.S. Secretary of State to the region, as well as efforts by others, in particular the special envoys from the United States, the Russian Federation and the European Union, and the United Nations Special Coordinator”. The Council remained seized of the matter.

**3.22** There followed, on 10 April 2002, a Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council supported a Joint Statement issued in Madrid on the same date by the UN Secretary-General, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Secretary of State of the United States, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain and the High Representative for European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy.<sup>39</sup> The Joint Statement, which is annexed to the Security Council Presidential Statement, said *inter alia* as follows:

“We call on Chairman Arafat, as the recognised, elected leader of the Palestinian people, to undertake immediately the maximum possible effort to stop terror attacks against innocent Israelis. We call upon the Palestinian Authority to act decisively and take all possible steps within its capacity to dismantle terrorist infrastructure, including terrorist financing, and to stop

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<sup>39</sup> S/PRST/2002/9, 10 April 2002. (Annex 9)

incitement to violence. We call upon Chairman Arafat to use the full weight of his political authority to persuade the Palestinian people that any and all terrorist attacks against Israelis should end immediately, and to authorise his representatives to resume immediately security coordination with Israel.

Terrorism, including suicide bombs, is illegal and immoral, has inflicted grave harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and must be condemned as called for in UNSCR 1373.

We call on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to reach agreement on ceasefire proposals put forward by General Zinni without further delay. We commend the efforts of General Zinni to date to achieve this objective.

The Quartet stands ready to assist the parties in implementing their agreements, in particular the Tenet security workplan and the Mitchell recommendations, including through a third party mechanism, as agreed to by the parties.”<sup>40</sup>

**3.23** On 24 June 2002, US President George W. Bush set out US policy in favour of a two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 16 July 2002, the Quartet – the UN, Russian Federation, European Union and United States – issued a joint statement supporting this vision of a two-State solution. In operative part, this statement reads:

“The Quartet deeply deplores today’s tragic killing of Israeli civilians and reiterates its strong and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism, including suicide bombing, which is morally repugnant and has caused great harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a better future. Terrorists must not be allowed to kill the hope of an entire region, and a united international community, for genuine peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis. The Quartet expresses once again its profound regret at the loss of innocent Israeli and Palestinian lives, and extends its sympathy to all who have suffered loss. The Quartet members express their increasing concern about the mounting humanitarian crisis in Palestinian areas and their determination to address urgent Palestinian needs.

Consistent with President Bush’s June 24 statement, the UN, EU and Russia express their strong support for the goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement which, with intensive effort on security and reform by all, could be reached within three years from now. The UN, EU and Russia welcome President Bush’s commitment to achieve U.S. leadership toward that goal. The Quartet remains committed to implementing the vision of two States, Israel and independent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, as affirmed by Security Council resolution 1397.”<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Joint Statement of the Quartet, 10 April 2002, annexed to S/PRST/2002/9, 10 April 2002. (Annex 9)

<sup>41</sup> Joint Statement of the Quartet, 16 July 2002. (Annex 10)

3.24 This Joint Statement by the Quartet was followed, on 18 July 2002, by a Statement by the President of the Security Council indicating the Council's support for the Quartet statement.<sup>42</sup> On 24 September 2002, the Security Council adopted resolution 1435 (2002). By operative paragraph 1 of this resolution, the Council reiterated "its demand for the complete cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction". By operative paragraph 4, the Council called upon "the Palestinian Authority to meet its expressed commitment to ensure that those responsible for terrorist acts are brought to justice by it". By operative paragraph 5, the Security Council expressed "its full support for the efforts of the Quartet". The Council remained seized of the matter.

3.25 On 20 December 2002, the Quartet issued a Joint Statement *inter alia* as follows:

"Reaffirming their previous statements, the Quartet members reviewed developments since their last meeting, on September 17, 2002. They condemned the brutal terror attacks carried out by Palestinian extremist organisations since the last meeting, which aim to diminish the prospects for peace, and only harm legitimate Palestinian aspirations for statehood.

...

Specifically, the Quartet calls for an immediate, comprehensive, ceasefire. **All Palestinian individuals and groups must end all acts of terror against Israelis, in any location.**"<sup>43</sup>

3.26 This statement was followed by another on 20 February 2003 in which the Quartet *inter alia* "expressed very serious concern at the continuing acts of violence and terror planned and directed against Israelis".<sup>44</sup>

(b) *The Roadmap and Security Council Resolution 1515 (2003)*

3.27 The Roadmap was presented to the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on 30 April 2003. By a letter dated 7 May 2003 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General transmitted the Roadmap to the Security Council.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> S/PRST/2002/20, 18 July 2002. (Annex 11)

<sup>43</sup> Joint Statement of the Quartet, 20 December 2002 (emphasis added). (Annex 12)

<sup>44</sup> Joint Statement of the Quartet, 20 February 2003. (Annex 13)

<sup>45</sup> S/2003/529, 7 May 2003. (Dossier No.70)

**3.28** As its name indicates, the Roadmap is a performance-based initiative aimed at a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its objective is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within a three-year time frame.

**3.29** The gateway to the resolution of the conflict on the basis of the Roadmap is an end to violence and terrorism. This is made clear in the opening paragraphs of the Roadmap in the following terms:

“A two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practising democracy based on tolerance and liberty ...”<sup>46</sup>

**3.30** The Roadmap proceeds from this opening statement of principle to lay down three phases towards the achievement of its objective. Phase I is headed “Ending Terror and Violence, Normalising Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions”. Phase II is headed “Transition”. Phase III is headed “Permanent Status Agreement and End of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”. The opening sentence of Phase I reads as follows:

“In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel.”

**3.31** Under the heading “Security” in Phase I, the opening point reads as follows:

“Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.”

**3.32** Also under this heading is the requirement that “Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror”.

**3.33** Phase II, “Transition”, is focused “on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty”. The “primary goals” of Phase II

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<sup>46</sup> Dossier No.70.

include “continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation”. Included amongst the elements of this Phase is the

“[c]reation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.”

**3.34** Phase III of the Roadmap is focused on achieving a Permanent Status Agreement. It envisages “a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements”.

**3.35** Four elements of the Roadmap warrant emphasis:

First, the immediate demand is for an end to Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel and Israelis, wherever they are. This would be matched by an end to Israel's military action in response to such attacks.

Second, the Roadmap envisages a phased process with progress being dependent on the effective realisation of the objectives of each phase. Thus, progress from Phase I, which is focused on security and on an end to terror, to Phase II, which will address the creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders, is dependent on effective and comprehensive security performance and cooperation.

Third, the resolution of key issues – including borders, Jerusalem and settlements – is the key element of Phase III of the Roadmap.

Fourth, the Quartet co-sponsors of the Roadmap anticipate a negotiating process between the two sides with the “active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet”.

**3.36** Following the presentation of the Roadmap, and continued violence on the ground, the Quartet met again in June 2003. Their Joint Statement of 22 June 2003 reads *inter alia* as follows:

“The Quartet members deplore and condemn the brutal terror attacks against Israeli citizens carried out by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade since the roadmap’s presentation. The Quartet calls for an immediate, comprehensive end to all violence and welcomes efforts by the Government of Egypt and others to achieve such an immediate and comprehensive halt to armed action by Palestinian groups. All Palestinian individuals and groups must end terror against Israelis, anywhere. The Quartet calls on the Palestinian authorities to take all possible steps to halt immediately the activities of individuals and groups planning and conducting attacks on Israelis.”<sup>47</sup>

**3.37** Again, on 26 September 2003, the Quartet issued a further statement reading *inter alia* as follows:

“[The Quartet members] condemn the vicious terror attacks of August and September carried out by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. They again affirm that such actions are morally indefensible and do not serve the interests of the Palestinian people. They call on Palestinians to take immediate, decisive steps against individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks. Such steps should be accompanied by Israeli supportive measures, including resumption of full security cooperation. They further call on all states to end harbouring and support, including fund-raising and financial assistance, of any groups and individuals that use terror and violence to advance their goals.

The Quartet members affirm that the Palestinian Authority security services must be consolidated under the clear control of an empowered Prime Minister and Interior Minister and must be the sole armed authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Noting that the first Palestinian Prime Minister has resigned his post, they urge that the new Palestinian Prime Minister form a cabinet as soon as possible, and ask that cabinet to re-commit itself to the pledges made in the roadmap and at Aqaba.<sup>48</sup> The Palestinian Authority must ensure that a ‘rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantling of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure’.

The Quartet members recognise Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence in the face of terrorist attacks against its citizens. In this context and in the context of international humanitarian law, they call on the Government of Israel to exert maximum efforts to avoid civilian casualties.”<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Joint Statement of the Quartet, 22 June 2003. (Annex 14)

<sup>48</sup> The statements of the two sides at the Aqaba Middle East Peace Summit of 4 June 2003 are set out below.

<sup>49</sup> Joint Statement of the Quartet, 26 September 2003. (Annex 15)

**3.38** The Roadmap, and progress towards it, have been the subject of detailed discussions by the Security Council in private session. On 19 November 2003, following private deliberations, the Security Council convened in open session to vote on a draft resolution co-sponsored by Bulgaria, Chile, China, France, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Spain and the United Kingdom. The draft resolution was adopted by the unanimous vote of all the Members of the Council, becoming resolution 1515 (2003). The resolution is short and merits recitation in full:

*“The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and the Madrid principles,

*Expressing* its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events in the Middle East,

*Reiterating* the demand for an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction,

*Reaffirming* its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognised borders,

*Emphasising* the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Syrian and the Israeli-Lebanese tracks,

*Welcoming* and *encouraging* the diplomatic efforts of the international Quartet and others,

1. *Endorses* the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (S/2003/529);
2. *Calls on* the parties to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security;
3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.”

*(c) Subsequent Developments in the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session*

**3.39** Nineteen days after the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council endorsing the Roadmap, the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, first convened in April 1997 under the Uniting for Peace Resolution to address an entirely separate matter, adopted resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 requesting an advisory opinion from the Court. The resolution,



although adopted by the requisite voting majority, failed to command the support of a majority of members of the United Nations, receiving 90 votes in favour of the resolution, with 8 against and 74 abstentions. It is significant that the members of the Quartet – the United Nations apart – including all the members of the European Union, either voted against the resolution or abstained.

**3.40** The Court will no doubt examine closely the record of the meeting at which the advisory opinion request was adopted. It is nonetheless worth extracting four statements – two prior to the vote and two explanations of vote – in illustration of at least a significant segment of sentiment in the room. The statements are those of Uganda and the United States, the United Kingdom and Singapore. They are set out in full.

**Uganda** (*abstaining on the vote*)

“Our delegation has noted the Secretary-General’s report, contained in document A/ES-10/248. Uganda remains a firm supporter of the Palestinian cause and our proposed course of action should be seen in that light. We are looking for ways of bringing both sides back to the negotiating table.

Uganda supports a two-nation policy, whereby the State of Israel and the Palestinian State exist side by side in peace, each State with internationally-recognised and secure borders. It is within this context that conflict in the Middle East should be addressed, and as a way forward, **the on-going Quartet-led road map for peace initiative should continue to be supported. On 19 November 2003 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1515 (2003) supporting the road map. This mechanism should be given a chance.**

The international community, especially the United Nations, should be part of the solution and not be seen as a part of the problem in the search for peace in the Middle East. Adopting resolutions to condemn one side would only harden attitudes, a fact to which the statements by the main protagonists this morning have eminently borne testimony. The United Nations should endeavour to bring the two sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis, together to the negotiating table to arrive at an amicable solution.

Resolutions should not be perceived as solutions per se or solutions in themselves, but as viable means to a solution. Without minimising the importance of resolutions as a way of garnering international pressure for a particular cause, Uganda believes that if adopting resolutions has not produced the desired results to date, an alternative mechanism should be found. **The solution lies in negotiated settlement by both sides. That is why, in our opinion, referring the matter to the International Court of Justice would not serve the cause of peace. We should avoid politicizing the Court, as this would undermine its impartiality and credibility. Furthermore, going to the International Court of Justice would amount to forum**

**shopping when there is already a mechanism through the Quartet-led road map to address the issue.**

Uganda will continue to support all international efforts aimed at bringing about a just and equitable resolution to the conflict and we believe that this General Assembly, the most representative and most universal of all such assemblies, can play a vital role in bringing the parties back to the negotiating table. We call upon all nations to support that process.”<sup>50</sup>

**United States of America** (*voting against the resolution*)

“This emergency special session which has been ongoing since 1997 does not contribute to the shared goal of implementing the road map. The path to peace is the Quartet performance-based road map to a permanent two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The road map, endorsed in Security Council resolution 1515 (2003), very clearly outlines the obligations and responsibilities of the parties to achieve President Bush’s vision of two-States, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace and security.

**The international community has long recognised that resolution of the conflict must be through negotiated settlement, as called for in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). That was spelled out clearly to the parties in the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. Involving the International Court of Justice in this conflict is inconsistent with that approach and could actually delay a two-State solution and negatively impact road map implementation. Furthermore, referral of this issue to the International Court of Justice risks politicising the Court. It will not advance the Court’s ability to contribute to global security, nor will it advance the prospects of peace.**

The United States policy on Israeli construction of the fence is clear and consistent. We oppose activities by either party that prejudge final status negotiations. President Bush said on 19 November 2003, ‘Israel should freeze settlement construction, dismantle unauthorised outposts and the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people and not prejudice final negotiations with the placements of walls and fences’.

But this meeting today and this draft resolution undermine rather than encourage direct negotiations between the parties to resolve their differences. This is the wrong way and the wrong time to proceed on this issue. Furthermore, the draft resolution itself is one-sided and completely unbalanced. The text itself is clearly not designed to promote a process towards peace. It doesn’t even mention the word ‘terrorism’. We will vote

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<sup>50</sup> Statement by Mr Wagaba, Representative of Uganda to the United Nations to the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session, 8 December 2003. A/ES-10/PV.23, 8 December 2003, at p.18 (emphasis added). (Dossier No.42)

against this ill-advised resolution and urge Assembly members not to support it.”<sup>51</sup>

**United Kingdom** (*abstaining on the vote*)

“The United Kingdom remains concerned about the route marked out for the barrier in the occupied West Bank. We regret that Israel has not complied with the General Assembly’s demand, in resolution ES-10/13, that it stop and reverse construction of the barrier inside the occupied Palestinian territories. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom abstained on the vote on the draft resolution calling for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the wall. We consider it inappropriate, without the consent of both parties, to ask the Court to give an advisory opinion. Moreover, it is unlikely to resolve the problem on the ground. **This is not a case in which the General Assembly genuinely needs legal advice in order to carry out its functions. It has already declared the wall to be illegal. The United Kingdom voted in favour of that resolution. The question of the wall can be settled only through direct negotiations between the two parties and through positive action on the ground in the framework of a comprehensive settlement. To pursue an advisory opinion will in no way help the parties to re-launch the much-needed political dialogue necessary to implement the road map – and implementing the road map should be the priority.**”<sup>52</sup>

**Singapore** (*abstaining on the vote*)

“Singapore consistently votes in favour of the Palestinian position in the General Assembly. During the Assembly’s fifty-seventh session, we voted in support of all 17 resolutions on this issue. And thus far, we have also voted in favour of the Palestinian position on all relevant resolutions at the fifth-eighth session of the General Assembly and at the recent meetings of the emergency special session, including on resolution ES-10/13 concerning the wall.

We do not support the actions of Israel in building the wall. However, we have reservations about seeking an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Israeli wall, as there are wider implications that cause us concern. As a small State, we rely on the integrity of international law, of which the ICJ is one of the most important pillars. **We do not consider it appropriate to involve the ICJ in this dispute in this way. The underlying dispute is one concerning territorial boundaries. This should be settled by negotiation among the parties concerned or by the binding decision of an appropriate international tribunal such as the ICJ. An advisory**

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<sup>51</sup> Statement by Mr Cunningham, Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations to the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session, 8 December 2003. A/ES-10/PV.23, 8 December 2003, at p.19 (emphasis added). (Dossier No.42)

<sup>52</sup> Statement by Sir Emyr Jones Parry, Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, to the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session, 8 December 2003. A/ES-10/PV.23, 8 December 2003, at p.21 (emphasis added). (Dossier No.42)

**opinion would have no binding effect on the parties to this dispute or on the General Assembly.**

The purpose of seeking the advisory opinion of the ICJ must be to assist or facilitate the work of the General Assembly. In operative paragraph 1 of resolution ES-10/13, the General Assembly has itself already made the determination that the construction of the wall by Israel is 'in departure of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law'.

That assessment must necessarily have been made based on considerations of the obligations incumbent on Israel. The ICJ's advisory opinion does not formally bind either party since it is made pursuant to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. Nor does it enable the General Assembly to take any action more binding than what it has already done in resolution ES-10/13. On the contrary, posing the question might create the impression that the General Assembly is not very sure about the correctness of its early determination on the legality of Israel's actions in resolution ES-10/13. For the above reasons, we have abstained from the vote on this draft resolution."<sup>53</sup>

**3.41** Israel acknowledges, as will be plain from the record of the proceedings as well as from other statements made in the Security Council, by the Quartet and elsewhere, that the fence now in issue has raised particular concerns. These concerns are most often made in ignorance of the facts and of the relevant applicable principles of law. The facts relevant to a meaningful appraisal of the issues are not now before the Court. Questions of routing and fabric of life consequences as a result of the fence exercise Israel greatly. It will not have escaped the attention of observers of Israel and readers of the Israeli press that decisions have been taken in recent months to vary the route of the fence, and make other material changes, in the light of fabric of life concerns where this can be done consistently with the dictates of security. Many phases of construction, including some which have attracted particular comment, have yet to be started or authorised. Israel is looking again at these issues. The High Court is currently seised of a number of petitions concerning the fence. Israel is a society based above all on the rule of law and will carefully comply with the decisions of its judiciary.<sup>54</sup>

**3.42** The question now in issue, however, is whether it is appropriate for the Court to respond, and whether it is within its jurisdiction to do so, to a request for an advisory opinion by the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly which cuts across and would risk

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<sup>53</sup> Statement by Mr Tan, Representative of Singapore to the United Nations to the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session, 8 December 2003. A/ES-10/PV.23, 8 December 2003, at pp.22 – 23 (emphasis added). **(Dossier No.42)**

<sup>54</sup> See further on this the statement by Prime Minister Sharon at paragraph 3.79 below.

destabilising an initiative expressly endorsed by the Security Council. Israel contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction in this case and that, even were it competent to do so, it should not, in the exercise of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute, respond to the substance of the question referred to it.

**3.43** All of these resolutions, agreements and statements point to the fundamental agreement of the two sides, the Quartet, the Security Council and the international community that the appropriate mechanism for resolving disputes between the two sides is negotiation within the context of the Roadmap. Unilateral initiatives that divert from this process, and seek to isolate one issue for attention in an alternative mechanism, are in direct contradiction to this fundamental principle and risk unravelling the framework by which a comprehensive settlement may be reached.

### **C. Borders, Jerusalem and Settlements**

#### **Under the Israeli-PLO Agreements and the Roadmap**

**3.44** The question referred to the Court calls for an examination by the Court of the route of the fence. It implies that the baseline that the Court should use for this purpose is the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Line. The question is whether this is an acceptable approach, particularly in the light of the scheme of the Roadmap. Israel does not here enter into the substance of the debate on these issues. A number of observations are, however, necessary by way of essential background to Israel's submissions on jurisdiction and propriety.

**3.45** The so-called "Green Line" is the term commonly used to describe the Armistice Demarcation Line ("ADL") described in the *General Armistice Agreement* signed by Israel and Jordan on 3 April 1949. The language of the "Green Line" has entered the popular lexicon of lay commentators on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the presumptive and immutable border between Israel and a putative Palestinian state. This assessment is, however, problematic as a matter of substance and has no basis in law. The point goes to one of the significant risks of this advisory opinion request, namely, that the Court will paint with a broad brush on the landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a way that will complicate initiatives to achieve a lasting peace settlement between the two sides.

**3.46** On 16 November 1948, the Security Council adopted resolution 62 (1948). In operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, the Security Council decided that, “in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to a permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine”. The Council, in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, went on to call upon the parties involved in the conflict, as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement on the delineation of an armistice demarcation line beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties would not move during the transition period to permanent peace.<sup>55</sup>

**3.47** On 3 April 1949, Israel and Jordan signed a *General Armistice Agreement*. The preambular paragraphs of the Agreement reference resolution 62 (1948) and Article 40 of the Charter.<sup>56</sup> Article II of the Armistice Agreement provides that no provision of the Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of the Agreement having being dictated exclusively by military considerations.<sup>57</sup> Article VI(9) provides expressly that the ADL is “without prejudice to future territorial settlement or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto.” The ADL, which was marked on the map in green, was known as the “Green Line”.

**3.48** The ADL was never authoritatively demarcated. Moreover, in the period following the *General Armistice Agreement*, and in accordance with its terms, a considerable number of adjustments were made to the route of the line as described in the Agreement. They were made by commanders on both sides, acting jointly, pursuant to Article IX and XII of the Agreement. The adjustments were marked on large scale maps of the parties which were signed and subsequently usually brought before the Mixed Armistice Commission for approval.

**3.49** An additional issue which the question posed to the Court might engage relates to the status of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This is a subject, the resolution of which the two sides have expressly agreed to leave to the permanent status negotiations. This is the scheme of the Roadmap. The question is whether Israel has a right to take measures to protect the lives of the residents of these settlements in the face of on-going attacks by Palestinian terrorists.

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<sup>55</sup> S/RES/62, 16 November 1948, at operative paragraph 2. (**Annex 16**)

<sup>56</sup> *Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – Israel: General Armistice Agreement*, 3 April 1949. (**Annex 17**)

<sup>57</sup> *General Armistice Agreement*, at Article II.

**3.50** It is often said by Israel's detractors, justifying Palestinian suicide and other attacks in particular against residents of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that the settlements are illegal and that the attacks are therefore legitimate and somehow morally acceptable. The same reasoning leads also to similar comments in respect of attacks to the east of the so-called Green Line or in parts of Jerusalem that the particular commentator would aggregate to "Palestine".

**3.51** As the extracts from the Quartet and other statements given above indicate, it is acknowledged by many close to the detail of this conflict that Palestinian terrorism against Israel and Israelis is illegal wherever it occurs. This includes terrorism directed at the Israeli settlements and the residents thereof in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to others east of the Green Line, in Jerusalem or elsewhere. Even the harshest of Israel's critics have been constrained to acknowledge that such attacks are a violation of the norms of international humanitarian law and general international law and cannot be justified.

**3.52** As already observed, the issue of settlements is to be addressed in the permanent status negotiations. This is the scheme of the Roadmap. It would be enormously problematic for the Court to enter into this complex issue in the context of the present request for an advisory opinion. Moreover, there is a significant risk that any decision of the Court on this issue could be construed as legitimising such attacks with the consequence that a renewed wave of such attacks might occur. The Court should be more than just ordinarily cautious about proceeding down this road. Any opinion on these issues would almost inevitably destabilise still further relations between the two sides and prejudice the Roadmap initiative.

#### **D. The Palestinian Terrorist Threat to Israel**

**3.53** The request for an opinion does not ask about the legal consequences of unlawful terrorist attacks upon the inherent right to life of Israeli citizens so often carried out by Palestinian terrorists with the support, active or passive, of the authorities of "Palestine". It should have done. Israel has a compelling case and it would not hesitate, in other circumstances, to make it. Neither does the question ask for an opinion on the consequences of the violation of the laws and customs of war and of wider customary principles of international human rights law by Palestinian terrorists and the Palestinian Authority. Here too Israel's case is compelling. As is

addressed in Chapter 8, an appreciation of these issues would be essential to any meaningful assessment by the Court of the question before it. The request for an opinion is not balanced. The procedure adopted by the Court is not conducive to a considered examination of the issues. Israel does not accept that the Court has jurisdiction to examine these issues, or that it would be proper for the Court to do so in the context of its advisory procedure.

**3.54** Some factual material on the nature and scale of the Palestinian terrorist threat to Israel will assist the Court properly to exercise its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute and decide whether or not to answer the question referred to it. The following paragraphs accordingly set out some basic details on these issues for purposes of Israel's submissions on jurisdiction and propriety only.

***(i) The Perpetrators of Terror***

**3.55** There are four principal Palestinian terrorist organisations that are responsible for the vast majority of the attacks against Israel and Israelis. These are:

- (a) Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades – this is also sometimes referred to as the “Tanzim” and is part of the Fatah organisation. It includes amongst its ranks members of the various security forces of the Palestinian Authority;
- (b) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (“PFLP”) – one of the original factions of the PLO;
- (c) Hamas – an Arabic acronym for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Resistance Movement; and
- (d) Palestine Islamic Jihad.

**3.56** Between them, these organisations have been responsible for about 20,000 separate incidents against Israel and Israelis since the start of the current violence in October 2000. As has already been noted, these attacks have left 916 Israelis dead and over 5,000 injured, many critically.



**3.57** The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades emerged out of the recent violence. They are based mainly in West Bank cities and towns and are an integral part of Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. They draw considerable support from the 80,000 strong security forces of the Palestinian Authority. Given their power base in Fatah, the Brigades are closely linked to Yasser Arafat personally. Giving an interview to *USA Today* in March 2002, one of the Brigades' leaders, Maslama Thabet, said "[w]e receive our instructions from Fatah. Our commander is Yasir Arafat himself".<sup>58</sup> Palestinian Authority officials have acknowledged that many of the Brigades' members are paid from Palestinian Authority funds in their capacities as members of the PA's various security forces.

**3.58** The Brigades have been responsible for – indeed, have claimed responsibility for – a large number of attacks against Israelis including some of the most murderous suicide bomb attacks. They provided assistance to Hamas in the most recent suicide bomb attack on 14 January 2004 in which four Israelis were killed at the Erez crossing-point between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Amongst other attacks for which they are responsible are:

- the 5 January 2003 double suicide bombing near the old central bus station in Tel Aviv which killed 23 people and left around 120 others injured (the bomber having come from Nablus),
- the 19 June 2002 suicide bomb attack at the French Hill intersection in Jerusalem which killed 7 people and left 50 injured at a crowded bus stop (the bomber having come from Nablus),
- the 12 April 2002 suicide bomb attack in a Jerusalem open-air market which killed 6 people and injured 104 (the bomber having come from Beit Fajar), and
- the 2 March 2002 suicide bomb attack in central Jerusalem which killed 11 people and injured 50 at a Barmitzvah celebration (the bomber having come from Dehaishe).

**3.59** The PFLP was founded in 1967 by George Habash. It was an original, founding member of the PLO. It is opposed to any negotiation with Israel and Israel's continued existence

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<sup>58</sup> *USA Today*, March 14, 2002, at p.A.06. (Annex 18)

in any form. It receives logistical support from, and safe haven in, Syria. It was responsible for the 17 October 2001 assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rechavam Ze'evi. Amongst other recent attacks for which it is responsible was the 25 December 2003 suicide bomb attack outside Tel Aviv which killed 4 people and injured 24 others.

**3.60** Hamas was established in 1987. It is an Islamist movement which is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is opposed to all negotiations with Israel and seeks Israel's destruction. Its military wing – Izz al-Din al-Qassam – is responsible for the principal suicide attacks within Israel. Amongst the attacks for which Hamas is responsible are:

- the 9 September 2003 suicide bomb attack at a café in the German Colony neighbourhood of Jerusalem which killed 7 people and injured over 50 (the bomber having come from Rantis),
- the 19 August 2003 suicide bomb attack on a bus in Jerusalem which killed 23 people and injured over 130 (the bomber having come from Hebron),
- the 11 June 2003 suicide bomb attack on another bus in Jerusalem which killed 17 people and injured over 100 (the bomber having come from Hebron),
- the 5 March 2003 suicide bomb attack on a bus in Haifa which killed 17 people and injured 53 (the bomber having come from Hebron),
- the 21 November 2002 suicide bomb attack on a bus carrying schoolchildren in Jerusalem which left 11 people dead and around 50 injured (the bomber having come from El-Khader),
- the 31 July 2002 bombing of the cafeteria on the campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem which killed 9 people and injured 85 (the bomber having come from Silwan),
- the 7 May 2002 suicide bombing of a gaming club in Rishon Lezion, south of Tel Aviv, which killed 15 people and injured 55,

- the 31 March 2002 suicide bomb attack on the Matza restaurant in Haifa which killed 15 people and injured 40 (the bomber having come from Jenin), and
- the 27 March 2002 suicide bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya which killed 30 people, most in their 70s and 80s, and injured 145 (the bomber having come from Tulkarem).

**3.61** Palestine Islamic Jihad was established in 1981. It receives support, sponsorship and safe haven from Syria, Lebanon and Iran (amongst the co-sponsors of the advisory opinion request). It is an Islamist movement which has as its goal the destruction of Israel. Although smaller than Hamas, it is more radical in its ideology. Amongst the attacks for which it is responsible are:

- the 4 October 2003 suicide bomb attack in Maxim's restaurant in Haifa which killed 21 people, including 4 children, and injured 60 (the bomber having come from Jenin),
- the 5 January 2003 double suicide bomb attack at the old central bus station in Tel Aviv (carried out jointly with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Bridges) which killed 23 people and injured 120 (the bomber having come from Nablus),
- the 21 October 2002 bombing of a bus *en route* from the north of Israel to Tel Aviv which left 14 people dead and injured around 50 others (the bomber having come from Jenin),
- the 5 June 2002 suicide bomb attack on a bus travelling from Tel Aviv to Tiberias which killed 17 people and injured 38 (the bomber having come from Jenin), and
- the 20 March 2002 suicide bombing of yet another bus *en route* from Tel Aviv which killed 7 people and injured around 30 others (the bomber having come from Jenin).

***(ii) The Methods and Means of Terror and its Victims***

**3.62** Terrorist attacks come in many forms. Over the past 40 months of violence, Israelis have been killed in attacks that range from stabbings to shootings at vehicles from roadside

ambushes to drive-by shootings and suicide and other bombings. Proportionately, suicide bombings represent a small minority of the attacks but account for the majority of Israeli dead and injured. They also pose a very particular difficulty for defence, law enforcement and security forces, as the normal concern of a combatant or other attacker to avoid injury to him or herself cannot be relied upon to prevent an attack. On the contrary, it is often precisely as attempts are made to apprehend an attacker that they detonate the bomb they are carrying killing those who are attempting to apprehend them. Since the start of the present violence, about 70% of all suicide attacks have taken place to the west of the so-called Green Line. These account for less than 10% of overall attacks in this area. Yet they account for around 80% of Israeli deaths from such attacks in this area. The next largest category of attacks by numbers of victims is shootings, including shooting at travelling vehicles from roadside ambushes.

**3.63** Less widely known, but nonetheless critical, are a different form of attack, referred to in the press as “mega-terror” attacks, akin to that in New York on 11 September 2001. Fortunately for Israel, most attempts of this kind have been foiled but the threat remains real and the risk of devastation considerable. Details of key incidents of this kind are given in section (iii) below.

**3.64** For purposes of the exercise by the Court of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute, it is important that the Court should appreciate the sheer scale of the terrorist onslaught that Israel has faced and continues to face. The opening requirement of the Roadmap is that “the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence”. The failure of the Palestinian leadership to take adequate steps to this end is a matter of wide public record. Two illustrative periods of terror attacks may be given by way of example of scale and effects – first, March 2002, the bloodiest month of Israeli fatalities, the scale of which led directly both to the military Operation Defensive Shield and to the decision to begin construction of the fence as a non-forcible barrier to the on-going attacks; and, second, the attacks in the past 12 month period from January 2003 culminating in the filing of this statement.

**3.65** There were 37 separate terrorist attacks resulting in Israeli fatalities in the 31 days of March 2002. These attacks killed 135 and injured 721 others, many critically. Of the dead, 12 were children; 28 were in their 70s and 80s. The overwhelming majority of those killed and injured were civilians. All were specifically targeted. These were not random acts. Amongst these atrocities in this period were the following:

- 2 March 2002 – 11 people were killed and over 50 injured when a suicide bomber detonated his bomb next to a group of women and infants waiting to attend a Barmitzvah celebration in Jerusalem. The bomber came from Dehaishe. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement claimed responsibility;
- 9 March 2002 – 9 month old Avia Malka of South Africa was killed and around 50 others were injured when two Palestinians opened fire with automatic weapons and threw hand grenades in the tourist hotel area of the coastal city of Netanya. Yasser Arafat's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility;
- 9 March 2002 – 11 people were killed and 54 injured in a suicide bomb attack in a crowded café in Jerusalem at 10.30 pm on a Saturday night. Hamas claimed responsibility;
- 27 March 2002 – 30 people were killed and 145 injured in the suicide bomb attack of the Park Hotel in Netanya during the Passover holiday dinner. The bomber came from Tulkarem. Hamas claimed responsibility;
- 31 March 2002 – 15 people were killed and over 40 injured in the suicide bombing of the Matza restaurant in Haifa. Two families suffered multiple fatalities. The bomber came from Jenin. Hamas claimed responsibility.

**3.66** In the 12 months from January 2003 to the filing of this statement, 218 people have been killed in terrorist attacks and around 850 people have been injured. These numbers are still unacceptably high but, by comparison with those of March 2002, they have fallen significantly. This drop in the number of Israeli casualties does not reflect a reduction in the number of attempted attacks against Israelis by Palestinian terrorists. The number of attempted attacks has remained broadly the same at around 50 a week. The reduction in casualties reflects the growing number of attacks that are thwarted by the Israeli Defence Forces ("IDF"). The fence has been a significant factor in this respect.

**3.67** Amongst the terrorist atrocities committed in the past 12 months are the following:

- 5 January 2003 – 23 people killed, including 8 foreign nationals, and around 120 injured in the double suicide bombing at the old central bus station in Tel Aviv. The bombers came from Nablus. Yasser Arafat's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Islamic Jihad jointly claimed responsibility for the attack;
- 5 March 2003 – 17 people were killed and 53 injured in a suicide bomb attack on a bus in Haifa *en route* to Haifa University. Nine of the 17 killed were under the age of 18. The bomber came from Hebron. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack;
- 30 April 2003 – 3 people were killed and around 60 injured in a suicide bomb attack at a Tel Aviv beachfront bar. Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement and Hamas both claimed responsibility. The attack was carried out by two British Muslim members of Hamas;
- 11 June 2003 – 17 people were killed and over 100 injured in a suicide bomb attack on a bus in central Jerusalem. The bomber came from Hebron. Hamas claimed responsibility;
- 19 August 2003 – 23 people were killed and over 130 injured in another suicide bomb attack on a bus in central Jerusalem. The bomber came from Hebron. Hamas claimed responsibility;
- 4 October 2003 – 21 people were killed and 60 wounded in a suicide bomb attack by a female terrorist from Jenin in Maxim's restaurant in Haifa. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility;
- 18 November 2003 – 2 soldiers were killed on a road outside Jerusalem when a member of Yasser Arafat's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades opened fire with a semi-automatic assault rifle concealed in a prayer rug.

**3.68** Statistics like these may seem remote to Members of the Court – mere numbers on a page. They are not remote to Israeli society. Israel is a small country. The casualties that it continues to suffer reach into every home. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains an *In Memoriam* website with every name and photograph and personal sketch of those who have

been killed in terrorist attacks in the past 40 months of violence.<sup>59</sup> Recalling briefly the identities of some of those who were once living is a salutary exercise. It gives pause for thought against the backdrop of some of the rhetoric that comes too often from the mouths of Israel's detractors. A few brief lines on some of Israel's typical casualties drawn from five "incidents" merit recitation.

**3.69** On 1 June 2001, a Friday evening, a suicide bomber from Kalkilya attacked a discothèque at the Tel Aviv Dolphinarium. That evening, girls were allowed in free of charge. Many were teenagers. Twenty-one people died that night when the bomb exploded. Most were young girls. Most were under 18 years of age. One of the victims was Anya Kazachkov. She was a newcomer from Russia, as were many of the others who died that night. She was 16. Her drawings decorate the walls of her school. She is buried in the Yarkon cemetery in Tel Aviv.

**3.70** On 27 March 2002, on Passover evening, 250 guests had just sat down to a meal in the Park Hotel in Netanya. A suicide bomber, later identified as a member of Hamas from Tulkarem just 10 kilometres away, entered the room and detonated his bomb. Thirty were killed and a further 140 injured, many critically. Most of the dead were elderly. One was Marianne Myriam Lehmann Zaoui, aged 77. She was a Holocaust survivor from Germany. After the Second World War she taught English in high schools in France where she lived for most of her life. She was celebrating the Passover dinner in the Park Hotel with her husband and daughter and 2 grandchildren. Her husband and 9 year old grandson were injured in the blast. Marianne was killed.

**3.71** Revital Ohayon was 34 years old. She was a mother of two small sons, Matan, 5, and Noam, 4. They lived in a kibbutz close to the coastal town of Hadera near to the Green Line. Revital was a school teacher. She was divorced and lived alone with her sons. On the night of 10 November 2002 she had put her small sons to bed and was talking on the telephone with her ex-husband Avi, with whom she maintained good relations. She heard shots outside as a terrorist from Yasser Arafat's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades entered the kibbutz. She dropped the phone and ran to her sons. They were killed, all three, holding each other in the corner of the room. Avi Ohayon heard the shots over the phone before the line was cut off. Revital and Matan and Noam are buried in the Tsur Shalom Cemetery in Kiryat Bialik. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack. The terrorist escaped.

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<sup>59</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFA1H0ikv0>

**3.72** Noam Leibowitz was 7 years old. She lived with her family in a village close to Haifa. On the night of 17 June 2003, the Leibowitz family was returning to Haifa from a trip to Jerusalem. It was 11.30 pm at night when a terrorist from Kalkilya, 400 meters from the highway on the other side of the Green Line, opened fire with a semi-automatic weapon at the vehicle in which the family were travelling. Noam was killed. Her three year old sister was seriously wounded. Their brother and grandfather were also injured in the attack. At her funeral, Noam was described as “a small girl with a large soul”. She is buried in the Moshav Nir Etzion cemetery.

**3.73** On 4 October 2003, 8 members of the Almog family, grandparents, parents and grandchildren, went for lunch to Maxim’s restaurant in Haifa. In the course of the meal, a young Palestinian woman from Jenin, a 29-year old lawyer named Henadi Jaradat, entered the restaurant. She positioned herself close to the family and set off her bomb. Ze’ev Almog, his wife Ruth, their son Moshe and two grandsons, Tomer and Assaf, were killed in the blast. Their daughter Galit, daughter-in-law Orly, and two other grandchildren were wounded. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

**3.74** There are many stories like those just recounted. Too many. One of the constant features of the terrorist attacks directed against Israelis over the past 40 months is that they have invariably been directed at civilians, specifically and by intent. The civilians have been especially vulnerable – children, the elderly, in discothèques or community halls or hotel dining rooms. This is the nature of the threat that Israel continues to face. This is the reason for the fence, a temporary and non-violent measure to counter a murderous threat directed at the softest of targets.

### ***(iii) The Threat of “Mega-Terror” Attacks***

**3.75** As noted above, there is a real and ever present threat to Israel from mega-terrorists attacks – attacks on a scale that would dwarf the acts of the individual suicide bomber or man with a gun. As a result of good intelligence and alert security, attempts of this kind have so far been successfully thwarted. The risk, however, remains very great. A number of such incidents are in the public domain, including:



- in late April 2002, Israeli security forces apprehended a Palestinian terrorist cell, based in Kalkilya, which had been planning to detonate a 1,000 kilogram car bomb at the base of the Azrieli twin skyscrapers in Tel Aviv;
- on 23 May 2002, a bomb was detonated by remote control inside the Pi Gllilot gas and oil depot on the northern outskirts of Tel Aviv. The resulting fire was quickly extinguished but the risk, and no doubt the intended result, was of a chain reaction of explosions across the depot which, had it occurred, could have killed thousands of people in the vicinity; and
- in January 2003, Israeli police intercepted a bomber who was *en route* to bomb the Teddy Kollek sports stadium in Jerusalem, then packed with people.

***(iv) The Responsibility of “Palestine” for Palestinian Terrorism***

**3.76** The question to the Court does not ask about “Palestine’s” responsibility for these acts of terrorism. It ought to have done. The evidence of attribution, of commission and omission, is great. In a different forum with a different procedure on a question that sought fairly to address the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel would have no hesitation in presenting its case. This is not that forum or that procedure or that question.

**3.77** Three points may nonetheless be made. First, it is accepted by all that the cessation of Palestinian terrorism is the threshold issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once this is addressed, all else will follow. Yasser Arafat committed the PLO, in the *Exchange of Letters* of September 1993, to the renunciation of terrorism and the taking of all possible steps to ensure that this is combated.

**3.78** The Mitchell Committee Report, the Tenet Cease-Fire Plan, the Roadmap, the Joint Statements of the Quartet and resolutions of the Security Council all place a cessation of Palestinian terrorism at the top of the agenda. Every time an attack takes place, the world sends its condolences. Israel has a file full of them. It is little solace in the face of the continuing onslaught. It is only the Government of Israel that can protect its own citizens. It has a responsibility to do so.

**3.79** Israel is acutely aware, and regrets, the suffering of innocent Palestinians on the other side of this conflict. It is concerned to alleviate fabric of life constraints that result from the fence or from any other action taken by Israel in the protection of its citizens. On the scales, however, weighing heavily when it comes to address these issues, are the lives of its citizens.

**3.80** A recent statement by Prime Minister Sharon, of 18 January 2004, reflects this dilemma:

“The operative experience that has accumulated over the past few months in which the fence was being built was both good and bad. It was excellent at preventing terror but was not satisfactory in all matters relating to the damage to Palestinians’ quality of life. I am personally monitoring the problems arising from the operation of the fence and am familiar with the complaints about it; it is possible that additional thought is needed to allow the possibility of changing the route, in order to reduce the number of mishaps in operating the fence without harming security.”<sup>60</sup>

**3.81** Second, there is no doubt that the terrorist actions are violations of the laws and customs of war, including some that amount to grave breaches, and other principles of customary international law. They are in breach of the principle of distinction, which requires differentiation between civilians and combatants. They are in breach of the rule against perfidy and the injunction prohibiting the use of booby traps. They amount to crimes against humanity, contrary to principles enshrined first in the Nuremburg Charter. They violate the most fundamental precepts of the international law safeguarding human rights, including the most basic of rights, that of the inherent right to life. They are also in violation of the central principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

**3.82** Third, the Palestinian leadership knows its responsibilities. Time and again it expresses itself to be committed to ending the violence. Little, if anything, by way of effective measures have ever been undertaken towards this end. The repeated calls by the Quartet, in the statements set out above, for action to be taken by the Palestinian leadership towards this end attests to the frustration of those in the international community who are closest to these issues at the failure to act on this matter.

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<sup>60</sup> Statement by Prime Minister Sharon, 18 January 2004. (Annex 19)

3.83 Speaking at the Aqaba Summit on 4 June 2003 in the presence of King Abdullah II of Jordan and US President George W. Bush, the then Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas, said as follows:

“As we all realise, this is an important moment. A new opportunity for peace exists, an opportunity based upon President Bush’s vision and the Quartet’s road map, which we have accepted without any reservations.

Our goal is two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side, in peace and security. The process is one of direct negotiations to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to resolve all the permanent status issues, and end the occupation that began in 1967, under which the Palestinians have suffered so much.

At the same time, we do not ignore the suffering of the Jews throughout history. It is time to bring this suffering to an end.

Just as Israel must meet its responsibilities, we, the Palestinians, will fulfil our obligations for this endeavour to succeed. We are ready to do our part.

Let me be very clear: There will be no military solution to this conflict, so we **repeat our renunciation, a renunciation of terror against Israelis wherever they may be. Such methods are inconsistent with our religious and moral traditions and are dangerous obstacles to the achievement of an independent, sovereign state we seek. These methods also conflict with the kinds of state we wish to build, based on human rights and the rule of law.**

**We will exert all of our efforts, using all our resources to end the militarization of the intifada, and we will succeed. The armed intifada must end, and we must use and resort to peaceful means in our quest to end the occupation and the suffering of Palestinians and Israelis.** And to establish the Palestinian state, we emphasise our determination to implement our pledges which we have made for our people and the international community. And that is a rule of law, single political authority, weapons only in the hands of those who are in charge with upholding the law and order, and political diversity within the framework of democracy.

**Our goal is clear and we will implement it firmly and without compromise: a complete end to violence and terrorism.** And we will be full partners in the international war against occupation and terrorism. And we will call upon our partners in this war to prevent financial and military assistance to those who oppose this position. We do this as part of our commitment to the interest of the Palestinian people, and the members of the large family of humanity.

We will also act vigorously against incitement and violence and hatred, whatever their form or forum may be. We will take measures to ensure that there is no incitement from Palestinian institutions. We must also reactivate

and invigorate the U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli Anti-Incitement Committee. We will continue to work to establish the rule of law and to consolidate government authority in accountable Palestinian institutions. We seek to build the kind of democratic state that will be a qualitative addition to the international community.

**All the PA security forces will be part of these efforts**, and will work together toward the achievement of these goals. Our national future is at stake, and no one will be allowed to jeopardise it.”<sup>61</sup>

**3.84** The killing began again the very next day. Since these words were spoken, 127 Israelis have been killed – in suicide bomb attacks, in roadside shootings, in stabbings. Yasser Arafat’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades have claimed responsibility for a many of these attacks.

**3.85** Responding to Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas at the Aqaba Summit, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon said as follows:

“As the Prime Minister of Israel, the land which is the cradle of the Jewish people, my paramount responsibility is the security of the people of Israel and of the State of Israel. There can be no compromise with terror and Israel, together with all free nations, will continue to fight terrorism until its final defeat.

Ultimately, permanent security requires peace and permanent security can only be obtained through security, and there is now hope of a new opportunity for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel, like others, has lent its strong support for President Bush’s vision, expressed on June 24, 2002, of two States – Israel and a Palestinian state – living side by side in peace and security. The Government and people of Israel welcome the opportunity to renew direct negotiations according to the steps of the roadmap as adopted by the Israeli government to achieve this vision.

It is in Israel’s interests not to govern the Palestinians but for the Palestinians to govern themselves in their own state. A democratic Palestinian state fully at peace with Israel will promote the long-term security and well-being of Israel as a Jewish state.

There can be no peace, however, without the abandonment and elimination of terrorism, violence, and incitement. We will work alongside the Palestinians and other states to fight terrorism, violence and incitement of all kinds. As all parties perform their obligations, we will seek to restore normal Palestinian life, improve the humanitarian situation, rebuild trust, and promote progress

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<sup>61</sup> Statement by Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas, Aqaba Summit, 4 June 2003 (emphasis added). (Annex 20)

towards the President's vision. We will act in a manner that respects the dignity as well as the human rights of all people.

We can also reassure our Palestinian partners that we understand the importance of territorial contiguity in the West Bank for a viable Palestinian state. Israeli policy in the territories that are subject to direct negotiations with the Palestinians will reflect this fact.

We accept the principle that no unilateral actions by any party can prejudice the outcome of our negotiations.

In regard to the unauthorised outposts, I want to reiterate that Israel is a society governed by the rule of law. Thus, we will immediately begin to remove unauthorised outposts.

Israel seeks peace with all its Arab neighbours. Israel is prepared to negotiate in good faith wherever there are partners. As normal relations are established, I am confident that they will find in Israel a neighbour and a people committed to a comprehensive peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the region.<sup>62</sup>

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**3.86** This is the prism through which Israel's objections to jurisdiction and to the propriety of a response by the Court on the substance of the question ought to be seen. The Court has discretion, under Article 65(1) of its Statute, to decide whether to respond to the request for an opinion. Israel urges the Court to exercise its discretion and decline to respond to the substance of the request. It is dangerous for the Roadmap. It cuts across the endorsed initiative of the Security Council. It is dangerous for the integrity of the Court. Legal arguments in support of this contention are developed in detail in the following Chapters of this statement.

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<sup>62</sup> Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, Aqaba Summit, 4 June 2003. (Annex 21)

**PART TWO**

**OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION**



**CHAPTER 4**  
**THE REQUEST IS *ULTRA VIRES* THE COMPETENCE OF THE 10<sup>th</sup> EMERGENCY  
SPECIAL SESSION AND/OR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

**A. Introduction**

**4.1** Israel contends that the present request for an advisory opinion is *ultra vires* the competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The Emergency Special Session was convened in April 1997 pursuant to General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950 entitled “United for Peace” (“Uniting for Peace Resolution”).<sup>63</sup> This provides, in operative part, that the General Assembly may consider a matter with a view to making appropriate recommendations “if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. In this case, however, there was no failure by the Security Council to act. On the contrary, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1515 (2003) just 19 days before the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session adopted the resolution requesting an advisory opinion. Resolution 1515 (2003) endorsed a carefully planned diplomatic initiative – the Roadmap – designed to find a path back to negotiations. The request for an advisory opinion is at odds with the Roadmap. It is *ultra vires* the competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session.

**4.2** This should be an end of the matter. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was the basis on which the Emergency Special Session was convened and continued to act. It sets the terms of its competence. A violation of its essential conditions is a sufficient basis for impugning the *vires* of the Emergency Special Session as regards its request for an advisory opinion.

**4.3** For completeness, however, Israel observes that, given the active engagement of the Security Council with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the advisory opinion request would also have been *ultra vires* the competence of the General Assembly even when convened in regular session. Israel does not question the General Assembly’s secondary responsibility and competence for the maintenance of international peace and security. Its responsibility and competence in this field are, however, subsidiary to that of the Security Council. Under the scheme of the Charter, in circumstances in which the Security Council has acted in exercise of its primary responsibility, the General Assembly has a duty to exercise restraint. The principle of

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<sup>63</sup> A/RES/377 (V), 3 November 1950, “Uniting for Peace”. (Annex 22)



speciality referred to by the Court in respect of international organisations in general in its advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Use by States of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict* applies equally to the competence and balance of responsibility of organs of the United Nations. These and related issues are addressed in more detail in the sections of this Chapter that follow below.

## B. Background

### (i) *The Convening of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly*

4.4 On 7 March 1997, the Security Council convened to consider a draft resolution addressing Israeli settlements.<sup>64</sup> The draft did not achieve the requisite majority in consequence of the negative vote of the United States. Speaking after the vote, Mr Al-Kidwa, the Palestinian Observer, stated *inter alia* as follows:

“... the Council has been unable to assume its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security or to adopt the draft resolution because one permanent member exercised its right of veto. ...

Accordingly, despite our deep appreciation for the efforts of all, in view of the Council’s failure to fulfil its obligations, we will request the members of the United Nations to agree an emergency meeting of the General Assembly, to be held in response to these developments in order to take appropriate action.”<sup>65</sup>

4.5 Two weeks later, a further draft resolution was brought to the Council on the same topic of settlements.<sup>66</sup> It too failed to achieve the requisite majority in consequence of the negative vote of the United States. Speaking after the vote, Mr Al-Kidwa, the Palestinian Observer, stated as follows:

“... the Security Council has, for the second time, failed to carry out its responsibilities and duties for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”<sup>67</sup>

4.6 In a letter dated 31 March 1997 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations requested “that an emergency special session of the

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<sup>64</sup> S/1997/199, 7 March 1997.

<sup>65</sup> Statement by Mr Al-Kidwa, S/PV.3747, 7 March 1997, at p.6.

<sup>66</sup> S/1997/241, 21 March 1997.

<sup>67</sup> Statement by Mr Al-Kidwa, S/PV.3756, 21 March 1997, at p.8.

General Assembly be convened pursuant to resolution 377 A (V), entitled ‘Uniting for Peace’”.  
In relevant part, this letter stated as follows:

“The Group of States members of the League of Arab States has discussed the dangerous situation resulting from the illegal Israeli actions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, in particular the commencement of the construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement to the south of occupied East Jerusalem, and other measures regarding Jerusalem and the building of settlements.

The Arab States have considered the failure of the Security Council to exercise its role in maintaining international peace and security owing to the use of the veto by a permanent member of the Council on two successive occasions in less than two weeks.

Given their belief that the illegal Israeli measures in question represent a threat to international peace and security as undermining the Middle East peace process and are in violation of international law and the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and in the light of Israel’s persistence in these measures **and of the failure of the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility under the charter of the United Nations**, the States members of the League of Arab States have decided that it is necessary to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly, pursuant to its resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, entitled ‘Uniting for Peace’, to consider ‘Illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory’.

Accordingly, and in my capacity as Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar to the United Nations, I request that an emergency special session of the General Assembly be convened pursuant to resolution 377 A (V), entitled ‘Uniting for Peace’, in order to consider this important matter.”<sup>68</sup>

4.7 Pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly as revised by the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the text of this letter was transmitted to UN Member States by the UN Secretary-General on 1 April 1997. In a note dated 22 April 1997, the Secretary-General informed Member States that the majority of Members had concurred in Qatar’s request and that, accordingly, the tenth emergency special session would convene on 24 April 1997.<sup>69</sup>

4.8 Opening the first meeting of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session on 24 April 1997, the President of the Session stated as follows:

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<sup>68</sup> A/ES-10/1, 22 April 1997 (emphasis added).

<sup>69</sup> A/ES-10/1, 22 April 1997.

“This emergency special session of the General Assembly reflects the conviction of the membership that there exists an increasingly grave situation involving peace and security. In the past two months, the Security Council twice held extensive discussions, and the General Assembly once, on the illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories. For the second time, the issue has been placed before the General Assembly. The discussions in the Security Council have proved to be inconclusive, **since it has been unable to take action because of lack of unanimity of its permanent Members.**

The convening of this session, which is being held in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, entitled ‘Uniting for Peace’, at the request of a Member State and with the concurrence of a large majority of Members, demonstrates clearly their gravest concern and awareness of the implications of the present situation.”<sup>70</sup>

**4.9** Opening the debate, Mr Al-Kidwa set the agenda in the following terms:

“Yes, uniting for peace. Uniting against the violation of international law and United Nations resolutions. Uniting to confront the arrogance of power and the mentality of occupation. Uniting to oppose the misuse of the veto and attempts to neutralise the Security Council. Uniting in order to rescue the Middle East peace process. Yes, uniting for a just solution to the question of Palestine and the establishment of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region.”<sup>71</sup>

**4.10** Following the debate, the Emergency Special Session adopted resolution A/RES/ES-10/2 of 25 April 1997. By operative paragraph 13 of the resolution, the Emergency Special Session decided to adjourn temporarily “to resume its meetings upon request from Member States”.<sup>72</sup> The Emergency Special Session has been reconvened, has been temporarily suspended, and has been reconvened again on 11 separate occasions in the 6 ½ year period since April 1997.<sup>73</sup> Its debates and resolutions over this period have ranged very far from the question of the

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<sup>70</sup> Statement by Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia, A/ES-10/PV.1, 24 April 1997, at p.2 (emphasis added).

<sup>71</sup> Statement by Mr Al-Kidwa, A/ES-10/PV.1, 24 April 1997, at p.3.

<sup>72</sup> A/RES/ES-10/2, 25 April 1997. (**Dossier No.3**)

<sup>73</sup> The Emergency Special Session (“ESS”) was reconvened on 15 July 1997 following a request of 7 July 1997 by the Permanent Representative of Egypt, and Chairman of the Arab Group, Ambassador Elaraby; A/ES-10/8, 7 July 1997. The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 13 of A/RES/ES-10/3, 15 July 1997 (**Dossier No.4**). The ESS was again reconvened on 13 November 1997 (A/ES-10/17, 24 October 1997). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 9 of A/RES/ES-10/4, 13 November 1997 (**Dossier No.5**). The ESS was again reconvened on 17 March 1998 (A/ES-10/21, 11 March 1998). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 8 of A/RES/ES-10/5, 17 March 1998 (**Dossier No.6**). The ESS was again reconvened on 5 February 1999 (A/ES-10/31, 26 January 1999). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 10 of A/RES/ES-10/6, 9 February 1999 (**Dossier No.7**). The ESS was

Israeli “settlement activities in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area”, the draft resolutions on which were vetoed in the Security Council by the United States, this being relied upon as the basis for the convening of the Emergency Special Session pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

*(ii) The Uniting for Peace Resolution*

**4.11** The Uniting for Peace Resolution was adopted by the 302<sup>nd</sup> plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 3 November 1950. Insofar as is material for present purposes, it provides:

*“The General Assembly*

*Recognising* that the first stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

‘To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace’, and

‘To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace’,

*Reaffirming* that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievement of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions,

*Finding* that international tension exists on a dangerous scale,

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again reconvened on 18 October 2000 (A/ES-10/36, 13 October 2000). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 12 of A/RES/ES-10/7, 20 October 2000 (**Dossier No.8**). The ESS was again reconvened on 20 December 2001 (A/ES-10/130, 18 December 2001). Two resolutions were adopted at this reconvened Session, A/RES/ES-10/8, 20 December 2001 (**Dossier No.9**) and A/RES/ES-10/9, 20 December 2001 (**Dossier No.10**). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of the latter resolution. The ESS was again reconvened on 7 May 2002 (A/ES-10/170, 3 May 2002). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 10 of A/RES/ES-10/10, 7 May 2002 (**Dossier No.11**). The ESS was again reconvened on 5 August 2002 (A/ES-10/187, 1 August 2002). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 8 of A/RES/ES-10/11, 10 September 2002 (**Dossier No.12**). The ESS was again reconvened on 19 September 2003 (A/ES-10/237, 17 September 2003). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of A/RES/ES-10/12, 25 September 2003 (**Dossier No.13**). The ESS was again reconvened on 20 October 2003 (A/ES-10/242, 15 October 2003). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of A/RES/ES-10/13, 27 October 2003 (**Dossier No.14**). Most recently, the ESS was again reconvened on 8 December 2003 (A/ES-10/249, 2 December 2003).

*Recalling* its resolution 290 (IV) entitled ‘Essentials of peace’, which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution,

*Reaffirming* the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

*Reaffirming* that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security,

*Conscious* that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

*Recognising* in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Recognising* that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,

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1. ***Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures***, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefore. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. *Adopts* for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

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3. *Establishes* a Peace Observation Commission ... which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilise the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilise the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilise the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter.

...<sup>74</sup>

**4.12** Pursuant to operative paragraph 2 of and the Annex to the Resolution, various amendments were made to the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.

**4.13** A number of salient features of the resolution warrant emphasis. First, the Uniting for Peace Resolution recognises that the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This is expressly stated, for example, in the seventh preambular paragraph of the resolution. Second, the resolution affirms the General Assembly's subsidiary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This is stated, for example, in the tenth preambular paragraph of the resolution. Third, the resolution expressly affirms a hierarchical relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly in respect of their overlapping competence and responsibility in this area. Thus, for example, the ninth preambular paragraph contemplates circumstances in which the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibilities. The point is affirmed in operative paragraph 1 of the resolution as regards the circumstances in which the General Assembly will be competent to consider a matter. It is reinforced in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution which provides that the General Assembly may utilise the Peace Observation Commission – a body established by the General Assembly – in respect of a matter only in circumstances in which “the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question”.

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<sup>74</sup> A/RES/377 (V), 3 November 1950, emphasis added. (Annex 22)

**4.14** Fourth, and most significantly, the resolution lays down a condition precedent to any consideration of a matter by the General Assembly under the framework of the resolution. By operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, the General Assembly shall consider a matter immediately “if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case”. The question in any case in which there may be a request for the General Assembly to convene to consider a matter, or for an Emergency Special Session to act in respect of a matter, is whether the Security Council, in consequence of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility in the case.

**4.15** Fifth, the resolution also lays down various procedural rules relevant to the convening of the General Assembly pursuant to the resolution to consider a matter. Operative paragraph 2, together with the annex to the resolution, amends the General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure as regards the convening of meetings of the Assembly pursuant to the terms of the resolution. Of some importance, operative paragraph 1 provides that the Assembly may meet in emergency special session to consider a matter pursuant to the terms of the resolution in circumstances in which the General Assembly is not in ordinary session.

**4.16** The Uniting for Peace Resolution is part of the fabric of the United Nations. It affirms the competence of the General Assembly under the Charter in circumstances in which the Security Council is unable to act. At the same time, however, it draws the limits on this competence in circumstances in which the Council is able to and has acted. It is a resolution of the General Assembly itself. It reflects the balance of responsibilities and competence between the principal executive organ and the principal deliberative organ of the United Nations. The strictures of its terms cannot be lightly discounted or wished away by the creative intent of some of the Members of the United Nations to achieve some private political purpose.

**C. The Exercise by the Security Council of its Primary Responsibility  
in Respect of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Subsequent to the Convening  
of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session**

**4.17** As noted in Chapter 3, the Security Council has been actively engaged in attempts to find a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past 40 months of violence. Resolution 1322 (2000) of 7 October 2000, adopted some days after the violence first erupted,

reaffirmed the Council's view "that a just and lasting solution to the Arab and Israeli conflict must be based on its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, *through an active negotiating process*."<sup>75</sup> Resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002 again recalled resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and, for the first time explicitly, affirmed "a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognised borders". Israel has endorsed this vision, as the statement, quoted in Chapter 3, by Prime Minister Sharon at the Aqaba Summit on 4 June 2003 attests. This resolution of the Security Council has become the central pivot of recent attempts to find a path back to negotiations.

**4.18** In March-April 2002, the Security Council was again actively engaged, adopting resolutions 1402 (2002), 1403 (2002) and 1405 (2002), as well as issuing a Statement by the President of the Security Council supporting the initiative of the Quartet that was later to become the Roadmap. A further Presidential Statement supporting the Quartet initiative was issued on 18 July 2002 and resolution 1435 (2002) adopted on 24 September 2002. Following its formal presentation to the two sides, the Roadmap was transmitted to the Security Council under cover of a letter from the UN Secretary-General of 7 May 2003.

**4.19** In early October 2003, a number of elements of the Israeli-Palestinian and wider Arab-Israeli conflict came again before the Security Council. On Saturday, 4 October 2003, a Palestinian suicide bomber from Jenin, acting in the name of Islamic Jihad, killed 19 people and injured a further 60, some critically, in Maxim's restaurant in Haifa. This was the attack, noted in Chapter 3, which killed 5 members of the Almog family. Islamic Jihad receives active support from Syria. Israel accordingly took action against terrorist facilities in Syria in response to the attack. No one was killed or injured in the Israeli action.

**4.20** In response to Israel's action, 17 States from the Arab League proposed a draft resolution to the Security Council on 5 October 2003 condemnatory of Israel's conduct.<sup>76</sup> No reference was made in the draft resolution to Syria's active support for the terrorist group that the preceding day had killed so many. The Council, on the eve of Yom Kippur, met to consider the

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<sup>75</sup> S/RES/1322 (2000), 7 October 2000, at the third preambular paragraph (emphasis added).

<sup>76</sup> S/2003/340, 5 October 2003.



draft resolution the same day.<sup>77</sup> Absent support for the draft resolution, it was not pressed to a vote.

**4.21** It is worth noting extracts from some of the statements made by Members of the Security Council in the course of the debate. Taken together, they point to a widely held view amongst Members of the Council that the Roadmap is the only option for finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**Mr Wang Guangya (China)**

“China is gravely concerned about the latest developments in the Middle East situation. We strongly condemn the suicide bombing of 4 October, which resulted in many innocent civilian casualties. We oppose any measures that may threaten the peace process between Israel and Palestine. We strongly urge both sides to cease acts of violence and any other acts that may exacerbate tensions. **We hope that they will return to the proper track of settling disputes through negotiation as soon as possible.**”<sup>78</sup>

**Sir Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom)**

“Let me be clear that Israel’s action today is unacceptable and represents an escalation. Israel should not allow its justified anger at continuing terrorism to lead to actions that undermine both the peace process and, we believe, Israel’s own interests. **But we have to recognise that terrorists are continuing to attack Israel and that they are being permitted to do so.** There is a heavy responsibility on all those who are in a position to act against terrorism to do so. That has been affirmed by the Security Council many times, and perhaps most clearly in resolution 1373 (2001).

Allowing impunity to those committed to using terror as a political instrument serves only to undermine peace and prevent progress in the Middle East peace process. The United Kingdom believes that lasting security can only be assured by a successful peace process, as was stressed at the conclusion of the Quartet meeting held in New York on 25 September. We believe that all sides should exercise restraint and now reinforce their efforts to implement the road map. In the next day, the Security Council should do all that it can to help bring that about. **We will all have to reflect carefully on the best message we can now send in order that we reinforce the prospects of the road map, and do so at a precarious moment in the Middle East.**”<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003. (Annex 23)

<sup>78</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.9 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

<sup>79</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.9 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

**Mr Gatilov** (Russian Federation)

“The ongoing escalation of violence in the Middle East requires more energetic action on the part of the international community in order to prevent an even more dangerous aggravation of the situation. It is important now to press the parties to the conflict to halt the confrontation as soon as possible and to restore the political process, the final goal of which is a comprehensive settlement in the region. To that end, **what we need above all is to unblock the way forward on the road map, to which there is no alternative in finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinians and Israelis alike must resume their dialogue and begin to carry out their obligations under the roadmap.**”<sup>80</sup>

**Mr Pleuger** (Germany)

“We are very concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. We feel that we have to break the vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence. **De-escalation, we feel, is possible only by a return to implementing the road map as proposed by the Quartet. There is no alternative to the road map for finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for creating peace and stability in the Middle East.**”<sup>81</sup>

**Mr De La Sablière** (France)

“I stress once again that the situation in the Middle East is most alarming. In such difficult circumstances, we appeal to all parties – particularly the Israelis, Palestinians and Syrians – to allow reason to prevail over the threat of escalation. There can be no lasting security without peace. Peace can prevail only through negotiation, not by the force of arms. It is essential that the opportunity for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement be sought in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. **The road map, which contains Syrian and Lebanese tracks, must be given a chance.**”<sup>82</sup>

**Mr Tafrov** (Bulgaria)

“Bulgaria categorically condemns the terrorist act carried out yesterday in Haifa, as we always do on such occasions. It is important for all those who make such acts possible to do their utmost to end them by ceasing all material and moral support to them. The murder of an innocent child is particularly repugnant.

Bulgaria believes that Israel’s armed action against the Syrian Arab Republic is not in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations or with international law. Like other delegations, we consider it to have been an unacceptable act. **The only resolution of the Middle East crisis – which has of late grown more serious – lies in the implementation of the road map**

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<sup>80</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at pp.9 – 10 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

<sup>81</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.10 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

<sup>82</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at pp.10 – 11 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

devised by the Quartet, as the Quartet itself noted in its statement following its most recent meeting in New York.”<sup>83</sup>

**Mr Muñoz (Chile)**

**“The international community views with alarm these developments and their impact on the peace process and the road map on which the Quartet is seeking to make progress for the benefit of the majority, who, we believe, seek peace and coexistence among Israel, Palestine, Syria and all other neighbours in the region.”**<sup>84</sup>

**Mr Gaspar Martins (Angola)**

**“We need to see a real commitment by the parties to the conflict to put a stop to the logic of violence. Violence is not stopped with violence. We reiterate our appeal to the States in the region to create a climate conducive to progress in the implementation of the road map, which, alone, will bring a stop to the building of walls, or to acts that took place over the weekend in Haifa and Damascus. My delegation unequivocally condemns such acts. A clear commitment to peace and moderation in the Middle East is long overdue.”**<sup>85</sup>

**Mr Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon)**

**“We urgently appeal to the international negotiators, in particular the Quartet, immediately to take actions aimed at the containment of the situation and to accelerate the taking of bold steps, which the Secretary-General referred to on 26 September. Such bold steps, in keeping with the roadmap, should deal simultaneously with the fundamental needs of the two parties, namely, security for Israel and an end to occupation for Palestine.”**<sup>86</sup>

**4.22** On 9 October 2003, refusing to heed the call of Members of the Security Council just 5 days earlier for moderation in an attempt to get back to the Roadmap, the Permanent Representative of Syria, as Chairman of the Arab Group, wrote to the President of the Security Council.<sup>87</sup> The letter referred to “the decision by Israel to proceed with the construction of its expansionist conquest wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. Annexed to the letter was a draft resolution for consideration by the Council which, in operative paragraph 1, would have had the Council decide that the “wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law”. This draft resolution was subsequently superseded by a further draft resolution proposed by Syria, Guinea,

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<sup>83</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.11 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

<sup>84</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.11 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

<sup>85</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.12 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

<sup>86</sup> S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.13 (emphasis added). (Annex 23)

<sup>87</sup> S/2003/973, 9 October 2003. (Dossier No.73)

Malaysia and Pakistan of 14 October 2003 which, with some additional preambular paragraphs, repeated operative paragraph 1 of the earlier draft resolution.<sup>88</sup>

4.23 The Security Council met to debate the issues on 14 October 2003.<sup>89</sup> A vote on the proposed draft resolution was defeated by the negative vote of the United States. Bulgaria, Cameroon, Germany and the United Kingdom abstained from supporting the draft resolution. Extracts of a number of the statements made in the course of the debate warrant citation:

**Sir Emyr Jones Parry** (United Kingdom – abstaining)

“The United Kingdom is gravely concerned about the prospects for peace in the Middle East. It is vital that both sides realise exactly how much is now at stake. **The United Kingdom is committed to the Quartet’s road map as the best way ahead to implement the vision of the two States, living side by side in peace and security. It is essential that the two sides implement the obligations contained in the road map.**

...

That is why the United Kingdom believes that the international community has a direct stake in the peace process. A continuing, strong international commitment to the road map-based process is imperative. A strong and determined Quartet can play a vital role, closely following road map implementation through reports of monitors and making an extra effort where it detects problems or deficiencies.

But, ultimately, Israel’s security can only be achieved through a just and lasting settlement negotiated between the two parties. A Palestinian State will not be created by acts of terrorism. The road map offers the region the best opportunity for peace. In that context, we look to both the Israelis and the Palestinians to move forward in implementing their obligations under the first phase.”<sup>90</sup>

**Mr Tafrov** (Bulgaria – abstaining)

“**Bulgaria is convinced that the road map alone is the answer to the problems of the Middle East.** Both parties must do their utmost to overcome their differences, to resume their contacts and to continue joint efforts to create two States living within internationally recognised boundaries, as provided for by Security Council resolutions.

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<sup>88</sup> S/2003/980, 14 October 2003. (Dossier No.84)

<sup>89</sup> S/PV.4841, 14 October 2003 (Dossier No.44) and S/PV.4842, 14 October 2003 (Dossier No.45).

<sup>90</sup> S/PV.4841, 14 October 2003, at pp.13 – 14 (emphasis added). (Dossier No.44)

**Bulgaria believes that it is necessary for the entire international community, and in particular the members of the Quartet, to convince both parties to implement the road map. At that point, there would no longer be any reason to build the wall, and prospects for a peaceful resolution would increase.**<sup>91</sup>

**Mr Lavrov** (Russian Federation – in favour)

“We believe that if the roadmap is not made binding in nature, it may remain on paper and the region will ultimately be swept up in a wave of violence. This is why, during the meeting of the Quartet in New York this September, **the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, Igor Ivanov, put forward an initiative for the adoption of a special Security Council resolution that would approve the road map.** This proposal not only remains valid, it is becoming ever more urgent.”<sup>92</sup>

**Mr Pleuger** (Germany – abstaining)

“The members of the Quartet continue to back the road map for peace as accepted by both sides at the Aqaba Summit, held on 4 June 2003. **We call upon both the Israeli and Palestinian Governments to continue to implement the road map in good faith, because we feel there is no alternative to the road map as the way to peace.**”<sup>93</sup>

**4.24** It is important to note what the draft resolution did not propose. It did not propose that the Security Council request an advisory opinion from the Court on the question of the legality of the fence, its legal consequences or anything else.

**4.25** Immediately following the vote in the Security Council, Syria, acting as Chair of the Arab Group, requested a reconvening of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly.<sup>94</sup> The Emergency Special Session was reconvened on 20 October 2003. The meeting had before it two draft resolutions, the first requesting an advisory opinion from the Court, the second purporting to declare the illegality of the fence. In the light of discussions, it was evident that there was strong opposition to an advisory opinion request. The draft resolution on the subject was not, therefore, pressed to a vote. On 27 October 2003, the Emergency Special Session adopted resolution ES-10/13.<sup>95</sup> Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution demanded that “Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall” and declared it to be in “contradiction to

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<sup>91</sup> S/PV.4841, 14 October 2003, at pp.14 – 15 (emphasis added). **(Dossier No.44)**

<sup>92</sup> S/PV.4841, 14 October 2003, at p.15 (emphasis added). **(Dossier No.44)**

<sup>93</sup> S/PV.4841, 14 October 2003, at p.19 (emphasis added). **(Dossier No.44)**

<sup>94</sup> A/ES-10/242, 15 October 2003. **(Dossier No.74)**

<sup>95</sup> A/RES/ES-10/13, 27 October 2003. **(Dossier No.14)**

relevant provisions of international law”. Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution called upon both parties to “fulfil their obligations under relevant provisions of the roadmap”.

**4.26** On 30 October 2003, three days after this vote, in keeping with the earlier initiative of the Russian Foreign Minister referred to in the Security Council debate on 14 October 2003, Russia proposed a draft resolution in the Security Council on the Roadmap. The text of this draft, which was the subject of extended private deliberations amongst Members of the Security Council, was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 19 November 2003 as resolution 1515 (2003).<sup>96</sup> On the same day, the Security Council held another meeting also to consider issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<sup>97</sup>

**4.27** Nineteen days after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1515 (2003), the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session adopted the resolution currently in issue requesting an advisory opinion. Extracts from a number of the statements made during the debate on this resolution were set out in Chapter 3. It is evident from the statements that there was a widely held view amongst Council Members that, in the words of Representative of Germany in the Security Council, “[t]here is no alternative to the road map for finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for creating peace and stability in the Middle East.”<sup>98</sup>

#### **D. The Advisory Opinion Request is *Ultra Vires* the Competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session and/or the General Assembly**

**4.28** As will be clear from the preceding, the Security Council has been intimately taken up with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past two years (and more) in an attempt to bring the two sides back to negotiations. This involvement has ranged from the affirmation of the vision of a two-State solution to the conflict in resolution 1397 (2002), to active support for the Quartet initiative throughout the preparatory process of the Roadmap, to the unanimous endorsement of the Roadmap in resolution 1515 (2003). The principal protagonists of the Roadmap within the Security Council, as well as others, have repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Roadmap and expressly sought to discourage, as destabilising to attempts to bring the two sides together,

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<sup>96</sup> S/PV.4862, 19 November 2003. (Annex 24)

<sup>97</sup> S/PV.4861, 19 November 2003. (Annex 24)

<sup>98</sup> See paragraph 4.21 above.

precisely the kinds of initiatives that were brought to the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session in its October and December 2003 meetings.

**4.29** As will be evident from the discussion in Chapter 3, virtually any response by the Court on the substance of the request for an opinion would cut across and risk destabilising the Roadmap. This issue is addressed further in Chapter 9. The question at this point is different. It is whether, given the active engagement by the Security Council with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its unanimous endorsement of a particular initiative just 19 days before the advisory opinion request, it was open to the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session, acting under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, to set in train a process different to that being pursued by the Security Council. Israel contends that it was not open to the Emergency Special Session to proceed in this manner. Moreover, the General Assembly convened in regular session would have been similarly precluded from so acting.

***(i) The Advisory Opinion Request is Ultra Vires the Competence of the  
Emergency Special Session Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution***

**4.30** As already noted, the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session was convened in April 1997 following the US veto in the Security Council of two draft resolutions concerning “settlement activities in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area” in Jerusalem. It has been a rolling session ever since, ranging far from the subject matter of the original issue it was convened to address.

**4.31** By reference to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, there are a number of highly problematical questions relevant to the conduct of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session. For example, is the rolling character of the Emergency Special Session – having been convened and reconvened on 12 separate occasions since April 1997 – consistent with the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the revised Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly adopted pursuant thereto? Israel contends that it is not. The Uniting for Peace Resolution contemplates the convening of emergency special sessions in accordance with a specific procedure to address a specific issue of immediate concern. The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly were revised to meet this objective. Rolling emergency special sessions which are reconvened at a time and on a subject that is detached from the original session are at odds with the very intent of the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure.

4.32 This practice, indeed, has been the subject of long-standing concern and criticism by a number of Members of the United Nations over many years. For example, addressing the resumption of the 7<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session in 1982 some 21 months after its temporary adjournment, US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, in a letter addressed to the President of the General Assembly, stated as follows:

“It seems plain that the purpose of this ‘temporary’ adjournment was to allow for a resumption in the same time frame if events warranted. We do not believe that Members contemplated that the session could be maintained in its state of adjournment indefinitely with the possibility of being ‘resumed’ on request. Indeed, two regular sessions, two emergency sessions and one special session of the General Assembly have been held since that time. What is now proposed is that, at the request of a group of Members, and notwithstanding the passage of a substantial period of time, an emergency special session should be reconvened without regard to the views of the majority of the membership of the United Nations or to developments that may have taken place. This dubious procedure of a ‘resumption’ has the effect of undermining the provisions of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly for the convening of an emergency special session. In the opinion of the United States, it is not possible some 21 months after adjournments to ‘resume’ the old session. We cannot understand how the word ‘temporary’ can be stretched to cover a gap of this duration.”<sup>99</sup>

4.33 This view was supported at the time by others, including Israel.<sup>100</sup> The point remains unresolved today. For example, while not explicitly challenging its rolling character, US Ambassador John Negroponte nevertheless expressed the doubts of the United States about the reconvening of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session in May 2002 in the following terms:

“The United States is fully committed to a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. ...

We believe that the best way forward is to advance the comprehensive strategy that the ‘quartet’ reaffirmed at its meeting last week. ...

The Security Council met 32 times on the Middle East last month, sidelining all other matters. Frankly, we are puzzled by the Palestinian decision to resort to a resumption of the emergency special session at this time of Security Council activism and new diplomatic initiative.”<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> A/ES-7/16, 19 April 1982.

<sup>100</sup> See, for example, A/ES-7/18, 22 April 1982.

<sup>101</sup> A/ES-10/PV.16, 7 May 2002, at p.12.



**4.34** An additional problematical aspect of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session is the convening of its meeting on the advisory opinion request at the same time as the General Assembly was meeting in regular session. Indeed, the propriety of holding an emergency special session simultaneously with a regular session was expressly rejected by the President of the General Assembly at the time of the 1<sup>st</sup> Emergency Special Session in 1956 in the following terms:

“Holding simultaneous sessions would be contrary to the provisions for convening emergency special sessions, which are held solely because the General Assembly is not in regular session at the time. The drafters of the rules relating to emergency meetings had not intended such meetings to be held when the Assembly was in regular session and thus fully capable of dealing with the items before it.”<sup>102</sup>

**4.35** The propriety of this view was formally confirmed by resolution 1003 (ES-I) of the 1<sup>st</sup> Emergency Special Session on 10 November 1956 which transferred the items on the agenda of the Emergency Special Session to the provisional agenda of the 11<sup>th</sup> regular session of the General Assembly for consideration in that forum.<sup>103</sup> The express terms of operative paragraph 1 of the Uniting for Peace Resolution also confirm the correctness of this approach.<sup>104</sup>

**4.36** The prohibition on convening an emergency special session while the General Assembly is in regular session was also emphasised in a Memorandum prepared by the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat on 25 August 1967. Supporting the statement, quoted above, of the President of the General Assembly at the time of the 1<sup>st</sup> Emergency Special Session, the Memorandum concluded:

“... there would seem to be considerable merit in the argument advanced by the President of the first emergency special session ... that holding simultaneous sessions would be contrary to the purpose of emergency special sessions, as a device for speedily convening the Assembly when it is not already in session.”<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> UN GAOR, 1<sup>st</sup> Emergency Special Session, 572<sup>nd</sup> Plenary Meeting, at paragraph 28.

<sup>103</sup> Resolution 1003 (ES-I), 10 November 1956.

<sup>104</sup> Operative paragraph 1 states *inter alia*: “If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session ...”

<sup>105</sup> United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1967, p.321, at p. 324. The same point is made in Simma (ed.), *The United Nations Charter: A Commentary* (2001), at pp.387 – 389.

4.37 There are other questions, too, which go to the essential propriety of the conduct of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session. It is not Israel's intention, however, in the context of these proceedings, to engage in detailed debates on every aspect of the procedural conduct of the Emergency Special Session. What is of more fundamental concern as regards these proceedings is the evident disregard by the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the condition precedent in the Uniting for Peace Resolution to any consideration of a matter by the General Assembly.

4.38 Operative paragraph 1 of the Uniting for Peace Resolution provides that the General Assembly

*“Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, **fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security** in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures ...”*<sup>106</sup>

4.39 This is the declared basis on which the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session was convened and is said to have been acting. The fundamental question is thus whether, in this case, the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has indeed failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It goes without saying that, while, in the first instance, this will be a matter for the appreciation of the General Assembly itself, the question engages the interpretation of a central pillar of Charter architecture designed to clarify and elaborate on the competence of and division of responsibility between two of the Organisation's principal organs. It is thus a matter which comes properly within the purview of the Court in proceedings such as this.

4.40 One observation needs immediately to be made. The Security Council was never seised of a draft resolution proposing that the Council itself should request an advisory opinion from the Court on the matters now in contention. It may be that the co-sponsors of the resolution in the Emergency Special Session calculated that such a draft would not have attracted sufficient support in the Council to have had any chance of adoption. The point at this stage is simple. It is that there has been no lack of unanimity of the permanent members or failure by the Council to

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<sup>106</sup> Emphasis added.

act on the matter which the co-sponsors of the advisory opinion request brought before the Emergency Special Session. The matter was simply never brought before the Security Council.

**4.41** The relevance of the point is cogently made by a number of commentators. Thus, for example, Wolfrum has observed:

“... there is an indispensable precondition for any action taken by the General Assembly that the Security Council has discussed the topic first, because only this can have resulted in a lack of unanimity between its members.”<sup>107</sup>

**4.42** Similarly, Reicher has commented:

“... the Security Council must have dealt with the issue before the General Assembly may take any action whatsoever. It cannot be said that the Council has failed to exercise its primary peacekeeping function by virtue of a lack of unanimity among permanent members unless the matter has at the very least been discussed in the Council. In fact, one may go further and suggest that for the pre-condition in Part A to be fulfilled, the deliberations in the Council must be brought to a vote. How else can a lack of unanimity be established?”<sup>108</sup>

**4.43** The co-sponsors of the advisory opinion request will no doubt point to the lack of unanimity of the permanent members on 14 October 2003 when the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution proposing the illegality of the fence. This, of course, is accurate but it leaves out of account a critical factor. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the competence of the General Assembly is engaged not simply by a lack of unanimity of the permanent members, but by a lack of unanimity which results in the Security Council’s failure to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**4.44** It is evident from the extracts from the statements of the Members of the Security Council, quoted above, on both sides of the issue in their 14 October 2003 meeting on the fence that, notwithstanding their differences of view on the question then before them, it was common ground that the only way forward on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was through negotiations between the two sides under the framework of the Roadmap.

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<sup>107</sup> Rudiger Wolfrum (ed.), *United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice* (1995), Volume 2, at p.1343.

<sup>108</sup> Harry Reicher, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage” (1981) 20 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, at p.40.

4.45 Significantly, this appreciation translated almost immediately into a Russian led initiative for the Security Council to endorse the Roadmap. This was a matter of active deliberation by the Security Council in late October and November 2003, culminating in the unanimous adoption of resolution 1515 (2003) on 19 November 2003, before the 12<sup>th</sup> reconvened session of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session was even requested. There was no lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council here. There was no failure by the Council to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. On the contrary, in this case the Charter was working just as it was conceived to work. The Security Council, after full and considered deliberation over an extended period of time, endorsed a course of action on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There was no basis under the Uniting for Peace Resolution for the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session to proceed on an initiative of its own. The advisory opinion request was thus *ultra vires* the competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

***(ii) The Advisory Opinion Request Would Have Been Ultra Vires the Competence of the General Assembly Convened in Regular Session***

4.46 That the advisory opinion request by the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session was *ultra vires* the Uniting for Peace Resolution should be an end of the matter. For completeness, however, lest Israel's interlocutors suggest that this is purely a formal objection, two further observations are required. First, Israel's objections concerning the *vires* of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session cannot be lightly dismissed as formal. The Emergency Special Session, conducting itself in a highly dubious and questionable fashion, purported to act under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The resolution is part of the essential fabric of the Charter, addressing the competence of and balance of responsibility between the Security Council and the General Assembly on matters going to the maintenance of international peace and security. A violation of its essential precepts and preconditions for action cannot by any stretch of the imagination be properly characterised as formal.

4.47 More fundamentally, Israel contends that, given the active engagement of the Security Council with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would not have been open to the General Assembly in regular session to adopt the advisory opinion request.

**4.48** Kelsen, writing in his seminal 1950 work *The Law of the United Nations*, observed as follows about the competence of the General Assembly and Security Council to request advisory opinions under Article 96(1) of the Charter:

“The competence of requesting advisory opinions as established by Article 96, paragraph 2, in contradistinction to that established by Article 96, paragraph 1, is restricted in so far as the organs authorised by the General Assembly are permitted to request advisory opinions only on legal questions ‘arising within the scope of their activities’. No such restriction is imposed upon the analogous competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council in paragraph 1 of Article 96. Nevertheless, these organs, too, are competent to request advisory opinions on legal questions only if such questions arise within the scope of their activities, that is to say, within their jurisdiction. The determination of any organ’s jurisdiction implies the norm not to act beyond the scope of its activity as determined by the legal instrument instituting the organ. It is not very likely that it was so intended to enlarge, by Article 96, paragraph 1, the scope of the activity of the General Assembly and the Security Council determined by other Articles of the Charter. Hence the words ‘arising within the scope of their activities’ in paragraph 2 of Article 96 are redundant.”<sup>109</sup>

**4.49** Judge Schwebel appeared to find this analysis persuasive,<sup>110</sup> although Judge Higgins observes that an advisory opinion request entails no substantive enlargement of the scope of the activity of the requesting organ.<sup>111</sup> As a general observation, this latter assessment may indeed be correct. The question in the present case, however, is whether, given the scheme of the Charter and the competence of and balance of responsibility between the Security Council and the General Assembly thereunder, it would be open to the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion of the Court on a matter which overlaps with action taken by the Security Council in the context of its exercise of its primary responsibility under the Charter and which would have the effect of hindering the work of the Council.

**4.50** Israel does not question that the General Assembly is also concerned with international peace and security under the scheme of the Charter. The point is so well established – including by the jurisprudence of the Court in the *Expenses* case<sup>112</sup> – as not even to warrant comment.

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<sup>109</sup> Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations*, 1950, at p.546.

<sup>110</sup> Schwebel, S.M., “Authorising the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice”, (1984) 78 AJIL 869, at 874 – 875.

<sup>111</sup> Higgins, R., “A comment on the health of Advisory Opinions”, in Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds.), *Fifty years of the International Court of Justice*, 1996, p.567, at p.577.

<sup>112</sup> *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter)*, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p.151, at p.163.

Israel contends, however, that, when the Security Council is acting in exercise of its primary responsibility, the General Assembly is under a duty to exercise restraint. Indeed, this very appreciation is the central pivot of the Uniting for Peace Resolution itself.

**4.51** It is well known that Article 24(1) of the Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is also well known that it is the Security Council, and the Security Council alone, which is competent to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. In addition, the Security Council is also virtually exclusively competent to act under Chapter VI of the Charter in respect of the pacific settlement of disputes. Thus, while Article 35 of the Charter establishes a limited competence to bring certain matters to the attention of the General Assembly, Article 35(3) provides expressly that any proceedings of the General Assembly on such matters are subject to the constraints of Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter, the latter of which restricts the competence of the General Assembly in circumstances where the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it under the Charter.

**4.52** More significantly, Articles 33, 34, 36, 37 and 38 of Chapter VI accord special responsibilities in respect of the pacific settlement of disputes only to the Security Council. Thus, under Article 33, it is the Security Council that is competent to call upon parties to a dispute to settle the dispute by peaceful means. Under Article 34, it is the Security Council that may investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction. Under Article 36(1), it is the Security Council that may recommend appropriate methods of adjustment. Significantly, under Article 36(3), it is the Security Council that is enjoined to “take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice”. It follows, by implication, that any request for an advisory opinion on such matters falls presumptively within the competence of the Security Council, not the General Assembly, especially when the Security Council has acted in exercise of its primary responsibility under the Charter. This, indeed, was the approach adopted in the *Namibia* case, in which it was the Security Council that requested an opinion from the Court.

**4.53** Under Article 37, it is again the Security Council that is competent to recommend terms for the settlement of a dispute. The Security Council is again competent under Article 38.

**4.54** The upshot of this is that, while the General Assembly is undoubtedly concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security, its competence in respect of the pacific settlement of disputes is secondary, based on its general powers under Chapter IV of the Charter rather than on any special powers derived from Chapter VI of the Charter. Special powers to act in this area are accorded exclusively to the Security Council. The Uniting for Peace Resolution accurately reflects this balance of competence and responsibility between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

**4.55** Other provisions of the Charter, too, affirm the competence and responsibility of the Security Council to act in respect of international peace and security to the evident exclusion of the General Assembly. Thus, for example, Articles 52 to 54 of the Charter, concerned with regional arrangements, accord a role to the Security Council alone in respect of such matters. Similarly, under Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General may bring matters which he considers may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. The General Assembly is not referred to in these provisions.

**4.56** There has undoubtedly been some evolution in the practice of the United Nations on such matters over the past almost 60 years of its existence. It is evident from this that the General Assembly is able to undertake a more active involvement in issues concerning international peace and security than the bare bones of the Charter might suggest. The scheme of the Charter, however, remains. It is the Security Council that has primary responsibility in the field of peace and security and the role of the General Assembly is subordinate to that.

**4.57** The competence of, and balance of responsibilities between, the General Assembly and the Security Council under the Charter cannot be lightly side-stepped. The issues in question are bigger than the case now before the Court. They go to the constitutional arrangements of the United Nations itself just at a point at which the Organisation is struggling to find its voice in the face of wider challenges to its ability to act. The scheme of the Charter is by no means perfect. The balance between the Security Council and the General Assembly under the Charter cannot, however, be ignored.

**4.58** In the light of the foregoing, Israel contends that, given the active engagement of the Security Council with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in exercise of its primary responsibility, including under Chapter VI of the Charter, it would have been *ultra vires* the competence of the

General Assembly even in regular session to request the advisory opinion now before the Court by resolution of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session.

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**CHAPTER 5**  
**THE REQUEST DOES NOT RAISE A LEGAL QUESTION**  
**WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 96(1) OF THE CHARTER**  
**AND ARTICLE 65(1) OF THE STATUTE**

**A. The Requirement That the Request Should Raise a Legal Question**

5.1 It is well-established that, in order for the Court to be able to exercise its advisory opinion jurisdiction, a request must have been referred to the Court on a “legal question”. This follows from Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute, the interpretation of which has been addressed in many of the advisory opinions given by the Court to date.<sup>113</sup>

5.2 The question referred to the Court in this case is not a “legal question” within the scope of Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute. Israel’s objection, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, is not that the question is “political”, although it will be abundantly clear from the discussion in Chapter 3 that the request is highly political and partisan in character and goes to one aspects of a wider political dispute. Rather, it is that the question referred to the Court is uncertain in its terms with the result that it is not amenable to a response by the Court.

5.3 For a question to constitute a legal question for the purposes of Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute it must be reasonably specific. This follows in part from the language of Article 65(2) of the Statute, which expressly requires “an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required”, and in part from basic principles. The Court has also been guided by the imperative of reaching conclusions which are legally certain.<sup>114</sup> The requirement that decisions be made by reference to and within the confines of legal certainty amounts to a general principle that falls to be applied as a matter of international law.<sup>115</sup> The

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<sup>113</sup> See, for example, *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter)*, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, p.151, at p.155: “Therefore, in accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the Court can give an advisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested.”

<sup>114</sup> See, for example, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.226, at para.95; *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.29, para.58. See also *Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada)*, Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, I.C.J. Reports 1998, at para.9.

<sup>115</sup> Dailier and Pellet, *Droit International Public* (6<sup>th</sup> ed.), p.349. See also Sir Hersch Lauterpacht referring to the “paramount postulate of security and stability” in the context of the administration of justice. Lauterpacht, H., *The Function of Law* (1933), p.253. The principle of legal certainty is also an important

issue of legal certainty is not to be confused with the issue that has arisen in previous advisory opinions as to whether a question is unduly abstract, ie, where the meaning of the question is certain but where it is said that it fails to relate to a specific factual situation.<sup>116</sup> The issue here is that it is not possible to decipher with reasonable certainty the legal meaning of the question. This is addressed further below.

**5.4** In addition, while Israel accepts that it is part of the Court's judicial function to seek to interpret the question put to it, in doing so the Court must not exceed its own competence. As the Permanent Court stated:

“The Court would exceed its own competency should it essay to consider controversial cases, actual or hypothetical, on which its opinion is not asked, and to intimate what, in its judgment, the decision upon them should be.”<sup>117</sup>

**5.5** The Court's task is to answer the question as put to it, not to seek to reformulate the question.<sup>118</sup> In the absence of a reasonably certain legal question for it to answer, the Court cannot establish its jurisdiction by augmenting the question before it.<sup>119</sup>

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concept in European Community law: see e.g. *Portelange v. Marchant*, Case 10/69 [1969] E.C.R., p.309, at p. 316.

<sup>116</sup> See, for example, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.226, at para.15.

<sup>117</sup> *Competence of the International Labour Organization to regulate, incidentally, the personal work of the Employer* (1926), P.C.I.J. Series B, No. 13, p. 24.

<sup>118</sup> See, for example, *Difference relating to immunity from legal process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p.62, at para.37; also, *Competence of the General Assembly*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p.4 at p.7.

<sup>119</sup> Given that the Court's jurisdiction is limited to answering the question put to it, and is in part defined by that question, the position is analogous to where a dispute resolution provision and in particular an arbitration agreement fails for uncertainty because it is not possible to ascertain how the parties wished their disputes to be resolved. See e.g. Redfern and Hunter, *Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), pp.172-173, on “Uncertainty”, addressing the issue of so-called “pathological arbitration clauses”. Another useful analogy is the Court's approach to the interpretation of treaty provisions at the jurisdictional phase e.g. in *Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)*, 1996, I.C.J. Reports, p.803, at p.810, para.16. The Court interpreted each provision relied on by the claimant so as to establish whether the facts alleged were capable of leading to a breach. The question whether the parties had consented to the Court's jurisdiction could not be answered on the basis merely of an “arguable” interpretation of the treaty. Greater certainty was required to establish the Court's jurisdiction.

## **B. The Question is Uncertain and Incapable of Response Within Its Terms**

### *(i) The Underlying Assumption of Illegality*

5.6 The question referred to the Court has three elements. It asks:

- what are the legal consequences arising from
- a given factual situation, ie, the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General,
- considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

5.7 The question goes to “legal consequences”, not to underlying issues of legality. Although the question put to the Court appears to assume that the construction of the fence is unlawful, there has in fact been no legally binding assessment or determination of the illegality of the fence.<sup>120</sup> This leaves two possibilities:

(a) that the Court is being asked (i) to find that the construction of the fence is unlawful, and then (ii) to give its opinion on the legal consequences of that illegality,

or

(b) that the Court is being asked (i) to assume that the construction of the fence is unlawful, and then (ii) to give its opinion on the legal consequences of that assumed illegality.

5.8 The first of these possibilities is unworkable. The second is unworkable and would also lead the Court to give an opinion that was devoid of object or purpose.

5.9 So far as the first possibility is concerned, the question as to whether the construction of the fence is unlawful is a complex question of mixed fact and law. This is discussed further in Chapter 8. It is also a question of acute political sensitivity, as has been shown in Chapter 3, not

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<sup>120</sup> Cf. General Assembly resolution A/RES/ES-10/13 of 27 October 2003, operative para.1. **(Dossier No.14)**

least given the Security Council endorsed initiative to bring the two sides back to negotiations. It may be supposed that if the General Assembly had wanted the Court's opinion on this highly complex and sensitive question, it would expressly have sought such an opinion. In an analogous situation, the Permanent Court found:

“The Council, if it had wished also to obtain the Court's opinion on this point ... would not have failed explicitly to say so. In these circumstances the Court does not consider that it has cognisance of this question.”<sup>121</sup>

**5.10** It is submitted that the Court should similarly decline to reformulate and respond to a question going to the issue of whether or not construction of the fence is unlawful. Further, the issue of legality is one that is inherently ill-suited for determination by way of an advisory opinion. This is because of the complex underlying questions of fact that would have to be resolved, which would of necessity involve consideration by the Court of abundant documentary, witness and expert witness evidence. As developed further in Chapter 8, the factual enquiry necessary to address the question of legality is one that cannot properly be shoehorned into the scope of the current advisory opinion request.

**5.11** As to the second possibility, if the Court were to proceed on the basis of an assumption of illegality, the resulting opinion could have no practical value. As follows from the *Western Sahara* case, the function of the Court is to give an opinion once it has come to the conclusion that the question put is relevant and has a practical and contemporary effect, and is not devoid of object or purpose.<sup>122</sup> These requirements cannot be considered satisfied if the question is simply asking the Court to give its opinion on the basis of an assumption, ie, the assumed illegality of the construction of the fence. The resulting opinion could not assist the General Assembly in the

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<sup>121</sup> *Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations* (1925), *P.C.I.J. Series B, No.10*, at p.17.

<sup>122</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at p.37, para.73. See also at p.20, para.20 and p.27, para.39. See also *Northern Cameroons, I.C.J. Reports 1963*, p.15, at p.33: “If the Court were to proceed and were to hold that the Applicant's contentions were all sound on the merits, it would still be impossible for the Court to render a judgment capable of effective application ...”. This was obviously in the context of a contentious matter, but in the same judgment the Court stressed that all the considerations of judicial propriety applied equally to the exercise of the advisory jurisdiction. *Ibid.*, pp.30-31. Cf. *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996*, p.226, at para.16. It is arguable that the Court's jurisprudence pulls in different directions on the appropriateness of considering the object and purpose of an advisory opinion request. However, the question in truth goes to immediacy of application. An opinion going to a general question of international law, as in the *Nuclear Weapons* case, has an immediate application regardless of whether or not there is a specific situation to which it may be applied. An opinion going to the legal consequences of a specific act, where that act may or may not be unlawful, can have no immediate application.

proper exercise of its functions.<sup>123</sup> It would also be a source of wider confusion. Further, any legal consequences would depend on the precise nature of the illegality. Is the Court then to proceed on the basis of an extended series of differing assumptions, giving its assessment of the legal consequences in each case?

**5.12** Thus, what is being asked of the Court is quite uncertain. It is uncertain which of the two options referred to above the Court is intended to adopt. It is uncertain, in terms of option (a), what the precise scope of the enquiry would be, and, in terms of option (b), precisely what assumptions could or should be made.

**5.13** The position was quite different in the *Namibia* case, where the Court was being asked to give its opinion on the legal consequences for States in circumstances in which the illegality of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia had already been definitively established by Security Council resolution 276 (1970). Thus, the starting point for the Court's consideration of the legal consequences for States in that case was precisely the fact that there had been a "binding determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal".<sup>124</sup>

#### *(ii) Legal Consequences for Whom?*

**5.14** The use of the formula "legal consequences" leads immediately to a further area of uncertainty. The question fails to specify whether the Court is being asked to address legal consequences for:

- the General Assembly or some other organ of the United Nations,
- Member States of the United Nations,
- Israel,
- "Palestine",
- some combination of the above, or some different entity.

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<sup>123</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at p.20, para.39.

<sup>124</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p.16, at p.54, para.117, and pp. 54-56, paras.118-126.

**5.15** Legal consequences do not exist in the abstract. They must have a defined object. In the absence of a defined object, there is an absence of legal certainty. The qualification of “consequences” by the adjective “legal” in no sense alters this. Moreover, the gap cannot be filled by reference to the record of the meeting at which the advisory opinion request was adopted. There is a notable lack of explanation on the record as to who was intended to be the beneficiary of any opinion of the Court – or, indeed, as to how the General Assembly would be assisted in the performance of its functions by the giving of an opinion.

**5.16** The uncertainty in this respect is relevant for two reasons. First, the Court must know the scope of the exercise on which it is being asked to embark. It cannot be for the Court to double-guess the General Assembly. Second, and no less importantly, States or other interested parties must also know the scope of the exercise on which the Court is being asked to embark. Failing this, they are not in a position to consider how to respond. In this respect, it may again be noted that, in the *Namibia* case, the Court was asked to give its opinion on the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970). The Court was not left to fill in the blanks, and the Court did not go beyond the specific task set by the question before it.

### **C. Conclusions**

**5.17** The failings outlined above render the question put to the Court uncertain. It follows from this that the question cannot be a legal question as required by Article 65(1) of the Statute. As the Court has frequently affirmed, where the question referred for an opinion is not a legal question, the Court has no discretion in the matter. It must decline to give the opinion requested.

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**PART THREE**

**PROPRIETY AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION**





**CHAPTER 6**  
**PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF PROPRIETY**  
**AND THE EXERCISE BY THE COURT OF ITS DISCRETION**  
**UNDER ARTICLE 65(1) OF THE STATUTE**

**A. The Court's Discretion to Decline to Answer the Question**

**6.1** The Court has a discretion to decline to respond to a request for an advisory opinion. Israel submits that the request now before the Court is one to which it should not respond. Article 65(1) of the Statute is cast in permissive terms. It provides that the Court “may give an advisory opinion” (emphasis added). The Court has on numerous occasions affirmed that this leaves it with “a large amount of discretion” to examine “whether the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it to answer the Request”.<sup>125</sup> For example, in the *Western Sahara* case, the Court addressed the matter in the following terms:

“Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, which establishes the power of the Court to give an advisory opinion, is permissive and, under it, that power is discretionary in character. In exercising this discretion, the International Court of Justice, like the Permanent Court of International Justice, has always been guided by the principle that, as a judicial body, it is bound to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character even in giving advisory opinions. If the question is a legal one which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may nonetheless decline to do so. As the Court has said in previous Opinions, the permissive character of Article 65, paragraph 1, gives it the power to examine whether the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it to decline to answer the request.”<sup>126</sup>

**6.2** Similarly, in its Opinion in the *Certain Expenses* case, the Court, recalling the Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the *Status of Eastern Carelia* Advisory Opinion, observed as follows:

“The power of the Court to give an advisory opinion is derived from Article 65 of the Statute. The power granted is of a discretionary character. In exercising its discretion, the International Court of Justice, like the Permanent Court of International Justice, has always been guided by the principle which the Permanent Court stated in the case concerning the *Status of Eastern Carelia* on 23 July 1923: ‘The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in

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<sup>125</sup> *Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p.65, at pp.71-72.

<sup>126</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at paragraph 23.

advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules governing their activity as a Court' (PCIJ, Series B, No.5, p.29). Therefore, in accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the Court can give an advisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested. But, even if the question is a legal one, which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may nonetheless decline to do so."<sup>127</sup>

**6.3** The Court has nonetheless also made clear both that a reply to a request for an advisory opinion, in principle, should not be refused and that only "compelling reasons" should lead it to refuse to give a requested advisory opinion.<sup>128</sup>

**6.4** The recent jurisprudence of the Court shows that the Court is particularly mindful to ensure that questions of jurisdiction and propriety are properly addressed before any question of merits is considered. So, for example, in the case of the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, the Court first resolved questions of jurisdiction and propriety before turning to consider the merits of the question referred for an opinion.<sup>129</sup> An examination of the Court's jurisprudence, and that of the Permanent Court before it, indicate a number of elements that are germane to the question of what would constitute "compelling reasons" that should lead the Court to refuse to give a requested opinion.

**(i) *The Requirement that the Court Remain Faithful to its Judicial Character***

**6.5** In the *Northern Cameroons* case, the Court, referring to the exercise of a judicial function, equally applicable to advisory opinions and contested cases, observed that "[t]hat function is circumscribed by inherent limitations which are none the less imperative because they may be difficult to catalogue, and may not frequently present themselves as a conclusive bar to adjudication in a concrete case."<sup>130</sup> This awareness of the "inherent limitations" evident in the "judicial function" has received a particular focus in the exercise of the Court's advisory jurisdiction, in which the Court has placed great emphasis on the dominant requirement that it

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<sup>127</sup> *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter)*, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: ICJ Reports 1962, p.151 at p.155.

<sup>128</sup> See *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter)*, Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: ICJ Reports 1962, p.151 at p.155.

<sup>129</sup> *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.226, at paragraphs 10 *et seq* and 14 *et seq* respectively.

<sup>130</sup> *Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p.15, at p.30.

remain faithful to its judicial character. This imperative draws on the Opinion of the Permanent Court in the *Eastern Carelia* case. Given its pertinence to the matter now before the Court, the principal conclusions of the Permanent Court warrant setting out in detail. Concluding that it would not give an Opinion on the question referred to it, the Permanent Court stated as follows:

“It follows from the above that the opinion which the Court has been requested to give bears on an actual dispute between Finland and Russia. ... It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement. ... Such consent, however, has never been given by Russia. On the contrary, Russia has, on several occasions, clearly declared that it accepts no intervention by the League of Nations in the dispute with Finland. The refusals which Russia has already opposed to the steps suggested by the Council have been renewed upon the receipt by it of the notification of the request for an advisory opinion. The Court therefore finds it impossible to give its opinion on a dispute of this kind.

It appears to the Court that there are other cogent reasons which render it very inexpedient that the Court should attempt to deal with the present question. The question whether Finland and Russia contracted on the terms of the Declaration as to the nature of the autonomy of Eastern Carelia is really one of fact. To answer it would involve the duty of ascertaining what evidence might throw light upon the contentions which have been put forward on this subject by Finland and Russia respectively, and of securing the attendance of such witnesses as might be necessary. The Court would, of course, be at a very great disadvantage in such an enquiry, owing to the fact that Russia refuses to take part in it. It appears now to be very doubtful whether there would be available to the Court materials sufficient to enable it to arrive at any judicial conclusion upon the question of fact: What did the parties agree to? The Court does not say that there is an absolute rule that the request for an advisory opinion may not involve some enquiry as to facts, but, under ordinary circumstances, it is certainly expedient that the facts upon which the opinion of the Court is desired should not be in controversy, and it should not be left to the Court itself to ascertain what they are.

The Court is aware of the fact that it is not requested to decide a dispute, but to give an advisory opinion. This circumstance, however, does not essentially modify the above considerations. The question put to the Court is not one of abstract law, but concerns directly the main point of controversy between Finland and Russia, and can only be decided by an investigation into the facts underlying the case. Answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties. The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding their activity as a Court.”<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> *Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion (1923), P.C.I.J., Series B, No.5, at pp.27-29.*

6.6 The Permanent Court was concerned by two factors of particular relevance in these proceedings: (a) the absence of consent to the adjudication of a legal dispute, and (b) the necessary bar against making determinations on underlying facts where the Court does not have sufficient evidence before it.

(a) *The Limitation on Giving an Advisory Opinion Where There is a Legal Dispute*

6.7 The opinion in the *Eastern Carelia* case was in part predicated on the fact that Russia was not a member of the League of Nations. It follows that it could not be said that Russia had consented generally to the Permanent Court's exercise of the advisory jurisdiction.<sup>132</sup> However, the jurisprudence of the International Court has focussed not on the jurisdictional element of the Permanent Court's finding, but rather on the issue of whether the consideration of a question that related to a pending dispute between States was consistent with judicial propriety.<sup>133</sup> This has led the Court to consider with care the issue of whether a given question put to it relates to an existing dispute between States.

6.8 Thus, in the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* case, the Court considered the nature of the question before it, which concerned the applicability to certain disputes of the settlement procedures instituted by the Peace Treaties, and found that this "in no way touches the merits of those disputes".<sup>134</sup> It followed that the *Eastern Carelia* case could be distinguished. It could not be said that the question "related to the main point of a dispute actually pending between two States, so that answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties."<sup>135</sup> The Court found that "the legal position of the parties to these disputes cannot be in any way compromised by the answers that the Court may give to the Questions put

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<sup>132</sup> Cf. *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p.16, at p.23, para.31; also *Western Sahara*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at pp.23-24, para.30.

<sup>133</sup> See for example Simma (ed.), *The Charter of the United Nations* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), Vol. II, p. 1185: "A decision to entertain a request would be inappropriate if a legal dispute relating to States which have not recognized the jurisdiction of the ICJ on the basis of Art. 36 of the Statute, were brought before the Court, in the absence of the States concerned, by a request for advisory proceedings." See also at p. 1187: "The ICJ has recognized, on the other hand, that the lack of consent of an interested State may render the giving of an Advisory Opinion incompatible with its judicial character."

<sup>134</sup> *Interpretation of Peace Treaties*, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.65, at p.72.

<sup>135</sup> *Interpretation of Peace Treaties*, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.65, at pp.71-72. See, Rosenne, *The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996*, Vol. II, noting that the views of the present Court as expounded in the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* Advisory Opinion "are today the guiding statement".

to it”.<sup>136</sup> In other words, the Court formulated a basic principle – that it should decline to answer a question where this “would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties” – and sought to establish whether that principle was applicable on the facts before it.

**6.9** Similarly, in the *Namibia* case the Court addressed itself to the question of whether the request related to a legal dispute actually pending between two States (and/or between South Africa and the United Nations), but found that it did not.<sup>137</sup> A further important factor in terms of consent was South Africa’s appearance before the Court for purposes of setting out its case on the merits of the question put to the Court.<sup>138</sup>

**6.10** In the *Western Sahara* case, the Court expressly addressed the continuing relevance of the *Eastern Carelia* case (building on the earlier consideration of this same question in the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* case), and concluded that: “the consent of an interested State continues to be relevant, not for the Court’s competence, but for the appreciation of the propriety of giving an opinion”.<sup>139</sup> It continued:

“In certain circumstances, therefore, the lack of consent of an interested State may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court’s judicial character. An instance of this would be when the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent.”<sup>140</sup>

**6.11** The principle that the Court must remain “faithful to the requirements of its judicial character”, highlighted in the *Western Sahara* case, goes to the proposition that the Court must not permit the advisory mechanism to become an abuse of process by which the scheme of the Statute on consensual jurisdiction is circumvented.<sup>141</sup> It is not simply a question of whether there is an actual dispute between States that might otherwise come before the Court through its

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<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p.16, at p.24, para.32.* It found: “It is not the purpose of the request to obtain the assistance of the Court in the exercise of the Security Council’s functions relating to the pacific settlement of a dispute pending before it between two or more States. The request is put forward by a United Nations organ with reference to its own decisions and it seeks legal advice from the Court on the consequences and implications of these decisions.”

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.23-24, para.31.

<sup>139</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at p.25, para.32.*

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p.25, para.33.

<sup>141</sup> See also the *IMCO Advisory Opinion*, *I.C.J. Reports 1960, p.50, at p.153.*

contentious procedure. It is whether engagement with the question by the Court would in effect involve the Court in an adjudication of issues – whether binding or not – in a manner that would evade the constraints of the Statute. The Court examined the situation before it in the *Western Sahara* case and found that the legal controversy before it had not arisen in bilateral relations between two States.<sup>142</sup> It also placed emphasis on the fact that, in the proceedings in the General Assembly, Spain had not opposed the reference of the question as such to the Court’s advisory jurisdiction.<sup>143</sup>

*(b) The Limitation on Giving an Advisory Opinion Where There is Insufficient Evidence Before the Court to Enable it to Make Findings of Fact*

**6.12** Notwithstanding the discretion that the Court enjoys in terms of the application of the rules applicable in contentious cases (pursuant to Article 68 of the Statute), the advisory jurisdiction does not readily allow for a procedure well-suited to the determination of complex issues of fact.<sup>144</sup> This has not been a major problem so far as the Court’s exercise of its advisory jurisdiction is concerned – prior to the present proceedings – as the Court has not been faced with the problem of establishing complex facts on which there has been disagreement.<sup>145</sup>

**6.13** In the *Eastern Carelia* case, the Permanent Court was faced with the difficulty of determining facts and found that, in the absence of a concerned party, it could not do so without departing from the essential rules guiding its activity as a Court. The weight and propriety of this principle has been consistently affirmed in the jurisprudence of the International Court.<sup>146</sup> Thus,

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<sup>142</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at p.25, para.34. Cf. the instant case, where Israel did of course vote against resolution A/RES/ES-10/14. The dicta in the *Western Sahara* case were considered and applied in *Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1989*, p. 177 at p. 191, para. 38. Again the Court considered whether the effect of the advisory opinion was to submit an existing dispute to judicial settlement without one State’s consent. It found that this was not the case.

<sup>143</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12 at p.24, para.30.

<sup>144</sup> See, for example, Rosenne, *The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), Vol. II, p. 992: “... unless there is agreement on the facts as the point of departure for the determination of the law applicable to those facts, non-contentious and non-adversarial procedures are not likely to be appropriate machineries for the establishment of facts.”

<sup>145</sup> Rosenne, *The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), Vol. II, p.993: “Both Courts have regularly made relatively simple findings of fact, established on the basis of the documentation submitted to the Court. Those instances are not conclusive, since the Court has not in the course of rendering an advisory opinion been faced with the problem of establishing facts on which there was disagreement.”

<sup>146</sup> See with respect to the Permanent Court’s decision in the *Eastern Carelia* case, Bin Cheng, *General Principles of Law* (1953), p.298: “The decision of the Court not to give its opinion demonstrates the

for example, in the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* advisory opinion, the Court affirmed that amongst the imperative inherent limitations of the judicial function in respect of advisory proceedings was the principle that the Court cannot give an opinion on questions which raise “a question of fact which [cannot] be elucidated without hearing both parties”.<sup>147</sup>

**6.14** This limitation was not problematic at the practical level in the *Interpretation of Peace Treaties* case because the Court was looking simply at the application of a dispute settlement mechanism, not at the underlying dispute. The issue was also raised by Spain in the *Western Sahara* case. The Court defined the question as follows:

“whether the Court has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact the determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions compatible with its judicial character.”<sup>148</sup>

**6.15** In the event, the Court found that it had the necessary information and evidence. It found that it had received from Mauritania, Morocco and Spain “very extensive documentary evidence of the facts which they considered relevant to the Court’s examination of the questions posed in the request” and that each of those States, as well as Algeria and Zaire, had presented their views on these facts and on the observations of the others.<sup>149</sup> In the present case, the Court has received no evidence from Israel bearing on the substantive question, and evidence received from others, including the United Nations Secretariat, cannot be regarded as authoritative or reliable.

**(ii) Other “Circumstances of the Case”<sup>150</sup> that May Lead the Court  
to Decline to Answer the Request**

**6.16** The two elements, outlined above, going to the judicial character of the Court are directly relevant to the present case and have featured extensively in the jurisprudence of the

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fundamental nature of the principle *audiatur et altera pars*. Exceptions should not be allowed save where a party, which is under an obligation to present itself and has been afforded the opportunity to do so, fails to comply with such obligation without valid reason and neglects to exercise the right and privilege of being heard.” That, of course, is not the situation in the present case. Israel is under no obligation to present its case in the current proceedings.

<sup>147</sup> *Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p.65, at p.72.

<sup>148</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at pp. 28-29, para.46.

<sup>149</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at p.29, para.47.

<sup>150</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at para.23.



Court. They are not the only factors, however, which are relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion. The requirement that the Court remain faithful to its judicial character suggests additional "compelling reasons" that require consideration in this case, notably, that the Court should not allow its advisory procedure to be used by the General Assembly to obtain an opinion, the mere fact of which would undermine a delicate process of political negotiation nurtured and endorsed by the Security Council in exercise of its primary responsibilities under the Charter.

*(iii) Judicial Propriety in the Circumstances of this Case*

**6.17** The following chapters in this Part address a number of specific elements of propriety and the exercise by the Court of its discretion in this case. These are:

- (a) the propriety of an opinion of the Court since the request concerns a contentious matter in respect of which Israel has not given consent to the jurisdiction of the Court (**Chapter 7**);
- (b) the propriety of an opinion of the Court since that the question requires the Court to speculate about essential facts and make assumptions about arguments of law (**Chapter 8**);
- (c) other compelling reasons in the circumstances of this case why the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should decline to give an Opinion (**Chapter 9**).

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## CHAPTER 7

### THE REQUEST CONCERNS A CONTENTIOUS MATTER IN RESPECT OF WHICH ISRAEL HAS NOT GIVEN CONSENT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

#### A. The Applicable Legal Principles

7.1 The present chapter develops Israel's submission that the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction in the present case because the request concerns a contentious matter in respect of which Israel has not given its consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. The applicable legal principles have already been outlined in Chapter 6. Absence of consent is an important factor to be taken into account when the Court considers whether to exercise its discretion. The following issues of principle can be derived from the analysis contained in Chapter 6:

- (a) does the question in the advisory opinion request relate to the main point of a dispute actually pending so that answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties?<sup>151</sup>
- (b) do the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent?<sup>152</sup>

7.2 In order to be able to address these issues, the Court must consider (i) the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and whether the effect of the advisory opinion request is to bring the substance of that dispute or an element of that dispute before the Court (Section B below), and (ii) whether Israel has consented to the settlement of the dispute by the Court (Section C below).

#### B. The Pending Dispute

7.3 The issue now before the Court is an integral part of the wider Israeli-Palestinian dispute concerning questions of terrorism, security, borders, settlements, Jerusalem and other related matters. Elements of that dispute, and in particular steps taken by the international

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<sup>151</sup> *Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p.65, at pp.71-72.

<sup>152</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at p.25, para.33.

community, including the Security Council, to achieve its resolution, have already been identified in Chapter 3. That the advisory opinion request brings before the Court a “dispute” between Israel and “Palestine” can most easily be seen from a review of the documents sent by the Secretary-General to the President of the Court on 8 December 2003, principally General Assembly resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 and the report of the Secretary-General of 24 November 2003 (A/ES-10/248).

**7.4** First, resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 firmly places the advisory opinion request in the context of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian dispute.<sup>153</sup> This is evident from:

- (a) the Agenda item, which is described as “Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory”;
- (b) the reference back to previous United Nations resolutions concerning actions of Israel such as settlement of its citizens in territory to the east of the so-called “Green line”;
- (c) the characterisation of Israel as “the Occupying Power”;
- (d) the reference to the construction of the “wall” in departure from the so-called “Green line”;
- (e) the affirmation of “the necessity of ending the conflict” between Israel and “Palestine”.

**7.5** Second, and even more telling, the Secretary-General’s report contains two annexes. Annex I is entitled “Summary legal position of the Government of Israel”. Annex II is entitled “Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization”. The existence of a dispute between Israel and “Palestine” could not be illustrated more clearly.

**7.6** Third, the “Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization” which forms Annex II to the Secretary-General’s report is apparently based on a legal opinion provided by the PLO for the purposes of the report. The “Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization”:

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<sup>153</sup> No point is taken here as to the bias and inaccuracy in the description of and approach to the dispute manifested in resolution A/RES/ES-10/14.

- makes reference to certain rights of Israel;
- makes reference to certain violations by Israel of Palestinian rights;
- makes reference to the criminal liability of Israel;
- claims that the “construction of the Barrier is an attempt to annex the territory [in the West Bank] contrary to international law” and that the “de facto annexation of land interferes with the territorial sovereignty and consequently with the right of the Palestinians to self-determination”.

7.7 Two points immediately follow. First, the language clearly predicates the existence of a dispute. Second, the dispute is unambiguously a key part of the wider Israeli-Palestinian dispute. If it were necessary, further confirmation of this last factor is provided by the language of the preamble to General Assembly resolution A/RES/ES-10/13, pursuant to which the Secretary-General’s report of 24 November 2003 was prepared.<sup>154</sup>

7.8 The existence of the pending dispute behind the advisory opinion request cannot be doubted. This is not a case, such as *Namibia*, where the Court could find that it was concerned with mere differences of views on legal issues which have existed in practically every advisory opinion.<sup>155</sup> The dispute between Israel and “Palestine” is the *fons et origo* of the advisory opinion request. This is also evident from a review of the record of the meeting at which the resolution requesting the advisory opinion was adopted. It is not merely that there is no hint in that record (or in the resolution itself) of how an advisory opinion might assist the General Assembly in the exercise of its functions.<sup>156</sup> On the contrary. The record abounds with statements going to the position of “Palestine”, and of Israel, and the intent on the part of the co-sponsors of the resolution to “send a powerful message to Israel” that “justice be done”.<sup>157</sup>

7.9 The issue then is whether responding to the question put to the Court would be substantially equivalent to deciding that dispute. This issue can be answered very simply. If the

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<sup>154</sup> See the ninth preambular paragraph, referring, for example, to “the need to end the occupation that began in 1967”.

<sup>155</sup> *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p.16, at p.24, para.34.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. *Western Sahara Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports 1975, at pp.26 – 27, para.39. The point was made expressly by the Representative from Singapore (see paragraph 3.40 above).

<sup>157</sup> See, for example, the statement by the Representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (A/ES-10/PV.23, 8 December 2003). (Dossier No.42)

Court interprets the question as requiring it to pronounce on the legality of Israel's construction of the fence, this would be substantially equivalent to deciding the pending dispute as to the legality of the fence. In fact, it would not just be a question of substantial equivalence. The Court would be making findings regarding the legality of the fence. The fact that it would be doing so in the exercise of its advisory capacity makes no difference. At the same time, the Court could not avoid deciding significant elements of the broader ongoing dispute between Israel and "Palestine". If the Court were merely to assume the illegality of the construction of the fence, the impact would be the same. Even if the Court were to construe the question as narrowly as possible, it would still inevitably have to address a dispute between the two sides in breach of the requirement of consent in contentious proceedings.

**7.10** This leaves the further issue of whether the reply to the question would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent, i.e. regardless of the fact that Israel has not consented to the Court dealing with any aspect of its dispute with "Palestine".

### **C. The Absence of Consent**

**7.11** As is its undoubted right, Israel has not consented to the Court's jurisdiction in respect of its dispute with "Palestine", or any element thereof, or with any other associated party. That Israel has so chosen is evident from:

- (a) the absence of any optional clause declaration;
- (b) reservations made by Israel to compromissory clauses in multilateral treaties;
- (c) the different mechanisms of dispute settlement that have been accepted by Israel, including in particular the dispute settlement arrangements in the Israel – PLO agreements.

Each of these is briefly considered below.

**7.12** So far as concerns the absence of any optional clause declaration, on 19 November 1985, Israel informed the Secretary-General that it was withdrawing the declaration of acceptance

of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court that it had deposited on 17 October 1956 and modified on 28 February 1984.<sup>158</sup> In response, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations informed Israel that the Secretary-General had received the letter on 21 November 1985 and that the notification would take effect from that date. Even had Israel not withdrawn its declaration in 1985, the dispute with “Palestine”, including the dispute put to the Court in the advisory opinion request, would not have been covered by Israel’s optional clause declaration. This contained reservations *inter alia* as follows:

“This Declaration does not apply to:

...

(c) any dispute between the State of Israel and any other State whether or not a member of the United Nations which does not recognize Israel or which refuses to establish or to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Israel and the absence or breach of normal relations precedes the dispute and exists independently of that dispute;

(d) disputes arising out of events occurring between 15 May 1948 and 20 July 1949;

(e) without prejudice to the operation of sub-paragraph (d) above, disputes arising out of, or having reference to, any hostilities, war, state of war, breach of the peace, breach of armistice agreement or belligerent or military occupation (whether such war shall have been declared or not, and whether any state of belligerency shall have been recognized or not) in which the Government of Israel are or have been or may be involved at any time. ...”<sup>159</sup>

**7.13** So far as concerns multilateral treaties to which Israel is a party, Israel has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in any multilateral treaty since 1975.<sup>160</sup> Although, since that date, Israel has become party to a number of treaties that include the possibility of dispute settlement by the Court, such settlement is optional only. In other cases, Israel has attached reservations that expressly withhold consent to dispute settlement by the Court.

**7.14** So far as concerns different mechanisms of dispute settlement that have been accepted by Israel, it is stressed that none of the treaties and agreements concluded by Israel as part of the

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<sup>158</sup> See 40 *ICJ Yearbook* (1985-1986), p.60.

<sup>159</sup> See 39 *ICJ Yearbook* (1984-1985), p.79.

<sup>160</sup> Israel has, in its nearly 56 years of existence, been party to only two bilateral treaties submitting to dispute resolution by the Court. Of these, only the 1951 *Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation* with the United States remains in force.

peace process contain references to dispute resolution by the Court.<sup>161</sup> In the context of the consideration of this aspect of judicial propriety, it is important to bear in mind that no agreement with the PLO, and no unilateral declaration by either Israel or the PLO provides for a compulsory settlement of the dispute whether by the Court or otherwise. Thus:

- (a) The letter from Chairman Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin of 9 September 1993 provides:

“... The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.”

- (b) Article XV of the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 provides:

“1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.”

- (c) Article XVII of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 4 May 1994 (superseded by the Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995) provides:

“Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the Declaration of Principles shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely:

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<sup>161</sup> Article VII of the *Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt* provides that disputes will be resolved by negotiations, conciliation or submitted to arbitration. Article 29 of the *Treaty of Peace between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* also provides that disputes will be resolved by negotiations, conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled by negotiations through the Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.”

(d) Article XXI of the Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995 provides:

“Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the DOP shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely:

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any related agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.”

**7.15** The position could not be clearer. Israel and the PLO have repeatedly agreed that their disputes should be settled by negotiation, with the possibility of an agreement that disputes be solved by arbitration. It is not just that Israel has not consented to the Court resolving its disputes with “Palestine”, or any part of that dispute. It is that other mechanisms of dispute settlement more appropriate to the circumstances have been expressly preferred.

#### **D. Conclusions**

**7.16** It follows from the above that in the instant case, if the Court has jurisdiction, which Israel submits it has not, the Court should exercise its discretion by refusing to respond to the



advisory opinion request. This is an exceptional case. Answering the question would be equivalent to the Court to deciding a significant element in the dispute between Israel and “Palestine”, and this is precisely what the co-sponsors of resolution A/RES/ES-10/13 appear to have been seeking.<sup>162</sup> Answering the request would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent. These factors apply *a fortiori* where a State has, in respect of a particular dispute, acted expressly to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court in favour of other forms of settlement.

7.17 To this must be added the further consideration, namely, that “Palestine” is not a State. It has no standing before the Court. The Court’s advisory jurisdiction cannot be employed to circumvent the scheme of the Statute in circumstances in which the Court would not in any circumstance be open to the would-be litigant most directly involved in the recourse to the advisory procedure.

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<sup>162</sup> See, for example, the statement of the Palestinian Representative, Mr Al-Kidwa, in the debate in the Emergency Special Session on 8 December 2003. A/ES-10/PV.23, 8 December 2003. **(Dossier No.42)**

## CHAPTER 8

### THE QUESTION REQUIRES THE COURT TO SPECULATE ABOUT ESSENTIAL FACTS AND MAKE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ARGUMENTS OF LAW

**8.1** In this Chapter, Israel will develop its contention that the question requires the Court to speculate about essential facts and make assumptions about arguments of law. The applicable legal principles have already been outlined in Chapter 6, from which the following questions can be derived:

- (a) does the advisory opinion request raise questions of fact which could not be elucidated without hearing the parties?<sup>163</sup>
- (b) does the Court have before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact the determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in a manner compatible with its judicial character?<sup>164</sup>

#### A. A Response to the Question Would Require the Court to Speculate About Essential and Highly Complex Facts Which Are Not Before It

**8.2** If the Court were seised of the issue of whether the construction of the fence were lawful or not and, if not, what the legal consequences of such illegality might be for certain specified parties, it would inevitably have to address and resolve a series of complex factual issues.

**8.3** The extent of the factual issues would, in a contentious case, appear from the pleadings of the parties. In the absence of such pleadings, and in circumstances where Israel does not know what issues “Palestine” is going to put before the Court, the likely ambit of the factual issues can most conveniently be derived from the allegations contained in Annex II to the Secretary-General’s report of 24 November 2003, “Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization”. On the basis of this document, it would be for the Court to consider:

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<sup>163</sup> *Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950*, p.65, at p.72.

<sup>164</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975*, p.12, at pp.28-29, para.46.

- (a) factual issues going to the military necessity of the fence;
- (b) factual issues going to the proportionality of the construction of the fence, including factual issues going to the question of whether the requirements of proportionality can more likely be met by different means including different routing of the fence.

**8.4** Any assessment of the military necessity of the fence would necessarily have to entail, including in respect of parts of the fence where the routing has not been finally determined:

- (a) an assessment of the security threat faced by Israel, which would in turn require an assessment of the nature and scale of terrorist attacks, the continuing nature of the threat, and the likely nature and scale of future attacks;
- (b) an assessment of the effectiveness of the fence to address the security threat relative to other available means;
- (c) an assessment of the motives behind the construction of the fence;
- (d) an assessment of the routing of the fence, including an assessment of whether the routing was justified by military necessity so far as concerns individual sections of the fence;
- (e) an assessment of the specific nature and extent of the construction, including an assessment of whether these aspects were justified by military necessity so far as concerns individual sections of the fence, to cover, for example, the issue of whether there was a justification on grounds of military necessity for those short sections of wall;
- (f) an assessment of the specific nature of the threat to the Israeli population at different sections of the fence;
- (g) in the light of the claim that the requirements of proportionality can better be met by different routing of the fence, an assessment of the relative threat arising as a result of

such different routing and of whether the requirements of military necessity could thus be satisfied.

**8.5** In order to begin to answer such questions, any tribunal seised with the determination of such contested facts would require extensive documentary, witness and expert evidence from all the parties involved.<sup>165</sup> It would be entirely inappropriate for the Court to rely simply on “evidence” supplied by “Palestine”. Evidence must be tested. And the Court would have to be willing to embark on a time-consuming determination of facts.

**8.6** The Court would also have to consider and rule upon countervailing factors relied upon by “Palestine” with respect to the contention that the construction of the fence is not proportionate. On the basis of the contentions made in the “Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization”, the Court would have to assess:

- (a) the extent and nature of the claimed “Extensive destruction of Palestinian homes and other property”;
- (b) the extent and nature of the claimed “Infringements of freedom of movement”;
- (c) the extent and nature of the claimed “Infringements on the rights to education, work, an adequate standard of living and health care”;
- (d) the extent and nature of the claimed “arbitrary interference of home”;
- (e) the extent and nature of the claimed “facilitation of the entry of Israeli citizens into the Closed Area while restricting Palestinian access to and residence in the Closed Area”;
- (f) the extent to which similar factors also affect non-Palestinians.

**8.7** The Court cannot possibly make any such factual determinations. Even if the case were a contentious one, the operational constraints under which the Court works do not permit thorough scrutiny of highly detailed or complex issues of fact. Indeed, it may be asked whether

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<sup>165</sup> Of course, strictly there are no parties in advisory opinion proceedings. This highlights the inappropriate nature of such proceedings for the resolution of disputes involving complex sets of facts.

the Court has ever decided facts of such a complex and highly politicised character, and that are so central to a conflict of this nature. These factors weigh all the more heavily where the Court is exercising its advisory jurisdiction, the point having already been made that non-contentious and non-adversarial procedures are not likely to be appropriate machineries for the establishment of facts.<sup>166</sup> This is all the more so in a case where “Palestine” has asserted the criminal liability of Israel.

**8.8** In the event, the Court has allowed a mere six weeks for the presentation of written statements. The Court could not possibly have the necessary material before it and will be in no position to make any findings of fact at all. For one thing, Israel contests the jurisdiction of the Court and is not putting forward a case on the substance. Further, in the light of recent decisions regarding changes to the routing of the fence in certain sensitive areas, and other developments, it is highly unlikely that even the basic factual material available to the Court from Palestinian and other non-Israeli sources will be accurate. The Court cannot replace the proper judicial determination of facts by assumptions or speculation. This is not a case like *Interpretation of Peace Treaties*, where the Court is in no sense looking at the underlying dispute; or the *Namibia* case, where a binding finding of illegality had already been made. This is not a case like *Western Sahara*, where the main protagonists had all submitted extensive documentary evidence of the facts which they considered relevant to the Court’s examination of the questions posed in the request, and had submitted their observations on that evidence.

**8.9** It follows that the Court will not have before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon disputed questions of fact the determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion compatible with its judicial character.

**B. A Response to the Question Would Require the Court to Make Assumptions About Arguments of Law Which Are Not Before It**

**8.10** In the absence of participation by Israel on the substance of the request, a response to the question would also require the Court to make assumptions about arguments of law which are not before it. This issue has already been touched upon in Chapter 5 above so far as assuming the illegality of the construction of the fence is concerned. The further point here is that, in order to make the findings that “Palestine” apparently seeks in the “Summary legal position of the

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<sup>166</sup> See the passage from the *Eastern Carelia* case set out in Chapter 6 above.

Palestine Liberation Organization”, the Court would have to not merely make the series of factual determinations referred to above, but it would also have to apply the relevant legal principles to those facts. To do so, the Court would have to make assumptions arguments of law which are not before it including as to:

- (a) the component elements of such legal concepts as military necessity and proportionality;
- (b) the interpretation and application of the broad series of other instruments that might be relied upon by “Palestine”;
- (c) questions concerning allegations of annexation;
- (d) other issues arising in the context of an enquiry as to legal consequences.

**8.11** These legal issues are varied and complex – as cannot be surprising given that they form part of a dispute that is many decades old.

### **C. Conclusions**

**8.12** This is an exceptional case. The issues arising in respect of the construction of the fence – whether confined to the question of legal consequences or whether expanded to include the underlying question of legality – do not lend themselves to hasty determination in a procedurally questionable manner. This is not simply a consequence of the Court’s Order of 19 December 2003. It is inherent in the advisory opinion procedure. To make findings on a complex legal and factual dispute, in the absence of one of the two most directly concerned parties, would constitute a departure from the essential rules guiding the Court’s juridical activity.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> *Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion (1923), P.C.I.J., Series B, No.5*, at pp.27-29.



**CHAPTER 9**  
**OTHER COMPELLING REASONS WHY THE COURT,**  
**IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION, SHOULD**  
**DECLINE TO ANSWER THE QUESTION**

9.1 The preceding Chapters of this Part have addressed established reasons of law which go to the exercise by the Court of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute to decline to answer the request for an advisory opinion. These draw on the principles in the *Eastern Carelia* case, largely affirmed as of continued relevance in the jurisprudence of the present Court. The circumstances of the present case, however, raise for the Court's consideration other "compelling reasons" which should lead the Court to decline to give the opinion requested. In Chapters 4 and 5 of this statement, Israel advanced two objections of jurisdiction which, in its contention, operate to preclude the Court – as a matter of law – from giving an opinion in this case. In the alternative, in the event that the Court takes the view that these elements do not preclude its consideration of the matter, Israel contends that the circumstances of the request and the competence of and balance of responsibility between the General Assembly and the Security Council are also relevant to the exercise by the Court of its discretion to decline to answer the opinion requested. Likewise, Israel contends that the inherent uncertainty of the question also goes to issues of discretion and propriety.

9.2 There are two additional aspects relevant to propriety that require further brief comment. They have already been addressed at some length at various points throughout this statement and only require brief concluding remarks.

**A. Equity Requires that the Court Decline to Give an Opinion**

9.3 Equitable principles of good faith and "clean hands" are widely acknowledged in the Court's jurisprudence, as also are their corollaries of bad faith and abuse of rights.<sup>168</sup> Citing the

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<sup>168</sup> See, for example, *Factory at Chorzow*, P.C.I.J., 1927 Series A, No.9, at p.31; *Free Zones Case*, P.C.I.J., 1932 Series A/B No.46, at p.167; *Legal Status of Eastern Greenland*, P.C.I.J., 1933 Series A/B No.53, as per Judge Anzilotti, at p.95; *Diversion of Water from the Meuse*, P.C.I.J., 1937 Series A/B, No.70, as per Judge Anzilotti, at p.50, and Judge Hudson, at p.77; *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment*, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.3, as per Judge Morozov, at pp.53-55, and Judge Tarazi, at pp.62-63; *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment*, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.14, as per Judge Schwebel, at paragraphs 240 and 268-272.



equitable maxim that “a court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the subject-matter of the litigation has been improper”, Judge Hudson, in his Separate Opinion in *Diversion of Water from the Meuse*, observed:

“The general principle is one of which the international tribunal should make a very sparing application. ... Yet, in a proper case, and with scrupulous regard for the limitations which are necessary, a tribunal bound by international law ought not to shrink from applying a principle of such obvious fairness.”<sup>169</sup>

9.4 Although this is a request for an advisory opinion, it is difficult to conceive of a case to which Judge Hudson’s injunction to the Court to act is more appropriately suited. As the material in Chapter 3 attests, “Palestine” is responsible for the terrorism which the fence is aimed at addressing. This cannot be ignored. It cannot be open to a party to seek a remedy from a court in circumstances in which it has committed the wrong that has brought about the very situation which is under examination. This follows from the principle *nullus commodum capere de sua injura proprio* – no one can be allowed to reap advantage from his own wrong – a principle which is just as pertinent in advisory proceedings which seek to raise for assessment questions which are essentially contentious. The reality of this case is that “Palestine” will be seeking from the Court certain findings of law. Yet it is the very suicide and other attacks against Israel and Israelis for which it is responsible that have led to the situation of which it complains. This is quite obviously a material factor, amounting to a “compelling reason”, which the Court must weigh in the balance when exercising its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute.

#### **B. An Opinion Would Cut Across the Scheme of the Roadmap**

9.5 The implications of an opinion of the Court on the substance of the request for the scheme of the Roadmap have already been addressed in detail in earlier Chapters. There are two reasons why an advisory opinion on the substance would be at odds with the Roadmap. The first is that the Roadmap commits the two sides to negotiations within an agreed framework. Acceding to the request for an advisory opinion which raises one aspect of a conflict that the two sides have agreed to address by other means would signal to “Palestine” that it is acceptable for it to pursue its objectives outside of the framework agreed. In practical terms, this is likely to act as

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<sup>169</sup> *Diversion of Water from the Meuse*, P.C.I.J., 1937 Series A/B, No.70, as per Judge Hudson, at p.77.

a factor detracting from the Roadmap modalities and, even more ominously as a green light for additional terror activities.

**9.6** The second and more important reason why an opinion on the substance would undermine the Roadmap is that almost any conceivable answer on the substance of the question would go directly to issues that the two sides have deferred for later discussion. The Roadmap advances a comprehensive approach to resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comprised of a number of phases. The scheme of these phases is not happenstance but a recognition of the foundation that needs to be established if there is to be any hope of success. It follows that, under the Roadmap, progress towards a permanent status agreement in Phase III of the initiative is dependent on the effective performance by the two sides of the commitments under Phases I and II. Critical amongst these is the requirement that the Palestinian side take effective measures to bring the terrorism to an end. This cannot be sidestepped by way of a procedure which seeks to engage the Court on issues that fall to be determined through negotiations in due course once “Palestine” has fulfilled its own threshold commitments.

**9.7** The dispute over the fence is only one aspect of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fence is a response by Israel to the failure by the Palestinians to fulfil their commitments to bring an end to the terror. One element of the dispute cannot properly be addressed in the absence of the other. And neither can be properly addressed by the Court, especially in the context of its advisory jurisdiction, without running a considerable risk that such balance as the Roadmap attempts to achieve, and to advance in due course through negotiations by the two sides, will be immediately upset.

**9.8** It does not require a particularly creative imagination to consider what an opinion of the Court might conceivably address – assuming *arguendo* that it would not simply endorse Israel’s right to construct the fence and all of its conduct in relation thereto. As one undertakes such an exercise, as the Court will no doubt do, it becomes immediately apparent that any opinion on the substance of the question would cut across the Roadmap. The point has been made in Chapter 3 by reference simply to some of the issues surrounding the Armistice Demarcation Line and the question of settlements. To these can be added others, such as the status of Jerusalem. Virtually anything that the Court might say would risk undermining the proposed scheme of the negotiations as well as their substance.

**9.9** The most evident difficulty concerns the question of legality. The point was made in Chapter 5 that this is not even explicitly part of the question. Yet some assessment of legality might be expected to be a prerequisite to anything that the Court might choose to say on the subject of legal consequences. There are, however, significant pitfalls in every direction of this question. Resolution ES-10/13, which purports to determine illegality, cannot properly be relied upon as an authoritative determination of legality. It is not binding. The assessment of illegality was not arrived at after any consideration of substantive issues of law. The resolution does not state what provisions of law the fence is supposed to be in contradiction of. An opinion of the Court based on this assessment of legality would not be credible and would be likely to embroil the Court, the two sides and the United Nations more generally in a longer-term dispute as to the weight of the Court's opinion.

**9.10** Other avenues to which the Court might turn to in order to assess legality would be equally problematic. Other resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly do not address the legality of the fence and are subject to their own significant limitations of assessment. These resolutions, even of the Security Council, are not akin to resolution 276 (1970), in issue in the *Namibia* case, which, under the scheme of the Charter, was dispositive of a matter essentially internal to the United Nations itself. A much more considered review of legality would properly be required.

**9.11** Assuming, however, simple reliance on such resolutions, the Court would still be faced with the need to extrapolate from these resolutions to address the legality of the fence. And it does not follow that a resolution on the legality of some or other question can of itself form an adequate and proper basis for an assessment of the legality of the fence. Even assuming that the Court, in its advisory function and absent relevant facts and arguments on the matter from Israel, could properly undertake a considered assessment of legality, the outcome would be an opinion which would undoubtedly trespass into the essential domain of the Roadmap on questions of borders, Jerusalem and settlements. Whatever the Court might say on these topics would be thrust into the balance of the intended negotiations with every chance of destabilising that process. Issues that the Quartet has proposed should be addressed in Phase III of the Roadmap would be catapulted up front with the opinion of the Court, given in ignorance of the wider political dynamic, undermining the negotiations.

**9.12** Other approaches do not suggest simpler solutions. “Legal consequences” do not subsist in a vacuum. An opinion addressing legal consequences for Israel, for “Palestine”, for other States, for the United Nations, which had no anchor in the reality of the events on the ground and a considered assessment of the balance of rights, would be counterproductive.

**9.13** Against this background, the statement of the United States, as the principal architect of the Roadmap, in the debate in the Emergency Special Session at which the advisory opinion request was adopted, bears recollection. The full statement is set out in Chapter 3. The salient element is as follows:

“The international community has long recognised that resolution of the conflict must be through negotiated settlement, as called for in Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). That was spelled out clearly to the parties in the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. Involving the International Court of Justice in this conflict is inconsistent with that approach and could actually delay a two-State solution and negatively impact road map implementation. Furthermore, referral of this issue to the International Court of Justice risks politicising the Court. It will not advance the Court’s ability to contribute to global security, nor will it advance the prospects of peace.”

**9.14** As will have been evident from the other extracts of statements set out in Chapters 3 and 4 above, the United States was not alone in this assessment.

**9.15** An advisory opinion, conducted on an accelerated procedure, which cuts across a concerted diplomatic initiative, endorsed by the Security Council, to bring the two sides back to negotiations, cannot but harm attempts to achieve a resolution of the conflict. Israel submits that, by any standard, this amounts to a “compelling reason” why the Court, in the exercise of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute, should decline to respond on the merits of the requested opinion.

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## CHAPTER 10

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

**10.1** As required by the Court's Practice Direction No.II, this Chapter contains a short summary of Israel's reasoning as set forth in the preceding Chapters. It also contains brief conclusions.

**10.2** Israel's contentions are twofold. First, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the advisory opinion request contained in resolution A/RES/ES-10/14. Second, if the Court finds that it has jurisdiction, as a matter of judicial propriety it should decline to answer the request. There is, however, a common theme that runs through both of these contentions, namely, that the advisory opinion request would see the Court trespass into the complex Israeli-Palestinian conflict notwithstanding that the Security Council unanimously endorsed the Roadmap in resolution 1515 (2003), just nineteen days before the advisory opinion request.

**10.3** The Court lacks jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the request for an advisory opinion is *ultra vires* the competence of the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly and would also have been *ultra vires* the competence of the General Assembly convened in regular session (see Chapter 4). The 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session was convened pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 3 November 1950, which provides in relevant part that "if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures". In the instant case, there has been no failure by the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. On the contrary, just nineteen days before the passing of resolution A/RES/ES-10/14, the Security Council exercised its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in endorsing the Roadmap. In any event, under the scheme of the Charter, the General Assembly's responsibility and competence for the maintenance of international peace and security is subsidiary to that of the Security Council. In circumstances such as the instant case, where the Security Council has acted in exercise of its primary responsibility, the General Assembly has a duty to exercise restraint.

**10.4** Second, in order for the Court to be able to exercise its advisory jurisdiction, a request must have been referred to the Court on a “legal question” (see Chapter 5). The question referred to the Court in this case is not a “legal question” within the scope of Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute because it is not sufficiently certain. This is so for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether the Court is being asked to find that the construction of the fence is unlawful, or merely to assume illegality. Second, although the concept of “legal consequences” does not exist in the abstract, the question does not state for whom the “legal consequences” are to be specified.

**10.5** Were the Court to conclude that it does have jurisdiction, there are significant reasons why it should decline to answer the request as a matter of judicial propriety. The relevant principles of law are set out in Chapter 6. The reasons why the Court should decline to respond to the requested opinion are as follows. First, the advisory opinion request relates to key aspects of the ongoing dispute between Israel and “Palestine” and would be substantially equivalent to deciding that dispute (see Chapter 7). In circumstances where Israel has expressly acted to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction in respect of that dispute, answering the request would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its dispute to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent.

**10.6** Second, answering the question would require the Court to speculate about essential and complex facts which are not before it, and also to make assumptions about arguments of law (see Chapter 8). The Court is not in a position to make the factual determinations necessary to a response to the advisory opinion request, and the Court cannot replace the judicial determination of facts by assumptions or by speculation. Nor can the Court make assumptions as to what legal arguments would be raised by Israel had it made submissions on the substance of the question raised in the advisory opinion request.

**10.7** Third, there are other compelling reasons why the Court should decline to exercise its advisory jurisdiction in this case (see Chapter 9). These go both to the general fairness of the proceedings and to judicial propriety. The Court should take full account of the fact that the prime motivator and co-sponsor of the advisory opinion request, “Palestine”, bears responsibility for the very attacks that the fence has been designed to prevent. In addition, any response to the advisory opinion request would cut across the Security Council endorsed Roadmap initiative.

**10.8** In view of the considerations set out in this statement, Israel submits that the Court should find that it has no jurisdiction to consider the advisory opinion request. In the alternative, Israel submits that there are compelling reasons why the Court should exercise its discretion to decline to answer the requested opinion.

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## LIST OF ANNEXES

<b>Annex No.</b>	<b>Document</b>
1.	Letter from H.E. Eitan Margalit, Ambassador of Israel, The Hague, to H.E. Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 11 December 2003
2.	Letter from H.E. Eitan Margalit, Ambassador of Israel, The Hague, to H.E. Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 31 December 2003
3.	A/RES/3237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974
4.	A/RES/43/160 A, 9 December 1988
5.	A/RES/43/177, 15 December 1988
6.	A/RES/52/250, 7 July 1998
7.	Letter dated 26 January 2004 from Ambassador Arye Mekel, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Israel to the United Nations in New York, addressed to the Secretary-General
8.	Letter dated 9 September 1993 from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, The Palestine Liberation Organisation, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
9.	S/PRST/2002/9, 10 April 2002
10.	Joint Statement of the Quartet, 16 July 2002
11.	S/PRST/2002/20, 18 July 2002
12.	Joint Statement of the Quartet, 20 December 2002
13.	Joint Statement of the Quartet, 20 February 2002
14.	Joint Statement of the Quartet, 22 June 2003
15.	Joint Statement of the Quartet, 26 September 2003
16.	S/RES/62, 16 November 1948
17.	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – Israel: General Armistice Agreement, 3 April 1949
18.	<i>USA Today</i> , March 14, 2002, p.A.06
19.	Statement by Prime Minister Sharon, 18 January 2004

20. Statement by Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas, Aqaba Summit, 4 June 2003
21. Statement by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, Aqaba Summit, 4 June 2003
22. A/RES/377 (V), 3 November 1950, "Uniting for Peace"
23. S/PV.4836, 5 October 2003
24. S/PV.4862, 19 November 2003

\* \* \*

Cour internationale de Justice

Enregistré au Greffe le :

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International Court of Justice

Filed in the Registry on :

30 JAN. 2004 /17(e)

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## **International Court of Justice**

Request for an Advisory Opinion from the 10<sup>th</sup> Emergency Special Session  
of the United Nations General Assembly on “the legal consequences arising  
from the construction of the wall being built by Israel”

*Written Statement of the Government of Israel*

*on Jurisdiction and Propriety*

*Annexes*

30 January 2004

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# Annex 1

H.E. Philippe Couvreur  
Registrar  
International Court of Justice  
Peace Palace  
2517 KJ The Hague  
The Netherlands

The Hague, December 11, 2003

Sir,

I refer to the adoption by the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly of Resolution A/ES-10/L.16 of 8 December 2003 requesting the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on "the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel".

The request raises contentious matters which bear directly on the security of the State of Israel and its population from terrorist attacks. The Government of Israel is accordingly considering its position on this request and whether it should take any part in the proceedings of the Court. Without prejudice to any further position that Israel may in due course take on the matter, Israel's view is that the Court should not entertain the request for reasons of discretion, jurisdiction and admissibility.

Israel notes that any considered assessment of the substance of the question would have to allow sufficient time for the preparation and exchange of written statements, and comments thereon by others, within the terms of Article 66 of the Court's *Statute*. Given the seriousness of the issue raised by the question, notwithstanding the expedition requested by the General Assembly, Israel does not think that this can be adequately, or fairly, achieved in the space of weeks but would have to allow at least a number of months for the preparation of initial written statements.


In this context, Israel is concerned by the negative effect of pending proceedings on any activities aimed at facilitating negotiations between the parties as envisaged by the "Road Map".



In these circumstances, Israel invites the Court to consider bifurcating the proceedings to allow an early response to the question of whether the request should be entertained by the Court. While sufficient time would still need to be allowed to States to prepare written statements on questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, in the event that the Court were to decide that it does have jurisdiction to, and should, entertain the request, it would then be possible to move on to the substance of the matter unencumbered by preliminary issues.

Given Israel's direct concern with this matter, it reserves all its rights under the Charter, the *Statute* and the Rules of the Court including its right to choose a Judge *ad hoc* in accordance with Article 31 of the Court's *Statute* and Articles 35 and 102(3) of the *Rules of the Court*. Israel also draws attention to Article 17(2) of the Court's *Statute* and Article 34 of its *Rules*.

Please be assured, Sir, of my highest considerations.



Eitan Margalit

Ambassador of Israel  
The Hague

## Annex 2

THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL  
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H.E. Philippe Couvreur  
Registrar  
International Court of Justice  
Peace Palace  
2517 KJ The Hague  
The Netherlands

The Hague, 31 December 2003

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my letter to you of 11 December 2003 and to the Court's Order of 19 December 2003 in the matter of the request for an advisory opinion in resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 of 8 December 2003 conveyed to the Court under cover of a letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations also of 8 December 2003.

The Government of Israel wishes to place on record its very considerable disquiet with key elements of the Court's Order. The Order runs counter to the established practice of the Court in respect of advisory proceedings and, in a material respect, is inconsistent with the express terms of the Statute and Rules of Court. It is troubling that, on a complex matter of such importance bearing directly on the security and defence of the State of Israel and of the right to life of its citizens, the Court has decided to proceed in this manner.

Israel notes that the Court has titled the case *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. In doing so, the Court has adopted the language of the question, although with some variation. Israel notes, however, that, in paragraph 2 of the Report annexed to the Secretary-General's letter of 8 December 2003, the Secretary-General referred to "a system of fences, walls, ditches and barriers in the West Bank ('the Barrier')". A footnote to this sentence states: "Palestinians often call this system the Separation Wall and Israelis use the term Security Fence. For the purpose of the present report, the more general term 'the Barrier' is used."

Given the acute sensitivities about terminology in this matter, and the fact that the barrier is overwhelmingly a wire fence rather than a concrete wall, Israel is concerned that the Court's failure to reflect the issues before it in a neutral way in the very name given to the case may be taken to suggest that the Court has already formed a view of the barrier which is supportive of the Palestinian position.

In operative paragraph 1 of its Order, the Court fixed a 6 week period for the filing of written statements. The Order makes no provision for a second round of written comments. The Court also fixed the date for the opening of the hearings 3 weeks after

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receipt of the written statements without regard to the number, size or content of the written statements to be submitted. The basis for the Court's decision is the request that the advisory opinion be rendered "urgently".

In its most recent advisory opinion, the Court was faced with a request "on a priority basis". It there fixed an 8 ½ week period for the exchange of first round written statements and a further 30 days thereafter for the submission of written comments on the written statements. A hearing date was set after the close of the written phase once the extent of the written statements was known. Time-limits in other priority advisory opinions have varied according to the complexity of the particular case.

The present case is considerably more complex than most, if not all, advisory proceedings that have come before the Court. It goes to Israel's essential security and defence interests. These aspects might have been expected to dictate longer periods for the filing of written statements, an opportunity for written comments on the written statements and an adequate opportunity to consider the written statements and comments before the opening of the hearings. On each element, however, the Court has fixed a procedure in this case that is hardly conducive to a considered examination of the matter. Particularly in the light of my letter to you of 11 December 2003, in which these very issues were raised by Israel in a manner intended to be of assistance to the Court, the arrangements laid down by the Court give rise to very serious concerns about the fairness of the procedure.

By operative paragraphs 2 and 4 of its Order, the Court provides that "Palestine" may submit a written statement on the question and may take part in the hearings. In this regard, Israel recalls the terms of Articles 35 and 66 of the Statute. Whatever the status of "Palestine", it is neither a "State entitled to appear before the Court" nor an international organisation within the scope of the relevant provisions of the Statute. On the contrary, pursuant to A/RES/43/177 of 15 December 1988 it is simply the case that "the designation 'Palestine' should be used in place of the designation 'Palestine Liberation Organization' in the United Nations system, without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system". While the Court should be in a position to receive information relevant to its task, Israel can see no basis in the Charter, the Statute, the Rules of Court or relevant United Nations resolutions for the arrangements in respect of "Palestine" now laid down in the Court's Order. It is not appropriate that a matter that has been highly contentious amongst UN Members for many years is now dealt with *en passant* and without discussion in a procedural Order of the Court.

In my letter of 11 December 2003, Israel referred to Article 17(2) of the Statute and Article 34 of the Rules of Court. In this regard, Israel notes that the 19 December 2003 Order of the Court was made by the full Bench of the Court after deliberation by all of its Members.

Israel is constrained to observe that a Member of the Court who has played a leading role in recent years in the very Emergency Special Session from which the advisory opinion

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request has now emerged should be participating in decisions in this case. This appears to be sharply at odds with the approach adopted by a number of other Members of the Court in recent years in other cases.

Resolution A/RES/ES-10/14 requesting the advisory opinion locates the request squarely in the context of the wider Arab-Israeli / Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The essentially contentious nature of the proceedings is also recognised by the Court's invitation to Palestine to participate in the case. It is inappropriate for a Member of the Court to participate in decisions in a case in which he has previously played an active, official and public role as an advocate for a cause that is in contention in this case. Israel will be writing to the President of the Court separately on this matter pursuant to Article 34(2) of the Rules of Court.

In the light of the Court's Order, Israel is considering its position. It maintains the view that the Court should not entertain the request for reasons of lack of jurisdiction and inadmissibility, reasons which are bound up with the truly contentious character of the case in which consent by Israel to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over it has not been given. For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this letter, or that of 11 December 2003, can in any way be taken as an acceptance by Israel of the Court's jurisdiction in respect of this matter or of the propriety of a response on the merits of the request. Indeed, Israel does not consider that the procedural framework laid down in the Order is conducive to a fair consideration of the merits of the case. Israel reserves all of its rights under the Charter, Statute and Rules of Court.

Please be assured, Sir, of my highest considerations.

*Eitan Margalit*  
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Eitan Margalit

Ambassador of Israel  
The Hague

## Annex 3

UNITED  
NATIONS

A



## General Assembly

A/RES/3237 (XXIX)  
22 November 1974

### 3237 (XXIX). Observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of Palestine,

*Taking into consideration* the universality of the United Nations prescribed in the Charter,

*Recalling* its resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,

*Taking into account* Economic and Social Council resolutions 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974,

*Noting* that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference have in effect invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in their respective deliberations,

*Noting also* that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its deliberations as an observer,

1. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;
2. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;
3. *Considers* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present resolution.

## Annex 4



UNITED  
NATIONS

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## General Assembly

A/RES/43/160  
9 December 1988

**43/160. Observer status of national liberation movements  
recognized by the Organization of African Unity  
and/or by the League of Arab States**

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*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 35/167 of 15 December 1980, 37/104 of 16 December 1982, 39/76 of 13 December 1984 and 41/71 of 3 December 1986,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General,<sup>1/</sup>

*Recalling* its resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, by which it granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization,

*Recalling further* its resolution 31/152 of 20 December 1976, by which it granted observer status to the South West Africa People's Organization,

*Desirous* of enhancing the effective role played by these national liberation movements,

*Bearing in mind* the necessity of facilitating the work of these organizations,

1. *Decides* that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's Organization are entitled to have their communications relating to the sessions and work of the General Assembly issued and circulated directly, and without intermediary, as official documents of the Assembly;
2. *Decides also* that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's Organization are entitled to have their communications relating to the sessions and work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly of the United Nations issued and circulated directly, and without intermediary, as official documents of these conferences;

3. *Authorizes* the Secretariat to issue and circulate as official documents of the United Nations, under the appropriate symbol of other organs or conferences of the United Nations, communications submitted directly, without intermediary, by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's Organization, on matters relative to the work of these organs and conferences;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present resolution.

*\*Only resolution 43/160 A deals with matters related to the question of Palestine.*

\* \* \*

1/ A/43/528 and Add.1 and 2.

**RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 43/160 A: 117-2-31**

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Israel, United States.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominica, El Salvador, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, United

Kingdom.

Absent: Bangladesh\*, Chile, Comoros, Haiti, Jamaica, Mozambique, St. Kitts and Nevis, Zimbabwe\*.

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*\*Later advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.*

## Annex 5

UNITED  
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## General Assembly

A/RES/43/177  
15 December 1988

### 43/177. Question of Palestine

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the item entitled "Question of Palestine",

*Recalling* its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, in which, *inter alia*, it called for the establishment of an Arab State and a Jewish State in Palestine,

*Mindful* of the special responsibility of the United Nations to achieve a just solution to the question of Palestine,

*Aware* of the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council in line with General Assembly resolution 181 (II) and in exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

*Affirming* the urgent need to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East which, *inter alia*, provides for peaceful coexistence for all States in the region,

*Recalling* its resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 on the observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization and subsequent relevant resolutions,

1. *Acknowledges* the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988;
2. *Affirms* the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967;
3. *Decides* that, effective as of 15 December 1988, the designation "Palestine" should be used in place of the designation "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the United Nations system, without prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system, in conformity with relevant United Nations resolutions and practice;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary action to implement the present resolution.

\* \* \*

**RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 43/177: 104-2-36**

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: Israel, United States.

Abstentions: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire.

Absent: Belize, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Solomon Islands.

*IRAN ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE VOTE.*

# Annex 6

**UNITED  
NATIONS****A****General Assembly**Distr.  
GENERALA/RES/52/250  
7 July 1998Fifty-second session  
Agenda item 36**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**  
[without reference to a Main Committee (A/52/L.53/Rev.2 and Add.1)]**52/250. Participation of Palestine in the work of the United Nations***The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, in which, *inter alia*, it recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab State, with Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum*,

*Recalling also* its resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, by which it granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation Organization,

*Recalling further* its resolution 43/160 A of 9 December 1988, adopted under the item entitled "Observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States", in which it decided that the Palestine Liberation Organization was entitled to have its communications issued and circulated as official documents of the United Nations,

*Recalling* its resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988, in which it acknowledged the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988 and decided that the designation "Palestine" should be used in place of the designation "Palestine Liberation Organization" in the United Nations system,

*Recalling also* its resolutions 49/12 A of 9 November 1994 and 49/12 B of 24 May 1995, through which, *inter alia*, arrangements for the special commemorative meeting of the General Assembly on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, in addition to applying to all Member and observer States, were also applied to Palestine, in its capacity as observer, including in the organizing process of the list of speakers for the commemorative meeting,

*Recalling further* that Palestine enjoys full membership in the Group of Asian States and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia,

*Aware* that Palestine is a full member of the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Group of 77 and China,

*Aware also* that general democratic Palestinian elections were held on 20 January 1996 and that the



Palestinian Authority was established on part of the occupied Palestinian territory,

*Desirous* of contributing to the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, thus attaining a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East,

1. *Decides* to confer upon Palestine, in its capacity as observer, and as contained in the annex to the present resolution, additional rights and privileges of participation in the sessions and work of the General Assembly and the international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly or other organs of the United Nations, as well as in United Nations conferences;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the General Assembly, within the current session, about the implementation of the modalities annexed to the present resolution.

*89th plenary meeting  
7 July 1998*

#### ANNEX

The additional rights and privileges of participation of Palestine shall be effected through the following modalities, without prejudice to the existing rights and privileges:

1. The right to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly.
2. Without prejudice to the priority of Member States, Palestine shall have the right of inscription on the list of speakers under agenda items other than Palestinian and Middle East issues at any plenary meeting of the General Assembly, after the last Member State inscribed on the list of that meeting.
3. The right of reply.
4. The right to raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues, provided that the right to raise such a point of order shall not include the right to challenge the decision of the presiding officer.
5. The right to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East issues. Such draft resolutions and decisions shall be put to a vote only upon request from a Member State.
6. The right to make interventions, with a precursory explanation or the recall of relevant General Assembly resolutions being made only once by the President of the General Assembly at the start of each session of the Assembly.
7. Seating for Palestine shall be arranged immediately after non-member States and before the other observers; and with the allocation of six seats in the General Assembly Hall.
8. Palestine shall not have the right to vote or to put forward candidates.

# Annex 7



AMBASSADOR ARYE MEKEL  
DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

26 January 2004

Excellency,

Israel must register its dismay and concern at the dossier submitted by the Secretariat to the International Court of Justice, in the request for an advisory opinion on Israel's security fence. The dossier is rife with what we hope are oversights, and cannot, in any way, be said to present a balanced picture of the relevant United Nations documents salient in this case.

The context in which the security fence was constructed – Israel's exercise of its legitimate right to self-defense in accordance with principles of international law and the UN Charter – has been entirely overlooked. Indeed, those UN resolutions which speak not only of a right, but rather of an obligation, to fight terrorism have not been included in the dossier. The most relevant of these are undoubtedly Security Council Resolutions 1269 and 1373.

At the same time, various documents have been included whose relevance is questionable, at the least. For example, the inclusion of General Assembly Resolution 194, as well as the Rome Statute of the ICC, could only be considered "relevant" in the context of a broad political campaign against Israel. At times, the lack of balance in the dossier borders on the absurd. I am at a loss to understand the justification for the inclusion of reports written by the Special Rapporteur of the CHR to the territories, while no mention is made of detailed responses by Israel, themselves circulated as documents of the United Nations.

I must protest these shortcomings in the strongest of terms. Both the inclusion of irrelevant materials, as well as the exclusion of salient documents, may have effect upon the work of the Court. I would therefore ask that these oversights be urgently corrected.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest considerations.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Arye Mekel".

Arye Mekel, Ambassador  
Charge d'affaires a.i.

H.E. Mr. Kofi Annan  
Secretary-General  
The United Nations  
New York, NY

## Annex 8

September 9, 1993

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments:

The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.


The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,

  
Yasser Arafat  
Chairman

The Palestine Liberation Organization

Yitzhak Rabin  
Prime Minister of Israel

# Annex 9



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
10 April 2002

Original: English

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### Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 4511th meeting of the Security Council, held on 10 April 2002, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council supports the Joint Statement (S/2002/369) issued in Madrid on 10 April 2002 by the Secretary-General, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Secretary of State of the United States, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain and High Representative for European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is annexed to this statement, as transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-General. The Security Council calls upon the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and all States in the region to cooperate with the efforts to achieve the goals set out in the Joint Statement and insists on the immediate implementation of resolutions 1402 (2002) and 1403 (2002)."

## Annex

### Joint Statement

The Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov, Secretary of State of the United States Colin Powell, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain Josep Pique and High Representative for European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana met in Madrid today. We reviewed the escalating confrontation in the Middle East and agreed to coordinate our actions to resolve the current crisis.

We express our grave concern about the present situation, including the mounting humanitarian crisis and the growing risk to regional security. We reiterate our shared condemnation of violence and terrorism, express our deep distress at the loss of innocent Palestinian and Israeli life, and extend our deepest sympathy to the families of those killed and wounded. Believing that there has been too much suffering and too much bloodshed, we call on the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to act in the interests of their own people, the region, and the international community and to immediately halt this senseless confrontation.

In this regard, we express our grave concern about the most recent attacks from Lebanon across the UN-determined Blue Line. The Quartet calls on all parties to respect the Blue Line, halt all attacks, and show the utmost restraint. The conflict should not be allowed to spread and threaten regional security and stability.

The UN, EU and Russia express their strong support for Secretary of State Powell's mission, and urge Israel and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate fully with his mission and with their continuing efforts to restore calm and resume a political process.

We reiterate that there is no military solution to the conflict and call on the parties to move towards a political resolution of their disputes based on UNSCR 242 and 338, and the principle of land for peace — which formed the basis for the Madrid Conference of 1991. We reaffirm our support for the objective expressed by President Bush and spelled out in UNSCR 1397, of two States, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side within secure and recognized borders. We warmly welcome Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's peace initiative, as endorsed in Beirut by the Arab League, as a significant contribution towards a comprehensive peace, including Syria and Lebanon.

To enable progress towards our shared goals, we reaffirm that UNSCR 1402 must be fully implemented immediately, as called for in UNSCR 1403. We call on Israel to halt immediately its military operations. We call for an immediate, meaningful ceasefire and an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities, including Ramallah, specifically including Chairman Arafat's headquarters. We call on Israel to fully comply with international humanitarian principles and to allow full and unimpeded access to humanitarian organizations and services. We call on Israel to refrain from the excessive use of force and undertake all possible efforts to ensure the protection of civilians.

We call on Chairman Arafat, as the recognized, elected leader of the Palestinian people, to undertake immediately the maximum possible effort to stop terror attacks against innocent Israelis. We call on the Palestinian Authority to act decisively and take all possible steps within its capacity to dismantle terrorist infrastructure, including terrorist financing, and to stop incitement to violence. We



call on Chairman Arafat to use the full weight of his political authority to persuade the Palestinian people that any and all terrorist attacks against Israelis should end immediately, and to authorize his representatives to resume immediately security coordination with Israel.

Terrorism, including suicide bombs, is illegal and immoral, has inflicted grave harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and must be condemned as called for in UNSCR 1373.

We call on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to reach agreement on ceasefire proposals put forward by General Zinni without further delay. We commend the efforts of General Zinni to date to achieve this objective.

The Quartet stands ready to assist the parties in implementing their agreements, in particular the Tenet security workplan and the Mitchell recommendations, including through a third-party mechanism, as agreed to by the parties.

We affirm that the Tenet and Mitchell plans must be fully implemented, including an end to all settlement activity. We affirm that there must be immediate, parallel and accelerated movement towards near-term and tangible political progress, and that there must be a defined series of steps leading to permanent peace — involving recognition, normalization and security between the sides, an end to Israeli occupation, and an end to the conflict. This will allow Israel to enjoy enduring peace and security and the Palestinian people to realize their hopes and aspirations in security and dignity.

In support of these objectives, we call on the international community, particularly the Arab States, to preserve, strengthen and assist the Palestinian Authority, including through efforts to rebuild its infrastructure, security and governance capacity. We call also on the donor community and the international financial institutions to renew their commitment to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, and to assist in economic and institutional reconstruction. We pay tribute to the courageous efforts of the humanitarian agencies.

We agreed on the need to keep the situation in the Middle East under review by the Quartet at the principal's level through regular consultations. Our Special Envoys will continue their efforts on the ground to assist the parties in reaching an end to confrontation and a resumption of political negotiations.

*Madrid — 10 April 2002*

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# Annex 10



## **Middle East Quartet Statement of July 16, 2002**

New York City  
July 16, 2002

After meeting at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City, the Quartet issued the following Statement:

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten met in New York today. The Quartet members reviewed the situation in the Middle East and agreed to continue close consultations, as expressed in the Madrid Declaration, to which the Quartet remains fully committed, to promote a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. The Quartet expresses its support for the convening of a further international Ministerial meeting at an appropriate time.

The Quartet deeply deplores today's tragic killing of Israeli civilians and reiterates its strong and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism, including suicide bombing, which is morally repugnant and has caused great harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a better future. Terrorists must not be allowed to kill the hope of an entire region, and a united international community, for genuine peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis. The Quartet expresses once again its profound regret at the loss of innocent Israeli and Palestinian lives, and extends its sympathy to all those who have suffered loss. The Quartet members expressed their increasing concern about the mounting humanitarian crisis in Palestinian areas and their determination to address urgent Palestinian needs.

Consistent with President Bush's June 24 statement, the UN, EU and Russia express their strong support for the goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement which, with intensive effort on security and reform by all, could be reached within three years from now. The UN, EU and Russia welcome President Bush's commitment to active U.S. leadership toward that goal. The Quartet remains committed to implementing the vision of two states, Israel and an independent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, as affirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 1397. The Quartet members, in their individual capacity and jointly, pledge all possible efforts to realize the goals of reform, security and peace and reaffirm that progress in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields must proceed together, hand-in-hand. The Quartet reiterates its welcome of the initiative of Saudi Arabia, endorsed by the Arab League Beirut Summit, as a significant contribution towards a comprehensive peace.

To assist progress toward these shared goals, the Quartet agreed on the importance of a coordinated international campaign to support Palestinian efforts at political and economic reform. The Quartet welcomes and encourages the strong Palestinian interest in fundamental reform, including the Palestinian 100-Day Reform Program. It also welcomes the willingness of regional states and the international community to assist the Palestinians to build institutions of good government, and to create a new governing framework of working democracy, in preparation \_ for statehood. For these objectives to be realized, it is essential that well-prepared, free, open and democratic elections take place. The new international Task Force on Reform, which is comprised of representatives of the U.S., EU, UN Secretary General, Russia, Japan, Norway, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and which works under the auspices of the Quartet, will strive to develop and implement a comprehensive action plan for reform. The inaugural meeting of this Task Force in London July 10 discussed a detailed plan including specific Palestinian commitments. It will meet again in August to review actions in areas including civil society, financial accountability, local government, the market economy, elections, and judicial and administrative reform.

Implementation of an action plan, with appropriate benchmarks for progress on reform measures, should lead to the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state characterized by the rule of law, separation of powers, and a vibrant free market economy that can best serve the interests of its people. The Quartet

also commits itself to continuing to assist the parties in efforts to renew dialogue, and welcomes in this regard the recent high-level ministerial meetings between Israelis and Palestinians on the issues of security, economics and reform.

The Quartet agreed on the critical need to build new and efficient Palestinian security capabilities on sound bases of unified command, and transparency and accountability with regard to resources and conduct. Restructuring security institutions to serve these goals should lead to improvement in Palestinian security performance, which is essential to progress on other aspects of institutional transformation and realization of a Palestinian state committed to combating terror.

In this context, the Quartet notes Israel's vital stake in the success of Palestinian reform. The Quartet calls upon Israel to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. Recognizing Israel's legitimate security concerns, these steps include immediate measures to ease the internal closures in certain areas and, as security improves through reciprocal steps, withdrawal of Israeli forces to their pre-September 28, 2000 positions. Moreover, frozen tax revenues should be released. In this connection, a more transparent and accountable mechanism is being put into place. In addition, consistent with the Mitchell Committee's recommendations, Israel should stop all new settlement activity. Israel must also ensure full, safe and unfettered access for international and humanitarian personnel.

The Quartet reaffirms that there must be a negotiated permanent settlement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. There can be no military solution to the conflict; Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them, through sustained negotiations, if there is to be real and lasting peace and security. The Israeli occupation that began in 1967 must end, and Israel must have secure and recognized borders. The Quartet further reaffirms its commitment to the goal of a comprehensive regional peace between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria, based upon Resolutions 242 and 338, the Madrid terms of reference, and the principle of land for peace.

The Quartet looks forward to upcoming consultations with the Foreign Ministers of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other regional partners, and determines to continue regular consultation on the situation in the Middle East at the principals' level. The Quartet envoys will continue their work on the ground to support the work of the principals, to assist the Task Force on Reform, and to aid the parties in resuming a political dialogue in order to reach a solution to the core political questions.

[End]

Released on July 16, 2002

# Annex 11



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
18 July 2002

Original: English

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### Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 4578th meeting of the Security Council, held on 18 July 2002, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council supports the Joint Statement of the 'Quartet', annexed to this statement, which was issued in New York on 16 July 2002 by the Secretary-General, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Secretary of State of the United States, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, the High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commissioner for External Affairs. The Security Council appreciates also the involvement in discussions with the 'Quartet' of senior representatives of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

"The Security Council calls upon the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and all States in the region to cooperate with the efforts to achieve the goals set out in the Joint Statement and stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, the Madrid terms of reference and the principle of land for peace."



## Annex

### "QUARTET" JOINT STATEMENT

Following is the text of a joint statement issued by the "Quartet" (United Nations, Russian Federation, the United States and the European Union) following their meeting in New York.

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten met in New York today. The Quartet members reviewed the situation in the Middle East and agreed to continue close consultations, as expressed in the Madrid Declaration, to which the Quartet remains fully committed, to promote a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. The Quartet expresses its support for the convening of a further international Ministerial meeting at an appropriate time.

The Quartet deeply deplores today's tragic killing of Israeli civilians and reiterates its strong and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism, including suicide bombing, which is morally repugnant and has caused great harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a better future. Terrorists must not be allowed to kill the hope of an entire region, and a united international community, for genuine peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis. The Quartet expresses once again its profound regret at the loss of innocent Israeli and Palestinian lives, and extends its sympathy to all those who have suffered loss. The Quartet members expressed their increasing concern about the mounting humanitarian crisis in Palestinian areas and their determination to address urgent Palestinian needs.

Consistent with President Bush's June 24 statement, the UN, EU and Russia express their strong support for the goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement which, with intensive effort on security and reform by all, could be reached within three years from now. The UN, EU and Russia welcome President Bush's commitment to active U.S. leadership toward that goal. The Quartet remains committed to implementing the vision of two states, Israel and an independent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, as affirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 1397. The Quartet members, in their individual capacity and jointly, pledge all possible efforts to

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realize the goals of reform, security and peace and reaffirm that progress in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields must proceed together,

hand-in-hand. The Quartet reiterates its welcome of the initiative of Saudi Arabia, endorsed by the Arab League Beirut Summit, as a significant contribution towards a comprehensive peace.

To assist progress toward these shared goals, the Quartet agreed on the importance of a coordinated international campaign to support Palestinian efforts at political and economic reform. The Quartet welcomes and encourages the strong Palestinian interest in fundamental reform, including the Palestinian 100-Day Reform Program. It also welcomes the willingness of regional states and the international community to assist the Palestinians to build institutions of good government, and to create a new governing framework of working democracy, in preparation for statehood. For these objectives to be realized, it is essential that well-prepared, free, open and democratic elections take place. The new international Task Force on Reform, which is comprised of representatives of the U.S., EU, UN Secretary General, Russia, Japan, Norway, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and which works under the auspices of the Quartet, will strive to develop and implement a comprehensive action plan for reform. The inaugural meeting of this Task Force in London July 10 discussed a detailed plan including specific Palestinian commitments. It will meet again in August to review actions in areas including civil society, financial accountability, local government, the market economy, elections, and judicial and administrative reform.

Implementation of an action plan, with appropriate benchmarks for progress on reform measures, should lead to the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state characterized by the rule of law, separation of powers, and a vibrant free market economy that can best serve the interests of its people. The Quartet also commits itself to continuing to assist the parties in efforts to renew dialogue, and welcomes in this regard the recent high-level ministerial meetings between Israelis and Palestinians on the issues of security, economics and reform.

The Quartet agreed on the critical need to build new and efficient Palestinian security capabilities on sound bases of unified command, and transparency and accountability with regard to resources and conduct. Restructuring security institutions to serve these goals should lead to improvement in Palestinian security performance, which is essential to progress on other aspects of institutional transformation and realization of a Palestinian state committed to combating terror.

In this context, the Quartet notes Israel's vital stake in the success of Palestinian reform. The Quartet calls upon Israel to take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. Recognizing Israel's legitimate security concerns, these steps include immediate measures to ease the internal closures in certain areas and, as security improves through reciprocal steps, withdrawal of Israeli forces to their pre-September 28, 2000 positions. Moreover, frozen tax revenues should be released. In this connection, a



more transparent and accountable mechanism is being put into place. In addition, consistent with the Mitchell Committee's recommendations, Israel should stop all new settlement activity. Israel must also ensure full, safe and unfettered access for international and humanitarian personnel.

The Quartet reaffirms that there must be a negotiated permanent settlement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. There can be no military solution to the conflict; Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them, through sustained negotiations, if there is to be real and lasting peace and security. The Israeli occupation that began in 1967 must end, and Israel must have secure and recognized borders. The Quartet further reaffirms its commitment to the goal of a comprehensive regional peace between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria, based upon Resolutions 242 and 338, the Madrid terms of reference, and the principle of land for peace.

The Quartet looks forward to upcoming consultations with the Foreign Ministers of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other regional partners, and determines to continue regular consultation on the situation in the Middle East at the principals' level. The Quartet envoys will continue their work on the ground to support the work of the principals, to assist the Task Force on Reform, and to aid the parties in resuming a political dialogue in order to reach a solution to the core political questions.

# Annex 12

European Union

20 December 2002

**Statement of the Middle East Quartet, Washington DC, 20 December 2002**

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten met today in Washington with President Bush and Secretary of State Powell. In his meeting, President Bush expressed strong support for the efforts of the Quartet and his firm commitment to the Quartet's roadmap, which would realize his vision of two states - Israel and Palestine - living side-by-side in peace and security.

Reaffirming their previous statements, the Quartet members reviewed developments since their last meeting, on September 17, 2002. They condemned the brutal terror attacks carried out by Palestinian extremist organizations since the last meeting, which aim to diminish the prospects for peace, and only harm legitimate Palestinian aspirations for statehood. The Quartet deplores the killing of innocent Palestinian civilians and UN employees in IDF security operations, and calls on the Government of Israel to review its rules of engagement and disciplinary procedures to avoid such civilian casualties.

The Quartet took stock of the results of the ongoing consultations with the parties on the elements of a three-phase performance-based and goal-driven roadmap to realize the vision expressed in President Bush's June 24 speech of two States - Israel and an independent, viable, sovereign, and democratic Palestine - living side-by-side in peace and security. The Quartet commended the constructive spirit that characterized its discussions with all parties. The Quartet, based upon a common understanding on the content and goals of this process, made substantial progress toward finalizing a roadmap for presentation to the parties in the near future. The Quartet agreed to further intensive work to develop a credible and effective monitoring mechanism. In the meantime, the Quartet calls on the parties to carry out as rapidly as possible their responsibilities to restore calm, pursue reforms, and improve the humanitarian situation - steps that will lead to a political process culminating in Palestinian statehood.

Specifically, the Quartet calls for an immediate, comprehensive cease-fire. All Palestinian individuals and groups must end all acts of terror against Israelis, in any location. In this regard, the Quartet welcomes the initiative of Egypt to work with Palestinians to achieve this end. Such a cease-fire should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by the government of Israel. As calm is established, Israeli forces should withdraw from Palestinian areas and the pre-Intifada status quo on the ground should be restored. The Quartet calls on the Palestinian leadership to work with the US and others to restructure and reform the Palestinian security services.

Recognizing the importance of well-prepared Palestinian elections to the process of building strong, democratic, institutions in preparation for statehood, the Quartet supports the accelerated work of the Constitutional Committee to draft a Palestinian constitution. The Quartet notes the progress made in the reform process under difficult circumstances and calls for increased efforts by the Palestinian Authority to move forward in a comprehensive and sustained manner, in cooperation with the Task Force on Palestinian Reform, on institutional reforms. In this context, the Quartet welcomes the initiative of the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Blair to convene a meeting early next year to encourage and accelerate the reform process.

The Quartet expresses concern at the deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the West Bank. It calls for increased efforts by the Government of Israel to ease the humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza. It also calls on Israel and the Palestinians to implement fully the recommendations of the Bertini report. The Quartet welcomes the recent transfer by Israel of VAT and other revenues due to the Palestinian Authority and calls on Israel to continue these monthly transfers including

arrears. The Quartet reiterates the importance of immediate Israeli measures, consistent with legitimate security concerns, to improve the lives of Palestinians, including allowing the resumption of normal economic activity facilitating the movement of goods, people, and essential services and lifting curfew and closures. The Quartet calls on Israel to avoid actions that undermine trust and create further hardship for innocent Palestinian civilians, including demolition of houses and civil infrastructure.

The Quartet welcomes efforts to re-organize and update donor coordination mechanisms in order to simplify and strengthen an already unified international effort so as to revive and support peace efforts.

The Quartet reiterates the critical importance of sustaining hope on the part of Israelis and Palestinians for the vision articulated by President Bush, and supported by the Quartet in its previous statements and ongoing engagement with the parties and in the region, of a future in which both peoples can live - in their own states - in genuine peace and security. Consistent with this goal the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties and based on resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders. For this goal to be achieved, violence and terror must come to an end. Israeli settlement activity must stop, consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell report.

The Quartet will continue to encourage all parties in the region to seek a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet looks forward to continuing consultations on achieving the above goals, and a further meeting of the Quartet principals in the near future to adopt the roadmap and present it to the parties.

\* \* \*

## Meeting in the Middle East Quartet in Washington DC, December 20, 2002

At the meeting the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Per Stig Moeller, deliberated on the below main points of view:

### **General**

Thank you for convening this meeting. EU is fully committed to the work of the Quartet. Only if we pool our efforts can we hope to influence the situation.

Also key to ensure continued close coordination with moderate Arab States. Equally important that we maintain close cooperation with the two parties. We therefore have to consider how best to communicate the results of our discussions today.

### **Road map**

As the EU heads of state and government underscored at last weeks European Council [in declaration on Middle East] we firmly remain of the view that the Quartet should have adopted and published the Road Map today.

I accept of course that there is no agreement to do this. But it is a pity. It is key to maintain momentum, keep a political perspective in the process and safeguard the credibility of the Quartet.

Much good-will has been invested in 'selling' the Road Map concept to the parties and regional stakeholder. They now expect the Quartet to deliver.

True - the Road Map could become hostage in the Israeli election campaign and this could complicate the subsequent implementation.

On the other hand, I do think the Israeli electorate has a right to know what the international community expects from Israel. Further, even Sharon himself has publicly stated that President Bush's vision is a realistic and attainable plan.

Given the circumstances, I find it important that we do three things:

Firstly, we have to send a clear and unambiguous message that the Road Map will be adopted and made public before the end of February.

Secondly, we need - if at all possible today - to finalize the text of the Road Map so it is ready for adoption.

Thirdly, we need to speed up the work of devising a credible monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the Road Map.

Turning to the content a major outstanding issue in the text is the linkage of the settlement freeze to a cessation of hostilities. This linkage poses quite frankly a problem for us. We are very concerned about the continuing expansion of settlements, which is a real threat to the realisation of the Two-State solution and to the implementation of the Road Map. What we should be calling for is therefore rather an unconditional settlement freeze. The settlements are illegal according to international law and a freeze should not be made contingent on a ceasefire. Quite to the contrary the settlements have themselves developed into major flashpoints for violent confrontation. A settlement freeze would provide decisive incentive to cessation of terror and violence.

### **Perspectives in the coming months**

Time is of essence. We are working within a narrow window of opportunity. If it comes to a military confrontation in Iraq we are likely to see a further polarization, particularly among the radical forces on both sides that are trying to undermine the peace process.

Very important that we provide encouragement to the moderate forces and regimes in the region. The Road Map can become a central rallying point for gaining such support.

A new Sharon government will - irrespective of whether Labour joins in the coalition or not - be dependent on the growing part of the Israeli public who is ready for a settlement that allows for both peace and security. It is therefore key to keep up the pressure on Sharon to go ahead with the Road Map.

In a similar way the EU is making a major effort through our policies to engage Turkey and Iran constructively on the side of the West.

### **Monitoring**

A credible monitoring mechanism will be essential to the implementation of the Road Map.

The mechanism must be presented together with the Road Map to the parties and they must agree to it.

We should draw on existing structures and personnel in providing information on implementation. The information should via working group structure be fed to the Quartet Envoys Group who should assess it and transform it into politically meaningful input to the Quartet Principals.

Key that the Quartet Envoy Group clearly pinpoints who is responsible in case of non-compliance and that the Quartet is ready to act on the information.

### **Palestinian reform process**

The EU is pleased with the work in the Quartet Task Force on Palestinian Reform and will continue to be actively engaged in its efforts to assist the reform process.

With the postponement of Palestinian elections there will be sufficient time for more thorough preparations for free and fair elections and for the Palestinians themselves to engage in an open debate on their future political leadership. The road map process can help to strengthen the internal debate on the need for a further devolution of executive power.

A significant number of important reform measures are directly or indirectly affected by Israeli actions such as closures and curfews. To facilitate the reform progress Israel should grant long-duration travel permits to all key Palestinian officials involved in the reform process. The Israelis made a commitment to do that at the last meeting of the Working Group on Palestinian Reform in Jordan. A list of such key Palestinian officials has been worked out and provided to Israel.

With the aim of consolidating the work on reform we should consider having an AHLC-meeting shortly after the Israeli elections.

### **Security**

We are encouraged by the Cairo-talks between Fatah and Hamas, which will be resumed in the near future with the aim of reaching an agreement on a stop to attacks on Israeli civilians as well as to attacks inside Israel. The Security Advisor of the EU's Special Middle East Envoy, Mr. Alistair Crooke, has been closely involved in facilitating these talks, which have the potential to change the developments on the ground in a positive direction. The aim should of course be to have Islamic Jihad included in an agreement.

In this connection, the EU will continue to impress on Syria and Iran the need to stop their financial and logistical support to terrorist organisations.

Very important that security trainers and observers are deployed on the ground quickly to follow up if an agreement falls into place.

### **British Middle East Conference**

Welcome the British initiative on Palestinian Reform. Could help keep up the momentum while we are awaiting a new Israeli Government and provide much needed encouragement to the reform forces on the Palestinian side.

\* \* \*

Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller's press statement after the meeting in the Middle East

## Quartet in Washington DC, 20 December, 2002

We have finalized the Road Map at our meeting.

Very important that President Bush has given his unreserved support to the Quartet and the Road Map principles.

Nobody should be in any doubt that the international community is fully committed to see the Road Map and the vision of two states living side by side in peace and security implemented.

We have a clear agreement. The final adoption and presentation to the parties should take place early in the new year.

Have impressed on the parties the need for them to start implementation of their commitments immediately so we do not lose more time.

The coming weeks will be used for working out an effective and credible monitoring mechanism of the Quartet for the implementation of the Road Map.

No doubt in my mind that the Road Map which builds on the initial Danish EU Presidency draft - in spite of the delays incurred - is the only way forward and will remain the central frame of reference for solving the conflict in the years to come.

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# Annex 13



**UN News Service****20 February 2003****Quartet Envoys Statement  
London, February 20, 2003**

Representatives of the Middle East Quartet -- the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United Nations -- met at the Envoys level in London February 19 to review the current situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and prospects for giving new impetus to peace efforts. They expressed very serious concern at the continuing acts of violence and terror planned and directed against Israelis, and at Israeli military operations over the past several days in the West Bank and Gaza which led to Palestinian civilian fatalities. The Envoys discussed the next steps toward the adoption and implementation of the Quartet's Road Map, as it is the means for progress toward the vision described by President Bush on June 24, 2002: two democratic states living side by side in peace. They reaffirmed that the Road Map should be formally adopted and presented to the parties as soon as possible.

The Quartet envoys reaffirmed the call of the Quartet principals in Washington on December 20 for an immediate, comprehensive cease-fire. All Palestinian individuals and groups must end all acts of terror against Israelis, in any location.

The Envoys reiterated their call for the Palestinians to build credible institutions to prepare for statehood and welcomed the Palestinians' decision to appoint a Prime Minister as a significant step. The Envoys underscored the importance of appointing a credible and fully empowered Prime Minister. They urged the immediate convening of the relevant legislative and executive Palestinian bodies to exercise their authority in this regard, and called on the Government of Israel to facilitate these meetings. The Quartet also encouraged the Palestinians to continue the process of preparing a constitution that would form the basis for a strong parliamentary democracy.

Noting Israel's important role in facilitating the Palestinian reform process, they recognized the positive effect of the resumption of monthly revenue transfers and return of outstanding arrears. Likewise, the Quartet Envoys emphasized Israel's obligation, consistent with legitimate security concerns, to do more to ease the dire humanitarian and socio-economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza, including facilitating freedom of movement and access, alleviating the daily burdens of life under occupation, and respecting the dignity of Palestinian civilians. They welcomed the opportunity for direct discussions between the donor community and Israelis and Palestinians to address this critical issue.

## Annex 14

**European Union  
Quartet  
Russian Federation  
United States of America  
Secretary-General**

**23 June 2003**

***Quartet Statement (Jordan)***

<b>Summary</b>	June 23, 2003: Statement by the Quartet, Dead Sea (Jordan) - June 22, 2003
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Representatives of the Quartet - United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten - met today at the Dead Sea in Jordan.

The Quartet members reviewed developments since their last meeting in Washington, on December 20, 2002. They welcome the appointment of Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas and the strong start he and his government have made in difficult circumstances, and the acceptance by Israeli and Palestinian authorities of the roadmap presented to the parties on April 30, 2003, leading to realization of the goal expressed by President Bush and shared by the Quartet members, of two states - Israel and Palestine - living side by side in peace and security, in 2005. They strongly endorse the results of the Red Sea Summit meetings, and pledge to support actively Prime Minister Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon in carrying out the commitments made at these meetings.

They welcome the very positive message and personal commitment of President Bush, and his decision to place a mission on the ground charged with helping the parties to move toward peace, through establishment of a credible and effective structure led by the United States, in close cooperation with the Quartet, to coordinate, monitor, and promote implementation of the parties' commitments and responsibilities, as laid out in the roadmap. The Quartet fully shares President Bush's expectation that both parties will meet their obligations in full, and welcomes the initial steps taken by the parties toward this goal.

The Quartet members deplore and condemn the brutal terror attacks against Israeli citizens carried out by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade since the roadmap's presentation. The Quartet calls for an immediate, comprehensive end to all violence and welcomes efforts by the Government of Egypt and others to achieve such an immediate and comprehensive halt to armed action by Palestinian groups. All Palestinian individuals and groups must end acts of terror against all Israelis, anywhere. The Quartet calls on the Palestinian authorities to take all possible steps to halt immediately the activities of individuals and groups planning and conducting attacks on Israelis. The Quartet supports immediate Palestinian action to restructure and consolidate under Prime Minister Abbas all security services, and calls on all states to assist in such efforts.

The Quartet welcomes the discussions between Israel and Palestinian authorities over transfer of security responsibility in Gaza and Bethlehem. They call on both sides to reach agreement as soon as possible on workable arrangements and timetables for implementation.

The Quartet calls on all states in the region and around the world to end immediately any form of support, including fund-raising and financial assistance, to groups and individuals that use terror and violence to diminish the chances for peace, and calls for an end to all forms of incitement to violence and hatred.

The Quartet expresses its deep concern over Israeli military actions that result in the killing of innocent Palestinian and other civilians. Such actions do not enhance security and undermine trust and prospects for cooperation. While the Quartet recognizes Israel's right to self-defense in the face of terrorist attacks against its citizens, it calls on the Government of Israel to respect international humanitarian law and to exert maximum efforts to avoid such civilian casualties.

The Quartet also calls on the Government of Israel to make all possible efforts to support Palestinian authorities and ease the plight of the Palestinian people through immediate actions. The Quartet strongly urges Israel to facilitate movement of people and goods, as well as access by international humanitarian organizations. These steps must be taken as rapidly and comprehensively as possible to improve the humanitarian situation and normalize the daily life of the Palestinian people.

The Quartet recalls its position that settlement activity must stop. In this context, it welcomes the undertaking

made by Prime Minister Sharon at Aqaba, and first steps taken by Israel on the ground, to remove unauthorized outposts.

The Quartet members reviewed progress made on Palestinian institutional reform, endorsed the result of the meetings of the Task Force and Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Meetings held earlier in the year, and reaffirmed their support for all efforts to fulfill the reform goals set forth in the first phase of the roadmap - including adoption of a Palestinian Constitution and preparations for free, open and fair Palestinian elections as soon as possible.

The Quartet reaffirms its commitment to a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement to the Arab- Israeli conflict, including progress toward peace between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.

Such a peace would be based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338, 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement.

The Quartet looks forward to continuing to work together in close consultation on these issues with the parties.

**Ref:** CL03-230EN  
**EU source:** Council

# Annex 15



**Security Council**

Distr.: General  
7 October 2003

Original: English

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**Letter dated 6 October 2003 from the Secretary-General  
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Quartet statement that was issued following the meeting of the Quartet principals — representing the United States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United Nations — at United Nations Headquarters on 26 September 2003 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Kofi A. **Annan**

## **Annex**

### **Quartet statement**

**New York, 26 September 2003**

Representatives of the Quartet — United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten — met today in New York.

The Quartet members view with great concern the situation in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, which has stalled implementation of the road map. The Quartet reminds both parties of the need to take into account long-term consequences of their actions, and the obligation for both parties to make rapid progress towards full implementation of the road map for peace. They reaffirm their commitment to President Bush's vision — shared by Russia, the European Union and the United Nations — of two States, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security; and call on both Israelis and Palestinians to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities under the road map and the commitments both sides made to President Bush at the Red Sea summit meeting in Aqaba.

The Quartet members remind all sides that they have obligations and responsibilities to each other that must be performed. Each party must do more to immediately and simultaneously address the core concerns of the other, as described in the road map. The Quartet members reaffirm their commitment to the road map and to resumed progress by the parties towards its rapid implementation.

They condemn the vicious terror attacks of August and September carried out by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. They again affirm that such actions are morally indefensible and do not serve the interests of the Palestinian people. They call on Palestinians to take immediate, decisive steps against individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks. Such steps should be accompanied by Israeli supportive measures, including resumption of full security cooperation. They further call on all States to end the harbouring and support, including fund-raising and financial assistance, of any groups and individuals that use terror and violence to advance their goals.

The Quartet members affirm that the Palestinian Authority security services must be consolidated under the clear control of an empowered Prime Minister and Interior Minister and must be the sole armed authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Noting that the first Palestinian Prime Minister has resigned his post, they urge that the new Palestinian Prime Minister form a cabinet as soon as possible, and ask that Cabinet to recommit itself to the pledges made in the road map and at Aqaba. The Palestinian Authority must ensure that a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure".

The Quartet members recognize Israel's legitimate right to self-defence in the face of terrorist attacks against its citizens. In this context and in the context of international humanitarian law, they call on the Government of Israel to exert

maximum efforts to avoid civilian casualties. The Government of Israel must “take no action undermining trust, including deportations, confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet Work Plan”. The Quartet members call on the Government of Israel to take immediate steps to ease the humanitarian and economic plight of the Palestinian people, including through easing the movement of people and goods and ensuring access to international humanitarian organizations. The Quartet members reaffirm that, in accordance with the road map, settlement activity must stop, and note with great concern the actual and proposed route of Israel’s West Bank fence, particularly as it results in the confiscation of Palestinian land, cuts off the movement of people and goods and undermines Palestinians’ trust in the road map process, as it appears to prejudge final borders of a future Palestinian State.

The Quartet calls upon the international and regional community to continue to provide well-coordinated assistance to the Palestinian Authority for the implementation of reforms and institution-building and to consider steps that could be taken with respect to the socio-economic development of the region. The Quartet members will continue to follow closely the implementation by the parties of their obligations. The Quartet members will coordinate their efforts through regular meetings of Quartet representatives, as well as through discussion among the Quartet principals. The principals will next meet prior to the end of the year.

The Quartet members look forward to continuing to work closely together, as well as in association with regional parties, to help achieve progress, both between Israelis and Palestinians and towards the goal of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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# Annex 16

UNITED  
NATIONS

S



## Security Council

S/RES/62 (1948)  
S/1080  
16 November 1948

### 62 (1948). Resolution of 16 November 1948

[S/1080]

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* its previous resolutions concerning the establishment and implementation of the truce in Palestine, and recalling particularly its resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948 which determined that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Taking note* that the General Assembly is continuing its consideration of the future government of Palestine in response to the request of the Security Council in its resolution 44 (1948) of 1 April 1948,

*Without prejudice* to the actions of the Acting Mediator regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 61 (1948) of 4 November 1948,

1. *Decides* that, in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine;

2. *Calls upon* the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice, including:

(a) The delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shall not move;

(b) Such withdrawal and reduction of their armed forces will ensure the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace in Palestine.

*Adopted at the 381st meeting. 1/*

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1/ The draft resolution was voted on in parts. No vote was taken on the text as a whole.

# Annex 17

**UNITED  
NATIONS**

**S**



**Security Council**

S/1302/Rev.1  
3 April 1949

**DOCUMENT S/1302/REV.1 1/**

**Cablegram dated 3 April 1949 from the United Nations Acting Mediator to the Secretary-General transmitting the text of the General Armistice Agreement between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel.**

[Original text: English]  
Rhodes, 3 April 1949

*For the President of the Security Council*

I have the honour to inform you that an armistice agreement between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel has been signed this evening, 3 April 1949, at Rhodes. The text of the agreement follows.

Ralph J. BUNCHE  
*Acting Mediator*

**HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL:  
GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT**

Rhodes, 3 April 1949

*Preamble*

The Parties to the present Agreement,

Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948,<sup>2/</sup> calling upon them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice;

Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship concerning the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement;

The undersigned representatives of their respective Governments, having exchanged their full powers found to be in good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

## Article I

With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed:

1. The injunction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties;
2. No aggressive action by the armed forces - land, sea, or air - of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the use of the term planned in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations;
3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected;
4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.

## Article II

With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed:

1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized;
2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.

## Article III

1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948, a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties - land, sea and air - is hereby established.
2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines set forth in articles V and VI of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party.
3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party.

## Article IV

1. The lines described in articles V and VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice Demarcation Lines and are delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948.
2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Lines is to delineate the lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.
3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians from crossing the

fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI.

#### Article V

1. The Armistice Demarcation Lines for all sectors other than the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on the maps 3/ in annex I to this Agreement, and shall be defined as follows:

(a) In the sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall follow the truce lines as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

(b) In the Jerusalem sector, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall correspond to the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area;

(c) In the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated on map I and marked B in annex I to this Agreement;

(d) In the sector from a point on the Dead Sea (MR 1925-0958) to the southernmost tip of Palestine, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be determined by existing military positions as surveyed in March 1949 by United Nations observers, and shall run from north to south as delineated on map I in annex I to this Agreement.

#### Article VI

1. It is agreed that the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom shall replace the forces of Iraq in the sector now held by the latter forces, the intention of the Government of Iraq in this regard having been communicated to the Acting Mediator in the message of 20 March from the Foreign Minister of Iraq authorizing the delegation of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom to negotiate for the Iraqi forces and stating that those forces would be withdrawn.

2. The Armistice Demarcation Line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on map I in Annex I to this Agreement and marked A.

3. The Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall be established in stages as follows, pending which the existing military lines may be maintained:

(a) In the area west of the road from Baqa to Jaljulia, and thence to the east of Kafr Qasim: within five weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;

(b) In the area of Wadi Ara north of the line from Baqa to Zubeiba: within seven weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;

(c) In all other areas of the Iraqi sector: within fifteen weeks of the date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed.

4. The Armistice Demarcation Line in the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, referred to in paragraph (c) of article V of this Agreement and marked B on map I in annex I, which involves substantial deviation from the existing military lines in favour of the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, is designated to offset the modifications of the existing military lines in the Iraqi sector set forth in paragraph 3 of this article.

5. In compensation for the road acquired between Tulkarem and Qalqiliya, the Government of Israel agrees to pay to the Government of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom the cost of constructing twenty kilometres of first-class new road.

6. Wherever villages may be affected by the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Line

provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, the inhabitants of such villages shall be entitled to maintain, and shall be protected in, their full rights of residence, property and freedom. In the event any of the inhabitants should decide to leave their villages, they shall be entitled to take with them their livestock and other movable property, and to receive without delay full compensation for the land which they have left. It shall be prohibited for Israeli forces to enter or to be stationed in such villages, in which locally recruited Arab police shall be organized and stationed for internal security purposes.

7. The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom accepts responsibility for all Iraqi forces in Palestine.

8. The provisions of this article shall not be interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate political settlement between the Parties to this Agreement.

9. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto.

10. Except where otherwise provided, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be established, including such withdrawal of forces as may be necessary for this purpose, within ten days from the date on which this Agreement is signed.

11. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this article and in article V shall be subject to such rectification as may be agreed upon by the Parties to this Agreement, and all such rectifications shall have the same force and effect as if they had been incorporated in full in this General Armistice Agreement.

#### Article VII

1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make this impractical, as at the southernmost tip of Palestine and the coastal strip. Defensive forces permissible in each sector shall be as defined in annex II to this Agreement. In the sector now held by Iraqi forces, calculations on the reduction of forces shall include the number of Iraqi forces in this sector.

2. Reduction of forces to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be completed within ten days of the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this Agreement. In the same way the removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party, shall be completed within the same period.

3. The strength of the forces which may be maintained by the Parties on each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be subject to periodical review with a view toward further reduction of such forces by mutual agreement of the Parties.

#### Article VIII

1. A Special Committee, composed of two representatives of each Party designated by the respective Governments, shall be established for the purpose of formulating agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of this Agreement and to effect improvements in its application.

2. The Special Committee shall be organized immediately following the coming into effect of this Agreement and shall direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either Party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following, on which agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads, resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places

and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem.

3. The Special Committee shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it. Agreed plans and arrangements formulated by it may provide for the exercise of supervisory functions by the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article XI.

#### Article IX

Agreements reached between the Parties subsequent to the signing of this Armistice Agreement relating to such matters as further reduction of forces as contemplated in paragraph 3 of article VII, future adjustments of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, and plans and arrangements formulated by the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall have the same force and effect as the provisions of this Agreement and shall be equally binding upon the Parties.

#### Article X

An exchange of prisoners of war having been effected by special arrangement between the Parties prior to the signing of this Agreement, no further arrangements on this matter are required except that the Mixed Armistice Commission shall undertake to re-examine whether there may be any prisoners of war belonging to either Party which were not included in the previous exchange. In the event that prisoners of war shall be found to exist, the Mixed Armistice Commission shall arrange for an early exchange of such prisoners. The Parties to this Agreement undertake to afford full co-operation to the Mixed Armistice Commission in its discharge of this responsibility.

#### Article XI

1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement, with the exception of such matters as fall within the exclusive competence of the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with both Parties to this Agreement.
2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at Jerusalem and shall hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its work.
3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing of this Agreement.
4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting.
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members.
6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ observers, who may be from among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its functions. In the event United Nations observers should be so employed, they shall remain under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated



representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman.

7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement.

8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the preamble and articles I and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.

9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations.

10. Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations observers only shall be employed.

11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.

#### Article XII

1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon being signed.

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article.

3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles I and III, at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles I and III. Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties.

4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine.

5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate 4/, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party, two copies communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine.

DONE at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the third of April one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization.

For and on behalf of the  
Government of the Hashemite  
Jordan Kingdom

(Signed)

Colonel Ahmed Sudki EL-JUNDI

Lieutenant-Colonel Mohamed MAAYTE

For and on behalf of the  
Government of Israel

(Signed)

Reuven SHILOAH

Lieutenant-Colonel Moshe DAYAN

#### Annex I MAPS DELINEATING ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES

[These maps follow annex II, and are explained in the [end]note [3] by the Secretariat to article V of the Agreement.]

#### Annex II DEFINITION OF DEFENSIVE FORCES

I. For the purposes of this Agreement defensive forces shall be defined as follows:

1. Land forces

(a) A standard battalion to consist of not more than 800 officers and other ranks, and to be composed of not more than:

(i) Four rifle companies with ordinary infantry equipment; rifles, LMG's, SMG's, light mortars, anti-tank rifles and PIAT.

The light mortars shall not be heavier than 2 inch.

The following number of weapons per battalion shall not be exceeded: 48 LMG's, 16 mortars 2 inch, 8 PIAT's;

(ii) One support company with not more than six MMG's, six mortars and not heavier than 3 inch, four anti-tank guns not heavier than six-pounders;

(iii) One headquarters company;

(b) The artillery and anti-aircraft artillery to be allotted to the defensive forces shall consist of the following type of weapons: field guns not heavier than twenty-five pounders, the anti-air-craft guns not heavier than forty millimetres.

2. The following are excluded from the term "defensive forces":

- (a) Armour, such as tanks of all types, armoured cars, Bren gun carriers, half-tracks, armoured vehicles or load carriers, or any other armoured vehicles;
- (b) All support arms and units other than those specified in paragraphs 1(a) i and ii, and 1 (b) above;
- (c) Service units to be agreed upon.

### 3. Air forces

In the areas where defensive forces only are permitted airfields, airstrips, landing fields and other installations, and military aircraft shall be employed for defensive and normal supply purposes only.

II. The defensive forces which may be maintained by each Party in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, as provided in paragraph 1 of article VI, shall be as follows for the sectors described in article V, paragraph 1:

1. Sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574) to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area: one battalion each.
2. Jerusalem sector: two battalions each.
3. Hebron-Dead Sea sector: one battalion each.
4. Sector Engeddi to Eylat: three battalions each. In addition, each side will be allowed one squadron of light armoured cars consisting of not more than 13 light armoured cars or half tracks. The weapons permissible on these vehicles will be determined by the Mixed Armistice Commission.
5. Sector now held by Iraqi forces: five battalions each, and one squadron of armoured cars each.

### *Notes*

1/ This document includes mimeographed documents S/1302, S/1302/Add.1, S/1302/Corr.1 and also annexes I and II of the Agreement.

2/ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, Third Year, No. 126 (381st meeting), page 53.

3/ *Note by the Secretariat*. The photo-offsets of the two officially signed maps comprising annex I will be found at the end of this fascicule. For purposes of reproduction, it has been necessary to present the map of Palestine (map 1) as a north sheet (part 1) and a south sheet (part 2). Map 2 is a survey map of Jerusalem which should be consulted in connexion with sub-paragraph (b) of article V. The line referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of article V begins on part 1 of map 1 (blue line south of the Jerusalem area) and continues south on part 2. For all other geographical references in articles V and VI, map 1, part 1 should be consulted. The truce lines referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of article V are the red and green lines on the latter map.

4/ All of the signed copies were in English, the English text being the only authentic one.

### MAPS DELINEATING ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES

*Palestine (North & South sheets), Jerusalem, Latrun*

# Annex 18

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USA TODAY

**March** 14, 2002, Thursday, FINAL EDITION

**SECTION:** NEWS; Pg. 6A

**LENGTH:** 1293 words

**HEADLINE:** Terrorist says orders come from Arafat

**BYLINE:** **Matthew Kalman**

**DATELINE:** TULKARM, West Bank

**BODY:**

TULKARM, West Bank -- A leader of the largest Palestinian terrorist group spearheading suicide bombings and other attacks against Israel says he is following the orders of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

"Our group is an integral part of Fatah," says Maslama Thabet, 33, a leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Fatah, headed by Arafat, is the largest group in the Palestinian Authority, the government of the autonomous Palestinian territories.

Thabet spoke from the Tulkarm refugee camp, where he was holed up with about 300 of his heavily armed followers as hundreds of Israeli soldiers swept through the town. Over the past two weeks, Israel has launched massive incursions into Palestinian towns and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza in search of terrorists.

"The truth is, we are Fatah itself, but we don't operate under the name of Fatah," he said in a recent interview. "We are the armed wing of the organization. We receive our instructions from Fatah. Our commander is Yasser Arafat himself."

Spokesmen for Arafat give differing responses when asked about his ties to Thabet and the brigade. Nabil Abu Rudeineh, Arafat's chief spokesman, says he has never heard of Thabet. "The president has nothing to do with these things, he has nothing to say about this issue," Rudeineh says.

But Mohammed Odwan, Arafat's foreign media spokesman, confirms that the brigade is "loyal to President Arafat."

"They are working for the interests of the Palestinian people," Odwan says. "They are fighting because they think these kind of operations -- and I agree -- will push forward their independence and their dream of freedom."

Israeli security officials concede Arafat is not involved in directing the on-the-ground operations of militant groups, but they say his regular calls for holy war against Israel's occupation have been taken up as a directive by the extremists.

In a televised address Saturday, as Palestinian terrorists launched suicide attacks in Netanya and Jerusalem, Arafat urged Palestinians to "sacrifice themselves as martyrs in jihad (holy war) for Palestine."

"When Arafat stands in front of a crowd and calls for millions of martyrs to march on Jerusalem and holy war against Israel, he is giving a clear directive to his followers," says Reserve Col. Eran Lerman, former head of research for Israeli Military Intelligence and now the Jerusalem director of the American Jewish Committees. "Marwan Barghouti (secretary-general of Fatah in the West Bank) and the local leaders below him take that directive and transform it into actions. . . . Arafat does not personally approve individual operations, but he provides the money for Barghouti's terrorism."

Barghouti, who often is on the guest list at dinners with Arafat in the Palestinian leader's compound in Ramallah, confirmed last week that one of his lieutenants who was killed in an Israeli assassination was a member of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.

The link between the brigade and Arafat signals a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It means the Palestinian leadership has openly allied itself with a terrorist group. Palestinian officials openly say dealing in death, not diplomacy, is the only viable way to achieve their end: an independent Palestinian state.

As the Palestinians have ramped up their attacks on Israeli targets, Israel has escalated its response. The result has been some of the worst violence the region has seen in decades. More than 200 people have died -- 163 Palestinians and 59 Israelis -- since the beginning of March. More than 1,500 people have been killed in the past 18 months, more than 1,000 of them Palestinians. Israel's incursions into Palestinian territory reached a new level this week: 20,000 troops were deployed, and they searched house-to-house for terrorists and weapons. It has been the biggest Israeli military operation since its invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

The emergence of a radical young branch of Arafat's Fatah faction comes as no surprise to Mahmoud Muhareb, a Palestinian professor of political science at Al-Quds University in Jerusalem. "They are under siege, under blockade and almost at the edge of starvation," he says. "When you dehumanize the life of human beings, they end up feeling their life is not worthy. Five years ago, you might find one suicide bomber in an entire city. Today, it is different. There are many, because they feel there is no meaning to their lives."

Palestinian Authority officials say most members of the brigade receive salaries from the authority. For example, the leader of the brigade in Nablus, Nasser Awes, is a salaried officer in the Palestinian National Security Force, which is one of 14 armed police and security services that report to Arafat.

In the past two weeks, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has claimed responsibility for attacks that include:

- \* A suicide bombing March 2 in Jerusalem that killed 10 Israelis and injured 44.
- \* A sniper ambush on a West Bank checkpoint March 3 that killed 10 Israelis and wounded four.
- \* The shooting attack on a seaside hotel late Saturday in Netanya, north of Tel Aviv, that killed two Israelis and injured dozens.
- \* An ambush in northern Israel on Tuesday in which gunmen wearing Israeli army uniforms killed six Israelis before soldiers shot two of the attackers dead.

Israeli police say they thwarted a string of other planned attacks by the group in recent weeks.

The brigade, unknown until a year ago, has become the largest armed Palestinian group operating in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. Unlike two other major Palestinian militant groups, the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the brigade is secular. The group grew out of the Fatah youth movement known as the Tanzim. Under the 1993 Oslo peace accords that stated only Palestinian security services may bear arms, Tanzim is an illegal militia of about 10,000 armed young men headed by Barghouti.

As the terrorist wing of Arafat's Fatah faction, the brigade has the support of the largest political and military faction in the Palestinian Authority. Hussein A-Sheikh, a Fatah political leader in the West Bank, seems insulted when asked whether the brigade is under Arafat's control. "Of course, there is control," he snaps. "What do you think? That we are just a bunch of gangs?"

The Israeli army says Fatah, fueled by the brigade's lethal activities, has surpassed Hamas in Israeli fatalities. Hamas killed 100 Israelis in 2001 and Fatah killed 45, the army says, but since the start of 2002, Fatah has killed 57 Israelis while Hamas has

killed 27. The brigade also introduced a lethal twist to its attacks: female suicide bombers. A woman killed an elderly man and wounded 50 people in a suicide attack Jan. 27 in Jerusalem. Another woman blew herself up at a West Bank army checkpoint Feb. 27, injuring two soldiers.

Thabet, who commands the brigade in Tulkarm, attained notoriety a year ago when, with his friend Raed Karmi, he kidnapped and executed two Israeli restaurateurs who had stopped in Tulkarm for lunch. Karmi, founder of the brigade in Tulkarm, died in an explosion in January in a suspected Israeli assassination. Palestinian security forces arrested Thabet last year. He was released, as were dozens of other suspected terrorists.

"Our struggle is against the Israeli occupation," Thabet said. "We are prepared to fight to the last fighter against (Israeli Prime Minister Ariel) Sharon and his war machine. . . . Israel must pay a heavy price for the atrocities and massacres which they are perpetrating on a daily basis against the Palestinian people."

\* Bush rebukes Israel, 1A

**GRAPHIC:** PHOTO, B/W, Elizabeth Dalziel, AP; PHOTO, B/W, Abdellah Senna, Agence France-Presse; GRAPHIC, B/W, USA TODAY (MAP); GRAPHIC, B/W, Robert W. Ahrens, USA TODAY, Source: The Associated Press (BAR GRAPH); Attack in Jerusalem: A man wounded in a suicide bombing at a crowded cafe is evacuated Saturday night. ◇ Brigade member: A Palestinian militant displays his belt of explosives Friday in Bethlehem.

**LOAD-DATE:** March 14, 2002



## Annex 19

Jerusalem, January 18, 2004

## **PM Sharon and senior ministers hold discussion ahead of ICJ deliberations**

(Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser)

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Justice Minister Joseph Lapid and Minister Meir Sheerit met this afternoon (Sunday), January 18, 2004, with the steering committee and the legal task force that have been appointed to prepare for the International Court of Justice in the Hague's discussion of the terrorism prevention fence.

Acting Attorney General Edna Arbel, Prime Minister Bureau Director Dov Weisglass, Foreign Ministry Director-General Yoav Biran, Prime Minister Sharon's and Defense Minister Mofaz's military secretaries, Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Alan Baker, Dr. Meir Rosen, the Director of International Law in the IDF Judge Advocate General's office and other senior Foreign, Defense and Justice Ministry officials also attended the meeting.

The goal of the discussion was to present the ministers with a summary of the expected courses of action in the diplomatic, military, informational and legal spheres.

At the beginning of the meeting, Prime Minister Sharon said: "We are not discussing a change in the route of the fence, and there will be no change as a result of Palestinian or UN demands, including those from the Court. A re-discussion of the fence's route will take place only as a result of internal Israeli deliberations. The operative experience that has accumulated over the last few months in which the fence was being constructed was both good and bad. It was excellent at preventing terror but was not satisfactory in all matters relating to the damage to Palestinians' quality of life. I am personally monitoring the problems arising from the operation of the fence and am familiar with the complaints about it; it is possible that additional thought is needed to allow for the possibility of changing the route, in order to reduce the number of mishaps in operating the fence without harming security.

Other considerations, even if for domestic Israeli reasons, are a difficult determination that I received in any case from Acting Attorney-General Arbel and which indicates legal difficulties in defending the State's position before the High Court of Justice on certain points related to the route of the fence. This is an internal legal position that must be considered with due seriousness and this I will do."

Foreign Ministry Director-General Biran reported on the diplomatic situation and the preparations for international diplomatic efforts.

Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz's Military Secretary, Brig.-Gen. Michael Herzog, reported on the security and intelligence situations.

Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Baker gave an update on contacts with international legal experts on the issue.

Foreign Ministry Deputy Director-General for Information and Media Gideon Meir reported on the media and information campaign ahead of, during and after the Hague discussion.

It was agreed that at this stage, the task force would prepare a range of professional positions on the basis of the fence's existing route; if Israel - for humanitarian and domestic reasons - decides to change the route, the task force will, of course, adapt the professional opinions in accordance with the changes.

## Annex 20

Israel  
Jordan  
Palestinian Authority  
United States of America

4 June 2003

**STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER MAHMOUD ABBAS  
OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AFTER THE  
AQABA SUMMIT MEETING, Jordan, 4 June 2003**

I would like to thank King Abdullah for hosting our meeting here today. I would like also to thank President Mubarak and King Abdullah, King Hamad, and Crown Prince Abdallah who met in Egypt yesterday. I thank them for their statements supporting our efforts. I also would like to thank the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon for joining us here in Jordan. And many thanks, especially, to President Bush, who took the longest journey for peace of all of us.

As we all realize, this is an important moment. A new opportunity for peace exists, an opportunity based upon President Bush's vision and the Quartet's road map, which we have accepted without any reservations.

Our goal is two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side, in peace and security. The process is the one of direct negotiations to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to resolve all the permanent status issues, and end the occupation that began in 1967, under which Palestinians have suffered so much.

At the same time, we do not ignore the suffering of the Jews throughout history. It is time to bring all this suffering to an end.

Just as Israel must meet its responsibilities, we, the Palestinians, will fulfill our obligations for this endeavor to succeed. We are ready to do our part.

Let me be very clear: There will be no military solution to this conflict, so we repeat our renunciation, a renunciation of terror against the Israelis wherever they might be. Such methods are inconsistent with our religious and moral traditions and are dangerous obstacles to the achievement of an independent, sovereign state we seek. These methods also conflict with the kinds of state we wish to build, based on human rights and the rule of law.

We will exert all of our efforts, using all our resources to end the militarization of the intifada, and we will succeed. The armed intifada must end, and we must use and resort to peaceful means in our quest to end the occupation and the suffering of Palestinians and Israelis. And to establish the Palestinian state, we emphasize our determination to implement our pledges which we have made for our people and the international community. And that is a rule of law, single political authority, weapons only in the hands of those who are in charge with upholding the law and order, and political diversity within the framework of democracy.

Our goal is clear and we will implement it firmly and without compromise: a complete end to violence and terrorism. And we will be full partners in the international war against occupation and terrorism. And we will call upon our partners in this war to prevent financial and military assistance to those who oppose this position. We do this as a part of our commitment to the interest of the Palestinian people, and as members of the large family of humanity.

**We will also act vigorously against incitement and violence and hatred, whatever their form or forum may be. We will take measures to ensure that there is no incitement -- from Palestinian institutions. We must also reactivate and invigorate the U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli Anti-Incitement Committee. We will continue our work to establish the rule of law and to consolidate government authority in accountable Palestinian institutions. We seek to build the kind of democratic state that will be a qualitative addition to the international community.**

**All the PA security forces will be part of these efforts, and will work together toward the achievement of these goals. Our national future is at stake, and no one will be allowed to jeopardize it.**

**We are committed to these steps because they are in our national interest. In order to succeed, there must be a clear improvement in the lives of Palestinians. Palestinians must live in dignity. Palestinians must be able to move, go to their jobs and schools, visit their families, and conduct a normal life. Palestinians must not be afraid for their lives, property, or livelihood.**

**We welcome and stress the need for the assistance of the international community and, in particular, the Arab states, to help us. And we also welcome and stress the need for a U.S.-led monitoring mechanism.**

**Together, we can achieve the goal of an independent Palestinian state, sovereign, viable, in the framework of good neighbors with all states in the region, including Israel. Thank you very much.**

## Annex 21

**Israel  
Jordan  
Palestinian Authority  
United States of America**

**4 June 2003**

**Statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel  
after the Aqaba Summit meeting, Jordan, 4 June 2003**

I would like to thank His Majesty King Abdullah for arranging this meeting, and express Israel's appreciation to President Bush for coming here to be with Prime Minister Abbas and me. Thank you.

As the Prime Minister of Israel, the land which is the cradle of the Jewish people, my paramount responsibility is the security of the people of Israel and of the State of Israel. There can be no compromise with terror and Israel, together with all free nations, will continue fighting terrorism until its final defeat.

Ultimately, permanent security requires peace and permanent peace can only be obtained through security, and there is now hope of a new opportunity for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel, like others, has lent its strong support for President Bush's vision, expressed on June 24, 2002, of two states - Israel and a Palestinian state - living side by side in peace and security. The Government and people of Israel welcome the opportunity to renew direct negotiations according to the steps of the roadmap as adopted by the Israeli government to achieve this vision.

It is in Israel's interest not to govern the Palestinians but for the Palestinians to govern themselves in their own state. A democratic Palestinian state fully at peace with Israel will promote the long-term security and well-being of Israel as a Jewish state.

There can be no peace, however, without the abandonment and elimination of terrorism, violence, and incitement. We will work alongside the Palestinians and other states to fight terrorism, violence and incitement of all kinds. As all parties perform their obligations, we will seek to restore normal Palestinian life, improve the humanitarian situation, rebuild trust, and promote progress toward the President's vision. We will act in a manner that respects the dignity as well as the human rights of all people.

We can also reassure our Palestinian partners that we understand the importance of territorial contiguity in the West Bank, for a viable, Palestinian state. Israeli policy in the territories that are subject to direct negotiations with the Palestinians will reflect this fact.

We accept the principle that no unilateral actions by any party can prejudge the outcome of our negotiations.

In regard to the unauthorized outposts, I want to reiterate that Israel is a society governed by the rule of law. Thus, we will immediately begin to remove unauthorized outposts.

Israel seeks peace with all its Arab neighbors. Israel is prepared to negotiate in good faith wherever there are partners. As normal relations are established, I am confident that they will find in Israel a neighbor and a people committed to comprehensive peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the region.

Thank you all.



## Annex 22

3. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within three weeks<sup>28</sup> of the adoption of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

4. *Also recommends* the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

5. *Expresses* its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and *per diem* of a representative and alternate from each of the States members of the Commission.

294th plenary meeting,  
7 October 1950.

### 377 (V). Uniting for peace

#### A

*The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing* that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace", and

"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace",

*Reaffirming* that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions,

*Finding* that international tension exists on a dangerous scale,

*Recalling* its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essentials of peace", which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution,

<sup>28</sup> See resolution 410 (V), page 31.

*Reaffirming* the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

*Reaffirming* that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security,

*Conscious* that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

*Recognizing* in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Recognizing* that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,

#### A

1. *Resolves* that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. *Adopts* for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

#### B

3. *Establishes* a Peace Observation Commission which, for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on

the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter;

4. *Decides* that the Commission shall have authority in its discretion to appoint sub-commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its functions;

5. *Recommends* to all governments and authorities that they co-operate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel of Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV);

#### C

7. *Invites* each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security;

8. *Recommends* to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. *Invites* the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8;

#### D

11. *Establishes* a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and directs the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods, including those in section C of the present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter);

12. *Recommends* to all Member States that they co-operate with the Committee and assist it in the performance of its functions;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present resolution;

#### E

14. *Is fully conscious* that, in adopting the proposals set forth above, enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principles and Purposes established in the Charter of the United Nations, upon the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries; and accordingly

15. *Urges* Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of under-developed countries and areas.

#### ANNEX

The rules of procedure of the General Assembly are amended in the following respects:

1. The present text of rule 8 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule, and a new paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows:

"Emergency special sessions pursuant to resolution 377 A (V) shall be convened within twenty-four hours of the receipt by the Secretary-General of a request for such a session from the Security Council, on the vote of any seven members thereof, or of a request from a majority of the Members of the United Nations expressed by vote in the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of the concurrence of a majority of Members as provided in rule 9."

2. The present text of rule 9 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule and a new paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows:

"This rule shall apply also to a request by any Member for an emergency special session pursuant to resolution 377 A (V). In such a case the Secretary-General shall communicate with other Members by the most expeditious means of communication available."

3. Rule 10 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"... In the case of an emergency special session convened pursuant to rule 8 (b), the Secretary-General shall notify the Members of the United Nations at least twelve hours in advance of the opening of the session."

4. Rule 16 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"... The provisional agenda of an emergency special session shall be communicated to the Members of the United Nations simultaneously with the communication summoning the session."

5. Rule 19 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"... During an emergency special session additional items concerning the matters dealt with in resolution 377 A (V) may be added to the agenda by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting."

6. There is added a new rule to precede rule 65 to read as follows:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule and unless the General Assembly decides otherwise, the Assembly, in case of an emergency special session, shall convene in plenary session only and proceed directly to consider the item proposed for consideration in the request for the holding of the session, without previous reference to the General Committee or to any other Committee; the President and Vice-Presidents for such emergency special sessions shall be, respectively, the Chairman of those delegations from which were elected the President and Vice-Presidents of the previous session."

302nd plenary meeting,  
3 November 1950.

### B

For the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter,

*The General Assembly*

*Recommends* to the Security Council:

That it should take the necessary steps to ensure that the action provided for under the Charter is taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

That it should devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee;

The above dispositions should in no manner prevent the General Assembly from fulfilling its functions under resolution 377 A (V).

302nd plenary meeting,  
3 November 1950.

### C

*The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing* that the primary function of the United Nations Organization is to maintain and promote peace, security and justice among all nations,

*Recognizing* the responsibility of all Member States to promote the cause of international peace in accordance with their obligations as provided in the Charter,

*Recognizing* that the Charter charges the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council on all problems which are likely to threaten world peace,

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 190 (III) entitled "Appeal to the Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace",

*Recommends* to the permanent members of the Security Council that:

(a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter;

(b) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of their consultations.

302nd plenary meeting,  
3 November 1950.

### 378 (V). Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities

#### A

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* the Principles embodied in the Charter, which require that the force of arms shall not be resorted to except in the common interest, and shall not be used against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

*Desiring* to create a further obstacle to the outbreak of war, even after hostilities have started, and to facilitate the cessation of the hostilities by the action of the parties themselves, thus contributing to the peaceful settlement of disputes,

1. *Recommends:*

(a) That if a State becomes engaged in armed conflict with another State or States, it take all steps

## Annex 23



# Security Council

Fifty-eighth year

*Provisional*

**4836**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Sunday, 5 October 2003, 4.45 p.m.  
New York

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<i>President:</i>	Mr. Negroponte	(United States of America)
<i>Members:</i>	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Bulgaria	Mr. Tafrov
	Cameroon	Mr. Belinga-Eboutou
	Chile	Mr. Muñoz
	China	Mr. Wang Guangya
	France	Mr. De La Sablière
	Germany	Mr. Pleuger
	Guinea	Mr. Sow
	Mexico	Mr. Aguilar Zinser
	Pakistan	Mr. Akram
	Russian Federation	Mr. Gatilov
	Spain	Mr. Arias
	Syrian Arab Republic	Mr. Mekdad
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Emyr Jones Parry

## Agenda

Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/939)

Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/943)

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This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

*The meeting was called to order at 4.45 p.m.*

**Expression of thanks to the retiring President**

**The President:** As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of October, I should like to take the opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency Sir Emyr Jones Parry, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, for his service as President of the Security Council for the month of September 2003. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Sir Emyr Jones Parry for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the Council's business last month.

**Adoption of the agenda**

*The agenda was adopted.*

**Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/939)**

**Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/943)**

**The President:** I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Israel in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gillerman (Israel) took a seat at the Council table.*

**The President:** I should also like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, which reads as follows:

"On behalf of the members of the League of Arab States, I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation to His Excellency Mr. Yahya Mahmassani, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, to address the Council under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure in the course of the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council'."

That letter will be published as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2003/941.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 to Mr. Yahya Mahmassani.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in response to the request contained in a letter dated 5 October from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

**Mr. Mekdad** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): Allow me at the outset to express to you, Sir, our thanks for immediately convening this meeting at the request of the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon and the Group of Arab States.

As this is the first open meeting of the month, we congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency and wish you every success in your stewardship.

We also thank Ambassador Sir Emyr Jones Parry, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, and the members of his delegation for their leadership of the Council last month.

Allow me to begin by reading out the text of the letter addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council. The letter has not yet been officially translated. Following my reading of the letter, I shall make my official statement on the item on the agenda.

"I wish to advise you that the Israeli air force, on the morning of Sunday, 5 October, violated the Lebanese and Syrian airspaces and committed an act of aggression by launching guided missiles inside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. The target was a civilian site in the village of Ein Saheb, north-west of the capital, Damascus. That act of aggression caused physical damage.

"The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic informs the Council of this flagrant violation of Lebanese and Syrian air space and of this aggression against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic in open defiance of the United Nations Charter and the norms of international law, and constituting a serious new escalation; it requests an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider this Israeli aggression against Syrian territory and to consider the measures that the Council must take to deter the Government of Israel from pursuing its provocative policy of aggression against Syria.

"By its persistent aggression against the Palestinians and by deliberately provoking the broadening of the scope of that aggression to include Syria and Lebanon, the present Government of Israel is underscoring that it is a Government of war, not a Government of peace.

"Syria is not incapable of establishing a balance of resistance and deterrence that would force Israel to reconsider its calculations. Syria has exercised maximum self-restraint, because it realizes that on many fronts Israel is provoking pretexts to export its current domestic crisis to the rest of the region, which would thus be exposed to further escalation and volatility.

"Syria, which is at present a member of the Security Council, believes that the Council is the most appropriate forum to address, condemn and halt this dangerous development, with a view to preventing a repetition of such acts; this development poses a threat to international peace and security and exposes the already deteriorating situation in the region to dire consequences that could spiral out of control."

That letter was signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I shall now make my statement on the item on the Council's agenda. Permit me, Mr. President, to thank you for convening this emergency meeting of the Security Council, in response to the request of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, to discuss the flagrant Israeli military aggression within the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, targeting a civilian site in the village of Ein Saheb north-west of Damascus and causing physical damage.

Let me also express our satisfaction at the statement issued by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, strongly deploring this act of aggression and expressing concern at the potential escalation of an already tense and difficult situation in the region.

This unwarranted aggression — in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, of international law and of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel — is a clear manifestation of an Israeli policy based on aggression and lack of respect for agreements. This Israeli aggression targeting a Syrian village is a true and precise embodiment of Israeli terrorism, while Israel falsely claims to be fighting terrorism and standing against it. Moreover, this terrorist act of aggression provides further proof that the massacres committed by Israel on the pretext of fighting so-called terrorism reflect a big lie and an irrational, foolish claim, all used in an attempt to justify the policy of colonialism and settlement-building in violation of all the principles of peace and security on which the United Nations was founded, and running counter to the peace process that began at Madrid in 1991.

The act of aggression that Israel committed against Syria this morning is part of a strategic policy adopted by the Israeli Government in order to escalate tension in the Middle East, at a time when the international community is pursuing efforts towards a comprehensive, just peace in the Middle East that would ensure peace and stability for all the peoples of the region.

It has become abundantly clear to the entire world that it is beyond belief that Syria — which has respected and complied with the mission of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force since 1974, as all the sponsors of the peace process and other world leaders can attest — or the powerless Palestinians — who lack weapons and who are languishing under Israeli occupation and harsh oppression — could take



any action posing a threat to anyone, especially as it is common knowledge that the Palestinian people lack an army and a military arsenal anything like those possessed by Israel.

For us, the question that comes immediately to mind is how Israel can persuade the entire world that it is a victim at a time when it forcibly occupies the territory of others, lays siege to them, demolishes their homes, uproots their crops and murders their children rather than joining them at the negotiating table to ensure the implementation of the legitimate rights of all sides, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law.

This flagrant Israeli aggression is no isolated incident. In fact, it was preceded by another Israeli violation, committed — without justification or provocation — on 2 January 2003 in the demilitarized zone, which resulted in the death of a Syrian soldier. The UNDOF report on this incident, following an extensive investigation, found that there was no justification for the crime and that Syria had exercised maximum restraint, which averted an escalation of the situation at that point.

It is strange that Israel should continue to violate international agreements and to flout the Charter of the United Nations, to the point where Arabs and many other people around the world have come to believe that Israel sees itself as above international law and as acting beyond the jurisdiction of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council.

It is very strange indeed that the Israeli Government, after several decades of occupation, bloodshed and the flouting of international law, does not recognize that the path to peace lies in Israel's implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. All those resolutions remain unimplemented and unrespected by Israel.

Nonetheless, it is important to place on record that Israel's past performance with regard to its respect for international law and the resolutions of the United Nations is not in the least honourable. Israel has defied the United Nations and its resolutions from 1948 to today. General Assembly resolution 181 (II) on the Palestinian State has been dead letter since its adoption. Resolution 194 (III) on the return of Palestinian refugees has not been implemented except insofar as Israel has challenged and denied it.

Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which seek to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, are contested, misinterpreted and distorted by Israel.

On this basis, it is only logical that all Member States, with the exception of Israel — which has become a symbol of defiance of the United Nations and its resolutions — should debate international legality and the implementation of Security Council resolutions. The current Government of Israel, through its continued aggression against the Palestinians and its broadening of the scope of that aggression to include Syria and Lebanon, confirms de facto that it is a Government of war and not a Government of peace.

I wish to stress and reiterate here in the Security Council the contents of the letter addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria to this Council, in which he emphasized that Syria is not incapable of establishing a balance of resistance and deterrence that would force Israel to revise its calculations. Syria has exercised maximum self-restraint because it recognizes that Israel is creating opportune pretexts with a view to exporting its current domestic crisis to the entire region, thus exposing it to further escalation and volatility.

Syria has come to the very heart of the house of legality, right here in the Security Council — which represents the hopes and aspirations of millions of Syrians and Arabs and the concerns of many millions more throughout the world who uphold the principles of international law — in order to condemn this act of aggression, which has no justification whatsoever, and to demonstrate once again to the entire world and from this forum our adherence to the United Nations system and its resolutions. In this regard, Syria has officially submitted the text of a draft resolution that responds to the challenges before us, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. I would stress that the draft resolution on the table reflects the positions usually adopted by the Security Council in the face of similar acts of aggression and threats.

We are fully confident that all members of the Council will respond forthwith and stand up to this Israeli challenge in the context of their ongoing efforts to address any threat to international peace and security. Will the Council meet this new challenge? We are very hopeful that it will.

**The President:** I give the floor to the representative of Israel.

**Mr. Gillerman (Israel):** First, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Let me also express to you my regret that your first meeting should be of this nature and take place on this day.

I wish also to express to Sir Emyr Jones Parry my great appreciation for his able and fair stewardship of the Security Council last month.

This meeting of the Security Council is being convened within hours of Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, which is the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. I deeply regret that the Council could not meet after this most important religious day so as to allow Israel to participate fully in the debate. I will, unfortunately, have to leave this meeting after I make my statement in order to observe this holy day.

Yesterday, a Palestinian suicide bomber entered a crowded beachfront restaurant in the port city of Haifa, murdering 19 innocent civilians and wounding at least 60 others. The restaurant — a symbol of Arab-Israeli coexistence, as is the city of Haifa — was frequented by Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel alike, and among the victims were four Israeli Arabs, three children and a little baby girl. Five victims were members of the same family and three were members of another family. Whole families were wiped out by that horrendous act, taking place on the Jewish sabbath on a quiet, peaceful beachfront in the city of Haifa.

Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization that operates freely from Palestinian Authority territory and has headquarters in Damascus, Syria, proudly claimed responsibility for this massacre. Islamic Jihad is an organization committed to the destruction of Israel through holy war and which engages in the deliberate and widespread murder of innocents to that end. It opposes moderate Arab Governments and actively supports terrorist attacks against Western targets. There could not be a more obvious example of a terrorist organization.

The massacre in Haifa is the latest of over 40 terrorist atrocities committed by Islamic Jihad in the past few years. Among the attacks perpetrated by that organization were the massacre of 21 teenagers at a discotheque in Tel Aviv on 2 June 2001; the bombing of 5 June 2002 at the Meggido Junction, which killed

18 Israelis; the bombing of a commuter bus on 21 October 2002, which killed 14 Israelis; the attack on a shopping mall in the Israeli town of Afula on 19 May 2003, in which three civilians were killed and over 70 wounded; and the attack on 30 March 2003, in which a suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a café in Netanya, wounding 58 civilians.

The encouragement, safe harbour, training facilities, funding and logistical support offered by Syria to a variety of notorious terrorist organizations is a matter of public knowledge. Among the many terrorists group that operate and benefit from the auspices of the Syrian dictatorship are Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It is well known that the Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, is one of several terrorist leaders who operate freely in Damascus and receive immunity and support from the Assad regime.

Allow me to briefly detail, for the benefit of Council, the extent of support that Syria, as well as the regime in Iran, afford to terrorist organizations such as Islamic Jihad, which are engaged in the deliberate massacre of innocent civilians.

Safe harbour and training facilities are provided throughout Syria for terrorist organizations such as Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hizbollah, both in separate facilities and in Syrian army bases. The Ein Saheb base, which was targeted in Israel's measured defensive operation today, is just one of those facilities sponsored by Syria and Iran. Recruits at camps such as Ein Saheb come from Islamic Jihad, Hamas and other terrorist groups. They are taught how to assemble bombs, conduct kidnapping, prepare suicide belts, gather intelligence and establish terrorist cells. Some have also received aviation instruction. Recruits training at those camps are slated to return to Palestinian Authority territory and other areas to set up cells and conduct terrorist operations.

Syria has itself facilitated and directed acts of terrorism by coordination and briefings via phone and Internet and by calling activists to Damascus for consultations and briefings. Three such operatives — Tarek Az Aldin, Ali Saffuri and Taabat Mardawi — have been identified under investigation as specifically designated liaisons for relaying instructions between officials in Damascus and terrorist cells in the West Bank and Gaza. Mr. Mardawi himself has admitted

involvement in many attacks, including a bus bombing in Haifa in May 2001, a suicide attack at a restaurant in Kiryat Motzkin in August of that year and an attack on a bus near Nazareth in March 2002.

Another example comes from an intelligence report provided by the Head of the Palestinian Preventative Security Apparatus on 31 October 2001, which asserts that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah were meeting in Damascus "in order to increase their joint activity ... with the aid of Iranian money". Instructions are also given to halt terrorist activity when it suits Syrian or Iranian interests to avoid the spotlight, such as following the terrorist attacks of 11 September in the United States. It is very strange that Syria decided to be in the spotlight today and actually put itself in the dock on this very day, after these actions.

Iran, through the use of the Syrian and Palestinian banking systems, sustains a systematic money transfer system, and large sums of money have been transferred to Islamic Jihad as well as other terrorists organizations through Damascus for the planning and perpetration of attacks. Mr. Shallah himself, the Secretary-General of Islamic Jihad, is known to have transferred funds in the hundreds of thousands of dollars from Damascus to the individual accounts of Islamic Jihad operatives such as Bassani ak-Saadi, who is responsible for Islamic Jihad financing in Jenin.

Syria uses its State-run media and official institutions to glorify and encourage suicide bombings against civilians in restaurants, schools, commuter buses and shopping malls. To mention but a few examples, Radio Damascus — far from being a free radio — in a broadcast on 9 May 2002 lauded "the wonderful and special suicide attacks which were executed by some of the sons of the Palestinian nation". In another State-run announcement on 1 January 2002, Damascus Radio declared "The entire world knows that Syria, its political leadership and its Arab people...have turned Syrian Arab soil into a training camp, a safe haven and an arms depot for the Palestinian revolutionaries." And on 13 May 2002, President Bashar Assad himself announced in reference to so-called acts of resistance "If I was not President of Syria I wouldn't hesitate to participate in them." This was not said by Osama bin Laden or by Saddam Hussain, but by a President of a State that is a member of this Council. Syria has also played host to a number

of conferences in which senior terrorist operatives from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other organizations meet.

Syria has facilitated the transfer of arms to Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Islamic Jihad by allowing the transfer of sophisticated weapons from Iran to Hizbollah through Syrian territory. Hizbollah, itself a vicious terrorist organization, has then sought to smuggle those arms to Palestinian terrorist groups, as was evidenced in the Karine A arms shipment and similar incidents.

These are just a few examples of the extent and nature of the involvement of the Syrian regime in the deliberate murder of innocent civilians. Each and every one of these acts constitutes a grave violation of international law and Security Council resolutions, as well as a threat to international peace and security. There are few better exhibits of State sponsorship of terrorism than the one provided by the Syrian regime.

Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter — which in act of the highest hypocrisy Syria itself voted for — makes absolutely clear that States must prevent acts of terrorism and refrain from any form of financing, support, safe harbour for or toleration of terrorist groups. Syrian complicity in and responsibility for suicide bombings are as blatant as they are repugnant. The membership of this arch-sponsor of terrorism in the Council is an unbearable contradiction and an embarrassment to the United Nations. For Syria to ask for a Council debate is comparable only to the Taliban calling for such a debate. It would be laughable, if it was not so sad.

And yet, members of the Council and the United Nations can hardly be surprised at this shameless act of hypocrisy by the Syrian regime. This is the same regime that speaks so often of occupation while it brutally occupies the neighbouring territory of Lebanon. It is the same regime that speaks of international law and human rights while it subjugates its people under a repressive and primitive dictatorship, violating countless international obligations. It is the same regime that supported the Saddam Hussain regime in Iraq in violation of Security Council resolutions and that to this day facilitates the infiltration of terrorists to attack civilian and military targets in Iraqi territory. And it is this same despot regime that speaks so freely of double standards at the United Nations. Syria would do well to take a hard

look at the mirror and count itself fortunate that it has not yet, for unfortunate reasons, been the subject of concerted international action as part of the global campaign against terrorism — not yet.

The Syrian delegate speaks a great deal about so-called resistance. Perhaps he can tell us precisely, without his familiar diplomatic word games and misrepresentations, how exactly the murder of children and babies in a restaurant is an act of legitimate resistance. Or perhaps he could tell us how the Syrians themselves have dealt with resistance, such as in the case of Hama, in which some 10,000 Syrian civilians were murdered by the Syrian armed forces.

Israel's measured defensive response to the horrific suicide bombings against a terrorist training facility in Syria is a clear act of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. Those actions come after Israel has exercised tremendous restraint despite countless acts of terrorism that have claimed hundreds of innocent lives, for which Syria bears direct and criminal responsibility. It comes after Israel and the international community as a whole have repeatedly called on Syria to end its support of terrorism and finally comply with international law. And it is designed to prevent further armed attacks against Israeli civilians in which Syria is complicit, with a view to encouraging Syria to resolve its dispute through bilateral negotiations in accordance with Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), as it is legally required to do. This is not a hypothetical question. Many States members of the Organization and of the Council have been faced with terrorism of far less intensity and have responded with far less restraint and far less concern for human life. And yet the Security Council has not seen fit to scrutinize their conduct. Indeed, on certain occasions the Council has specifically endorsed such defensive measures.

If there is a double standard in this Organization, it is that while some States are afforded the right to protect their citizens, Israel too often is sent the message that its citizens are not worthy of protection. If there is a double standard, it is that some States are able to support terrorism with impunity, while those defending against it are called to account. If there is a double standard, it is Syria sitting at the Council table and raising one hand to vote against terror and the other to perpetrate and initiate terror around the world.

For the sake of peace and the reputation of the Council, let there be no such double standard today.

In the face of the rejectionism, aggression and terrorist sponsorship of the Syrian regime, together with Iran and the Palestinian Authority, what would the international community have us do? Like any State faced with such a critical and prolonged threat, Israel must exercise its inherent right and obligation to defend its citizens. What can we tell the Arab and Israeli mothers of children murdered in this weekend's attack in Haifa? Should we say, "We could have prevented the death of your son or daughter. We could have stopped a terrorist from walking into your town, your school, your home, your bedroom — but our hands were tied"? Israel remains committed to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict and is ready to make painful compromises to that end. But no peace can come while terrorism prospers. No negotiations can bring progress, while our citizens die on the streets.

Today, on the very eve of the Day of Atonement and the thirtieth anniversary of the Egyptian-Syrian aggression that initiated the Yom Kippur War, we call on members of the Council to come to the aid of the victims of terrorism, not of its sponsors. Syria deserves no support for its complicity in murder, and the Council would commit an unforgivable act of moral blindness were it to act otherwise. The time has come for the Council, which adopted resolution 1373 (2002), and which has been at the forefront of the global counter-terrorism campaign, to hold to account a brutal dictatorship that is world-renowned for adopting terrorism as its primary tool. The world is watching. And today, more than on any other day, God is watching too.

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Algeria, Bahrain, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Baali (Algeria), Mr. Almansoor (Bahrain), Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla (Cuba), Mr. Olhaye (Djibouti), Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt), Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Al-Hussein (Jordan), Mr. Al-Otaibi (Kuwait), Mr. Kronfol (Lebanon), Mr. El-Treki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Bennouna (Morocco), Mr. Al-Sameen (Oman), Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar), Mr. Shobokshi (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Hashi (Somalia), Mr. Erwa (Sudan), Mr. Hachami (Tunisia), Mr. Al-Shamsi (United Arab Emirates) and Mr. Alsaidi (Yemen) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.*

**The President:** I should also like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, which will be issued as document S/2003/942, and which reads as follows:

“I have the honour to request that, in accordance with its previous practice, the Security Council invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council to be held today, 5 October 2003, regarding the letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council.”

I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to participate in the current debate, in accordance with the rules of procedure and previous practice in this regard.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al-Kidwa (Palestine), took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.*

**Mr. Akram (Pakistan):** As this is the first formal meeting of the Security Council for this month, may I take this opportunity to extend to you, Sir, the warm felicitations of the delegation of Pakistan on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the current month. We will extend our full cooperation to you to ensure the success of your presidency.

I would also like to express my delegation's congratulations and admiration to Sir Emyr Jones

Parry, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, for a successful presidency last month.

The Security Council has been established to defend a world order based on the principles and purposes of the Charter. Our Charter prescribes strict rules for the use of force by Member States, and this is envisaged in two circumstances only. The first is in exercise of the right of self-defence against a direct act of aggression or use of force; the second is the collective use of force under Article 42 of the Charter, with the explicit authorization of the Security Council.

The attack perpetrated by Israel against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic on 5 October did not meet these strict requirements set out in the Charter with regard to the use of force. This was an arbitrary attack, and in legal and political terms it is clearly a violation of the Charter. It is also a violation of the several resolutions that the Security Council has adopted on the issue of the Middle East — resolutions 242 (1967), and 338 (1973), 350 (1974), 1397 (2002) and others.

We welcome the fact that the Government of Syria, instead of retaliating against this wanton attack on its territory, has chosen to approach the Security Council for redress. The Security Council must commend Syria's self-restraint and condemn the Israeli attack against Syria's territory.

A few weeks ago, the Secretary-General warned Member States about the danger of the misuse of the “T” word — namely, terrorism — for actions by States designed to suppress peoples and to achieve their own partisan objectives. We believe that the response of Israel in this case is one such example of the exploitation of the campaign against terrorism for other purposes. The problems that Israel faces are problems that arise from its illegal occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories. The answer to individual acts of terrorism is not State terrorism, nor is it wanton attacks against other countries, in violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. State power must distinguish between acts of terrorism and the legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation for self-determination and liberation.

Pakistan has officially condemned Israel's attack against Syrian territory as a violation of international law. We urge the Council to speedily adopt a decision to condemn that military aggression and to uphold the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.

**Mr. Arias** (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): Today's meeting is taking place due to certain events of grave concern to us. The situation in the Middle East during recent weeks has obligated us to call for prudence and restraint. Any act that will unleash a spiral of violence must be rejected. In that context, we would like firmly to condemn yesterday's attack in Haifa, which we believe was completely odious and reprehensible, regardless of the date on which it was committed. However, that cannot cause us to overlook or minimize the extreme gravity of the attack perpetrated against Syria today. That attack is clearly a patent violation of international law. Accordingly, it is something we believe to be worthy of condemnation. I should also like to appeal for moderation to be exercised in the Middle East. The parties should also understand that reprisals only lead to a dire aggravation of the situation.

**Mr. Wang Guangya** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): First of all, please allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. China will fully cooperate with you in order to carry out the Council's work this month. I would also like to thank Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, for successfully presiding over the work of the Council during September.

China is gravely concerned about the latest developments in the Middle East situation. We strongly condemn the suicide bombing of 4 October, which resulted in many innocent civilian casualties. We oppose any measures that may threaten the peace process between Israel and Palestine. We strongly urge both sides to cease acts of violence and any other acts that may exacerbate tensions. We hope that they will return to the proper track of settling disputes through negotiation as soon as possible.

We also condemn Israel's air attack against Syria. Israel's action is a violation of the norms of international law. We are deeply concerned about the negative effect of that action on the situation in the Middle East. We call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid any actions that may lead to further aggravating tensions in the overall situation in the Middle East.

**Sir Emyr Jones Parry** (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I would like to use this occasion to offer you every best wish for your presidency, Mr. President, as well as to affirm the United Kingdom's commitment to offer you every support.

This is the first meeting since the Haifa bombing, so I must begin by condemning strongly the actions that took place yesterday, and to express our condolences to the families of those killed and maimed. I note that Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility for that action.

Let me be clear that Israel's action today is unacceptable and represents an escalation. Israel should not allow its justified anger at continuing terrorism to lead to actions that undermine both the peace process and, we believe, Israel's own interests. But we have to recognize that terrorists are continuing to attack Israel and that they are being permitted to do so. There is a heavy responsibility on all those who are in a position to act against terrorism to do so. That has been affirmed by the Security Council many times, and perhaps most clearly in resolution 1373 (2001).

Allowing impunity to those committed to using terror as a political instrument serves only to undermine peace and to prevent progress in the Middle East peace process. The United Kingdom believes that lasting security can only be assured by a successful peace process, as was stressed at the conclusion of the Quartet meeting held here in New York on 25 September. We believe that all sides should exercise restraint and now reinforce their efforts to implement the road map. In the next day, the Security Council should do all it can to help bring that about. We will all have to reflect carefully on the best message we can now send in order that we reinforce the prospects of the road map, and do so at a precarious moment in the Middle East.

**Mr. Gatilov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Since this is our first statement in the Council this month, we should like to join other delegations in wishing you success, Sir, in your presidency of the Council.

We also thank the Ambassador Jones Parry of the United Kingdom for his very skilful conduct of the Council's work in September.

The course of events in the Middle East is of growing concern and alarm. Following the large-scale terrorist act in Haifa, the Israeli air force, for the first time in many years, sent missile strikes against Syrian territory near Damascus, targeting what Israel claimed to be a training camp for the extremist organization Islamic Jihad. It left open the possibility of other attacks against terrorists wherever they may be.

It is very clear that such acts lead to increased confrontation in the Middle East, are fraught with peril for other countries and could trigger even more dramatic consequences, both for the very tense situation in the region and for international security as a whole. Russia urges all parties to the conflict to show maximum restraint and to act in a balanced and responsible way so as to avert any further escalation in the spiral of violence and to prevent regional destabilization, the tragic results of which would be difficult to foresee.

The ongoing escalation of violence in the Middle East requires more energetic action on the part of the international community in order to prevent an even more dangerous aggravation of the situation. It is important now to press the parties to the conflict to halt the confrontation as soon as possible and to restore the political process, the final goal of which is a comprehensive settlement in the region. To that end, what we need above all is to unblock the way forward on the road map, to which there is no alternative in finding a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Palestinians and Israelis alike must resume their dialogue and begin to carry out their obligations under the road map.

**Mr. Pleuger** (Germany): Like other delegations, mine would like to welcome you, Sir, in the presidency of the Security Council and to assure you of its support this month.

I would also like to thank Ambassador Jones Parry for the very effective and elegant way in which he did his job as President of the Council last month.

As the German Chancellor said after a meeting with President Mubarak, the action against Syria is not acceptable. The German Government feels that a violation of the sovereignty of a neighbouring State does not facilitate peace and stability in the region and that such action makes the Middle East conflict even more complicated. We, like other delegations, also condemn the suicide bombing that occurred in Haifa

and that killed 19 people and injured many more. Our condolences go to the bereaved families of the victims. These acts of terrorism have to be stopped and whoever can exercise influence to that effect should do so.

We are very concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. We feel that we have to break the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence. De-escalation, we feel, is possible only by a return to implementing the road map as proposed by the Quartet. There is no alternative to the road map for finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for creating peace and stability in the Middle East.

**Mr. De La Sablière** (France) (*spoke in French*): Since this is the first time I am taking the floor this month, like my colleagues who have spoken before me I should like to wish you great success, Sir, in your duties.

I also thank Ambassador Jones Parry for the way in which he conducted our work last month.

We are deeply concerned by the deterioration of the situation and the serious danger of rising tension. We condemn violence from wherever it may come. It is unacceptable and politically ineffective, kills innocent people, obscures the political horizon and can only aggravate the crisis.

The Israeli operation today that targeted a site near Damascus is a grim business and an unacceptable violation of international law and the rules of sovereignty. In a Middle East situation that has already been made precarious by such crises, it is the responsibility of all, particularly of States in the region, to refrain from increasing stability and tension. Any act of terrorism is unjustifiable and should be condemned. Having said that, the fight against terrorism to which France is firmly committed must be undertaken in the context of respect for international law. That is essential.

I stress once again that the situation in the Middle East is most alarming. In such difficult circumstances, we appeal to all parties — particularly the Israelis, Palestinians and Syrians — to allow reason to prevail over the threat of escalation. There can be no lasting security without peace. Peace can prevail only through negotiation, not by the force of arms. It is essential that the opportunity for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement be sought in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The road map, which

contains Syrian and Lebanese tracks, must be given a chance.

**Mr. Tafrov** (Bulgaria) (*spoke in French*): I should like to extend my delegation's congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and to assure you of our full cooperation.

I should also like to thank Ambassador Jones Parry for his skilful presidency last month.

Bulgaria categorically condemns the terrorist act carried out yesterday in Haifa, as we always do on such occasions. It is important for all those who make such acts possible to do their utmost to end them by ceasing all material and moral support to them. The murder of an innocent child is particularly repugnant.

Bulgaria believes that Israel's armed action against the Syrian Arab Republic is not in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations or with international law. Like other delegations, we consider it to have been an unacceptable act. The only resolution of the Middle East crisis — which has of late grown more serious — lies in the implementation of the road map devised by the Quartet, as the Quartet itself noted in its statement following its most recent meeting in New York.

**Mr. Muñoz** (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): We might have preferred a different meeting of the Security Council to congratulate you, Ambassador Negro Ponte, on your assumption of the presidency, to offer you our best wishes and to assure you of our cooperation, as well as to thank Ambassador Jones Parry for his excellent work during the month of September.

Events in the Middle East in recent hours prompt Chile to make the following statement. First of all, we condemn the Israeli air force bombing on Syrian territory, which is an outrage against international law and the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. Such conduct is unacceptable and dangerous, because it can widen the conflict and pose additional threats to international peace and security in the Middle East.

Similarly, Chile firmly and harshly condemns the repugnant terrorist attack in Haifa, which killed 19 innocent people and injured some 50 others. Such violence against civilians can never be justified. Chile has condemned in the past and will continue to

denounce and condemn all acts of terrorism, whatever their origin. We reject any attempt to justify such acts.

Suicide attacks followed by the destruction of civilian homes, air strikes and further acts of terror constitute a vicious circle of violence that must stop. We appeal to both Syria and Israel to be prudent. We call on them to exercise all due restraint in order to avoid the taking of even graver decisions that would escalate the violence.

The international community views with alarm these developments and their impact on the peace process and the road map on which the Quartet is seeking to make progress for the benefit of the majority, who, we believe, seek peace and coexistence among Israel, Palestine, Syria and all other neighbours in the region.

**Mr. Aguilar Zinser** (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Like the Permanent Representative of Chile, I am sorry, Sir, that this should be the first Security Council meeting for the month of October, at which we express our pleasure at seeing you assume the Council presidency. Yet we express to you our confidence and support. Further, our thanks go to Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry of the United Kingdom. He had just joined the Council, but he conducted our work most effectively, wisely and prudently.

Let me begin by conveying my country's condolences to the families of those who lost their lives in the suicide bombing that took place yesterday in a seaside restaurant in Haifa. Nothing can justify such an attack against innocent civilians. It was yet another expression of extremism that contributed nothing to furthering the Palestinian cause. And yet again the Council is obliged to condemn such acts and appeal to the Palestinian Authority genuinely to work to combat and prevent such attacks.

The reprisals taken by Israel in consequence of that attack are equally reprehensible. Israel gains nothing by such reprisals; they only contribute to the spiral of violence of which Israel and its citizens are the victims. The Israeli attack on Syrian territory was a clear violation of the United Nations Charter; it was a grave act that endangers international peace and security.

In that connection, my delegation notes with optimism Syria's decision not to respond militarily to the aggression. It is our expectation that, as this matter



has been brought before the Security Council, it will follow a course permitting the easing of tension. We also appeal to Israel to channel its own legitimate indignation into the appropriate course, as set out in the Charter. The Security Council must be the forum in which to ease and resolve disputes that threaten peace. We hope that prudence, moderation, reason and international law will prevail and that this escalation will not lead to an even more serious spiral of violence. The consequences for the region and the rest of the world would be horrific.

We support the efforts of the Quartet and urge its members to redouble their efforts to secure peace in the Middle East. Once again, my country considers that it is only the establishment of a Palestinian State can lay a firm foundation for peace in the Middle East.

**Mr. Gaspar Martins** (Angola): Permit me first to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of October. It is regrettable that this should be the first meeting of your presidency, but the matter before us is a situation of which the Council had to be seized and on which it must adopt a position. I am sure that, under your guidance, we will continue to have a very fruitful month of deliberations. I would also like to seize this opportunity to extend to Sir Emyr Jones Parry my congratulations for his very skilful stewardship of the Council during the past month.

I note with regret that the deplorable acts of war that we are examining this afternoon — which represent a very serious escalation of violence in a situation that is already dangerously affecting world peace — namely the direct strikes on Damascus and also the recent attacks in Haifa, are taking place in a context in which a relatively shaky peace already prevails. The situation we are examining demonstrates the real fragility of the situation and the need for a more comprehensive peace agreement for the entire Middle East region.

We need to see a real commitment by the parties to this conflict to put a stop to the logic of violence. Violence is not stopped with violence. We reiterate our appeal to the States in the region to create a climate conducive to progress in the implementation of the road map, which, alone, will bring a stop to the building of walls, or to the acts that took place over the weekend in Haifa and in Damascus. My delegation unequivocally condemns such acts. A clear

commitment to peace and moderation in the Middle East is long overdue.

At the heart of this situation clearly lies the unresolved Palestinian question. In the face of failure to achieve a satisfactory conclusion, with implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and progress on the road map, the Council must continue to make unceasing demands that true advances be made.

I would like to end by saying that the resolution that we have been presented this afternoon clearly calls for a position to be adopted by our Council, and we shall put ours forward following consultations with my authorities in the capital.

**Mr. Sow** (Guinea) (*spoke in French*): My delegation would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of our Council and to assure you of our full cooperation. We are very grateful also to Ambassador Jones Parry for his excellent conduct of our work during September.

Allow me to express my delegation's appreciation for the wisdom you demonstrated in the prompt organization of this public meeting of our Council in the face of the escalation of tensions in the Middle East following the violation of Syria's air space by the Israel Government and the extension of extrajudicial State violence to that neighbouring Arab State.

Nothing — absolutely, nothing — can justify such an act, which is contrary to all acceptable standards of international conduct, and whose sole purpose is to extend the strategy of chaos already imposed on the people of Palestine to all the neighbouring Arab Islamic States. Such an act violates all the relevant Security Council resolutions designed to bring about a negotiated political peace settlement to the Israeli-Arab crisis.

Thirty years after the signing of the disengagement agreement of 30 May 1974 between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel's unjustified attack on Syria is a particularly serious and alarming threat to international peace and security and is liable to jeopardize the implementation of the Quartet's road map, whose ultimate goal is to overcome the problems raised by the cycle of violence and to safeguard the peace process in the Middle East.

My country, the Republic of Guinea, firmly condemns the use of force and violence and,

particularly, terrorism as a means of political and diplomatic negotiation or of pressure to advance political views. We condemn terrorism in all its forms, including in the form of State terrorism. In that respect, we have condemned the terrorist attacks committed on the eve of Yom Kippur in Haifa, which struck innocent Israeli citizens.

Such blind violence can only damage the noble Palestinian cause, which my country has always supported. The Israeli armed reprisal is a disproportionate reaction stemming from a political will to destroy the peace efforts in the region of the international Islamic community. We firmly condemn this military attack, and we express our concern at the attempt to illegally expand the zone of conflict and destabilize the entire Middle East.

My country commends the measured and very responsible reaction of the Syrian Government. In promoting the path to dialogue and appealing to the conscience of Security Council members, Syria is setting an encouraging and laudable example.

We believe yet again that we must call on the Israeli Government to show more self-restraint and moderation and comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions. In that context, my delegation fully supports the draft resolution submitted by Syria. That draft is moderate, and could be a positive and beneficial signal to the peoples of the Middle East and the world.

**Mr. Belinga-Eboutou** (Cameroon) (*spoke in French*): First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council during October and to assure you of my delegation's full cooperation. I would also like to express our appreciation to the permanent representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, for his innovative presidency last month.

We learned with consternation of the outbreak of violence that has recurred in the Middle East over the past two days, which has been marked by the attack in Haifa and the raids into Syrian territory.

All of these acts are serious violations of the terms of the Quartet's road map, of the ceasefire agreement of 1974 between Israel and Syria and of international law. Such acts are dangerous because they jeopardize the prospects for a speedy return to peace

and security in the region — prospects that are already very weak. Cameroon has always condemned all acts of terrorism. We believe that there can be no justification for such acts and that no cause can legitimize them. Similarly, Cameroon, which is resolutely committed to combating that scourge, is convinced that our common struggle must be undertaken with full respect for fundamental human rights and international law.

Faced with this dangerous escalation, we call on all of the parties to demonstrate a great deal of restraint at this extremely difficult and delicate time. We call on them to refrain from any initiative that might exacerbate the situation. We call on them to respect their commitments — contained both in the road map and in earlier agreements. Finally, we call on them to put an end to the cycle of violence in the Middle East so as to facilitate a resumption of dialogue.

We urgently appeal to the international negotiators, in particular the Quartet, immediately to take actions aimed at the containment of the situation and to accelerate the taking of bold steps, which the Secretary-General referred to on 26 September. Such bold steps, in keeping with the road map, should deal simultaneously with the fundamental needs of the two parties, namely, security for Israel and an end to occupation for Palestine.

It goes without saying that if such measures are not taken we will run the risk, as the Secretary-General warned us, of having to pay a heavy price. Recent events make clear the urgent need for what Cameroon terms comprehensive disarmament in the Middle East — a disarmament policy aimed in particular at cultural disarmament, which would eradicate war psychosis and the violence in people's hearts and show the various parties that their survival depends, not on the results of war, but on the outcome of negotiations.

We have just received a copy of a draft resolution. Immediately after the end of this public meeting we will transmit it to our capital and await instructions.

**The President:** I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the United States.

We call on all sides to avoid heightening the tension in the Middle East and to think carefully about the consequences of their actions. We were notified this morning of the Israeli action in Syria last night, after

the event. This morning, at 9 a.m., President Bush called Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and conveyed our condolences for the victims of Saturday's terrorist attack at a restaurant in Haifa, which claimed the lives of 19 Israelis, including three children and five Israeli Arabs, and wounded dozens more. The United States and the Government of Israel agreed that it is important to avoid actions that could lead to a further heightening of tension in the Middle East.

The United States believes that Syria is on the wrong side of the war on terrorism. We have been clear of the need for Syria to cease harbouring terrorist groups. Specific directions for terrorist acts continue to be issued from terrorist groups based in Syria. During his visit to Damascus this year, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Government of Syria that this was unacceptable and intolerable. I myself made this point to Syrian Foreign Minister Al-Shara' in June 2002 in this Chamber.

We believe that it is in Syria's interest and in the broader interests of Middle East peace for Syria to stop harbouring and supporting the groups that perpetrate terrorist acts such as the one that occurred in Haifa yesterday.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

As a measure to optimize the use of our time and in order to allow delegations to take the floor as quickly as possible, I will not individually invite speakers to take a seat at the Council or invite them to resume their seats at the side of the Council Chamber. When a speaker is taking the floor, the Conference Officer will seat the next speaker on the list at the table.

I thank representatives for their understanding and cooperation.

I now give the floor to the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations.

**Mr. Mahmassani** (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I am convinced that you will guide the work of the Council with wisdom and skill. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, for his work at the helm of the Council last month.

The Council of the Arab League held an emergency meeting today at the level of permanent representative to consider the consequences of the repugnant Israeli attack against Syrian territory. The League considers that this attack constitutes an escalation that threatens international peace and security, as well as representing a deterioration in the situation such that it could spin out of control and involve the entire region in a cycle of violence. It calls upon the United Nations to discharge its responsibilities to preserve international peace and security and to consider this question under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Council of the Arab League denounces this attack and considers that it is yet another flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the principles of international law. Israel is fully responsible for all consequences that may result from such aggression.

The Council reaffirms its support for and solidarity with the Syrian Arab Republic and any measures that it may adopt in self-defence against such aggression. The Council calls upon the Security Council to prevent Israel from continuing such provocative acts. We call for the cessation of State terrorism and Israeli measures against the Palestinian people, Syrian and Lebanon in order to ensure that the entire region does not become inflamed and experience even greater insecurity.

This attack reaffirms the aggressive nature of Israel and the fact that the Israeli Government rejects any peace initiative. Israeli aggression against Syria is part and parcel of Israeli policy to continue the occupation of the Syrian Golan and the other occupied Arab territories. It confirms that Israel is not devoted to a just and lasting peace throughout the Middle East. It is Israeli politics and its policy in continuing settlements and annexation of Arab territories.

This attack acerbates the situation. It will have a serious fallout that will make any peaceful settlement of the conflict impossible. I call on the Security Council to discharge its duty and see what can be done now, because Israel works beyond the range of legality as enshrined in all international resolutions. The Security Council's double standards are enabling Israel to continue to act outside international law, as if it enjoys total impunity. The Security Council has

adopted 37 resolutions that Israel has not implemented. Israel has not implemented any of those resolutions.

At the very heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict we find Israel's occupation of Arab territories. Israel is trying to distract people from this truth. Israel is presenting its acts as if they are a way to eliminate terrorism. That is naïve. Israeli occupation of Arab territories is at the very heart of this problem. It will remain unsolved until Israel abides by international legality and leaves those occupied Arab territories. Measures and punishments exacted by Israel against the Palestinian people do not bring peace to the region; they lead to violence and continuing deterioration of the situation. That situation can be solved only by sitting around the negotiating table, and Israel must implement the Security Council resolutions, the 2002 proposal from Beirut and the principle of land for peace.

**The President:** I now call on the Ambassador of Lebanon.

**Mr. Kronfol (Lebanon)***(spoke in Arabic)*: Allow me first, Mr. President, to express to you my hope that your presidency of the Council this month will be successful in achieving peace and security in the whole world, especially in our region. Let me thank your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, for his skilful presidency.

At the beginning I wish to state that my Government today addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in which it requested the convening of an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the violation by Israeli military planes of the Lebanese airspace in order to strike a site inside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Our understanding now is that the Secretariat is in the process of translating that letter from Arabic so that it may be circulated to all members of the Council. I request that that fact be reflected in the official records of this meeting.

I will now read the text of that letter:

“His Excellency, the President of the Security Council, Ambassador John Negroponte:

“We would like to advise you, Sir, that in the morning of Sunday, 5 October 2003, Israeli military planes violated the airspace of Lebanon in order to strike a site inside the territory of the

Syrian Arab Republic. On the same date, at noon, eight other Israeli military planes violated the airspace in southern and northern Lebanon.

“It is to be noted that despite the repeated positions of the Secretary-General, and notwithstanding the announcements and warnings by his representative in Lebanon, the Israeli violations continue without any grounds or justifications.

“The most recent of those violations is the use of Lebanese airspace in order to commit an act of aggression against a sister neighbouring State. That action constitutes a serious escalation of the situation and a new development in the method of Israeli attacks.

“On this basis Lebanon requests that the Security Council meet immediately to examine these acts of aggression and to take proper measures to deter Israel. Those violations, especially the most recent, constitute blatant aggression against the Blue Line, which is sponsored by the United Nations in southern Lebanon. They also endanger stability along that line and represent Israel's intention to export its current dilemmas in the occupied territories to other places.

“As it draws the attention of this Council to this grave situation, Lebanon is fully confident in the measures the Council will take to condemn Israel and to deter it from similar acts of aggression that would lead to dire consequences that would destabilize the current situation along the Blue Line as well as seriously endanger peace and stability in the region.”

That letter, dated 5 October 2003 from Beirut, is from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Expatriate Lebanese, Mr. Michael Smaha.

Lebanon requested a meeting of the Security Council due to Israel's excessive violations of Lebanon's air space and of the Blue Line arrangements sponsored by the United Nations in southern Lebanon. Those actions led to an act aggression against a Member State of the United Nations and current member of the Security Council, in addition to being an act of aggression against a sisterly State with whom my country has the closest of relations.

The Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law, which all of us must respect, warn against any act of aggression by any Member State against another irrespective of the reason. They also hold that a State should first resort to the Security Council to argue its case.

The Government of Israel has no right to exploit the international campaign against terrorism as a stalking horse to implement its policy against the people whose lands it occupies. Mixing up the Haifa bombing with an action against Syria or linking it with the State terrorism practised by Israel is a contravention of the norms of international law. No crime can be justified by the commission of an even more serious crime.

Israel has all along rejected all forms of international advice. It has also completely disregarded the advice and warnings of the Secretary-General and of his Representative in southern Lebanon. The danger of these violations and the disregard for the United Nations remarks constitute flagrant acts of aggression against peace and stability along the Blue Line, which is a strategic line that represents the strategic position of Lebanon, Syria and the Arab Group to reach a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region, as reflected in the Arab peace initiative adopted at the Beirut Arab summit.

Lebanon requests the Security Council to fully meet its responsibilities and take the proper measures to condemn Israel and deter it from committing acts of aggression, violations and the constant threats that have become a daily routine against Lebanon. Israel is doing all those things without any real grounds or reasons, except to mislead Israeli public opinion by fleeing to the front and exporting its domestic crisis outside Israel and to give world public opinion the false impression that it is a victim of aggression.

The letters that my Government has repeatedly addressed in the past to the Secretariat and to the Security Council constitute clear proof of the fact that Israel's intentions are aggressive and not defensive. Israel's violations of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and of international agreements are the cause of pain, anguish, misery, evil and turbulence throughout the Middle East. The tactics pursued by Israel to justify its presence in neighbouring countries are known to all. But if the Government of Israel wants to send a message of terrorism and intimidation to

Lebanon and Syria, it has missed the mark. These actions by Israel will further fuel the cycle of violence in which that country will itself become trapped.

Lebanon hopes that the international community will lay bare the true nature of these Israeli practices, bring them to an end and strongly condemn them, just as it should condemn those who order them and implement them. Lebanon also hopes and expects that the Security Council will condemn Israel's aggression against another peaceful Syrian village, just as it condemned the Israeli air force's attacks against many peaceful villages and towns in Lebanon.

Given the current practices of the Israeli Government, which can only be described as reckless, and given its blind violence, the Security Council should not compromise all its peace efforts. More than ever before, the Council has a clear responsibility today to rein in Israel's wholly illegitimate acts of aggression.

**The President:** I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria.

**Mr. Baali (Algeria) (*spoke in French*):** I would first like to thank you, Mr. President, for having agreed so promptly to the request of the Arab Group to hold this open meeting to consider an event of extreme gravity that has imperiled international peace and security just a few days after many world leaders came to the United Nations to reaffirm their adherence to international law, the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and the system of collective security embodied by the Security Council. I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of your duties as President of the Council for the month of October. I also wish to congratulate the representative of the United Kingdom for his outstanding performance as President of the Council last month.

An exceptionally grave Israeli act of aggression has taken place today against a sovereign State and member of the Organization, the Syrian Arab Republic. This is a prime example of a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law, the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the disengagement agreement that has linked two countries since 1974. This act of aggression is particularly serious given that it is taking place in an atmosphere of extreme tension that is affecting a region made fragile

by the policy of terror and repression practised by Israel in occupied Arab territories.

This flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic is a new stage in the policy of escalation and flight pursued by the Israeli regime, which is designed to end the peace process that the Quartet is working hard to relaunch and to ruin any opportunities for peace in the region.

Given that risky policy, which could send the entire region into a spiral of violence whose consequences are unpredictable, it is very important that the international community adopt a firm and vigilance attitude and condemn in the strongest terms this new Israeli challenge to the Security Council and international law. Complacency of any kind would only encourage Israel to practice its irredentist policy and to continue to trample Security Council resolutions and norms of international law.

Algeria, which today condemned through the spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this act of military aggression wishes to reiterate its full solidarity with the fraternal Syrian people and emphasizes that only a just comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on the principle of land for peace and the exercise of the legitimate rights of all peoples of the region, including those of the Palestinians to establish an independent State, will enable this part of the world to regain peace, stability and prosperity.

Given this aggression against a sovereign State, in violation of international law, my delegation expects that the Security Council will adopt the firmest position, condemn unreservedly this aggression and force Israel to abide by international law and to respect Security Council resolutions.

**The President:** The next speaker on my list is the representative of Morocco.

**Mr. Bennouna** (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): I wish to add my voice to those have already done so in expressing our full confidence in you, Sir, as President of the Council this month. I also wish to congratulate Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry for a very determined and innovative presidency last month.

Syria, a fraternal country and member of the Council, was a victim of Israel's recourse to the use of force, in violation of the Charter. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter calls on all Member States to refrain

from the use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State. The Israeli attack that took place last night or this morning was a flagrant violation of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The fact is there. No one is denying it. That fact cannot be the object of the sole legal justification envisaged by the Charter — legitimate self-defence. If words still have meaning and if international law still exists, the concept of legitimate self-defence has nothing to do with the deliberate attack against Syrian territory.

Striking because a reprehensible, odious and unacceptable act was committed in Haifa recalls times of sad memories when blind, collective punishment took the place of justice. In any case, we would be far from the principles of the Charter and the fundamental standards of international law.

Therefore, if the facts are evident, it is the responsibility of the Council to take note of them and to determine if they pertain to Chapter VII of the Charter — namely aggression, a breach of the peace or a threat to peace — and then to take the measures required of the Council as the organ primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Kingdom of Morocco can only express its alarm at the escalation of violence in the Middle East, an escalation that runs the risk of including all countries of the region, and beyond that endangering peace and security in the world. We sincerely hope that the Council will take the appropriate measures to stop this escalation by requiring Israel to respect the sovereignty of its neighbours and their territorial integrity, particularly of Syria, to which the Kingdom of Morocco expresses its full solidarity.

**The President:** I call on the representative of Jordan.

**Mr. Al-Husseini** (Jordan) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council this month. We wish you every success in leading the deliberations of the Council. We also express our appreciation to His Excellency Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry for his impressive presidency of the Council last month. I also wish to thank you, Sir, for convening this emergency meeting.

The convening of this important meeting at this time to examine the situation in the Middle East is a clear manifestation of the Security Council's recognition of the grave developments that have taken place in the our region that will endanger the peace process and will lead to bloodshed.

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan strongly condemns the aerial attack by Israel this morning against the Syrian Arab Republic.

International law in this regard is very clear. No party can act outside of the jurisdiction of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, which prohibits the use of force except in two cases. The first case is if the use of force is used under Article 51 of the Charter, which reflects the principle of self-defence. However, the exercise of that right on the part of any State is conditioned on a prior armed attack against it. The second case is if the Security Council authorizes the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Neither case applies in this matter. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan calls upon Israel to cease forthwith using force and any forms of violence, comply with international law and respect the sovereignty of all States of the region.

**The President:** I call on the representative of Egypt.

**Mr. Aboul-Gheit** (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): The Security Council is meeting following the attack, which means that the Council must now carry out its responsibilities, strongly condemn that act of aggression and take steps to ensure that it does not recur.

I should like to read out a statement issued today in Cairo by our Minister for Foreign Affairs. That statement reads as follows.

"The international community is endeavouring to achieve a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East in the context of peace and security for all peoples. At present, Israel continues to escalate the situation and has even attacked Syrian territory. This inflames tension and could broaden the sphere of violence and counter-violence.

"The Arab Republic of Egypt condemns this new act of aggression, which is part and parcel of Israel's usual policies. It expresses its solidarity

with the people of Syria, who remain committed to international legality. Egypt calls upon the international community to oppose this new act of aggression and to ensure that the situation in the Middle East does not deteriorate.

"We condemn all acts of aggression perpetrated against civilians, including the attack carried out yesterday in Haifa."

Israel's continued provocative and aggressive acts against the Arab States of the region should cause the international community to use its powers in order to bring about lasting peace. The entire world understands that Israel must withdraw from all territories occupied since 1967 and that an independent Palestinian State must be established, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Such a settlement — on which negotiations must resume immediately — would be consistent with the principles of international law and common sense, and would be in the interest of all peoples. Any delay in reaching such a settlement will cause further civilian victims on both sides and will be a loss of precious time for people who seek prosperity and development.

Today, the international community has an opportunity to reassert its engagement and to condemn the adventurists, who will bring only suffering to the peoples of the region. A firm position must be taken today for the sake of the tomorrow we wish to build together. Stern measures must be adopted today to avert further years of suffering. A strong consensus will open the way for hope, and will convince the adventurists that they are harbouring illusions that only perpetuate aggression. They will have to renounce the desire to hold on to the territory of others. Peace must reign.

Today the Israeli representative told the Council that on this day 30 years ago Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel made a similar statement today; he spoke of unprovoked Egyptian-Syrian aggression. I cannot fail to recall that the Egyptian-Syrian military action across the Suez Canal was legitimate and had the clear-cut goal of regaining Egyptian territory in the Sinai at a time when Israel was insisting on retaining the Sinai. Egypt's action was in full conformity with the United Nations Charter and with the right of self-defence. It took place within Egyptian territory and on Egyptian territory.

**The President:** I now give the floor to the representative of Tunisia.

**Mr. Hachani** (Tunisia) (*spoke in Arabic*): I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of October. My appreciation goes to Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry for the way in which he guided the work of the Council last month. My delegation thanks you, Mr. President, for having responded so quickly to the request to convene this meeting to discuss recent events in the Middle East.

Tunisia learned with grave concern of Israel's act of aggression against fraternal Syria. We condemn that act of aggression and stand in solidarity with Syria. We believe it threatens a serious escalation and violates international law. It poses a threat to regional security and constitutes a violation of resolution 338 (1973). It is a flagrant violation of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, Tunisia vigorously deplores the violation of Lebanese air space in the commission of this aggression against Syria.

Tunisia believes that this unjustified act of aggression will further complicate the situation in the region and will bring further escalation, violence and destabilization. Here, Tunisia appeals to the Israeli Government to halt such acts of provocation so as to prevent the region from being caught up in a cycle of violence. We call on the international community to shoulder its responsibilities and to take urgent and forceful measures to prevent the escalation of the situation.

My delegation cannot fail to welcome the responsible position taken by the Government of Syria, rejecting the logic of violence in the face of Israeli escalation. The Council should take this into account.

**The President:** I now give the floor to the Permanent Observer of Palestine.

**Mr. Al-Kidwa** (Palestine) (*spoke in Arabic*): I wish at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month, and to convey our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry.

As members of the Council know, Israeli warplanes attacked a site north of Damascus, the capital of sisterly Syria. There is no doubt whatsoever that this marks new Israeli aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. It is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the

norms of international law. In the course of this action against Syria, Israel also violated Lebanese air space — which constitutes aggression against yet another Arab country.

Today's action may be added to the long list of acts of Israeli military aggression against many Arab countries, and confirms Israel's determination to use aggression and force and to violate international law. We vigorously deplore and condemn this most recent Israeli aggression against Syria and call upon the Security Council to join in vigorously condemning it. We call upon the Council to demand that Israel cease such acts of aggression and such violations of international law, as set out in the Arab draft resolution that has been placed before the Council.

The Israeli aggression threatens to extend the cycle of confrontation to the entire Middle East, adding to the great dangers that we already face in that region. We speak today as the victims of systematized Israeli aggression and of the bloody Israeli campaign against us of the past three years, including repeated war crimes. We are victims of settler colonization, expansionist policies and the denial of our national right to an independent Palestinian State with its capital in East Jerusalem.

Despite long years of colonization, we take the position of responsibility in standing against all illegal acts undertaken from our occupied territories against civilians in Israel. On that basis, the Palestinian leadership condemned the suicide bombing that took place yesterday in the city of Haifa and called for the full and immediate cessation of such acts.

On the other side, Israel must admit that such acts are the consequences of colonization and of its policies and actions, and not vice-versa. Israel must also stop linking its dirty acts to the international community's struggle against terrorism. Israel must also cease its illegal campaigns, including its building of a wall around our country; its threatening the life of the Palestinian leader, elected by the Palestinian people; and its intimidation of Arab countries, including sisterly Syria.

**The President:** I now call on the representative of Kuwait.

**Mr. Al-Otaibi** (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this



month. I wish you every success in conducting our deliberations.

I would be remiss if I failed to thank your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, for his leadership of the Council last month.

We appreciate your swift response to the request of the Arab Group to convene this meeting. Such celerity is based in the Council's belief that Israel's act of aggression today against a State member of the Security Council represents a grave threat to international peace and security. Kuwait condemns Israel's violation of Lebanon's and Syria's airspaces and its attack against Syrian territory by targeting a civilian site in the village of Ein Saheb. The statement issued by our Prime Minister stressed our condemnation of that act of aggression, which violates the principles of international law and the fundamental principles of the United Nations.

We welcome the statement made by Secretary-General Kofi Annan on this grave escalation and we share his concern that the deterioration of the situation in the region could presage further threats to regional peace and security. Such provocative and unwarranted acts of aggression by Israel fall within the context of its ongoing efforts to undermine the peace process by setting up obstacles to the implementation of the road map of the Quartet. Such acts also prove the fact that the Israeli Government is not serious about achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East and will bring further violence to the region.

Israel's acts of aggression, by them in the occupied Palestinian territories or in neighbouring Arab States, will not achieve its desired sense of security. Israel should stop shirking its responsibilities and international commitments. We call on Israel to commit itself to the obligations it has already assumed, including those under Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), as well as to the principle of land for peace. Israel should also implement the road map, with all its obligations, and withdraw from all the territories it occupied in 1967.

Kuwait stands in full solidarity with the Syrian Arab Republic in defying the act of aggression committed today. Kuwait supports the measures to be taken in defence of the territorial integrity of Syria and calls on the Security Council to assume its responsibilities in the maintenance of international

peace and security. The Council must condemn this escalation and call on Israel to refrain from such acts, which threaten regional and international security and will further exacerbate an already explosive situation in the Middle East.

**The President:** I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

**Mr. Shobokshi (Saudi Arabia) (spoke in Arabic):** I join with those who have congratulated you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are optimistic that your wisdom and experience will help you in conducting the Council's business as we all would wish.

I also extend appreciation and thanks to your predecessor, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, for guiding the Council's work last month.

Once again, Israel has affirmed its disregard for international law and norms. Once again, it has affirmed that it does not care about any agreement, convention or international legality. The Israeli air force has committed an unprovoked aggression against a civilian site in Syria that posed no threat or danger to anybody. Israel's violation of Lebanese and Syrian airspaces and its aggression against Syrian territory is a blatant contravention of international law and norms, confirming the aggressive, terrorist nature of the Israeli Government.

The Israeli Government is resorting to every pretext to export its internal crises, terrorizing and intimidating the countries of the region and pursuing its continued aggression against the Palestinians and repressive practices in the occupied territories. The Israeli Government is trying to confuse everybody, wrecking havoc on the region and raising tensions in a very volatile situation.

We agree with the statement made by the Secretary-General in which he denounced the Israeli aggression and warned against escalation in a region that is already extremely tense and against a rising danger that may be difficult to contain. We need to implement the road map through the Quartet's insistence on the implementation of all its provisions with due impartiality.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia denounces Israel's aggression against sisterly Syria. This aggression is a provocation that may undermine the peace process in the area. It threatens international and regional security

and represents a dangerous deterioration of the situation in the region.

Saudi Arabia, while affirming its solidarity with the position of Syria — which has showed great restraint in the face of this aggression — calls upon the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security by condemning the Israeli aggression and by putting an end to this organized State terrorism, to the inhumane practices of the Israeli occupation against the Palestinian people and to its aggression against Syria and Lebanon. In order to maintain peace and security in the region, it must not repeat its act of aggression.

**The President:** I now call on the representative of Cuba.

**Mr. Rodríguez Parrilla (Cuba)** (*spoke in Spanish*): I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency and to express my gratitude for the presidency of Ambassador Jones Parry.

The delegation of Cuba strongly condemns the military attack launched by Israel on 5 October against the Syrian Arab Republic in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the very resolutions of the Security Council. An act of aggression has been committed, in the light of which the Council must exercise its functions under the mandate of the Charter.

The Security Council has the duty to prevent a dangerous escalation in the Middle East conflict. Approximately 3,600 people — nearly 2,800 of them innocent Palestinian civilians — have died since September 2000. A wall is being built to segregate the Palestinian people. There are repeated violations of airspace and attacks against southern Lebanon. The provocations and slanderous statements against Syria are increasing.

While we reiterate our condemnation of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians — who continue to be innocent victims of the spiral of violence caused by their Government's policy — Cuba rejects the use of such individual actions to attempt to justify State terrorism against Syria and Lebanon and atrocities perpetrated by an army that possesses the most modern and lethal means for indiscriminately killing targeted persons as well as numerous other victims.

The veto of the United States — repeated 37 times — has thus far prevented Security Council resolutions from being implemented, has prevented Chapter VI of the Charter from being invoked, has prevented appropriate actions from being taken to ensure Israel's withdrawal from all the occupied territories, and has prevented peace from being restored in the Middle East.

Cuba confirms its full support for the cause of the Arab peoples against Israeli occupation and aggression, and we express our deeply felt solidarity with their resistance. A just and lasting peace cannot be achieved in the Middle East unless there is an end to Israeli occupation, unless the Palestinian people can exercise their legitimate right to establish an independent State with its capital in East Jerusalem, until there is a return of all the occupied territories, until Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Syrian Golan back to the line held on 4 June 1967. There will not be peace until the Israeli provocations in southern Lebanon cease, until the rights of the Palestinian refugees are guaranteed and until the illegal Israeli settlements are eliminated, in conformity with Security Council resolutions.

**Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran):** I should like to join previous speakers in expressing our felicitations to you, Sir, on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council and to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, on the excellent way he conducted the work of the Council last month. I also wish to thank you for having convened this urgent Council meeting.

The Israeli violation of Lebanese territory and airspace and the raid against civilian centres in Syria, causing destruction and casualties, is a further random act in the course of the incessant Israeli aggression against Arab countries and the Palestinian people. It clearly represents Israeli persistence in the pursuit of a policy of State terrorism, which must be vigorously condemned. No justification or pretext can be accepted for such a policy of reckless recourse to armed aggression, which represents a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the most basic principles of international law.

This aggression represents a serious escalation at a time when tension is running high in the region. The raid further deteriorates the situation and threatens to broaden the scope of violence. It is in line with the

policy of escalation that the Israeli regime has pursued all along with a view to holding on to the Palestinian and Arab lands it has continued to occupy for decades. That is nothing but playing with fire in a region already scarred by decades of aggression and occupation by Israel.

My delegation rejects the baseless fabrication against my country presented in the Council today. But it is evident that no amount of slander, deception and smear campaigns by Israel can cloud the obvious: that the Sharon regime has engaged in a systematic campaign of provocation and escalation, from desecration of holy places to targeted murder of Palestinian leaders, in order to obliterate any prospect for peace.

However, this new adventure is all the more ominous, because it clearly indicates the fact that Israel, in its manoeuvring to continue its policy of occupation through escalation and provocation, is running out of options. It is attacking Arab countries in the belief that that will enable it to get out of the impasse it has created for itself. This new course of action, if unchecked, will drag the entire region into a downward spiral of violence, as it is designed to do. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has already condemned this act of aggression — which is an integral part of the provocative and aggressive Israeli policy — and expressed its full solidarity with the Government and the people of Syria and the Government and the people of Lebanon.

We call on the international community, represented by this body, to impose restraints on the Israeli regime, whose actions are a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East. It is unfortunate that the Security Council, bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has thus far been prevented from shouldering its responsibility with regard to the crisis in the Middle East. There is no doubt that the impunity that Israel enjoys emboldens it to perpetrate its policy of aggression and occupation. Thus we urge the Council to take decisive action this time on this new, alarming aggression. This is especially necessary in the light of further threats by Israel to launch more attacks on Syria.

**The President:** I now call on the representative of Bahrain.

**Mr. Almansoor (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*):** At the outset, I should like to sincerely congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I should also like to thank your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Jones Parry, for his success in conducting the work of the Council last month. We thank you for promptly convening this emergency Security Council meeting to examine the dangerous situation that has arisen in the region.

The Security Council is holding this emergency meeting in the shadow of the dangerous developments threatening the peace and security in the Middle East and stemming from the current Israel's Governments policy of war, with unforeseeable consequences. The Israeli attack against sisterly Syria is a dangerous escalation of violence that threatens international and regional security. It is a violation of the United Nations Charter and international law and is in defiance of all the agreements, conventions and principles of international law. Israel's actions today offer a textbook example of the foregoing. As if it were not enough to conduct a policy of violence against the defenceless Palestinian people, the Israeli Government, through its policy of provocation, went on to launch an attack against a Member State and current non-permanent member of the Security Council.

My country condemns the Israeli raid against the Syrian Arab Republic and its violation of Lebanese and Syrian airspace. My country deplores this blatant aggression and the gross violation of international legality and the laws on the sovereignty of States. We denounce any action conducive to war.

The current Israeli Government is called on to desist from its current policy, which has dragged the region into a cycle of violence and tension. It must exercise reason and wisdom rather than engage the language of war and aggression against others. It must respect the principles of international law, including respect for the sovereignty of States in the region.

Here, I would like to pay tribute to the policy of restraint adopted by the Syrian Arab Republic in the face of aggression. Syria believes that international forums are the best recourse and far preferable to a language of war that victimizes people.

Finally, the Kingdom of Bahrain calls on the Security Council to apply the Charter against aggressor

countries. We call on the international community to take every measure to pressure Israel to stop the practices that are undermining all peace efforts and threatening stability and security in the region.

**The President:** I give the floor to the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

**Mr. El-Treki** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would also like to express to you, Sir, our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We wish you every success in your work. We would like to extend our thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, the representative of the United Kingdom, for the efforts he made last month to make the work of the Council a success.

We meet today not for the first time – and it will not be the last – to discuss Israeli aggression against a State member of the Security Council. Israel's aggressive nature and years-long exercise of State terrorism have continued unabated without any decision taken to address the problem. Because of Security Council inaction, aggression and political assassinations have continued, as has occupation of land. Syrian land too is still occupied because of Israeli aggression.

I am not saying that this is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, for Israel has never respected the Charter or any Security Council resolutions. Perhaps we might now have an opportunity to stop such aggression and an aggressor that has been exercising State terrorism, which, owing to the lack of constraints and measures to stop Israel from carrying out terrorist acts, has promoted the spread of international terrorism. Syria is a victim today. Palestine is another victim. No one knows who will be the next victim.

I would like to mention in particular the friends of Israel. We must speak frankly with Israel. We should not believe Israel. We should tell the Israelis that continued aggression, assassinations and occupation will not result in the achievement of a sense of security for Israel. The entire question of security for Israel, the only guarantee of security for Israel, lies in its abiding by international resolutions, recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people, withdrawing from occupied Arab territories and putting an end to the State terrorism that it exercises. Security cannot be achieved through aggression. Despite the conditions that

encourage such aggression, it must end. I believe that the Council, which is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, must put an end to such aggression.

We express our support for and solidarity with sisterly Syria. We stand with Syria and Lebanon to confront such aggression. No peace and no end to terrorism can be achieved so long as people continue to live under occupation and State terrorism is exercised not just for self-defence but for the sake of occupation and aggression.

We hope that the Council will rise to its responsibilities, at least for once. It must say that aggression must be stopped and condemned. The Charter must be applied to Israelis, as it is to other people. Only then can we end aggression and occupation. We are certain that the Council is capable of doing so, if it can muster the will and a sense of responsibility towards the members.

**The President:** I now give the floor to the representative of Yemen.

**Mr. Alsaidi** (Yemen) (*spoke in Arabic*): Allow me to begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. We are confident that your well-known wisdom will help the Council reach the objective for which this meeting has been convened. Allow me also to express our sincere thanks to Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, for the wise manner in which he conducted the deliberations of the Security Council last month.

Israeli forces committed an unprecedented act of aggression this morning in an attempt to drag Arab States into military confrontation and to mask the heinous crimes perpetrated by the Israeli Government against Palestinians, in the hopes that such an action would draw the region into further conflict. This is an act of aggression whose like we have not seen against the Syrian Arab Republic in 30 years. Israel has failed to suppress the Palestinian intifada, so it has tirelessly endeavoured to export its internal crisis to neighbouring States. What is truly regrettable, however, is that Israel has not yet understood that a just and comprehensive solution, the establishment of a Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital and Israeli withdrawal from occupied Syrian and Lebanese territory constitute the solution that will prevent any

further bloodshed and war in the region. Israel's act of aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic is a challenge to international law and to internationally binding resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. The Republic of Yemen therefore condemns that act of aggression. Yemen also expresses its solidarity with its brothers in the Syrian Arab Republic and in the Lebanese Republic.

We call upon the international community, and primarily upon the Security Council and the United Nations, to condemn this senseless act of aggression. We also call upon them to adopt resolution to deter any further premeditated escalation by Israel. In our view, such escalation would pose an ominous threat to peace and stability in the region.

**The President:** I now give the floor to the representative of Qatar.

**Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar) (*spoke in Arabic*):** At the outset, I would like to convey our congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. We are confident that your wisdom will guide the Council to the attainment of all our expectations. I would also like to thank your predecessor, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the Permanent Representative of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for his efforts during the month of September. We further wish to thank the members of the Council for their speedy response to the request made by the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to hold an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider the dangerous escalation of aggression perpetrated by Israeli forces against sites in the Syrian Arab Republic and Israeli violation of Lebanese air space.

The Foreign Ministry of Qatar issued a statement this morning in which it condemned the raid launched by Israeli forces against sites in Syria. We consider those actions a grave threat to peace and security in the Middle East that could drag the region back to war and tension. My country reaffirms that it stands by the sisterly Syrian Arab Republic. We call on the international community to bring pressure to bear on Israel to cease its aggression and commit itself to implement internationally binding resolutions calling on it to withdraw from all occupied Arab territory.

Israel's aggression against Syria is in clear defiance of all international rules and laws. It is also a clear violation of the Disengagement Agreement

between Syrian and Israeli forces. It also affirms Israel's desire to export its internal crisis by waging wider war in the guise of combating terrorism.

My country has joined the list of sponsors of the draft resolution that has been submitted to the Council. We are confident that, given the very delicate circumstances, the Council will be able to assume its full responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.

**The President:** I now give the floor to the representative of the Sudan.

**Mr. Erwa (Sudan) (*spoke in Arabic*):** At the outset, Sir, I would like to congratulate you, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are fully confident of your ability and wisdom. We would also like to thank Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, for the wise way in which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

We have returned to the Security Council for the second time in less than a month because of Israel's repeated violations of international law. God only knows how long and how often we will have to continue to come to the Council.

My delegation has followed with great concern Israel's violation of Syrian and Lebanese air space and its acts of aggression against the territory of both countries that targeted a civilian site north-west of Syria's capital, Damascus, and that caused material damage. My delegation considers that act of aggression to be a dangerous escalation that could threaten international peace and security and make an already bad situation vulnerable to incalculable and uncontrollable repercussions. At the same time, my delegation also condemns Israel's aggression against Lebanese and Syrian territories, which we consider yet one more in a long series of Israeli violations of international norms and law and instances of Israeli contempt for international legitimacy.

My delegation reaffirms its support for, and solidarity with, the Syrian Arab Republic. We also reaffirm its right to self-defence and to respond to this act of aggression.

My delegation further asks the Security Council to shoulder its responsibility and to intervene immediately to prevent Israel from continuing its provocative acts of aggression against Syria, against

the Palestinian people and against neighbouring Arab countries. My delegation reaffirms that it is necessary to abide by the provisions of the United Nations Charter and by international law.

The blatant aggression committed this morning is not an isolated event. It was preceded by another such act on 8 January in the demilitarized zone between Syria and Israel. Now Israel has once again returned to its previous behaviour by committing another act this morning. The Security Council is called upon to take the necessary measures to ensure that Israel does not continue its terrorist acts, and that it returns to its senses and understands that its security lies in withdrawing from the land it occupies and putting an end to its acts of aggression against the Palestinian people and its attacks against neighbouring Arab countries.

**Mr. Mekdad** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): I regret having to take the floor again. However, this afternoon the Council heard unfounded lies, through which the Israeli representative tried to divert our attention from the reason for which the Council met: the Israeli violation of the air space of Syria and Lebanon and the acts of aggression committed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State member of the Security Council and of the United Nations. Is there an insolence that can exceed what we have already witnessed? This Israeli style of prevarication is not new to us. We know about Israel's unfounded lies, and we know about Israeli attempts to distort facts and realities. That is the pattern we have come to expect from Israel, from 1948 to this very moment.

I will not respond to the unfounded lies perpetrated and promoted by the representative of the Israeli war Government, because the statements that were included in his statement simply deserve to be thrown into the Council's wastepaper basket. The logic promoted by the Israeli representative is the logic and the reasoning of a gang, not that of a responsible party. What is even more arrogant in what we have heard today is that he came here to preach to us about Israel's history of respecting international legitimacy, despite the fact that each and every of us here knows very well that that history is not exactly honourable. We would have greatly preferred to have him tell us the reasons for the Israeli failure to implement the scores — or even more than scores — of resolutions adopted by the United Nations, including by the Security Council,

with regard to Israel ever since the State of Israel was established.

That representative chose to ignore the main reason behind the catastrophes and disasters which our region faces. He chose to ignore the blood-letting — by that I mean Israel's insistence on occupying Arab territories, its daily acts of aggression against the Palestinian civilians and its acts of aggression against Arab States, the last of which we have witnessed this morning. The Israeli continued occupation is the reason for the presence of hundreds of thousands, if not say millions of Palestinians in Syria and in other Arab lands. It is also needless to recall that the presence of those refugees was supposed to be temporary until the circumstances allowed them to go back to their country from which they were expelled by Israel and whereby they were replaced by illegitimate settlers and illegitimate settlements, things that this Council has rejected more than once.

The Palestinian field leadership is in the Palestinian territories. It is just logical to say that for tactical and geographic reasons the Palestinians who reside in Syria cannot plan for operations that take place on Palestinian territories. Therefore, accusing Syria with what the Israeli representative chose to term as giving refuge to terrorist organizations is only a desperate attempt to get out of the dead-end that Israel finds itself in and, as I say, an attempt by Israel to export its internal crises beyond its borders.

Nothing hurts international action against terrorism more than Israeli acts of aggression and the killing of Palestinians under the pretext of combating terrorism. Israel chooses to ignore the fact that it — and only it — was the first to introduce the concept of terrorism into our region through crimes committed by the Stern and the Haganah: gangs that were in fact the nucleus of the Israeli army. Some of their members are still wanted in Great Britain to this very day because of the acts of terror they committed. They became Prime Ministers and other high officials in Israel. Do members remember the assassination by those gangs of Count Bernadotte, the international mediator; do members remember the carnage and the massacres of Deir Yassin and Qana; do members remember the massacres of Sabra and Shatila; do members remember the role of General Sharon, the current Israeli Prime Minister in those massacres? We marked the anniversary of these massacres just a few days ago.

In combating terrorism, Syria stands side by side with all the other countries of the world. We frankly believe that this is what we should really do, that this is the correct course of action. Has not Syria cooperated with all with all the other countries of the world, including the United States in combating terrorism? Has not Syria saved lives, as recognized by United States Administration officials? Were we in fact on the wrong side when we cooperated in that field? We do not believe that this is the case. The responsibility of one permanent member in the Security Council and a co-sponsor of the peace process makes it incumbent on that party to adopt balanced positions that do not encourage acts of aggression and that do not accept any such acts, but that would deter the commission of such acts.

I would like to refer briefly to the comments that the representative of Israel made about democracy and respect for human rights, among other issues. The Israeli record with regard to democratic practices is very well known to all of us. Israel demonstrates its respect for the rights of the Palestinian people at checkpoints, in the building of the fence and in the demolition of the houses of civilians while their inhabitants are still inside. Such actions provide evidence of the Israeli attitude to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments of international humanitarian law, which we are all seeking to respect.

Is that truly respect for human rights? Do States members of the Council believe in Israel's unique way of showing respect for human rights? I say to Israel that the members of the Council would not accept such notions.

In conclusion, I would like to thank those who condemned the Israeli act of aggression against my country. In doing so they expressed their support for the Charter and for international legitimacy. That is the right course of action to take in the interests of the maintenance of international peace and security.

**The President:** There are no further speakers inscribed on my list.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I now invite Council members to continue our discussion of the subject in informal consultations.

*The meeting rose at 7.55 p.m.*

## Annex 24





# Security Council

Fifty-eighth year

Provisional

## 4862<sup>nd</sup> meeting

Wednesday, 19 November 2003, 12.20 p.m.  
New York

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<i>President:</i>	Mr. Gaspar Martins . . . . .	(Angola)
<i>Members:</i>	Bulgaria . . . . .	Mr. Raytchev
	Cameroon . . . . .	Mr. Tidjani
	Chile . . . . .	Mr. Muñoz
	China . . . . .	Mr. Wang Guangya
	France . . . . .	Mr. De La Sablière
	Germany . . . . .	Mr. Pleuger
	Guinea . . . . .	Mr. Sow
	Mexico . . . . .	Mr. Pujalte
	Pakistan . . . . .	Mr. Akram
	Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Lavrov
	Spain . . . . .	Ms. Menéndez
	Syrian Arab Republic . . . . .	Mr. Mekdad
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . . .	Sir Emyr Jones Parry
	United States of America . . . . .	Mr. Negroponte

### Agenda

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

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This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

03-62146 (E)

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*The meeting was called to order at 12.20 p.m.*

**Adoption of the agenda**

*The agenda was adopted.*

**The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question**

**The President:** I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Israel, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mekel (Israel) took a seat at the Council table.*

**The President:** I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 19 November 2003 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations, which will be issued as document S/2003/1102, and which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to request that, in accordance with its previous practice, the Security Council invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the meeting of the Security Council to be held today, Wednesday, 19 November 2003, regarding the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question."

I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to participate in the meeting in accordance with the rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al-Kidwa (Palestine) took a seat at the Council table.*

**The President:** I should like to inform Council members that Bulgaria, China, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom have also joined as sponsors to the draft resolution contained in document S/2003/1100.

Accordingly, members of the Council have before them document S/2003/1100, submitted by Bulgaria, Chile, China, France, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

I welcome the presence of the distinguished Secretary-General at this meeting today.

It is my understanding that the Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. If I hear no objection, I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:*

Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, France, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

**The President:** The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1515 (2003).

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

*The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.*