

### **Annex 103**

“Implementation Completion and Results Report on a credit in the amount of SDR 23.8 million (US\$ 35 million equivalent) and on a grant from the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund in the Amount of US\$ 5.0 million to the Republic of Kenya for the Kenya Coastal Development Project (P094692)”, *The World Bank*, 31 December 2017

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**IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT**

IDA-48010 AND TF-97578

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 23.8 MILLION

(US\$ 35 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND ON A

GRANT FROM THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY TRUST FUND

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$ 5.0 MILLION

TO THE

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA**

FOR THE

**KENYA COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ( P094692 )**

December 31, 2017

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2017)

Currency Unit = Kenyan Shilling

KES 105.484 = US\$1

US\$ 1.39 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

ALRMP	Arid Lands Resource Management Project
BDS	Business Development Services
BMU	Beach Management Unit
CDA	Coast Development Authority
CDD	Community Driven Development
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CMA	Co-Management Area
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CVF	Coastal Village Fund
DPP	Department of Physical Planning
EA	Environmental Audit
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
FM	Financial Management
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEO	Global Environmental Objective
GIS	Geographical Information System
GoK	Government of Kenya
HMP	Hazina ya Maendeleo ya Pwani
ICBIMS	Integrated Coastal Biodiversity Information Management System
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
ICZM	Integrated Coastal Zone Management
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
ISDS	Integrated Safeguards Datasheet
IPPF	Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework
KEFRI	Kenya Forestry Research Institute
KEMFSED	Kenya Marine Fisheries and Socioeconomic Development Project

KMFRI	Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute
KMMP	Kisite-Mpunguti Marine Protected Area
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
KWSTI	Kenya Wildlife Service Training Institute
METT	Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoFD	Ministry of Fisheries Development
MCS	Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MLDP	Ministry of Lands (Department of Physical Planning)
MMPA	Malindi Marine Protected Area
MPA	Marine Protected Area
MPs	Management Plans
MSMEs	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MS	Moderately Satisfactory
MU	Moderately Unsatisfactory
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NRM	Natural Resources Management
OPCS	Operations Policy and Country Services
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PMU	Project Management Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
SDF	State Department of Fisheries
SDR	Special Drawing Right
SHNP	Shimba Hills National Reserve
TTL	Task Team Leader
VMG	Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

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## DATA SHEET

## BASIC INFORMATION

## Product Information

Project ID	Project Name
P094692	KENYA COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ( P094692 )
Country	Financing Instrument
Kenya	Specific Investment Loan
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

## Related Projects

Relationship	Project	Approval	Product Line
Supplement	P108845-Kenya Coastal Development Proejct	27-Jul-2010	Global Environment Project

## Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Government of Kenya	KEMFRI

## Project Development Objective (PDO)

## Original PDO

The project development objective is to promote an environmentally sustainable management of Kenya's coastal and marine resources by strengthening the capacity of existing relevant government agencies and by enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in selected coastal communities.

## Revised PDO

To improve management effectiveness and enhance revenue generation of Kenya's coastal and marine resources.



## FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
<b>World Bank Financing</b>			
P094692 IDA-48010	35,000,000	30,054,759	29,704,529
P108845 TF-97578	5,000,000	4,953,531	4,953,531
<b>Total</b>	<b>40,000,000</b>	<b>35,008,290</b>	<b>34,658,060</b>
<b>Non-World Bank Financing</b>			
Borrower	2,000,000	1,986,290	1,986,290
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,000,000</b>	<b>1,986,290</b>	<b>1,986,290</b>
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	<b>42,000,000</b>	<b>36,994,580</b>	<b>36,644,350</b>

## KEY DATES

Project	Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
P094692	27-Jul-2010	30-Jun-2011	24-Apr-2015	29-Oct-2016	30-Jun-2017
P108845	27-Jul-2010	30-Jun-2011	24-Apr-2015	29-Oct-2016	30-Jun-2017

**RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING**

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
21-Sep-2012	3.01	Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Financing Plan Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Disbursements Arrangements Change in Institutional Arrangements Change in Procurement
06-Oct-2015	21.57	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Cancellation of Financing Change in Financing Plan Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Disbursements Arrangements Change in Institutional Arrangements Other Change(s)
29-Sep-2016	29.28	Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

**KEY RATINGS**

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Substantial

**RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs**

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	19-Mar-2011	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0
02	30-Nov-2011	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.14
03	07-May-2012	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.84
04	23-Feb-2013	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3.63
05	26-Jul-2013	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	8.66
06	18-Jan-2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	8.65
07	08-Oct-2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	15.61





08	14-Apr-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	16.40
09	27-Oct-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	21.57
10	18-May-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	29.28
11	22-Dec-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	29.28
12	27-Jun-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	30.06

## SECTORS AND THEMES

### Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

#### **Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry** **100**

Agricultural Extension, Research, and Other Support Activities 4

Fisheries 1

Public Administration - Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 19

Livestock 1

Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 75

### Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)

#### **Private Sector Development** **100**

Jobs 100

#### **Finance** **4**

Finance for Development 4

Agriculture Finance 4

#### **Urban and Rural Development** **83**

Rural Development 83

Rural Markets 4

Rural Non-farm Income Generation 47

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 14

Land Administration and Management 18



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**ADM STAFF**

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## I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

### A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

#### Context

1. Despite the considerable post-independence growth, which converted Kenya into the most prosperous country in East Africa in the 1980's, per capita GDP became stagnant during the '1990s and '2000s. Thus, at appraisal, poverty in Kenya was widespread, with 46 percent of the country's population living below the poverty line. Developed in 2008, the government's ambitious development blueprint (Kenya Vision 2030), was aimed at transforming the country into a newly industrializing middle-income country, providing a high-quality life to all its citizens by 2030. To achieve this goal, all sectors were expected to make significant efforts to bring the governance issues under control, address social inequities and provide the poor with sound opportunities to improve their income and living standards. This was consistent with the World Bank's 2010-2013 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) focus on supporting sustainability based on economic, environmental and social principles. Of particular relevance was the focus on the coastal region and on tourism as a driver of future national growth, job creation, poverty reduction and wealth generation. Coastal tourism was directly and indirectly responsible for about 24 percent of the country's GDP, while about 70 percent of the per capita economic activity of the coastal region derived from tourism-related activities, placing tourism at the center of development.

2. The coastal region extends 150 km inland from the seafront, covering an area of 67,500 km<sup>2</sup> and constituting about 11.5 percent of the total area of the country. Coral reefs run parallel to the coastline, from Vanga to Malindi Bay, and mangrove forest, a vital part of the coastal ecosystem providing economic development and environmental services, covered about 500 km<sup>2</sup>. The fishery sub-sector was an important contributor to the GDP, sustaining the livelihoods of many coastal and inland lake residents. In 2007, the average fish production was 156,000 metric tons, with inland fisheries contributing up to 95 percent, followed by marine fisheries (4 percent) and aquaculture (1 percent). In terms of biodiversity, the coastal region of Kenya has four marine parks and six marine reserves that incorporate important marine wildlife and habitats including coral reefs, seagrass beds and mangrove forests.

3. The Coast Province was one of the poorest in the country with over 62 percent of overall rural poverty, and consequently the central and local government agencies were not equipped to handle the investments needed to reduce poverty and improve environmental conditions. As a result, long-term neglect, resource overuse, and poor management and planning have had a major negative impact on the coastal environment. Overuse of fragile coral reefs by local residents and tourists, excessive fishing pressure in the inshore areas, inappropriate land use in coastal districts, and poor development management have severely degraded the value of coastal resources. In addition, organic pollution from human and solid waste produced by the major urban areas and tourist hotels has also affected the natural resources upon which the coastal economy is based. Furthermore, the benefits of exploiting valuable existing resources have not fully accrued to coastal residents or the national economy due to the lack of proper management. Limited domestic fishing occurred beyond territorial waters – most fishing within or close to the fringing coral reefs-- with a high prevalence of illegal coastal and offshore fishing due to inadequate public-sector capacity to monitor and control fishing. The Kenya Coastal Development Project (KCDP) was developed to address some of these challenges while contributing to the poverty alleviation goals. The World Bank's (WB) rationale for involvement was its significant experience in addressing poverty and development issues in Africa's coastal zones (the KCDP was the latest in a series of marine and freshwater projects developed in the coastal zones of Mozambique, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Kenya), and its technical and financing capacity, which was expected to attract and harmonize




additional financing from other development partners and technical organizations.

### Theory of Change (Results Chain)

4. While the initial aim of the KCDP was to build the capacity of implementing agencies to effectively deliver services towards improved natural resources management, and ultimately increased revenue for the Government of Kenya (GoK) and improved livelihood of the coastal communities, the theory of change was not explicitly described or illustrated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) or any other project document. However, as can be interpreted from the results framework, the underlying assumptions supporting the theory of change to be pursued by the project were that the promotion of coastal tourism should integrate environmental and social values in order to be sustainable. For this, the challenges facing the coastal region's overall development and its tourism needed to be addressed in an integrated manner. These included: (i) contradictory regulatory and legal frameworks, (ii) a weak institutional framework, (iii) inadequate infrastructure, (iv) poor coordination and marketing of the tourism product globally and domestically, (v) poor management of the region's natural resources associated with levels of poverty; and (vi) limited participation of coastal people in the development of the sector.

### Theory of Change: Kenya Coastal Development Project at Appraisal





5. Addressing the degradation of natural resources and shifting resource use to a more rational pattern, required the sustainable utilization of the coastal areas. Such a strategy required interventions aimed at involving capture fisheries, particularly in the deeper near-shore areas that were considered poorly exploited by artisanal fishermen, increasing mariculture, reducing illegal offshore fishing, better understanding land capability and land use, infrastructure improvements, capacity building, assessment of markets, and improving technology for value addition.

### Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

6. The original Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the PAD and Financing Agreement was “to promote environmentally sustainable management of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources by strengthening the capacity of existing relevant government agencies and by enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in selected coastal communities”. The Global Environment Objective (GEO) as presented in both, the PAD and associated Financing Agreement was “to strengthen conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity”.

### Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

7. In order to assess the achievement of the project’s development objectives, the PAD-stated compound PDO and GEO of the project have been broken down, resulting in the following specific key expected outcomes and respective indicators:

Expected Outcome	Indicators
Promote environmentally sustainable management of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources by:	
1. Strengthening the capacity of existing relevant government agencies	50% increased revenue generated to GoK from vessel licensing in 200 mile EEZ and from near shore fisheries development 10% increase in cost recovery of MPAs
2. Enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small and medium enterprises in selected coastal areas	20% increase in micro, small and medium sized enterprise startups and business expansions directly related to project interventions in pilot villages
3. Strengthen conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity	Quality of data, data coverage and reporting frequency of catch and effort (the frame) (15,000 records by EOP) improved. and associated with by-catch management measures At least three of the more important existing conservation areas brought under effective management (including co-management) by EOP)

### Components

8. As described in the original Project Results Framework, the project would be implemented through the following four (4) main components:

- **Component 1 (US\$8.88 million) - Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources:** Implemented through three sub-components: (i) governance and management of offshore and coastal fisheries resources; (ii) research on fish stocks, fish value addition and market chain enhancement; and (iii) fish production through sustainable aquaculture development. Actual disbursement at project closing was US\$8.56 million, equivalent to 96.5 percent of the original allocation.
- **Component 2 (US\$9.04 million) - Sound Management of Natural Resources:** Implemented through two sub-components, namely: (i) biodiversity & natural resources Assessment and Information Systems; and (ii) capacity Building, Research, Extension and Tourism Enhancement. Following a Level 2 restructuring in



2015, several project activities were cancelled, resulting in a reduced budget allocation of US\$4.52 million. Actual disbursement at project closing eventually was US\$6.93 million, equivalent to 77 percent of the original amount.

- **Component 3 (US\$12.20 million) - Support for Alternative Livelihoods:** Implemented through three subcomponents, namely: (i) spatial Planning; (ii) environmental governance; and (iii) microenterprise development.
- **Component 4 (US\$11.35 million) - Capacity building, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) System, Project Management and Communication, and Coastal Village Fund (CVF):** Implemented through two subcomponents, namely: (i) project management, capacity building and M&E; and (ii) the Coastal Village Fund (CVF). Following the Level 2 restructuring in 2015, Components 3 and 4 were merged and project activities cancelled, resulting in a reduced combined budget allocation of US\$18.58 million. Actual disbursement at project closing eventually stood at US\$18.72 million, equivalent to 79 percent of the original allocation US\$23.55 million (US\$12.20 million plus US\$11.35 million).

## B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

### Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

9. The project has undergone three significant restructurings, which introduced major changes to all key elements of the project, including the PDO, components, indicators, targets and financing.

10. In September 2012, only 15 months after project effectiveness, a Level 1 Restructuring was processed and approved by the Board. The project had disbursed US\$3.47 million, including US\$2.95 million from IDA and US\$0.52 from GEF, or 8.16 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively. The restructuring aimed at expediting implementation, through streamlining of activities, and included the simplification of the PDO, which became “to improve management effectiveness and enhance revenue generation of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources”; the GEO remained unchanged. The Results Framework was revised and simplified to include more relevant, measurable and better-defined outcome indicators. The institutional arrangements were changed to allow for the implementation of the Development Fund of the Coast or “*Hazina Ya Maendeleo Ya Pwani*” (HMP) by the Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI), replacing the Coastal Village Fund originally planned to be implemented by the Arid Lands Resource Management Project II (ALMRP II), which was cancelled due to corruption allegations after KCDP was approved, and thus represented one of the reasons for restructuring KCDP. Even though Kenya had started implementing its devolution process, the overall project implementation responsibilities remained at the ministry- and agency-level. Furthermore, funds were reallocated between categories to cover unbudgeted costs associated with safeguards requirements and the management costs for the HMP. The restructuring finally included changes in activities to be supported under each component, and adding Force Account and Community Participation as procurement methods. The modifications were also intended to define those project activities to be fully financed by the GEF grant, while retaining the original project design and component structure.<sup>1</sup>

11. In October 2015, addressing the comprehensive independent assessment and subsequent agreements reached during the Mid-Term Review (MTR), through a Level 2 Restructuring, a series of substantial changes were introduced. These included a partial cancellation of US\$4.59 million from the IDA credit (reducing the IDA

<sup>1</sup> World Bank: Restructuring Paper on Proposed Project Restructuring of KCDP Approved on August 9, 2012



contribution to US\$ 30,413,780),<sup>2</sup> the reallocation of funds among components and disbursement categories, a realignment of implementation arrangements, and the revision of outcome indicators and targets. In addition, project components were reduced to three by essentially merging Components 3 and 4.

12. In September 2016, the closing date was extended by 8 months, from October 31, 2016 to June 30, 2017.

13. The GEO: “strengthening conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity” remained unchanged throughout the different restructurings. Similarly, the scope and ambition of the project were not affected by the restructurings.

### Revised PDO Indicators

#### Level 1 Restructuring September 2012

	<i>Original PDO Level Results Indicator</i>	<i>Revised PDO Level Results Indicator</i>	<i>Comments/Rationale for Change</i>
1.	50% increased revenue generated to GoK from vessel licensing in 200 mile EEZ and from near shore fisheries development	Increased revenue generation to GOK from near shore and EEZ fisheries	Same indicator, but improved clarity of formulation and annual fluctuation corrected by using US\$/yr based on three-year average for combined near shore and EEZ.
2.	10% increase in cost recovery of MPAs	Dropped	Sustainability aspect already covered by increased revenues in the above indicator
3.	20% increase in micro, small and medium sized enterprise startups and business expansions directly related to project interventions in pilot villages	Dropped	Not a direct aspect of the PDO
4.	Direct Project Beneficiaries (number), of which female (%)		Mandatory core indicator moved from the intermediate level as required by OPCS
5.	At least three of the more important existing conservation areas brought under effective management (including co-management) by EOP	Conservation/target areas with management plan in place, implemented and showing improvement in management as shown by effectiveness tracking tool by EoP.	Same indicator, but improved clarity of formulation

#### Level 2 Restructuring October 2015

	<i>Original PDO Level Results Indicator</i>	<i>Original Target</i>	<i>New/Revised PDO Level Results Indicator</i>	<i>New/Revised Target</i>	<i>Comments/Rationale for Change</i>
1.	Conservation/target areas with management plan in place, implemented and showing improvement in management as shown by effectiveness tracking tool by EOP		Revised: Number of conservation areas brought under effective management (including co-management) as defined by Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) score of at least 55	Baseline: 0 End Target: 3	Same indicator, but improved clarity of formulation
2.	N/A		New: Areas outside protected areas brought under improved management (ha).	Baseline: 0 ha End Target: 30 ha	To indicate the impact of the Project outside conservation areas including buffer zones
3.	N/A		New: Number of coastal households with annual earnings of US\$50 or more from commercial NRM activities supported by the project.	Baseline: 0 End Target: 1,000	To indicate the economic/livelihood outcomes
4.	Revenue generation to GOK from near shore and EEZ	US\$1 million	Unchanged	US\$3.18 million	To make the target consistent with

<sup>2</sup> World Bank Mission Aide Memoire – KCDP MTR Mission, April 13 - 24, 2015



	fisheries				implementation progress
5.	Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (%).	1,000 of which female 35%	Unchanged	10,000 of which female 45%.	To make the target consistent with implementation progress

### Revised Components

14. As part of the post MTR second restructuring, project implementation was reorganized into three main components:

- Component 1: Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources:** The broad objective of this component was “to increase revenue earning potential of the GoK through sound monitoring, control and surveillance and a transparent process of licensing of foreign vessels”. The component also aimed at promoting research for value addition and overall improvement of the fisheries’ sector governance. These objectives were pursued through three key interventions/sub-components: (a) Governance and management of off-shore and coastal fisheries resources; (b) Advanced research on coastal and near shore fish stocks and technologies and value addition; and (c) Increased fish production.
- Component 2: Sound Management of Natural Resources:** The main aim of this component was “to improve the management and regeneration of natural resources and biodiversity in the coastal region and marine environment as well as provide assistance to communities in the development of eco-tourism ventures”. The component was planned to be implemented through the following five key interventions/sub-components: (a) Development of a coastal biodiversity information system; (b) Improved biodiversity management systems, guidelines and strategies; (c) Capacity building and institutional support and minor infrastructural development to improve management effectiveness; (d) Improved research and technology for extension services; and (e) Enhanced tourism and cultural heritage.
- Component 3: Building Coastal Capacity for Sustainable Natural Resource Use and Management:** Resulting from the restructuring of the original Components 3 and 4, this component aimed at “building the capacity for natural resources management” through the following five operational sub-components: (a) Integrated spatial planning and land capability; (b) Environmental governance and integrated coastal management; (c) Development of micro, small and medium enterprises Investments; (d) Capacity building; and (e) Development Fund of the Coast or “Hazina Ya Maendeleo Ya Pwani” (HMP) - providing grants to communities, including support to Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs).

### Other Changes

15. Implementation of KCDP’s Community Driven Development (CDD) activities: A significant change was required to implement activities supporting beneficiary communities. According to the original project design, the World Bank-funded Kenya Arid Lands Resources Management Project II (ALRMP II) would have been responsible for implementing the Coastal Village Fund (CVF). Specifically, the Project was to use established ALRMP II capacity, experience, implementation tools and local presence at district and community levels to identify and implement community subprojects, provide necessary training and disburse funds. Following the premature closing of the ALRMP II on December 31, 2010, the Development Fund of the Coast, or Hazina ya Maendeleo ya Pwani (HMP) formally replaced the CVF as part of the 2012 restructuring. Under the new HMP, responsibility for implementing and overseeing the overall implementation of CDD activities was given to the Kenya Marine Fisheries Research





Institute (KMFRI) - the agency responsible for implementing Component 4 and coordinating overall project implementation - in collaboration with other implementing agencies (i.e., Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI), Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), State Department of Fisheries (SDF), National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), the Department of Physical Planning (DPP), and Coast Development Authority (CDA)). This necessary change in the project's institutional arrangements also resulted in (i) the reallocation of 26 percent of funds for KMFRI to deliver this new function; (ii) establishing and equipping County Liaison Offices in each of the six coastal counties; (iii) hiring staff for each of these offices; and (iv) developing and installing a management information system to allow the handling, processing, monitoring and reporting of HMP activities. However, it is important to note that with multiple implementing agencies and continued project implementation challenges, the devolution of project management from national to county level was not considered in order to avoid further complexities in project implementation. Nevertheless, the county representation in project implementation was strengthened with regular project updates to participating county governments and integrating some of the project activities into county integrated development plans, which also strengthened the sustainability of project outcomes.

#### **Rationale for Changes and their Implication on the Original Theory of Change**

16. Changes introduced by the two major restructurings were mainly aimed at addressing the weaknesses of project design, resolving issues related to readiness for implementation, and, as part of the MTR, introduce realistic adjustments to activities and targets in light of pre-MTR performance and the limited implementation time prior to project closing. The different sub-components represented stand-alone institutional priorities rather than a coherent set of activities. As a result of this, the institutional changes introduced were critical to address the minimal integration or synergy between different components, or even sub-components. These formal changes were operationally significant and highly relevant to the final outcome of the project, but as they did not modify the overall PDO and components, implications on the envisaged theory of change pursued were minimal.



## II. OUTCOME

### A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

17. Initially, the objective of the project was well aligned with the development goals of both IDA and the GEF as well as the Kenya Vision 2030 and the Constitutional Reform approved in 2010, which aimed at narrowing long-term, deeply entrenched regional disparities and increasing the responsiveness of the government. County governments started playing the primary on-the-ground role in delivering services (in the agriculture, water, environment, urban, and health sectors), while the national government retained a policy-making, regulatory, and research role. Kenya's decentralization has been among the most rapid and ambitious processes globally, with new governance challenges and opportunities rising as the country builds a new set of county governments. In the coastal counties, KCDP played a role in supporting the initial work program of the newly created county governments relating to the fisheries sector. Furthermore, the World Bank Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2010-2013, highlighted that "sustainable growth calls for policies that address the economic, environmental and social principles of development. These policies need to be agreed and implemented on a cross-sectoral basis, with good governance and a spatial focus where possible". This was the basis of the KCDP, which promoted spatial-focused interventions to promote environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive growth, and contributed to strengthening of environmental governance both in institutions and in communities, who are engaged in promoting growth, livelihoods and value addition. In addition, fisheries continued to have a significant role in employment generation, food security, and rural development.

18. At completion, KCDP's objectives continued to be well aligned with the current CPS FY14-18, as updated during the Performance and Learning Review in 2017, whose overarching goal is sustainable reduction in poverty and increased shared prosperity. Aligned both with Kenya's Vision 2030 and its Medium-Term Plan, the CPS highlights three priority areas of engagement: (i) competitiveness and sustainability – growth to eradicate poverty; (ii) protection and potential – human resource development for shared prosperity; and (iii) building consistency and equity – delivering a devolution dividend. The project contributed to the competitiveness and sustainability pillar of the CPS through development of a more robust marine and coastal fishery economy, thereby addressing the government's growth and poverty reduction strategies. By focusing on the coastal region, the project is expected to contribute to economic prosperity, employment, and livelihood of the coastal communities, where deep-rooted poverty and inequality are still a major concern for the government.

#### Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

19. **Rating – Substantial:** The relevance of the project's PDO is rated as Substantial given that it was well aligned with the priorities of the GoK, the World Bank, and the GEF at appraisal, and revised accordingly to maintain this relevance. The PDO became even more relevant at completion, mainly as a result of its consistency with the ongoing devolution process from the central to local governments and the high priority recently given by GoK to the development of the Blue Economy.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the objective and activities of the project have been largely in line with the mandate of various implementing agencies and have been broadly aligned with the respective strategies

<sup>3</sup> Driven by a growing population and the need for sustainable growth in ocean-related economic activities, the GoK has made a strong commitment towards improving the management of its marine fisheries by developing its Blue Economy. Several relevant State Departments have been established in 2016, with the State Department for Fisheries and Blue Economy (SDF-BE) tasked to coordinate economic ocean activity and protect marine ecosystem. In addition, a new Fisheries Management and Development Act is being implemented, and the Kenya Fisheries Service (KeFS) was established as a new national fisheries agency to bolster management of the fisheries sector and lead the national coordination of blue economy development.



included in the County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) of the six coastal counties comprising the project area.

## B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

### Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

20. **Rating before restructuring – Modest.** Following the delayed project effectiveness in June 2011, the project had only been under implementation for approximately 15 months before the PDO was revised. Only 10 percent of project proceeds had been disbursed, with only limited progress towards achieving the PDO.

21. **Rating after restructuring – Substantial.** The PDO of the project has been broken down into the following specific key expected outcomes and respective indicators:

22. **PDO Outcome 1: To improve management effectiveness of Kenya's coastal and marine resources.** This outcome was expected to be achieved mainly through enhancing the capacity and functions of public institutions responsible for the management of natural resources, including Protected Areas (PAs) through the financing provided by the GEF, and by enhancing the capacity of rural micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in conducting business activities in selected coastal areas. Consistent with this, the project financed a series of interventions which contributed to the achievement of this outcome.

23. Management effectiveness of Kenya's coastal and marine resources including improved biodiversity conservation was achieved through strengthened capacity and functions of the public institutions responsible for the management of natural resources including PAs:

- a) Three highly relevant coastal areas including Kisite/Mpunguti Marine National Park (KMMNP) in Kwale County, Malindi Marine Park Reserve (MMPR), and Shimba Hills National Reserve (SHNR), were brought under effective management, as measured by the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT)<sup>4</sup> score (PDO indicator #1 – fully achieved). The support provided by GEF for the provision of infrastructure, equipment and capacity building resulted in significant improvements in the management of these areas. The METT was developed by World Bank and WWF to help track and monitor progress in the achievement of worldwide targets related to PA management effectiveness. Using this instrument, the three PAs recorded important improvements in relation to their baseline METT index (SHNR score increased from 54 to 58; KMMNP from 51 to 58; and MMPR from 52 to 56). Project activities that contributed to the improved METT score included use of night vision cameras to enhance surveillance and security, implementation of the Strategic Adaptive Management (SAM) program, implementation of community projects that supported both biodiversity conservation and community livelihoods, the development or updating of management plans, capacity building for all levels of staff, and investments in infrastructure such as the construction of a tourist-dedicated jetty for KWS in the KMMNP and a nature trail at Sheldrick Falls in SHNR. In addition, the participatory demarcation of boundaries in the KMMNP and MMPR served the objective of communicating the MPA boundaries to the wider community, thus minimizing conflicts. In SHNR, a 6-Km electric fence was established in a human/wildlife conflict hotspot. In addition, management effectiveness in three marine protected areas (Mombasa, Watamu, and Kiunga) was improved. These investments, as well as conducting

<sup>4</sup> The METT was developed by the World Bank-WWF Alliance for Forest Conservation and Sustainable Use in 1999 and adapted and used by many global and national organizations. It is a rapid assessment tool for protected area (PA) or conservation area (CA) management with three main sections: datasheets of key information, an assessment form containing a questionnaire with four potential scores for each of 30 questions including notes, justifications and steps to improve management (if necessary), and financial sustainability assessment. PA managers may use METT (or an adapted version) to plan for and report on the management effectiveness of a PA.



comprehensive biodiversity assessments (expected to feed into the Integrated Coastal Biodiversity Information Management System (ICBIMS)) and monitoring have enhanced management effectiveness in all six PAs, therefore contributing towards both the overall common GEO and PDO objective.

- b) Acknowledging that PAs in the coastal region cover only a small proportion of the areas in need of conservation actions, an additional set of interventions was introduced at MTR aimed at bringing areas outside PAs under effective management. At project closure, the management of 50 hectares of land outside of PAs was improved (PDO indicator #3 – fully achieved). Project activities contributing towards this outcome included the establishment of seed stands covering an estimated 50 hectares in several locations in Kilifi County (Gede), Lamu County (Mpeketoni and Witu), and Mombasa County (Comensum and Amani Jipange Mangrove Conservation community-based organizations). KEFRI has now taken up the cost of maintaining the seed sources (seed stands and orchards) established by the project. Project support to co-management activities has also been instrumental in achieving this outcome. Undertaken by both KMFRI (marine ecosystems) and KEFRI (terrestrial ecosystems), the process of strengthening co-management was initiated by conducting need assessments in eight community-managed areas along the coast, which resulted in the development of Co-Management Area (CMA) Plans. In addition, a pilot restoration program of seagrass and degraded coral reefs was initiated in 2014 and implemented successfully in the Wasini CMA by the local Beach Management Unit (BMU). Although the ecological or socio-economic value of these initiatives (either in terms of biodiversity conservation, fisheries productivity or tourism revenue) still has to be proven, the success in implementing this initiative can be attributed to the consistent support to the BMU, which received training on diving and coral transplanting on concrete blocks and sea grass restoration, and provision of diving and snorkeling gear. The Wasini CMA has also been demarcated with buoys and community youth received training on Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) allowing them to work collaboratively with KWS, the institution managing coastal and biodiversity resources. Improved co-management in the project area was further supported by the establishment of improved catch-related data quality and coverage, and database management associated with catch statistics on over-exploited native species, expected to include up to 15,000 new entries per year.
- c) Construction of modern facilities for KMFRI headquarters, and a Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) Center at the KeFS offices in Mombasa, which included the installation of an advanced Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), has strengthened capacity and functions of the respective institutions. Although it only became fully operational during the last year of the project, the VMS contributed towards the monitoring of the fishery which consequently increased management effectiveness. At project closing, a total of 38 vessels had been licensed, and KeFS has made it a requirement for all vessels fishing within the Kenyan EEZ to be linked to the VMS through onboard transponders, a measure expected to further increase revenue collection and to provide additional benefits, including reduction of illegal fishing, enhanced regional compliance and collaboration, and provision of scientific data for improved management of fisheries resources within the EEZ. Further strengthening of capacity and functions was achieved through the construction of the NEMA Green Point in Lamu, and the KEFRI Farmers Resource Center in Lamu.
- d) The development of a draft MCS strategy and database (with further support from WWF and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission - IOTC), and improved participation of Kenya in, and compliance with, and contribution to relevant international initiatives such as Fish-i Africa, IOTC, Fish Crime, and Interpol's Environmental Security Programs. Additionally, the project undertook a legal review and gap analysis of the legal framework of Kenya's fisheries sector. The objective of the review was to provide support for the development of regulations specific for the marine sector as well as enable adaptation and adoption of



various international fisheries-related instruments. Due to initial procurement delays, although the review was concluded, the parliamentary approval process is still pending.

- e) Capacity was further strengthened through the development of valuable knowledge-related public goods. This included marine frame surveys, Catch Assessment Surveys (CAS), the identification of stock status of key species and the subsequent development of management plans for lobster, prawns, small purse seine and aquarium species, development of co-management plans, and integrated spatial planning and land capability mapping (at regional, county and ward levels), all of which not only have contributed to improving management effectiveness and sustaining the revenue generation efforts, but also represent a solid base for consolidation and expansion of sectoral revenue, one of the main pillars of the country's decision to pursue the challenges and benefits of the Blue Economy.

24. The capacity of MSMEs was strengthened through training provided to 521 SMEs, of which 213 developed business plans, representing 107 percent in relation to the target of 200 entrepreneurs. Of the fully trained SMEs, there was almost equal gender participation, with 52 percent and 48 percent of male and female beneficiaries, respectively. Indirect beneficiaries are estimated at approximately 350,000 people accruing benefits from various training provided in a number of topics, including SMEs development, BMU organization, tourism services, Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and biodiversity assessments. Important to note that the project also supported a significant number of scholarships and internship for the coastal youth. By project end, a total of 121 young students from coastal communities had been sponsored to participate in Bachelor's and Master's Degree courses in several universities as well as certificate courses at the Kenya Forestry College (KFC) and the Kenya Wildlife Service Training Institute (KWSTI).

25. In addition, project interventions comprised a combination of capacity building (i.e., awareness creation, governance, development of business plans, business and financial management and governance, book keeping and record keeping); infrastructure for enterprise development and for community services; and support to communities in the establishment and development of socially and environmentally friendly commercial enterprises. Benefits in terms of improved livelihoods were derived from a wide range of coastal and marine income earning interventions, mainly from sale of poles (woodlots), tree seedlings, fishing and aquaculture (finfish and milkfish), seaweed farming, waste management and eco-tourism, poultry farming, and water supply, among others. The improved management effectiveness of coastal and marine resources made possible for the income earning interventions to be successful.

26. End of project assessments and beneficiary surveys suggest that most interventions have achieved the intended results and therefore contributed to the overall outcome. However, given that the bulk of activities linked to this outcome were delivered during the last three years of the project due to the initial delays, the long-term sustainability of the support provided to SMEs and BMUs may be affected by a number of factors, including overall commercial viability, limited access to markets and financing, and inadequate skills regarding business planning, financial management, and record-keeping. Should direct support to beneficiary groups had started earlier in the life of the project, KCDP could have supported market research to allow for more informed decisions regarding market demand for products and/or services; and support for market access to encourage sustainability of established enterprises.

27. *PDO Outcome 2: To enhance revenue generation of Kenya's coastal and marine resources.* The project's second PDO outcome can be seen as complementary to the first outcome, as its actions and results are mostly aimed at promoting the sustainability of the improved management effectiveness of marine and coastal resources



through enhanced revenue generation by both the public and private sectors. To achieve this, the project not only supported a number of public and private revenue-generating initiatives, but most importantly contributed to the development of a significant set of complementary tools and instruments which have undoubtedly improved the sectoral knowledge base and the potential sustainability of project interventions.

28. One of the key anticipated sources of public sector revenue was the licensing of fishing vessels in the 200-mile EEZ and from near shore fisheries development. The expected sources of revenue increase included the licensing of (i) foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ, (ii) fish exports and imports, (iii) fishing registration, (iv) local fishermen, and (v) fish processing and aquarium dealers. At closing, the project has reported a cumulative combined revenue from these sources of about US\$4.09 million - which represents an overachievement of approximately 28.5 percent in relation to the original target of US\$3.18 million, and a major increase compared to the June 2011 baseline of US\$0.68 million. This commendable achievement can be attributed to the effective implementation of a number of relevant activities, specifically undertaking regular patrols and frame surveys, which were used to enhance the licensing of vessels used in in-shore areas, and conducting awareness campaigns. The installation of the VMS indirectly supported revenue generation as a licensing condition.

29. Regarding the efforts to enhance private sector revenue generation, the project supported a series of initiatives which provided technical and financial assistance for local communities to initiate or expand commercial ventures. These included (i) support to livelihood-improving initiatives through HMP, which generated revenue equivalent to US\$660,000; (ii) the development and implementation of co-management plans for the Malindi-Ungwana Bay and the Shimoni-Vanga Area; (ii) fish landing and marketing infrastructure to several fishing communities in southern Kenya (Kibuyuni, Shimoni) and Faza in Lamu County; and (iii) development of community SMEs aquaculture projects (seaweed, artemia, tilapia and milkfish trials). Although at project closing all SME initiatives were reported as operational, the revenue generated has not been quantified, while their long-term viability will require further training and technical support, particularly regarding business management and marketing skills. In addition, the revised post MTR results framework included an indicator on the number of coastal households with annual earnings of US\$50 or more from commercial natural resource management activities supported by the project. Although the number of 642 households reached represents a shortcoming related to the target of 1000 households, the coverage and potential livelihood improvements achieved are considered significant in light of the short implementation period for this activity.

30. *GEO outcome: To strengthen conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity.* The project featured a commendable blend of PDO and GEO. Due to the particular nature of the resources comprising the project area, this complementarity allowed for environmental outcomes to become an integral part of overall project achievements. As such, through its GEO, KCDP supported the implementation of significant activities within several marine and terrestrial protected areas, promoted effective management beyond the protected areas, and most importantly developed and implemented pilot co-management schemes in the project's marine ecosystems, as described in the above assessment.

31. Overall, the project benefited a total of 73,660 people, against a target of 10,000 beneficiaries, including members of 320 Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs). The target was overachieved by 600 percent, while female beneficiaries accounted for 46 percent of the direct beneficiaries (PDO indicator #2 – fully achieved).



## C. EFFICIENCY

### Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

32. **Rating – Modest:** The analysis conducted at appraisal showed that the proposed interventions were economically and financially feasible. The potential benefits of the marine fisheries component had a Net Present Value (NPV) equivalent to US\$1.3 million (KES 98.7 million) at a discount rate of 12 percent, and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) was 31 percent. At project closure,<sup>5</sup> using the same discount rate of 12 percent and the marine fisheries component revenue flows from the monitoring and evaluation report,<sup>6</sup> the NPV was equivalent to US\$2.8 million, and the IRR 47 percent. Further, an incremental cost analysis assessed the incremental costs to justify the added value of doing GEF supported investments (US\$5 million) over the business as usual scenario and to inform the “reasonableness” of the proposed GEF financing. GEF-funded activities towards sustainable management of fisheries resources and sound management of natural resources (i.e., components 1 and 2), had an absorption rate of 88 percent at the end of the project. The borrower’s project evaluation report provides evidence that the project had significant benefits, both at global and national levels. The quantifiable benefit streams were estimated using project-based data, and as presented in the subsequent sections, the benefits outweighed the costs. The main limitation to this analysis was that there were several activities in each component whose benefit streams could not be quantified ex-ante; hence non-quantifiable benefits of these components are also discussed.

33. **Quantifiable benefits.** According to the PAD, the investments towards establishing a VMS and strengthening MCS were to improve the regime for monitoring fishing licenses in the Kenyan EEZ, with estimated revenues from increased vessel licensing of approximately US\$2.1 million (KES 159 million). By the end of the project, the revenues reports were cumulatively US\$4.09 million, which exceeded the targeted amount. The increase in revenue was largely driven by improved licensing of vessels through frame surveys, enforcement patrols, and sensitization. In addition, the HMP window aimed at supporting community-identified and implemented micro-projects, by focusing on small scale livelihood-enhancing interventions. Groups receiving grants were expected to contribute in cash and in-kind, and designed to maximize returns on the community’s input of labor, time, materials and cash. At the end of the project, a total of 151 HMP sub-projects had been financed, with an estimated US\$660,000 (KES 69 million) generated from various income-generating activities. As discussed previously, the revised results framework also measured the number of coastal households with annual earnings of US\$50 or more from commercial natural resource management activities supported by the project. Finally, the Project’s MSME objective was to assist in establishing joint ventures between communities and the private investor, in order to create a business environment that attracts more investments. The target was to identify, train and assist 200 MSME’s and further help them develop business plans. The project surpassed the target since 213 MSMEs were trained, in developing business plans. However, there were no PPPs established between the MSMEs and local banks to ensure sustainability of the projects after the KCDP. In addition, the selected projects should have been subjected to a rigorous commercial viability criterion in order to ensure sustainability and eventually attracting private investors at the end of the KCDP project.

34. **Non-quantifiable benefits.** The Project had several activities which included community capacity strengthening activities, and direct stakeholder support in extension-related activities and pilot projects, however,

<sup>5</sup> Some of the elements that were considered in the ex-post economic analysis summarized in this ICR do not necessarily represent economic benefits in a conventional sense. For example, public revenues from fishing license fees, represent transfers from private citizens to the State, and no economic benefits were generated in the process. Nevertheless, in order to maintain consistency with the ex-ante economic analysis conducted at appraisal, the ex-post analysis in this ICR used the approach and terminology as employed in the PAD.

<sup>6</sup> Y1- 0.68 m, Y2- 1.38 m; Y3-2.18m Y4-3.18m- Source: M&E report 2017



estimating the benefits of such projects ex-ante and consequently ex-poste is difficult. Non-quantifiable benefits include those resulting from improved management of natural resources and restoration of degraded marine resources. Under the KCDP, three target areas were brought under effective management: Kisite- Mpunguti in Kwale County, area under management increased from 51 to 58 percent; Malindi Marine Park in Kilifi County, area under management increased from 52 to 56 percent; and Shimba Hills in Taita Taveta County, area under management increased from 54 to 58 percent. This surpassed the average target of 55 percent in all cases by 1.8 - 5.4 percent. Even though it is difficult to estimate the benefits of MPAs, empirical evidence on the benefits of MPA<sup>7</sup> shows that on average, a 1 percent increase in MPA results in an increased growth rate of fish populations by about 1 percent, implying that protecting MPAs is a worthwhile investment. In addition, the Project carried out various capacity building activities at the government, county, and community levels, which have led to both a stronger enabling environment and increased capacity to sustainably manage coastal and marine resources.

35. ***Efficiency in design and implementation of the project.*** The project's effectiveness was delayed by one year as a result of delayed fulfillment of the project's conditions for effectiveness, and overall project implementation was slow up until MTR in 2015 (see Section III for more details). However, the project was restructured twice which were instrumental to accelerated project implementation progress and completion of project activities, particularly those associated with infrastructure. The financial absorption rate significantly increased, particularly following the cancellation of funds as part of the restructuring after the MTR in 2015. As most targets remained unchanged, the cancellation of funds contributed significantly to overall project efficiency. The absorption rate increased from 30 percent in 2015, to 88 percent in 2017, equaling US\$20.57 million in disbursements, and comparing to US\$12.17 million that had been utilized prior to MTR, during the first 4 years of project implementation. The expenditure on travel and Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) is also important in determining the level of efficiency of a project. There is no threshold for determining an optimal DSA to total expenditure ratio, however, high rates of DSA to total expenditure tend to imply signs of inefficiency. DSA as a proportion of total KCDP expenditure was approximately 30 percent, which is considered high. However, there are a couple of attributing factors that need to be recognized. First, the project covered a wide geographical area that necessitated long distance travel expenditures, and second, the project decided to utilize technical resources from the various implementing agencies rather than consultants to conduct studies, assessments, and field work, in an effort to strengthen technical capacity. By excluding DSA that can directly be associated with research activities and technical assistance provided to communities under the HMP and VMG activities, expenditures associated with DSA represent only 6 percent of total KCDP expenditures.

#### D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

36. ***Rating: Moderately Satisfactory.*** This overall outcome rating is based on the substantial relevance of the project's PDO, the substantial efficacy of project outputs in reaching its intended results, and the modest efficiency achieved by the project. The relevance of the PDO is demonstrated by the decision of GoK to pursue the upscaling and replication of KCDP interventions through an ambitious Blue Economy agenda, which will be fully supported by the World Bank's Kenya Marine Fisheries and Socioeconomic Development Project (KEMFSED) currently under its initial stages of preparation.

37. Project outputs comprised a balanced combination of capacity building, public and private infrastructure, development of valuable regulatory and knowledge-related public goods, and support to communities in the establishment or strengthening of small-scale commercial enterprises. These interventions not

<sup>7</sup> Heal, G. and Rising J. (2014). "Global Benefits of Marine Protected Areas" NBER Working Paper No. 19982





only have contributed to improving the role of government agencies and local communities in the management effectiveness and sustainable use of coastal resources, but also to improve the revenue generation of both the public sector and local communities. Although a substantial portion of these outputs were delivered in the latter part of the life of the project and therefore may not be fully verified at project closing, the initial benefits registered and the commitment of sectoral agencies and local county governments to sustain project interventions, provide adequate assurance that project outputs will further consolidate the achievement of the intended outcomes.

38. Despite disbursements of only 10 percent at the time of the Level 1 restructuring in 2012, the overall outcome rating is based on a split rating, to be consistent with OPCS Guidelines. The rating takes into account the original and formally revised targets, weighing pre- and post-revision performance by the share of actual disbursements before and after the restructuring. The second and third restructurings did not warrant a split rating. Project outputs comprised a balanced combination of capacity building, public and private infrastructure, development of valuable regulatory and knowledge-related public goods, and support to communities in the establishment or strengthening of small-scale commercial enterprises. These interventions not only have contributed to improving the role of government agencies and local communities in the management effectiveness and sustainable use of coastal resources, but also to improve the revenue generation of both the public sector and local communities. Although a substantial portion of these outputs were delivered in the latter part of the life of the project and therefore may not be fully verified at project closing, the initial benefits registered and the commitment of sectoral agencies and local county governments to sustain project interventions, provide adequate assurance that project outputs will further consolidate the achievement of the intended outcomes.

		Before Restructuring	After Restructuring
<b>Relevance of Objective</b>		Substantial	
<b>Efficacy (PDO)</b>		Modest	Substantial
<b>Efficiency</b>		Modest	
<b>1.</b>	<b>Outcome Ratings</b>	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
<b>2.</b>	<b>Numerical value of the outcome ratings</b>	3	4
<b>3.</b>	<b>Disbursement</b>	US\$3.47 million	US\$30.74
<b>4.</b>	<b>Share of Disbursement*</b>	10%	90%
<b>5.</b>	<b>Weighted Value of the Outcome Rating</b>	0.3	3.6
<b>6.</b>	<b>Final Outcome Rating</b>	Moderately Satisfactory	

\*Combined IDA Credit and GEF Grant

## E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

### Gender

39. At design, the project made reasonable and explicit consideration to inclusiveness and equity of women, youth and vulnerable groups. In this regard, the original results framework in the PAD included a trackable indicator of achievement of 35 percent of female beneficiaries within the total number of direct beneficiaries. As a result of gender pro-activeness by the PMU (evidenced by the disaggregation of relevant indicators) and subsequent support from Bank supervision, this target was fully achieved in relation to female participation in the project. Of the total direct and indirect beneficiaries, female beneficiaries accounted for 46 percent surpassing the revised target of 45 percent. Moreover, of the fully trained 213 MSMEs, there was almost equal gender



presentation with 52 percent males and 48 percent females. Gender representation was also satisfactorily achieved in the highly relevant support provided to undergraduate training on environmental and social disciplines. Specifically, of the 29 students from local communities that were awarded scholarships, 57 percent were male and 43 percent were female. In addition, representative female participation was verified in the over 200 Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs) supported by the project. There was also a strong gender balance in all training events supported by the project.

### **Institutional Strengthening**

40. Despite the project's institutional complexity, the overall capacity building efforts were mostly successful and supportive of the PDO and GEO by enhancing skill development<sup>8</sup> and providing relevant equipment to all seven participating government agencies (and to some extent to staff of the six counties, both local staff and those transferred from central ministries as part of the devolution process), and by improving the capacity of micro, small and medium sized enterprises in coastal communities.

41. As a result of the project's nature (and interventions), in addition to capacity building, collaboration and cooperation between implementing agencies has improved considerably- especially in the last three years of implementation. Besides technical capacity of staff which has been enhanced through project training, learning tours, and participation of seconded staff in the PMU agencies exhibited improved cooperation, involving component managers in management decision-making, and most importantly through the adoption of joint work planning. These were major factors contributing to improved effectiveness and efficiency in project implementation, and are expected to be institutionalized beyond the arrangements of KCDP, and further expanded to incorporate the county governments (a relative shortcoming of the project) as key players in the development of a sound Blue Economy, consistent with GoK's devolution process. Synergy and collaboration with other development agencies and projects represents a key factor towards project efficiency, sustainability, and leveraging of resources. Although the PAD did not provide any indicative framework for synergy and collaboration with other stakeholders, during implementation the PMU proactively engaged a wide range of collaborators, including universities, NGOs, bilateral partners and Government institutions.

### **Mobilizing Private Sector Financing**

42. The project supported the preparation of suitability maps for aquaculture, high value forest trees and 46 agricultural crops, creating a valuable source of information for potential private sector investors, if adequately disseminated. In addition, beneficiary communities contributed their counterpart share of 10 percent of subproject costs (of which 5 percent in cash) despite the poverty levels prevalent in the region. End of project surveys and field visits suggest that the majority of projects linked to tourism are generating acceptable levels of revenue. However, although the PMU structure included a private sector specialist, the project does not formally register any relevant output with regard to this important element of the project implementation and its subsequent sustainability. In this respect, the lack of private sector engagement (and financing) during implementation could represent a significant factor affecting the viability of productive MSMEs and community subprojects, particularly given the difficulties experienced in many cases regarding access to markets, and the financial limitations of most beneficiaries. To address this shortcoming, the project could have reached out more actively to the considerable number of microfinancing organizations operating in the coastal region.

<sup>8</sup> A comprehensive training program allowed an estimated 63 public officials selected from the implementing agencies to engage in graduate and undergraduate courses relevant to the objectives of the project.



### Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

43. Although not an explicit objective, the project included a number of interventions directly targeted to poor fishers and farmers of the coastal region as well as VMGs living in the project area, which according to end of project assessments, have generated significant livelihood improvements to beneficiary households and communities. As mentioned earlier, an estimated 73,660 poor community members benefited directly from project activities.

44. Community livelihood interventions (HMP) included training and capacity building especially in business management, and financial support through small grants to groups within local communities, which also included demand driven social welfare and local environmental management interventions. In addition to the financial support provided, direct beneficiaries earned an estimated KES 69 million (equivalent to almost US\$700,000) from various income-generating activities including aquaculture, seaweed farming, tree seedlings, woodlots (poles), eco-tourism enterprises, and crop and livestock production. Livelihood and infrastructural development for VMGs, although introduced into the project work plan only after the MTR (June 2015), was aimed at VMGs living in extreme poverty. Subprojects were successfully implemented in various sectors including social infrastructure (health and education) and livelihoods (livestock and subsistence crops).

45. Despite the late start of this safeguard-related activity, the success of the 80 subprojects benefitting over 200 marginalized communities was largely attributed to improved work planning approach (centralization of project financial budgeting, common work planning and budgeting, adoption of the RRI approach); the support by departments of public works (national and county government) in the design and supervision of civil works; the participatory approach used, whereby VMGs could prioritize their own needs; as well as the fact that the demand-driven interventions were fully consistent with their livelihood needs. In addition, other relevant county government departments (mainly health, livestock and education) were also involved in the implementation of VMG subprojects.

## III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

### A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

46. Project design closely followed the structure of other WB-funded projects in coastal areas of Africa. The PAD clearly states that “there was nothing new and untested in the design of the KCDP and its technical design and implementation management arrangements are based on similar, successful, coastal and natural resource management operations in Kenya, other countries in East and West Africa, and elsewhere”.<sup>9</sup> Inconsistent with this statement, the extensive preparation process (2006-2009) appears to have been insufficient to adequately identify and address Kenya’s particular conditions and requirements for a successful coastal development project. As a result project design and subsequent quality at entry were affected by shortcomings related to (i) limited adequacy and robustness of basic sectoral information upon which the project was conceptualized; (ii) a not clearly articulated and disseminated development model or theory of change; (iii) the intervention mix in terms of planned activities, outputs, and anticipated outcomes; (iv) the definition and clarity of indicators; (v) the realism of project

<sup>9</sup> World Bank-supported Tanzania Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project - MACEMP (P082492); World Bank-financed South West Indian Ocean Fisheries – SWIOFP (P072202); World Bank-supported Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project – LVEMP (P090680); Asian Development Bank-supported Coral Triangle Initiative in East Asia, Asian Development Bank-supported Coastal Resources Management Project in Sri Lanka)



timeline, geographical scope, institutional arrangements and implementation capacity; and (vi) the readiness for implementation, as demonstrated by the inclusion of six conditions of effectiveness.

## B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

47. Initially, the project faced a number of challenges leading to an extended period of slow implementation progress, which resulted in low achievements in relation to set targets during the first 2-3 years of the project. Main factors were:

- a) Quality at entry deficiencies, reflected in the loss of almost one full year (July 27, 2010 to June 30, 2011) since Board approval due to major, albeit foreseeable delays in the fulfilment of the various conditions for effectiveness;
- b) The premature closing of the Kenya Arid Lands Resource Management Project II (ALRMP II), designated in the PAD to implement the project's grants to communities, which delayed considerably the implementation of community support initiatives;
- c) The institutional changes caused by the Constitutional devolution process and the establishment of Counties;
- d) Delays caused by the design and processing of two comprehensive restructurings in 2012 (to address quality at entry issues), and in 2015 (following the MTR);
- e) Poor and disjointed work planning by the various implementing agencies prior to the MTR;
- f) Slow procurement, primarily due to limitations in staff capacity and low responsiveness of the procurement committee; and
- g) Factors beyond the control of the project such as insecurity in coastal areas, especially in Lamu County, and major disruptions related to the National Elections of 2012.

48. Some of the important shortcomings of project design and implementation readiness were proactively addressed through the first restructuring. Preparation of the Level 1 restructuring began as part of the first supervision mission, and was approved by the Board within 18 months of project effectiveness. The details of the restructuring are described in Section 1. The second project restructuring was the result of a comprehensive MTR, which included a detailed independent assessment of project implementation progress. This equally proactive and well-designed Level 2 restructuring addressed the technical and operational recommendations of the MTR and included a partial cancellation of US\$4.6 million, the realignment of implementation arrangements, the revision of project components and indicators, and a substantial change in the disbursement of funds, promoting the elaboration of joint workplans by the implementing agencies. A third, minor restructuring was processed to extend the closing date of the project by 8 months, to June 30, 2017.

49. In addition to the factors addressed as part of the restructurings, overall implementation and performance was consistently affected by the complexity of institutional arrangements. Although this is to a large extent a logical consequence of attempting to implement a comprehensive coastal development strategy (a major challenge common to coastal interventions), the changes empowering the PMU to take a leading role in managing project interventions proved that the negative impact of such complexity could be reduced. Furthermore, following the constitutional devolution to counties, a deeper reform of institutional arrangements could have potentially



facilitated more active engagement of the local governments located in the project area. However, the devolution was a gradual process requiring time and resources, and taking account of the project challenges at the time, the project implementation was retained at the ministry- and agency-level to avoid adding further complexities, and involvement of local governments was strengthened, especially through capacity building. Despite being essential to achieve satisfactory results, the improvements included in the project as part of the second restructuring were not timely enough to ensure sustainable implementation and consolidation of project interventions, particularly those activities supporting communities. For this to occur, more time was needed to build, and monitor results, of stronger elements of capacity building and support in three main areas: (i) market research to allow for more informed decisions by beneficiaries regarding market demand and channels for their target products and/or services; (ii) support for market access/linkages so as to facilitate sustainability of established and commercially oriented HMP and SMEs; and (iii) training on business management and access to financial resources in the case of SMEs, and to supplement capacity building and provision of startup grants in the case of HMP projects. This would have been particularly important for commercial-oriented or value addition interventions such as seaweed farming, aquaculture and eco-tourism ventures.

#### IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

##### A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

###### M&E Design

50. The PAD strongly emphasized the need to establish a robust M&E system for the project. In this regard, it stated that “a long-term M&E strategy is needed to detect project-related changes in coastal areas, identify the likely causes of these changes and the lessons learned, and recommend interim and long-term adaptive and management responses applicable to KCDP implementation and future interventions in the Coast”. Despite the identification of these critical functions, in the original results framework, a number of indicators were considered at restructuring to have weaknesses in terms of definition and interpretation. Part of the reason for the poorly defined M&E systems and indicators of achievement in the original results framework can be attributed to the failure to fully involve an M&E specialist during project preparation. The project’s M&E greatly benefited from the revised implementation arrangements where the role of the PMU was enhanced and implementation workplans were jointly prepared by the various participating institutions. In addition, following the restructuring, the project’s results framework was revised to include a total of 19 monitorable indicators of achievements, five of which were PDO level indicators and the remaining 14 were intermediate level indicators. Unlike in the case of the original design, the majority of the indicators of achievement in the revised framework were well defined, clear and fully compliant with the definitions of specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound (SMART).

###### M&E Implementation

51. The project’s M&E greatly benefited from the revised implementation arrangements, as the collection and flow of information became more timely, reliable and consistent with reporting requirements. As a result, detailed quarterly and annual reports were produced by the M&E specialist of the PMU, containing in a standardized format both the quantitative progress and qualitative assessment of each indicator of the results framework. In addition, the conclusions and recommendations of the independent MTR were greatly supported by the available M&E information, which was complemented by assessments using the Rapid Result Initiatives (RRI) methodology.



### M&E Utilization

52. Although the project M&E system effectively started in 2014 following the recruitment of a qualified M&E specialist at the PMU, M&E functions gradually improved and provided valuable information to inform decision-making by project management. As an example, an internal evaluation report in 2014/2015 indicated that business oriented sub-projects in fisheries, natural resource and HMP sub-components had no requisite business management skill training and warned that this would adversely affect the sustainability of such projects. On the basis of this, training on business development services (BDS) was introduced and offered in partnership with Strathmore Business School. As a result, almost 200 additional enterprises received training in BDS – thereby increasing the number of SMEs trained from 318 to 512. Subsequent to the MTR, the M&E system of the project became fully functional and was an effective tool to monitor project progress, inform management decisions, and support the Bank’s supervision requirements. At project closing, the quality and accurateness of the independent Borrower Completion Report was significantly enhanced by the physical and financial information provided by the M&E system, including the detailed quantification of all targets linked to the indicators of the Results Framework. Further to the project specific M&E system, it should be noted that KCDP also supported the establishment of a number of monitoring tools, ranging from the sophisticated system for monitoring of vessels fishing in the Kenya’s EEZ (the VMS) to the development of methods and protocols to conduct regular monitoring of fish species and biodiversity, for which the respective responsible agencies have committed continued support.

### Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

53. **Rating – Substantial:** Despite the initial deficiencies in terms of design of the indicators for the M&E system, the retrofitting conducted, and the significant improvement achieved in terms of implementation and utilization, made the M&E system an important tool for monitoring of project performance (i.e., physical and financial indicators) and managerial decision-making by both the PMU and World Bank supervision team. The design of the revised M&E system contained adequate indicators to monitor progress toward the PDOs and the TOC, and was implemented by the PMU using effective M&E arrangements and data collection procedures.

## B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

54. **Environmental Safeguards:** Given KCDPs predominantly environmental nature, the project was classified as a Category B for environmental risks. As such, no major issues related to environmental safeguard compliance were recorded during the life of the project. Furthermore, many project interventions were aimed at improving the management of marine and terrestrial natural resources and biodiversity of global significance. Institutionally, the project included the participation of the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) and the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), which ensured that, beyond specific implementation functions, the key environmental and biodiversity protection agencies of the country received considerable strengthening through targeted capacity building and training. Project implementation also included annual environmental and social audits aimed at improving compliance with safeguard requirements of KCDP interventions in line with the country’s Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) Cap387 and the Environmental and Social Management framework (ESMF) for the project put in place at the inception. Three audits were conducted in 2015, 2016 and 2017. The 2015 and 2017 audits covered all KCDP sub-projects while the 2016 was specifically focused on the environmental impact of woodlots.

55. **Social Safeguards:** Project preparation included a comprehensive Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF). Project implementation took into full consideration the guidelines and requirements to comply with the identified social safeguards, particularly



in relation to the selection, participation and gender balance of project beneficiaries. However, after procurement-related delays, the ESMF was revised in 2015 to improve environmental and social management of project activities and to ensure all relevant Bank safeguard policies were complied with. Similarly, due to major delays in the recruitment of the consultancy for the identification of Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs) and design of the corresponding support mechanisms for these communities, technical and financial support to VMGs was only implemented during the last two years of project implementation, thus limiting the technical support and capacity building received by VMG beneficiaries.

56. Despite this, VMG activities reached all identified marginalized communities located in remote areas of the project counties. Communities assisted by KCDP activities included the Waata, Wakifundi, Wachwaka, Wailwana, Mnyoyaya, Wasanye and Awer people through a total of 80 demand-driven subprojects. These were identified after a social assessment and an action plan was prepared jointly by VMG representatives, County and KCDP staff. A total of 11 subprojects provided social infrastructure (mainly dispensaries and educational facilities) while the 69 livelihood improvement subprojects supplied improved small ruminants, inputs for crop production, and fishing gear. Despite limited supervision due to remoteness, the independent end of project surveys conducted indicate a high level of satisfaction by VMG beneficiaries, further demonstrated by the fact that no major complaints were received through the grievance redress mechanism developed by the project (which in fact also included the establishment of grievance committees). It should be noted, that one subproject involving the rehabilitation of a pedestrian bridge in the Bombi area was approved as a VMG subproject but was not completed prior to the closing date. At the time of the ICR mission (October 2017), Kenyan authorities provided written confirmation that an additional Ksh 40 million (equivalent to US\$390,000) had been allocated by Treasury to finance the remaining works to complete the bridge, as well as strengthen sustainability aspects of the VMG subprojects.

57. **Procurement:** During the early stages of project implementation, procurement-related delays were identified as a bottleneck to overall project performance. Key factors causing delays were: limited staff capacity in the procurement unit (i.e., lack of experience in the implementation of World Bank-financed operations, lack of a fulltime procurement officer assigned to the project), limited technical capacity of implementing agencies to develop procurement documents (e.g., ToR, designs, specifications), and poor coordination by the PMU of activities undertaken by the many implementing agencies. To address these challenges, procurement functions and processes were eventually reorganized, including the strengthening of the procurement planning and administrative processes by hiring of a fulltime project procurement officer, centralized processing of procurement activities through the PMU, use of indefinite delivery contracting arrangements, and processing of contracts and contracts award through KMFRI. Enhanced procurement training and capacity building for PMU staff was also undertaken in addition to increased World Bank hand-holding support and oversight, eventually significantly improving procurement performance. Although this was only done in the early stages of 2015 as part of the MTR, significant improvements were subsequently verified in the preparation and implementation of procurement plans, especially with regards to the implementation of civil works as noted in the World Bank's Aide Memoire of November 2015. Further delays in the implementation of the procurement plan were experienced in late 2016, caused by challenges related to budget utilization. However, implementation was back on track early 2017 through improved activity coordination, better planning and enhanced procurement performance.

58. Procurement deficiencies and the delays in addressing them were undoubtedly a major contributing factor to the limited implementation progress, especially in the initial years of the project. The subsequent



backloading of critical project activities during the last two years of implementation, coupled with slow decision making, affected not only the provision of project support to communities, but also the delivery of key products and instruments, such as the biodiversity management information system, the hardware and software for fisheries monitoring, the installation of the VMS, and the consultancies for the development of SME business plans and VMG identification and interventions.

59. **Financial Management (FM):** Generally, adequate FM arrangements were maintained throughout Project implementation, resulting in ratings of S and MS throughout most of the project life. The PMU had qualified FM staff assisted by a project accountant, and each of the sub-implementing agencies had a qualified project accountant. The Project was in compliance with the World Bank's financial reporting requirements with the quarterly Intermediate Financial Reports (IFRs) and annual audited financial statements submitted to the WB within the stipulated timelines, and deemed to be in content and form acceptable to the World Bank. The internal control arrangements were also deemed to be effective. The Project had a comprehensive FM Procedures Manual and complied with Kenya's Public Financial Management (PFM) laws and regulations. Due to procurement-related delays, the Project was not able to install an accounting software at the PMU as planned in the beginning of project implementation. However, the project managed to perform its FM obligations using a manual accounting system until it procured and installed an off-the-shelf accounting software in mid-2015.

60. Concerning the results of external and internal audit procedures, no major issues were reported throughout the life of the project, although a number of minor issues were raised by auditors from the Auditor General's office in their management letters. In general, the auditor's opinions were mostly related to omissions rather than impropriety by KCDP implementing agencies, which did not result in any loss or misuse of project funds. The project experienced one case of ineligible expenditure, an amount of KES 2,736,470 (US\$ 28,000 equivalent) incurred by KWS, however, the funds were promptly refunded to the Bank by the GoK. There were no outstanding audit issues at project closure. Implementing agencies promptly responded to and addressed any FM issues flagged during WB FM supervision reviews and the GoK internal and external audit reports. For example, in 2016, inaccurate FM data and delays in preparing cashflow projections slowed down the finalization of the annual work program and budget approval. However, the PMU, together with the implementing agencies and support from the WB, promptly addressed the issues to ensure continued project implementation.

61. Disbursement of project funds was consistent with the slow implementation progress experienced initially, and remained below financial projections until the MTR. However, due to the managerial and institutional improvements introduced by the second project restructuring (as well as the cancellation of US\$4.59 million from IDA), total disbursements accelerated and at project closing (including the grace period) represented over 99 percent of both the IDA credit and the GEF grant. Specifically, at the end of the grace period, the Project had disbursed US\$29.26 million (99 percent) and US\$5 million (100 percent), of the IDA credit and GEF grant, respectively.

## C. BANK PERFORMANCE

### Quality at Entry

62. Quality at entry was a determining factor in the overall implementation, performance and outcome of the project. Regardless of the substantial relevance of the project for GoK and the World Bank, and despite the extended three-year preparation process, further supported through Japan's Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) (US\$650,000) and GEF (US\$228,000), some key elements of project design were not





adequately addressed. As described in the PAD, project design perhaps relied heavily on the World Bank's experience in other coastal development projects and did not fully adapt such experiences to the operational and institutional conditions of Kenya, in particular the weakness of the organizational, administrative and governance structure of the project. This, combined with the limited borrower ownership of project design (essential for a project with the institutional complexity of KCDP) and the equally limited progress in developing the necessary operational instruments to support implementation (M&E system, fiduciary procedures, operational manual, safeguard compliance), resulted in inadequate readiness for implementation, partly illustrated by the inclusion of a number of conditions of effectiveness in the financial agreement, which not only required almost one year to be fulfilled, but also limited the World Bank's dedication to routine supervision activities.

### Quality of Supervision

63. The World Bank provided comprehensive support to the project throughout the implementation period. A significant portion of the World Bank's supervision efforts was dedicated to the preparation and processing of the two major restructurings required by the project, which to some extent may have impacted the team's dedication to regular supervision tasks. The World Bank teams demonstrated commendable proactiveness and candor to engage the client and World Bank management in the complexity and implications of undertaking such comprehensive restructurings. Early in the life of the project, the first restructuring was focused on addressing the overall weaknesses of project design, while the second restructuring was the result of the comprehensive independent MTR promoted by the World Bank, which was aimed at incorporating substantial operational and fiduciary adjustments required to accelerate implementation and attempt to achieve the project's outcomes. Even though Kenya had started implementing its devolution process, the overall project implementation responsibilities remained at the ministry- and agency-level. The devolution transition was a gradual exercise requiring time and resources, and taking account of the project's challenges at the time, the task team adequately decided not to devolve the project management to the county-level, to avoid further complexities. Instead, county representation in project implementation was strengthened, resulting in some of the project activities having been integrated into county integrated development plans.

64. Throughout the life of the project, the World Bank conducted a total of 12 full supervision mission, which were complemented by numerous fiduciary and technical missions, the latter comprised of highly qualified specialists in key project areas such as fisheries development, biodiversity and infrastructure, which provided sound advice and guidance on implementation matters to the PMU and the respective implementing agencies. Due to security restrictions, missions were often not granted clearance to visit sensitive project sites. The World Bank's supervision efforts were led by two different Task Team Leaders (TTL), who provided a smooth transition due to a significant overlap period, including their joint participation in the MTR. Missions not only provided extensive progress reviews and assessments as well as recommendations to address key implementation challenges as documented in the Aide Memoires, but also complied in a timely manner with internal World Bank reporting requirements through the filing of issues-oriented Implementation Status and Results (ISR) Reports. In the opinion of the client, as expressed by the Directors of implementing agencies during the ICR mission, World Bank supervision was instrumental to the resolution of implementing bottlenecks and consequently the significant improvement in project performance and achievements. That notwithstanding, World Bank support could have been further enhanced by ensuring more continuity and in-country presence of supervision TTLs and teams. Activities of KCDP where the client considered that the World Bank could have provided stronger supervision support included procurement, infrastructure development, entrepreneurship and community development



### Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

65. **Rating – Moderately Satisfactory:** Based on the above assessment of the Bank throughout the different phases of the project cycle, and the outcome rating achieved, the overall rating of Bank performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory, resulting from the combined rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory for Quality at Entry and Satisfactory for Quality of Supervision.

### D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

66. Although the project did not conduct systematic and regular assessments of risks, relevant mitigation measures for pre-identified and emerging risks were adequately taken into consideration, in particular the security situation in certain project areas was appropriately reflected in revisions to project implementation plans. At project closing, the main risks to the project's development outcomes are related to the implications of the backloading of many important project activities. The late implementation of many community, SME and VMG subprojects, as well as public investments such as the VMS, increase the vulnerability of these activities. Due to this, the effective continuity and in some cases the viability of project interventions will strongly rely on Government capacity to provide adequate technical assistance (to communities) and operations and maintenance costs to ensure the functionality of public instruments supported by the project. Both risks appear to be minimized by the commitment of the government and counties to provide the necessary support beyond project closing. After project closing, the National Treasury has allocated KES 40 million (i.e., US\$380,000) towards strengthening the sustainability mechanisms of the VMG subprojects. In addition, the presence of several coastal initiatives financed by bilateral partners, and the World Bank's decision to support GOK's efforts towards developing its blue economy through the KEMFSED project are expected to reduce the above described risks and ensure the long-term impact of the project's outcomes.

### V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

67. The Implementation of KCDP has generated a series on valuable technical and operational lessons, which can be applied to coastal development projects or projects with a strong focus on community development.

- a) In countries with decentralization policies (or constitutional devolution, as in Kenya) strong and proactive involvement of local governments may require additional institutional arrangements and capacity building efforts, but it is essential to enhance local ownership, support implementation requirements, and provide commitment to the long-term sustainability of project interventions.
- b) Projects with spatial development focus especially on coastal areas to be sustainable, the design phase must assess the appropriateness of the relevant policy and regulatory framework, and if needed, incorporate support to develop improved policies and/or instruments to ensure that project investments are mainstreamed in public-sector mandates.
- c) In projects with multiple institutions and a broad stakeholder base, a sound, well designed communication strategy is not only a good practice but can be instrumental in ensuring adequate collaboration among institutions and to identify opportunities for stakeholder cooperation. The communication strategy and other communication tools (e.g., video, website) that were prepared under KCDP provided the project with a brand and identity, which served as incentives for good collaboration.
- d) An additional requirement for complex institutional projects is the establishment of an appropriate work planning and budgeting approach which includes the centralization of financial resources and budgeting



under the PMU, the adoption of joint workplans, and the active involvement of component managers in the decision-making process triggering coherence in planning, management and also enhanced teamwork among project staff. The use of joint workplans had a particularly positive impact on the collaboration of the various implementing agencies.

- e) The alternative of direct implementation by technical staff of activities such as studies, management plans or other tasks requiring considerable field work can be a cost-effective measure compared to the time-consuming process of recruiting consultants. However, such alternative may not be efficient and cost-effective, and may result in low product quality, and the risk of developing DSA dependency among public employees. Where implemented, capacity building should be identified as part of project preparation and delivered as a pre-requisite to engaging staff of implementing agencies in technical work.
- f) For projects that include seconded staff from other government ministries/agencies as part of the PMU, clear arrangements must be in place confirming that these staff are fully released from their parent institutions for the agreed period. During project implementation, PMU staff were often performing their normal duties in addition to their responsibilities under KCDP.
- g) Business-related training of prospective or newly established SMEs can be of limited effectiveness if conducted in the absence of financial support to investments, particularly when high levels of poverty predominate among SME members.
- h) Project implementation of the KCDP benefitted significantly from early restructuring. Early project restructurings can be instrumental in reverting potentially severe quality at entry limitations to achieve project objectives, including weak borrower ownership, inadequate institutional arrangements, and absence of basic implementation instruments.
- i) KCDP experience clearly indicates that strong elements of capacity building are essential to complement financial support to and MSMEs beneficiaries in (i) value addition, market research and marketing skills to facilitate informed decisions regarding the market conditions, challenges and opportunities and (ii) business management and administration skills to facilitate enterprise operation, improved financial management and access to financing.



**ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS**

**A. RESULTS INDICATORS**

**A.1 PDO Indicators**

**Objective/Outcome:** To improve management effectiveness of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of conservation areas brought under effective management (including co-management) as defined by Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) score of at least 55	Number	0.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	05-Oct-2015	30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (100%): The protected areas brought under effective management are Shimba Hills, Kisite-Mpunguti and Malindi. The METT score for the Shimba Hills increased from 54 to 57; the score for Kisite-Mpunguti increased from 51 to 57; and the score for Malindi increased from 52 to 57. The activities that have contributed to the increases in the METT score include biodiversity assessments; the use of night vision cameras to enhance security; development/review of management plans; staff training; boundary marking/fencing of protected areas, and implementation of projects that enhance conservation and community welfare. The data was collected annually.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries	Number	0.00	1000.00	10000.00	73660.00



		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	05-Oct-2015	30-Jun-2017
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	0.00	35.00	45.00	46.00
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	05-Oct-2015	30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (740%): Over 73,000 people have directly benefited from the project to date, which exceeds the end-target of 10,000. Benefits have been drawn from woodlots, tree nurseries, ICZM training, and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) training, SME capacity building, staff capacity building, HMP sub-projects, scholarships and internship for coastal students, sea seed farming, aquaculture, fin fish farming, BMU training, beach inspectors workshops, fish quality control, processing and marketing, community managed areas, tour guide training, biodiversity assessment training, school enrolment in classrooms supported by the project, and street paving users and clients of Kinondo banking hall. Approximately 46 percent of the beneficiaries are female against a target of 45 percent. In addition to the direct beneficiaries referenced here, indirect beneficiaries from HMP activities are estimated to be approximately 350,000 people. Data was collected bi-annually. The number of beneficiaries was measured by counting all individuals that have benefited directly from KCDP through grants, scholarships and training, community sub-projects, and through access to and/or use of goods and services from project financed sub-projects.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Areas outside protected areas brought under improved management	Hectare(Ha)	0.00	30.00		50.00
		05-Oct-2015	05-Oct-2015		30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (170%): The management of 50 hectares of land outside protected areas (i.e., in Gede, Mpeketoni, Witu, and Comensum and Amani) has been improved through the establishment of seed stands and rehabilitation/restoration of degraded areas, which has exceeded the end-target of 30 hectares. Data was collected annually.

**Objective/Outcome:** PDO Outcome 2: To enhance revenue generation of Kenya's coastal and marine resources.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at Completion
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				Target	
Revenue generation to GOK from near shore and EEZ fisheries	Amount(USD)	0.68	1.00	3.18	4.09
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	05-Oct-2015	30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (129%): US\$ 4.09 million in revenue has been generated from near shore and EEZ fisheries through licensing of foreign fishing vessels, fishermen licenses, fishing registration, fish processing licenses, aquarium dealer licenses and inshore water revenue collection, which exceeds the target of US\$3.19 million. Frame survey information was used to enhance the licensing of vessels used in in-shore areas. Enforcement patrols and sensitization were also carried out contributing to increase in revenue generation. The data was collected annually.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of coastal households with annual earnings of US\$50 or more from commercial NRM activities supported by the project	Number	0.00	1000.00		642.00
		05-Oct-2015	05-Oct-2015		30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target partly achieved (64%): This indicator was introduced following the mid-term restructuring in 2015. Through commercial natural resource management activities supported by the KCDP, households have earned US\$50 or more from selling sea weed, fin fish, poles, and tree seedlings, or from waste management and ecotourism. Data was collected annually.

## A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

**Component:** Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
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Number of vessels licensed to fish in the Kenyan waters with VMS installed	Number	0.00 01-Jun-2011	20.00 01-Jun-2011		44.00 30-Jun-2017
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**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (220%): The newly installed and operationalized Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) has registered six local, and 38 foreign vessels.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of species with Fishery Management plans developed	Number	0.00 01-Jun-2011	3.00 01-Jun-2011		3.00 30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (100%): Fish management plans including ring net management, lobster and aquarium Management plans were completed. The final plans were reviewed, verified by stakeholders, and distributed to stakeholders at various levels.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of key exploited species with stock status established	Number	0.00 01-Jun-2011	5.00 01-Jun-2011	3.00 21-Sep-2012	5.00 30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (166%): Selection and prioritization of key commercial species using SICA framework. For the five prioritized species (i.e., lobster, aquarium, small and medium pelagic, seganus suta, and prawns), standard operation procedures for stock assessments have been developed, and actual stock assessments have been completed including the preparation of fact sheets.


**Component:** Sound management of natural resources

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Target areas with annually updated geo-referenced biodiversity data	Hectare(Ha)	0.00	15000.00	10000.00	25000.00
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	21-Sep-2012	30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (250%): Through biodiversity assessments in protected areas (i.e., Shimba Hills Ecosystem, Kisite-Mpunguti Marine Park and Reserve and its environments) and outside protected areas (i.e., Lamu, Lake Kenyatta, Lake Jipe (Taita)), geo-referenced biodiversity data has been generated, and subsequently used to develop a coastal biodiversity information system to support the management of marine and coastal resources. The data was collected annually.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of Management Plans developed or updated	Number	0.00	3.00		4.00
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011		30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (133%): Four management plans including the Mangrove Management Plan, the Witu Forest Management Plan, the Kisite Mpunguti and Malindi Marine Management Plans, have been completed. The Mangrove Management Plan has been integrated into County Integrated Development Plans, and is being implemented by the government through the Kenya Forest Service. In addition, two conservation and management strategies have been developed for Coral Reef and Sea Grass Beds, and Sable Antelopes. The Coral Reef Strategy is currently being implemented through the Climate Change Adaptation Program, and the Sable Antelope Strategy is being implemented through the Kenya Wildlife Service and WWF. The plans were considered developed, when the process of developing the plans was commenced through KCDP, and continued throughout implementation, until the plan was accepted and endorsed by the relevant government authority.

Indicator Name	Unit of	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at
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	Measure			Target	Completion
Biodiversity management information system is developed, populated and updated annually	Yes/No	N	N		Y
		21-Sep-2011	21-Sep-2012		30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (100%): The biodiversity management information system has been developed, installed, and populated. The system is being used by stakeholders towards improving the management and conservation of the marine and coastal resources. Since the installation of the system was only completed towards the end of the project, the system has not been updated (as per the envisaged annual update).

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of successful community based interventions documented and disseminated	Number	0.00	5.00	10.00	10.00
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	21-Sep-2012	30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (100%): Ten successful community-based interventions were documented, and the associated report was disseminated to stakeholders at a workshop held in 2017. Examples of successful community-based interventions include waste management activities implemented by the Watamu Marine Association, mangrove conservation implemented by the Jimbo Environmental Group, or turtle rehabilitation implemented by the Watamu Turtle Watch.

**Component:** Building Coastal Capacity for Sustainable Natural Resource Use and Management

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of regions and wards	Number	0.00	11.00	6.00	6.00



with coastal land capability plans or maps developed		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	05-Oct-2015	30-Jun-2017
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**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (100%): Six coastal land capability plans/maps were developed including (i) the coastal region land capability mapping; (ii) county land use plans for Kilifi and Lamu; and (iii) action area plans for Pongwe Kikoneni, Bomeni, and Kipini East. In addition, 26 tree species capability mappings were completed.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of officers from lead agencies trained on ICZM & EIA (including EIA certification)	Number	0.00 01-Jun-2011	85.00 01-Jun-2011		84.00 30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (99%): Eighty-four of the targeted eighty-five officers have been trained in Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). The indicator's end-target is considered achieved.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Annual environmental and social audits for KCDP supported projects undertaken	Number	0.00 01-Jun-2011	3.00 01-Jun-2011		3.00 30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (100%): Three environmental and social audits for KCDP supported sub-projects were completed, and approved, with one of them having being on tree promotion activities.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
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Entrepreneurs identified, trained, and with business plan developed	Number	0.00	200.00		213.00
		21-Sep-2012	21-Sep-2012		30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (107%): Following substantial delays, this indicator's end-target has been achieved. 521 entrepreneurs have been trained under the KCDP, of which 213 have developed business plans. Progress and training reports documented the training.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of HMP subprojects completed or operational	Number	0.00	500.00	200.00	230.00
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011	21-Sep-2012	30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (115%): Overall, 230 HMP sub-projects were completed and are operational, including 79 sub-projects targeted at Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMGs). Progress reports and sub-project reports confirmed the outcome.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Performance monitoring reports (with progress on agreed indicators) produced on time and with satisfactory quality	Yes/No	N	Y		Y
		01-Jun-2011	01-Jun-2011		30-Jun-2017

**Comments (achievements against targets):** Target achieved (100%): M&E reports, including financial management reports, were regularly developed and submitted to assess progress and inform decision-making processes.



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Communication strategy in place	Yes/No	N 01-Jun-2011	Y 01-Jun-2011		Y 30-Jun-2017
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b> Target achieved (100%): A communication strategy for the KCDP was developed and implemented. In addition, the project developed a website and dedicated Facebook both, which have both been updated regularly. <a href="http://www.kcdp.co.ke">http://www.kcdp.co.ke</a>					



B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1 - To improve management effectiveness of Kenya’s coastal and marine resources	
Outcome Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Direct project beneficiaries</li> <li>2. Areas outside protected areas brought under improved management</li> </ol>
Intermediate Results Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of species with fishery management plans developed</li> <li>2. Number of key exploited species with stock status established</li> <li>3. Number of HMP (community) subprojects completed or operational</li> <li>4. Number of regions and wards with Coastal Capability plans or maps developed</li> </ol>
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A total of 73,660 beneficiaries received technical and financial assistance through HNP and VMG subprojects, training, and support to SMEs, of which 46% were females</li> <li>2. Management was improved in 50 has of four important sites outside of protected areas</li> <li>3. Fish management plans were developed for ring-net management, lobster and aquarium species</li> <li>4. Stock status assessments were conducted for five key species (lobster, aquarium species, pelagics, prawns, and siganus sp)</li> <li>5. The project supported a total of 231 community subprojects through the HNP (162 subprojects) and VMG (69 subprojects) schemes. Predominant HNP community subprojects included water supply (54), waste and sanitation (28), woodlots (26), and health and education facilities (25), while VMG subprojects were mostly demanded for the provision of small ruminants (61).</li> <li>6. Six land capability assessments were prepared for the entire coastal region, Kilifi and Lamu Counties, and Bomeni, Pongwe Kikoneni and Kipini areas</li> <li>7. In collaboration with county governments, adaptive research was conducted by KMFRI to improve fishing gear, including basket traps, prawn gear, and dropline.</li> <li>8. Co-management arrangements were supported for a total of 13 Beach Management Units (BMU) including four newly established and nine existing BMUs</li> <li>9. In addition to a comprehensive short-term training program for project beneficiaries, formal training on NRM management and environmental degrees was provided to a total</li> </ol>



	<p>of 183 individuals, of which 130 (mostly youth) were from coastal communities and 53 were staff from the seven project's implementing agencies</p> <p>10. Public sector performance and governance was improved through the provision of key infrastructure and equipment, including the Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Center (MCS), the development and operation of the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and the construction of expanded facilities for the KMFRI Resource Center</p>
<p><b>Objective/Outcome 2 - To enhance revenue generation of Kenya's coastal and marine resources</b></p>	
Outcome Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Revenue generation by GOK</li> <li>2. Number of coastal households with annual earnings of US\$50 or more from commercial NRM activities</li> </ol>
Intermediate Results Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of vessels licensed to fish in Kenyan waters with VMS installed</li> <li>2. Entrepreneurs identified, trained and with business plans developed</li> <li>3. Number of HMP subprojects completed</li> </ol>
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Through vessel licensing, frame surveys, patrols, port state measures and awareness campaigns, accumulated revenue collected amounted to US\$4.09 million</li> <li>2. Through commercial NR-based activities such as seaweed, milkfish, shrimp and artemia farming, wood poles and tree nurseries, a total of 642 households generated an income of at least US\$ 50.00</li> <li>3. By project closing, a total of 44 fishing vessels (38 foreign and 6 local) operating in Kenya's EEZ had been registered, licensed and monitored through the VMS</li> <li>4. The project provided training to over 500 small-scale entrepreneurs, of which 213 developed business plans</li> <li>5. The project provided financing for the implementation of 231 community subprojects, including 69 targeted at Vulnerable and Marginalized Groups (VMG)</li> <li>6. Private infrastructure for income generation through value addition was supported in Shimoni (fish banda and ice plant), Faza (ice plant) and Kibuyuni (fish banda), as well as 39 community ponds for various aquaculture ventures, and facilities for seaweed harvesting and processing</li> <li>7. Suitability Maps were prepared for 26 tree species adapted to coastal conditions,</li> </ol>



	expected to be valuable tools for County government planning and commercial feasibility assessments by private investors
<b>Objective/Outcome 3 - To strengthen conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biodiversity</b>	
Outcome Indicators	1. Number of Protected Areas brought under effective management
Intermediate Results Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Target areas with annually updated geo-referenced biodiversity data</li> <li>2. Number of Management Plans developed or updated</li> <li>3. Biodiversity Management information system is developed, populated, and updated annually</li> </ol>
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 3)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Through the provision of infrastructure and equipment, three Protected Areas (Kisite-Mpunguti, Malindi, and Shimba Hills) were supported to improve overall management performance, as verified by the higher individual METT score achieved</li> <li>2. Biodiversity assessments were conducted for a total of 25,000 ha. Including the Kisite Mpunguti and Shimba Hills protected areas, as well as biodiversity relevant areas in Lamu, Lake Kenyatta and Lake Jipe</li> <li>3. The project supported the preparation or updating of four Management Plans, including the Mangrove Management Plan for the entire coastal area, and the plans for Kisite-Mpunguti, Malindi and Witu Forest</li> <li>4. Conservation and management strategies were prepared for Coral Reef and Seagrass Beds, for turtles and for Sable Antelopes</li> <li>5. A Biodiversity Information System for the coastal region was developed and installed</li> <li>6. Relevant biodiversity conservation infrastructure supported by the project included the Sheldrick Falls nature trail and the Lukore fence at Shimba Hills, the Shimoni jetty at Kisite-Mpunguti Marine Area, and boundary demarcation buoys in five priority sites</li> </ol>

**ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION**
**A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS**

Name	Role
<b>Preparation</b>	
William Leeds Lane	Senior Environmental Specialist (former TTL)
Xavier Vincent	Senior Fisheries Specialist
Nyambura Gihagui	Senior Social Development Specialist
Henry Amena Amuguni	Financial Management Specialist
Dahir Elmi Warsame	Senior Procurement Specialist
Joel Munyori	Procurement Specialist
Luis M. Schwarz	Senior Finance Officer
Christiaan Johannes Nieuwoudt	Financial Analyst
Maria Elizabeth Carneiro	Finance Assistant
Clemencia R. Onesty	Portfolio Officer
Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza	Senior Counsel
Stephen Mukaindo	Counsel
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>	
Dinesh Aryal, Veruschka Schmidt	Task Team Leader(s)
Ann Jeannette Glauber	Lead Environmental Specialist (former TTL)
Anna Corsi	Senior Land Administration Specialist
Maria Paulina Mogollon	Senior Private Sector Development Specialist
Joel Buku Munyori, Tesfaye Ayele	Senior Procurement Specialist(s)
Henry Amena Amuguni	Senior Financial Management Specialist
Gibwa A. Kajubi	Senior Social Safeguards Specialist
Johanna Michaela Weber	Private Sector Specialist
Tobias Von Platen-Hallermund	Environmental Safeguards Specialist (Consultant)
Agnes Yvonne Mkamaghanga Masaka	Team Member
Lilian Wambui Kahindo	Social Safeguards Specialist



David Japp	Fisheries Specialist (FAO)
Jason Rubens	Community Fisheries Specialist (FAO)
Jo Sciortino	Infrastructure Specialist (FAO)
Michael Carroll	ICR Main Author

## B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Preparation</b>		
FY06	7.513	48,622.03
FY07	4.925	27,578.03
FY08	17.447	100,956.55
FY09	11.318	80,751.81
FY10	25.126	198,220.69
FY11	0	- 0.54
<b>Total</b>	<b>66.33</b>	<b>456,128.57</b>
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
FY11	15.781	80,422.43
FY12	31.680	124,213.90
FY13	30.500	122,256.11
FY14	20.683	108,683.15
FY15	27.391	161,116.29
FY16	24.301	129,729.78
FY17	24.625	156,997.96
FY18	8.913	70,094.67
<b>Total</b>	<b>183.87</b>	<b>953,514.29</b>



## ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
1. Sustainable Management of Fisheries Resources	7.41	8.56	115
2. Sound Management of Natural Resources	9.05	6.93	77
3. Building Coastal Capacity for Sustainable Natural Resource Use and Management	20.64	18.72	91
4. Removed/merged with component 3.	2.90	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>40.00</b>	<b>34.21</b>	<b>86</b>



#### ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

**Background and limitations of Analysis.** The analysis conducted at appraisal showed that the proposed interventions were economically and financially feasible. The potential benefits of the marine fisheries component had a Net Present Value (NPV) equivalent to US\$1.3 million (KES 98.7 million) at a discount rate of 12 percent, and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) was 31 percent. At project closure,<sup>10</sup> using the same discount rate of 12 percent and the project revenue flows from the monitoring and evaluation report,<sup>11</sup> the NPV was equivalent to US\$2.8 million, and the IRR 47 percent. Further, an incremental cost analysis assessed the incremental costs that would be eligible for GEF financing (US\$5 million). GEF-funded activities towards sustainable management of fisheries resources and sound management of natural resources (i.e., components 1 and 2), had an absorption rate of 88 percent at the end of the project. The borrower's project evaluation report provides evidence that the project had significant benefits. The quantifiable benefit streams were estimated using project-based data, and as presented in the subsequent sections, the benefits outweighed the costs. The main limitation to this analysis was that there were several activities in each component whose benefit streams could not be quantified ex-ante; hence non-quantifiable benefits of these components are also discussed.

**Quantifiable benefits from the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Fisheries Development.** According to the PAD, the investments towards establishing a VMS and strengthening MCS were to improve the regime for monitoring fishing licenses in the Kenyan EEZ. The 'without project scenario' estimated that revenues from EEZ and fisheries development would be US\$ 0.8 million (KES 61.8 million), this amount was approximately 11 percent lower than the historical average for the period 2000-2008. In the 'with project scenario' there would be a more efficient system with increasing number of licenses, improved MCS and more offshore patrols and joint offshore patrols including interlinking the Vessel Monitoring, consequently increasing the license fees resulting in total revenues increasing to approximately US\$2.1 million (KES 159 million). The project had a NPV at a 12 percent rate of US\$1.3 million (KES 98.7 million) and internal IRR of 31 percent, making it a viable project. By the end of the project, the revenues reports were cumulatively US\$4.09 million, which exceeded the targeted amount. Using the same discount rate of 12 percent and the project revenue flows from the monitoring and evaluation report, the NPV was equivalent to US\$2.8 million, and the IRR is 47 percent. The increase in revenue was largely driven by improved licensing of vessels through frame surveys, enforcement patrols, and sensitization.

**Quantifiable benefits from improved livelihoods.** The HMP (Hazina ya Maendeleo ya Pwani) window aimed at supporting community-identified and implemented micro-projects, by focusing on small scale livelihood-enhancing interventions. Groups receiving grants were expected to contribute in cash and in-kind, and designed to maximize returns on the community's input of labor, time, materials and cash. At the end of the project, a total of 151 HMP sub-projects had been financed, with an estimated US\$660,000 (KES 69 million) generated from various income-

<sup>10</sup> Some of the elements that were considered in the ex-post economic analysis summarized in this ICR do not necessarily represent economic benefits in a conventional sense. For example, public revenues from fishing license fees, represent transfers from private citizens to the State, and no economic benefits were generated in the process. Nevertheless, in order to maintain consistency with the ex-ante economic analysis conducted at appraisal, the ex-post analysis in this ICR used the approach and terminology as employed in the PAD.

<sup>11</sup> Y1- 0.68 m, Y2- 1.38 m; Y3-2.18m Y4-3.18m- Source: M&E report 2017



generating activities. Some of the income sources included: the sale of seaweed estimated at a cumulative total of KES 1.3 million; sale of fin fish estimated at a cumulative total of KES 157,000; sale of Casuarina tree poles (woodlots) estimated at a cumulative total of KES 4.6 million; sale of tree seedlings estimated at a cumulative total of KES 4.5 million; earnings from waste management ventures estimated at a cumulative total of KES 640,000; earnings from eco-tourism related enterprises estimated at a cumulative total of KES 650,000, and additional earnings from improved quality of marine fish estimated at a cumulative total KES 5.7 million. The revision of the results framework following the MTR included an indicator targeting the number of coastal households with annual earnings of US\$50 or more from commercial natural resource management activities supported by the project. The target number of households was 1000, of which 642 households were eventually reached by the end of the project (approximately 64 percent).

**Micro-credit Access and Sustainability of MSMEs.** The MSME investments' objective was to assist in establishing joint ventures between the community and the private investor, in order to create a business environment that attracts more investments. The target was to identify, train and assist 200 MSME's and further help them develop business plans. The project surpassed the target since 213 MSMEs were trained, in developing business plans. However, there were no PPPs established between the MSMEs and local banks to ensure sustainability of the projects after the KCDP. In addition, the selected projects should have been subjected to a rigorous commercial viability criterion in order to ensure sustainability and eventually attracting private investors at the end of the KCDP project.

**Non-quantifiable benefits.** The Project included community capacity strengthening activities, and direct stakeholder support in extension-related activities and pilot projects, however, estimating the benefits of such projects ex-ante are difficult. Non-quantifiable benefits include those resulting from improved management of natural resources and restoration of degraded marine resources. Under the KCDP, three target areas were brought under effective management: Kisite- Mpunguti in Kwale County, area under management increased from 51 to 58 percent; Malindi Marine Park in Kilifi County, area under management increased from 52 to 56 percent; and Shimba Hills in Taita Taveta County, area under management increased from 54 to 58 percent. This surpassed the average target of 55 percent in all cases by 1.8 - 5.4 percent. Even though it is difficult to estimate the benefits of MPAs, empirical evidence shows that on average, a 1 percent increase in MPA results in an increased growth rate of fish populations by about 1 percent, suggesting that protecting MPAs is a worthwhile investment. In addition, the Project carried out various capacity building activities at the government, county, and community level, which have led to increased capacity to sustainably manage coastal and marine resources.

**Design and implementation of the project:** The project's effectiveness was delayed by one year as a result of delayed fulfillment of the project's conditions for effectiveness, and overall project implementation was slow up until MTR in 2015 (see Section III for more details). However, several project restructurings targeted at simplifying and modifying the results framework, and extending the overall project life time, allowed for accelerated project implementation progress and completion of project activities, particularly those associated with infrastructure. The financial absorption rate significantly increased, particularly following the restructuring after the MTR in 2015. The absorption rate increased from 30 percent in 2015, to 88 percent in 2017, equaling US\$20.57 million in disbursements, and comparing to US\$12,17 that had been utilized prior to MTR, during the first 4 years of project implementation.

The expenditure on travel and Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) is also important in determining the level of efficiency of a project. There is no threshold for determining an optimal DSA to total expenditure ratio, however, high rates of DSA to total expenditure tend to imply signs of inefficiency. DSA as a proportion of total KCDP expenditure



was approximately 30 percent, which is considered high. However, there are a couple of attributing factors that need to be recognized. First, the project covered a wide geographical area that necessitated long distance travel expenditures, and second, the project decided to utilize technical resources from the various implementing agencies rather than consultants to conduct studies, assessments, and field work, in an effort to strengthen technical capacity. By excluding DSA that can directly be associated with research activities and technical assistance provided to communities under the HMP and VMG activities, expenditures associated with DSA represent only 6 percent of total KCDP expenditures.



## ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

## REPUBLIC OF KENYA



**MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, LIVESTOCK AND FISHERIES  
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR FISHERIES AND THE BLUE ECONOMY  
OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY**

Email: [psfisheries@kilimo.go.ke](mailto:psfisheries@kilimo.go.ke)  
Telephone: 2718870

KILIMO HOUSE  
CATHEDRAL ROAD  
P.O. Box 58187/00200  
NAIROBI

When replying please quote;

Ref. MOALF/SDF/FF/4A

19<sup>th</sup> December, 2017

**Verushaka Schmidt**  
Task Team Leader for KCDP  
World Bank  
**DAR-ES-SALAAM**

Dear *Veru,*

**KENYA COASTAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (KCDP): COMMENTS ON  
THE IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS (ICR) REPORT**

The above subject refers.

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of the Implementation Completion and Results Report for the Kenya Coastal Development Project (KCDP).

The KCDP teams have reviewed the report and made comments in the document for your consideration.

Further to this, our substantive input on the report includes the following:

1. **Review of the PDO indicators:** There is need to review the indicators to ensure compliance with the agreements made during the 2012 and 2015 restructuring of KCDP. To support this the extracts of the restructuring paper for 2012 and the Aide Memoire of April 2015 have been annexed to this letter for your review and adjustment of this section of the report.



2. **In – kind Contribution of the Government of Kenya**: It is important to reflect the contribution of the Government of Kenya through staff time and contributions made to the project and this is annexed for your consideration.

Overall, the report provides a good assessment of the project status and we look forward to the follow on work in support of the Blue Economy Sector.

Thank you.

Yours *Sincerely,*

**Prof. Micheni Japhet Ntiba, CBS**  
**PRINCIPAL SECRETARY**

Encl.

**Copy to:**

**Dr. Kamau Thugge, CBS**  
Principal Secretary  
National Treasury  
**NAIROBI**



No.	Contribution Cost for 7 years (Kshs)	Unit of costing	KEFRI	KMFRI	KWS	NEMA	CDA	SDF	DPP
6.	Quality seedlings from KEFRI research nurseries in Kitui, Kibwezi, Maseno and Gede for establishment of seed sources	Number of seedlings	3,555,555						
7.	Regular internal auditing for compliance	Travel expenses	7,462,000	10,000,000	1,400,000		500,000		
8.	Attendance of both Technical Implementation and Project Steering Committee meetings and monitoring visits	Percentage time spend on project work	700,000		840,000			3,661,710	2,327,940
<b>Total in kind contribution</b>			<b>67,355,555</b>	<b>234,434,725</b>	<b>97,236,200</b>	<b>24,552,000</b>	<b>53,425,600</b>	<b>83,843,328</b>	<b>27,116,474</b>

**TOTAL APPROXIMATE IN-KIND CONTRIBUTION = KSH. 582,963,882 IE USD 5,829,639**





#### **Annex 104**

“Developing sustainable fisheries and healthy oceans for food and nutrition security”,  
*UN FAO*, 27 July 2015, available at: <http://www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/en/c/318147/> (last accessed: 21 December 2020)


[English](#)

## FAO Regional Office for Africa

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### Developing sustainable fisheries and healthy oceans for food and nutrition security

The Government of Kenya and FAO launch the Blue Growth Initiative in Kenya



Fishermen using special fishing nets provided by FAO on Lake Victoria: (Photo: ©FAO/Ami Vitale)

**27<sup>th</sup> July 2015**, Mombasa - *Kenya*: The Government of Kenya and FAO have launched the Blue Growth Initiative (BGI) to benefit select areas in the coastal region of Kenya. BGI is a FAO flagship initiative promoting more productive, sustainable and socioeconomically responsible fisheries, and aquaculture sectors.

The launch was held in Mombasa, Kenya, led by the acting Cabinet Secretary for Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Mr. Adan Mohamed and FAO Representative in Kenya Dr. Luca Alinovi. In attendance was county leadership from Kilifi, Kwale, Mombasa and TanaRiver counties.

In his opening remarks, the acting Cabinet Secretary for Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Mr. Mohamed Adan noted that sustainability of fish supply in our waters requires concerted attention.

'Improvements targeted across the various aspects of fisheries management, as well as regulatory barriers, difficulty in accessing funding, fragmented research and development, and poor access to markets need to be addressed. Particular attention may be given to empowering the small/rural or artisanal fishermen and fish farmers who contribute consistently to the seafood supply chain, but do not have the capacity to optimize their farming or fish catch,' he noted.

The inland aquaculture sector continues to grow, but mariculture is lagging behind. While most of the current aquaculture production is based in freshwater fish farming, there exists a lot of potential in mariculture (aquaculture in coastal and marine environments) on the extensive Kenya coast.

'We can sustainability develop mariculture through improving the governance and management of the aquatic eco-systems, conservation of biodiversity and habitats and most importantly, empower vulnerable communities engaged in small-scale production to act as resource users and stewards' noted Dr. Alinovi.

#### Implementing BGI through the Ecosystem Approach to Aquaculture (EAA) in Kenya

The EAA is best implemented within a national aquaculture policy with a regulatory framework that promotes the growth of a healthy and competitive aquaculture sector while providing protections from threats such as disease spread, pollution and environmental degradation.

Mr. Mohamed reiterated Kenya's commitment to developing fisheries in Kenya. 'I wish to stress that my ministry is committed to making the fisheries sector one of the key pillars of economic growth in Kenya' he said. 'It is therefore my strong belief that the modest initiative my ministry is starting with FAO and other developing partners through these projects today will culminate in opportunities for major investments, additional livelihoods for the coastal communities and overall well-being for the Kenyan people as envisaged in Kenya's development Blue Print Vision 2030'.

In collaboration with the Government of Kenya, FAO has developed two projects worth a total of USD 1 million from the BGI, namely 'In Support of Food Security and Nutrition, Poverty Alleviation and Healthy Oceans' and 'In support of implementation of mariculture in Kenya within an ecosystems approach'. Both projects aim to increase knowledge of water basin to coral reef ecosystem services supporting food, nutrition and livelihood security so as to guide and improve investment in sustainable coastal mariculture. This includes a better integration of the sector into other activities in the coastal zones so as to increase understanding in conserving and improving coastal ecosystem services.

#### Elaborating the Ecosystem Approach to Aquaculture

The BGI is designed around capture fisheries, sustainable aquaculture, livelihoods and food systems, and economic growth from aquatic eco-system services. It is also bringing support and more attention to enhance the implementation of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries and Aquaculture (EAF/EAA).

The launch is to be followed by a five day training workshop on implementing the Ecosystem Approach to Aquaculture (EAA). The EAA strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking account of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems including their interactions, flows and processes and applying an integrated approach within ecologically and operationally meaningful boundaries.

The general objective of the workshop is to inform and train managers, developers, farmers and other relevant stakeholders on the EAA and how to develop EAA management plans for mariculture areas in Kenya that incorporate other users of the coastal zones.

The workshop will produce better informed stakeholders on the EAA and its potential for aquaculture management at local and national level, and improved understanding of aquaculture for stakeholders outside the agricultural sector. It is expected that one or more draft management plans for piloting in selected aquaculture management areas and recommendations for the national aquaculture strategy in the context of EAA will be realized.

**Related Links:**

- [The EAA Approach \(FAO Site\)](#)
- [The Blue Growth Initiative \(FAO Site\)](#)
- [State of the World's Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014 \(FAO Report\)](#)
- [FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries](#)

Contact:

Email: [judith.mulinge@fao.org](mailto:judith.mulinge@fao.org)

### **Annex 105**

“Silk Roads Programme: Kiunga”, *UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, available at: <https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/silk-road-themes/biosphere-reserve/kiunga> (last accessed: 21 December 2020)

## Kiunga


Kiunga Biosphere Reserve is located on the northernmost part of Kenya's coast, about 16 km south of the Somali border. On the coastal strip, there are sandy beaches with sand dunes and dry coastal shrubby forest. The coast consists of parallel lines of old and living reefs with one line situated 1,6-16 km offshore forming a chain of about 50 calcareous islands composed of coral and organic debris. In-between the islands and the coast, there are sheltered and calm water habitats. The biosphere reserve is important for nesting seabirds, green turtles (*Chelonia mydas*) and dugongs (*Dugong dugon*) and hosts relatively pristine mangroves.

Within the marine reserve, only traditional fishing with approved methods is permitted. Human impacts on the environment derive from the collection of corals and shells, used in burning for lime. Poaching of green turtles and dugongs has also been reported.

The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) are collaborating to enhance the management of the Kiunga Marine Reserve since 1996. Focus is on the conservation of the outstanding biodiversity, natural resources and ecology of the area through consensus-based management with the full participation of local communities. Research and monitoring is carried out on the status of coral reefs, their threats such as fishing, shell collecting, sedimentation, and pollution in the Kenyan marine reserves. [Read more about this reserve on the UNESCO Biosphere Reserves website.](#)

© Profile picture: Walter Deshler

### The Silk Roads on the Map



## Country profile



[Kenya](#)

**Capital:** Nairobi

**Region:** Africa

## Related Information

**Route:** Maritime

**Local contacts:**

Kiunga Marine National Reserve,  
Lamu District - P.O. Box 82,  
Kiunga,  
Kenya.

Email: [kws@kws.org](mailto:kws@kws.org)

Website: <http://www.kws.org/>

**Site Type:** Biosphere reserves

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**Annex 106**

“UK-based Soma Oil & Gas talks about its plans in Somalia”, *How we made it in Africa*,

26 August 2013



# HOW WE MADE IT IN AFRICA

AFRICA BUSINESS INSIGHT

KATE DOUGLAS, 26 AUGUST 2013

## UK-based Soma Oil & Gas talks about its plans in Somalia



Soma Oil & Gas, a UK-based company established to survey and explore oil and gas potential in Somalia, is the first to sign an oil deal with the new Somali government. The East African country has suffered from years of political unrest and violence since a civil war broke out in 1991, but saw the formation of an internationally recognised government with the inauguration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in September last year.

Soma, which was only established this year, is headed by chairman Michael Howard, a former Conservative Party leader who has held various cabinet positions in British government, and CEO Robert Sheppard, an ex-BP executive with over 40 years' experience in the **energy** sector.

According to Sheppard, **Somalia's** oil and gas potential is relatively under-explored, and with recent discoveries in East African countries such as **Tanzania** and **Kenya**, Soma is reportedly investing over US\$20m in exploring Somalia's **oil and gas** potential. In addition, Sheppard told *How we made it in Africa* that the company believes Somalia is beginning to move in a positive direction under its new central government.

“There are green shoots of economic development, there are green shoots of stability, and we combine that with the exploration prospectively and for a first-mover... to fill that space very quickly I think is to Soma's advantage.”

Despite this optimism, Somalia is still affected by conflict. Aid agency Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) recently **announced** it would be pulling out of Somalia. According to Unni Karunakara, the agency's international president, the organisation could no longer put up with the attacks it was experiencing such as looting, kidnapping and murder.

Sheppard said the global oil and gas exploration industry has a high risk profile, and the additional risks that come with working in a country with a history of conflict are diminishing in Somalia.

“They have a central government that is working very hard to stabilise the country. There is a lot of international support for that stabilisation. So we think those risks are being diminished.”

He added that Soma's activities will be primarily devoted to offshore surveying and exploration. “That gives us more control over the environment and then diminishes the risk in that sense.”

### Collecting data

According to Soma, the agreement with the Somali government will allow the company to conduct seismic surveying in specific areas in Somalia's territorial waters and in limited onshore areas. In addition, the company will also collect and reprocess historic seismic data and provide the government with an evaluation of the country's petroleum potential.

“We have agreed to collate and collect the existing geologic and geophysical data that may be out there, because much of that data was lost as a result of the conflict,” said Sheppard. “We are trying to reconstruct that information from other sources and put it in a modern digital format and give that to the government.”

In return, Soma will be able to get an application to nominate and obtain exploration and drilling rights for reportedly up to 12 oil blocks.

“That agreement is a bit unique and in consideration of that we have been given the opportunity to get an application for some production sharing agreement areas, under the petroleum law of 2008... where we can take the exploration activity to the next phase,” said Sheppard.

Prior to the civil war, a number of major oil companies including Shell and Total had claimed and signed deals for oil blocks, and according to statements by Soma, the company will not impinge on these areas.

Concerns have been raised over Soma being picked for such a deal over more experienced oil players. The East African Energy Forum, a lobby group which seemingly aims to protect the natural resources and sovereignty of Somalia, has **accused** Soma's deal of not being transparent. In addition, it has questioned Soma's capacity and capability, considering that the company is only a few months old.

"I'm not sure what their concerns are," Sheppard responded. "The transparency issues are pretty clear. We've got an open arrangement."

While Sheppard admitted that he cannot comment on the business potential in other sectors, he said the country is beginning to rebuild itself and there is the opportunity to benefit from being a first-mover in the country. He said foreign businesses should contact the appropriate ministry in Somalia when looking to enter the country, and engage with government in a straightforward manner.

"[The Somali government] is new, I will grant you that, but I think there is help from international agencies and others that have tried to put together a government system that is quite similar in nature to other countries," he said.

**Annex 107**

“Total renforce son exploration au Kenya avec la prise du permis d’exploration offshore  
L22, situé dans le Bassin de Lamu”, *Total*, 27 June 2012

Accueil > [Total renforce son exploration au Kenya avec la prise du permis d'exploration offshore L22, situé dans le bassin de Lamu](#)

## TOTAL RENFORCE SON EXPLORATION AU KENYA AVEC LA PRISE DU PERMIS D'EXPLORATION OFFSHORE L22, SITUÉ DANS LE BASSIN DE LAMU

27/06/2012  **Actualités**

**Paris, le 27 Juin 2012** : Total annonce la signature d'un contrat de partage de production sur le bloc L22 avec les autorités kényanes, sur lequel il détiendra une participation de 100% et le rôle d'opérateur.

Ce permis d'exploration offshore se trouve au large de l'archipel de Lamu et s'étend sur une superficie de plus de 10 000 kilomètres carrés, avec des profondeurs d'eau entre 2 000 et 3 500 mètres. Le programme d'exploration prévoit, dans une première phase, une campagne d'acquisition de sismique 3D.

A la suite de cette signature, Jacques Marraud des Grottes, directeur Afrique de la branche Exploration-Production de Total a déclaré : « *Cette opération s'inscrit dans la stratégie d'ancrage de Total en Afrique de l'Est dans des nouveaux bassins aux thématiques d'exploration prometteuses en s'appuyant sur l'expertise mondialement reconnue du Groupe dans l'offshore profond* ».

### Total au Kenya

Le Kenya est l'une des plus anciennes implantations de Total en Afrique. Le Groupe y est présent depuis 1955 à travers sa filiale Total Kenya dont le siège social est à Nairobi. Cette filiale est cotée à la bourse de Nairobi et compte 385 collaborateurs.

Total Kenya couvre l'ensemble des activités de distribution de produits pétroliers, avec notamment un réseau de 167 stations, des activités de commerce général, lubrifiants, GPL et aviation. Total Kenya est leader de ce marché depuis la reprise des activités de Chevron en 2009.

Total est présent depuis 2011 dans l'exploration-production et détient 40% des permis d'exploration L5, L7, L11a, L11b et L12 du bassin de Lamu, opérés par Anadarko, sur lesquels un puits d'exploration doit démarrer en 2012.

Contact pour toute information concernant ce communiqué :

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
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**Annex 108**

“Somalia signs Shell-ExxonMobil E&P roadmap”, *Petroleum Economist*, 3 March 2020



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**Craig Guthrie**3 March 2020

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## Somalia signs Shell-ExxonMobil E&P roadmap

Agreement with joint venture explorer boosts Somalia's post-conflict effort to attract IOCs to its long-delayed licensing round

Somalia reached an agreement with a Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture on 24 February that covers future exploration of offshore oil and gas blocks, according to the East African country's Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.

The agreement enables historic concessions held by the decades-old Shell-Exxon joint venture to be converted to a new model production-sharing agreement (PSA), which was published earlier this month following the ratification on 8 February of the country's first Petroleum Law.

“I am delighted we have agreed an initial roadmap with the Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture,” petroleum minister Abdirashid Mohamed Ahmed wrote in a statement. “This gives us confidence in [our] ability to further explore any offshore hydrocarbon potential.”

The Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture made a \$1.7mn payment to Somalia last October as retrospective rent for five blocks it was awarded three decades ago under former president Mohamed Siad Barre—the blocks were never accessed due to the vicious civil conflicts that erupted following Barre’s overthrow in 1991.

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“I am delighted we have agreed an initial roadmap with the Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture”  
Ahmed, Somalia Ministry of Petroleum

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“We have a long relationship with the Shell-ExxonMobil joint venture and look forward to this continuing as we seek to provide the building blocks we need to grow our economy,” says Ahmed.

Norwegian seismic data survey company TGS has estimated potentially 30bn bl of oil lies in the 15 shallow and deepwater blocks on offer in a long-delayed licensing round that the country hopes to launch this year.

Officials are yet to advise a new timeframe for the round, which was postponed last year due to a maritime dispute with neighbouring Kenya. It covers approximately 75,000 km<sup>2</sup> and It is backed by over 40,000km<sup>2</sup> of seismic data.

A Shell spokesman told *Petroleum Economist* by email: “Shell EP Somalia and Mobil Exploration Somalia hold exclusive petroleum exploration and production rights over five offshore blocks in Somalia (M3/4/5/6/7) under a Concession Agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia which has been under force majeure since 1990.

“We have an ongoing and constructive dialogue with the Somali authorities about a roadmap potentially to convert the existing concession to a production sharing agreement, in line with the new Petroleum Law which is coming into effect. We continue to monitor the security and operating environment in and surrounding Somalia.”



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
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**Annex 109**

“Somalia PM thanks Kenya for solid support”, *Capital News*, 13 June 2012




The Somali PM was speaking on Wednesday at State House Nairobi/FILE

KENYA

# Somalia PM Thanks Kenya For Solid Support

By CAPITAL REPORTER  
Published June 13, 2021



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The Somali PM was speaking on Wednesday at State House Nairobi/FILE

NAIROBI, Kenya, Jun 13 – Somalia Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali has thanked Kenya for its unwavering support to the war-torn nation.

Acknowledging the role Kenya has continued to play towards the restoration of peace in Somalia, the prime minister expressed optimism that his country was on the right path towards stability.

Ali particularly welcomed the recent signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Kenya and the Commission of the African Union

for the Kenya Defence Forces to formally join AMISOM, saying the move will go a long way towards rooting out negative forces in Somalia.

The Somali PM was speaking on Wednesday at State House Nairobi when he paid a courtesy call on President Mwai Kibaki to brief him on the roadmap towards ending of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia which will pave way for the election of an all-inclusive national government.

Speaking during the meeting, President Mwai Kibaki reiterated Kenya's desire for the people of Somalia to take charge of the ongoing peace initiatives and move the country forward.

The president emphasised the need for Somalia to strengthen state institutions including the national army, police and Judiciary to steer the reconstruction process.

President Kibaki and the Somali Prime Minister also discussed the plight of Somali refugees where the president encouraged the Somali government to galvanise international support to resettle the refugees in secured regions back in Somalia.

"We believe that the best place for the Somali refugees is in the regions that have been liberated back in their native country," President Kibaki said.

The president commended the significant progress made by AMISOM in collaboration with the TFG forces, in securing large swathes of South Central Somalia from Al Shabaab and urged the Somali leadership to take advantage of this development to consolidate its authority in the region.

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"This will encourage the voluntary return of refugees and other migrants to Somalia," the President said.

President Kibaki, once again, reaffirmed Kenya's continued support to the people of Somalia particularly with regard to human and institutional capacity building.

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Present during the meeting were acting Head Public Service and Secretary to the Cabinet Francis Kimemia and Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi among other senior government officials.

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**Kenya**  
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**Confirmed Cases**  
70,804

**New Cases**  
559

**Total Deaths**  
1,287

**New Deaths**  
18

**Total Recovered**  
46,244

**Active Cases**  
23,273

**in Critical**  
64

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**Annex 110**

“Kenya and Somalia agree on plan to maintain peace along border”, *The New York Times*, 21 July 1977

# Kenya and Somalia Agree on Plan To Maintain Peace Along Border

By JOHN DARNTON  
Special to The New York Times

NAIROBI, Kenya, July 20—Kenya and Somalia have pledged to maintain peace along their border and agreed to set up a border commission to “normalize and restore tranquility” in the region, it was announced today.

On June 30 Kenya stunned the Organization of African Unity at its meeting in Libreville, Gabon, by charging that it had been invaded by thousands of armed men from Somalia, which denied the accusation and suggested that perhaps the invaders were Ethiopians.

Somalia is actively backing secessionist guerrillas in the vast Ogaden region of southeastern Ethiopia, where fighting has stepped up recently. One route for Somali infiltration into the Ogaden is thought to be through the hot and desolate corner of northern Kenya.

Western diplomatic sources have advanced the theory that any large and armed group of Somalis that crossed the border would most likely have been headed for Ethiopia. If so, the clash with Kenyan units was probably unintentional, the sources say, since Somali-Kenyan relations are not hostile.

## Large Section Historically Claimed

In the past, Somalia has laid an historical claim to a large section of northern Kenya inhabited by Somali-speaking nomads, but in recent years it has not pressed the claim but has concentrated instead on reunification with the Somali-populated Ogaden.


Today's announcement came after a 30-minute meeting here yesterday between the Vice Presidents of the two countries, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya and Hussein Kulmia Afrah of Somalia.

At a news conference, Hussein Mohamed Baullaleh, public relations officer for the Somali Foreign Affairs Ministry, repeated the assertion that his country was “not involved” in the border clashes, in which six men from each side were killed, according to the Kenyans. But he said that Somalia and Kenya “regretted the loss of lives” and resolved to avoid such incidents in the future.

Mr. Baullaleh also denied reports that during the talks Somalia had sought an agreement to allow guerrillas to cross Kenyan territory into Ethiopia.

“We are not aware of any Somali liberation movements passing through northern Kenya,” he said.

For fear of damaging relations with



The New York Times/July 21, 1977

**Somalia is aiding guerrillas in Ethiopia's Ogaden area, with an infiltration route there said to go through northern Kenya.**

the Marxist military regime in Addis Ababa, Kenya would be unlikely to grant any such concession, observers here believe.

According to reports reaching Nairobi, fighting has increased markedly over the last several months in the Ogaden, where the Ethiopian Government has deployed part of a “peasant army” against a force of Somali-backed insurgents estimated at 3,000 to 6,000.

A report issued by the Western Somali Liberation Front in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, contended that guerrillas had destroyed nine aircraft and damaged factories and a telecommunications center in an attack last week upon Diredawa, a city 90 miles from the Somali border.

The front said that 150 Ethiopian troops had been killed in “bitter fighting” but gave no report of its own casualties.

The Ethiopian Government has not confirmed the fighting. Diredawa is strategic for Ethiopia because it is the midway point of the railroad from Addis Ababa to Djibouti. The line carries more than half Ethiopia's imports and exports but apparently has not been reopened since guerrilla attacks two months ago severed it in three places.

**Annex 111**

“Kenyan explorers look deeper offshore”, *Offshore Engineer*, 21 July 2014



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# Kenyan explorers look deeper offshore



BG Group used Odfjell's Deepsea Metro I drillship for the Sunbird-1 in Block L10A this year. Photo from BG Group.

Offshore East Africa is among the newest frontier exploration regions, with results of wildcats eagerly awaited. The area still lacks infra-structure to support meaningful development and logistics remain a challenge to all comers. The activity has spread beyond the shores of Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, reaching Madagascar, the Comoros, and the Seychelles.

All of Kenya's offshore blocks are in the Lamu basin, which formed during the separation of Madagascar from Africa and has Middle to Late Jurassic source rocks. The exploration focused in the Lamu basin follows a successful trend from Mozambique and Tanzania. Small independent operators are surrounded by majors, leading to interesting industry partnerships and strategic opportunities for companies large and small.

### Years of activity

In 1964, BP and Shell drilled the onshore Dodori-1 well to 4311m TD very close to the coast. The well reached Campanian rocks in the late Cretaceous section, with oil and gas shows in Tertiary and Cretaceous. This well flowed at 3.1mcf/d.

In 1971, BP and Shell drilled the Pate-1 well south of the Dodori well, in the L5 area, to 4188m TD, reaching Eocene sediments with gas shows. It flowed at 12.7mcf/d.

In the same year, they drilled the Kipini well to the south, close to the coast in the nearby L-6 area, to 3663m TD. It reached the Campanian section, with fluorescence and gas shows in Tertiary and Cretaceous section.

In 1978, France's Total drilled the offshore Simba-1 well to 3604m TD, with wet gas shows (C1-C5) in the Tertiary.

In 1982, a consortium of Cities Services, Marathon and Union drilled the offshore Maridadi-1 well to 4198m TD with gas shows in the Tertiary, and in 1985, drilled the offshore Kofia-1 well to 3629m TD, with oil and gas shows.

A Lamu basin study 1991- 1995 led Kenya to subdivide the Lamu embayment (both onshore and offshore) into 10 exploration blocks and then add two more after 2001.

Between 2000-2002, seven production sharing agreements were signed for offshore Lamu basin blocks L5, L6, L7, L8, L9, L10, and L11. In 2003, Australia's Woodside Petroleum acquired 7884 km of 2D seismic data covering the seven licensed blocks as well as Block L12. Woodside then drilled the deepest offshore well in 2006.

Anadarko acquired 5000 line-km of 2D seismic data over offshore blocks L5, L7, L12, L11A and L11B, followed by 3D seismic.


By December 2009, Origin Energy acquired 900sq km of 3D seismic over Block L8, using M/V Seisquest to tow eight streamers, 5100m long.

Afren, through its subsidiary EAX, acquired 460km of shallow-water and transition-zone 2D seismic over Blocks L17 and L18, completed in October 2010.

In 2011-2012, Ophir Energy acquired Dominion Petroleum for £118m (US\$186million).

In November 2011, BG began acquiring 3D seismic data in license areas L10A and L10B, followed by a 2D seismic survey over the western area of the blocks (the Sunbird area).

In January 2012, Afren (EAX) completed acquisition of 1207km of 2D data in the deeper water portions of Blocks L17 and L18. In December 2012, it completed acquisition of 1006sq km of 3D data (in lieu of a well commitment), and the 3D was processed by July 2013.



In June 2012, Total signed a PSC for 100% of offshore license Block L22, with water depths of 2000m to 3500m. The first phase of exploration is 3D seismic acquisition.

In July 2012, PTT E&P Thailand agreed to a \$1.93billion acquisition of Cove Energy, which had interests in several blocks offshore Kenya.

In 2012, Fugro-Geoteam AS completed the Kifaru 3D seismic survey including 778sq km over Block L6 for FAR Ltd. and Pancontinental. Fugro's Geo Caribbean seismic vessel stopped in Cape Town in May 2012.

## Discoveries

Working oil and gas systems were only recently proven offshore Kenya, beginning with the Mbawa-1 well on the western side of Block L8. The well reached 2553m in September 2012 and encountered 51.8m net gas pay in porous Cretaceous sandstones. It was then drilled further to 3275m TD. Apache Corp. operates the license (50%) on behalf of partners Origin Energy (20%), Pancontinental (15%), and Tullow (15%). Apache's Exploration Director Angus McCoss said at the time: "A gas discovery on prognosis in the shallowest objective at Mbawa-1 is an encouraging start to our East African transform margin exploration campaign." However, the find was not commercial, although Apache said it would keep the option to re-enter the well open.

In April 2013, Anadarko announced that its Kubwa well in Block L7 was not commercial. The company's Senior Vice President for worldwide exploration Bob Daniels said, "The Kubwa well tested multiple play concepts and provided useful data regarding the prospectivity of our six-million-acre position offshore Kenya."

In October 2013, Apache relinquished its 50% stake in the L8 block, saying that gas volumes were not commercially viable.

Likewise, in December 2013, Britain's Premier Oil announced that it was withdrawing from Block L10A and relinquishing its 20% stake in the license. However, Premier retained its 25% share in neighboring Block L10B.

Pancontinental announced a small gas discovery in Block L8 in December. Pancontinental's finance director Ernest Myers said, "The well on its own may not currently be commercially viable, but could be when aggregated with other gas discoveries which may occur in the L8 or nearby blocks." On 6 January 2014, Pancontinental and BG spud the Sunbird-1 well with the Deepsea Metro-I drillship in 723m water depth, Block L10A, and drilled to 2850m, penetrating the top of the Sunbird Miocene reef at 1583.7m subsea. It became Kenya's first offshore oil discovery, confirmed in June 2014.

## What's ahead

Several major international oil companies—BG Group, Tullow, Total, ENI, and Anadarko— have aggressively pursued prospects off Kenya, and operators appear more willing to drill commercial-sized oil prospects now that source rocks and oil-generation timing has been proven.

## Kenya offshore interests

Blocks with planned drilling are shaded

Offshore Block	Acreage	Ownership	Status
L4	7510sq km	Zarara Oil & Gas Ltd. 75%, SOHI Gas 25%	Predominantly onshore block
L5	8735sq km	Anadarko 50% Total 40%, PTTEP 10%	Territory partially claimed by Somalia
L6	5010sq km (3134sq km offshore)	FAR Ltd. 60% Pancontinental 40% (offshore shares)	Undrilled, shallow water coastal block. Ophir farmout to Milo International.
L7	6944sq km	Anadarko 50% Total 40%, PTTEP 10%	Kubwa well, May 2013 – oil shows
L8	5123sq km	Apache 50% Origin Energy 20% Pancontinental 15% Tullow Oil 15%	Mbawa-1 gas discovery, Sept. 2012
L9	5100sq km	Ophir Energy 90% FAR Ltd. 10% (will increase to 30% subject to gov't approval)	Simba-1 well drilled 1978. Will drill a DW well in H1 2015. WD to 1400m.
L10A	4962sq km	BG Group 50% PTTEP 31.25% Pancontinental 18.75%	Sunbird-1 oil, gas discovery, March 2014, 723m WD.
L10B	5585sq km	BG Group 45% Pancontinental 20% PTTEP 15%	
L11A	5009sq km	Anadarko 50% Total 40%, PTTEP 10%	
L11B	4963sq km	Anadarko 50% Total 40%, PTTEP 10%	Kiboko well P&A Sept. 2013
L12		Anadarko 50% Total 40%, PTTEP 10%	
L13	3000sq km	Zarara Oil & Gas Ltd. 75%, SOHI Gas 25%	Territory claimed by Somalia
L15	2331sq km		Kofia-1 well drilled in 1985. Relinquished by Ophir Energy in 2013.
L16	5027sq km	Camac Energy Gov't Kenya	
L17	1259sq km	Afren/EAX	
L18	3583sq km	Afren/EAX	
L21		ENI	Territory claimed by Somalia
L22	10,000+sq km	Total	Territory claimed by Somalia
L23		ENI	Territory claimed by Somalia
L24		ENI	Territory claimed by Somalia
L25			Territory claimed by Somalia
L26		OPEN (Edgo Energy, Qatar First Investment Bank)	Territory claimed by Somalia
L27		CAMAC Energy Gov't Kenya	
L28		CAMAC Energy Gov't Kenya	

Will Anadarko drill again off Kenya? Perth-based Pancontinental Oil & Gas NL said in a June 2014 presentation that it would potentially re-enter Kenya offshore Block L8 in the second half of this year. The Kenyan government also granted the company a 12-month extension for the initial exploration period of the L10B license area. Ophir Energy, which holds a 90% interest in Block L9, had said it would drill a well in 3Q 2014, but in a June 2014 investor presentation, announced that it was pushed to 1H 2015. This may be related to the farm-out to FAR of 30%, subject to government approval. The prospect has P50 reserves of 190MMboe gross and 171 MMboe net.

FAR anticipates drilling a well in Block L6 at the end of 1Q 2015.

Afrin (EAX) is preparing to drill two wells in 2015 in Blocks L17/L18.

Ultra-deepwater Block L26 is not currently under license. Edgo Energy, the exploration unit of Jordan's Edgo, and joint venture partner Qatar First Bank relinquished the block in January 2013. Mazen Masri, managing director of Edgo, cited the technical and monetary challenges of drilling in water depths beyond 1500m, and also mentioned that the block is subject to a maritime border dispute, claimed by both Kenya and Somalia.

## NOCK

The National Oil Corp. of Kenya Ltd. (NOCK) is a state-owned company that was established in April 1981 to spearhead exploration.

A new Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act was enacted in 1984, and revised in 1986, when royalties were replaced with production sharing contracts. Through 2012, most of Kenya's PSCs gave NOCK a 10% stake in production, raised to 25% in 2013, along with higher fees and new capital gains tax rules. Kenya's first competitive licensing round has been postponed to at least

4Q 2014, and GlobalData's sub-Saharan upstream analyst John Sisa said in May that the delay could benefit the country if additional discoveries are made in the interim.

## Logistics

Adequate ports and docking facilities are still in short supply along the East African coast. The different types of vessels needed to support a robust exploration program require supply and repair yards and berthing options.

The Kenya Ports Authority manages the Port of Mombasa, named Africa's fifth largest for container shipping in 2013, based on increased traffic after capacity expansion. In January, incoming KPA Chairman Danson Mungatana expressed his support for the development of small ports program and said the new commissioning of the standard gauge railway line would "revamp the transport sector and...support port efficiency."

Kenya is boosting existing port facilities with the construction of a \$3.5billion Lamu port.

The Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) was set up in June 2004 to provide regulatory oversight of the Kenyan marine industry. KMA implements international maritime conventions and promotes safety, security, maritime

training, search and rescue, pollution prevention and the preservation of the marine environment. KMA's mandate, as stipulated in Kenya's KMA Act 2006, is "to regulate coordinate and oversee maritime affairs."

Annex 111

Roads connecting ports, airports, and other supply routes need to be bolstered to support the heavy loads, as well as move personnel.

The oil and gas industry along with emerging sectors of the economy and a growing middle class have boosted civil aviation needs in the region. The country's main airport is Jomo Kenyatta International (Nairobi), and there are smaller airports at Wilson, Mombasa, Eldoret, and Kisumu.

Bobby Bryan, Delta Airlines commercial manager for East Africa and West Africa, told the Discover Global Markets Conference in May that airports, aircraft, adequate fuel supplies and staff are necessary to service vessels and crews. Delta has an office in Nairobi and opened one in Dar es Salaam a year ago. It partners with KLM and Kenya Airways.

In a January 2013 report, Deloitte & Touche described Kenya's economy as "energy starved" and that may hamper rapid infrastructure development.

## Security

Securing infrastructure, operations and personnel safety is a primary consideration. Given Kenya's proximity to Somalia and shared, but porous, maritime border, critical infrastructure – electric, gas, telecoms, transportation, water and food supplies – supporting the offshore industry may be a constant target.

Increasingly frequent terrorist attacks, some of which the Kenya National Disaster Operation Centre attributes to Somali militant groups, may negatively influence investment investments and possibly forestall exploration activity in Kenya.

Earlier this year, bomb and grenade attacks in Nairobi and the coastal city of Mombasa led the UK, US, France and Australia to issue travel warnings. As this issue goes to press, Somali militants attacked hotels and killed dozens in Mpeketoni, a coastal town in Kenya's Lamu County, another blow towards destabilizing the tourist economy.

With evolving threats, Kenyan government efforts to protect people and critical infrastructure must evolve as well, or the country risks losing petroleum investment.

The East Africa Oil & Gas Summit (EAOGS) will take place in Nairobi this October, and we'll see what a few months more will bring.


**Annex 112**

“Kenya: An African oil upstart in transition”, *The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, October 2014

October 2014

# Kenya:

## An African oil upstart in transition





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## Executive Summary

In late March 2012, Kenya entered the East African oil scene with a surprising splash. After decades of unsuccessful on-and-off exploration by international oil companies, Tullow Oil, a UK-based firm, discovered oil in Kenya's north-west Turkana County. This paper analyses the opportunities and risks facing Kenya's oil industry and its role as a regional oil transport hub. It provides a snapshot of Kenya's economic, political, and security environment, offers a comprehensive overview of the development of Kenya's oil industry and possibilities for regional oil infrastructure cooperation with neighbouring countries in East Africa, and considers the potential political, social, and security risks facing the oil industry and regional infrastructure plans.

## Kenya Overview

In the aftermath of the large-scale violence that followed its December 2007 general elections, Kenya has turned a corner. In June 2008 its government launched Vision 2030, an ambitious development blueprint, to modernize and make Kenya a middle-income economy; in 2010 it passed a new constitution; and in 2013 contested, yet largely peaceful, general elections were held. The discovery of oil in 2012 immediately provided an extra boost to Kenya's already growing and diverse economy and its position as East Africa's strategic transport and communications hub.

But over the past two years, political and security tensions have risen dramatically to threaten Kenya's bright future. In the political arena, the 2010 constitution stipulated the devolution of powers from the central government to newly constituted counties, but its full realization must overcome enormous systematic, structural, and political implementation hurdles. At the same time, devolution will hardly be a success if it only leads to the decentralization of Kenya's political troubles (which include ethno-politics and corruption) to the local level, where more political officials are now in competition with one another. Oil and other resources will influence disputes between central authorities and counties and communities seeking to assert new-found powers.

On the security front, terrorist attacks, highlighted by the September 2013 killings by the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab at Nairobi's upscale Westgate Shopping Mall, have grown in Kenya's coastal and north-eastern regions. These attacks threaten to enflame and intermingle with long-standing animosities between communities in these regions and the central government in Nairobi, undermining the popular development aspirations introduced by the new constitution. Possible insecurity from political and social tensions sits ominously alongside the oil industry's plans to move from the exploration to development phase and to construct key export infrastructure on the coast.

## Kenya's oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation

Kenya's role as a regional hub for East African crude oil and petroleum products may be more significant than its potential position as an oil and gas producer. To date, Kenya's oil resources are estimated to be 600 million barrels and new discoveries may still only make the country a small African producer. Oil exploration in Kenya began in the 1950s with Shell and BP carrying out the first survey work, mapping out major geological basins, and drilling the first oil well in 1960. Over 40 wells have since been drilled on and offshore, but it was not until 2012 that potential commercially viable oil resources were discovered through Tullow Oil's Ngamia 1, together with subsequent findings in Turkana County in Kenya's north-west.

Recent interest grew out of Uganda's 2006 onshore oil discoveries, and offshore gas findings in Mozambique and Tanzania. The regional proximity of proven oil and gas reserves, coupled with sustained high international oil prices, attracted a wide variety of oil companies to Kenya; these included Africa Oil, Tullow Oil, BG Group, and Total. Tullow is seeking to finalize appraisal and testing of an estimated 600 million barrels of oil resources held in Turkana by the end of 2015. At that point, if



the discoveries prove to be commercially viable, the company aims to also settle plans with the Kenya government for an export pipeline to the coast at either Lamu or Mombasa.

However, the huge and diverse infrastructure development goals of Kenya's \$25 billion Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor will be significantly delayed and likely need to be downsized. A piecemeal approach – beginning with a basic export pipeline and port terminal at Lamu – may well be adopted. Rather than Kenya joining Ethiopia and South Sudan in plans for export and product pipelines to Lamu, it is more likely that, in the short term, Uganda and Kenya will establish the first pipeline links while other neighbours join through oil, road, and rail links in the medium and long term.

Kenya could go it alone and develop an 850 kilometre export pipeline from Turkana to the coast for its oil resources, but since its findings still remain relatively small, a regional agreement with Uganda to share an oil pipeline would be more viable. But there remain hurdles to achieving such cooperation. It will take two to four years to ascertain final commerciality of Kenya's oil discoveries and in the meantime Uganda remains eager to push forward with generating revenues from its long idle but proven oil reserves.


### Political, social, and security risks

As the oil industry shifts from exploration to development and production in Kenya, required investments will grow from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars for new oil infrastructure. Tullow Oil, and in particular its smaller and more exploration-orientated partner Africa Oil, will likely sell a share of their interests in the Turkana concessions to larger industry players, such as oil majors and Asian national oil companies, to provide the required capital investments to develop the oil fields. It is at this juncture that risk incentives among the involved oil companies will decline profoundly. During the exploration phase, in the initial drive to discover oil, oil industry operations have been left relatively free from regulatory constraints and political interference. In the upcoming development and production phase this will likely not be the case. The nascent oil industry will not be completely insulated from increased risks in a shifting political and security landscape.

First, the regulatory environment for the oil industry in Kenya is in flux. The establishment and implementation of a new National Energy Bill and Petroleum Exploration and Development Production Act will have important consequences for the oil industry. New laws will encourage investment on one hand, particularly in natural gas where there is a lack of regulation, but on the other hand such laws can increase the costs of doing business. And since the political and regulatory environment in Kenya is intertwined, the government may exploit new rules and regulations to advance political and economic goals. Once production does begin, and petrodollars flow into government coffers, oil revenue sharing will become a fixture of Kenya's often-divisive politics.


Second, the successful advancement of the 2010 constitution offers potential economic and social development benefits and help in reversing high levels of inequality in Kenya. Such a process, however, offers challenges to the oil industry as communities in oil regions, and their political representatives, grapple with the convergence of new economic resources and increased political power through devolution. But a failure by the Kenyan government to implement devolution could be even more damaging to the timely development of the oil industry. Such an outcome could see aggrieved counties contest oil resources with the national government and international oil companies. If the objectives of devolution in the new constitution are fulfilled and political power and economic resources shift from the centre to county level (particularly in restless peripheral regions such as Turkana) then conflicts over scarce resources can be mitigated.

Third, political instability and insecurity is threatening not only the commencement of Kenya's oil production, but also its exit to international markets on the coast. Kenya's coastal and north-eastern communities have longstanding social and political grievances with the central government in Nairobi. Internal politics alone has the capacity to create insecurity for the oil industry if planned pipeline and other downstream infrastructure are targeted. But there is also the possibility that these disputes



could become a toxic mix with the incursion of the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab, delaying and hampering large-scale investments.

Al-Shabaab may be positioning itself to exploit social and political tensions to win support from local populations on Kenya's coast. But if the Kenyan government is able to advance political devolution to coastal counties, while working to contain al-Shabaab in an apolitical manner, then there is a strong likelihood that, with regional and international support, Nairobi can curb the militant group's activities, providing the oil industry with a relatively secure environment. If Kenya is to become the transit hub for East Africa's oil boom then relative stability and security on the coast must be achieved.





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## Introduction

In late March 2012, Kenya entered the East African oil scene with a surprising splash. After decades of unsuccessful on-and-off exploration by international oil companies, Tullow Oil, a UK-based firm, discovered oil in Kenya's north-west Turkana County. Quite unceremoniously, then President Mwai Kibaki announced the find at the end of a planned speech on performance evaluation results for public agencies: 'I wish to make an important announcement to the nation ... This morning, I have been informed by the Minister for Energy that our country has made a major breakthrough in oil exploration ... This is the first time Kenya has made such a discovery and it is very good news for our country. It is, however, the beginning of a long journey to make our country an oil producer...'<sup>1</sup>

This paper analyses the opportunities and challenges facing Kenya's oil industry and role as a regional oil transport hub. First, it provides a snapshot of Kenya's political and economic environment. Second, the paper offers a comprehensive overview of the development of Kenya's oil industry, from exploration to the upcoming production phase, the main players, and the possibilities for regional oil infrastructure in cooperation with neighbouring countries in East Africa. Finally, the paper considers the potential political risk from new rules and regulations, the social risk from relations with local communities and officials in Turkana County (where oil has been discovered), and the security risk facing oil industry and regional infrastructure plans. The paper does not fully engage questions revolving around the 'resource curse' in Africa – concerning how oil will impact Kenya's economic, political, and social development. Rather it does the reverse, by examining how Kenya's political economy and security environment will impact the industry in the future.

## Kenya Overview

### Economic aspirations

Kenya is the economic centre of East Africa. It has the largest economy in the East African Community (Figures 1 and 2) and one of the largest in Africa. It also has one of the most diverse economies on the continent. Tea, coffee, and other agriculture, alongside tourism and services, are a major part of Kenya's economic success story (Figure 3). This is in sharp contrast to other large African economies where oil, gas, and minerals dominate. On the back of growth in tourism and telecommunications, Kenya enjoyed average annual growth rates of 5.4 per cent between 2002 and 2007.<sup>2</sup> The economy was unsettled by the insecurity that followed the 2007 general elections, but it has picked up pace again in recent years. In 2014, international investors demonstrated their confidence in the economy when Kenya raised \$2 billion in its first sovereign bond offering, a record-breaking debut for an African country.<sup>3</sup>

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
<sup>1</sup> 'Speech by his excellency Hon. Mwai Kibaki, C.G.H., M.P., President and Commander-in-Chief of the defence forces of the Republic of Kenya during the official announcement of the evaluation results of the performance of public agencies for the financial year 2010/11', Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi, 26 March 2012, [statehousekenya.go.ke](http://statehousekenya.go.ke), accessed 23 July 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, 'Political Economy Analysis of Kenya', Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo, 2009, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Katrina Manson & Javier Blas, 'Kenya's debut \$2bn bond breaks Africa record', *Financial Times*, 16 June 2014.




**Figure 1: East African Community – GDP billion (USD, 2013)**



Source: World Bank

**Figure 2: East African Community – GNI per capita (USD, 2013)**




Source: World Bank





**Figure 3: Economic Structure, Kenya 2013**



Source: CIA – The World Factbook

Kenya's economic strength is bolstered by its strategic position in East Africa. It is the main entry and exit point for trade from landlocked East and Central African countries – Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. Uganda was its largest export partner in 2013, accounting for 13.6 per cent of total Kenyan exports.<sup>4</sup> Mombasa is East Africa's largest port, followed by those in Tanzania and Djibouti. Kenya is seeking to exploit its strategic location on the Indian Ocean further by leveraging its relative proximity to large and growing Asian markets, particularly those in India and China which are Kenya's largest import partners, representing 14.2 per cent and 12.2 per cent respectively of total imports in 2013.<sup>5</sup> Kenya is also the financial and communications hub for East Africa. 'Silicon Savannah', an initiative to establish a major techno-city in Konzo, 40 miles outside Nairobi, seeks to make Kenya East Africa's technology hub as well. IBM established its first African research lab in Nairobi, while Google, Microsoft, and Intel also have regional headquarters there.<sup>6</sup>

Kenya's diversified economy needs substantial infrastructure development in order to industrialize. In 2008, the Kenyan government under then President Mwai Kibaki established Vision 2030 to modernize Kenya and make it a middle-income country. One of the flagship projects of the initiative is the \$25 billion Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. This seeks to establish road, rail, and oil pipeline links between the regional neighbours, airports, and resort cities at Isiolo and Lamu, as well as a new port at Manda Bay and a 120,000 barrels/day (b/d) oil refinery at Lamu.<sup>7</sup> The twin goals of this ambitious undertaking are to promote regional economic development and to develop northern Kenya (which has long been economically marginalized compared to central counties) and integrate it into the national economy.

Although there has been little progress in its implementation since the 2012 official launch of LAPSSET,<sup>8</sup> Kenya is also spearheading other related regional infrastructure agreements. President Uhuru Kenyatta hosted Chinese Premier Li Keiqiang in May 2014 and, alongside regional leaders

<sup>4</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Kenya', Country Report, EIU, London, 1 June 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Kenya', Country Report, EIU, London, 1 June 2014.

<sup>6</sup> Mwangi S. Kimenyi & Josephine Kibe, 'Africa's Powerhouse', Brookings, Opinion, 6 January 2014 [www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/30-kenya-economy-kimenyi](http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/30-kenya-economy-kimenyi), accessed 28 July 2014.

<sup>7</sup> 'Lamu Port and New Transport Corridor Development to Southern Sudan and Ethiopia (LAPSSET)', Progress Report, Kenya Vision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, [www.vision2030.go.ke](http://www.vision2030.go.ke).

<sup>8</sup> Drazen Jorgic, 'Kenya attacks undermine plans for east African trade hub', *Reuters*, 20 June 2014.



from South Sudan, Rwanda, and Uganda, signed an agreement to establish a new East African railway line. At nearly \$4 billion, Chinese companies will build the first stage, a 610-kilometre line from Mombasa to Nairobi.<sup>9</sup> As a sign of Kenya's broadening international ties, the planned Chinese-built railway will replace the original line established during British colonial rule over 100 years ago. If Kenya is to continue to act as the gateway to East Africa in the face of outside competition (Tanzania is busy enhancing its own ports with Chinese cooperation), then such infrastructure projects will need to move forward.

The discovery of oil could help Kenya finance its large infrastructure needs. The current government, under Uhuru Kenyatta, included oil, gas, and mineral resources as a sixth priority sector within the economic pillar of Vision 2030; this seeks to harness oil to increase export earnings and produce higher GDP growth, broader social development, infrastructure development, and job creation.<sup>10</sup> The oil industry needs billions in infrastructure development investment if it is to act as a driver for Kenya's broader economic and social development goals. But over the past two years political and security tensions have risen dramatically, threatening to upend Kenya's economic aspirations.

### Political and security challenges

It had been expected that 2013 would be a breakout year for Kenya – the country was turning a corner after having held largely peaceful general elections in March that year. Its new Jubilee government may have been dogged by the indictment of President Uhuru and Deputy President Ruto by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged role in the 2007/08 post-election violence, but a resurgent economy gave promise for the future. Jubilee pushed forward with former president Kibaki's Vision 2030 to modernize Kenya; the government was generally business friendly, engaging a younger generation of industrialists and entrepreneurs compared to previous governments.<sup>11</sup>

But 2013 would not be the year of stability and growth for which Kenya had hoped. The 2010 constitution stipulated the devolution of powers from the central government to newly constituted counties, but its full realization needed to overcome enormous systematic, structural, and political implementation hurdles. All the while terrorist attacks – prominent among which was the September 2013 massacre carried out by the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab at Nairobi's upscale Westgate Shopping Mall – have grown in Kenya's coastal and north-eastern regions. These attacks threaten to enflame and intermingle with long-standing animosities between communities in these regions and the central government in Nairobi, undermining the popular development aspirations put forward by the new constitution.

Oil and other resources will influence disputes between central authorities and counties and communities seeking to assert new-found powers stipulated by the constitution. Possible insecurity due to political and social tensions sits ominously alongside the oil industry's plans to move from the exploration to the development phase, combined with construction of key export infrastructure on the coast. The insecurity has hurt Kenya's tourism sector, one of its main economic engines and job producers. The World Bank downgraded its forecast on economic growth in 2014 and 2015 from 5.2 per cent to 4.7 per cent for both years on account of the insecurity.<sup>12</sup> A failure to grapple with these structural problems through fully implementing devolution, to settle the ICC indictment, and to tackle terrorism will undermine development.

Kenyan politics are ethnically and regionally-driven and are deeply embedded in business. Kenya has been described as an 'ethnocracy'; a democracy in which politics are steered along ethnic lines and

<sup>9</sup> 'China to build new East Africa railway line', *BBC News*, 12 May 2014.

<sup>10</sup> 'Second Medium Term Plan 2013-2017', Kenya Vision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, Nairobi, 2013, 68.

<sup>11</sup> David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, 'East African prospects: An update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda', Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 22.


<sup>12</sup> David Malingha and Sarah McGregor, 'East Africa Powerhouse Kenya Shaken as Attacks', *Politics Mix*, *Bloomberg*, 8 July 2014.



coalitions, or 'tribal arithmetic' applied to form and structure the government.<sup>13</sup> The political culture is a product of the manner in which the British colonial administration limited political organization to specific regions in Kenya, to avoid the establishment of national movements; this served to ethnocize Kenyan politics early on.<sup>14</sup> The Kikuyu, roughly representing 20 per cent of the population, were the dominant group after Kenya's 1963 independence and remain so today. Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, the father of the current president Uhuru, established a patrimonial state where informal networks which formed around the president and ruling party rewarded clients with land, state contracts, and other preferential treatment.<sup>15</sup> After Daniel arap Moi became president in 1979, he set about shifting the centre of political and economic power away from the Kikuyu community and towards his Kalenjin community and Kenyan Asian business allies.<sup>16</sup> In 2002, the Kalenjin–Kenya–Asia alliance lost its strong position in politics and business after a coalition of opposition parties led by Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, rose to power. This brought central political influence back to the Kikuyu community.

The political violence that followed the 2007 general elections dealt a serious blow to Kenya's political stability and growing economy. More than 1,000 people were killed and 650,000 displaced in the post-election ethnic fighting, which was mainly between Kenya's largest groups, the Kikuyus, Kalenjins, and Luo. An African Union mediation team led by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan was able to broker a coalition government between President Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga. But this was not the first time that election outcomes had sparked widespread violence and economic decline, political violence has been the norm rather than the exception in the lead up to and aftermath of Kenyan elections.<sup>17</sup> Since multiparty elections were established in 1992, the economy has suffered from periodic bouts of violence (Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Kenya's annual growth rate (%) – illustrating economic decline and multi-party elections (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007)**



Source: David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, 'East African prospects: An update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda', Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 30.

<sup>13</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman, 'Kenya's Future Clouds as Tensions Rise and Tourists Flee', *The New York Times*, 27 June 2014.

<sup>14</sup> Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, 'Political Economy Analysis of Kenya', Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo, 2009, 6.

<sup>15</sup> Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, 'Political Economy Analysis of Kenya', Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo, 2009, 1.

<sup>16</sup> David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, 'East African prospects: An update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda', Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 13–15.

<sup>17</sup> Geir Sundet & Eli Moen, 'Political Economy Analysis of Kenya', Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo, 2009, 8.



The coalition government formed in 2008 succeeded in passing a new constitution in 2010; this strived to change the way in which Kenyan public affairs are managed and to repair the country's ethnocized and oft-violent political culture. It sets out to devolve political and economic decision-making from the presidency to 47 new counties throughout the country (Figure 5). The aim is to reverse the high regional inequalities and ethnic tensions that have mired politics and sparked violence since independence. These institutional changes are geared towards making government officials more accountable to local populations and addressing deep inequalities and grievances; between 2000 and 2010 Kenya's inequality levels were some of the worst in the world – higher than other budding African oil and gas producers such as Uganda, Mozambique, and Tanzania.<sup>18</sup> The restructuring of the entire fabric of how politics and business have functioned in Kenya for over a half century was to be a challenging endeavour.

In the 2012 general election then Prime Minister Raila Odinga faced off against Uhuru Kenyatta. It was again a close and contested election, but Uhuru prevailed and The National Alliance party formed a new government – the Jubilee Alliance – with William Ruto, a Kalenjin, leading the United Republican Party, as deputy president. Both Uhuru and Ruto were indicted by the International Criminal Court for their alleged role in inciting post-election violence in 2007/08. The ICC prosecutor's case, however, has been weakened by the retraction of statements and deaths of key witnesses, but the indictments may still drive a wedge between Uhuru and Ruto's political camps.<sup>19</sup>

While international oil companies are concerned about legal measures which may be taken by western governments if Kenya's leaders are convicted, in all likelihood Kenya's relationship with the USA and Europe will remain strong due to mutual regional security concerns revolving around al-Shabaab and other militant groups operating out of Somalia.<sup>20</sup> Kenya has, nonetheless, rebounded from the strained diplomatic relations with western countries caused by the ICC indictments to look east to China and other non-western partners for new avenues of economic engagement. Balancing between foreign partners, however, will not solve political divides at the national level.

The 2013 election outcome was no exception in Kenya's historical political trend. Kenyan politics remains polarized along ethnic-regional lines, with the Kikuyu/Kalenjin Jubilee Alliance in government and Odinga's CORD Alliance of Luo, Kamba, Luhya, and coastal groups in opposition.<sup>21</sup> Political tensions, corruption, poverty, and high levels of inequality are also still very real, and very challenging, hurdles to overcome. Devolution will remain a central feature of Kenya's political landscape in the coming years, especially in the lead up to new elections in 2017.<sup>22</sup> Important political questions on whether central authorities will fully implement institutional changes remain unanswered, as the process is in its early stages. At the same time, whether or not the counties will have the capacity and expertise to manage their new-found power is also unclear.

Devolution may only lead to the decentralization of Kenya's political troubles, including ethno-politics and corruption, to the local level, where more political officials are now in competition with one another. What is clear is that a failure to push forward with devolution and other key aspects of the new constitution by the central government will only heighten political tensions. But if Uhuru and Ruto were to move forward with implementing the new constitution, progress towards a more inclusive government is possible; this would strengthen the government's hand with both local constituents and western partners. The oil industry is set to develop amidst this shifting political and security environment.

<sup>18</sup> Patricia I. Vasquez, 'Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves', *Articles and Debates*, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.

<sup>19</sup> 'Kenya, Chickens come home to roost', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 55, No. 1, 10 January 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Andrea S. Pongo, 'Effects of the 2013 National Elections on Oil Exploration in Kenya', Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria VA, 2013, 7–8.

<sup>21</sup> David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, 'East African prospects: An update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda', Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 27.

<sup>22</sup> David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, 'East African prospects: An update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda', Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 31–2.



**Figure 5: Kenya's new political constituencies**



Source: Kenya Open Data, Government of Kenya



## Kenya's oil sector and regional infrastructure cooperation

Kenya's long history of oil exploration has come in three waves. BP and Shell began the first exploration work in the 1950s. Aeromagnetic, gravimetric, and seismic surveys identified over 300,000 square kilometres of sedimentary basin: the Tertiary Rift Basin to the north-west, Anza in the north, Mandera in the east, and Lamu, which is both on and offshore, in the south-east.<sup>23</sup> BP and Shell also drilled the first well in 1960 in the Lamu embayment. In the 1970s, Kenya continued to attract attention in the international oil industry as oil majors looked for alternative sources of investment in the aftermath of major nationalizations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. Altogether, a total of 15 wells were drilled in Kenya throughout the 1960s and 70s, but with no commercial success.

The second wave of oil exploration came after Kenya established its Petroleum Act in 1985. This encouraged new investment by changing previous royalty-based contracts to production-sharing contracts.<sup>24</sup> Another 15 wells were drilled in the 1980s and 90s. Among other companies, Total and Amoco were most active in exploration work. They drilled in Anza and Mandera basins, discovered indications of oil and gas, but no commercial finds. In 1992, the Loperot-1 well was drilled in Block 10BB by Shell some 100 kilometres south of the town of Lodwar in present-day Turkana County. This showed signs of waxy crude, but Shell abandoned its work after failing to negotiate a contract extension with the Moi government, which took power that year. Low international oil prices in the mid and late 1980s provided little incentive for expensive exploration and development work.

The third and current wave of exploration in Kenya's oil industry came in 2000, after the Kenyan government had carried out new geological studies on the Lamu and Tertiary Rift basins.<sup>25</sup> Interest grew substantially after Uganda's 2006 onshore oil discoveries, and offshore gas finds in Mozambique and Tanzania. The regional proximity of proven oil and gas reserves, coupled with sustained high international oil prices, attracted a wide variety of oil companies to Kenya, these included: Africa Oil, Apache Corporation, Anadarko, BG Group, Centric, Cove Energy, Pancontinental, Premier Oil, Simba Energy, CNOOC, Total, and Tullow Oil (Figure 6). By 2012, a total of 33 wells had been drilled onshore, half of which showed signs of hydrocarbons, as well as four non-commercial wells offshore.<sup>26</sup> But it was not until Tullow's Ngamia 1 discovery in early 2012, together with a string of others in Block 10BB and Block 13T in Turkana County, that oil resources of significant commercial potential were found.

<sup>23</sup> 'Untapped Oil Frontier: Hunting Elephants in East Africa', *Cormark Securities Inc.*, 3 February 2011, 15–7.

<sup>24</sup> 'Overview of Petroleum Exploration in Kenya', Presentation to the 5<sup>th</sup> East African Petroleum Conference and Exhibition 2011, Ministry of Energy, Kenya, 25 February 2011, 6.

<sup>25</sup> 'Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society', The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 14.

<sup>26</sup> Deloitte, 'The Deloitte Guide to Oil and Gas in East Africa: Where potential lies', *Deloitte*, 2013, 4.



**Figure 6: Licensed Petroleum Exploration Companies in Kenya as of June 2014**

No	Exploration Companies	Exploration Block Nos.	No. Of Blocks
1.	Tullow Oil Corporation	10A, 10BB, 10BA, 13T, 12A, and 12B	6
2.	Anardarko	L-5, L-7, L-12, L-11A, L-11B	5
3.	BG Group	L-10A, L-10B	2
4.	Ophir/Dominion	L-9, L-5	2
5.	Apache (now withdrawn)	L-8	1
6.	Vanoil Resources	3A, 3B	2
7.	Africa Oil Corporation	9	1
8.	Zarara	L-4, L-13	2
9.	FAR/Flow Energy	L-6	1
10.	Lion Petroleum	2B	1
11.	NOCK	14T	1
12.	Simba	2A	1
13.	Afren	L-17/L-18, 1	3
14.	A-Z Petroleum	L-1A & L-3	2
15.	CAMAC Energy	L-1B, L-16, L-27, L-28	4
16.	Rift Energy	L-19	1
17.	Imara Energy Corp.	L-2	1
18.	Adamantine Energy Ltd	11A	1
19.	Pacific Seaboard Investments Ltd	L-20	1
20.	ERHC Energy Inc.	11B	1
21.	Lamu Oil Exploration	L-14	1
22.	Total Exploration & Production Kenya B.V.	L-22	1
23.	ENI Spa	L-21, L-23, L-24	3

Source: 'Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society', The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 17.



## Exploration

Kenya is an attractive investment location in the global oil business, particularly for upstart mid-sized oil companies and Asian national oil companies looking to increase their international activities. Sentiment remains upbeat for new finds in Kenya's oil and gas concessions (Figure 7). As Africa Oil CEO Keith Hill has said: 'There are not many places left on earth where you can put together an acreage portfolio like this ... Good contract terms, good support from the government – there are not that many happy hunting grounds left'.<sup>27</sup> Africa Oil, as part of the Lundin Group, has a longer history in Kenya than most international oil companies. Lundin entered Kenya in late 2007, after signing a contract in Block 10A in the Anza Basin, in the north. (Anza is an extension of the Muglad Basin in South Sudan, where Lundin was once active.<sup>28</sup>) Lundin then bought an interest in Block 9, also in Anza, from the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a state-owned oil company. In 2009, Lundin sold its Kenya interests to Africa Oil, in which it was a majority shareholder.<sup>29</sup>

CNOOC had arrived in Kenya in 2006. It signed six contracts with Kenya in the Lamu, Anza, and Mandera Basins in a well-publicized ceremony attended by China's President Hu Jintao and Kenya's Mwai Kibaki.<sup>30</sup> The political pomp, however, did not help CNOOC find oil, although it drilled the over 5,000 metre deep Bogal 1 well in Block 9 in 2009, at a cost of \$25 million. This was the deepest well ever drilled in Kenya,<sup>31</sup> and while it confirmed there was hydrocarbon potential in Anza, no oil was found. In 2010, CNOOC left Kenya to invest \$1.45 billion into Uganda's proven oil reserves with Total and Tullow. Africa Oil, also a partner in Bogal 1, has not abandoned Block 9; it is re-evaluating CNOOC data and planning Bogal 2 in search of gas.<sup>32</sup>

In hopes of repeating the natural gas discovery story of Mozambique and Tanzania, the Kenyan Ministry of Energy was quick to establish new offshore deepwater concessions.<sup>33</sup> In addition to a number of mid-sized exploration companies, the French oil major Total was attracted to the prospects and bought a 40 per cent stake in a number of Anadarko's and Cove Energy's concessions in 2011 (L5, L7, L11a, L11b, and L12) in the Lamu Basin. Total then acquired 100 per cent of offshore block L22 the following year, but exploration wells drilled in Blocks L7 and L11b did not produce positive results.<sup>34</sup> After Apache drilled its Mbawa 1 well in 2012 in Block L8 it did encounter gas, but abandoned the concession in late 2013.<sup>35</sup> While offshore gas has still not been discovered in commercial quantities, the BG Group and its partners found both oil and gas offshore in Lamu in 2014 and are assessing the commercial potential.<sup>36</sup> Drilling an offshore well in Kenya typically costs \$80 million, but if BG's results prove positive, this may help to incentivize further exploration into Kenyan waters.

<sup>27</sup> Yadhullah Hussain, 'Canada's Africa Oil Corp. sees promise in Kenya', *Financial Post*, 24 October 2013.

<sup>28</sup> Daniel Wells, 'Sweden's Lundin signs Kenya oil exploration deal', *Reuters*, 8 October 2007.

<sup>29</sup> Africa Oil bought these interests with a loan provided by Lundin; 'Lundin Petroleum to sell its East African interests', Lundin Petroleum, 5 February 2009, [www.lundin-petroleum.com/Press/pr\\_corp\\_05-02-09\\_e.html](http://www.lundin-petroleum.com/Press/pr_corp_05-02-09_e.html), accessed 28 July 2014.

<sup>30</sup> 'CNOOC signs deal to search for oil in Kenya', *CRIENGLISH.com*, 29 April 2006, <http://english.cri.cn/811/2006/04/29/301@83073.htm>, accessed 28 July 2014.

<sup>31</sup> 'Untapped Oil Frontier: Hunting Elephants in East Africa', *Cormark Securities Inc.*, 3 February 2011, 17.

<sup>32</sup> 'Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy', *Energy Intelligence Finance*, 4 April 2012.

<sup>33</sup> 'Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy', *Energy Intelligence Finance*, 4 April 2012.

<sup>34</sup> Total, '2013 Form 20-F Total S.A.', Total, Paris, 17–18.


<sup>35</sup> Eduard Gismatullin, 'Apache Exits Kenya to Focus on Energy Exploration Elsewhere', *Bloomberg*, 9 October 2013.

<sup>36</sup> Kennedy Senelwa, 'BG to submit plans after Lamu oil find', *The East African*, 21 June 2014.





Figure 7: Kenya exploration blocks



Source: National Oil Corporation of Kenya



## Development and production

Kenya's oil industry made a major breakthrough in 2012 with Tullow's Ngamia 1 discovery in Turkana County. Ngamia 1 helped to de-risk other prospects around Lake Turkana, opening up new exploration options.<sup>37</sup> Tullow first farmed into Kenya in 2010 after buying 50 per cent in Blocks 10BA, 10BB, 12A, and 13T from Africa Oil and Centric Energy. Tullow also bought into Uganda by purchasing Energy Africa in 2004, Hardman Resources in 2007, and licences of Heritage Oil in 2010. Uganda served dual purposes for Tullow's eventual entry into Kenya: it attracted the company and others due to the proximity of its discoveries, but it also benefited from the technical lessons Tullow took on from its Ugandan operations. Tullow saw analogies between the Albertine Basin in Uganda and geological features in Kenya and Ethiopia, and the company spent \$23 million for licences in the two countries.<sup>38</sup> Sentiment (in the nature of a regional rivalry with Uganda) likely also encouraged Kenya's efforts to attract international oil companies, in order to re-energize exploration activity.<sup>39</sup> Uganda's 2006 oil discoveries and intervention in Somalia raised its stature in East Africa, while Kenya's position declined, alongside its economy, following the 2007/08 post-election violence. Discovering oil offered the chance to reinvigorate the economy and maintain Kenya's status as the regional economic centre.

After a year in Kenya, Tullow made multiple discoveries south-west of Lake Turkana from 2012 to 2014. Nonetheless, by mid-2014, Tullow's discoveries in Kenya remain only contingent resources, not proven oil reserves. Mwendia Nyaga Chief Executive at Oil & Energy Services Limited, a Kenyan company, has said: 'We must be cautiously optimistic ... Unless someone tells you the actual amounts they [Tullow] have discovered and stop calling the finds oil resources and start calling them oil reserves, things can go either way'.<sup>40</sup> Tullow plans to drill over 20 wells by the end of 2015, which will consist of new exploration and appraisal of existing finds.<sup>41</sup> At that point, possibilities for commercializing the oil resources will be better understood.

Tullow estimates that its finds in the South Lokichar sub-basin (within the Tertiary Basin) contain 600 million barrels of oil resources, and have the potential for 1 billion barrels.<sup>42</sup> Following the discoveries of Amosing 1 and Ewoi 1, Tullow's estimates had increased from 300 million to 600 million barrels from 2012 to 2014.<sup>43</sup> A minimum of 500 million barrels has been regarded as the threshold to satisfy onshore development costs and thus make the resources commercial.<sup>44</sup> Tullow estimates that production from the South Lokichar sub-basin will be above 100,000 bpd (barrels per day).<sup>45</sup>

In addition, good potential still remains for an upside on oil resources in Kenya. The current discoveries remain limited to the Lokichar area in Turkana County, but Tullow estimates that Kenya could hold as much as 10 billion barrels of oil.<sup>46</sup> Indications of slicks on the surface of Lake Turkana and oil seeps on its northern shore suggest that drilling in the lake may be another possibility,<sup>47</sup> although environmental and social concerns will need to be properly addressed. But some of Tullow's 2014 exploration and appraisal wells have been disappointing.<sup>48</sup> Kenya could very well become only a small oil producer.

<sup>37</sup> 'Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy', *Energy Intelligence Finance*, 4 April 2012.

<sup>38</sup> 'Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013', Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 22.

<sup>39</sup> Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.

<sup>40</sup> Macharia Kamau, 'Kenya could take up to five years to pump oil', *The Standard*, 17 January 2014.

<sup>41</sup> Tullow, 'Operational Update – Kenya', Press Release, 15 January 2014.

<sup>42</sup> 'Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013', Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 28.

<sup>43</sup> Macharia Kamau, 'Kenya on fast track to join world's top oil producers', *The Standard*, 16 January 2014.

<sup>44</sup> 'Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy', *Energy Intelligence Finance*, 4 April 2012.

<sup>45</sup> 'Kenya', Energy Information Agency, Country Analysis Note, April 2014.


<sup>46</sup> Eduard Gismatullin, 'Kenya From Nowhere Plans East Africa's First Oil Exports: Energy', *Bloomberg*, 19 August 2013.

<sup>47</sup> 'Kenya government approves Centric Energy farmout of Block 10BA to Tullow Oil', *Centric Energy*, Press Release, 5 November 2010.

<sup>48</sup> Eduard Gismatullin, 'Tullow Oil Falls Most in Two Weeks on Well Results in Kenya', *Reuters*, 27 March 2014.



Figure 8: Turkana County oil development prospects



Source: Tullow Oil, Overview Presentation, April 2014, p. 30.

Tullow and its partner Africa Oil (an exploration company) believe they can monetize the discovered oil resources. But this will prove challenging. Tullow Oil's CEO, Aidan Heavey, said in May 2013 that the company would be ready to produce if road networks were upgraded to allow for the transportation of crude oil to Kenya's Mombasa refinery.<sup>49</sup> This underlines the underdeveloped state of necessary infrastructure (lack of roads and railway) and the region's remoteness. As a result, getting oil out of Turkana is an expensive prospect. An 850-kilometre pipeline and supporting infrastructure is required to export Turkana's oil resources (Figure 8).<sup>50</sup> The quality of oil will play a role in defining Kenya's infrastructure needs. Similar to that in Uganda, the oil found in Kenya is medium light, between 25 and 35 degrees API, but waxy. The crude qualities are compatible for comingling, without having a major impact on value. But the waxy content will require the pipeline to

<sup>49</sup> 'Kenya ready to produce oil 'now', *Daily Nation*, 23 May 2013.

<sup>50</sup> 'Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013', Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 19.



be heated to lower the oil's viscosity, avoid the oil congealing, and allow it to flow. The pipeline will be the longest heated pipeline in the world.<sup>51</sup> But this is not an enviable feat, as the heating and insulation requirements will be enormously expensive. The pipeline from Turkana to Lamu on the Kenyan coast could cost up to \$3 billion.<sup>52</sup>

In 2012, Keith Hill, CEO of Africa Oil, indicated that the company would seek to bring in larger investors to aid in developing the resource at a cost of \$5 to \$7 billion.<sup>53</sup> Total and CNOOC (each having experience in Kenya, being active, operating in partnership with Tullow in Uganda, and possessing larger chequebooks) would be obvious candidates. The pan-African Ecobank suggests that it will cost in the neighbourhood of \$16 billion to develop the oil resources, construct a pipeline from Turkana to the coast, and build a new port for oil exports at Lamu.<sup>54</sup> Tullow wants to finalize a development plan and gain government approval for an export pipeline plan from Turkana to Kenya's coast by the end of 2016.<sup>55</sup> The director of the National Oil Corporation of Kenya suggests oil production could begin by 2018.<sup>56</sup> These may be ambitious goals, but Kenya could arguably become an oil exporter by the end of the decade.

### Regional oil infrastructure development

Kenya's role as a regional hub for East African crude oil and petroleum products may be more significant than its potential position as an oil and gas producer. To date, Kenya's oil resources are estimated to be 600 million barrels. New discoveries may only make Kenya a small African producer – at the same level, if not smaller than, Uganda or Ghana. As a result, involvement in an East African oil pipeline is critical if Kenya wishes to remain the regional economic centre. Kenya can very well go it alone on oil exports and develop a pipeline to the coast from Turkana. But if both Ugandan and Kenyan oil were to run through the same pipeline network, the multi-billion dollar investment would be more viable. It is feasible to link a pipeline from Uganda's Lake Albert region, through Turkana, and onward to the coast (see Figure 9). But a significant number of obstacles remain before a regional pipeline is achieved. These include: finalizing the appraisal of discovered oil resources in Kenya, regional government approval of a pipeline plan, securing the finance, acquiring land for the route, and pipeline construction.<sup>57</sup> There is a long way to go before the regional pipeline can be developed and to date the neighbouring countries have been slow moving.

Progress on the Lamu Port, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor is a case in point, illustrating the arduous progress of regional infrastructure development in East Africa. The \$25 billion flagship project of Kenya's Vision 2030 includes an oil pipeline, a 32-berth port, and a refinery at Lamu. In the 1500s, Lamu was a bustling seaport connecting routes to and from the Middle East, India, and the Far East to East Africa.<sup>58</sup> Whether or not it will have a modern revival remains in question. Of late, although a few preparatory developments are ongoing at the proposed port site, LAPSSET remains very much a plan on paper alone. The ground breaking and signing of MoUs for a railway and pipeline between Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan took place in March 2012 at Lamu. But in a reflection of the long delay of the entire plan, construction of the oil refinery, which was expected to be complete in 2015, had still not begun by mid-2014.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>51</sup> It will likely have similar design features to the nearly 500-kilometre Mangala Development Pipeline between Rajasthan and Gujarat in India; 'Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013', Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 29.

<sup>52</sup> Zeddy Sambu, 'Government to invite bids for Sh255 billion crude oil pipeline', *Daily Nation*, 8 February 2014, <http://mobile.nation.co.ke/business/Government-to-invite-bids-for-Sh255-billion-crude-oil-pipeline/-/1950106/2197832/-/format/xhtml/-/ggqndaz/-/index.html>, accessed 28 July 2014.

<sup>53</sup> Yaddullah Hussain, 'Canada's Africa Oil Corp. sees promise in Kenya', *Financial Post*, 24 October 2013.

<sup>54</sup> George Mwangi, 'Ecobank: Kenya Oil Segment Needs \$16 Billion Investment', *Dow Jones Business News*, 29 July 2014.

<sup>55</sup> Tullow, 'Operational Update – Kenya', Press Release, 15 January 2014.

<sup>56</sup> 'A New Frontier: Oil and Gas in East Africa', *Control Risks*, 2012, 10.

<sup>57</sup> 'Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013', Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 29.

<sup>58</sup> 'Kenya: Lamu – Back to the Future', *African Business Magazine*, 19 February 2012.

<sup>59</sup> 'Emerging East Africa Energy', Energy Information Administration, 23 May 2013.



Oil and construction companies are eager to sign contracts and begin work on LAPSSET. But who pays the bill is still unclear. International investors have not been forthcoming to date, and Kenya's capacity to fund many parts of the massive undertaking is quite limited. Silvester Kasuku, chief executive of LAPSSET, said that the China Communications Construction Company would lead the construction of the nearly \$500 million project to build the first three berths of the planned 32-berth port at Lamu,<sup>60</sup> But it took over a year for the Kenyan government to finalize the contract after the Chinese company won the tender.<sup>61</sup>

**Figure 9: Regional oil pipeline possibilities**



Source: The Economist

The original LAPSSET plan and its huge and diverse infrastructure development goals may need to be significantly downsized to increase viability. A piecemeal approach, beginning with a basic export pipeline and port terminal at Lamu, will likely be the first parts developed. Different consortia have submitted design proposals to construct pipelines within Kenya and between neighbouring Uganda and South Sudan: Tullow/Africa Oil for a Lokichar–Lamu route; Toyota Tsusho for a Hoima (Uganda)–Lamu route; Tullow, Total, and CNOOC for Hoima–Lokichar–Lamu route; LAPSSET for Juba–Lokichar–Moyale–Lamu; and Total for a Hoima–Eldoret–Lamu/Mombasa route.<sup>62</sup> But rather than Kenya joining Ethiopia and South Sudan for export and product pipelines to Lamu, in the short term it is more likely that Uganda and Kenya will establish the first pipeline links with other neighbours joining through oil, road, and rail links in the medium and long term. This in part due to the ongoing civil war and lack of new oil discoveries in South Sudan, as well as unsuccessful exploration in Ethiopia, which deters investors from developing tie-in export pipelines from both countries. Uganda, Rwanda, and

<sup>60</sup> George Mwani, 'Chinese Firm Signs \$478.9 Million Kenya Lamu Port Deal', *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 August 2014.

<sup>61</sup> Drazen Jorgic, 'Kenya says Chinese firm wins first tender for Lamu port project', *Reuters*, 11 April 2013.

<sup>62</sup> Zeddy Sambu, 'Kenya amends conditions for pipeline tender following talks with Uganda', *Daily Nation*, 19 July 2014.



Kenya have also signed MoUs on product and export pipelines and may be the first to implement the agreements.<sup>63</sup>

Several of the pipeline plans submitted by international oil companies operating in the region include Mombasa as the end destination for Kenyan and Ugandan crude oil. This may be a more feasible option because an expansion of the otherwise congested Mombasa port is ongoing, there is already product pipeline infrastructure between Mombasa and Nairobi, existing road and rail support is in place to develop new pipelines (unlike the case in Turkana and northern Kenya), and a new Chinese-financed and constructed railway is planned. But LAPSSSET holds high political importance for Kenya's government and will not easily be abandoned.

The quality of Ugandan and Kenyan crude is compatible and can flow in the same pipeline, but questions remain over whether the potential Kenya–Uganda oil cooperation will be upended by longstanding competition between the two East African countries. In the words of one international oil company advisor: 'If relations are driven by economics, they will find a solution ... If politics decides, it will be more arbitrary.'<sup>64</sup> If all goes smoothly, the Uganda–Kenya pipeline could be finished by 2019. 'It's not certain, but it's possible,' said the advisor. A transparent regional agreement between Kenya and neighbouring countries, particularly Uganda, and the speedy implementation of such a plan, would help turn rivalries in East Africa into partnerships, and encourage investors. Kenya, which initially did not invite Uganda to participate in regional pipeline plans, has since increased dialogue, and established preliminary agreements with Kampala. But there are still differences that need to be overcome between the East African neighbours.

The cost of a Uganda–Kenya pipeline could be between \$2.5 and \$5 billion.<sup>65</sup> The exact route will play a large role in dictating the final cost since the requirement that the pipe be heated and insulated increases investment needs substantially. Keeping the pipeline as short as possible is vital for the project's viability. For its part, Uganda is eager to monetize its oil resources, a goal which has been long delayed since its 2006 discoveries. Kampala favours a Southern Corridor, the Hoima–Eldoret–Lamu/Mombasa route, and initially wants to avoid the pipeline link to Turkana.<sup>66</sup> This would establish an independent pipeline system along the existing Nairobi–Mombasa route.

Nairobi, however, is pushing for a Northern Corridor, through Lokichar, and to Lamu in order to develop Turkana's oil resources and meet some of its LAPSSSET goals.<sup>67</sup> But the Northern Corridor has a 1,300 kilometre route which crosses over mountainous, isolated, and underdeveloped areas, where rock will need to be removed and roads and supporting infrastructure built, while a three-month rainy season would slow down operations. There would also need to be extensive social engagement with local communities along the route. As a vice president of an international oil company in Kenya said: 'All your communities, all your local authorities, and all your levels of government, along the route of the pipeline will need to be involved'. All these considerations push the costs of the Northern Corridor pipeline to above \$4.5 billion.<sup>68</sup>

Kenya's oil resources are still under appraisal by Tullow and Africa Oil, which will help determine whether an East African oil pipeline should first go through Turkana, or a spur line connecting the isolated region to a southern route from Uganda be built later. It will take two to four years to ascertain final commerciality and in the meantime Uganda remains eager to push forward with generating

<sup>63</sup> Sulaiman Kakaire and David Tash Lumu, 'East Africa: Museveni, Kenyatta, Kagame in Ambitious East Africa Devt Plan', *The Observer*, 23 June 2013.

<sup>64</sup> Interview, advisor at international oil company active in East Africa, 26 June 2014.

<sup>65</sup> Drazen Jorgic, 'Kenya attacks undermine plans for east African trade hub', *Reuters*, 20 June 2014.

<sup>66</sup> Interview, vice-president of international oil company active in Kenya, 26 June 2014.

<sup>67</sup> In either the Northern or Southern Corridor, pipeline construction would be split into two parts, one beginning from Hoima to the Kenya/Uganda border, the other from the border to Lamu or Mombasa; 'Kenya', Energy Information Agency, Country Analysis Note, April 2014.

<sup>68</sup> Interview, vice-president of international oil company active in Kenya, 26 June 2014.



revenues from its long idle but proven oil reserves. ‘Uganda is still the backbone of East Africa oil,’ said the international oil company vice president.<sup>69</sup>

Other regional oil infrastructure development plans may act as substitutes for a Kenya-centred regional oil infrastructure network. Oil companies in Uganda are also considering a Uganda–Tanzania route along the west side of Lake Victoria (see Figure 9) instead of through Kenya, but it would need to be far longer than a route through Kenya, and Uganda alone may have to bear the costs.<sup>70</sup> There is competition between Kenya and Tanzania, and their respective ports at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, and new sites. Kenya is expanding the capacity of the Mombasa port and easing costs for landlocked Uganda and Rwanda in the face of Tanzanian competition.<sup>71</sup> If Kenya wants to maintain its ‘Gateway to East Africa’ status, it will need to move forward with its infrastructure plans.

### Political, social, and security risks

As the oil industry shifts from exploration to development and production, required investments will grow from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars for new oil infrastructure. Tullow Oil, and in particular its smaller and more exploration-orientated partner Africa Oil, will likely sell a share of their interests in the Turkana concessions to larger industry players, such as oil majors and Asian national oil companies, to provide the required capital investments to develop the oil fields. It is at this juncture that risk incentives among the involved oil companies will lower profoundly. During the exploration phase, in the initial drive to discover oil, oil industry operations have been left relatively free from regulatory constraints and political interference. In the upcoming development phase this will likely not be the case. Rather, an ‘obsolescing bargain’, in which an initial favourable bargaining position for international companies shifts in favour of the government over time, as fixed asset investments increase, may be developing in East Africa.

### Political risk

Any business activity is inherently political. This is particularly relevant in a country such as Kenya where politics are so closely tied to business and ethnicity. As a result, the nascent oil industry will not be completely insulated from growing risks in a shifting political and security landscape. The regulatory environment for the oil industry in Kenya is in flux. The planning, establishment, and implementation of a new National Energy Bill and Petroleum Exploration and Development Production Act will have important consequences for the oil industry. New laws will encourage investment on the one hand, particularly in natural gas where there is a lack of regulation, but on the other hand the costs of doing business could increase. And since the political and regulatory environments in Kenya are intertwined, the government may exploit new rules and regulations to advance political and economic goals.

International oil companies have received ample support from both former and current governments in Kenya. International oil companies are confident that the Kenyan government will not delay the start of oil production by stymying foreign investment with restrictive regulations.<sup>72</sup> But the onset of production may very well coincide with political changes in Kenya, as the next general elections are scheduled for August 2017. The incumbent, or a potential new government, may put forward new policies for the oil industry, in an effort to leverage the government’s financial position and to gain support from political constituencies, particularly in oil regions and those regions where related infrastructure development is expected. Kenya’s mining industry offers examples of how political and

<sup>69</sup> Interview, vice-president of international oil company active in Kenya, 26 June 2014.

<sup>70</sup> Interviews, senior managers of international oil companies active in Kenya, 26 June 2014 & 9 July 2014.

<sup>71</sup> Sara Jerving, ‘Kenya Fights Off Port Competition With \$13 Billion Plan: Freight’, *Bloomberg*, 20 August 2013.

<sup>72</sup> Interviews, senior managers of international oil companies active in Kenya, 26 June 2014 & 9 July 2014.



legal disputes between local communities and county and central governments can delay commercial activities.<sup>73</sup> Once oil production does begin, and petrodollars flow into government coffers, oil revenue sharing will become a fixture of Kenyan politics.

The Kenyan government is striving to enhance the relatively weak legal and regulatory framework of its 1985 Petroleum Exploration and Production Act. The new law will change the governance structure of the oil industry. To date, the National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee (NAFFAC), an inter-ministerial body, has been officially in charge of licensing concessions.<sup>74</sup> This power will likely be fully constituted under the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MEP) in the new energy policy, while NAFFAC will become a consultation body.<sup>75</sup> The Cabinet Secretary within the MEP will probably maintain the most power in both policy-making and regulatory decisions, leaving space for political interference in the industry.<sup>76</sup> Nonetheless, the 2010 constitution, and the establishment of a National Land Commission in 2012, may have consequences for oil governance in Kenya. It is likely that there will be a multi-tier governance structure over the oil industry, as parliament should be given greater ratification powers over other bodies of government, according to the new constitution.<sup>77</sup> Regulatory responsibility may be shared between national and county governments, as well as various constitutional commissions and government companies and agencies. This presents a complex regulatory landscape for investors to navigate, and may increase the cost of doing business.

There are also a number of specific policy changes in store for the oil industry. Kenya aims to improve its technical capacity to engage and govern the oil and gas sector through the Ministry of Energy and national companies such as: the National Oil Corporation of Kenya, Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited, and Kenya Pipeline Company Limited.<sup>78</sup> Although the majority of oil concessions have already been licensed out, Kenya has indicated it will introduce bidding rounds in the future to replace direct proposals and the first-come first-served basis under which the industry has operated to date.<sup>79</sup> By mid-2014, the first round was still delayed because the new energy bill had not yet been brought in line with the 2010 constitution and reviewed by parliament.<sup>80</sup> Once competitive bidding does begin, exploration concessions will be expanded from 46 to 51.<sup>81</sup> Future contracts will include new licensing fees, exploration schedules, and requirements to meet annual training fees for Kenyan civil servants. These measures were taken to discourage speculators and encourage exploration and development.<sup>82</sup> Kenya demonstrated the seriousness of its new approach to the industry by its expulsion of Statoil, after the Norwegian company had failed to conduct a 3D survey of its licensed offshore L26 block as demanded by the MEP.<sup>83</sup>

For contract terms, the former Commissioner for Petroleum Energy, Martin Mwaisakenyi, commented that oil companies could recover their costs from exploration, 'cost oil', at 60 per cent per year once production begins. The remaining 'profit oil' will be split between the companies and government depending on production levels: the government share will be 50 per cent up to 30,000 bpd and rise to 78 per cent above 100,000 bpd.<sup>84</sup> The combination of high-cost payments by the government to oil

<sup>73</sup> Steve Mbogo, 'Mui coal plant row goes out of court', *The East African*, 26 October 2013, [www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Mui-coal-plant-row-goes-out-of-court/-/2560/2047916/-/nc03plz/-/index.html](http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Mui-coal-plant-row-goes-out-of-court/-/2560/2047916/-/nc03plz/-/index.html) accessed on 10 September 2014.

<sup>74</sup> 'Kenya unveils new oil and gas licensing rules', *The East African*, 15 December 2012.

<sup>75</sup> 'Draft National Energy Policy', Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Republic of Kenya, 24 February 2014, 22.

<sup>76</sup> 'Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society', The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 31.

<sup>77</sup> 'Kenya', Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, March 2013, 2.

<sup>78</sup> 'Second Medium Term Plan 2013–2017', Kenya Vision 2030, Government of the Republic of Kenya, Nairobi, 2013, 69.

<sup>79</sup> 'Kenya Joins East Africa Oil and Gas Frenzy', *Energy Intelligence Finance*, 4 April 2012.

<sup>80</sup> George Obulutsa, 'Kenya delays energy bill until June', *Reuters*, 8 January 2014.

<sup>81</sup> Oil companies will also need to cede 25% of exploration acreage after 2 years onshore and 3 years offshore if work commitments not made; Kennedy Senelwa, 'Kenya set to auction five oil, gas blocks as new rules take effect', *The East African*, 5 January 2013.

<sup>82</sup> 'Kenya unveils new oil and gas licensing rules', *The East African*, 15 December 2012.

<sup>83</sup> Rawlings Otini, 'Kenya expels oil giant Statoil from exploration plan', *Business Daily*, 5 November 2012.

<sup>84</sup> 'Kenya unveils new oil and gas licensing rules', *The East African*, 15 December 2012.





companies and initial low production will result in low initial government profit shares. This may cause some public resentment towards oil companies if expectations of production are not properly managed before it begins.

Kenyan officials have stressed that they do not wish to repeat the delays to oil development witnessed in Uganda. President Kenyatta will likely strive to see oil production as soon as possible in order to capitalize on political credit before the next election, particularly in launching major infrastructure projects to develop the northern and coastal regions where his current support is weak compared to the central counties. But at the same time, Kenyatta does not want to repeat Uganda's negative experience of not capturing significant gains during the development phase of its oil industry. Foreseeing potential large concession interest sales by Tullow Oil and Africa Oil, Kenya plans to impose taxes on oil, gas, and mining companies by the end of 2014, and President Kenyatta says: 'We want to ensure that we as a country also are able to benefit from both the windfall and capital gains tax ... Uganda has lost a lot of revenue as a result of not really having focused on that'.<sup>85</sup>

Unlike the position facing other regional neighbours, there is more potential in Kenya for bottom-up oversight and intervention in the oil industry.<sup>86</sup> In the coming years, Tullow and Africa Oil will need to bring in larger partners to help develop oil resources in Blocks 10BB and 13T of Turkana County. These sales will likely result in public scrutiny of how the two exploration companies acquired the concessions. During the coalition government between 2008 and 2012, high-level politicians allegedly profited from selling oil concessions to international oil companies through private companies (the 2003 Public Officer Ethics Act does not prohibit civil servants from owning stakes or having interests in private companies unless these conflict with official duties).<sup>87</sup> These dealings, together with unfavourable terms for the government in existing contracts, even if they were designed to attract foreign investment to unproven oil regions, may face public backlash and potential review, as has been the case in Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania in recent years.

Fearing a potential loss of negotiating power, local communities and county governments will also respond to the entry of new oil companies, and may make renewed demands that delay the industry from advancing forward.<sup>88</sup> There is also regional political risk from un-demarcated international borders between Kenya and its neighbours. Somalia is seeking to take Kenya to the International Court of Justice in The Hague over maritime border claims of some offshore concessions.<sup>89</sup> Such disputes may also arise onshore if oil exploration in Turkana County reaches the disputed Ilemi Triangle between Kenya, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

## Social risk

The successful advancement of the 2010 constitution offers potential economic and social development boons and can help reverse high levels of inequality in Kenya. Such a process, however, offers challenges to the oil industry as communities in oil regions and their political representatives grapple with the convergence of new economic resources and increased political power. But a failure by the Kenyan government to successfully implement political devolution could be even more damaging to the timely development of the oil industry. This outcome could see aggrieved counties contest oil resources with the national government and international oil companies. If the objectives of devolution in the new constitution are fulfilled and political power and economic resources shift from the centre to county level, particularly in restless peripheral regions such as Turkana, then conflicts over scarce resources can be mitigated.

<sup>85</sup> 'Blow for Tullow as Kenya eyes windfall tax on oil companies', *The Irish Independent*, 5 August 2014.

<sup>86</sup> David Booth, Brian Coosey, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, and Karuti Kanyinga, 'East African prospects: An update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda', Overseas Development Institute, Report, May 2014, 27.

<sup>87</sup> 'Minister's Firm Sold Turkana Oil Block for Sh800m', *The Daily Nation*, 27 March 2012; Andrea S. Pongo, 'Effects of the 2013 National Elections on Oil Exploration in Kenya', Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria VA, 2013, 2.

<sup>88</sup> Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 September 2014.

<sup>89</sup> 'Somalia takes Kenya to U.N. court in oil rights row', *Reuters*, 29 August 2014.



There has been widespread oil exploration over the past 60 years in Kenya. But to date oil has only been found in Turkana County. Turkana is a large and isolated region located in Kenya's north-west, bordering Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Turkana is part of Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands (as are counties within the Anza, Mander, and Lamu Basins) and it is also one of Kenya's poorest regions, where the vast majority live under the poverty line. As a colonial officer once coarsely (and mistakenly) said of Turkana, it is 'the wildest and most worthless district in Kenya.'<sup>90</sup>

The Turkana population, estimated at over 1 million with a density of two people per square kilometre, is largely pastoralist; the tending of livestock (cattle, sheep, and goats) providing both livelihood and identity.<sup>91</sup> Development in Turkana has been neglected by the central government in Nairobi for decades. It lacks infrastructure, skilled labour, and security, with a large flow of small arms coming through porous borders to and from conflicts in neighbouring countries.<sup>92</sup> Working in such isolated and underdeveloped regions is not uncommon in the international oil industry, but Turkana is nonetheless a difficult and expensive operational environment.

The national-local political divides, local competition, and the possible and perceived environmental impact of the oil industry have all fuelled concerns that Turkana may take on some of the negative traits of poverty and conflict associated with oil development in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Sparking superstitious concern, rig 804 operating at the Ngamia 1 well (the site of Kenya's first oil discovery) was previously used in the Niger Delta.<sup>93</sup> But the situation in Turkana is a long way off such environmental degradation and armed conflict. And Kenya's relatively strong civil society, media, and judicial system can act to prevent these traits from developing, if mechanisms to settle political and social grievances are conceived.

In Turkana, expectations are high that oil will bring fast-paced economic growth and development. Managing these expectations according to both the long timeframe for oil development and the limitations of what are still relatively small oil discoveries, is regarded as one of the main challenges facing the Kenyan government and international oil companies in relations with local communities.<sup>94</sup> As a senior manager at Africa Oil said: 'The oil and gas industry cannot be the game changer in the country's north ... At best, it can be a stimulus'.<sup>95</sup> There is also apprehension among the local population that they will be left out of the oil boom. In this sense, oil companies will be well advised to manage their expectations of time constraints on operations, and the importance of relations with local communities, in the social and political environment in which they are working.

Speaking at a meeting on the sidelines of the US-African Leaders Summit in Washington DC in August 2014, President Kenyatta underlined his willingness to make oil contracts publicly available.<sup>96</sup> Although the Kenyan president's position may be geared towards attracting further US investment to Kenya's oil sector, Kenyatta visited Houston and potential investors, including ExxonMobil and

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<sup>90</sup> Rayner, H., *The Ivory Traders*, London: W. Heinemann, 1923, quoted in R. Dyson-Hudson and J. Terrence McCabe, *South Turkana Nomadism: Coping with an Unpredictably Varying Environment*, Ethnography Series, FL17-001. New Haven: HRAFlex Books, 1985.

<sup>91</sup> Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, 'Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or development?', *African Geographical Review*, 2014, 3–5.

<sup>92</sup> Patricia I. Vasquez, 'Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves', *Articles and Debates*, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.

<sup>93</sup> 'Kenya oil: Inside Tullow Oil Ngamia 1 rig in Turkana', *Kenya Reporter*, 12 April 2012.

<sup>94</sup> Ryan Cummings, 'Predicting Africa's Next Oil Insurgency: The Precarious Case of Kenya's Turkana County', *Think Africa Press*, 13 September 2013, <http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting-next-oil-insurgency-precarious-case-turkana-county> accessed 14 August 2014.

<sup>95</sup> 'Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society', The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 68.

<sup>96</sup> Ian Gary, '“Absolutely” – Kenya President backs full oil contract disclosure', *The Politics of Poverty*, 27 August 2014, <http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2014/08/absolutely-kenya-president-backs-full-oil-contract-disclosure/> accessed 11 September 2014.



Conoco Philips,<sup>97</sup> Tullow and other oil companies present in Kenya are supportive of publishing the contracts and environmental impact assessments.<sup>98</sup> The draft of the National Energy Policy calls for 20 per cent of 'the government share of profits from energy natural resources' to be shared with the county government and 5 per cent with the local community (determined by the sub-county where the resource exists and delivered by the county government).<sup>99</sup> These are all positive indications, but have not yet been followed through with action. If the central government does not manage the oil industry in a relatively transparent manner, then the obscure distribution, budgeting, and expenditure of oil revenues will create further grievances among local populations.

Just as political tensions are present around oil at the national–local level, they also exist between local communities and their political representatives, together with wrangling between the governor, MPs, and the senate. The lack of capacity, in county governments and local communities, to assess the social and environmental impact of the oil industry, to negotiate business involvement, and to manage possible future revenues, has created concern that governance flaws in Kenya will simply be relocated from the central to the county level through political devolution.<sup>100</sup> How the county level government disseminates its oil revenue share is critical. Local communities not in the sub-counties where oil is produced, but nonetheless affected by oil operations and infrastructure, may make strong demands for revenue shares. Oil companies may become conduits for local communities to attempt to amend social grievances with local and national government and be scrutinized for their own behaviour in a regulatory weak business environment.

Even though still in the exploration and development phase, social grievances among the local population have constrained oil operations in Turkana. In late October 2013, Tullow suspended its operations in Block 10BB and 13T in Turkana in the face of demonstrations by hundreds of local residents over the lack of employment and business opportunities. The respective members of parliament in Turkana South and Turkana East led local residents in the protests. They marched on the Twiga 1, Etuko, and Ngamia 1 oil well sites and shut down operations in the two districts for several weeks in the process.<sup>101</sup> While the local MPs were detained and questioned for a period by Kenya's Police Criminal Investigation Department,<sup>102</sup> the central government sent representatives to meet with community leaders to defuse the situation. There were wide-reaching consequences for international oil companies involved in the concessions. Stock of Tullow Oil and its partner Africa Oil dropped by 1.4 per cent and 2 per cent respectively upon the news.

Tullow responded to these grievances through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that underlined the company's commitment to using local staff, goods, and services (even before the incident over half of its 1,400 staff in Kenya came from Turkana), pledged to agree on a formal grievance resolution procedure, committed to doubling its social investments in 2014 to \$2 million (from \$1 million in 2013), and opened community resource offices in Lodwar, Lokori, and Lokichar.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Samuel Kamau Mbote, 'President Kenyatta to visit Texas for energy related discussions', *Oil News Kenya*, 8 August 2014, <http://oilnewskenya.com/2014/08/08/president-kenyatta-to-visit-texas-for-energy-related-discussions/> accessed 28 September 2014

<sup>98</sup> Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.

<sup>99</sup> 'Draft National Energy Policy', Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Republic of Kenya, 24 February 2014, 130 & 146.

<sup>100</sup> Patricia I. Vasquez, 'Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves', *Articles and Debates*, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.

<sup>101</sup> Lucas Ngaasike, 'Tullow Oil suspends operations over conflict with locals', *The Standard*, 28 October 2013.

<sup>102</sup> Cyrus Ombati and Lucas Ng'Asike, 'MPs grilled over protests at Tullow Oil well, Turkana', *The Standard*, 30 October 2013, [www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000096529/mps-grilled-over-protests-at-tullow-oil-well-turkana](http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/thecounties/article/2000096529/mps-grilled-over-protests-at-tullow-oil-well-turkana) accessed 14 August 2014.

<sup>103</sup> Michael Kavanagh and Katrina Manson, 'Tullow temporarily halts Kenya work after protests', *Financial Times*, 28 October 2013; 'Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society', The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 53; 'Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013', Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 27.



But since there is little oversight over the MoU, which excluded consultations with civil society in its drafting, it may be only a temporary fix.<sup>104</sup>

The protest was a product of the desire of the Turkana people themselves, rather than ‘foreigners’, to benefit from oil specifically (from the perspective of most Turkana people, other Kenyans who do not come from the region are also regarded as foreigners).<sup>105</sup> It was also the result of infighting among the Turkana people. Oil has been confirmed in South Turkana, and people in the sub-county want to see the majority of the jobs, contracts, and other boons from oil development come their way first before they spread to others in the county.

There are also acute concerns among local residents that their political representatives will exploit their positions to advance their own interests in collaboration with oil companies.<sup>106</sup> In June 2012, in Lodwar, the capital of Turkana County, community leaders claimed local officials had exploited their positions to profit from land acquisitions by the oil industry and had intimidated and displaced communities near oil wells. Tullow was accused by local communities of colluding with county and national officials in not publishing environmental impact assessments, not compensating local communities sufficiently, bribing local officials to secure land, not employing enough local people, and not providing adequate compensation for claims of losses incurred from oil exploration activities.<sup>107</sup>

Local content will be a critical political and social issue for oil operations in Kenya. The national government wants to leverage Kenyan companies’ activities and provision of goods and services in the oil industry.<sup>108</sup> But local content cannot be easily separated from often-divisive politics in Kenya and close links between business and political interests. International oil companies will be hard pressed to navigate, at times, competing interests between the national government, county governors, MPs, the county senate, and local communities.<sup>109</sup> Tullow has been increasingly transparent about its payments to Kenyan stakeholders. In 2013, it spent \$71 million altogether on local suppliers, taxes, and community development.<sup>110</sup> But as investment levels rise during the development phase, oil companies will be expected to increase their engagement with Kenyan companies, labour, and investments in local communities. Since there is a limit to engagement with local communities in Turkana, due to their lack of skills and capacity to work in the oil industry, tensions between the national and local level should be expected as other Kenyan companies and non-Turkana labour move in to fill the vacuum, until the Turkana people can play a deeper role in the oil industry through training.

In Turkana, where arable land and water are scarce, acute environmental concerns are attached to the expansion of the oil industry. Kenya’s National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) is charged with monitoring compliance to environmental and social safeguards, but is understaffed and underfunded.<sup>111</sup> NEMA may muster its resources to focus on big industries and projects, such as oil

<sup>104</sup> ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 54.

<sup>105</sup> Personal communications, Kenyan academic. 9 September 2014.

<sup>106</sup> ‘Governor Nanok clarifies why Turkana county returned Sh3b to National treasury’, *The Standard*, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/campus/story/2000133442/governor-nanok-clarifies-why-turkana-county-returned-sh3b-to-national-treasury>, 1 September 2014, accessed 10 September 2014; Personal communications, Kenyan academic. 9 September 2014.

<sup>107</sup> Ryan Cummings, ‘Predicting Africa’s Next Oil Insurgency: The Precarious Case of Kenya’s Turkana County’, *Think Africa Press*, 13 September 2013, <http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/predicting-next-oil-insurgency-precarious-case-turkana-county> accessed 14 August 2014; Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.

<sup>108</sup> ‘Kenya’, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, March 2013, 4.

<sup>109</sup> ‘Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society’, The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 69.

<sup>110</sup> In 2011, Tullow spent \$23.6 million on local suppliers. This represented 23% of its overall spending in Kenya, ‘Kenya unveils new oil and gas licensing rules’, *The East African*, 15 December 2012; ‘Tullow Oil, Annual Report 2013’, Tullow Oil, London, 2014, 24.

<sup>111</sup> Patricia I. Vasquez, ‘Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves’, *Articles and Debates*, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.



and gas, but there are also allegations that it is fraught with corruption.<sup>112</sup> Since enforcement can be lacking, some self-regulation may be required by the oil industry if a regulatory vacuum continues.

The struggle over scarce resources in Turkana is spilling over into oil. After the discovery of oil at Ngamia 1 by Tullow Oil, the Turkana and Pokot (a neighbouring ethnic group) disputed the location of the well; the Pokot accused the Turkana of illegally occupying the land.<sup>113</sup> The Turkana–Pokot oil dispute threatens to serve as a new frontier of a traditional rivalry over cattle, water, and pastures.<sup>114</sup> Too often international oil companies have described such local disputes and armed fighting as ‘occasional intertribal conflict’ to assuage investor concerns.<sup>115</sup> But when these are actually decades-old conflicts,<sup>116</sup> it does not serve the interests of companies to downplay their existence. While Tullow, Total, and BG Group are signatories to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (a set of human rights guidelines for extractive industry companies) some capacity to deal with insecurity in a manner compatible with international best practice is required within the Kenyan security forces.<sup>117</sup>

The demands for more benefits from the oil industry are not necessarily just a product of overblown expectations among local communities, they are also a result of witnessing the damage that oil development has caused in the past in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. Local communities are not unaccustomed to dealing with oil companies. Oil exploration has gone on for some six decades across large swaths of Kenya, and not without negative experiences for local communities. Some communities have accused oil companies once operating in the country of harming livestock, after waste was dumped.<sup>118</sup> For example, in Marsabit County locals claim that waste dumped in abandoned oil wells is the source of increased incidences of cancer and other chronic ailments among humans and livestock.<sup>119</sup>

Employment issues are also hotly contested at the local level and have a history that predates oil. The Kenyan government and NGOs and international organizations have been the largest employers in Turkana to date, but nonlocal Kenyans hold the majority of the jobs.<sup>120</sup> Although largely lacking the skills and education to participate, the uneven distribution of jobs has nonetheless created discontent among the Turkana; this, as a result, has amplified recent hostility towards the oil industry regarding hiring practices. These negative experiences fuel mistrust towards current operators.

The Swedish firm, Lundin, claims that before it arrived in 2007 no oil company had ever taken a systematic approach to community engagement.<sup>121</sup> Many exploration companies have shorter time horizons and little capacity to engage in community development programmes. Local politicians and communities in Turkana remain fearful that Tullow, which has made significant discoveries, will exit after selling these resources to new companies, while local communities will have to renegotiate conditions with new companies, losing any commitments and benefits they negotiated with the current companies.<sup>122</sup> While Tullow is increasingly involved in production activities around the world, and will most likely keep a significant share in its Kenyan concessions, other more exploration-focused companies may seek early monetization of their interests.

<sup>112</sup> Brian Otieno, ‘Two NEMA Officials Probed Over Graft’, *The Star*, 8 February 2014.

<sup>113</sup> Patricia I. Vasquez, ‘Kenya at a crossroads: Hopes and fears concerning the development of oil and gas reserves’, *Articles and Debates*, 4.3, International Development Policy, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2013, 7.

<sup>114</sup> Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.

<sup>115</sup> Christine Batruch, ‘Lundin Petroleum AB’s experience in East Africa: the role of the private sector in conflict-prone Countries’, *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2010, 7.

<sup>116</sup> Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, ‘Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or development?’, *African Geographical Review*, 2014, 7.

<sup>117</sup> Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.

<sup>118</sup> Christine Batruch, ‘Lundin Petroleum AB’s experience in East Africa: the role of the private sector in conflict-prone Countries’, *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2010, 9.

<sup>119</sup> Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.

<sup>120</sup> Eliza M. Johannes, Leo C. Zulu, and Ezekiel Kalipeni, ‘Oil discovery in Turkana County, Kenya: a source of conflict or development?’, *African Geographical Review*, 2014, 11.

<sup>121</sup> Christine Batruch, ‘Lundin Petroleum AB’s experience in East Africa: the role of the private sector in conflict-prone Countries’, *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2010, 7.

<sup>122</sup> Personal communication, Kenyan academic, 6 August 2014.



The implementation of new legislation may be the answer to settling community concerns on concession sales. The possible retrospective effect of new laws coming out of Kenya's 2010 constitution – such as the Community Land Bill – may at first glance appear to upset oil industry interests,<sup>123</sup> but opposition to the advancement of such laws may actually backfire if the alternative is a hostile operational climate. If these social grievances go unaddressed then the operations of the oil industry will be delayed and limited due to protests, blockages, sabotage, theft, and even armed attacks.

### Security risk

Not only is the starting point of Kenya's oil production under threat from political instability and insecurity, but also its exit to international markets on the coast. Kenya's coastal communities have longstanding social and political grievances with the central government in Nairobi. Internal politics alone have the capacity to create insecurity for the oil industry if planned pipeline and other downstream infrastructure is targeted. But there is also the possibility that these disputes could become a toxic mix with the incursion of the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab on the coast – delaying and hampering large-scale investments in the process.

Al-Shabaab may be positioning itself to exploit social and political tensions to win support from local populations on Kenya's coast. But if the Kenyan government is able to advance political devolution to coastal counties, while working to contain al-Shabaab in an apolitical manner, then there is a strong likelihood that, with regional and international support, Nairobi will be able to curb the militant group's activities, allowing the oil industry to operate in a relatively secure environment. If Kenya is to become the transit hub for East Africa's oil boom, and fend off competition from Tanzania, then relative stability and security on the coast must be achieved.

The coastal regions, similar to Turkana, are some of the least developed in Kenya. There exist severe social grievances over neglect by the central government in Nairobi, particularly among the Muslim population. This is coupled with feelings of exploitation over land rights (since Kikuyu settlers came to the region in the 1960s) and the incursion of Kenyan companies from the Nairobi area into the coast's prosperous tourism sector. These grievances have fuelled separatist sentiment through groups, such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) whose common slogan is *Pwani Si Kenya* or 'The Coast is not Kenya'.

At the same time, a series of terrorist attacks carried out by al-Shabaab over the past two years has heightened security concerns in Kenya. The militant group claims that such attacks are in response to Kenya's military incursion, first unilaterally and then through the African Union force in southern Somalia in 2011. In September 2013, 67 people were killed in a dramatic terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi. A bomb attack killed 10 people in the capital in May 2014. Later, following five attacks connected to al-Shabaab on coastal communities in Lamu and Tana River counties, over 100 were left dead (Mombasa County had been targeted in earlier attacks). The insecurity has negatively affected tourism, as the USA, Britain, and other western governments have issued travel advisories.<sup>124</sup> A security response from the Kenyan government may be necessary to dissuade attacks in the near future, but a long-term solution to contain al-Shabaab requires a political settlement, which must include some degree of stability in Somalia.<sup>125</sup>

The threat posed by al-Shabaab to the oil industry should not be over amplified. But there is growing concern that terrorist attacks in Kenya over the past few years may widen political divides between Nairobi and the coast. The targeting of, and discrimination shown against, Kenyan Somalis and

<sup>123</sup> Harold Ayodo, 'Tullow Oil's move on land Bill opposed', *The Standard*, 24 April 2014.

<sup>124</sup> Jeffrey Gettleman, 'Gruesome Attacks in Kenyan Villages Heighten Fears of a Nation on Edge', *The New York Times*, 7 July 2014.

<sup>125</sup> 'Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War', *International Crisis Group*, Africa Briefing No 99, 26 June 2014.



Muslims by Kenyan security forces in the wake of the Westgate attack provides recruitment possibilities and avenues of support for al-Shabaab in Kenya.<sup>126</sup> After the terrorist attacks on coastal villages, in which the many of the victims were Kikuyu (Kenya's dominant ethnic group, and that of President Kenyatta) security authorities and the president himself linked the killings to local political groups such as the MRC.<sup>127</sup> In a statement on 17 June, Uhuru Kenyatta said: 'The attack in Lamu was well planned, orchestrated, and politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and evicting them for political reasons'.<sup>128</sup>

Some observers believe that al-Shabaab is deliberately trying to undermine political stability in Kenya through targeted attacks on Kikuyus in coastal regions.<sup>129</sup> Although he later advanced the theory that al-Shabaab may have played a role, President Kenyatta's politicization of the attacks sparked concern that the security situation may worsen because internal divisions between ethnic groups had been enflamed.<sup>130</sup> Such tensions are aggravated when rich Kenyan speculators from Nairobi and the Rift Valley buy up acreage in Lamu County, with intentions of later selling the land when schemes for government-planned infrastructure increase prices.<sup>131</sup> Possibly in an attempt to subdue some of these concerns, President Kenyatta recently ordered the repossession of 500,000 acres of public land after an audit found developers had acquired ownership under 'dubious and suspicious corrupt circumstances'.<sup>132</sup>

The consequences for the oil industry of the insecurity on Kenya's coast are already starting to show. One oil company assigned a 'business critical' status to travel to Nairobi in the wake of terrorist attacks.<sup>133</sup> Other exploration activity, in Blocks 3A and 3B in northern Kenya near the border with Somalia, has been delayed, due in part to security concerns.<sup>134</sup> 'Al-Shabaab is target oriented and pretty mobile', said one advisor at an international oil company active in Kenya.<sup>135</sup> The ability of Kenya's Defence Forces, National Intelligence Service, and National Police Service to protect critical infrastructure in the energy sector has also come under question, on account of the lack of a key authority covering security measures and competition between government ministries on security issues that would foster information sharing, which is otherwise inhibited.<sup>136</sup>

Security concerns will entail extra insurance premiums for the financing of a possible Uganda–Kenya pipeline, pushing its cost to the higher end of the \$2.5 to \$5 billion estimate.<sup>137</sup> Tullow has suggested that any consortium of companies building a pipeline will need to bury it underground for security and environmental reasons, following international best practice in the industry. This would increase construction time, but in the long run, a buried pipeline would help avoid the oil bunkering witnessed in Nigeria and have a smaller footprint on pastoral livelihoods in Kenya's north.<sup>138</sup>

<sup>126</sup> 'Kenya and its coastal discontents', *Aljazeera*, 26 September 2012, [www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/20129238293700321.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/20129238293700321.html) accessed 14 August 2014.

<sup>127</sup> Robyn Dixon, 'Tension rises in Kenya as 29 are killed in attacks on coastal towns', *The Los Angeles Times*, 6 July 2014.

<sup>128</sup> 'Conflict dynamics on Kenya's coast', *IRIN*, 23 July 2014, [www.irinnews.org/report/100394/analysis-conflict-dynamics-on-kenya-s-coast](http://www.irinnews.org/report/100394/analysis-conflict-dynamics-on-kenya-s-coast) accessed 14 August 2014.

<sup>129</sup> Mohamed Mubarak, 'Al-Shabaab's foreign operations arm is busy recruiting in Kenya', *African Arguments*, 3 July 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/03/al-shabaabs-foreign-operations-arm-is-busy-recruiting-in-kenya-by-mohamed-mubarak/> accessed 14 August 2014.

<sup>130</sup> Murithi Mutiga, 'Al-Shabaab Lays a Trap for Kenya', *The New York Times*, 29 June 2014.

<sup>131</sup> 'Lapsset, oil discovery triggers real estate boom in Lamu Archipengo', *The Standard*, 21 May 2014.

<sup>132</sup> 'Kenya's leader Kenyatta orders Lamu land repossession', *BBC News*, 1 August 2014.

<sup>133</sup> Magnus Taylor, 'Kenyan gloom and ineffective authoritarianism: free-form thinking on the state of Eastern Africa', *African Arguments*, 7 July 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/07/07/kenyan-gloom-and-ineffective-authoritarianism-free-form-thinking-on-the-state-of-eastern-africa-by-magnus-taylor/> accessed 14 August 2014.

<sup>134</sup> 'Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya's Oil and Gas Resources – The Perspectives of Civil Society', The Kenya Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (KCSPOG), Nairobi, July 2014, 10.

<sup>135</sup> Interview, 26 June 2014.

<sup>136</sup> E.O.S Odhiambo, T.L Maito, and K. Onkware, 'Kenya's oil pipeline and terrorism', *Journal of Defense Resources Management*, Vol. 5, Issue 1, 2014, 27–8.

<sup>137</sup> Drazen Jorgic, 'Kenya attacks undermine plans for east African trade hub', *Reuters*, 20 June 2014.

<sup>138</sup> Personal communication, representative of international oil company active in Kenya, 7 September 2014.



Reform in Kenya's security establishment and ongoing cooperation with the USA may serve to curtail attacks against infrastructure and weaken al-Shabaab.<sup>139</sup> International oil companies are also not unaccustomed to operating in insecure environments. While there has been no serious attack against oil installations in Kenya to date, investors are still concerned that ongoing insecurity along the coast will delay planned infrastructure projects, increase costs, and prolong construction time. In particular, if insecurity persists, the Kenyan government's ability to obtain financing for the ambitious \$25 billion LAPSET port and transport infrastructure project will be limited.

## Conclusion

It is still early days for oil development in Kenya. Opportunities for new oil and gas exploration are many, but it is far from certain that significant new discoveries will be made. Expectations of what oil can bring for economic growth and development are far ahead of the level of actual discoveries to date. Even if Kenya's oil resources of 600 million barrels were to multiply with new finds in the coming years, the country would still only be able to play the role of a small African producer. Kenya's role as a regional transit hub for East African oil and gas, however, could prove to be more significant.

Politics will weigh heavily on the oil industry in Kenya, regardless of how large it becomes. The favourable business environment for international oil companies is shifting towards greater regulation and the potential for higher levels of political interference. With the August 2017 general election on the horizon, either the incumbent or a new government could exploit new rules and regulations to put forward political and economic goals.

At the same time, the 2010 constitution promise of a decentralization of political and economic decision-making power from the central government in Nairobi to 47 new counties is still underway. Counties are coming to terms with the convergence of new economic resources and increased political power through devolution. Oil has already become a point of contention between the national and local level in Turkana County and has caused rifts between county political representatives and local communities. Disputes will continue to stall progress in the oil industry, until the different levels of government in cooperation with international oil companies and local communities develop formal mechanisms to settle these grievances.

Finally, security concerns loom as the oil industry strives to move from the exploration to the development phase. Already hostile relations between the central government and coastal and north-eastern counties could slow down or upend plans for large oil infrastructure. The incursions of al-Shabaab in Kenya threaten to add fuel to these long-standing animosities, but the advancement of the new constitution could help mitigate insecurity. Kenya could very well develop both into Africa's newest oil producer and the regional centre for oil and gas transit by the end of the decade.

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<sup>139</sup> In September 2014, a US armed drone targeted and reportedly killed the al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Aw Muhammad, commonly known as Godane; Stig Jarle Hansen, 'How will the death of its leader, Ahmed Godane, impact Al Shabaab?', *African Arguments*, 8 September 2014, <http://africanarguments.org/2014/09/08/how-will-the-death-of-its-leader-ahmed-godane-impact-al-shabaab-by-stig-jarle-hansen/> accessed 12 September 2014.



**Annex 113**

“Kenya’s PM urges S. Korea to support peace in Somalia”, *Dow Jones Institutional News*, 10 July 2012

# Kenya's PM Urges S. Korea to Support Peace in Somalia

**Infos sur la publication:** Dow Jones Institutional News ; New York [New York]10 July 2012.

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## TEXTE INTÉGRAL

By George Mwangi

Special to

NAIROBI—Kenya's Prime Minister Raila Odinga has urged the South Korean government to support ongoing efforts to restore peace in Somalia and the feuding nations of Sudan, Mr. Odinga's press office said in a statement Tuesday.

Mr. Odinga had asked South Korean premier Kim Hwang-Sik, who is on a four-day official visit, to help establish a legitimate state in war-torn Somalia to contain the security threat posed by terrorist cells and pirates in the horn of Africa, the statement said.

"We call upon South Korea to be steadfast in support for the reconstruction in Somalia and demanding stability and peace in the Sudans," Mr. Odinga is quoted as saying.

He said the two nations should strengthen their ties on security issues to detect and deter any threats posed by terrorist groups and pirates.

In October last year, Kenya sent troops to Somalia to fight Al Shebab militias who it accuses of carrying out several attacks, including kidnapping international aid workers and tourists on its soil.

Somalia has been without an effective central government since 1991 following the ouster of then-President Mohamed Siad Barre. The horn of Africa nation has since become a haven for terror groups, pirates and illegal arms dealers.

On Monday, Mr. Hwang-Sik assured Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki that his government would join hands with other members of the international community to support AMISOM (Africa Union Mission for Somalia) troops in Somalia, the Kenyan presidential office said in a statement.

Write to George Mwangi at [generaldeskondon@dowjones.com](mailto:generaldeskondon@dowjones.com)

(END)

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**Annex 114**

“SOLSTICE Project Group, SOLSTICE implementation plan version 4”, *SOLSTICE-  
WIO*, 26 March 2018

# SOLSTICE

# Implementation Plan

Version 4

26 March 2018

Emerging fishery of the North Kenyan Bank:  
The next frontier for food security of the coastal  
population  
(Kenyan Case Study)



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## Document Purpose

The purpose of the SOLSTICE Implementation Plan is to identify key contributions of SOLSTICE partners to research, capacity development and communication objectives of the project and their associated timescales, milestones and deliverables.

This document underpins Institutional Agreements between the Lead Organisation (National Oceanography Centre, UK) and the partner institutions. This document also underpins SOLSTICE Monitoring and Evaluation Plan.

The document is available to project partners and the project Advisory Panel.

SOLSTICE Implementation Plan is an evolving document and subject to regular reviews by the SOLSTICE Leadership Team. Any changes to this document must be approved by the Leadership Team and communicated to all project participants. The latest version of this document can be found on the password-protected SOLSTICE website.

**Text shown in red requires updating.**

## SOLSTICE project outputs

SOLSTICE Logical Framework v1 (as submitted with the project proposal in May 2017) identifies the following key project outputs:

Output 1: Strong and self-sustaining **scientific transdisciplinary WIO-UK network** producing high quality intensive body of knowledge on ecosystems dynamics, human dependence on them, their future trends and human responses

Output 2: **Capacity developed in WIO** to conduct interdisciplinary ecosystem research that meets the needs of ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF), policy, industry and markets. **Capacity developed in UK** to meet the needs of official development assistance (ODA) compliant research.

Output 3: **Strong body of evidence** produced by the network in each Case Study addressing societal challenges and providing strategy options co-created with stakeholders and based on ecosystem approach

Output 4: **Transfer of cost saving technologies** underpinning ecosystem research to overcome limited investment into research infrastructure in WIO.

SOLSTICE Logical Framework and Theory of Change are evolving documents and will be revised regularly by the SOLSTICE Monitoring and Evaluation team. All changes to either of the documents (including proposed Outputs above) are subject to approval by the Project Leadership Team (appointment and Terms of Reference for the Project Leadership Team are expected by the end of January 2018).



## 1. Resource summary

Participant short name	KMFRI	NOC-OBE	NOC-MPOC-PHY	NOC-MPOC-RS	NOC-MSM	PML-RS	PML-SE	SA-NMU
Person/ mon	36	12	2	18	24	6	7	6

The table above lists all SOLSTICE project partners contributing to the Kenyan Case study with the number of months funded by SOLSTICE for this Case Study. The table includes only directly funded contributions. Contributions “in kind” and studentships aligned with the project are not included into this table and are listed below. Due to the size and complexity of NOC contribution, NOC departments and groups are listed separately.

KMFRI – Kenyan Marine Fisheries Research Institute

WIOMSA – Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association

NOC – National Oceanography Centre, UK

NOC-OBE – Ocean Biogeochemistry and Ecosystems (NOC, UK)

NOC-MSM – Marine System modelling (NOC, UK)

NOC-RS – Remote Sensing (NOC, UK)

NOC-MPOC – Marine Physics and Ocean Climate (NOC, UK)

NOC-OTE – Ocean Technology and Engineering (NOC, UK)

NOC-MG – Marine Geoscience (NOC, UK)

PML – Plymouth Marine Laboratory (UK)

PML-RS – Remote Sensing (PML, UK)

PML-SE – Socio-Economics (PML, UK)

HWU – Heriot-Watt University (UK)

SAEON – South African Environmental Observation Network (SA)

Rhodes – Rhodes University (SA)

NMU – Nelson Mandela University (NMU)

CORDIO - Coastal Oceans Research and Development – Indian Ocean (Kenya)

*Contributions “in kind” (students and staff effort only)*

KMFRI proposes to align the following PhD students with SOLSTICE:

**Fridah Munyi**: “Exploring livelihoods and dependency on the fishery resources and their implications as a strategy for improving food security and resilience to climate change within the North Kenya Bank fishery zone.” **Supervisors: Start date: End date: S.Aswani and E.Papathanasopoulou are happy to co-supervise if required.**

**Pascal Thoya**: “Spatial temporal modeling of satellite imagery to map productivity zones: A case study of the North Kenya Banks”. **Supervisors: Start date: End date:**

Pascal Thoya will participate in KMFRI cruise and **will be offered training/exchange visits** to UK for biogeochemical measurements. He will lead a SI paper on biogeochemical processes at the North Kenyan Bank. Pascal Thoya will use satellite imagery to determine productivity trends linking the same to the long term fishery catches from NKB. The information obtained will help to assess the effect of climate change and inform on the resilience of the system.

**Amon K. Kimeli**: “Plume dynamics and the historical sedimentation of the Tana River sediments—A Combination of Field studies and Satellite Imagery Processing.” **Supervisors: Start date: End date:**

Amon K. Kimeli will participate in KMFRI cruise as part of the planned fieldwork on sediment coring and bathymetry mapping of NKB. Any offer of training/exchange for satellite imagery processing and modelling of plume dynamics will be appreciated.

Amon Kimeli Will use remote sensing to determine current and historical sediment plume dispersion directions and extent. He will also employ in situ measurements to model the influence of oceanographic parameters (currents and waves) while using satellite imagery to validate.

Amon Kimeli is keen to be trained on hands-on modelling he has a modelling component in his PhD study. Amon Kimeli will participate in KMFRI cruise and needs training/exchange visits to UK for plume dynamics modelling and remote sensing. He will lead a SI paper on current and historical Tana River plume dynamics.

**Athman Salim Hussein** (BSc graduate with a Physics and Mathematics major): MSc student his study to be focused on aspects of Biogeochemical modelling

KMFRI proposes to align the following researchers with SOLSTICE to participate in training/exchange visits:

**Mr. Noah Ngisiange:** will participate in KMFRI cruise and will be offered training/exchange visits to UK for ADCP measurements and marine robotics. Mr. Ngisiange will lead a SI paper on physical processes at the North Kenyan Bank.

## 2. Case Study background (J. Kamau, KMFRI)

In Kenya, marine fishery is predominantly conducted on a small scale and is artisanal (Sanders et al, 1990; FAO, 2016). Small-scale fisheries generally constitute the pillar of coastal livelihoods and in the provision of coastal food security (Barnes-Mauthe et al. 2013; A review conducted by UNEP (1998) on Marine Fisheries Resources for Kenya estimated that the marine fishery supports about 60,000 people. Annual production from artisanal coastal fisheries average 9,928 MT (FAO 2016). While, Le Manach et al., 2015 reported an annual marine fish landing from artisanal fisheries to be 8,406 tons.

The productivity of the Kenyan marine fishery is constrained by a number of biophysical factors including the narrow continental shelf (estimated at 19,120 km<sup>2</sup>), low productivity waters and seasonality. This, combined with increasing fishing pressure, has led to overexploitation in many areas. The pelagic fishery conducted by small-scale fleet (motorized boats) is increasingly gaining importance due to the decline of reef fish (Maina 2012).

In the last three years the North Kenya Bank has emerged as a new frontier for food security. The bank is expansive (approximately 4325 km<sup>2</sup>) and presumed to be highly productive. According to a recent hydro-acoustic survey study by Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI) it was estimated that the North Kenya Banks has a pelagic fish density of about 21Mt per sq Km, which translates to 401,520 Mt (KMFRI, 2016).

It is presumed that the productivity of the North Kenya bank is driven by wind driven upwelling systems. The northward and southward flow of the monsoonal and local winds drive the surface flows off the Kenyan coast causing localized upwellings. The alongshore stress of the equatorward winds induces an acceleration of the surface currents, which drift offshore under the influence of the Coriolis force. Johnson et al (1982) postulated that the deflection of the EACC seaward at its point of convergence with the Somali Current is mainly due to topographic forcing in the North Kenyan Banks.

### Problem statement/Justification

The North Kenya Bank is an important emerging fishery that is expected to spur economic growth for the local fishing communities. The sustainability of this resource requires formulation of informed management interventions. Effective resource utilization will also require informed research on the spatial and temporal distribution of the pelagic fishery by employing tracer proxies (Chl-a, upwelling cells). There however, exists only scanty information on the ecological status, physical environment and drivers of this important emerging fishery resource. If well managed, the fisheries can be a window of opportunities for achieving national development goals including poverty eradication and wealth creation. Moreover, this huge potential is a critical vehicle for the achievement of the Kenya Vision 2030 development plan (Aloo, 2009).

The productivity of the North Kenya Bank is deemed to be driven by the Tana river sediments and nutrients input (both dissolved and particulate). Tana river provides high nutrients that flow over the North Kenya Banks at the convergence of the East African Coastal and Somali currents resulting in a highly productive environment (Wakwabi et al., 2003).

#### Research questions

1. What is the potential of the North Kenya bank marine fisheries resource
2. What are the Ecosystem processes; identify and understand key ecosystem processes related to productivity/resilience of ecosystems (biogeochemical process), to sustain fisheries productivity and ecosystem health.
3. What are the relative impacts of the productivity drivers: upwelling and Tana river input,
4. Is Climate variability and change affecting the productivity of the North Kenya bank
5. How to optimize the use of the resources, integrating ecological and socioeconomic aspects, to provide long-term benefits to society.
6. Is the North Kenya Banks a depositional sink of the Tana River sediments

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### 3. Description of work

#### 3.1 Synthesis

##### *3.1.1. End-to-end literature review and formulation of key hypotheses*

**Deliverable:** Internal project report (Month 12)

**Milestone:** M8 all contributors identified and agreed

Participating institutions: KMFRI, all participants.

PIs responsible for delivery: J.Kamau (KMFRI), K.Popova (NOC)

We will produce a comprehensive interdisciplinary literature review for the case study following the structure of the SOLSTICE WPs including main challenges and formulation of the key hypotheses. This review will underpin WP contributions to the case study. It is anticipated that this review will form one of the SI papers. Preliminary hypothesis testing is anticipated by WP1a,b (Remote sensing and modelling).

##### *3.1.2. Special Issue (Kenyan and Tanzanian Case Studies)*

**Deliverable:** Collection of peer-reviewed papers (Month 36)

PIs responsible for delivery: SOLSTICE directors (Roberts, Popova), J.Kamau (KMFRI)

Milestones:

M12: Full list of potential papers identified, journal agreed, guest editors assigned

M24: Full list of papers finalised

M30: All papers reviewed at the Science Progress Workshop

**Participating institutions:** Directors, IMS, KMFRI, all participants.

As a main deliverable for Output 3 (“Strong body of evidence”) we will produce a Special Issue (SI) of DSR or a similar journal with socio-economic component. ***This is a combined Kenya-Tanzania deliverable.***

##### *3.1.3. Synthesis paper(s)*

**Deliverable:** Peer-reviewed papers (post-SI effort, Month 42)

**PIs responsible for delivery:** SOLSTICE directors (Roberts, Popova) and two guest editors (one from each case study, to be identified by M12)

Milestones:

M30: List of papers identified

M36: List of papers finalised and lead authors assigned.

M42: Papers submitted

**Participating institutions:** Directors, KMFRI, all participants.

Key end-to-end synthesis paper(s) with strong links to policy recommendations will be based on the SI collection and submitted by Month 42.

### ***3.1.4. Final project Report for Kenyan Case Study***

**Deliverable:** External Project Report (Month 48)

**PIs responsible for delivery:** SOLSTICE directors (Roberts, Popova), J.Kamau (KMFRI)

Milestones:

M31: Decision if to proceed with the report, its content and alignment with the final project reporting

Participating institutions: all participants.

This report is likely to provide key end-to-end synthesis of the project findings with strong links to policy recommendations. At this stage there is no consensus if such a report is needed/useful. This will be decided by the Project Leadership Team in April 2020, M31). No reporting guidelines have yet been received from the UK project funder (GCRF).

## **3.2. WP1a Remote Sensing**

### ***3.2.1. Synthesis of the satellite-derived information to identify large scale drivers of ecosystem variability***

Deliverables:

- Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
- SI paper or contribution to WP1b-led SI paper (Month 24)
- Contribution to MOOC (M30)
- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)

**PIs responsible for delivery:** M.Srokosz (NOC), B.Kuguru (KMFRI), Y.Shaghude (IMS), S.Mahongo (TAFIRI)

Milestones:

M12 Preliminary results presented as internal project report (underpinning model verification)

**Participating Institutions:** NOC-RS, NOC-MSM, PML-RS, IMS, TAFIRI, KMFRI

## Description:

Analysis of temporal and spatial variability of parameters influencing ecosystem dynamics in the Northwest Indian Ocean (chl-a, primary production, PFTs, ocean currents, coastal altimetry), working with WP1b to support model validation and hypothesis testing and to identify further research questions for investigation in joint African/UK postgraduate research projects. In addition, consider effects of Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) and monsoon on ecosystem. ***This is a combined Kenya-Tanzania study.***

**3.2.2. *Synthesis of the satellite-derived information to identify local drivers of the North Kenyan Bank ecosystem variability***

## Deliverables:

- Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
- SI paper (Month 24)
- Contribution to MOOC (M30)
- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)

**PIs responsible for delivery:** B.Kuguru (KMFRI), D.Raitsos (PML)

Participating Institutions: PML-RS, NOC-RS, KMFRI

## Description:

Study of chl-a, SST, water quality with a focus on the river plume (complementary to the work of the KMFRI PhD student on Sentinel-2 optical data) ultimately, linking remote sensing to available *in situ* observations. Some satellite altimeter tracks intersect the North Kenya Bank so coastal altimetry data will be used too. This study cannot take advantage of 1/12° NEMO model as the scale is too small and NEMO does not have riverine input of nutrients, however a lagrangian modelling study of the riverine input will be conducted as a part of the modelling package.

**3.2.3. *Real-time support of the fieldwork and optimisation of the cruise strategy***

**Deliverable:** online data base and contribution to the cruise plan (Months 6-20)

**Participating Institutions:** PML-RS (PI: B.Taylor, NEODAAS)

This work will provide the consortium with near-real-time daily ocean colour and SST products at 1km resolution from MODIS and VIIRS satellite sensors to support field campaigns in the North Kenyan Bank case study region - to cover the cruise duration + 1 month before fieldwork start and 1 month after field-work finish.

On-line / off-line data access: altimetry, chl-a, SST

**Deliverable:** on-line /off-line database and data discovery tools (Month 12 and on-going)

**Participating Institutions:** NOC-IT (PI V.Byfield), NOC-RS, PML-RS

IT group at NOC will develop a web based system. NOC-MPOC and PML-RS will provide relevant data to populate system. Initially, this could be large-scale data (e.g. ESA CCI altimetry, chl-a, SST) on a  $\frac{1}{4}^\circ$  grid and monthly for the whole WIO over the satellite era (1990s onwards). WP4 (Capacity development) will engage with the WIO partners to identify requirements for remotely sensed data and WP 1a will populate the database accordingly. Any remotely sensed data used in SOLSTICE studies could be added to the database (e.g. 1km high resolution chl-a, SST).

In addition, given that internet links for researchers in WIO countries are limited in bandwidth, an off-line version of the database could be made available to those researchers to ease access. We note that this request is strongly supported by WIO partners and an M&E indicator will be developed to reflect availability of the offline data.

### ***3.2.4. Training/capacity development for WP1a (Remote sensing)***

Milestones:

- Student co-supervision and exchange visits identified (M4)
- See additional milestones related to the training courses in Section 3.7.

PIs responsible for delivery: V.Byfield (NOC)

A 2-week remote sensing training course will be run at IMS.

Exchange/training visits dedicated to the remote sensing applications for the Kenyan case study up to one month duration to NOC and PML (UK) are possible if prioritised by WIO institutions (see Note on exchange Visits).

Co-supervision of the WIO students working on remote sensing data by UK partners is possible if requested.

## **3.3. WP1b Modelling**

### ***3.3.1. Model skill assessment***

Deliverables:

Internal project report (M6)

Participating institution: NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova)

We will assess NEMO-MEDUSA model skills in all three case study areas, establish model limitations, identify most promising model applications, and range of possible projects and their costs.

### ***3.3.2. Biogeochemical modelling***

Deliverables:

- Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
- SI paper or contribution (Month 24)
- Contribution to MOOC (M30)



- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)

PI responsible for delivery: K.Popova (NOC)

**Participating institutions:** NOC-MSM, NOC-RS, NOC-OBE, PML-RS, KMFRI, IMS, TAFIRI, CORDIO

Description:

We will use NEMO-MEDUSA coupled physical and biogeochemical model at 1/12o (hindcast) and 1/4o (climate change projections for RCP8.5 to year 2099) to constrain the key large-scale drivers of the ecosystem variability at seasonal (monsoon), decadal (ENSO, Indian Ocean Dipole) and climatically driven (RCP8.5) variability along the Kenya-Northern Tanzania shelf. Note that resolution and boundary conditions in the model will not allow addressing impacts of Tana deposition of nutrients (these will be addressed in the lagrangian studies). We will focus on the mechanisms of the marine nutrient supply and in particular dynamics and potential changes of the upwelling. The model will be validated using available climatological data, ARGO floats, remote sensing observations and IMS and KMFRI in-situ observations. The modelling package will assist with optimisation of the fieldwork and synthesis of the observational information. ***This is a combined Kenya-Tanzania study.***

### 3.3.3. Lagrangian modelling

Deliverables:

- SI paper (M36);
- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)
- Internal report on numerical runs conducted for a number of studies co-designed with WIO participants (M30)
- Contribution to MOOC (M30)

PI responsible for delivery: K.Popova (NOC)

Milestones:

M12 potential studies of interest and Kenyan collaborators identified

**Participating institutions:** NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova), NOC-RS, KMFRI

Description:

A collaborative KMFRI-NOC study will use lagrangian tracer approach to constrain key advective pathways, their variability, potential modifications under the impact of climate change and applications to the issues such as marine pollution (micro-plastics, potential oil spills), design of the MPA, pathways of Tana river, invasive and non-native species, and connectivity with upstream areas. Specific list of applications will be identified in collaboration with KMFRI. A substantial input from local researchers will be required.

### 3.3.4. *Climate change stressors and their uncertainty*

Deliverables:

- SI paper (month 36)
- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (M40)
- Contribution to MOOC (M30)

PI responsible for delivery: K.Popova (NOC)

**Participating institutions:** NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova), NOC-RS, IMS, TAFIRI, KMFRI

We will analyse CMIP5 and CMIP6 model ensembles for the WIO, identify their predictive skills and evaluate key drivers of uncertainty in future projections of the WIO ecosystem dynamics. We will use the forward run of NEMO-MEDUSA (1/4° resolution or 1/12° if available by M30) to focus on the future projections of upwelling. *This is a combined Kenya-Tanzania study.*

### 3.3.5. *NEMO-MEDUSA data access server*

Deliverable: online data access and user manual (months 18)

Participating institution: NOC (PI H.Snaith)

We will develop a server providing access to the model output with area-extraction capability suitable for low bandwidth. This server will be essential for the wide use of the model by WIO researchers and will underpin Modelling training course.

### 3.3.6. *Training/capacity development for WP1b (Modelling)*

Milestones:

- Student co-supervision and exchange visits identified (M4)
- Opportunities for wider training of KMFRI researchers identified (M6)
- See additional milestones related to the training courses in Section 3.7

PIs responsible for delivery: V.Byfield (NOC)

A 2-week remote modelling training course will be run at IMS.

Training in the use of available model output at any level will be provided during the North Kenyan Bank workshops for a wide range of KMFRI scientists (to be discussed and confirmed with KMFRI by M6).

Exchange/training visits dedicated to the modelling applications for the Kenyan case study up to one month duration to NOC (UK) are possible if prioritised by WIO institutions (see note on exchange visits).

Co-supervision of the WIO students working on modelling by UK partners is possible if requested.

We note KMFRI specific request for training in Modelling, relationship between fisheries and climate change , future changes in fisheries, Species Shifts, and Abundance.

### 3.4. WP1d Fieldwork

#### 3.4.1. North Kenyan Bank biogeochemical survey (RV Mtafiti)

Deliverables:

- Fieldwork Plan (Internal Report; M8) including capacity development needs and agreement on data archiving
- Workshop at KMFRI on historical data and cruise planning (M13).
- Contribution to CS review (M12)
- Fieldwork (Feb-Mar (M17) and June-July 2019, M22)
- Fieldwork Report (External Report; M28, January 2020)
- Data (archived via BODC M28)
- Papers for SI (M36):
- Contribution to final case study report (External Report M36)

**Participating institutions:** KMFRI (PI J.Kamau), NMU (M.Roberts only, **but note the clash with Tanzanian fieldwork – participation TBC**)

Description:

KMFRI will conduct two biogeochemical surveys of 10 days duration each in Feb-Mar and June-July 2019. KMFRI will perform CTD casts, acquire ADCP cruise readings, conduct hydroacoustic measurements, bong net tow, sample phytoplankton and obtain sediment cores using a piston corer.




Figure 1. The Kenya coastline showing the tentative North Kenya banks sampling locations

North Kenya bank/Kiwayu tentative Stations					
Station	Long	Latitude	Station	Long	Latitude
NKB_1	40.87628917	-2.431126834	NKB_17	40.88181038	-2.790005501
NKB_2	41.05848911	-2.425605624	NKB_18	40.87904977	-2.878344866
NKB_3	41.23792844	-2.422845019	NKB_19	40.70237105	-2.881105471
NKB_4	41.06124971	-2.516705593	NKB_20	40.5174105	-2.883866076
NKB_5	40.87904977	-2.516705593	NKB_21	40.34625298	-2.881105471
NKB_6	40.69961044	-2.516705593	NKB_22	40.25515301	-2.97220544
NKB_7	40.70237105	-2.610566168	NKB_23	40.52293171	-2.969444835
NKB_8	40.87904977	-2.607805563	NKB_24	40.70789226	-2.969444835
NKB_9	41.06401032	-2.607805563	NKB_25	40.88181038	-2.97220544
NKB_10	41.06124971	-2.696144927	NKB_26	40.34073177	-3.06330541
NKB_11	40.87628917	-2.698905532	NKB_27	40.52017111	-3.066066015
NKB_12	40.70237105	-2.698905532	NKB_28	40.70513165	-3.0577842

NKB_13	40.52017111	-2.698905532	NKB_29	40.34349238	-3.154405379
NKB_14	40.34073177	-2.790005501	NKB_30	41.06124971	-2.334505654
NKB_15	40.52293171	-2.790005501	NKB_31	41.24344965	-2.334505654
NKB_16	40.69408923	-2.792766107			

Note that according to SOLSTICE Terms and Conditions regarding risks, health and safety, no SOLSTICE researchers other than researchers from KMFRI will be allowed to participate in the fieldwork in the north Kenyan waters. Mike Roberts is the only exception from this rule due to his dual contract between UK and SA.

### 3.4.2. North Kenyan Bank survey support

Deliverables:

- Fieldwork Plan (Internal Report; M8) including capacity development needs and agreement on data archiving
- Contribution to CS review (M12)
- Fieldwork (Feb-Mar (M17) and June-July 2019, M22)
- Fieldwork Report (External Report; M28, January 2020)
- Data (archived via BODC M28)
- Papers for SI (M36):
- Contribution to final case study report (External Report M36)

Milestones:

- Training exchange visits identified (M4)

Participating institutions: NOC, KMFRI

PIs responsible for delivery: S.Painter, J.Kamau

Description:

SOLSTICE will offer support of the cruise in form of equipment rental, analytical sample training of Kenyan researchers in Kenya in UK, cruise planning and synthesis workshops, assistance with data archiving, interpretation and throughput to peer reviewed publications in SOLSTICE Special Issue.

#### **Workshop 1.** Cruise planning (KMFRI, Mombasa, **November 2018 - TBC**):

Review of the past observational data, design and planning of the survey, synthesis of modelling and satellite information to assist with the cruise planning and data interpretation; instrument cross-

calibration and testing. This workshop can include additional training by UK researchers in analytical methods.

**Workshop 2.** Data analysis and synthesis (KMFRI, Mombasa, **March 2020 - TBC**):

Data analysis and interpretation, preparation for publications, synthesis of modelling and satellite information; data archiving.

*Training/capacity development:*

SOLSTICE will provide hands-on training for KMFRI in the areas which will be identified by M6. SOLSTICE will provide post-cruise assistance in delivering the results of this fieldwork into peer-reviewed literature.

SOLSTICE proposes to fund 1 month training visits to Liverpool for a physical scientist during 2018. Visits will be designed to overlap with planned glider deployments in AlterEco to enable hands-on seagoing training. Additional 1 month visits to UK in 2019 can be provided for data processing and analysis leading to a SI publication. Exchange visits will be funded from SOLSTICE central budget if prioritised by WIO institutions (see note on Exchange Visits).

SOLSTICE proposes to fund 1 month training visits to Southampton for a biogeochemistry-focused researcher during 2018 including one day training cruise on Calisto. Additional 1 month visits to UK in 2019 can be provided for data processing and analysis leading to a SI publication. Exchange visits will be funded from SOLSTICE central budget if prioritised by WIO institutions (see note on Exchange Visits).

### 3.5. WP2 Socio-economic studies

#### 3.5.1. *Multi-species fish modelling*

Deliverables:

- Contribution to the CS review (Month 12). Dependant on collected data regarding fish and fisheries.
- SI paper (Month 24 paper identified and content finalised; Month 36 paper submitted to SI)
- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (Month 30 paper(s) identified and finalised; Month 42 paper submitted)
- Fish model outputs (Month 15-18) made available to partners along with short description of the outputs and how to use them. Plus delivery of model outputs for further work within WP2 (specific data type and format).
- Report on the model outputs (Month 24) with case study specific aspects highlighted. Plus comparison to available data.

## Milestones:

M6 Lead contacts for fish related enquiries identified by KMFRI.

M6 NEMO-MEDUSA data received from NOC

M7 list of main fish species of interest for the case study agreed on by case study partners.

M8 Additional data (where needed) for model parameterisation provided by partners or gathered from literature

M10-15 Data on fish catch to validate the model output

Participating institutions: PML (PI: Sévrine Sailley), NOC, KMFRI

PI responsible for delivery: Sévrine Sailley, PML

## Description:

The fish modelling will make use of the SS-DBEM model to obtain projections regarding possible changes of fish species distribution and potential catch within the century. The model projections will target key fish species for the case study (both in term of subsistence and economic value) and make use of NEMO-MEDUSA model outputs to look at changes of distribution and abundance due to change in climate. There will also be additional run(s) to look at effect of fishing and different management approaches (whether the fishing is at or above the Maximum Sustainable Fishing Yield, MSFY). Model outputs will be made available to project partners, and a report will be produced to highlight the major findings regarding the sustainability of current targeted fishes and possible alternatives.

Although the model and report deliverables will be specific to this case study, the model domain and some of the fish species will overlap across all three SOLSTICE case studies (Kenya, Tanzania, and, South Africa).

KMFRI researcher Dr. Gladys Okemwa will be a lead contact for queries regarding fishing (e.g. main fish species, landing data).

### *3.5.2. Emergent Fisheries of the North Kenyan Bank*

Participating institutions: KMFRI, all participants

**PI responsible for delivery:** J.Kamau (KMFRI), SOLSTICE directors (Popova, Roberts)

## Deliverables:

- Key contribution to the CS literature review (M12)
- SI paper (M 36)

## Description:

KMFRI will lead the key “foundation” study demonstrating what we know about the fishery, why its sustainable management is critically dependent on understanding of the marine environment

and biophysical drivers. This study should result in the SI “setting the scene” paper (a compulsory requirement of the SI).

### *3.5.3. Wider engagement with fisheries: Importance of skip jack tuna along the east African coast*

Participating institutions: Rhodes, NOC, PML

Deliverables:

- Detailed research plan presented including sampling program (M12)
- Project progress report (M24)
- SI paper (Month 36)

Milestones:

- Rhodes student identified (M6)
- Timing of the exchange visit agreed (M6)
- Deliverables agreed (M12)
- Input into policy identified (M24)

Description:

The project will address importance of skip jack tuna along the east African coast – synthesis of current biological knowledge, understanding population structure, and potential impacts of climate change. This project was created on request of the DSFA and is aligned with projects in the University of Aberystwyth (UK, Prof. P. Shaw) and Rhodes. The project will include synthesise available biological info (desk top), understand population structure, lagrangian modelling of the ocean circulation related to tuna movement with emphasis on climate change, and provide management advice. The project will include field trips to collect genetic samples - South Africa, Tanzania (mainland, Zanzibar and Pemba Island), Kenya; collection of genetic samples across the area.

Capacity development:

The following exchange visit will be offered to the Rhodes student (funded from NMU budget): Visit to the UK for 4 months, 2 months to NOC (Ocean circulation models and lagrangian analysis), Genetic analysis: - 2 month Aberystwyth (funded by Aberystwyth).

### *3.5.4. Input-output tables*

Deliverables:

- Contribution to the CS literature review (Month 12)
- SI paper (Month 12, 24 paper identified and finalised; Month 36 paper submitted to SI)
- Contribution to MOOC (M30). Regionalising input-output tables and its application to fisheries under climate change scenarios
- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (Month 30, 36 paper(s) identified and finalised; Month 42 paper(s) submitted)
- Regional input-output data table and user document made available to partners and wider community (Month 24)



Milestones:

M6: Data required for regional input-output tables identified and agreed with UDSM, TAFIRI, IMS

M21: Data collated for regional input-output table in collaboration with KMFRI, CORDIO

M18: Fish model outputs received from PML-fisheries

M30: Results of economic assessment produced and used in writing SI and synthesis papers

**Participating institutions:** PML (PI: E. Papathanasopoulou), KMFRI, CORDIO

Description:

Regionalised input-output (RIO) tables will be produced for the case study areas. These will be developed using earlier productions of the table at a national level and scaled down by regional data available through statistical records and collected by local partners. The RIO tables will be used to estimate the direct and indirect economic impact on the local economies from changes in fisheries due to climate change. The direct and indirect impacts provide insight into the wider economic impact of the reliance on natural resources and can prove useful for structural regional development that aims to ensure resilience and adaptive capacity. These impacts will be estimated in revenue and employment units.

Training/Capacity development:

Two visits to PML, UK, will be offered to Fridah Munyi. One visit in the first year of her PhD to work with Eleni to identify primary data requirements and its translation into macroeconomic analysis and Sustainable Development Goal monitoring. The second visit will be organised for the last year of her PhD research, where results from her research will be presented at PML and written publications progressed.

### *3.5.5. Considering climate change as part of resilient Spatial Planning & Ecosystem Based Management for the North Kenyan Bank*

**Participating institutions:** PML (PI: A. Queirós), KMFRI, CORDIO & others (potentially Kenya Wildlife Service)

Note: this study will go ahead if the associated Milestone at M9 (data scoping) has a positive outcome.

Deliverables:

- Contribution to the CS review (Month 12)
- SI paper (Month 36 paper submitted to SI)
- Report geared towards policy communicating main findings of spatial analysis providing advice for resilient use of different gear fisheries & other wild capture

resources, as well as conservation resources based activities in the NKB, within the context of climate change and ecosystem based management. (Month 42).

- Contribution to synthesis paper(s) (Month 42 paper submitted)

Milestones:

M6: Spatial data on relevant marine sectors required co-mapping identified with KMFRI, CORDIO & others

M9: Data scoping: feasibility assessment of the Marine Spatial Planning study

M12: Spatial data delivered or holder identified with KMFRI, CORDIO & others.

M18: Climate modelling projections for physics, biogeochemistry and fish models received from PML-fisheries and NOC-modelling, ready for use in spatial meta-analysis.

M36: Results of spatial meta-analysis data finalised and delivered as manuscript to SI

M42: Report summarising results in less technical language and geared towards policy delivered, with input from partners.

Description:

The main outcome of this task will be to: 1) highlight potential opportunities for growth and resilience for fisheries in the NKB that may result from potential changes in the distribution of resources, and/or of key areas that may support their productivity, as climate change unfolds in the region; 2) anticipate potential conflicts and opportunities for other sectors using the marine space of the NKB, given those changes.

The contribution of local institutes will consist of: the provision of GIS data; support in the liaison with other local partners that may hold available data (pending data availability); co-development of the work through advice in the understanding of the local blue economy context; and participation in publications & dissemination as appropriate.

We will assess the resilience (and vulnerability) of current economic sectors dependant on living resources to climate change, in the NKB and encompassing waters, as well as their distribution. The analysis will take into account the current distribution of activities (gear specific fishing grounds) and co-located economic sectors (e.g. spatial data tourism, MPAs or other), as well as projected changes to their associated environment and target resources (species specific), based on modelling projections to the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century undertaken by PML and NOC (NEMO-MEDUSA and SS-DBEM).

The completion of this activity will be dependent on the availability of spatial data for co-mapping (local partner engagement) and model projection availability.

Capacity building for this task will be achieved through the collaboration in all aspects of the work, co-design of the study and one-to-one/small team coaching on the methodology and result interpretation. The main capacity building outcome is the analysis as a product for use by the local partners in their marine management engagement and advice to government in Kenya.

### **3.6 WP3. Science into policy and wider stakeholder engagement**

### *3.6.1. Stakeholder engagement Action Plan*

**Deliverable:** Project Report (Month 9)

Participating institutions: KMFRI (J.Kamau), CORDIO, NOC, PML

Description:

We will produce a report identifying key stakeholders in the following groups: policy, industry, communities, and academia. The report will contain a detailed engagement plan including plans for profiling (M&E indicators, surveys and interviews), identification of stakeholder capacity development needs, stakeholder engagement events, and links with MOOC and MOOC-light.

KMFRI plans to engage the resource managers of the five riparian counties from the onset so that they associate with the project and provide their thoughts on what they require the project to inform them as concerns the resource. KMFRI will also engage the various relevant NGO's, institutions, BMUs, and county development bodies as well as the state department of fisheries. We will require planned visits to the county Governors office to initiate the process.

### *3.6.2. Policy and practice notes*

**Deliverable:** Policy and practice information pack (M42)

Participating institutions: KMFRI, NOC, PML

Milestones:

M9: Science into policy framework and action plan developed; Examples of Policy and practice notes from previous project reviewed.

M36: Full list and layout of Policy and practice notes identified

Description:

We will produce policy and practice notes aiming at key groups of stakeholders

### *3.6.3. Final stakeholder engagement event*

Deliverable: Workshop with stakeholders (~July 2021)

Participating institutions: KMFRI, NOC, PML

We will run three stakeholder engagement workshops (beginning, mid-term and the end of the project).

**Final workshop:** a targeted stakeholder information event on the key deliverables of the project, and its legacy. We will present Policy and Practice information pack. We will use this event for the final stakeholder related indicators for M&E profiling (interviews, surveys).

### 3.7. WP4. Capacity Development

#### 3.7.1. Full capacity development plan for Kenya

**Deliverable:** Project report and outcome/impact indicators (M9)

**Participating institutions:** NOC (Byfield), WP leaders 1a,b,c and 2, KMFRI,

We will produce a project report outlining the following:

- Institutional capacity baseline, including overview of facilities and expertise
- All project MSc/PhD studentships including UK-WIO supervisors, training needs, participation in the project events and exchange visits and contribution to the key deliverables.
- Institutional capacity development requirements in technologies (modelling, remote sensing) and field work, key outcome indicators, baseline assessment of these indicators, and capacity development plan.
- Stakeholder capacity development needs
- NOC/PML capacity development needs in application of core expertise in ODA arena
- GCRF might require additional activities on baselining of institutional capacity (TBC).

#### 3.7.2. Training courses

**Deliverable:** Training courses and associated material (M12, M18, M30)

**Description:**

We will run three 2-week training courses: Applications of remote sensing, Applications of ocean modelling, and Science communication. This will be available to junior staff and post-graduate students at participating institutions, including at least one person from each of the supporting partners in the wider WIO.

Course 1: Applications of marine remote sensing (M12)

**Deliverables:** Training course brochure (M8), delivery (M12); course report (M13); course lectures and tutorials available on line (M13).

**Participating:** NOC-RS (PI V.Byfield), IMS, KMFRI, PML-RS, CORDIO, SAEON, Rhodes

**Milestones** (main milestones for wider distribution in bold)

**M8:** Course brochure for publication to partner institutions,

**M12:** Delivery of the training course

**M13:** Course report with analysis of student feedback

Course 2: Modelling training course (M24)

**Deliverables:** Training course brochure (M20), delivery (M24); course report (M25); course lectures and tutorials available on line (M25).

Participating: NOC-MSM (PI E.Popova), NMU, PML

Milestones:

**M20:** Course brochure for publication to partner institutions,

**M24:** Delivery of the training course

**M25:** Course report with analysis of student feedback

**M28:** On-line availability of course material (lectures and tutorials) on SOLSTICE web site

Course 3: Science communication& MOOC production workshop (M30)

The aim of this training workshop is to develop skills for communicating science to different audiences through participatory training exercises and produce SOLSTICE MOOC material based on the case studies.

**Deliverables:** Training course brochure (M25), delivery (M30); course report (M19); course lectures and tutorials available on line (M21), additional outreach resources on line (M24).

**Participating:** NOC-MPOC (PI V.Byfield), IMS, Imperative Space, NOC Coms, all partners

**Milestones** (main milestones for wider distribution in bold)

**M30:** Delivery of the training course;

**M31:** Course report with analysis of student feedback

**M23:** On-line availability of communication material developed during the course and refined by participants in the following months.

### *3.7.3. Training in analytical methods at KMFRI and analysis of historical data*

Deliverables:

**M14** (Nov 2018): Cruise planning and data analysis workshop (at KMFRI)

**M26** (Nov 2019): Cruise data analysis workshop

Milestones:

**M4:** Exchange visits identified

**M6** Workshop dates, scope and format confirmed and development needs identified

PI responsible for delivery: S.Painter (NOC), V.Byfield

We will organise two training workshops at KMFRI: the first one will be dedicated to the analysis of historical data, cruise planning and data archiving. The second workshop will be dedicated to the analysis of the North Kenyan Bank cruise data.

In addition, a number of exchange visits dedicated to the training in analytical methods will be carried out between KMFRI and NOC.

Additional deliverables

**M16, M30** Report on the effectiveness of the fieldwork capacity development activities based on feedback from participating mentors and ‘trainees’, as contribution to an M&E report.

#### 3.7.4. MOOC

**Deliverables:** course content (M36) and screening (Months 37, 42, 48)

Provisional title: “Sustainable use of living marine resources: case studies from the Western Indian Ocean”

**PI:** V.Byfield

Description:

The MOOC will run on the Future Learn (Open University) platform. Following its first screening, an offline version will be made available for use by the partners, and other organisations in the WIO in their course activities. The MOOC will build on research activities in WPs 1, 2 and capacity development resources developed in 4.2, using examples from each of the three case studies, and from SOLSTICE stakeholder engagement activities. The content will address selected capacity development needs of partner institutions and stakeholders, as identified in the capacity development plan. It will run over 6 weeks, each week covering a major theme in SOLSTICE research and stakeholder engagement. Content related to Kenya will include:

- interviews with experts and selected stakeholders, transcript of interviews,
- video from research activities collected during training courses and workshops
- model and satellite animations,
- brief background text and figures with references to further information on the SOLSTICE web site and elsewhere on-line,
- short Q/A exercises to test student understanding,
- forum where students can discuss the topic, ask questions, and share information.

**All Co-Is in the UK and WIO are expected to contribute in areas of their expertise**, and encourage their students and junior scientists to engage with the MOOC development. Contributors are expected to:

- give interviews about their work and area of expertise,
- facilitate filming of research and other project activities
- provide background text and references, figures, images and/or animations for the MOOC content, related to their research and area of expertise
- follow the MOOC on-line while it runs to answer questions related to their area of expertise.

Milestones:

**M9:** MOOC outline agreed, all contributors identified,

**M12:** detailed MOOC outline developed, presenter/interviewer identified for each country (Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, UK) KMFRI will engage Ms Jane Kiguta as a key MOOC liaison person, she is in charge of public relations at the Institute.

**M13:** MOOC promotional video produced (NOC, IMS)

**M13:** MOOC sample lecture produced (NOC)

**M18:** MOOC CS1 &2 layout finalised (following fieldwork completion)

**M24:** MOOC CS3 layout finalised (following fieldwork completion)

**M34:** MOOC outline completed and advertised on Future Learn

**M35:** Full MOOC content compiled

**M36** – Published on FutureLearn platform

**M37:** MOOC Run 1 (Oct 2020)

**M40:** Off-line version of MOOC available on SOLSTICE web site (Jan 2021)

**M42:** Off-line version on Ocean Teacher

**M42:** MOOC Run 2 (Apr 2021)

**M48:** MOOC Run 3 (Sep 2021)

**M39,M44, M50** Short reports with statistics on MOOC uptake and user profiles for inclusion in M&E reports

### **3.7.5. MOOC Light**

**Deliverables:** M39 MOOC Light; M48 report on community testing

**PI:** V.Byfield

**Description:**

The MOOC Light will be designed for use in schools and as informal education tool to promote ocean literacy. Covering the main themes addressed by the MOOC, it comprises video, informative brochures and a selection of guided education activities to promote understanding of local habitats, the global interconnectedness of the oceans, and of the productivity that supports larger marine animals, including species important to local fisheries. It will be available in English and Swahili.

**Milestones:**

M12: recommendation from Science-to-policy WGs on MOOC content received

M30: MOOC Light layout agreed (following CS 1, 2 and 3 fieldwork) and

M39: Content compiled in English and Swahili

M45: MOOC light tested with local fishing communities (KMFRI, IMS, NMU, SAEON, SASMIA, WWF, other participants involved in community engagement activities)

## **3.8. WP5 Communication**

### ***3.8.1. Regular channels of communication:***

- Project website (external): Fully operational by 15<sup>th</sup> December 2017
- Project website (internal): Fully operational by 1<sup>st</sup> march 2018
- Project newsletter (internal): every 3 months starting 1<sup>st</sup> December 2017
- Project newsletter (external, summary for stakeholders): every 6 months, starting 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018
- Project newsletter (external, impact summary for funders): every 6 months, starting 1<sup>st</sup> April 2018

### ***3.8.2. One-off communication material:***

- SOLSTICE banners (M1)
- SOLSTICE brochure (M1)
- SOLSTICE promotional video: M9
- SOLSTICE MOOC promotional video: M13
- SOLSTICE MOOC sample lecture (video): M13
- Training course leaflets (M8, M14, M25)
- MOOC leaflets (M32)
- Infographics for the Case Studies (M42)
- Policy and practice notes for the Case Studies (M42)
- SOLSTICE: summary of outcomes and impacts leaflet



## 4. Monitoring and evaluation

### 4.1. Network profiling

**Deliverables:** survey and basic analysis tools (M6)

Participating institutions: NOC (Popova, Alexiou), PML, all partners

Milestones:

M5 questionnaire finalised

M6 survey returned

M6 methodology and indicators finalised

We will use a modified GULLS survey (social network analysis) to profile the network strength and growth parameters (baseline, midterm and end term). International transdisciplinary network is the key delivery of the GCRF Grow call, thus this survey is of extreme importance and should clearly reflect our key success indicators.

### 4.2. M&E strategy

Participating institutions: NOC (Popova), PML

**Deliverables:** Project Report (M6)

In consultation with GCRF we will produce a strategy document detailing a complete M&E approach including logframe, theory of change, profiling surveys and methods of qualitative information collection.

### 4.3. Monitoring and evaluation reports

Participating institutions: NOC, PML

**Deliverables:** Project Report (M12, M30, M51, long term impact TBD)

**Milestones:** M&E indicators will be collected every six months

M&E will consider four evaluation categories: i) impact of capacity development both in WIO and UK; ii) benefits, costs and practicalities of employing the new technologies and recommendations; iii) societal impact of case study outcomes; and iv) strength and impact of UK-WIO transdisciplinary networks.

Towards the end of the project we will secure additional funding for the post-project M&E when the highest impacts are expected to be achieved (GCRF additional funding, NC, national and public good are the most obvious routes).

## 5. Alignment with key regional programs

### 5.1. PEACC

Acronym: [PEACC](#) (Productivity in the EACC under Climate Change)

[Pronounced ‘peace’ – calling for mankind to be at peace with the environment]

Duration: 24 months (1 July 2016 – 30 June 2018)

Project Reference: MASMA/OP/2016/02

Budget: US\$ 252 753

Engagement: We will engage with PEACC via partners in the project e.g. in synthesis: Dr Issufo Halo and Majuto Manyilizu (modelling, Dodoma University and Cape Peninsular University of Technology), Dr Rose Mwaipopo (socio-economics, UDSM) and Dr Albogast Kamukuru (fisheries, UDSM)

### 5.2. IIOE-II

[IIOE-II](#) (Second International Indian Ocean Expedition (IIOE-2))

Engagement: We will engage with Mika Odido from IOC sub-commission for Africa and the adjacent island states and with Ben Milligan (via SOLSTICE Advisory Panel).

### 5.3. The Western Indian Ocean Upwelling Research Initiative (WIOURI)

[WIOURI](#) (Western Indian Ocean Upwelling Research Initiative)

Engagement via WIOURI PI Mike Roberts

### 5.4. ACCORD

ACCORD (Addressing Challenges of Coastal Communities through Ocean Research for Developing Economies) is a four year UK National Capability Program ...

Engagement via K.Popova involved into both project.

### 5.5. SAPPHIRE:

SAPPHIRE (The Western Indian Ocean Large Marine Ecosystems Strategic Action Programme Policy Harmonisation and Institutional Reforms). **Engagement routes to be established by Science into Policy WGs.**

## 5.6 WIOSAP

WIOSAP (Strategic Action Programme for the protection of the Western Indian Ocean from land-based sources and activities (WIO-SAP))

## 6. Key events and workshops

April 2018, London (TBC)

- Annual Leadership team meeting
- Annual Advisory Panel meeting

April 2018, Mombasa

- Science into policy working group (or in June 2018)

September 2018, Zanzibar

- Remote Sensing training course

November, 2018, Mombasa

- Cruise planning workshop

February-March, 2019

- First North Kenyan Bank cruise

April 2019, Mombasa (TBC)

- Annual Leadership team meeting
- Annual Advisory Panel meeting

June-July, 2019

- Second North Kenyan Bank cruise

June-July 2019, Zanzibar

- Operations room and stakeholder engagement event during robotics mission (2 weeks). This event might be of interest to KMFRI to see the robotics in action and discuss future funding opportunities in this area

September 2019, Zanzibar (preliminary date)

- Modelling training course

November 2019, Location?

- 11<sup>th</sup> WIOMSA symposium
- SOLSTICE exhibition and special session (if WIOMSA is run in one of the SOLSTICE countries)

October 2019, Mombasa

- Cruise synthesis workshop
- Second stakeholder engagement workshop

April 2020, Zanzibar (TBC)

- Annual Leadership team meeting
- Annual Advisory Panel meeting

December 2020, Mombasa

- Science into policy WG

February 2020, Zanzibar (preliminary date)

- Communication training course

March 2020, Zanzibar (preliminary date)

- Science progress workshop in preparation to SI submission (combined Kenya and Tanzania event)

April 2021, Port Elizabeth (TBC)

- Annual Leadership team meeting
- Annual Advisory Panel meeting

October 2021, **Location?**

- 12<sup>th</sup> WIOMSA symposium
- SOLSTICE exhibition and special session (if WIOMSA is run in one of the SOLSTICE countries)
- SOLSTICE science-into-policy workshop with stakeholders

July 2021, Mombasa

- Synthesis, evaluation and science into policy workshop. Final stakeholder engagement workshop for Kenyan Case Study

## 7. Institutional Contributions to the Case Study

### 7.1. KMFRI

KMFRI will lead the North Kenyan Bank Case Study. In particular KMFRI will coordinate the Case Study literature review and the North Kenyan Bank foundation paper for the Special Issue (UK contribution for the literature review will be coordinated by K.Popova).

KMFRI will assist with validation of the physical and biogeochemical model output using historical data and knowledge of the region and contribute to the modelling publication.

KMFRI will conduct two biogeochemical surveys of 10 days duration in February-March and June-July 2019.

KMFRI will aim to produce lead author publications (SOLSTICE Special Issue) in the following areas:

- North Kenyan Bank foundation paper
- Physical processes driving ecosystem dynamics at the NKB (observations)
- Biogeochemical processes (observations)
- Current and historical Plume dynamics from satellite imagery
- Radiocarbon dating and historical sedimentation rates

KMFRI will lead Science into policy work package coordinating stakeholder engagement and production of science into policy material (reports, infographics, policy and practice notes). A substantial contribution of UK researchers (in particular WP2) will be provided to support this activity.

KMFRI researchers will contribute to the MOOC and participate in filming of the material dedicated to the case study; a local contact person will be identified to act as liaison for MOOC development.

KMFRI will facilitate making the off-line version of the MOOC available via Ocean Teacher Global Academy (OTGA) Mr. Harrison Onganda will facilitate this activity.

KMFRI will provide meeting facilities for the SOLSTICE project meeting and workshops run in Kenya.

Dr.J.Kamau will serve as members of the SOLSTICE Leadership Team reporting annually to the Advisory Panel.

## 7.2. CORDIO

- CORDIO suggests a Beach Management Unit fisheries training course on fisheries information for improved artisanal fisheries co-management (building on a course already prepared and run by CORDIO in 2012 – under SmartFish (IOC)). This will reinforce catch monitoring for at least one year - June 2018 to July 2019 - by BMUs operating in North Kenya Banks.

## 7.3. NMU

Dr M. Noyon will lead a training session on plankton ecology at IMS in June 2018 with a special focus on plankton collection, identification and measurements in collaboration with HWU and KMFRI (Dr James Mwaluma). The workshop will include looking at samples that have been collected or will be collected during various cruises (Nansen program and IIOE2).

Prof M.Roberts will participate in the North Kenyan Ban cruise if there is no overlap with eth South African and Tanzanian fieldwork.

## 7.4. Rhodes

Prof. W Sauer will lead on SOLSTICE wider engagement with the WIO fisheries and DSFA (with links to tuna) in particular.

Prof. W Sauer will strongly contribute to the Science into Policy working group activities and in particular to the production of final Science into Policy briefings and material.

Prof. Sauer will serve as a member of the SOLSTICE Leadership Team reporting annually to the Advisory Panel.

## 7.5. PML

PML will take the lead on WP2 (Socio Economics, PI: E. Papathanasopoulou) and contribute to: the Remote Sensing component of WP1 (Remote Sensing, PI: D. Raitsos), WP3 (Science to Policy), WP4 (Capacity Development) and M&E.

PML will take a lead on the following WP2 tasks: Fish modelling; Input-Output tables; and Marine Spatial Planning. It will also strongly contribute/lead WP1 tasks: synthesis of satellite information to identify large scale drivers, local drivers, real-time support of fieldwork, on-line/off-line remote sensing access; WP3: all relevant activities; WP4: 2-week remote sensing training course and MOOCs.

PML will be involved in co-supervising master and PhD students aligned with the Kenyan case study, particularly through the WP2 Input-output task (E. Papathanasopoulou).

E. Papathanasopoulou will serve as a member of the SOLSTICE Leadership Team reporting annually to the Advisory Panel.

#### **7.6. NOC**

NOC as a lead organisation has overall responsibility for delivering the project. NOC PI is identified in every WP.

## 8. List of abbreviations

AUV - Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

BGC - Biogeochemistry

CS – Case Study

EAF - ecosystem approach to fisheries

GCRF – Global Challenges Research Fund, UK (Project Funder)

MOOC – Massive Online Open Course

M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation

ODA - official development assistance

ROV - (Remotely Operated Vehicle)

RS – Remote Sensing

SI – Special Issue

WG – Working Group

WP – Work Package



**Annex 115**

“Tullow Oil discovers gas pay at Mbawa 1 well offshore Kenya”, *NS Energy*,

10 September 2012

[\(https://www.nsenenergybusiness.com/\)](https://www.nsenenergybusiness.com/)

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News 

## Tullow Oil discovers gas pay at Mbawa 1 well offshore Kenya

By NS Energy Staff Writer 10 Sep 2012

[NEWS \(https://www.nsenenergybusiness.com/news/\)](https://www.nsenenergybusiness.com/news/)

**UK-based oil company Tullow Oil has encountered 52m of net gas pay in porous Cretaceous sandstones at the Mbawa-1 exploration well in the L8 licence area, offshore Kenya.**

The well was drilled to a depth of 2,553m and reported gas in the shallowest objective.

The company intends to drill the well to a total depth (TD) of 3,275m to target further exploration objectives; a secondary exploration target lies above the planned TD.

Tullow Oil exploration director Angus McCoss said, "A gas discovery on prognosis in the shallowest objective at Mbawa-1 is an encouraging start to our East African Transform Margin exploration campaign."

Pancontinental Oil & Gas CEO and Director Barry Rushworth said the gas discovery proves the presence of a working hydrocarbon system offshore Kenya.

"We thank the Government of Kenya for its cooperation and support in achieving this very positive initial outcome for the country of Kenya, for the L8 joint venture and for Pancontinental," said Rushworth.

"With drilling continuing to a deeper exploration target, these interim results may be the first part of the story in this well, and they are certainly just the beginning of the main story of oil and gas exploration offshore Kenya.

Apache is the operator with 50% stake in the joint venture which includes Origin Energy holding 20%, Pancontinental Oil & Gas 15% and Tullow Kenya owns 15% stake respectively.

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**Annex 116**

“Somalia: oil thrown on the fire”, *Financial Times*, 13 May 2013

## Energy sector

### Somalia: Oil thrown on the fire

Energy companies scrambling for reserves risk opening up dangerous faultlines



On guard: a pirate on the Galmudug coast. Pirates have earned close to \$400m by ransoming 149 vessels since 2005

Katrina Manson MAY 13 2013

After an absence of more than 30 years, Abdirizak Omar Mohamed has returned to [Somalia](#), the country of his birth. Last year he gave up his job as a civil servant in the housing sector in Canada to take up a position as one of only 10 ministers in Mogadishu's new, slimline cabinet.

As minister for natural resources in a [dysfunctional country divided by a continuing war](#), he has to oversee a bulging portfolio that includes water, agriculture, the environment and livestock. As if that were not enough, his brief now also includes hydrocarbons just as Somalia – and east Africa more broadly – has become one of the most attractive frontiers in oil exploration for leading companies such as [Royal Dutch Shell](#) and [ConocoPhillips](#).

“The president and I have discussions every day about oil,” says Mr Mohamed in his office that looks out at the Indian Ocean across the tumbledown city of Mogadishu. Late last year, Somalia caught the attention of foreign oil companies by announcing it intended to auction some of 308 newly delineated oil blocks this year.

The world's leading oil companies are increasingly accepting that their quest for new reserves will take them into challenging new territory. In regions such as the [Arctic](#), the problems are technical.

Around the Horn of Africa, companies must calculate whether political and security risks will put too heavy a burden on their production costs. This is hazardous territory in which to operate. A chunk of Somalia is still under the control of [al-Shabaab](#), jihadi militants allied with al-Qaeda. Its waters are the hunting ground of pirates, who since 2005 have earned close to \$400m by ransoming 149 vessels.

The politics is also messy, internecine and riven by militias. Oil companies in the race for contracts find themselves unsure whether the power lies in Mogadishu or in semi-autonomous regions such as Puntland or self-declared states such as Galmudug. Somaliland to the north, bordering Djibouti, has declared itself a fully independent republic.

Attempts to carve up oil blocks before the Mogadishu government even controls the whole national territory are undermining efforts to bring [peace and stability](#) to a state that has been shattered by 22 years of war and that exports terrorism. The race to lay claim to resources risks triggering wider conflicts: regional authorities have been hostile to central government since the 22-year military dictatorship of Siad Barre. When he was deposed in 1991, warlords carved up the country – and several clan-based militias still hold sway, sometimes cutting deals with al-Shabaab.

The danger is that the race for oil will feed a destabilising rivalry between Mogadishu and other regions – some still influenced by former warlords – just as the international community is celebrating progress. UK ambassador Matt Baugh says the situation remains “very, very fragile”. Rival administrations have issued several companies rights to a clutch of overlapping oil blocks, redrawing the political map of Somalia in line with their own interests.

On an international level, disagreement between Kenya and Somalia over their maritime boundary has also created what one diplomat terms a “triangle of confusion” reaching across 120,000 square kilometres. Kenyan troops defend the [port of Kismayo](#), south of Mogadishu, notionally in support of the Mogadishu government, but Somali officials worry Kenya is keener on securing oil rights.

“The biggest conflicts right now among Somalis are all about oil rights ...oil is the main player in all of this mess,” says Mohamed Nur of Dissident Nation, a lobby group. “But it’s also a force that allows all sides to have bargaining chips and have an equal role in the future of the nation.”

Indeed, seven months into the job, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has called for a consensus, saying he has not yet signed any oil deals. He has also called on international oil companies not to cut their own deals with regional authorities because “that will block their future engagement in Somalia”.

“Resources should not be used as a pretext for new conflict,” he told the Financial Times.

It is a short drive from the president’s office to the well-guarded steps of the resources ministry. From behind the window of his bulletproof vehicle, Mr Mohamed points out the recent additions to [Mogadishu’s scars](#): a car bomb here; a suicide attack there. “We should wait until we have the right laws in place ...we are not ready yet,” he says, before heading home for a lunch of chips, camel steak, spaghetti and cumin-infused rice. Such a culinary hotch-potch offers a reminder that the former Italian colony has long had to contend with foreign influence and interests.

But oil companies are not proving as patient as Mr Mohamud – or as patient as he would like. A quarter of a century ago, BP, [Chevron](#), [Conoco](#), Eni and [Shell](#) bought oil blocks and started ambitious exploration programmes. By 1991 they had all put them on ice, declaring force majeure as civil war took hold. Now several companies want them back.

The Somali government has already started discussions with two previous concession holders – Eni and Shell – that want to reclaim their pre-1991 blocks and enter into production sharing agreements, says a senior government official. He adds that Conoco is also ready to reclaim its stake and that BP is considering the idea.

While the companies have not presented concrete plans, oil executives say they are interested in Somalia should force majeure be lifted.

But hazardous faultlines between competing authorities are beginning to erupt. In February, PetroQuest Africa, an affiliate of US exploration company Liberty Petroleum, signed a deal for a block with the regional government of Galmudug, a self-declared state to the north of Mogadishu.

The move shows how quickly tensions can be inflamed because Liberty’s concession overlaps an offshore block also claimed by Shell. In a letter of April 24, Shell asked the Somali authorities to take action to safeguard its “exclusive rights” to the block.

Mr Mohamed is quick to defend Shell and the pre-eminence of his weak, donor-backed Mogadishu government: “Galmudug should not ever offer any block to any company let alone the Shell block; it should not be signing contracts ...there’s only one president.”

...

In Galmudug itself, they see things differently. The president there is Abdi Hasan Awale Qeybdiid, a former warlord portrayed in *Black Hawk Down*, the film of the disastrous 1993 US mission when Somali militants downed US helicopters and dragged US corpses through the streets. He told the FT that he believed his agreement with Liberty was in line with the new provisional, federal constitution.

“We are not feeling any guilt for this kind of thing,” he says. “If there is a problem between the government and Galmudug we need to discuss, including Shell and Liberty and everyone, let them come to court.”

Phoenix-based Lane Franks, president of PetroQuest and Liberty, co-founded by his brother and US Congressman Trent Franks, suggests Shell should buy them out if the company wants to avoid stoking violence in Somalia. “Shell could still maintain its operatorship by compensating PQ with a modest royalty and reasonable fee to acquire all the PQ rights,” said Mr Franks in a letter to Shell executives on April 9. “Shell would also avoid potential rebellion or backlash from the autonomous states [that could reignite] ...at worst, another civil war.”

Abdillahi Mohamud of the East African Energy Forum, another lobby group, warns that such frictions show the stakes are high: “If we see a scramble for petroleum concessions before a political settlement between the federal states and Mogadishu is reached, we can definitely see a new conflict.”

In 2005, when Marcus Edwards-Jones, now non-executive board director of Aim-listed Range Resources, went to Puntland – a semi-autonomous state of northern Somalia – he took a Ukrainian charter plane from Yemen, lured by the promise of data left over from when Conoco conducted surveys there.

“It was a no-go area in those days – humanitarian planes didn’t even land, they would just drop aid out the back of a plane,” says Mr Edwards-Jones. Undaunted, he went on to raise \$40m from London fund managers to explore throughout Puntland following an agreement with the government. Range and its partners have put more than \$100m into the zone. In addition to drilling two wells, they built an airstrip and deployed 250 troops, led by South African security contractors, to counter al-Shabaab.

Mr Mohamed insists that any contracts signed with Puntland since 1991 are “null and void”, and ConocoPhillips wrote in 2007 that it had “not relinquished its rights in Somalia”. But Puntland’s government countered in February that the Mogadishu government was interfering “illegitimately on resource exploitation”.

Both Range’s wells were dry, hitting the share price and making it harder to raise money for the next well. But Mr Edwards-Jones says the area is so vast he would need to drill 15 wells before he gave up hope. “We did find traces of hydrocarbons down there; you can miss it by five feet,” he says.

His group has not been able to touch a more attractive block, Nugaal, because it lies in a controversial zone. In fact, Puntland draws its border with [Somaliland](#) to accommodate the Nugaal block. “Puntland came up with this creative imaginary boundary to entice oil and gas companies,” says Hussein Abdi Dualeh, Somaliland’s energy minister. He himself faces similar claims from Mogadishu, which says Somaliland has no right to make oil contracts of its own.

Mr Dualeh says the earlier claims in Somaliland have lapsed. He has kept up the pressure by bringing in new companies. Two weeks ago Somaliland signed over a block to Norway’s DNO International. Ophir Energy has an interest in two blocks that overlap former BP blocks. Genel last year took a stake in two other onshore blocks – one of which overlaps a former Conoco block – and is conducting a seismic survey.

“Ninety-five per cent of who has legality is whoever controls the territory,” says Mr Dualeh of Nugaal. “No oil and gas company in their right minds would come in willy-nilly and start doing things.”

But the situation is looking even more complex. The area around Nugaal, Khaatumo, last year declared independence from both Somaliland and Puntland, highlighting the risk that oil could rupture the country.

Mr Mohamed admits there are fissures. He wants to change the constitution – crafted at great expense by Somali lawmakers and UN legal experts – to accommodate an amended version of the 2008 petroleum law, which stipulates that the central government will determine oil deals. “We want oil companies to come into the country ...but companies are taking huge risks, some of them deliberate.”

...

**Development: A tangle of converging foreign interests**



In recent years, foreign involvement in Somalia has been characterised as part of an effort to combat terrorism.

But now Somalis are quick to identify a new set of self-interested motives. “Of course it’s all about oil,” says one senior Somali adviser about Norway’s growing interest in his country.

Norway, whose state oil company Statoil is exploring off [east Africa](#), has made various commitments to Somalia. Oslo has installed solar-powered lamps on the streets of Mogadishu and is setting up a special \$30m finance facility.

Last month a Somali parliamentary delegation visited Oslo to discuss co-operation, development and the management of natural resources. Most critically, these talks included discussion of a triangle of water disputed between Kenya and Somalia.

The Somali parliamentarians rejected a 2009 agreement by the previous transitional government to sign away the triangle to Kenya. That has raised the political stakes surrounding the status of Jubaland, a proposed Somali region neighbouring Kenya that would hold sway over the disputed offshore zone. Diplomats say that [Kenya, whose peacekeeping troops guard Kismayo](#), the port at the economic heart of Jubaland, is keen to assert influence there, against the wishes of the new Mogadishu government.

This tension between Somalia and Kenya matters to western oil interests. Somalia has already warned [Statoil](#), along with [Total](#) and [Eni](#), not to accept any oil concessions offered by Kenya in the disputed triangle.

Oslo lobbied hard for a Norwegian to become UN envoy to Somalia. That job instead went this month to a diplomat from the UK, which last week hosted an important conference on Somalia.

The attendees at the conference revealed the range of interests converging on Somalia. Qatar, for example, is an investor in Shell. Turkey has led a diplomatic charge for Somalia by setting up an embassy outside the secure airport compound and delivering prominent support, such as a camp for displaced people, a technical college and scholarships.

In the cold war, the Soviet Union and the US competed for influence in Somalia. But the competing forces are now eminently more complex.

**Annex 117**

“Soma wins funding for Somali seismic survey”, *African Energy*, 30 January 2014



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## Soma wins funding for Somali seismic survey



Issue 270 - 30 Jan 2014

Soma Oil & Gas, led by former UK Conservative party leader Michael Howard, has secured an equity investment of \$50m from British Virgin Islands-registered private investment company Winter Sky. Soma has an agreement with the Somali Federal Government to acquire substantial acreage in exchange for shooting seismic, (AE 261/4), and says the funding means it can finalise a contract for a planned 2D exploration programme. "Negotiations with a small number of seismic contractors are at an advanced stage, and Soma expects to make an appointment soon. The seismic work programme will commence within Q1 2014," a company spokeswoman told African Energy.

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
**Annex 118**

“Inquiry puts survival in doubt, says African oil explorer”, *The Times*, 14 October 2016

# Inquiry puts survival in doubt, says African oil explorer

Marcus Leroux

Friday October 14 2016,  
12.01am, The Times



Lord Howard of Lympne has a 4 per cent stake in Soma, the African fuel explorer  
JOHN STILLWELL/PA

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Soma Oil and Gas, the African oil explorer chaired by Lord Howard of Lympne, needs a fresh injection of cash to stay afloat as the Serious Fraud Office's inquiry enters a new chapter.

In its annual report, Soma's auditor warns that the SFO investigation casts a "material doubt" over its ability to continue as a going concern. The accounts also disclosed

that Winter Sky Investments, a private equity company controlled by Alexander Dzhaparidze, a Russian oil tycoon, has taken control of the business.

The company has been under investigation by the SFO since last summer. Initially, the agency was looking into allegations that so-called “capacity building payments” to the Somalian government amounted to bribes. That line of inquiry has been dropped but the SFO is continuing with “other strands” of its investigation.

Bevan Whitehead, an auditor for Deloitte’s energy and resources practice, wrote in the company’s accounts, which were posted yesterday at Companies House: “The group is reliant on receiving financing from existing shareholders in the next three months in order to continue to meet its obligations.”

Mr Whitehead said that the SFO investigation would make it difficult to raise further finance and that if the company was found guilty of corruption, it would forfeit its rights to the oil concessions it is trying to secure from the Somalian government.

The company lost \$4.1 million (£3.3 million) last year, down from \$8.8 million in 2014. It has consistently denied any wrongdoing and this week lost an “extraordinary” legal bid to force the SFO to wind up its investigation. It has also insisted that Lord Howard was

not personally suspected of any wrongdoing.

Lord Howard, the former Conservative leader, owns a 4 per cent stake. One of the founding investors is Basil Shiblaq, the executive chairman, who controls 37 per cent of the company through a British Virgin Islands entity.

In December Soma handed over exploration data to the Somalian government as part of a deal signed in 2013, which included the capacity building payments. It has also faced criticism from one adviser to the Somalian government for not disclosing how much it was paying a lawyer acting for the Somalians. Soma insisted the payments to the lawyer were above board and approved by all parties.

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**Annex 119**

“EAEF moves to oppose Soma Oil and Gas deal”, *Hiraan Online*, 15 August 2013



Today from Hiiraan Online:

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## EAEF moves to oppose Soma Oil and Gas deal



Thursday, August 15, 2013

The Federal Government of Somalia's recent deal with Soma Oil and Gas is facing heavy opposition from the East African Energy Forum (EAEF), a group of Somali resource experts and lawyers that monitor Somalia's natural resources, waters, territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The EAEF says it is opposing this deal after conducting a thorough investigation and concluding it to be contrary to the Somali national interest with little net benefit to the public.

"This deal goes against the very principle of transparency and anti-corruption that this government took an oath on last year, We are surprised at the cloud of secrecy and "behind-closed-doors" methodology this government believes they can deal our natural resources in." says Abdillahi Mohamud, the group's director.

The group says that the Federal Government has committed to the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) during the pre-G8 summit on trade, tax and transparency this year in the UK and has duties to implement transparency and anti-corruption measures.

Aside from the lack of transparency, the group is also blasting the technical quality of the deal and companies involved that have signed with the central government.

"Does this government and these companies believe that Somalis who are experienced in the fields of petroleum and maritime affairs would blindly look the other way while unprofessional and biased deals are made with their natural resources and waters; the only source of future wealth and hope a nation of 10 million has left to recover?" asked Mr. Mohamud.

The EAEF has called on the central government to cancel the Soma Oil and Gas deal immediately and to review the procedures used to strike this deal, believing that this will set a precedent of shady deals being common practice in Somalia.

The EAEF's technical team says that Soma Oil and Gas does not have the expertise or the capacity to conduct the offshore seismic survey themselves and would need to sub contract to a capable

seismic company. It also added that it is a blatant conflict of interest to allow a company to collect the seismic data that the government plans to use to sell oil blocks, at the same time allowing it to choose whichever blocks it wants in a private sale.

"How can a company barely four months in existence be given the reigns to explore in our offshore waters? Who are their sub-contractors that will actually do the work? Why aren't reputable seismic companies being allowed to bid on this project in public as is the industry norm? The government should cancel this deal and conduct itself in a transparent and open manner that is good business for the country." said Feysal Mayow, the EAEF's technical director.

The group has also raised the alarm that the central government has abandoned its initial suggestion that it will not engage in oil deals until it has harmonized a robust petroleum law with the constitution and begin talks with the regions on this topic.

"Under what Somali law will this company be governed, which environmental standards, which statutes will they be held accountable in Somalia? The answer is none, because the government has found it a "nuisance" to have proper laws that Somalis can support and rally behind." Said Mr. Mayow.

The Somali insecurity situation is underpinned by a race for natural resources at a time when other priorities should be taking center stage says the EAEF.

"Much of the conflict in Somalia today is about economic security, namely about ownership of natural resources and land, this move will only exacerbate the powder-keg situation in the country at a time when we should be focusing on reconciliation and security." Says Abdillahi Mohamud.

The EAEF says it has been supporting the central government with capacity building initiatives, but that the FGS has got the cart before the horse in this deal and is pressuring the government to invest in its institutions, public procurement, and transparency and anti-corruption systems.

"We should be focusing on building the relevant Ministries, training Somali bureaucrats in these fields, producing laws that protect Somalia's resources economically and environmentally, not signing shady deals with a barely four month old company." says Feysal Mayow.

"It seems elements within the FGS as well as some foreign companies still think that Somalia is that place you can conduct a shady deal and go unnoticed. The Somalis are no longer dormant in their politics and the EAEF as citizens of the country will continue to hold its government and commercial partners to account." Mr. Mayow adds.

The group has said it will continue its investigation and monitor developments as well as using its influence in parliament and other avenues to oppose this deal. It is encouraging Prime Minister Shirdon to nullify this deal and open a review of how the deal was sourced and signed.

"I don't think Somalis are interested in these unprofessional deals while their country is rife with insecurity and political bickering. The government should be focusing on that which matters the most and not signing shady oil deals. This is a sector that requires well functioning public institutions and at the moment we haven't got those to an acceptable standard" Said Abdillahi Mohamud.

**Annex 120**

“Somalia removes prime minister in no-confidence vote”, *The Guardian*, 25 July 2020

# The Guardian



This article is more than **3 months old**

## Somalia removes prime minister in no-confidence vote

**170 of 178 MPs back motion against Hassan Ali Khaire for failing to move towards democratic elections**

*Agence France-Presse*

Sat 25 Jul 2020 16.59 BST

Somalia's parliament removed the prime minister, Hassan Ali Khaire, from his post in a vote of no confidence on Saturday for failing to pave the way towards fully democratic elections, the speaker said.

A whopping 170 of parliament's 178 MPs backed the no-confidence motion, and Khaire's ouster was immediately endorsed by the president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, who had appointed him as prime minister in February 2017.

The deputies had arrived at the national assembly on Saturday to work on the organisation of the next national elections in 2021.

“After learning that the government had failed in its promise to prepare a clear plan that paves the way for one-person-one-vote elections in 2021 ... parliament undertook a vote of no confidence against the government and its prime minister, Hassan Ali Khaire,” parliamentary speaker Mohamed Mursal told reporters.

“The president of the federal government of Somalia ... will appoint a prime minister and a government which will pave the way for elections,” he added.

The office of the president issued a statement indicating that Farmajo would nominate a new prime minister soon.

“I have decided to accept the decision of the parliament,” the president said in the statement.

The fragile central government, chaired by Farmajo, controls only a part of Somali territory and is facing an insurgency from the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab militant group.

Somalia has set itself the goal of holding a one-person, one-vote national election in early 2021 - as opposed to a complex system in which special delegates pick lawmakers who then vote for the president - in what would be its first full democratic election since 1969.

Khaire, 52, was a newcomer to the political scene when he became prime minister, having previously held the post of director of the Africa department of the British oil company Soma Oil and Gas.

Khaire is a member of the Hawiye clan while Farmajo is from the Darod clan, in keeping with the traditional balance at the top of the Somali executive.

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#### Topics

- Somalia
- Africa
- Middle East and North Africa
- news

**Annex 121**

“Corruption perceptions index 2019”, *Transparency International*, 2020

# **CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2019**



Transparency International is a global movement with one vision: a world in which government, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption. With more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, we are leading the fight against corruption to turn this vision into reality.

**#cpi2019**

**[www.transparency.org/cpi](http://www.transparency.org/cpi)**

Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of January 2020. Nevertheless, Transparency International cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts.

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

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
# 180 COUNTRIES. 180 SCORES.

## HOW DOES YOUR COUNTRY MEASURE UP?

The perceived levels of public sector corruption in 180 countries/territories around the world.



SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	RANK	SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	RANK	SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	RANK
87	Denmark	1	69	France	23	56	Czech Republic	44
87	New Zealand	1	69	United States of America	23	56	Georgia	44
86	Finland	3	68	Bhutan	25	56	Latvia	44
85	Singapore	4	67	Chile	26	55	Dominica	48
85	Sweden	4	66	Seychelles	27	55	Saint Lucia	48
85	Switzerland	4	65	Taiwan	28	54	Malta	50
84	Norway	7	64	Bahamas	29	53	Grenada	51
82	Netherlands	8	64	Barbados	30	53	Italy	51
80	Germany	9	62	Portugal	30	53	Malaysia	51
80	Luxembourg	9	62	Qatar	30	53	Rwanda	51
78	Iceland	11	62	Spain	30	53	Saudi Arabia	51
77	Australia	12	62	Spain	30	52	Mauritius	56
77	Austria	12	61	Botswana	34	52	Namibia	56
77	Canada	12	60	Brunei Darussalam	35	52	Oman	56
77	United Kingdom	12	60	Israel	35	50	Slovakia	59
76	Hong Kong	16	60	Lithuania	35	48	Cuba	60
75	Belgium	17	60	Slovenia	35	48	Greece	60
74	Estonia	18	59	Korea, South	39	48	Jordan	60
74	Ireland	18	59	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	39	47	Croatia	63
73	Japan	20	58	Cabo Verde	41	46	Sao Tome and Principe	64
71	United Arab Emirates	21	58	Cyprus	41	46	Vanuatu	64
71	Uruguay	21	58	Poland	41	45	Argentina	66
			56	Costa Rica	44	45	Belarus	66
						45	Montenegro	66
						45	Senegal	66
						44	Hungary	70
						44	Romania	70
						44	South Africa	70
						44	Suriname	70
						43	Bulgaria	74
						43	Jamaica	74
						43	Tunisia	74
						42	Armenia	77
						42	Bahrain	77
						42	Solomon Islands	77
						41	Benin	80
						41	China	80
						41	Ghana	80
						41	India	80
						41	Morocco	80
						40	Burkina Faso	85
						40	Guyana	85
						40	Indonesia	85
						40	Kuwait	85
						40	Lesotho	85
						40	Trinidad and Tobago	85



39	Serbia	91	34	Kazakhstan	113	28	Dominican Republic	137	24	Zimbabwe	158
39	Turkey	91	34	Nepal	113	28	Kenya	137	23	Eritrea	160
38	Ecuador	93	34	Philippines	113	28	Lebanon	137	22	Nicaragua	161
38	Sri Lanka	93	34	Eswatini	113	28	Liberia	137	20	Cambodia	162
38	Timor-Leste	93	34	Zambia	113	28	Mauritania	137	20	Chad	162
37	Colombia	96	33	Sierra Leone	119	28	Papua New Guinea	137	20	Iraq	162
37	Ethiopia	96	32	Moldova	120	28	Paraguay	137	19	Burundi	165
37	Gambia	96	32	Niger	120	28	Russia	137	19	Congo	165
37	Tanzania	96	32	Pakistan	120	28	Uganda	137	19	Turkmenistan	165
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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Corruption Perceptions Index 2019 reveals a staggering number of countries are showing little to no improvement in tackling corruption. Our analysis also suggests that reducing big money in politics and promoting inclusive political decision-making are essential to curb corruption.

In the last year, anti-corruption movements across the globe gained momentum as millions of people joined together to speak out against corruption in their governments.


Protests from Latin America, North Africa and Eastern Europe to the Middle East and Central Asia made headlines as citizens marched in Santiago, Prague, Beirut, and a host of other cities to voice their frustrations in the streets.

From fraud that occurs at the highest levels of government to petty bribery that blocks access to basic public services like health care and education, citizens are fed up with corrupt leaders and institutions. This frustration fuels a growing lack of trust in government and further erodes public confidence in political leaders, elected officials and democracy.

The current state of corruption speaks to a need for greater

political integrity in many countries. To have any chance of curbing corruption, governments must strengthen checks and balances, limit the influence of big money in politics and ensure broad input in political decision-making. Public policies and resources should not be determined by economic power or political influence, but by fair consultation and impartial budget allocation.

**180** COUNTRIES SCORED



THE CPI USES A SCALE FROM 0 TO 100

The CPI scores **180 countries and territories** by their **perceived** levels of public sector corruption, according to experts and business people.

100 is **very clean** and 0 is **highly corrupt**

**2/3** OF COUNTRIES SCORE BELOW

THE **AVERAGE** SCORE IS

**50**/100

**43**/100

## Recommendations

To end corruption and restore trust in politics, it is imperative to prevent opportunities for political corruption and to foster the integrity of political systems. Transparency International recommends:




### MANAGE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Governments should reduce the risk of undue influence in policy-making by tightening controls over financial and other interests of government officials. Governments should also address “revolving doors”, establish cooling-off periods for former officials and ensure rules are properly enforced and sanctioned.



### CONTROL POLITICAL FINANCING

In order to prevent excessive money and influence in politics, governments should improve and properly enforce campaign finance regulations. Political parties should also disclose their sources of income, assets and loans, and governments should empower oversight agencies with stronger mandates and appropriate resources.



### STRENGTHEN ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

For democracy to be effective against corruption, governments must ensure that elections are free and fair. Preventing and sanctioning vote-buying and misinformation campaigns are essential to rebuilding trust in government and ensuring that citizens can use their vote to punish corrupt politicians.



### REGULATE LOBBYING ACTIVITIES

Governments should promote open and meaningful access to decision-making and consult a wider range of groups, beyond well-resourced lobbyists and a few private interests. Lobbying activities should be public and easily accessible.



### TACKLE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

Governments should create mechanisms to ensure that service delivery and public resource allocation are not driven by personal connections or are biased towards special interest groups at the expense of the overall public good.



### EMPOWER CITIZENS

Governments should protect civil liberties and political rights, including freedom of speech, expression and association. Governments should engage civil society and protect citizens, activists, whistleblowers and journalists in monitoring and exposing corruption.




### REINFORCE CHECKS AND BALANCES

Governments must promote the separation of powers, strengthen judicial independence and preserve checks and balances.

# GLOBAL HIGHLIGHTS


This year's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows corruption is more pervasive in countries where big money can flow freely into electoral campaigns and where governments listen only to the voices of wealthy or well-connected individuals.



HIGHEST SCORING REGION


**WESTERN EUROPE & EUROPEAN UNION**

**66** /100



AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE


**⊞ SINCE 2018**



LOWEST SCORING REGION


**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

**32** /100



AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE

**⊞ SINCE 2018**



The index ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, according to experts and business people. It uses a scale of zero to 100, where zero is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean.

More than two-thirds of countries score below 50 on this year's CPI, with an average score of just 43.

Similar to previous years, the data shows that despite some progress, a majority of countries are still failing to tackle public sector corruption effectively.

The top countries are New Zealand and Denmark, with scores of 87 each, followed by Finland (86), Singapore (85), Sweden (85) and Switzerland (85).

The bottom countries are Somalia, South Sudan and Syria with scores of 9, 12 and 13, respectively. These countries are closely followed by Yemen (15), Venezuela (16), Sudan (16), Equatorial Guinea (16) and Afghanistan (16).

**“ Governments must urgently address the corrupting role of big money in political party financing and the undue influence it exerts on our political systems.**

**Delia Ferreira Rubio**  
Chair  
*Transparency International*





In the last eight years, only 22 countries significantly improved their CPI scores, including Greece, Guyana and Estonia. In the same period, 21 countries significantly decreased their scores, including Canada, Australia and Nicaragua. In the remaining 137 countries, the levels of corruption show little to no change.

Since 2012:

22



**COUNTRIES IMPROVED\***

Including:

- Greece (+12)
- Guyana (+12)
- Estonia (+10)


21



**COUNTRIES DECLINED\***

Including:

- Canada (-7)
- Nicaragua (-7)
- Australia (-8)




**THE REMAINING COUNTRIES MADE LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN RECENT YEARS**

\* In these six examples, the country score changed significantly between 2012 and 2019.

## RESULTS BY REGION

Average regional scores, with top and bottom performers in each region.



# POLITICAL INTEGRITY

Keeping big money out of politics is essential to ensure political decision-making serves the public interest and curb opportunities for corrupt deals.

This year, our research highlights the relationship between politics, money and corruption. Unregulated flows of big money in politics also make public policy vulnerable to undue influence. Countries with stronger enforcement of campaign finance regulations have lower levels of corruption, as measured by the CPI.

Countries where campaign finance regulations are comprehensive and systematically enforced have an average score of 70 on the CPI, whereas countries where such regulations either don't exist or are poorly enforced score an average of just 34 and 35 respectively.

Sixty per cent of countries that significantly improved their CPI scores since 2012 also strengthened their enforcement of campaign finance regulations.

In addition, when policy-makers listen only to wealthy or politically connected individuals and groups, they often do so at the expense of the citizens they serve.

Countries with broader and more open consultation processes score an average of 61 on the CPI. By contrast, where there is little to no consultation, the average score is just 32.

A vast majority of countries that significantly declined their CPI

scores since 2012 do not engage the most relevant political, social and business actors in political decision-making.

Countries with lower CPI scores also have a higher concentration of political power among wealthy citizens.<sup>1</sup> Across the board, there is a concerning popular perception that rich people buy elections, both among some of the lowest-scoring countries on the CPI, as well as among certain higher-scoring countries, such as the United States.<sup>2</sup>




“ To have any chance of ending corruption and improving peoples’ lives, we must tackle the relationship between politics and big money. All citizens must be represented in decision-making.

**Patricia Moreira**  
*Managing Director*  
*Transparency International*

# TRANSPARENCY IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Greater transparency of campaign donations is associated with lower levels of corruption. Each dot represents a country's CPI 2019 score and the circles represent the average CPI score as compared to the strength of enforcement.<sup>3</sup>



VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY (V-DEM) 2019 "DISCLOSURE OF CAMPAIGN DONATIONS"

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

36 ▼

With a score of 36, Bosnia and Herzegovina significantly declined by six points on the CPI since 2012. The country also suffers from weak enforcement of campaign finance regulations. During the 2018 elections, political parties and civil society organisations raised concerns over voting irregularities, threats against voters, the misuse of public resources and unequal access to the media.<sup>4</sup>

## SOUTH KOREA

59 ▲

With a score of 59, South Korea significantly improved by six points on the CPI since 2016. While a large share of funding comes from private donations, campaign contributions are well regulated and the rules enforced.<sup>5</sup> Many elected officials and parliamentarians have lost their offices or seats due to violations of these regulations.


## CÔTE D'IVOIRE

35 ▲

This year, Côte d'Ivoire scores 35 on the CPI, a significant increase of six points since 2012. Campaign finance regulations are partially enforced in the country. Since 2010, there have been few complaints about irregularities in elections. International observers have deemed elections inclusive and transparent, from the candidate registration process to vote counting.<sup>6</sup>

## POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING

Broad consultation in political decision-making is associated with lower levels of corruption. Each dot represents a country's CPI 2019 score and the circles represent the average CPI score as compared to the extent of consultation.<sup>7</sup>



### NICARAGUA

22 ▼

With a score of 22, Nicaragua significantly declined by seven points on the CPI since 2012. There is little to no consultation on political decisions with political, social and business groups in the country. Civil society and opposition parties are systematically excluded from the policy process, while groups critical of the government operate in an increasingly restrictive environment.<sup>8</sup>

### ECUADOR

38 ▲

Since 2016, Ecuador significantly improved six points to earn a score of 38 on the CPI this year. Over the past two years, the government rolled back some restrictions on civil society. Despite these positive developments, the government retains excessive regulatory power over NGOs and it remains to be seen how it responds to recent protests in the country.<sup>9</sup>

### TURKEY

39 ▼

This year, Turkey scores 39 on the CPI, a significant decrease of 10 points since 2012. There is little space for consultative decision-making in the country. The government recently cracked down on NGOs, closing at least 1,500 foundations and associations and seizing their assets, while continuing to harass, arrest and prosecute civil society leaders.<sup>10</sup>

# AMERICAS


With an average score of 43 for the fourth consecutive year, the Americas region fails to make significant progress in the fight against corruption.

32

COUNTRIES ASSESSED

43/100

AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE



While Canada is consistently a top performer, with a score of 77 out of 100, the country dropped four points since last year and seven points since 2012. At the bottom of the index, Venezuela scores 16, which is also one of the bottom five scores globally.

The region faces significant challenges from political leaders acting in their own self-interest at the expense of the citizens they serve. Specifically, political party financing and electoral integrity are big challenges.

For example, the Lava Jato investigation,<sup>11</sup> or “Operation Car Wash”, which exposed corruption spanning at least 10 countries in

Latin America, points to a surge in illegal political contributions or donations as part of one of the biggest corruption scandals in history.<sup>12</sup>

Odebrecht, the Brazilian construction giant at the heart of the case, was convicted for paying US\$1 billion in bribes over the past 15 years, including to political leaders in Brazil, Peru and Argentina during elections.

With scores of 22 and 29 respectively, Nicaragua and Mexico are significant decliners on the CPI since 2012. Although the recent *Global Corruption Barometer – Latin America and the Caribbean*<sup>13</sup> highlights vote-buying

and other corruption issues in Mexico, a recent anti-corruption reform, along with a new, legally autonomous attorney general's office are positive changes.<sup>14</sup> In Nicaragua, social unrest and human rights violations are on the rise.<sup>15</sup> Public services and consultative decision-making are sorely lacking in the country.

With a score of 40, Guyana is a significant improver on the CPI since 2012.<sup>16</sup> While there is still much work to do, the government is demonstrating political will to hold former politicians accountable for the misuse of state resources.

## COUNTRIES TO WATCH

### United States (US)

With a score of 69, the United States drops two points since last year to earn its lowest score on the CPI in eight years. This comes at a time when Americans' trust in government is at an historic low of 17 per cent,<sup>17</sup> according to the Pew Research Center.

The US faces a wide range of challenges, from threats to its system of checks and balances,<sup>18</sup>

and the ever-increasing influence of special interests in government,<sup>19</sup> to the use of anonymous shell companies by criminals, corrupt individuals and even terrorists, to hide illicit activities.<sup>20</sup>

While President Trump campaigned on a promise of "draining the swamp" and making government work for more than just Washington insiders and political elites, a series

of scandals, resignations and allegations of unethical behaviour suggest that the "pay-to-play" culture has only become more entrenched.<sup>21</sup> In December 2019, the US House of Representatives formally impeached President Trump for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress.<sup>22</sup>

*A whistleblower complaint sparked the impeachment process, providing a powerful reminder of the need to protect, and expand, the legal and everyday environment for whistleblowers and to avoid the shame and blame that often ensues if their identities are revealed.<sup>23</sup>*

Photo: Michael Fleshman <https://flic.kr/p/eJrGgh> CC BY-NC 2.0



### Brazil

Corruption remains one of the biggest impediments to economic and social development in Brazil. With a score of 35, Brazil remains stagnated, with its lowest CPI score since 2012.


After the 2018 national elections, which were strongly influenced by

an anti-corruption agenda, Brazil experienced a series of setbacks to its legal and institutional anti-corruption frameworks.<sup>24</sup> The country also faced difficulties in advancing wide-ranging reforms to its political system.

Setbacks included a Supreme Court injunction that virtually paralysed Brazil's anti-money

laundering system<sup>25</sup> and an illegal inquiry that secretly targeted law enforcement agents.<sup>26</sup>

Ongoing challenges include growing political interference with anti-corruption institutions by President Bolsonaro, and congressional approval of legislation that threatens the independence of law enforcement agents and the accountability of political parties.



*Progress in Brazil's anti-corruption agenda is at risk and mounting impunity threatens to weaken democracy and destabilise the country.*

Photo: Mario Roberto Duran Ortiz/Wikimedia Commons

# ASIA PACIFIC


A regional average of 45, after many consecutive years of an average score of 44, illustrates general stagnation across the Asia Pacific.

31

COUNTRIES ASSESSED

45/100

AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE



Despite the presence of high performers like New Zealand (87), Singapore (85), Australia (77), Hong Kong (76) and Japan (73), the region hasn't witnessed substantial progress in anti-corruption efforts or results. In addition, low performers like Afghanistan (16), North Korea (17) and Cambodia (20) continue to highlight serious challenges in the region.

While often seen as an engine of the global economy, in terms of political integrity and governance, the region performs only marginally better than the global average. Many countries

see economic openness as a way forward, however, governments across the region, from China to Cambodia to Vietnam, continue to restrict participation in public affairs, silence dissenting voices and keep decision-making out of public scrutiny.<sup>27</sup>

Given these issues, it comes as no surprise that vibrant economic powers like China (41), Indonesia (40), Vietnam (37), the Philippines (34) and others continue to struggle to tackle corruption.

Even in democracies, such as Australia<sup>28</sup> and India<sup>29</sup>, unfair and opaque political financing

and undue influence in decision-making and lobbying by powerful corporate interest groups, result in stagnation or decline in control of corruption.

## COUNTRIES TO WATCH

### Indonesia

With a score of 40, Indonesia improves by two points on the CPI. A promising emerging economy is coupled with repression of civil society and weak oversight institutions. The independence and effectiveness of Indonesia's anti-corruption

commission, the KPK, is currently being thwarted by the government.<sup>30</sup>

The Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), is seen as a symbol of progress and modernisation, but is undergoing a loss of autonomy and power. Paradoxically, this contradicts

the government's aspirations and President Widodo's own agenda, which prioritises foreign investment and a booming economy.<sup>31</sup> With corruption issues in the limelight, Indonesia risks scaring off investors and slowing economic progress.



*The re-election of President Joko Widodo was a setback to political integrity that surprised many, undercutting the impressive democratic and anti-corruption resurgence the country experienced in the last few years.<sup>32</sup>*

Photo: Adek Berry/AFP

### Papua New Guinea

With a score of 28, Papua New Guinea remains stagnant on the CPI. However, despite low performance on the CPI for years, recent anti-corruption developments are encouraging.

corruption, the government instituted structural changes and introduced new legislation to establish an Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). Together, these small improvements give citizens a reason for optimism.

previous commitments, as well as its 20-year anti-corruption strategy established in 2012, and work to investigate and punish bribery, fraud, conflicts of interest, nepotism and other corrupt acts.

Following the removal of former Prime Minister O'Neill, currently being investigated for alleged

Under the current leadership of Prime Minister Marape, the government should uphold its

*More progress is needed to make real change in Papua New Guinea and civil society organisations must remain vigilant in holding the government accountable.*

Photo: David Gray/Reuters





# EASTERN EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA


Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the second-lowest performing region on the CPI, with an average score of 35.

19

COUNTRIES ASSESSED

35/100

AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE



Across the region, countries experience limited separation of powers, abuse of state resources for electoral purposes, opaque political party financing and conflicts of interest.<sup>33 34</sup>

Only three countries score above the global average: Georgia (56), Belarus (45) and Montenegro (45). At the bottom of the region are Turkmenistan (19), Uzbekistan (25) and Tajikistan (25).

Strong political influence over oversight institutions, insufficient judicial independence and limited press freedoms serve to create an over-concentration of power in many countries across the region.

Despite aspirations to join the European Union, the scores in six Western Balkan countries and Turkey have not improved.

Turkey (39) declined significantly by 10 points since 2012, while Bosnia and Herzegovina (36) declined by six points in the same period. A lack of political will and a decline in implementation of laws and regulations are real challenges.

Since 2012, Belarus (45), Kyrgyzstan (30) and Uzbekistan (25) have significantly improved on the CPI. However, these three post-Soviet states continue to experience state capture and a

failure to preserve checks and balances.

While Uzbekistan has loosened some media restrictions, it still remains one of the most authoritarian regimes worldwide.<sup>35</sup>

State capture and the concentration of power in private hands remain a major stumbling block in the region. Corruption can only be addressed effectively if political leaders prioritise public interests and set an example for transparency.

## COUNTRIES TO WATCH

### Armenia

With a score of 42, Armenia improves by seven points since last year. Following the revolution in 2018 and the formation of a new parliament, the country has demonstrated promising developments in advancing anti-corruption policy reforms.<sup>36</sup>

Despite these improvements, conflicts of interests and non-transparent and unaccountable public operations remain impediments to ending corruption in the country.<sup>37</sup>

While improving political integrity will take time and resources, increasing public trust in law

enforcement and the judiciary are critical first steps in ensuring appropriate checks and balances and improving anti-corruption efforts.<sup>38</sup>

*In Armenia, political will and implementation of anti-corruption policies are important, while fundamental and urgent change of political culture and governance is crucial.*

Photo: Amnat Phuthamrong/shutterstock.com



### Kosovo

With a score of 36, Kosovo, is experiencing a shift in parliamentary power that could offer an opportunity for change. After years of criticising the government and international community in Kosovo for their failure to address corruption,<sup>39</sup>

the Self-Determination (*Vetevendosje*) party, which recently won a majority of parliamentary seats, has a chance to demonstrate its commitment to combating corruption.<sup>40</sup>

During the election campaign, the party was one of a few that responded to requests to disclose campaign costs.

However, it remains to be seen if a new government will live up to a higher standard of political integrity. It can do so by abandoning the usual practice of political appointments in state-owned enterprises and by establishing a strong legal obligation for financial disclosure by political parties.



*In Kosovo, the new parliament has an opportunity to reverse the shortcomings of the previous administration and prioritise anti-corruption efforts.*

Photo: Albinfo/Wikimedia Commons

# MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA


With the same average score of 39 as last year, there is little progress in improving control of corruption in the Middle East and North Africa region.

18

COUNTRIES ASSESSED

39/100

AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE



With a score of 71, the United Arab Emirates is the best regional performer, followed by Qatar (62). At the bottom of the region, Syria scores 13, followed by Yemen with a score of 15. Both countries are significant decliners on the CPI, with Yemen dropping eight points since 2012 and Syria dropping 13 points during the same period.

The region faces significant corruption challenges that highlight a lack of political integrity. According to our recent report, *Global Corruption*

*Barometer — Middle East and North Africa*, nearly one in two people in Lebanon is offered bribes in exchange for their votes, while more than one in four receives threats if they don't vote a certain way.<sup>41</sup>

In a region where fair and democratic elections are the exception, state capture is commonplace. Powerful individuals routinely divert public funds to their own pockets at the expense of ordinary citizens. Separation of powers is another challenge: independent judiciaries

with the potential to act as a check on the executive branch are rare or non-existent.<sup>42</sup>

To improve citizens' trust in government, countries must build transparent and accountable institutions and prosecute wrongdoing. They should also hold free and fair elections and allow for citizen engagement and participation in decision-making.

## COUNTRIES TO WATCH

### Tunisia

With a score of 43, Tunisia remains at a standstill on the CPI despite advances in anti-corruption legislation over the past five years. Recent laws to protect whistleblowers and improve access to information, combined with stronger social accountability and space for civil society, are important steps, but they are not enough.


For anti-corruption laws to be effective, decrees and implementing orders from the executive branch are needed. In addition, financial and human resources are vital to strengthen the country's anti-corruption commission and increase its independence.

To date, few political leaders have been prosecuted for corruption,<sup>43</sup> and recovery of stolen assets is

slow.<sup>44</sup> An independent judiciary is another major challenge. While the recent establishment of a judiciary council is encouraging, the council is not yet fully operational and still lacks total independence from the legislative branch.<sup>45</sup>

*In Tunisia, the lack of enforcement of laws and regulations is a major challenge. Without proper implementation mechanisms and administrative decrees, laws will remain ineffective.*

Photo: ColorMaker/Shutterstock.com



### Saudi Arabia

With a score of 53, Saudi Arabia improved by four points since last year. However, its score does not reflect the myriad problems in the country, including a dismal human rights record and severe restrictions on journalists, political activists and other citizens.

In 2017, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman carried out an "anti-corruption" purge as part of his reform of the country. Despite government claims of recovering approximately US\$106 billion of stolen assets,<sup>46</sup> there was no due process, transparent investigation or fair and free trial for suspects.<sup>47</sup>

This year, Saudi Arabia takes on the presidency of the G20. As it assumes this leadership role, the country must end its crackdown on civil liberties and strengthen further checks on the executive branch to foster transparency and accountability.



*The social and economic reforms that helped improve Saudi Arabia's business environment and attract foreign investment came with a heavy human rights price tag.*

Photo: Faisal Nasser/Reuters

# SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA


As the lowest-scoring region on the CPI, with an average of 32, Sub-Saharan Africa's performance paints a bleak picture of inaction against corruption.

49

COUNTRIES ASSESSED

32/100

AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE



With a score of 66, the Seychelles earns the highest mark in the region, followed by Botswana (61), Cabo Verde (58), Rwanda (53) and Mauritius (52). At the bottom of the index are Somalia (9), South Sudan (12), Sudan (16) and Equatorial Guinea (16).

Significant improvers since 2012, Cote d'Ivoire (35) and Senegal (45) still have much work to do. The political will demonstrated by the leaders of both countries, which saw a number of key legal, policy and institutional reforms implemented in their early days in office, has been on a backslide since 2016.

Since 2012, several countries, including Congo (19), Liberia (28), Madagascar (24) and Malawi (31) have significantly declined on the CPI. Congo has been the subject of repeated reports of money laundering and embezzlement of public funds by the country's political elite<sup>48</sup> with no action taken by national authorities.<sup>49</sup>

In Madagascar, despite a 2018 constitutional court ruling against electoral amendments favouring the incumbent president and cited as unconstitutional, judicial independence remains a concern.<sup>50</sup> More recently, the national anti-corruption agency

began legal action against more than half of the country's parliamentarians, who stand accused of taking bribes.<sup>51</sup>

Money is used to win elections, consolidate power and further personal interests. Although the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting Corruption has provisions to prevent corruption and encourage transparency in campaign financing, implementation is weak.

## COUNTRIES TO WATCH

### Angola

Following four decades of authoritarian rule, Angola (26) jumped seven points in this year's CPI, making it a significant improver. However, given its overall low score, the country is still well below the global average of 43.

Isabel Dos Santos, the former president's daughter, who is

also known as "Africa's richest woman", was fired from her job as head of the state oil and gas firm, Sonangol, months after President Lourenço's election. In December 2019, as investigations into corruption allegations progressed, an Angolan court ordered a freeze of Dos Santos's assets.<sup>52</sup>

Although the country has

recovered US\$5 billion in stolen assets, more needs to be done to strengthen integrity and promote transparency in accounting for oil revenue.<sup>53</sup>



*Following a change of regime in 2017, the Angolan government introduced a set of governance reforms to crack down on corruption.*

Photo: Stephen Eisenhammer/Reuters

### Ghana

Known as a beacon of democracy in West Africa, Ghana dropped seven points on the CPI since 2014, moving from 48 in 2014 to 41 in 2019. Revelations of bribery in Ghana's high court in 2015<sup>54</sup>

and the murder of investigative journalist Ahmed Hussein-Suale in early 2019<sup>55</sup> cast serious doubts on the country's anti-corruption efforts.

Despite these developments, there is hope for change. In 2017,

the Office of Special Prosecutor was established, which has the power to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption. In 2019, a right to information bill was also passed. These efforts, combined with the enhanced performance of the Auditor General's office, offer hope for improvement.



*Given recent scandals, corruption is expected to feature prominently in electoral debates during the upcoming elections in 2020.*

Photo: demerzel21/iStockphoto.com

# WESTERN EUROPE & EUROPEAN UNION


Fourteen of the top 20 countries in this year's CPI are from Western Europe and the European Union (EU), including nine countries from the EU alone.

31

COUNTRIES ASSESSED

66/100

AVERAGE REGIONAL SCORE



Despite being the best performing region, with an average score of 66 out of 100, Western Europe and the EU are not immune to corruption.

With 87 points, Denmark is the highest-scoring country in the region, followed by Finland (86), Sweden (85) and Switzerland (85). At the bottom of the region are Bulgaria (43), Romania (44) and Hungary (44).

With a score of 53, Italy increased by 11 points since 2012 while Greece (48) increased by 12 points during the same period. Both countries experienced

concrete improvements, including legislative progress in Italy with the passage of anti-corruption laws<sup>56</sup> and the creation of an anti-corruption agency<sup>57</sup> in both countries.

Most post-communist EU member states are struggling to address corruption effectively. Several countries, including Hungary, Poland and Romania, have taken steps to undermine judicial independence, which weakens their ability to prosecute cases of high-level corruption.<sup>58</sup>

In the Czech Republic (56), recent scandals involving the

prime minister and his efforts to obtain public money through EU subsidies for his company highlight a startling lack of political integrity.<sup>59</sup> The scandals also point to an insufficient level of transparency in political campaign financing.

Issues of conflict of interest, abuse of state resources for electoral purposes, insufficient disclosure of political party and campaign financing, and a lack of media independence are prevalent and should take priority both for national governments and the EU.

## COUNTRIES TO WATCH

### Malta

With a score of 54, Malta is a significant decliner on the CPI, dropping six points since 2015. Given the “pair of political machines [that] have [for decades] operated with impunity on the island”<sup>60</sup> it’s no wonder that two years after


the assassination of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, who was killed while reporting on corruption, the country is still mired in corruption.

Despite calls from Maltese citizens, Caruana Galizia’s family and the international community to solve the case, the government

dragged its feet in the judicial procedures. Several scandals involving the Panama Papers, the collapse of a Maltese bank and the “golden visa” scheme that sells Maltese citizenship to wealthy overseas investors may also contribute to Malta’s decline on the CPI.

*In Malta, corruption is undermining the rule of law. A significant lack of political integrity contributes to politicians and others hiding illicit wealth behind secret companies.*

Photo: Darrin Zammit Lupi/Reuters



### Estonia

For the past decade, Estonia (74) has seen a stable rise on the CPI. A significant improver, the country increased its score by 10 points since 2012. A comprehensive legislative framework, independent institutions and effective online tools make it possible to reduce

petty corruption and make political party financing open and transparent. There is a need, however, to legally define and regulate lobbying to prevent and detect undue influence on policy-making.

Although private sector corruption is not captured on the CPI, recent money

laundering scandals involving the Estonian branch of Danske Bank demonstrate a greater need for integrity and accountability in the banking and business sectors.<sup>61</sup> The scandal also highlights a need for better and stronger EU-wide anti-money laundering supervision.<sup>62</sup>



*The public institutions of Estonia are largely characterised by high levels of integrity and transparency.*

Photo: Kollawat Somsri/shutterstock.com



# TROUBLE AT THE TOP

Top scoring countries on the CPI like Denmark, Switzerland and Iceland are not immune to corruption. While the CPI shows these public sectors to be among the cleanest in the world, corruption still exists, particularly in cases of money laundering and other private sector corruption.

The Nordic economies stand out as leaders on the CPI, with Denmark (87), Finland (86), Sweden (85), Norway (84) and Iceland (78) taking five of the top 11 places.

However, integrity at home does not always translate into integrity abroad, and multiple scandals in 2019 demonstrated that transnational corruption is often facilitated, enabled and perpetuated by seemingly clean Nordic countries.


Despite some high-profile fines and prosecutions, our research shows that enforcement of foreign bribery laws among OECD countries is shockingly low.<sup>63</sup> The outsized roles that some companies play in their national economies gives them political support that too often triumphs over real accountability. Some banks and businesses aren't just too big to fail – they're also too powerful to pay. Anti-money laundering supervision and sanctions for breaches are often disjointed and ineffective.

The CPI highlights where stronger anti-corruption efforts are needed across the globe. It emphasises where businesses should show the greatest responsibility to promote integrity and accountability, and where governments must eliminate undue influence from private interests that can have a devastating impact on sustainable development.

## THE FISHROT FILES

In November, the Fishrot Files investigation revealed that Samherji, one of Iceland's largest fishing conglomerates, allegedly bribed government officials in Namibia (52) and Angola (26) for rights to massive fishing quotas. The company established shell companies in tax havens such as the UAE (71), Mauritius (52), Cyprus (58) and the Marshall Islands, some of which were allegedly used to launder the proceeds of corrupt deals. Many of the funds seem to have been transferred through a Norwegian state-owned bank, DNB.<sup>64</sup>

- bribery
- illicit finances



## TELECOM BRIBERY

Last year, Swedish telecoms giant, Ericsson, agreed to pay over US\$1 billion to settle a foreign bribery case over its 16-year cash-for-contracts campaign in China (41), Djibouti (30), Kuwait (40), Indonesia (40) and Vietnam (37). This is the second largest fine paid to US authorities.<sup>65</sup>


○ bribery



## THE SNC-LAVALIN AFFAIR

In Canada (77), which drops four points since last year, a former executive of construction company SNC-Lavalin was convicted in December over bribes the company paid in Libya (18).

○ bribery



## DANSKE BANK SCANDAL

Following the money laundering scandal at Danske Bank, the largest bank in Denmark (87), major banks like Swedbank in Sweden (85) and Deutsche Bank in Germany (80), were reportedly investigated in 2019 for their role in handling suspicious payments from high-risk non-resident clients, mostly from Russia (28), through Estonia (74).

○ illicit finances



# METHODOLOGY

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) aggregates data from a number of different sources that provide perceptions by business-people and country experts of the level of corruption in the public sector. The following steps are taken to calculate the CPI:

**1. Select data sources.** Each data source used to construct the CPI must fulfil the following criteria to qualify as a valid source:

- + Quantifies risks or perceptions of corruption in the public sector
- + Is based on a reliable and valid methodology
- + Comes from a reputable organisation
- + Allows for sufficient variation of scores to distinguish between countries
- + Ranks a substantial number of countries

- + Considers only the assessments of country experts or businesspeople

- + Is regularly updated

The CPI 2019 is calculated using 13 different data sources from 12 different institutions that capture perceptions of corruption within the past two years.

**2. Standardise data sources to a scale of 0-100.** This standardisation is done by subtracting the mean of each source in the baseline year from each country score, then dividing by the standard deviation of that source in the baseline year. This subtraction and division using the baseline year parameters ensures that the CPI scores are comparable year on year since 2012. After this procedure, the standardised scores are transformed to the CPI scale by multiplying with the value of the CPI standard deviation in 2012 (20) and adding the mean of CPI in 2012 (45), so that the data set fits the CPI's 0-100 scale.

**3. Calculate the average.** For a country or territory to be included in the CPI, a minimum of three sources must assess that country. A country's CPI score is then calculated as the average of all standardised scores available for that country. Scores are rounded to whole numbers.

**4. Report the measure of uncertainty.** The CPI score is accompanied by a standard error and confidence interval. This captures the variation across the data sources available for a country or territory.

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**Annex 122**

“Somalia corruption report”, *Risk & Compliance Portal Powered by GAN*, July 2020



# Somalia Corruption Report

 LAST UPDATED: JULY 2020

## Snapshot

Somalia ranks among the world's most corrupt countries. Insecurity is also a major issue; the ongoing instability greatly restricts business. Corrupt government officials tolerate illegal activities in return for bribes. Dysfunctional institutions facilitate an environment of lawlessness, and the absence of any form of regulatory framework hinders prospects of economic competitiveness. Business is based on **patronage** networks, and tight monopolies dominate the market. Somalia's **Provisional Constitution** criminalizes several forms of corruption (including **abuse of office, embezzlement** and **bribery**); however, implementation is non-existent. The governing elite is continuously involved in allegations of embezzlement of public funds from the already meager Somalian coffers. Finally, bribery is commonplace in all sectors, and procurement contracts frequently involve corruption.

## Quick Links

RISK  
KEY

■ LOW

■ MODERATELY  
LOW

■ MODERATE

■ MODERATELY  
HIGH

■ HIGH

 [Judicial System >](#)

 [Police >](#)

 [Public Services >](#)

 [Land Administration >](#)

 [Tax Administration >](#)

 [Customs Administration >](#)

 [Public Procurement >](#)

 [Natural Resources >](#)

 [Legislation >](#)

 [Civil Society >](#)

 [Sources >](#)

## Judicial System ■

Businesses face a high corruption risk when dealing with the courts. The institution is subject to political interference and suffers from high levels of corruption, rendering it ineffective (HRR 2015; FitW 2015). Civil courts in Somalia are practically nonfunctional; a combination of traditional and customary, sharia and formal law guide the institution and in some local courts depend on dominant local clans for establishing authority (BTI 2016). Court orders are not respected by Somalian authorities (HRR 2015).

### Police ■

Corruption is rife within the security apparatus. Impunity is widespread, and authorities do not maintain effective control over the police force (HRR 2015). In addition, the police are ineffective (HRR 2015). To stay protected from crime, companies in Somalia are forced either to cooperate with violent groups or to arm themselves against threats (BTI 2016).

The Somali National Army is the country's most important security institution. It suffers rampant corruption: Army leaders have systematically inflated troop numbers to obtain greater funding. Furthermore, family and business ties link officials responsible for provisions and the companies contracted to provide the food rations (worth USD 8 million per year) (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015). Cases of corruption and misappropriation within the army led President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to order the replacement of the chief of the armed forces in 2015 (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015).

### Public Services ■

In 1991, Somalia's state institutions witnessed a complete collapse, and efforts to rebuild the country's public administrations since have been modest due to ongoing armed conflict and rampant corruption (BTI 2016). There are no legal or institutional frameworks regulating the market in Somalia, thus market competition is absent and the economy is controlled by patronage networks with close ties to the ruling elite (BTI 2016).

### Land Administration ■

Somali authorities are incapable of protecting property rights (BTI 2016). The construction boom the country is currently witnessing has further fueled conflict as title deeds are either unavailable or forged (BTI 2016). Forced evictions by both private and public actors, coupled with the absence of land deeds and corruption, will most likely further exacerbate land conflict in the future (BTI 2016). The country has no functioning land registry (BTI 2016).

## Tax Administration ■

The tax administration is absent in Somalia, and most businesses operate in the informal sector and thus go untaxed (BTI 2016). The government lacks the capacity both to collect taxes and to control the country's territory, parts of which are under the rule of rebel groups (BTI 2016). This has allowed rebel leaders and warlords to establish their unique tax collection system from traders and businessmen operating in areas under their control (BTI 2016).

## Customs Administration ■

Businesses are likely to face extensive corruption in the customs sector. Bribery is common when clearing goods through the Mogadishu port (*Hiiiran Online*, Jan. 2015). Generally, the diversion of revenue from ports is very common; for instance, revenue from the Mogadishu port totaled more than USD 5.5 million per month during 2013 (to put this in perspective, the Somali central bank in 2014 received an average of USD 4.6 million per month) (HRR 2014).

Trade in counterfeit goods is widespread at Somalia's borders and has also served as a source of financing for armed rebels such as Al-Shabab (BTI 2016).

## Public Procurement ■

Public procurement in Somalia holds high corruption risks for business. The majority of public tenders are treated as confidential (BTI 2016). "Secret contracting," where officials close public procurement deals in complete absence of transparency and oversight, is a common practice (HRR 2015). Reportedly, some regional entities have closed contracts with oil companies independently from the government (BTI 2016).

Public funds are found to be frequently diverted and misappropriated

due to corruption (HRR 2015). In one major case, it was found that approximately 80% of payment transfers made by the central bank of Somalia was to private persons for non-business purposes (BTI 2016; HRR 2015). Government officials with close ties to the president also actively used the central bank to control overseas recovered assets including cash and gold held in banks during the Somali civil war as well as government property abroad (HRR 2015, HRR 2014). The bank's governor resigned after details of the case were revealed in 2013. His predecessor, appointed by the President, also resigned weeks later due to heavy political interference and corruption (BTI 2016). The case has triggered the government to set up a Financial Governance Committee to restore the trust of international donors. The committee is responsible for controlling corruption and securing transparency in the handling of public assets; however, only a small proportion of government contracts are shared with the committee (BTI 2016).



## Natural Resources



The natural resources industries are jeopardized by corruption and insecurity. The sector is almost completely unregulated; the petroleum industry is particularly problematic (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015). Several members of the political elite have signed extractive industry contracts with international companies in secret (BTI 2016). Furthermore, growing hostility over resource-sharing between the federal government and regional administrations has driven the latter to sign oil and gas contracts independently of the federal government (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015).

Licensing in the natural resources sector is also challenged by the absence of a regulatory system and widespread corruption. International energy companies have obtained oil exploration licenses from different local and national authorities (BTI 2016). Evidence also suggests that the Somali Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources has been transferring money acquired from selling fishing licenses into a private ministerial bank account in Djibouti (UN Security Council, Oct. 2015).

In one ongoing corruption case, the British company Soma Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd. is being investigated by the UK Serious Fraud Office for corruption in Somalia. The company allegedly made salary payments to Somali oil officials totaling USD 500,000. The company claims that the UN monitoring group has misunderstood the intention of the payments, which were meant for funding a capacity-building program in Somalia (*Mail & Guardian Africa*, Oct. 2015).



## Legislation

The country's legal framework relies on the [Provisional Constitution](#), which criminalizes abuse of office, bribery of national and foreign officials, embezzlement and [trading in influence](#). However, the government does not implement anti-corruption laws effectively, and officials engage in corruption with impunity (HRR 2015). Governance in Somalia is, to a large extent, based on informal mechanisms and institutions, which are in turn, based on patronage and clientelistic networks serving personal interests and affiliations (BTI 2016). International funding has further consolidated the current structure of government, and senior officials are often involved in accusations of corruption and embezzlement of foreign funds (BTI 2016). Neither appointed nor elected officials are subject to financial disclosure laws (HRR 2015).

State-building is hampered by large-scale corruption and misappropriation of public funds (BTI 2016). There is no developed revenue system in Somalia. International funding and payments made at sea and airports are the main sources of revenue for the country, but there is no transparency in the collection or distribution of these funds (BTI 2016). The country's institutions are dysfunctional, and there are no integrity mechanisms in place to curb corruption. Somalia has signed but not yet ratified or acceded to the [African Union Convention on Combatting and Preventing Corruption](#). Somalia is not signatory to the UN Convention against Corruption.

## Civil Society

Freedoms of speech and press are protected under the Constitution, but these rights are completely violated in practice; Somalia ranks among the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists (HRR 2014; [FotP 2015](#)). Several journalists were killed both in 2013 and 2014 (BTI 2016).

Traditions of social engagement are strong in Somalia, and these have further prospered since the onset of the Somali civil war as the state's collapse made social network structures vital for survival (BTI 2016). Furthermore, foreign funding has also encouraged the creation of numerous NGOs (BTI 2016). Nonetheless, NGOs are not effectively consulted by the government. Further, armed opposition groups such as Al-Shabab undermine freedoms of association, and civil society activists are often the victims of attacks (BTI 2016).

## Sources +

**Annex 123**

“2020 Ibrahim index of African governance, index report”, *Mo Ibrahim Foundation*, 2020



# 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance

## Index Report

30.2	64.9	32.7	18.5	59.5	31.0	81.2	76.2	52.4	35.1	16.2	18.5	100.0
45.1	66.7	45.3	36.5	74.1	52.8	66.5	66.7	76.1	47.2	25.6	44.0	59.2
18.1	100.0	18.1	28.6	69.4	46.1	87.5	11.2	58.3	63.9	11.1	52.6	100.0
22.0	80.3	22.3	30.6	33.3	22.6	45.4	22.4	31.2	22.9	10.5	27.3	50.0
18.9	99.2	27.7	58.9	23.6	87.5	48.7	44.9	49.0	57.4	14.6	28.7	32.6
38.4	59.2	26.0	42.3	56.7	60.2	63.8	84.9	57.6	59.6	24.1	44.7	58.6
27.4	71.4	26.2	35.7	60.7	63.1	66.7	100.0	56.0	59.5	21.4	42.5	50.0
46.3	31.9	50.1	36.9	60.9	63.4	80.1	73.5	54.8	43.9	13.1	38.0	84.5
49.0	100.0	33.3	71.2	59.7	59.8	78.7	86.2	59.4	45.2	17.9	49.2	77.8
25.0	70.8	0.0	50.5	62.5	65.0	12.5	64.5	75.0	62.0	37.5	47.4	12.5
44.6	21.9	20.3	17.1	39.7	50.0	80.9	100.0	42.6	87.2	30.8	46.7	68.0
50.4	73.6	44.1	42.3	66.1	55.0	72.8	68.5	57.4	50.7	30.2	47.2	76.2
87.4	77.4	81.2	57.6	90.8	53.5	85.3	76.2	59.6	56.3	56.2	55.6	89.4
98.7	51.8	89.0	21.8	98.7	5.8	109.8	85.0	57.0	47.6	85.1	58.8	100.0
88.8	2.2	84.1	1.0	92.6	26.1	9.8	83.1	26.0	20.1	6.3	38.9	100.0
99.8	35.1	99.9	4.9	99.9	2.9	9.9	41.2	92.9	85.0	68.6	79.2	100.0
49.8	66.9	40.7	67.1	73.8	76.8	61.5	70.6	43.5	73.2	32.2	67.1	71.9
99.7	93.3	81.8	70.7	89.2	59.5	64.6	87.8	81.8	67.9	89.0	65.3	75.2
48.8	75.0	39.9	75.0	64.7	29.6	76.4	41.5	59.0	44.2	24.8	24.1	88.5
36.3	75.7	50.9	34.7	70.9	58.2	87.5	68.7	69.8	41.5	32.4	52.7	93.5
1.6	69.3	39.4	25.5	47.6	68.4	67.4	64.6	65.8	45.7	1.8	52.1	98.2
65.8	73.7	29.6	35.6	47.4	39.3	75.8	36.2	50.3	21.1	21.1	31.9	81.5
69.1	90.2	56.3	42.7	89.4	66.5	68.5	78.7	64.6	41.1	33.3	50.3	100.0
62.8	91.8	31.1	47.8	58.3	64.1	67.9	91.4	44.2	73.8	28.7	79.1	67.6
57.4	53.2	32.0	22.1	74.7	52.8	91.3	72.4	59.1	26.0	31.5	50.2	90.2
26.9	82.2	29.2	34.6	52.0	48.0	65.9	44.3	53.4	45.3	15.6	35.6	68.4
30.2	64.9	32.7	18.5	59.5	31.0	81.2	76.2	52.4	35.1	16.2	18.5	100.0
45.1	66.7	45.3	36.5	74.1	52.8	66.5	66.7	76.1	47.2	25.6	44.0	59.2
18.1	100.0	18.1	28.6	69.4	46.1	87.5	11.2	58.3	63.9	11.1	52.6	100.0
22.0	80.3	22.3	30.6	33.3	22.6	45.4	22.4	31.2	22.9	10.5	27.3	50.0
18.9	99.2	27.7	58.9	23.6	87.5	48.7	44.9	49.0	57.4	14.6	28.7	32.6
38.4	59.2	26.0	42.3	56.7	60.2	63.8	84.9	57.6	59.6	24.1	44.7	58.6
27.4	71.4	26.2	35.7	60.7	63.1	66.7	100.0	56.0	59.5	21.4	42.5	50.0
46.3	31.9	50.1	36.9	60.9	63.4	80.1	73.5	54.8	43.9	13.1	38.0	84.5
49.0	100.0	33.3	71.2	59.7	59.8	78.7	86.2	59.4	45.2	17.9	49.2	77.8
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44.6	21.9	20.3	17.1	39.7	50.0	80.9	100.0	42.6	87.2	30.8	46.7	68.0
65.8	73.7	29.6	35.6	47.4	39.3	75.8	36.2	50.3	21.1	21.1	31.9	81.5
69.1	90.2	56.3	42.7	89.4	66.5	68.5	78.7	64.6	41.1	33.3	50.3	100.0
62.8	91.8	31.1	47.8	58.3	64.1	67.9	91.4	44.2	73.8	28.7	79.1	67.6
57.4	53.2	32.0	22.1	74.7	52.8	91.3	72.4	59.1	26.0	31.5	50.2	90.2
26.9	82.2	29.2	34.6	52.0	48.0	65.9	44.3	53.4	45.3	15.6	35.6	68.4
30.2	64.9	32.7	18.5	59.5	31.0	81.2	76.2	52.4	35.1	16.2	18.5	100.0





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
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# The IIAG's in-depth review: background and main changes

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## The IIAG in-depth review

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation defines governance as the provision of political, social, economic and environmental public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their government, and that a government has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.

Published since 2007, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) assesses governance performance in 54 African countries over the latest available ten-year period. It provides a framework and dashboard for any interested audience to assess the delivery of public goods and services and public policy outcomes in African countries.

The IIAG constitutes the most comprehensive dataset measuring African governance, providing scores and trends for African countries on a whole spectrum of thematic governance dimensions, from security to justice, to rights and economic opportunity, to health and environment. The IIAG dataset and online and Excel data portals provide average scores and trends at country level as well as for the continent, African geographical regions or Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or specific groups.

The first of its kind when launched dedicated to Africa and governance, the IIAG remains one of the few, among a growing proliferation of indices, solely focused on Africa, encompassing governance in a broad sense.

Since 2007, both the data and governance landscapes have evolved hugely. To take into account those changes, a thorough review of the IIAG, the first of this depth since its inception, was conducted between 2018 and 2020, providing a completely re-worked framework for the next iterations of the IIAG.

This comprehensive review updated the theoretical framework and data for the IIAG, based on a review of the most recent and relevant literature and data sources and on consultations with the IIAG Advisory Council, the Foundation's Board, experts and practitioners, as well as each of the IIAG data sources.

The increased availability of data has also strengthened the robustness of IIAG indicators: nearly 90% of them are now based on more than one source or variable as opposed to less than half of the indicators in the 2018 IIAG, therefore mitigating the 'one source or variable bias'. Composite scores constitute a key added value of the new IIAG dataset.

## A new framework and three main new features

### The 2018-2020 IIAG in-depth review:

- In-depth review of governance-related literature and data sources
- Consultations with Board members, IIAG Advisory Council, experts and practitioners
- Consultations with each of the IIAG data sources

### A new IIAG framework with three main new features:


- 1 More dimensions covered – reflecting the evolution of the governance landscape
- 2 More data but clustered indicators – for a more valid and reliable measure of governance
- 3 A new section dedicated to *Citizens' Voices* – to give more prominence to the end recipients of governance



## 1. The new IIAG framework encompasses additional governance dimensions

As defined and covered by the IIAG, public governance encompasses the 'basket' of political, social, economic and environmental public goods and services that any 21<sup>st</sup> century citizen is entitled to receive from their government, and that any 21<sup>st</sup> century government is expected to deliver to its citizens. Since the IIAG inception in 2007, the data and governance landscapes have both significantly evolved, with a larger debate on governance and better availability of data.

The definition of governance that has been chosen and confirmed by MIF's Board, aims at fully reflecting citizens' expectations towards their governments. In today's world, these have largely expanded, amplified by the 21<sup>st</sup> century's multiplying challenges and Africa's specific young and urbanising demography to include demands for political participation, solidarity, protection against various criminal threats, jobs, business-enabling environments, climate change mitigation and food security, to name a few.



As a result of this, while the first iterations of the IIAG were mainly focused on traditional public services, such as security or education, the 2020 IIAG is now encompassing new areas such as environmental sustainability, digital rights, inequality mitigation and social protection.

The updated IIAG framework includes three new sub-categories, *Anti-Corruption*, *Inclusion & Equality* and *Sustainable Environment*.

Meanwhile, thanks to shared efforts and strong advocacy, relevant data on Africa have slowly become more robust and available from being concerningly scarce some ten years ago, resulting in a stronger IIAG.

### The three new IIAG sub-categories



## 2. A better-balanced structure and mainly clustered indicators

**A better-balanced structure:** the 2020 extended review of the IIAG led to a better balance among the different levels: the number of sub-categories is now even, with four for each category, and the number of underlying indicators has now been set to four to six for each sub-category, with the majority having five. While a marginal level of accepted, implicit weighting still exists in the IIAG, these improvements have minimised this and moved towards a more equal balance of weight for each component.

**90% of indicators are now clustered:** in spite of an increase in the number of sources, from 35 in the 2018 IIAG to 40 in the 2020 IIAG, and in the number of variables collected from sources, from 191 to 237, the number of indicators has been reduced from 102 to 79, as the vast majority (nearly 90%) of them are now clustered (see box on page 9 with examples of clustered indicators). Clustered indicators provide the added value of assessing a dimension either using similar variables from different sources or different proxy variables from either the same or different sources.



This has led to a strengthening of the IIAG indicators, mitigating the 'one source or variable bias' and providing a clearer, more complete and more stable framework, as new data additions and changes will from now on mainly take place at sub-indicator or sub-sub-indicator level. Composite scores constitute a key value added of the new IIAG dataset.

It is worth noting that the methodology used to calculate IIAG scores, initially built with the Kennedy School of Governance at Harvard University, has remained unchanged. This has been thoroughly reviewed in search of better ways to calculate the IIAG confirming the current methodology as the best possible to calculate a composite index like the IIAG.

### Examples of IIAG clustered indicators

*Property Rights*: similar variables from different sources

*Property Rights & Regulations* - Bertelsmann Stiftung

*Private Property Rights* - World Justice Project

*Right to Private Property* - Varieties of Democracy

*Absence of Forced Migration*: different proxy variables

*Absence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)* -

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

*Absence of Refugees* - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**'Single source or single variable bias' and measurement errors are minimised**

**A more stable framework for future IIAG iterations:** data/conceptual updates will most likely only impact lower levels (sub- and sub-sub-indicator)

### 3. Africa's citizens' voices are more prominently highlighted

As citizens are the recipients of public leadership and governance, citizens' perceptions have been given a key importance by MIF from the very beginning of the IIAG's production. The assessment of governance performance needs to be rooted in citizens' perceptions to complement official and expert assessment data. For the past ten years, MIF has been working with and supporting Afrobarometer, the leading pan-African research institution conducting public attitude surveys on the continent, as a key source for the IIAG. As such, the new 2020 IIAG framework gives it more prominence.

Formerly scattered across various levels in the IIAG, citizens' assessments of various governance components are now highlighted in a new, specific *Citizens' Voices* section. *Citizens'*

*Voices* provides a comprehensive 'reality check' to complement the IIAG results with citizens' perceptions and satisfaction with public services.

*Citizens' Voices* mirrors the IIAG categories and provides public perception data on the closest proxies to the IIAG measures, from security and safety, to rights, participation and inclusion, economic opportunities, health, education and social protection.

It will therefore become a key reference section of the IIAG, allowing the IIAG results to be judged alongside the reality on the ground as perceived by citizens. For the purpose of complementing the IIAG assessment on governance delivery, *Citizens' Voices* scores do not contribute to the calculation of IIAG scores.

Assessment of  
governance performance

=

official and expert  
assessment data

+

citizens' perceptions

#### A dedicated parallel index based on Afrobarometer data

- a 'reality check' to complement the IIAG results with citizens' perceptions and satisfaction with public services
- mirrors the IIAG categories and provides public perception data on the closest proxies to the IIAG measures

This is also in line with the new MIF initiative launched in June to start a series of Now Generation Network Surveys to capture and highlight the voices of Africa's young people, who represent the vast majority of Africa's population. Analyses of the *Citizens' Voices* section will in time be accompanied by results from the new Now Generation Network Surveys.



## SPOTLIGHT

### Data gaps: still a lot to be done

Data gaps, that is the lack of indicators measuring certain governance topics, remain a key challenge within Africa. Even if indicators for specific topics exist, they often only cover a limited number of African countries, or are outdated. The background research and analysis carried out by the Foundation for the IIAG in-depth review aimed at mapping thematic pillars of governance to make sure the IIAG framework reflects the current governance landscape and the demands of African citizens of their state. On the basis of this framework, an analysis of the existing data covering these topics was conducted to identify the most relevant data sources for assessing and measuring the governance dimensions. This work resulted in a clear overview of the existing data gaps, highlighting the continued need to advocate on improving data availability and coverage in key governance areas.

Among these areas are:

- Environment, and in particular the lack of comparable data in climate change mitigation and adaptation policies
- Capacity of the healthcare system, for instance variables such as hospital bed density, hospital density and medical doctors
- Education completion

- Continental integration
- Access to energy
- Organised crime
- Criminal events besides homicides
- Inequality and poverty

In addition to a continuous mapping of the most relevant existing data sources for inclusion in the IIAG, the Foundation will continue to fund projects aimed at filling data gaps for key themes of governance as well as strengthening the assessment of other issues already covered by the IIAG dataset. The Foundation currently supports four organisations that conduct large-scale African data collection initiatives: Afrobarometer (Afrobarometer Surveys), Global Integrity (Africa Integrity Indicators), V-Dem Institute (Varieties of Democracy Project) and the World Justice Project (WJP Rule of Law Index).


On a more general level, the Foundation has, since its establishment, strongly advocated for civil registration and vital statistics to be the fundamental basis of any comprehensive public policy and effective public service delivery, be it education, health, housing, employment, justice, security or access to elections.



## Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)



## Citizens' Voices





## FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

### Public Administration

- Civil Registration
- Capacity of the Statistical System
- Tax & Revenue Mobilisation
- Budgetary & Financial Management
- Professional Administration

### Business Environment

- Regional Integration
- Trade Environment
- Business & Competition Regulations
- Access to Financial Services
- Labour Relations

### Infrastructure

- Transport Network
- Access to Energy
- Mobile Communications
- Digital Access

### Rural Sector

- Rural Land & Water Access
- Rural Market Access
- Rural Sector Support
- Rural Businesses & Organisations



## HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

### Health

- Access to Healthcare
- Access to Water & Sanitation
- Control of Communicable Diseases
- Control of Non-Communicable Diseases
- Control of Child & Maternal Mortality
- Compliance with International Health Regulations

### Education

- Equality in Education
- Education Enrolment
- Education Completion
- Human Resources in Education
- Education Quality

### Social Protection

- Social Safety Nets
- Poverty Reduction Policies
- Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation
- Access to Housing
- Absence of Undernourishment

### Sustainable Environment

- Promotion of Environmental Sustainability
- Enforcement of Environmental Policies
- Air Quality
- Sustainable Management of Land & Forests
- Land & Water Biodiversity

### Public Perception of Economic Opportunity Foundations

- Public Perception of Public Administration
- Satisfaction with Economic Opportunities
- Satisfaction with Infrastructure

### Public Perception of Human Development

- Satisfaction with Health Provision
- Satisfaction with Education Provision
- Lived Poverty & Public Perception of Social Protection

## Reading the results

The 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) covers ten years' worth of data from 2010-2019 inclusive for 54 African countries. The construction method provides vast amounts of data.

To construct the 2020 IIAG, the Foundation's Research Team collected 237 variables that measure governance concepts from 40 sources. These were combined to form 79 indicators, which are organised under the IIAG's key governance dimensions; the 16 sub-categories and four categories that make up the *Overall Governance* score. Including all the data collected from source and the calculations made expressly for the IIAG, there are a total of 372 different measures of governance for any given country or group in any given year across ten years. These are made up of indicators that measure specific issues such as *Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law*, which is one part of the broader sub-category measure *Rule of Law & Justice*, which is in turn one part of the overarching category measure *Security & Rule of Law*. In total, there are more than 200,000 data points in the 2020 IIAG.

### Scores, ranks, trends, structure & levels

IIAG results can be classified into three main types: score, rank and trend.

All three types must be considered when studying the IIAG, as each type of result gives context to the others. For example, looking only at rank or score without considering the trends overlooks the important trajectories that countries follow. In the 2020 IIAG for example, South Africa ranks in the top ten highest scoring countries in 2019 (6<sup>th</sup>) with a score of 65.8. In the last ten years, however, it also the joint eighth most deteriorated country on the continent in *Overall Governance*, having declined by -0.9 in this period. In the same way that trends should be taken into account when looking at scores and ranks, when looking at trends it is important to take into account the level of score and rank. Somalia, for example, shows the seventh largest improvement over ten years (+5.7) and the eighth largest improvement over five years (+2.6) in *Overall Governance* but still sits at the bottom of the ranking table at 54<sup>th</sup> position.

To fully assess any country's governance performance, it is vital to drill-down beyond the broader measures such as the *Overall Governance* score to take into account country performance across the different governance dimensions encompassed by the categories, sub-categories and indicators of the IIAG. These are all essentially mini indexes in their own right and country performance can vary across these dimensions. Using Madagascar and Sudan as examples, while improving in all four categories, the two countries have, however, declined in seven and six sub-categories, respectively.

The benefit of the IIAG structure is that country or group performance can be assessed holistically through the broader measures, but users can also drill-down to assess performance in specific governance issues.

### Group averages

By averaging the scores of countries, the IIAG provides group analysis for a variety of different group compositions. For this report, key findings are often provided for 'Africa'. These results are the average of the scores of 54 African countries, at all levels of the IIAG. Of course, Africa is a diverse continent with many unique countries, and readers of this report are advised not to over analyse the continental findings. This report focuses on presenting the top-level findings of the 2020 IIAG for Africa as well as other groups, such as regions. In-depth analysis of countries and other groupings are available via our other publications and tools on our website.

### An objective and independent measure of African governance

The IIAG is an objective exercise, to help further the conversation on governance, to assess current and emerging trends, identify areas to improve, and to highlight and learn from success. It does not make policy prescriptions. It uses the same indicators for all countries in order to produce comparable scores, regardless of the size of their economies, population, geography or other external factors. These are of course important and must be assessed alongside the data, but the IIAG aims to provide an objective dataset. Crucially, indicators measure outcomes of policy, and not inputs.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is not a primary data collector. Data is collected from 40 independent sources. Please see the Annex in this report for further information.



## Trend classifications

As the Index time-series covers ten years (from 2010-2019) the IIAG provides important insights into country trajectories. Moreover, assessing recent trends alongside long-term findings identifies early signs of the direction and pace of country trajectories.

Whilst registering overall improvement over the decade, a country can have, over the last five years:


- Increased its rate of improvement;
- Slowed its rate of improvement;
- Shown recent decline, thus demonstrating early warning signs.

Similarly, a country registering overall decline over the decade can have, over the last five years:

- Increased its rate of decline;
- Slowed its rate of decline;
- Shown recent improvement, thus demonstrating hopeful signs of reversing a negative trend.

To capture these 'trends within trends', the IIAG classifies countries, regions and groups according to the direction and size of their annual average trend in the recent five years, compared to the direction and size of their annual average trend over the decade.

**Annual Average Trend = Total change in score between years / Number of annual time periods**




The resulting trend classifications are six: Increasing Improvement, Slowing Improvement, Warning Signs, Bouncing Back, Slowing Deterioration or Increasing Deterioration. These classifications are applied to all measures in the IIAG and are used for groups as well as countries. Depending on the size and direction of the annual average trends in these periods, countries and groups are assigned these classifications, which are best explained as follows:

Classification	Characteristic
Increasing Deterioration	Decline over the last ten years, with the rate of decline increasing over the last 5 years
Slowing Deterioration	Decline over the last ten years, but the rate of decline is slowing over the last 5 years
Warning Signs	Progress (or no change) over the last ten years, but showing recent decline over the last 5 years
Bouncing Back	Decline (or no change) over the last ten years, but showing recent progress over the last 5 years
Slowing Improvement	Progress over the last ten years, with the rate of improvement slowing over the last 5 years
Increasing Improvement	Progress over the last ten years, with the rate of improvement increasing over the last 5 years

Please note there are instances where countries cannot be classified or show no change. A full overview of the calculation of all classifications, including No Change and Not Classified are contained in the Notes section in the Annex.

# The 2020 IIAG findings


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# Overall Governance




 **OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

- Security & Rule of Law** 
  - Security & Safety
  - Rule of Law & Justice
  - Accountability & Transparency
  - Anti-Corruption
- Participation, Rights & Inclusion** 
  - Participation
  - Rights
  - Inclusion & Equality
  - Gender
- Foundations for Economic Opportunity** 
  - Public Administration
  - Business Environment
  - Infrastructure
  - Rural Sector
- Human Development** 
  - Health
  - Education
  - Social Protection
  - Sustainable Environment

2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE /100.0	<b>48.8</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>+1.2</b>
TREND CLASSIFICATION	Slowing Improvement 
Underlying categories	2019 Score   Change 2010-2019
Security & Rule of Law	49.5 -0.7
Participation, Rights & Inclusion	46.2 -1.4
Foundations for Economic Opportunity	47.8 +4.1
Human Development	51.9 +3.0

DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019  
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)

**36** Improved  
**17** Deteriorated  
**0** No change  
**1** Not available\*




\* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.

TREND CLASSIFICATION	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Slowing Improvement	14 
Increasing Deterioration	13 
Increasing Improvement	12 
Warning Signs	10 
Bouncing Back	2 
Slowing Deterioration	2 

LARGEST IMPROVEMENT	<b>GAMBIA</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>+9.2</b>
LARGEST DETERIORATION	<b>LIBYA</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>-5.5</b>

RANK/54		2019 SCORE/100.0	CHANGE 2010-2019
1	Mauritius	77.2	-0.5
2	Cabo Verde	73.1	+0.2
3	Seychelles	72.3	+7.8
4	Tunisia	70.4	+8.2
5	Botswana	66.9	+0.8
6	South Africa	65.8	-0.9
7	Namibia	65.1	+3.4
8	Ghana	64.3	+0.1
9	Senegal	63.2	+3.3
10	Morocco	61.0	+5.3
11	Rwanda	60.5	+3.7
12	São Tomé and Príncipe	60.4	+2.8
13	Benin	58.6	+1.1
14	Kenya	58.5	+3.7
15	Algeria	56.2	+3.3
16	Gambia	55.9	+9.2
17	Burkina Faso	54.0	+1.0
18	Côte d'Ivoire	53.9	+9.0
19	Tanzania	53.0	+0.2
20	Lesotho	52.3	-0.5
21	Zambia	52.0	-0.8
22	Uganda	51.8	+0.7
23	Malawi	51.5	-1.3
24	Sierra Leone	51.0	+4.8
25	Togo	50.1	+4.8
26	Mozambique	49.0	-0.2
27	Liberia	47.9	+1.2
28	Niger	47.8	+0.4
29	Gabon	47.7	+1.0
30	Egypt	47.4	+0.5
31	Ethiopia	46.6	+6.7
31	Mali	46.6	-2.5
33	Zimbabwe	46.1	+7.4
34	Nigeria	45.5	-1.6
35	Madagascar	44.4	+1.7
36	Eswatini	43.8	+2.5
37	Cameroon	43.5	-0.6
38	Comoros	43.2	-2.6
39	Guinea	42.5	+1.3
40	Mauritania	41.6	+2.0
41	Guinea-Bissau	41.4	+2.8
42	Djibouti	41.3	+2.0
43	Angola	40.0	+5.4
44	Burundi	36.9	-3.6
45	Congo Republic	36.1	-0.2
46	Libya	35.2	-5.5
47	Chad	33.9	+3.7
48	Sudan	32.5	+2.5
49	DR Congo	31.7	-2.8
50	Central African Republic	30.7	-0.9
51	Equatorial Guinea	28.7	-0.3
52	Eritrea	25.8	-0.8
53	South Sudan*	20.7	.
54	Somalia	19.2	+5.7
	<b>AFRICAN AVERAGE</b>	<b>48.8</b>	<b>+1.2</b>


### Overall Governance: the first ever year-on-year decline in 2019



With an African average score of 48.8, *Overall Governance* has improved by +1.2 points over the last decade (2010-2019).

However, the rate of progress has slowed since 2019, with the annual average trend between 2015 and 2019 (+0.05) being less than half that for the decade (+0.13).

A further cause for concern is that in 2019 the African average governance score has declined for the first time over the decade, while between 2010 and 2018 *Overall Governance* had either maintained or increased in score every year.




**Over the decade, while *Human Development* and *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* lead the way, *Security & Rule of Law* and *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* have stalled**

Progress in *Overall Governance* over the past decade has been driven by improvements in the categories *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* (+4.1) and *Human Development* (+3.0).

The biggest strides have been made in the sub-categories *Infrastructure* and *Health*, complemented by improvements in *Environmental Sustainability*.

However, in the same period, countries have shown concerning declines in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* (-1.4) and *Security & Rule of Law* (-0.7).


Here, a deteriorating security situation and an increasingly precarious environment for human rights and civic participation are the primary drivers.



In 2019, *Human Development* is the highest scoring of the four categories at the African average level, while *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* is the lowest scoring category with a difference in score of almost six points.

Three of the four sub-categories of both *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* and *Security & Rule of Law* sit in the lower half of the ranking of the 16 IIAG sub-categories based on their 2019 scores, while the majority of the sub-categories of both *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and *Human Development* sit in the upper half.

Of the five highest scoring sub-categories, two belong to *Human Development* while two of the five lowest scoring sub-categories belong to *Security & Rule of Law*.



Current trends indicate the divergence in different areas of governance may be set to increase. *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and *Human Development* have continued to improve on average, though at a slowing rate in the last five years, while during the same time period, *Security & Rule of Law* has continued to deteriorate, albeit at a slower pace, and *Participation & Human Rights* has declined at an accelerating rate.


All sub-categories of *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* have declined over the past decade, while in contrast all sub-categories of *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* have improved.

While *Security & Rule of Law* and *Human Development* have each seen three of their four sub-categories improve over

the decade, the difference in the magnitude of improvement is striking.

The improvement in the *Health* sub-category (+6.8), the most improved sub-category of *Human Development*, is more than six times larger than the improvement in *Anti-Corruption* (+1.1), the most improved sub-category within *Security & Rule of Law*.

While the three *Human Development* sub-categories have managed to sustain progress also over the past five years, the only *Security & Rule of Law* sub-category to have done so is *Anti-Corruption*.





**The majority of countries have improved over the decade, however almost half register a decline in 2019**

Encouragingly, 36 countries have seen an improvement in their *Overall Governance* score since 2010, meaning that 61.2% of Africa’s population lives in a country where *Overall Governance* performance has progressed over the last decade.


Gambia is the biggest improver of all 54 countries (+9.2), driven by large improvements in *Accountability & Transparency* and its participatory environment.

Côte d’Ivoire has also made notable improvements (+9.0) thanks to strides in *Infrastructure* and *Public Administration*.

Libya (-5.5) has seen the largest deterioration, on the back of a precarious security situation and weakened social protection.

However, in general, progress has not maintained its pace between 2015 and 2019, with 14 countries registering slowing improvement and as many as 25 countries declining in the same period.

Between 2018 and 2019 over half of African countries have seen their *Overall Governance* score decline.



**Ranks are not a definite given: some high-ranking countries follow a deteriorating path, while some low-ranking ones feature among the largest improvers**

In *Overall Governance*, Mauritius maintains the top position in 2019 for the 10<sup>th</sup> consecutive year with a score of 77.2. Somalia, meanwhile, remains bottom for the 10<sup>th</sup> consecutive year with a score of 19.2.

However, the two top and bottom countries follow opposing trajectories as the gap between them shrinks to its lowest over the decade in 2019.


Somalia’s *Overall Governance* score has increased by +5.7 since 2010 on the back of improved infrastructure and increased gender equality, among other things. Since 2015 the rate of improvement has even modestly accelerated.

Moving in the opposite direction, Mauritius’s *Overall Governance* score declines at an increasing rate, driven by weakening social protection and deteriorating human rights.

South Africa, ranked 6<sup>th</sup>, has declined over the decade with an increased pace since 2015, while 5<sup>th</sup> placed Botswana has started to show warning signs.

At the same time, Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe ranking 16<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup> and 33<sup>rd</sup> respectively, feature among the five most improved countries over the decade.

However, the trends showcased by these countries do not tell the full story. Although the gap between the top and bottom ranked countries has been closing over the last decade, on average countries' governance performances are more dispersed in 2019 than they were a decade ago.



### Unbalanced governance progress: only eight countries manage to improve in all four categories over the decade

Only eight countries have managed to improve in all four categories over the decade: Angola, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Seychelles, Sudan and Togo.

Of these, Ethiopia is the only country to have improved in all 16 sub-categories over the decade.

While improving in all four categories, Madagascar and Sudan have however declined in seven and six sub-categories respectively.

Over the past decade, 20 countries, hosting 41.9% of Africa's population, have made progress in both *Human Development*

and *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* but at the same time also declined in both *Security & Rule of Law* and *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*.


This growing divergence is worsening with the rate of deterioration having accelerated for over half (29) the countries in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*, while 22 have shown increasing improvement in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*.

Of the countries that have seen their rate of deterioration worsen in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* since 2015, almost 80% (23 out of 29), hosting 50.9% of Africa's population, have simultaneously been improving in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*.

**Selected African countries: Improved in Foundations for Economic Opportunity and Human Development & declined in Security & Rule of Law and Participation, Rights & Inclusion (2010-2019)**

**Improved in Foundations for Economic Opportunity and Human Development**

- Algeria
- Angola
- Benin
- Burkina Faso
- Chad
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Djibouti
- Eswatini
- Ethiopia
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Mauritania
- Morocco
- Rwanda
- São Tomé and Príncipe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Togo
- Zimbabwe




**Declined in Security & Rule of Law and Participation, Rights & Inclusion**


- Cabo Verde
- Eritrea
- Mauritius
- Nigeria
- South Africa

- Botswana
- DR Congo
- Kenya
- Namibia
- Burundi
- Egypt
- Lesotho
- Niger
- Cameroon
- Gabon
- Malawi
- Tanzania
- Comoros
- Ghana
- Mali
- Uganda
- Congo Republic
- Guinea
- Mozambique
- Zambia

**African countries: IAG categories, number of countries per trend classification (2010-2019)**



The most unbalanced performances are seen between *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* and *Human Development*: 21 countries have gaps of 10.0 or higher between their scores for these two categories.



### Tell-tale correlations: besides balance, rule of law, justice, inclusion and equality are the common denominators among best performers


Looking at the strength of correlations between IIAG indicators and *Overall Governance* allows us to identify the common factors between countries with the best governance performances. Furthermore, it can also signal potential avenues to improve *Overall Governance* capacity.

Of the 16 IIAG sub-categories, *Rule of Law & Justice* and *Inclusion & Equality* show the strongest correlations with *Overall Governance* both in 2019 and over the decade. Eight of the top ten scoring countries in *Overall Governance* in 2019 also feature in the top ten scoring countries in these two sub-categories.

The analysis therefore suggests that strong institutions, rule of law, impartial and effective justice, as well as equality are key dimensions for countries to set themselves on the path towards sound governance.

*Rule of Law & Justice* assesses compliance with the rule of law by the executive, impartiality of the judicial system, judicial processes including access, affordability and timeliness, equality before the law, law enforcement, as well as property rights.

*Inclusion & Equality* assesses equality in the distribution of political power, in political representation, in civil liberties, in socioeconomic opportunity, and in access to public services across different strata of society.



*Anti-Corruption, Business Environment and Accountability & Transparency* also feature among the five most correlated sub-categories with *Overall Governance* in 2019 and over the decade.

Both in 2019 and over the ten-year time series, the indicators showing the strongest relationships with high governance scores span across the four IIAG categories, underlining the need for a balanced approach to governance. In this sense, the factors that are among the most associated with high *Overall Governance* scores pertain to personal liberties, executive compliance with the law, judicial processes, equal opportunities and rights, as well as budgetary management, statistical capacity, quality of education and environmental policies.

**African countries: correlations between Overall Governance and 16 IIAG sub-categories (2019)**

Sub-category	$r$
Rule of Law & Justice	+0.95
Inclusion & Equality	+0.90
Anti-Corruption	+0.89
Business Environment	+0.87
Accountability & Transparency	+0.87
Education	+0.83
Rights	+0.83
Public Administration	+0.81
Gender	+0.81
Health	+0.79
Participation	+0.79
Social Protection	+0.78
Infrastructure	+0.71
Security & Safety	+0.68
Rural Sector	+0.67
Sustainable Environment	+0.65

$r$  = strength of correlation (out of +/- 1.00)

**African countries: correlations between Overall Governance and 16 IIAG sub-categories (2010-2019)**

Sub-category	$r$
Rule of Law & Justice	+0.95
Inclusion & Equality	+0.90
Anti-Corruption	+0.88
Accountability & Transparency	+0.87
Business Environment	+0.84
Rights	+0.81
Education	+0.81
Participation	+0.80
Gender	+0.79
Public Administration	+0.79
Health	+0.78
Social Protection	+0.75
Infrastructure	+0.67
Rural Sector	+0.67
Security & Safety	+0.66
Sustainable Environment	+0.61

$r$  = strength of correlation (out of +/- 1.00)

## SPOTLIGHT

### Regional discrepancies: Northern Africa is on the up while Central Africa, the lowest scoring region, is falling behind

Of the five geographical regions, Southern Africa (53.3) is on average the highest scoring at the *Overall Governance* level for 2019, followed by Western Africa (53.1). Central Africa is the lowest scoring region (38.8).

Central Africa is the only region to have on average declined in *Overall Governance* over the last decade (-0.1). Western Africa (+2.4) and Northern Africa (+2.3) are the two most improved regions.

Libya is the only Northern African country to have declined in *Overall Governance*.

While Western Africa scores the highest in the *Security & Rule of Law* and *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* categories, Northern Africa performs best in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and *Human Development*. Central Africa is the lowest scoring region in all four categories.

All five regions have improved in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and *Human Development* over the last ten years.

In Eastern and Southern Africa all countries improved in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* over this period.

South Africa is the only Southern African country to have declined in *Human Development* over the ten-year period.


On the other hand, only Northern Africa has improved in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*, although the region has seen a decline in the last five years.

Northern Africa and Western Africa are the only two regions to have improved in *Security & Rule of Law*, but only Northern Africa has been able to sustain progress over the last five years.

Only three of the ten Southern Africa countries, Angola, Eswatini and Zimbabwe, have improved in *Security & Rule of Law* while Angola is the only one to have improved in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*.

Of the nine Central African countries, only Chad improved in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*.

#### Overall Governance: Africa geographical regions, trend classifications (2010-2019)



**Central Africa**

	2019 Score	
<i>Overall Governance</i>	38.8	
<i>Security &amp; Rule of Law</i>	37.1	
<i>Participation, Rights &amp; Inclusion</i>	36.1	
<i>Foundations for Economic Opportunity</i>	36.1	
<i>Human Development</i>	46.1	
Best scoring country: São Tomé and Príncipe	60.4	
Worst scoring country: Equatorial Guinea	28.7	

**Northern Africa**

	2019 Score	
<i>Overall Governance</i>	52.0	
<i>Security &amp; Rule of Law</i>	48.3	
<i>Participation, Rights &amp; Inclusion</i>	42.5	
<i>Foundations for Economic Opportunity</i>	54.9	
<i>Human Development</i>	62.3	
Best scoring country: Tunisia	70.4	
Worst scoring country: Libya	35.2	

**Western Africa**

	2019 Score	
<i>Overall Governance</i>	53.1	
<i>Security &amp; Rule of Law</i>	56.4	
<i>Participation, Rights &amp; Inclusion</i>	54.6	
<i>Foundations for Economic Opportunity</i>	50.0	
<i>Human Development</i>	51.2	
Best scoring country: Cabo Verde	73.1	
Worst scoring country: Guinea-Bissau	41.4	

**Eastern Africa**

	2019 Score	
<i>Overall Governance</i>	46.2	
<i>Security &amp; Rule of Law</i>	45.9	
<i>Participation, Rights &amp; Inclusion</i>	41.5	
<i>Foundations for Economic Opportunity</i>	47.3	
<i>Human Development</i>	50.2	
Best scoring country: Mauritius	77.2	
Worst scoring country: Somalia	19.2	

**Southern Africa**

	2019 Score	
<i>Overall Governance</i>	53.3	
<i>Security &amp; Rule of Law</i>	56.0	
<i>Participation, Rights &amp; Inclusion</i>	51.3	
<i>Foundations for Economic Opportunity</i>	51.4	
<i>Human Development</i>	54.3	
Best scoring country: Botswana	66.9	
Worst scoring country: Angola	40.0	

**Trend classification**

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration



## SPOTLIGHT

### What can the 2020 IIAG results tell us about the impact of COVID-19 on Africa?

The 2020 IIAG covers a ten-year period up to the end of 2019, thus providing a comprehensive picture of the continent's main governance trends just before it was hit by COVID-19. The 2020 Index can also help analyse which pre-existing weaknesses may have been exacerbated by this specific contingency and what constitutes a new threat.

As highlighted in MIF's recent publications, as well as in the first Now Generation Network (NGN) Survey, COVID-19 is undoubtedly a major health challenge in Africa, though maybe less so, at least for the time being, than in other regions.

The pandemic has, however, brought to the fore gaps in Africa's health systems, while also triggering a major economic crisis. Furthermore, it has contributed to a declining democratic environment, increasing food insecurity, as well as instability and violence, including gender-based.

**Participation, Rights & Inclusion:** COVID-19 has had an impact on democratic processes as some scheduled elections have been postponed. Measures to contain the virus have also been used to conceal interference with ongoing election preparation and monitoring as well as to restrict civic space. However, the 2020 IIAG shows that the continent had been going through an erosion of civil society space, participation and rights long before COVID-19, and the pandemic has just worsened an already alarming situation.

**Security & Rule of Law:** here too, COVID-19 hit the continent while it was already experiencing a declining security and safety landscape. The African average score for the *Security & Safety* sub-category has been deteriorating during both the last ten and five years, and COVID-19 triggered increased repression in some countries in order to implement lockdown rules. The heavy economic and social impact of the pandemic could potentially lead to increased domestic unrest.

**Human Development:** the response of governments in terms of prevention measures has been swifter than in other regions thanks to lessons learnt from previous pandemics. However, the COVID-19 crisis put under the spotlight gaps in health capacities across the continent. The 2020 IIAG results confirm that progress in health-related indicators, while on a positive path over the last decade, has been slowing in the last five years.

**Foundations for Economic Opportunity:** the economic impact of COVID-19 in Africa is dramatic and there is limited capacity at national or regional levels to mitigate its effects. The 2020 IIAG results show that the COVID-19 pandemic hit the continent while it was set on a positive path of improvement both over the last ten and five years. The economic impacts resulting from COVID-19 undoubtedly threaten this progress.





# Participation, Rights & Inclusion



**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

**Participation**

- Freedom of Association & Assembly
- Political Pluralism
- Civil Society Space
- Democratic Elections

**Rights**


- Personal Liberties
- Freedom of Expression & Belief
- Media Freedom
- Digital Rights
- Protection against Discrimination

**Inclusion & Equality**

- Equal Political Power
- Equal Political Representation
- Equal Civil Liberties
- Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity
- Equal Access to Public Services


**Gender**

- Political Power & Representation of Women
- Equal Civil Liberties for Women
- Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women
- Equal Access to Public Services for Women
- Laws on Violence against Women

2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE /100.0	46.2	
CHANGE 2010-2019	-1.4	
TREND CLASSIFICATION	Increasing Deterioration 	
Underlying sub-categories	2019 Score   Change 2010-2019	
Participation	42.5	-2.2
Rights	45.5	-2.9
Inclusion & Equality	46.3	-0.5
Gender	50.2	-0.2

DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019  
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)

15 Improved  
38 Deteriorated  
0 No change  
1 Not available\*



\* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.

TREND CLASSIFICATION	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Increasing Deterioration	29 
Increasing Improvement	7 
Bouncing Back	5 
Warning Signs	5 
Slowing Deterioration	4 
Slowing Improvement	3 

LARGEST IMPROVEMENT	GAMBIA
CHANGE 2010-2019	+19.5
LARGEST DETERIORATION	BURUNDI
CHANGE 2010-2019	-11.0

RANK/54		2019 SCORE /100.0	CHANGE 2010-2019
1	Mauritius	77.8	-3.5
2	Cabo Verde	76.6	-0.2
3	Seychelles	75.3	+6.2
4	Tunisia	71.4	+17.6
5	Ghana	69.7	-2.9
6	Botswana	67.5	-0.1
7	South Africa	67.2	-0.6
8	Namibia	67.0	-1.8
9	São Tomé and Príncipe	66.6	-0.8
10	Senegal	64.3	-1.6
11	Benin	59.7	-6.2
12	Gambia	57.1	+19.5
13	Sierra Leone	56.8	-1.1
14	Burkina Faso	56.7	-3.5
15	Lesotho	55.9	-4.3
16	Liberia	54.9	-3.5
17	Côte d'Ivoire	54.2	+3.6
18	Mozambique	52.1	-5.1
19	Kenya	51.6	-0.6
20	Niger	49.5	-7.2
21	Zambia	48.9	-2.1
22	Madagascar	48.2	+1.1
22	Togo	48.2	+0.4
24	Guinea-Bissau	47.5	+5.1
24	Malawi	47.5	-7.1
26	Uganda	46.8	-1.8
27	Morocco	46.2	-2.8
28	Algeria	45.9	+0.3
29	Tanzania	45.5	-6.2
30	Gabon	44.6	-2.1
31	Rwanda	44.5	-2.4
32	Nigeria	43.6	-3.7
33	Comoros	43.5	-5.4
34	Mali	42.2	-7.6
35	Angola	39.3	+4.8
36	Guinea	38.3	-5.8
37	Cameroon	36.6	-5.2
38	Zimbabwe	36.0	-1.9
39	Central African Republic	35.6	-1.8
40	Mauritania	35.1	-2.1
41	Ethiopia	34.8	+6.3
42	Burundi	33.2	-11.0
43	Libya	32.3	+0.7
44	Eswatini	31.2	-2.0
45	DR Congo	31.1	-5.7
46	Congo Republic	30.6	-0.3
47	Chad	29.4	+2.1
48	Djibouti	29.2	+2.4
49	Egypt	23.8	-3.8
50	Somalia	23.1	+5.4
51	Sudan	22.5	+3.3
52	South Sudan*	20.9	.
53	Eritrea	17.1	-1.9
54	Equatorial Guinea	17.0	-4.1
	AFRICAN AVERAGE	46.2	-1.4

### **Participation, Rights & Inclusion: deterioration over the past decade, at twice the speed since 2015, drives the first ever year-on-year decline at the overall governance level**

With an African average score of 46.2 in 2019, *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* is the lowest-scoring category (out of four) of the IIAG.

The category has also experienced the largest deterioration both between 2010 and 2019 (-1.4) and between 2015 and 2019 (-1.3). Concerningly, the pace of deterioration has more than doubled since 2015, with an annual average trend of -0.33 compared to -0.16 over the decade (2010-2019).

### **All components decline over the decade, but trends differ from 2015 onwards**

Of the four categories, *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* is the only one where all four underlying sub-categories have followed a negative trajectory since 2010: *Rights* (-2.9), *Participation* (-2.2), *Inclusion & Equality* (-0.5) and *Gender* (-0.2).

However, in the second part of the decade trajectories are diverging. On the one hand, the pace of deterioration in both *Participation* and *Rights* has worsened since 2015, and they register the two largest deteriorations of the 16 IIAG sub-categories, -3.5 and -2.5, respectively.


*Participation* constitutes, on average, Africa's third lowest scoring sub-category in 2019, only behind *Accountability & Transparency* and *Anti-Corruption*.

On the other hand, despite having declined over the decade, *Inclusion & Equality* and *Gender* have started to bounce back, having shown small improvements between 2015 and 2019.

**Participation:** 3<sup>rd</sup> lowest scoring IIAG sub-category/ largest IIAG sub-category deterioration over 5-year period

**Rights:** 2<sup>nd</sup> largest IIAG sub-category deterioration over 5-year period


**Africa: Participation, Rights & Inclusion sub-categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**



### **More than half the countries follow a path of increasing deterioration from 2015**

The *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* category raises the most concerns, with more than half (29) of African countries having followed a negative trajectory in both the ten-year and five-year periods, and at an even faster pace over the latter.

The five highest scoring countries in 2019 are Mauritius (77.8), Cabo Verde (76.6), Seychelles (75.3), Tunisia (71.4) and Ghana (69.7). The five lowest scoring countries are Somalia (23.1), Sudan (22.5), South Sudan (20.9), Eritrea (17.1) and Equatorial Guinea (17.0).



Of the ten best performing countries, only Seychelles has managed to improve performance over the last ten years with a faster pace in the second half of the decade. Tunisia has been the only other top ten performer to improve over the decade, however progress has slowed since 2015. Botswana, South Africa and São Tomé and Príncipe are however bouncing back, having followed a positive trajectory in the last five years.

More concerningly, half of the ten best performers in 2019 have followed a trend of increasing deterioration over the decade.

When looking at the rest of the upper half of the ranking table, between 11<sup>th</sup> ranked Benin and 27<sup>th</sup> ranked Morocco, nine more countries have followed a trend of increasing deterioration and three, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Togo, have shown warning signs.

Gambia is the most improved country, both over the ten-year and five-year periods, and is the only country in the upper half of the ranking table besides Seychelles to have shown increasing improvement.

Meanwhile, half of the ten worst performers have deteriorated over the last ten years.


While deterioration in DR Congo, Congo Republic and Egypt has taken place at a faster pace since 2015, Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea have slowed their pace of decline over the latest five years.

On the other hand, three of the ten lowest scoring countries, Chad, Djibouti and Sudan have managed to increase their score in the *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* category over the past ten years, and at an increased pace over the latest five years. Sudan and Djibouti have even been the sixth and seventh most improved countries respectively over the latter period.

Somalia has also improved over the decade, experiencing the fifth largest improvement. However, its progress has slowed since 2015.

Looking at the full lower half of the ranking table, between 28<sup>th</sup> ranked Algeria and bottom ranked Equatorial Guinea, a total of 18 countries have seen their scores deteriorate over the ten-year period. Fifteen of them have even accelerated their deterioration over the latest five years.

Angola and Ethiopia are the only countries showing increasing improvement. Mauritania, though still declining over the ten-year period, has bounced back strongly since 2015.



### Participation: the most declined of the IIAG's 16 sub-categories since 2015

*Participation* is the third lowest scoring of the 16 IIAG sub-categories at the African average level in 2019.

Already the third most deteriorated sub-category over the decade (-2.2), *Participation* has experienced the largest decline since 2015 (-3.5). The pace of decline has also increased more than three-fold in the latest five years, with an annual average trend of -0.88 compared to -0.24 over the ten-year period.

This recent decline is driven by deterioration in all four underlying indicators.

Firstly, African citizens are enjoying less freedom to associate and assemble freely in 2019 compared to 2010, and the situation has worsened at an even faster pace since 2015.

Compared to 2010, political parties are also less able to operate freely and have less equitable access to state-owned media and public financing campaigns. The speed of decline has been more than five times as fast between 2015 and 2019 than over the decade, with an annual average trend of -0.93 compared to -0.17.



Between 2015 and 2019, the largest indicator deterioration is that of *Civil Society Space*. In this time, the rate of decline

(annual average trend of -1.15) has been almost twice that for the decade (-0.63).

The drivers of this deterioration have been the increased restrictions on civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to establish and operate freely, as well as the higher levels of repression and persecution that they have faced.

*Democratic Elections* is the only *Participation* indicator to have improved since 2010. However, the decline registered at the African average level since 2015 constitutes a warning sign. This negative trend has been driven by a decline in the integrity of elections and the functioning of election monitoring bodies.

***Freedom of Association & Assembly, Political Pluralism, Civil Society Space:*** all feature among 10 most declined IIAG indicators over 5-year period



### Rights: the second most declined IIAG sub-category over the decade and since 2015

With a 2019 African average score of 45.5, *Rights* is the second lowest scoring sub-category within *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*.

Among all 16 IIAG sub-categories, *Rights* is the second most deteriorated over both the past ten (-2.9) and five years (-2.5) with the pace of deterioration nearly doubling in the latter period.

This concerning trajectory is driven by four of the five underlying indicators which are on a trend of increasing deterioration.

The largest deteriorations both in the ten-year and five-year period have been in the *Digital Rights* indicator. It is also the most deteriorated of all 79 IIAG indicators at the African average level over the latest five years.

The worrying decline of *Digital Rights* on the continent has been mostly driven by increasingly high levels of government censorship of both citizen-created and political content on the internet.

However, compared to ten years ago, African governments have shut down domestic access to the internet and social media platforms less frequently. The pace of improvement in this area has even accelerated between 2015 and 2019.

The second largest deterioration both in the ten-year and five-year periods has been registered in *Media Freedom*, with a speed of deterioration that has also increased since 2015.

Government-led censorship and self-censorship by the media are more rampant today than in 2010, and the decline in this area has even accelerated since 2015.

Moreover, in the last decade and with a worsening decline in the last five years, African media have had less freedom to be critical of incumbent regimes and have become more biased in their coverage of the opposition, representing a narrower array of political perspectives.

On the other hand, the curtailment of the freedom enjoyed by journalists has stopped since 2015, even if it has been on a deteriorating path when looking at the full decade.

Since 2015, there has also been an increasing deterioration in the *Freedom of Expression & Belief* indicator, mostly driven by a decline in the freedom of expression enjoyed by Africa's citizens.


On a positive note, the respect for academic freedom has been on the rise on the continent both in the ten-year and five-year periods, albeit at a slower pace in the latter.

*Personal Liberties* afforded to Africa's citizens have been eroded over the decade as well, and the deterioration has worsened between 2015 and 2019. This is a result of an accelerating decline in freedom of movement and the guarantee of personal social freedoms.

Despite being the only improved indicator in the *Rights* sub-category in both time periods, albeit at a slower pace since 2015, *Protection against Discrimination* (16.2) obtains the lowest IIAG indicator score in 2019.

While protection against ethnic discrimination has improved at a slower pace in the latest five years, progress in protection against religious and sexual orientation based discrimination has accelerated.


#### Africa: *Rights* indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)



***Digital Rights***: 4<sup>th</sup> largest IIAG indicator deterioration over 10-year period/ most deteriorated over 5-year period

***Protection against Discrimination***: lowest IIAG indicator score in 2019 (16.2)





### ***Inclusion & Equality*: bouncing back in the latest five years within a decade of decline**

With a 2019 score of 46.3, *Inclusion & Equality* has the second highest sub-category score at the African average level in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*, behind *Gender*.

*Inclusion & Equality* has improved slightly since 2015 (+0.1), starting to revert the deterioration experienced over the ten-year period (-0.5).

This encouraging later trend is driven by growing equality in socioeconomic opportunity and access to public services.

Even though the indicator *Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity* has experienced a small deterioration over the decade, its score has bounced back strongly since 2015 with an annual average trend of +0.45 compared to -0.02 during the ten-year period. This reflects increasing improvement in the equality of access to state jobs and state business opportunities regardless of income level, social group, or urban-rural location.

Moreover, while the *Promotion of Socioeconomic Integration of Youth* has experienced a large decline since 2010, the deterioration in this sub-indicator has stopped in the latest five years.

Despite having made no progress over the decade, since 2015 there has been a small increase in the score obtained by the *Equal Access to Public Services* indicator. While access to basic public services in the latest five years has become more equal regardless of income level or social group, further progress at the indicator level has been hindered by increasing inequality in public service access for rural dwellers compared to urban dwellers.


Concerningly, *Equal Political Representation* on the African continent is worse than ten years ago, and the pace of decline has even tripled between 2015 and 2019. The worsening trend in the latest five years has been driven by an acceleration in the deterioration of full political rights and electoral opportunities granted to various segments of the population, including ethnic, religious, and LGBT.

There has been no change in the *Equal Political Power* indicator score over the decade, with decline even appearing between 2015 and 2019. This is mostly driven by an increasing deterioration in the level of political power conferred to rural dwellers compared to urban dwellers, as well as to sexual minorities.

In contrast, youth have enjoyed increasing levels of representation in parliaments in both time periods, and the pace of improvement in this area has more than doubled between 2015 and 2019.

Civil liberties have also become less equal in both the ten-year and five-year periods, driven by an increasing deterioration in the civil liberties enjoyed by the poor and by minority groups.

**Africa: Inclusion & Equality indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**



**African countries: Inclusion & Equality scores & trend classifications (2019)**



## Gender: bouncing back in the latest five years and highest scoring sub-category in *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* in 2019

With a 2019 score of 50.2, *Gender* constitutes the best performing sub-category within *Participation, Rights & Inclusion*. Of the 16 IIAG sub-categories, it obtains the fifth largest score in 2019 at the African average level.

Having achieved a small improvement since 2015 (+0.2), *Gender* has almost reversed the deterioration shown over the decade, with the speed of improvement in the last five years (annual average trend of +0.05) more than twice the speed of its decline over the ten years (-0.02).

The encouraging trend has been mostly driven by the indicators *Political Power & Representation of Women* and *Equal Access to Public Services for Women*.

Compared to ten years ago, access to political power and representation for Africa's women has increased, and the pace of this improvement has nearly doubled between 2015 and 2019.

Women's access to basic public services has also increased both in the ten-year and five-year period and at a faster pace between 2015 and 2019.

While the indicator *Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women* has also followed a positive trajectory over the past ten years, improvement has slowed in the latest five years.

Women's access to state jobs and state business opportunities has increased over the last ten years, with the pace of improvement more than doubling between 2015 and 2019.

However, women's equality in the workplace has declined more recently, threatening to reverse progress made in equal pay, opportunities and non-discrimination in the workforce over the past decade.

In the latest five years, further progress in the *Gender* sub-category has been prevented by a concerning deterioration in *Equal Civil Liberties for Women*. This indicator has declined over the decade, with the rate of deterioration increasing nearly seven-fold since 2015.


Women's civil society participation, increasing over the decade, has deteriorated between 2015 and 2019.

The guarantee of civil liberties to Africa's women, including access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labour, has deteriorated in both time periods, even if deterioration has slowed since 2015.

*Laws on Violence against Women*, assessing countries' legal frameworks for protection against sexual assault, rape, domestic violence, or sexual harassment, is the fourth most deteriorated IIAG indicator since 2015. Concerningly, the indicator has also seen the largest deterioration over the decade at the indicator level across the whole IIAG dataset.


### Africa: Gender indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)

Indicator



Trend classification ■ Increasing Improvement ■ Slowing Improvement ■ Bouncing Back ■ Warning Signs ■ Slowing Deterioration ■ Increasing Deterioration

**African countries: Gender scores & trend classifications (2019)**



**Slowing deterioration:** 1 of 2 sub-categories across all 16 with largest number of countries

Number of countries showing trend classification			
■ Increasing Improvement	12	■ Warning Signs	5
■ Slowing Improvement	9	■ Slowing Deterioration	8
■ Bouncing Back	5	■ Increasing Deterioration	14
		■ Not Classified	1



# Security & Rule of Law



**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

**Security & Safety**

- Absence of Armed Conflict
- Absence of Violence against Civilians
- Absence of Forced Migration
- Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour
- Absence of Criminality

**Rule of Law & Justice**


- Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law
- Impartiality of the Judicial System
- Judicial Processes
- Equality before the Law
- Law Enforcement
- Property Rights

**Accountability & Transparency**

- Institutional Checks & Balances
- Civic Checks & Balances
- Absence of Undue Influence on Government
- Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information
- Accessibility of Information


**Anti-Corruption**

- Anti-Corruption Mechanisms
- Absence of Corruption in State Institutions
- Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector
- Public Procurement Procedures
- Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector

2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE /100.0	<b>49.5</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>-0.7</b>
TREND CLASSIFICATION	Slowing Deterioration 
Underlying sub-categories	2019 Score   Change 2010-2019
Security & Safety	75.9 -5.3
Rule of Law & Justice	45.2 +0.8
Accountability & Transparency	38.1 +0.8
Anti-Corruption	38.8 +1.1

DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019  
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)

- 23 Improved
- 29 Deteriorated
- 1 No change
- 1 Not available\*



\* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.

TREND CLASSIFICATION	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Increasing Deterioration	22 
Increasing Improvement	14 
Bouncing Back	7 
Warning Signs	5 
Slowing Improvement	4 
Slowing Deterioration	1 

LARGEST IMPROVEMENT	<b>GAMBIA</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>+14.2</b>
LARGEST DETERIORATION	<b>BURUNDI</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>-12.7</b>

RANK/54		2019 SCORE /100.0	CHANGE 2010-2019
1	Mauritius	79.5	-1.4
2	Cabo Verde	76.2	-2.1
3	Botswana	72.8	-5.1
4	Seychelles	72.4	+7.4
4	Tunisia	72.4	+13.4
6	Namibia	69.6	-2.0
7	Senegal	68.2	+3.8
8	South Africa	67.6	-2.3
9	São Tomé and Príncipe	67.5	0.0
10	Benin	66.1	+3.2
11	Ghana	66.0	-5.4
11	Rwanda	66.0	+0.5
13	Morocco	60.7	+4.9
14	Malawi	58.9	-1.4
15	Côte d'Ivoire	58.2	+8.8
16	Gambia	58.0	+14.2
17	Burkina Faso	57.4	+0.7
18	Kenya	56.3	-2.3
19	Sierra Leone	56.2	+4.0
19	Tanzania	56.2	-2.3
19	Zambia	56.2	-6.9
22	Liberia	54.9	+2.0
23	Lesotho	53.9	-4.1
24	Niger	52.7	-0.4
25	Togo	51.3	+2.0
26	Uganda	50.6	-3.8
27	Algeria	50.4	-0.4
28	Madagascar	49.9	+4.4
29	Guinea-Bissau	48.5	+8.0
30	Ethiopia	47.9	+5.2
31	Mozambique	47.1	-3.4
32	Zimbabwe	46.4	+6.9
33	Mali	45.1	-7.9
34	Nigeria	44.3	-3.2
35	Angola	44.1	+5.5
36	Eswatini	43.7	+2.9
37	Gabon	43.5	-3.2
38	Guinea	43.4	-1.7
39	Comoros	42.3	-11.1
40	Djibouti	41.3	-2.7
41	Mauritania	40.3	+6.7
42	Egypt	39.0	-3.6
43	Chad	37.5	+6.5
44	Cameroon	35.7	-5.5
45	Central African Republic	34.1	+2.4
46	Congo Republic	32.8	-5.4
47	Burundi	30.2	-12.7
48	Equatorial Guinea	29.1	+0.6
49	Sudan	27.4	+1.5
50	Libya	26.9	-5.3
51	Eritrea	23.7	-0.5
52	DR Congo	23.5	-9.4
53	South Sudan*	15.3	.
54	Somalia	13.8	-0.5
	<b>AFRICAN AVERAGE</b>	<b>49.5</b>	<b>-0.7</b>

## Security & Rule of Law: continued deterioration over the past decade, albeit slower since 2015

Though still the second highest scoring category (out of four) in 2019, with an African average score of 49.5, *Security & Rule of Law* is also one of the two categories that have deteriorated over the last decade (2010-2019).

However, the deterioration has slowed over the last five years (2015-2019), with an annual average trend of -0.05 compared to -0.08 over the past ten years.

### Very diverse performances within the category

This trend at category level is mainly led by the performances of both the *Security & Safety* and the *Anti-Corruption* sub-categories.

Since 2015 *Security & Safety* has slowed the speed of decline registered at continental level over the decade, and in 2019 it is the highest scoring sub-category out of the 16 in the IIAG.


The African average score for *Anti-Corruption* has improved over the decade, with progress even accelerating between 2015 and 2019. However, *Anti-Corruption* still constitutes Africa's second lowest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019.

Meanwhile, despite a positive trajectory over the decade, both *Rule of Law & Justice* and *Accountability & Transparency* have shown warning signs in the latest five years.

Progress in *Accountability & Transparency* has stalled, leading it to become the IIAG's lowest scoring sub-category in 2019.

*Rule of Law & Justice* has even experienced a downturn between 2015 and 2019.

Africa: Security & Rule of Law sub-categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)



## At country level: worrying trends for some of the better performers

The five best performing countries in 2019 are Mauritius (79.5), Cabo Verde (76.2), Botswana (72.8), Seychelles (72.4) and Tunisia (72.4). On the other hand, the five worst performing countries are Libya (26.9), Eritrea (23.7), DR Congo (23.5), South Sudan (15.3) and Somalia (13.8).

Concerningly, the majority of countries sitting in the upper half of the ranking table are either on a trend of increasing deterioration or have shown warning signs in the past five years.

Of the ten highest ranking countries, only two, Benin and Seychelles, are on a path of increasing improvement, with progress over the decade accelerating in the most recent five years.

Meanwhile, the three highest scoring countries have declined over the decade, although Mauritius and Cabo Verde have reverted to

progress between 2015 and 2019, while Botswana has slowed its decline in this period.


Namibia, the 6<sup>th</sup> highest scoring country, is facing increasing deterioration while Senegal, ranking 7<sup>th</sup>, is showing warning signs.

Between 14<sup>th</sup> ranked Malawi and 27<sup>th</sup> ranked Algeria, only two countries, Gambia and Sierra Leone, have not seen a decline in their *Security & Rule of Law* score between 2015 and 2019.

Most of the ten worst scoring countries have declined over the decade. Barring Zambia, ranking 19<sup>th</sup>, all of the five most deteriorated countries over the last ten years are sitting in the lower half of the ranking table.

Eleven of the 15 most deteriorated countries over the decade have even increased their pace of deterioration over the last five years. The four exceptions are Burundi, Egypt and Libya, all bouncing back, and Botswana, which has been declining at a slower rate.





However, some encouraging trends are worth noting among the low-ranking countries. Between 2015 and 2019, with the exception of Gambia, the five most improved countries sit in the lower half of the ranking table, all of them have shown increasing improvement.

Despite being among the ten worst performers in 2019, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan have progressed over the decade, at an increased pace over the last five years. Though still ranking 49<sup>th</sup> in 2019, Sudan is the second most improved country since 2015.



## Security & Safety: the 2019 best scoring yet most declined IIAG sub-category

While *Security & Safety* is the highest scoring IIAG sub-category at the African average level, it is also the sub-category that has registered the largest decline over the last ten years (-5.3), even though deterioration has slowed down in the latest five years.

This concerning negative trajectory has been driven by four of the five underlying indicators.

Firstly, there has been an increase in the level of violence against civilians by the government and by non-state actors, to a larger extent by the former. While the pace of deterioration in *Absence of Non-State Actor Violence against Civilians* has slowed between 2015 and 2019, it has increased in *Absence of Government Violence against Civilians*.

Compared to ten years ago, the continent is also exposed to higher levels of state-based and non-state armed conflict, as well as forced migration.

The deterioration in *Absence of Armed Conflict* and *Absence of Forced Migration* has, however, slowed within the last five years.

Over the decade *Absence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)* and *Absence of Refugees* have deteriorated at similar rates, however between 2015 and 2019, the former has been declining almost eight times faster than the latter, with a five year annual average trend of -0.38 compared to -0.05.


Albeit declining over the decade, *Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour* is the only indicator within the *Security & Safety* sub-category that has reverted to a positive trajectory in the more recent period.

This is driven by increased efforts of governments to meet the minimum standards of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 for the elimination of human trafficking and not by an actual reduction in the prevalence of forced labour. The IIAG sub-indicator *Absence of Forced Labour* has declined both over the last ten and the last five years, although at a slower pace in the more recent period.


*Absence of Criminality* is the only indicator to have progressed over the decade, but it has shown warning signs, with the rate of homicides having risen again over the last five years.

### Africa: Security & Safety indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010–2019 & 2015–2019)

Indicator



Trend classification: ■ Increasing Improvement ■ Slowing Improvement ■ Bouncing Back ■ Warning Signs ■ Slowing Deterioration ■ Increasing Deterioration



### **Rule of Law & Justice: marginal progress over the decade already under threat**

With an African average score of 45.2, *Rule of Law & Justice* is the second highest scoring sub-category within *Security & Rule of Law*, but the sixth lowest scoring among the 16 IIAG sub-categories.

Despite having followed a positive trajectory over the last ten years, the sub-category has deteriorated between 2015 and 2019.

With the pace of decline in the last five years (annual average trend of -0.10) faster than the pace of improvement over the decade (+0.09), *Rule of Law & Justice* has displayed warning signs, potentially reversing the already small progress.


Progress has been driven most notably by improvements in law enforcement, in particular by better police services, while only marginal progress has been made on the functioning of the criminal justice system.

Nevertheless, law enforcement on the continent remains an area of concern as it is the lowest scoring indicator within the *Rule of Law & Justice* sub-category and the ninth lowest scoring of all 79 IIAG indicators.

Over the course of the decade, the continent has also seen better compliance by the executive with the rule of law, as reflected in the, albeit small, improvement when it comes to lawful transfers of power. Improvement with regards to the compliance with the constitution by the executive has even accelerated over the last five years. However, the continent has not seen more compliance by the executive with judicial decisions.

While judicial systems on the continent are on average more impartial than ten years ago due to progress both in judicial independence and the merit-based appointment of judges, retreat in both over the last five years risks overturning the progress made over the decade. This is one of the main drivers of the sub-category's decline between 2015 and 2019.

**Africa: Rule of Law & Justice indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**



There have been negative developments with regards to judicial processes on the continent and there is less equality and more discrimination before the law. The deterioration of *Judicial Processes* is due to less access to and affordability of justice, due and fair process being less of a guarantee, as well as more delays and less effectiveness in the enforcement of justice. However, within the last five years, progress has been made in the access and affordability of justice, resulting in a small positive trajectory in *Judicial Processes* between 2015 and 2019.


*Property Rights* has also deteriorated and has been following an increasing path of deterioration. The rate of decline has more than tripled over the last five years with an annual average trend of -0.13 between 2010 and 2019 compared to annual average trend of -0.48 between 2015 and 2019.

**African countries: Rule of Law & Justice scores & trend classifications (2019)**




**Accountability & Transparency: progress on hold for the lowest scoring sub-category in 2019**

With an African average score of 38.1 in 2019, *Accountability & Transparency* is the lowest scoring of the 16 IIAG sub-categories. The low score is driven by the two transparency-related indicators *Accessibility of Information* and *Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information* which are the third and fourth lowest scoring indicators out of all 79 IIAG indicators.



Little progress has been made in the sub-category over the decade, with a marginal increase in score of +0.8, the second smallest across all ten sub-categories that have improved, and no further progress since 2015.



The small progress over the decade is most notably driven by *Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information*. At continental level, progress has been made in budget transparency and disclosure of assets held by politicians and public officials compared to ten years ago. But in contrast, laws and judicial information have on average become less public.

Checks and balances by citizens, particularly petitions and complaint mechanisms, have improved both within the last ten and the last five years, with the speed of progress accelerating in the more recent time period.


While civic checks and balances are improving, institutional checks and balances on the continent are on a concerning trajectory.

Despite an improvement over the decade, *Institutional Checks & Balances* has deteriorated over the last five years, with the rate of decline between 2015 and 2019 (annual average trend of -0.23) more than seven times the rate of improvement over the decade (+0.03).

There are better legislative checks on the executive in 2019 than in 2010, however progress has slowed down in more recent years. At the same time, in 2019 there are fewer working separations of powers and fewer sanctions for misconduct than ten years ago, with the pace of decline even having increased in these areas in the last five years.

Over the last five years, governments on the continent have become increasingly subject to undue influence, although to a lesser extent than ten years ago. The rate of decline for *Absence of Undue Influence on Government* between 2015 and 2019 (annual average trend of -0.20) is more than six times the rate of improvement over the decade (+0.03).

*Accessibility of Information* is the only indicator of the sub-category to have declined over the decade as information requests are of lower quality and reliability, while there is less access to party financing information. But because access to public records, legislative information and records of state-owned companies has improved over the decade and at a faster rate between 2015 and 2019, *Accessibility of Information* has seen a small increase in score in the last five years.



### **Anti-Corruption: accelerating improvement but still the second lowest scoring IIAG sub-category**

*Anti-Corruption* is the only sub-category of *Security & Rule of Law* to have followed a positive trajectory both over the ten-year and five-year period, with the pace of improvement even accelerating within the last five years.

Nevertheless, with an African average score of 38.8 it remains the second lowest scoring of the 16 IIAG sub-categories with only *Accountability & Transparency* receiving a lower score.

The positive trajectory of the sub-category has most notably been driven by reduced corruption in state institutions but also in the public sector, as well as by strengthened anti-corruption mechanisms.

Levels of corruption have been reduced in all branches of government with the greatest progress made on corruption within executive powers, followed by corruption within judicial powers.


While the pace of improvement for the latter has slowed in the past five years, the former has increased its pace of progress within this period.

The prevalence of corruption within legislative branches increased again between 2015 and 2019, despite the improvement over the decade. This has led to slower improvement in *Absence of Corruption in State Institutions* in the more recent time period.

Both public sector theft and public sector bribery, including in the police and military, have been reduced at continental average level over the last decade with the positive trajectory picking up speed between 2015 and 2019.

Despite increasing by a smaller magnitude than the indicators on state institutions and public sector corruption and remaining the second lowest scoring indicator of the sub-category, *Anti-Corruption Mechanisms* has also followed a path of increasing improvement in the last five years.


**Africa: Anti-Corruption indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**



Although corruption in the private sector is slightly more prevalent than ten years ago, progress has been made in the last five years with the continent improving its average score for *Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector* between 2015 and 2019.

A concerning trend has emerged with regards to public procurement procedures. Procurement procedures have become less competitive and sanctioning of companies that have violated the law is less rigorous than ten years ago, with the pace of decline having picked up speed in the last five years. *Public Procurement Procedures* is the lowest scoring indicator constituting the *Anti-Corruption* sub-category while also being the fifth lowest scoring indicator in the IIAG overall.

**African countries: Anti-Corruption scores & trend classifications (2019)**



# Human Development



**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

**Health**

- Access to Healthcare
- Access to Water & Sanitation
- Control of Communicable Diseases
- Control of Non-Communicable Diseases
- Control of Child & Maternal Mortality
- Compliance with International Health Regulations

**Education**

- Equality in Education
- Education Enrolment
- Education Completion
- Human Resources in Education
- Education Quality


**Social Protection**

- Social Safety Nets
- Poverty Reduction Policies
- Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation
- Access to Housing
- Absence of Undernourishment

**Sustainable Environment**


- Promotion of Environmental Sustainability
- Enforcement of Environmental Policies
- Air Quality
- Sustainable Management of Land & Forests
- Land & Water Biodiversity





2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE /100.0	<b>51.9</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>+3.0</b>
TREND CLASSIFICATION	Slowing Improvement 
Underlying sub-categories	2019 Score   Change 2010-2019
Health	60.3 +6.8
Education	49.3 +1.7
Social Protection	42.6 -0.3
Sustainable Environment	55.4 +3.8

DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019  
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)

42 Improved  
11 Deteriorated  
0 No change  
1 Not available\*



\* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.

TREND CLASSIFICATION	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Slowing Improvement	20 
Increasing Improvement	14 
Warning Signs	8 
Slowing Deterioration	5 
Increasing Deterioration	4 
Bouncing Back	2 

LARGEST IMPROVEMENT	<b>CÔTE D'IVOIRE</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>+12.1</b>
LARGEST DETERIORATION	<b>LIBYA</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>-12.7</b>

RANK/54		2019 SCORE/100.0	CHANGE 2010-2019
1	Mauritius	75.5	-0.8
2	Seychelles	75.2	+8.3
3	Algeria	73.6	+4.6
4	Tunisia	71.8	-0.7
5	Botswana	68.5	+3.6
6	Cabo Verde	67.0	-0.1
7	Morocco	66.8	+8.2
8	Egypt	65.4	+3.6
9	South Africa	64.3	-0.7
10	Rwanda	64.0	+3.6
11	Gabon	61.0	+5.2
12	Namibia	60.9	+4.2
13	Ghana	60.7	+2.4
14	Kenya	59.4	+8.1
15	São Tomé and Príncipe	59.3	+4.7
16	Senegal	58.3	+5.7
17	Tanzania	57.8	+7.2
18	Togo	55.5	+9.9
19	Benin	55.0	+3.2
20	Uganda	54.9	+3.9
20	Zimbabwe	54.9	+5.3
22	Cameroon	54.4	+7.1
23	Ethiopia	54.0	+9.6
24	Malawi	53.6	+2.7
25	Zambia	52.7	+2.1
26	Côte d'Ivoire	52.4	+12.1
27	Gambia	51.4	-1.8
28	Burkina Faso	50.7	+5.4
29	Lesotho	50.4	+2.4
30	Mali	50.3	+2.2
31	Eswatini	50.1	+0.6
32	Djibouti	48.5	+1.2
33	Comoros	48.3	+4.9
34	Mauritania	48.1	+3.1
35	Libya	47.8	-12.7
36	Burundi	47.2	+6.3
37	Nigeria	46.5	-0.2
38	Congo Republic	46.0	+2.4
38	Niger	46.0	+6.3
40	Mozambique	45.7	+2.3
41	Sierra Leone	45.6	+11.2
42	Guinea	45.2	+6.7
43	Liberia	44.3	+2.8
44	Equatorial Guinea	43.7	-1.2
45	Sudan	42.7	+2.2
46	Angola	42.3	+5.8
47	DR Congo	40.3	+3.0
48	Guinea-Bissau	38.7	-1.2
49	Madagascar	37.4	+0.4
50	Eritrea	36.9	-1.4
51	Chad	35.1	+3.8
52	Central African Republic	27.5	-0.9
53	South Sudan*	26.5	.
54	Somalia	21.3	+6.7
	<b>AFRICAN AVERAGE</b>	<b>51.9</b>	<b>+3.0</b>

## Human Development: slowing improvement since 2015 and first ever year-on-year decline mirror the trajectory of Overall Governance in 2019

*Human Development* is the highest-scoring category (out of four) in 2019, with an African average score of 51.9. It is one of only two IIAG categories to have improved over the last ten (2010-2019) and five (2015-2019) years. But improvement has slowed from 2015, with an annual average trend of +0.23 compared to +0.33 over the past ten years.

Mirroring the trajectory at the *Overall Governance* level, *Human Development* registers the first year-on-year score decline in 2019 (51.9 compared to 52.0 in 2018).

## Deteriorating Social Protection, as well as slowing improvement in Health and Education drive the slowdown

Performances within the category are mixed. Declining *Social Protection* as well as slowing improvement in *Health* and, to a lesser extent, *Education*, drive the slowdown at the category level.

*Social Protection*, the lowest scoring sub-category in *Human Development*, has deteriorated over the past decade, albeit at a slower pace between 2015 and 2019.

While achieving the second largest improvement of the 16 IIAG sub-categories over the decade (+6.8), *Health* has more than halved its pace of improvement since 2015. However, it remains the second highest scoring IIAG sub-category at the African average level in 2019.


Similarly, even though *Education* has shown improvement both in the ten-year and five-year period, progress has slowed marginally in the latest five years.

Improvement has been achieved in *Sustainable Environment* over the decade, and at an even faster pace since 2015, making it the third highest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019.

**Health:** 2<sup>nd</sup> highest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019.

**Sustainable Environment:** 3<sup>rd</sup> highest scoring IIAG sub-category in 2019

Africa: Human Development sub-categories, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)




## Human Development is the category where most countries follow a path of slowing improvement

The slowing progress registered at the African average level is reflected in the trajectories of most countries. Of the four IIAG categories, *Human Development* has the largest number of countries (20) that have improved at a slower pace since 2015.

The first year-on-year score decline is driven by fewer countries improving between 2018 and 2019 (26) than between 2017 and 2018 (40).

In 2019, the five highest scoring countries are Mauritius (75.5), Seychelles (75.2), Algeria (73.6), Tunisia (71.8) and Botswana (68.5). The five lowest scoring countries are Eritrea (36.9), Chad (35.1), Central African Republic (27.5), South Sudan (26.5) and Somalia (21.3).



Of the ten highest ranking countries in 2019, only Seychelles, Algeria and Egypt have been on a path of increasing improvement, with progress over the decade accelerating in the most recent five years.

Meanwhile, Botswana, Morocco and Rwanda, though still following a positive trajectory over the decade, have seen their progress slow since 2015.

More worryingly, the four remaining of the ten best performers have deteriorated over decade. While Tunisia has managed to slow deterioration in the last five years, decline has worsened in Mauritius and South Africa over the same period. Cabo Verde is bouncing back, having improved between 2015 and 2019.

In the rest of the upper half of the ranking table, between 11<sup>th</sup> ranked Gabon and 27<sup>th</sup> ranked Gambia, only three countries, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin and Malawi, have followed a path of increasing improvement. Gambia is the only country to have deteriorated since 2010, though at a slower pace in the second half of the decade.


Out of the ten lowest scoring countries, only three have registered a decline in the ten-year period. However, none of these have increased their rate of deterioration in the latest five years.

Trend performance is diverse among the bottom ten countries. Six of them have managed to increase their score over the

past ten years, but Sudan, DR Congo and Chad have exhibited warning signs since 2015. Progress in Angola has slowed in the latest five years, while Madagascar and Somalia have managed to increase improvement.

In the lower half of the rankings table, between 28<sup>th</sup> ranked Burkina Faso and 44<sup>th</sup> ranked Equatorial Guinea, 14 countries have seen their scores increase over the ten-year period, six of them at an even faster pace over the five-year period. Only three countries have registered a decline over the decade. Of these, Libya has managed to slow its deterioration in the latest five years, while for Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea deterioration has worsened.

**Somalia:** lowest scoring country in 2019 (21.3), but increasing progress has led to 2<sup>nd</sup> largest improvement over 5-year period (+5.3)



**Sierra Leone:** ranking 41<sup>st</sup> in 2019, has experienced 2<sup>nd</sup> largest improvement over 10-year period (+11.2) and largest over 5-year period (+5.4)

**Libya:** has dropped more in rank (-26) than any other country over 10-year period

### Health: still second highest scoring in 2019 and second most improved IIAG sub-category over the decade, but progress has slowed since 2015

With an African average score of 60.3, *Health* is the second highest scoring of the IIAG's 16 sub-categories in 2019.

*Health* is also the second most improved IIAG sub-category over the decade (+6.8), but only the fourth between 2015 and 2019 (+1.5).

Its pace of improvement has halved since 2015 with an annual average trend of +0.38 compared to +0.76 over the ten years.

This slowing progress in the latest five years has been driven by all six underlying indicators, which have either been on a path of slowing improvement or been registering warning signs.

Since 2015, *Access to Healthcare* on the continent has become slightly more restricted, threatening to reverse the small progress made over the decade. This discouraging later trend is driven by increasing levels of out-of-pocket spending on healthcare by Africa's citizens between 2015 and 2019.

Likewise, even though it is the most improved indicator in the *Human Development* category over the ten-year period, as well as the third most improved of all the 79 IIAG indicators, progress in *Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR)* has stalled over the latest five years.

*Control of Communicable Diseases* is the second most improved indicator in the category over the past decade, and the most improved in the latest five years. However, its pace of improvement has slowed since 2015.

The slackening trend has been driven by slower progress in the provision of antiretroviral therapy to HIV-positive people, especially among pregnant women, as well as in the fight against malaria deaths.

On the other hand, child immunisation coverage against measles, DPT and Hepatitis B has extended over the decade and at an even faster pace over the latest five years.

Compared to ten years ago, there are fewer child and maternal deaths on the continent. Even though the pace of improvement in both these areas has slowed since 2015, *Control of Child & Maternal Mortality* is still the third most improved indicator in the category over both time periods.

While there has been some improvement in the *Control of Non-Communicable Diseases* over the past decade, progress has slowed marginally since 2015 in an area that is increasingly challenging for African health systems. This is mostly due to increasing levels of metabolic risks.


Finally, access to water and sanitation for Africa's citizens has increased both in the ten-year and five-year periods, albeit at a slower pace in the latter. This has been driven by slower progress in extending the availability of drinking water, as well as handwashing and improved sanitation facilities.

#### **Compliance with International Health Regulations**


(IHR): 3<sup>rd</sup> most improved IIAG indicator and most improved in category over 10-year period

#### **Africa: Health indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**

Indicator



Trend classification ■ Increasing Improvement ■ Slowing Improvement ■ Bouncing Back ■ Warning Signs ■ Slowing Deterioration ■ Increasing Deterioration



**Somalia:** lowest scoring country in 2019 (34.0), but 4<sup>th</sup> most improved country over 5-year period (+5.1)

**Sierra Leone:** only country to feature among 5 largest improvers over both 10-year period (+21.6) and 5-year period (+4.4)

### Education: progress has marginally slowed since 2015

With a 2019 score of 49.3, *Education* is the second lowest scoring sub-category within *Human Development* at the African average level.

Still the fourth most improved of the IIAG's 16 sub-categories over the past decade, *Education* has seen its progress slow slightly since 2015, with an annual average trend of +0.18 between 2015 and 2019 compared to +0.19 over the ten-year period.

This slowing trajectory in the latest five years has been driven by three of the five underlying indicators, three of them having seen the pace of improvement slowing.

Firstly, although education enrolment rates have increased over the decade, the pace of progress has reduced more than three-fold

since 2015, mostly due to an increasingly declining enrolment rate in primary education, as well as an enrolment rate in pre-primary education that has reverted to decline between 2015 and 2019.


Even though it is the second most improved indicator in the sub-category over the last ten years, the pace of improvement in *Education Completion* has nearly halved since 2015, due to slowing improvement in both the completion rate of primary education and the expected years of schooling throughout a child's life.


Similarly, despite being the seventh highest scoring IIAG indicator in 2019 and the ninth most improved over the past decade, the rate of progress in *Human Resources in Education* has slightly slowed since 2015, driven by slower progress in increasing the number of teachers per pupil in primary education. Despite this, it is still the most improved *Education* indicator between 2015 and 2019.

Compared to ten years ago, education quality on the African continent is lower. *Education Quality* is the seventh most deteriorated IIAG indicator over the ten-year period. Although the speed of decline has slowed since 2015, it is still the second most deteriorated indicator in the *Human Development* category between 2015 and 2019. Further deterioration has been prevented by the *Education Alignment with Market Needs* sub-indicator, which is bouncing back, having registered an improvement since 2015 amidst a general deterioration over the decade.

**Human Resources in Education:** 7<sup>th</sup> highest scoring IIAG indicator and 9<sup>th</sup> most improved over 10-year period

**Education Quality:** 7<sup>th</sup> most deteriorated IIAG indicator over 10-year period





### **Social Protection: concerning trends for the fourth lowest scoring IAG sub-category in 2019 and the only one in Human Development to have declined since 2010**

*Social Protection* is the lowest scoring sub-category (42.6) within *Human Development* and the fourth lowest scoring of all the 16 IAG sub-categories. It is the only *Human Development* sub-category to have deteriorated over the decade, although deterioration has slowed since 2015.

The main driver of this decline is the deteriorating effectiveness of countries' *Poverty Reduction Policies*. Although there seem to be more and better policies and service delivery regarding access to health and education, as well as better service delivery, there also appear to be more socioeconomic barriers than ten years ago, with larger parts of the population being excluded from society due to poverty and inequality. The issue has become even more prominent within the last five years as the rate of decline for *Poverty Reduction Policies* between 2015 and 2019 (annual average trend of -0.75) has more than doubled compared to the ten-year period (-0.31).

Africans also have less access to housing than ten years ago with the problem having accelerated in the latest five years. The annual average trend of decline for *Access to Housing* between 2015 and 2019 (-0.25) is more than ten times as high as that over

the decade (-0.02). While the proportion of the urban population living in slums has on average been reduced, urban housing has become less affordable. Housing constitutes a major area of concern as the indicator *Access to Housing* (32.8) is one of the ten lowest scoring indicators across the whole IAG in 2019.


No improvement has been made over the decade in *Social Safety Nets*, which also features among the ten lowest scoring of the 79 IAG indicators. However, the indicator is the most improved of all *Social Protection* indicators since 2015, reversing earlier declines during the decade.

Progress, albeit small, has been made in *Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation* and the improvement has been nine times faster in the latest five years, with an annual average trend of +0.20 compared to +0.02 between 2010 and 2019. Although public expenditures and revenue recollection have become less consistent with national poverty reduction priorities, African countries have offset some of this by improving income equality.


The continent has made progress in eliminating undernourishment. *Absence of Undernourishment* is the most improved indicator in *Social Protection* over the decade. However, on average the continent has followed a negative trajectory since 2015, threatening to overturn the progress made. The annual average decline over the last five years (-0.23) has been quicker than the annual average progress over the decade (+0.19).



**Africa: Social Protection indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**



**African countries: Social Protection scores & trend classifications (2019)**



**Mauritius:** most deteriorated over 10-year period (-11.0) and 2<sup>nd</sup> most deteriorated over 5-year period (-10.4), despite being ranked 2<sup>nd</sup>

**Somalia & Eritrea:** 3<sup>rd</sup> (+6.3) and 4<sup>th</sup> (+4.2) most improved countries respectively over 5-year period, despite being ranked 52<sup>nd</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup>

### **Sustainable Environment: the only IIAG sub-category where every single indicator improved over the whole decade**

*Sustainable Environment* is the third best scoring sub-category in 2019 (55.4). It is also the third most improved sub-category in the IIAG over the decade (+3.8) and the second most improved in the latest five years (+1.7), having marginally increased its pace of progress in the latter period.

All underlying indicators of the sub-category have improved both over the ten-year and five-year period. *Sustainable Environment* is the only sub-category of the 16 in the IIAG to achieve this.

The continent has on average stepped up in promoting environmental sustainability through policies and regulations and has also become more rigorous in enforcing such policies, having accelerated efforts over the last five years.

The continent has further seen progress with regards to air quality, management of land and forests, as well as biodiversity.


On average over the last ten years most progress has been made in improving air quality, including a reduction in household air pollution. The annual average trend of improvement has slightly slowed since 2015.

Both terrestrial biomes and marine areas are better protected than ten years ago, although the rate of progress has almost halved over the second half of the decade for *Land & Water Biodiversity*, with an annual average trend of +0.25 between 2015 and 2019 compared to +0.49 over the decade.

The least progress has been made in the sustainable management of land and forests. On average, countries have made progress in the sustainability and diversification of agriculture. However, primary forest loss has worsened over the last ten years.

#### **Africa: Sustainable Environment indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**

Indicator



Trend classification: ■ Increasing Improvement ■ Slowing Improvement ■ Bouncing Back ■ Warning Signs ■ Slowing Deterioration ■ Increasing Deterioration

## African countries: Sustainable Environment scores &amp; trend classifications (2019)





**Gabon:** most improved over both 10-year (+18.5) and 5-year period (+14.5), rising to 2<sup>nd</sup> best scoring in 2019

**Morocco:** 2<sup>nd</sup> most improved over 10-year period (+15.9), moving from lower half of the ranking table in 2010 to top 10 in 2019

**Equatorial Guinea:** 2<sup>nd</sup> most declined country over 10-year period (-7.2), dropping from top 10 in 2010 to lower half of ranking table in 2019


# Foundations for Economic Opportunity



2019 AFRICAN AVERAGE SCORE /100.0	<b>47.8</b>	
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>+4.1</b>	
TREND CLASSIFICATION	Slowing Improvement 	
Underlying sub-categories	2019 Score   Change 2010-2019	
Public Administration	47.5	+0.1
Business Environment	49.4	+1.7
Infrastructure	43.4	+12.8
Rural Sector	51.5	+1.4

DIRECTION OF CHANGE 2010-2019  
(NUMBER OF COUNTRIES)

50 Improved  
3 Deteriorated  
0 No change  
1 Not available\*



\* 10-year trend for South Sudan is not available since the 2020 IIAG dataset does not include data for South Sudan pre 2011, as it was not yet an independent state.

TREND CLASSIFICATION	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Increasing Improvement	22 
Slowing Improvement	16 
Warning Signs	12 
Bouncing Back	2 
Increasing Deterioration	1 
Slowing Deterioration	0 

LARGEST IMPROVEMENT	<b>ZIMBABWE</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>+19.5</b>
LARGEST DETERIORATION	<b>LIBYA</b>
CHANGE 2010-2019	<b>-4.4</b>

RANK/54		2019 SCORE /100.0	CHANGE 2010-2019
1	Mauritius	76.0	+3.6
2	Cabo Verde	72.8	+3.5
3	Morocco	70.1	+10.9
4	Rwanda	67.6	+13.2
5	Kenya	66.7	+9.8
6	Tunisia	66.2	+2.7
7	Seychelles	66.1	+9.1
8	South Africa	64.1	+0.1
9	Namibia	62.7	+12.8
10	Senegal	61.9	+5.4
11	Egypt	61.6	+6.0
12	Ghana	60.9	+6.3
13	Botswana	58.8	+4.9
14	Gambia	57.0	+4.7
15	Uganda	55.0	+4.7
16	Algeria	54.7	+8.2
17	Benin	53.5	+4.1
18	Tanzania	52.7	+2.4
19	Burkina Faso	51.2	+1.3
20	Mozambique	51.1	+5.4
21	Côte d'Ivoire	50.8	+11.6
22	Eswatini	50.3	+8.7
22	Zambia	50.3	+4.0
24	Ethiopia	49.7	+5.6
25	Lesotho	49.0	+3.8
26	Mali	48.7	+3.1
27	São Tomé and Príncipe	48.1	+7.1
28	Nigeria	47.8	+1.0
29	Cameroon	47.2	+1.2
29	Zimbabwe	47.2	+19.5
31	Djibouti	46.3	+7.2
31	Malawi	46.3	+0.7
33	Togo	45.4	+6.8
34	Sierra Leone	45.3	+5.0
35	Mauritania	43.1	+0.6
36	Guinea	43.0	+6.0
36	Niger	43.0	+2.8
38	Madagascar	42.2	+0.7
39	Gabon	41.5	+3.9
40	Comoros	38.7	+1.3
41	Liberia	37.4	+3.2
41	Sudan	37.4	+3.1
43	Burundi	37.0	+3.0
44	Congo Republic	35.3	+2.6
45	Angola	34.3	+5.5
46	Libya	33.9	-4.4
47	Chad	33.5	+2.1
48	DR Congo	31.8	+0.9
49	Guinea-Bissau	30.9	-0.8
50	Central African Republic	25.5	-3.5
51	Eritrea	25.3	+0.3
52	Equatorial Guinea	25.0	+3.6
53	South Sudan*	19.9	.
54	Somalia	18.4	+10.8
<b>AFRICAN AVERAGE</b>		<b>47.8</b>	<b>+4.1</b>

### Foundations for Economic Opportunity: IIAG’s most improved category since 2010

With an African average score of 47.8 in 2019, *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* ranks third among the four IIAG categories behind *Human Development* (51.9) and *Security & Rule of Law* (49.5). Sizeable improvements over the decade (2010-2019) mean it is no longer the lowest scoring category in the IIAG as it was in 2010 and has since overtaken *Participation, Rights & Inclusion* (46.2).

*Foundations for Economic Opportunity* is the most improved category in the IIAG, with a score increase of +4.1 over the ten-year period.

The overall rate of improvement in this category has almost remained stable, although it has slowed very slightly in the last five years (2015-2019) with an annual average trend of +0.46




for the decade dropping to +0.43. Nevertheless, it is still improving at almost twice the rate of *Human Development*, the next most improved category in this period (annual average trend of +0.23).

### All sub-categories have improved over the decade, with the largest progress in Infrastructure

All of the four *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* sub-categories have improved over the decade.

*Infrastructure* has been the main driver of improvement, with the African average score increasing by +12.8 between 2010 and 2019, more than seven times any of the other three sub-categories.

Improvements in *Business Environment* (+1.7) and *Rural Sector* (+1.4) have been more modest, while the *Public Administration* sub-category has almost stalled (+0.1).



\*Trend classifications are not considered relevant for the 2020 IIAG Rural Sector sub-category analysis. As the latest data year available from source is 2015, all data points in 2016-2019 have had to be estimated and five-year trends (2015-2019) are static. See methodological notes for more information.

Over the ten-year period, four of the IIAG's five most improved indicators (out of 79) belong to the *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* category, three of which are sitting under *Infrastructure*.

#### Africa: IIAG indicators, 5 most improved average scores (2010-2019)

Sub-category	Indicator	2019 Score	Change 2010-2019
Infrastructure	Mobile Communications	57.8	+22.3
Infrastructure	Digital Access	24.6	+18.4
Health	Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR)	56.7	+15.1
Business Environment	Access to Financial Services	35.7	+13.0
Infrastructure	Access to Energy	52.7	+12.3

### All countries but three have improved over the decade

In 2019, Mauritius (76.0) is the top scorer in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity*, a position it has maintained over the whole decade (2010-2019). Cabo Verde (72.8) is the next best scorer in 2019, while Morocco (70.1), Rwanda (67.6) and Kenya (66.7) make up the rest of the top five on the back of large improvements over the decade.

Over the ten-year period, 50 countries have improved their score, the most of any category. For 22 of them, the rate of improvement has increased since 2015, again more than in any other category.

Only Libya (-4.4), Central African Republic (-3.5) and Guinea-

Bissau (-0.8) have seen their scores decline. Libya is the only country to have seen an increasing deterioration, with an annual average trend of -0.49 over the ten years dropping to -0.89 over the latest five years.

Zimbabwe is the most improved country over the decade, with an increase of +19.5 between 2010 and 2019.

However, this positive trend remains fragile. Twelve countries have already displayed warning signs, as their overall positive trend for the decade has been jeopardised by a decline in the last five years.

These warning signs are greatest in South Africa (-3.0), DR Congo (-2.4) and Eritrea (-2.3), while even top scorer Mauritius has seen its score drop in the last five years (-0.4).

#### African countries: *Foundations of Economic Opportunity* scores & trend classifications (2019)



**Increasing Improvement:** largest number of countries across all 4 categories  
**Warning Signs:** largest number of countries across all 4 categories

#### Number of countries showing trend classification

Increasing Improvement	22	Warning Signs	12
Slowing Improvement	16	Slowing Deterioration	0
Bouncing Back	2	Increasing Deterioration	1
		Not Classified	1

**Infrastructure: though still low scoring in 2019, it is the best trending IAG sub-category over the decade**

Despite being the lowest scoring of the *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* sub-categories, *Infrastructure* (+12.8) is the most improved sub-category (out of 16) across the whole IAG.

The African average annual trend over the past decade for *Infrastructure* reaches +1.42, almost twice that of the IAG's next most improved sub-category, *Health* (+0.76). The rate of improvement has also accelerated over the last five years, with an annual average trend of +1.53 between 2015 and 2019.

The underlying picture for this sub-category is, however, more complicated than the numbers suggest, as the dramatic improvements seen are not shared across all forms of


infrastructure, but driven primarily by improvements in *Mobile Communications* (+22.3) and *Digital Access* (+18.4).

The last decade has been characterised by the proliferation of accessible and affordable mobile phones and internet, as well as an increasing share of households with a computer and secure, fast internet access. Nevertheless, there is still more progress to be made with *Digital Access* remaining the second lowest scoring indicator on the IAG.


Some of the more conventional forms of infrastructure have deteriorated, with a decline in the quality of air infrastructure and in the performance of the postal service.

However, provision of energy has substantially improved, with the share of Africans with access to electricity growing at an increasing rate.

**Africa: Infrastructure indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**



**African countries: Infrastructure scores & trend classifications (2019)**





## Business Environment: better access to financial services drives progress

*Business Environment* is the second most improved sub-category in *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* and shares the place of fourth most improved sub-category of the IIAG with *Education*, the African average score having increased by +1.7 between 2010 and 2019.

Recent trends have shown further positive signs, with the rate of improvement in the last five years (annual average trend of +0.40) more than double that for the decade (+0.19).

The improvement has been largely driven by increased *Access to Financial Services* (+13.0), namely bank accounts and digital payment services.

Access to such services has improved over the ten-year period and has expanded at an increasing rate in the last five years.


Improved efforts by governments to promote regional integration and more efficient customs and border management have also, to a lesser extent, contributed to the improving *Business Environment* on the continent.

However, this positive trajectory for the decade masks a concerning decline in the freedom of trade unions and decreased cooperation in labour-employer relations.


*Access to Financial Services* while still low scoring, is the fourth most improved indicator on the IIAG over the decade and has improved at the third fastest rate of any IIAG indicator since 2015 (annual average trend of +1.75). This has mostly been driven by a surge in the *Use of Digital Payments* since 2015 (+11.6)

### Africa: Business Environment indicators, average trends & trend classifications (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)

Indicator



Trend classification: ■ Increasing Improvement ■ Slowing Improvement ■ Bouncing Back ■ Warning Signs ■ Slowing Deterioration ■ Increasing Deterioration




### Public Administration: almost at standstill as 31 countries have shown signs of deterioration since 2015

*Public Administration* is the least improved of the *Foundations for Economic Opportunity* sub-categories, with a small increase of +0.1 over the decade.


Improvements over the decade have been largely driven by greater taxation capacity and more efficient revenue mobilisation, although a reversal of this trend in the last five years threatens this progress.

The expansion in taxation capacity has been somewhat offset by the shrinking capacity of national statistical systems, a worrying trend given their importance in progressing towards the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063. This trend, compounded by worsening systems of financial management and to a lesser extent civil registration, has led to the overall gains in *Public Administration* for the decade being just above zero.

Over the last five years, *Public Administration* performance has been noticeably deteriorating (-1.2), threatening progress made over the decade.



**African countries: Public Administration scores & trend classifications (2019)**



**Increasing Deterioration:** largest number of countries across all 4 Foundations of Economic Opportunity sub-categories

Number of countries showing trend classification	
Increasing Improvement	13
Slowing Improvement	6
Bouncing Back	3
Warning Signs	7
Slowing Deterioration	3
Increasing Deterioration	21
Not Classified	1


**Rural Sector\*: the best scoring sub-category in Foundations for Economic Opportunity**

Rural Sector is the best scoring sub-category in Foundations for Economic Opportunity and the IIAG's fourth best scoring sub-category overall, with an African average score of 51.5 in 2019.

Over the ten-year period it has improved by +1.4, largely driven by increased access to rural land and water, as well as an improved environment for the rural poor to collectively organise and enter dialogue with the government.

Rural Sector's overall sub-category score in 2019 would have been higher if governments had better frameworks to support the development of commercially based agricultural markets, that are both equitable and accessible to small scale farmers. The IIAG shows that African average performance in this area lags behind other Rural Sector indicators in 2019.

**Africa: Rural Sector indicators, average scores (2019)**



**Zimbabwe:** most improved country over 10-year period (+49.4), driven mostly by improved land and water access for the rural poor





\* Trend classifications are not considered relevant for the 2020 IIAG Rural Sector sub-category analysis. As the latest data year available from source is 2015, all data points in 2016-2019 have had to be estimated and five-year trends (2015-2019) are static. See methodological notes for more information.

# Citizens' Voices results


>

31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
65.0
50.0
55.0
53.5
45.8
26.9
82.5
76.8
59.5
29.6
58.2
68.4
39.3
66.5
64.1
52.8
48.0
31.0
52.8
46.1
22.6
87.5
60.2
63.1
63.4
59.8
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50.0
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66.5
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52.8
48.0
31.0

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF OVERALL GOVERNANCE


<p>Public Perception of Security &amp; Rule of Law</p>	<p>Public Perception of Participation, Rights &amp; Inclusion</p>	<p>Public Perception of Economic Opportunity Foundations</p>	<p>Public Perception of Human Development</p>
			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public Perception of Security &amp; Safety</li> <li>Public Perception of the Rule of Law</li> <li>Public Perception of Accountability</li> <li>Public Perception of Anti-Corruption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public Perception of Elections &amp; Freedom</li> <li>Public Perception of Inclusion &amp; Equality</li> <li>Public Perception of Women's Leadership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public Perception of Public Administration</li> <li>Satisfaction with Economic Opportunities</li> <li>Satisfaction with Infrastructure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Satisfaction with Health Provision</li> <li>Satisfaction with Education Provision</li> <li>Lived Poverty &amp; Public Perception of Social Protection</li> </ul>

Africa: Public Perception of Overall Governance average score (2010-2019)



## Public Perception of Overall Governance: 2019 score is the lowest of the decade

The African average score for *Public Perception of Overall Governance* (48.8) is the lowest registered over the decade (2010-2019). The pace of deterioration has nearly doubled within the last five years (2015-2019), with an annual average trend of -0.43 between 2015 and 2019 compared to -0.22 over the ten-year period.



### Public perceptions of governance have declined in most countries over the decade and since 2015

Between 2010 and 2019, Afrobarometer surveyed 39 African countries at least once, providing a sample of public perceptions for the equivalent of 86.8% of Africa's total population. Of the 36 countries with multiple data points over the ten-year period, in more than half (23) citizens are less satisfied with their country's governance performance than ten years ago. For 13 countries, *Public Perception of Overall Governance* has been deteriorating at an increasing rate since 2015.

#### Number of countries showing trend classification

Increasing Improvement	8
Slowing Improvement	1
Bouncing Back	4
Warning Signs	4
Slowing Deterioration	6
Increasing Deterioration	13

### All four sub-sections record the lowest scores of the decade

For all four sub-sections, the 2019 African average scores are at their lowest across the whole ten-year period.

The trajectory of *Public Perception of Economic Opportunity Foundations* is of particular concern. While the decline over the decade has been the smallest (-0.5) across all four sub-sections, deterioration over the last five years has been the most dramatic, at a rate of more than twelve-times that of the decade.

Progress in infrastructure stands out, as citizens are more satisfied with their countries' infrastructure than ten years ago. However, since 2015, dissatisfaction with public administration and economic opportunities is growing.

*Public Perception of Human Development* registers the second largest decline over the decade with the rate of deterioration more than doubling over the last five years. This trend is mainly driven by growing dissatisfaction with countries' health and education provision.

However, citizens experience less lived poverty and are more satisfied with social protection than ten years ago.

*Public Perception of Participation, Rights & Inclusion* results may appear rather counter-intuitive in light of the IIAG results. The deterioration in *Public Perception of Participation, Rights & Inclusion* has slowed since 2015, and it is the highest-scoring sub-section in 2019.

This has mainly been driven by more favourable attitudes towards women's leadership and diversity, as well as a perceived decrease in ethnic discrimination.

However, more concerningly, citizens consider elections to be less free and fair and consider themselves less free to say what they think compared to ten years ago. *Public Perception of Elections &*

*Freedom* is the most declined indicator within the *Citizens' Voices* section over both the decade and the last five years.

*Public Perception of Security & Rule of Law* is the most declined sub-section over the decade. However, the decline over the last five years has markedly slowed since 2015, and is the smallest of all four sub-sections over this last period.

*Public Perception of Security & Rule of Law* is the only sub-section to have seen all its indicators decline between 2010 and 2019, with citizens believing accountability and rule of law to have faded the most. While the perception of the rule of law has improved between 2015 and 2019, citizens on average consider the security and safety situation to have worsened over the last five years.

**African countries: *Citizens' Voices* sub-sections, number of countries with a deteriorated score, an improved score & no score change (2010-2019 & 2015-2019)**

		Number of countries with a deteriorated score	Number of countries with an improved score	Number of countries with no score change
<b>Public Perception of Security &amp; Rule of Law</b>	10-Year Trend	23	13	0
	5-Year Trend	20	15	1
<b>Public Perception of Participation, Rights &amp; Inclusion</b>	10-Year Trend	20	16	0
	5-Year Trend	17	15	4
<b>Public Perception of Economic Opportunity Foundations</b>	10-Year Trend	18	18	0
	5-Year Trend	23	12	1
<b>Public Perception of Human Development</b>	10-Year Trend	20	16	0
	5-Year Trend	20	15	1





# Annex

>



# Country Scorecards



## List of African countries

The left column in the following table lists the official names of African countries as of September 2019, as outlined in the African Union Handbook 2020. The abbreviations (right column) are the names used in this report.

People's Democratic Republic of Algeria	Algeria
Republic of Angola	Angola
Republic of Benin	Benin
Republic of Botswana	Botswana
Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso
Republic of Burundi	Burundi
Republic of Cabo Verde	Cabo Verde
Republic of Cameroon	Cameroon
Central African Republic	Central African Republic
Republic of Chad	Chad
Union of the Comoros	Comoros
Republic of the Congo	Congo Republic
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire
Democratic Republic of Congo	DR Congo

Republic of Djibouti	Djibouti
Arab Republic of Egypt	Egypt
Republic of Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea
State of Eritrea	Eritrea
Kingdom of Eswatini	Eswatini
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	Ethiopia
Gabonese Republic	Gabon
Republic of the Gambia	Gambia
Republic of Ghana	Ghana
Republic of Guinea	Guinea
Republic of Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau
Republic of Kenya	Kenya
Kingdom of Lesotho	Lesotho
Republic of Liberia	Liberia
Libya	Libya
Republic of Madagascar	Madagascar
Republic of Malawi	Malawi
Republic of Mali	Mali
Islamic Republic of Mauritania	Mauritania
Republic of Mauritius	Mauritius
Kingdom of Morocco	Morocco
Republic of Mozambique	Mozambique
Republic of Namibia	Namibia
Republic of Niger	Niger
Federal Republic of Nigeria	Nigeria
Republic of Rwanda	Rwanda
Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe	São Tomé and Príncipe
Republic of Senegal	Senegal
Republic of Seychelles	Seychelles
Republic of Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone
Federal Republic of Somalia	Somalia
Republic of South Africa	South Africa
Republic of South Sudan	South Sudan
Republic of the Sudan	Sudan
Togolese Republic	Togo
Republic of Tunisia	Tunisia
Republic of Uganda	Uganda
United Republic of Tanzania	Tanzania
Republic of Zambia	Zambia
Republic of Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Algeria

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
56.2	15 <sup>th</sup>	+3.3

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>87.4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+4.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	98.7	31	+12.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	88.8	18	+4.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.8	9	+0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	49.8	35	-3.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	99.7	1	+8.9
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>48.8</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-4.8</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	36.3	40	+0.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	1.6	52	-19.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	65.8	11	+3.2
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	69.1	9	-0.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	62.8	6	-4.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	57.4	24	-8.3
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>26.9</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	30.2	38	-1.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	45.1	35	+2.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	18.1	33	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	22.0	36	+0.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	18.9	35	-11.9
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	27.4	33	0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	46.3	24	+3.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	49.0	17	+8.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	44.6	19	+16.7

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>34.4</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	53.2	10	+2.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	19.2	48	-6.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	27.5	40	-5.8
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>-5.4</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	58.3	15	+3.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	34.8	45	-4.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	45.0	36	-20.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	28.4	46	-5.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-1.4</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	50.8	24	-4.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	39.6	33	-3.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	69.7	12	+3.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	55.7	19	-3.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	58.5	8	+1.1
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>61.2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+7.6</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	51.6	26	+14.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	73.8	32	+2.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	59.0	15	+17.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	71.8	7	+3.4
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	0.0

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>54.7</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+8.2</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>46.1</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-5.9</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	100.0	1	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	31.6	42	-5.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	27.8	42	+7.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	25.0	37	-25.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>40.8</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>6.3</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	39.0	41	+9.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	51.1	33	+4.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	38.1	13	+5.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	35.2	39	+5.7
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>77.3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+24.4</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	57.8	11	+5.8
Access to Energy (WB)	100.0	1	+1.2
Mobile Communications (ITU)	81.8	3	+33.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	69.5	6	+56.7
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	.	.	-
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	.	.	-

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>73.6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+4.6</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>77.4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+5.2</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	51.9	23	-1.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	92.2	6	+1.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	85.1	16	+3.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	66.9	29	+2.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	93.3	8	+1.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	75.0	9	+24.5
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>75.7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+5.9</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	69.3	10	+3.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	73.7	1	+8.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	90.2	2	+8.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	91.8	4	-0.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	53.2	17	+8.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>82.2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+6.7</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	64.9	4	+4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	66.7	6	0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	100.0	1	+2.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	80.3	2	+22.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	99.2	2	+4.3
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>59.2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	71.4	6	+14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	31.9	39	-10.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	100.0	1	+0.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	70.8	12	0.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	21.9	41	0.0


**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
40.0	43 <sup>rd</sup>	+5.4

**TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY**

<span style="color: green;">■</span> Increasing Improvement	<span style="color: grey;">■</span> Slowing Improvement	<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Bouncing Back
<span style="color: pink;">■</span> Warning Signs	<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Slowing Deterioration	<span style="color: red;">■</span> Increasing Deterioration
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> No Change	<span style="color: black;">-</span> Not Classified	


**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	44.1	35	+5.5
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>81.2</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.8	16	+0.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	84.3	29	-2.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.5	22	+10.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	40.7	43	-14.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	81.8	33	+2.8
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+7.6</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	50.9	30	+12.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	39.4	27	+21.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	29.6	39	+2.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	56.3	20	+15.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	31.1	28	+3.6
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	32.0	44	-9.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+6.2</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	32.7	34	+10.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	45.3	34	+13.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	18.1	33	-5.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	22.3	35	+8.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	27.7	25	+4.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+8.8</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	26.2	34	+21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	50.1	21	+19.7
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	33.3	35	+8.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	0.0	48	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	20.3	43	-5.9


**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	34.3	45	+5.5
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+4.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	37.5	45	+25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	39.4	32	+7.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	17.7	50	-1.8
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	42.9	34	0.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	16.7	48	-8.3
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-2.0</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	25.6	51	+6.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	22.7	49	-5.4
Access to Financial Services (WB)	31.6	21	-11.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	35.1	40	+2.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>34.2</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+7.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	32.0	33	-1.7
Access to Energy (WB)	40.8	34	+10.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	51.8	36	+11.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	12.2	29	+7.6
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+12.5</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	54.9	26	+37.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	41.8	29	+16.8
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	42.1	39	-0.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	34.3	42	-3.9


**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	39.3	35	+4.8
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+8.4</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	35.1	29	-4.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	32.5	40	+11.7
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	27.7	39	+14.1
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+3.5</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	33.4	36	+1.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	51.0	35	-7.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	58.1	27	+19.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	57.7	27	-3.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	+8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	20.6	50	+0.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	38.7	36	+4.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	40.1	44	+3.4
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	30.5	44	+1.8
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	31.5	34	+1.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>53.0</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+5.0</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	77.9	3	+10.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	79.4	25	+2.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	29.7	44	+12.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	52.7	20	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	0.0


**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	42.3	46	+5.8
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+10.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	41.8	33	-8.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	41.0	28	+6.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	49.9	52	+7.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	67.1	27	+4.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	70.7	30	+17.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	75.0	9	+34.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+1.7</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	25.5	50	+2.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	35.6	23	+2.7
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	42.7	37	+18.0
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	47.8	44	-6.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	22.1	43	-8.1
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>34.6</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+10.9</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	18.5	44	-7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	36.5	37	0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	28.6	45	0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	30.6	25	+12.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	58.9	21	+49.2
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>42.3</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	35.7	43	-14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	36.9	36	-1.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	71.2	21	+17.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	50.5	41	-1.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	17.1	45	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Benin

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
58.6	13 <sup>th</sup>	+1.1

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>66.1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+3.2</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>90.8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-0.4</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	98.7	31	-1.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	92.6	12	-0.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.9	8	0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	73.8	2	-0.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	89.2	15	+0.6
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>64.7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	70.9	14	-6.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	47.6	19	-9.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	47.4	22	+4.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	89.4	4	+0.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	58.3	8	+9.8
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	74.7	10	+7.6
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>52.0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	59.5	16	-4.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	74.1	9	+6.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	69.4	14	-12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	33.3	21	+12.1
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	23.6	30	+3.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+11.0</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	60.7	7	+8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	60.9	15	+17.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	59.7	11	+20.1
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	62.5	6	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	39.7	27	+8.8

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	+12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	49.6	21	+5.3
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	47.9	19	-1.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	71.0	10	-5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	72.3	2	+9.9
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+7.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	75.0	8	+12.5
Trade Environment (WB)	64.7	14	+12.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	68.0	8	-0.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	33.5	20	+25.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	63.3	16	-14.3
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+11.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	31.8	34	-3.7
Access to Energy (WB)	39.0	36	+7.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	68.7	16	+30.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	10.5	34	+9.4
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-5.8</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	48.4	33	-1.8
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	-12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	58.3	21	-9.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	63.2	13	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>59.7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-6.2</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>55.8</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>-16.9</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-37.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	33.9	34	-17.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	82.4	10	-14.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	69.3	7	+1.5
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>-12.0</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	59.2	14	+0.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	94.1	3	-2.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	54.5	31	-20.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	59.7	24	-36.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>68.7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+2.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	81.6	1	+7.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	53.3	16	-5.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	76.1	5	-4.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	66.2	14	+9.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	66.2	5	+6.8
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>59.1</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+1.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	53.1	25	+4.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	92.6	3	-2.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	61.3	14	-12.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	38.8	30	-0.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	+16.7

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+3.2</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+0.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	45.8	28	+3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	26.9	47	+4.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	82.5	21	+13.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	76.8	10	+0.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	59.5	39	+8.5
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	29.6	48	-27.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+9.7</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	68.4	11	+9.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	39.3	16	+3.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	66.5	19	+15.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	64.1	35	+21.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	52.8	18	-1.3
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-2.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	31.0	25	-7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	52.8	16	-2.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	46.1	29	-8.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	22.6	35	+4.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	87.5	10	+3.3
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	63.1	12	+7.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	63.4	8	-0.8
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	59.8	34	+10.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	65.0	18	+7.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	50.0	29	0.0




**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**66.9**                    **5<sup>th</sup>**                    **+0.8**

**TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY**

- Increasing Improvement    ■ Slowing Improvement    ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                    ■ Slowing Deterioration    ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                            — Not Classified


**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	72.8	3	-5.1
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>85.3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>-2.5</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	93.8	6	-6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.8	9	-0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	68.5	6	-4.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	64.6	49	-1.9
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>76.4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+0.1</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	87.5	4	+2.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	67.4	10	-12.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	75.8	5	+9.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	68.5	10	-8.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	67.9	3	+10.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	91.3	1	-0.6
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>65.9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>-2.3</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	81.2	4	-5.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	66.5	15	-7.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	87.5	5	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	45.4	12	+3.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	48.7	8	-2.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>-15.4</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	66.7	3	-16.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	80.1	2	-1.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	78.7	4	-8.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	-50.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	80.9	3	-0.5


**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	58.8	13	+4.9
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>55.4</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-3.3</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	63.0	7	+2.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	33.7	39	-3.4
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	50.0	15	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	84.8	2	+21.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	57.3	21	-9.1
Access to Financial Services (WB)	49.8	8	+8.0
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	72.7	6	-4.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>59.7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+21.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	53.8	12	-3.5
Access to Energy (WB)	63.3	20	+12.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	69.4	15	+28.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	52.3	10	+46.4
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	65.9	17	+3.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	33.3	34	-8.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	54.9	26	-6.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	61.1	15	+2.5


**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	67.5	6	-0.1
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>71.2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	100.0	1	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	40.1	27	+10.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	80.7	11	-10.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	64.2	13	-8.8
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>62.3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+0.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	66.4	10	+6.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	84.0	13	-0.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	63.7	15	-11.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	86.1	6	-2.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	11.1	25	+11.1
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>71.5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+3.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	62.6	6	-2.0
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	47.2	24	+5.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	76.1	5	+0.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	84.0	4	+1.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	87.6	3	+9.6
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>65.1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-5.0</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	29.1	48	-1.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	90.1	8	+2.9
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	86.0	1	+7.0
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	95.2	2	+7.9
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-41.7


**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	68.5	5	+3.6
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	83.0	1	-4.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	83.1	8	+9.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	91.2	8	+8.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	70.6	23	-5.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	87.8	11	+5.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	41.5	41	-5.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>68.7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-2.9</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	64.6	12	-4.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	36.2	21	+3.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	78.7	6	+1.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	91.4	5	-0.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	72.4	4	-13.9
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+7.8</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	76.2	3	+4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	66.7	6	+16.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	11.2	52	+9.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	22.4	36	+3.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	44.9	28	+5.6
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>84.9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+7.8</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	100.0	1	+14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	73.5	4	+14.8
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	86.2	10	+4.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	64.5	21	+5.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	100.0	1	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Burkina Faso

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
54.0	17 <sup>th</sup>	+1.0

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>57.4</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+0.7</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>59.6</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-29.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	53.6	47	-46.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	26.0	48	-67.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	92.9	40	-7.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	43.5	41	-28.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	81.8	33	+1.0
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>59.0</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	69.8	15	+8.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	65.8	11	+40.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	50.3	20	-4.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	64.6	15	+7.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	44.2	20	+8.8
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	59.1	21	-12.9
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>53.4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+20.5</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	52.4	20	+17.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	76.1	6	+16.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	58.3	17	+34.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	31.2	24	+26.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	49.0	7	+8.1
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	56.0	8	-3.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	54.8	18	+6.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	59.4	12	+18.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	75.0	2	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	42.6	21	-1.3

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>-3.5</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>-4.8</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	62.5	11	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	66.0	5	-3.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	65.4	21	-20.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	51.6	20	-8.0
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>50.8</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-9.0</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	44.3	24	-6.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	82.1	14	-13.9
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	70.7	11	-2.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	48.7	33	-13.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	-8.4
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>62.1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-0.8</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	58.1	10	-0.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	50.2	21	+7.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	59.9	25	-13.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	83.3	5	+2.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	59.2	7	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	25.9	50	-22.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	90.8	5	-3.5
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	70.9	6	+19.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	49.9	23	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	+8.3

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+1.3</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>56.5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-5.8</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	35.6	36	-0.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	44.3	26	-1.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	76.9	5	-14.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	50.7	13	-12.4
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+9.9</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	87.5	3	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	60.2	19	+4.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	68.0	8	+1.4
Access to Financial Services (WB)	35.7	18	+26.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	53.0	26	+17.9
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+9.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	33.4	29	-0.8
Access to Energy (WB)	10.7	52	+1.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	46.7	41	+27.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	9.5	36	+8.1
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>-7.9</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	52.2	29	-10.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	62.5	6	-4.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	58.2	22	-15.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	75.7	3	-1.3

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>50.7</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+6.0</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	47.6	26	+0.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	20.1	49	+2.1
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	85.0	17	+17.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	73.2	16	-2.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	67.9	33	+15.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	44.2	37	+2.8
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+10.0</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	45.7	33	+11.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	21.1	41	+11.6
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	41.1	39	+20.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	73.8	24	+4.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	26.0	40	+1.5
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>45.3</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	35.1	18	+8.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	47.2	24	-1.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	63.9	14	+2.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	22.9	34	-15.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	57.4	23	+0.3
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>59.6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+6.8</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	59.5	15	+10.7
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	43.9	27	+4.9
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	45.2	45	+6.8
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	62.0	25	+10.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	87.2	8	+0.9


**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**36.9**                    **44<sup>th</sup>**                    **-3.6**

**TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY**

- Increasing Improvement    ■ Slowing Improvement    ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                    ■ Slowing Deterioration    ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                            - Not Classified


**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	30.2	47	-12.7
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>56.2</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-26.4</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	85.1	42	-10.5
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	6.3	52	-66.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	68.6	49	-19.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	32.2	46	-36.7
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	89.0	16	+1.5
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-8.2</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	32.4	45	-14.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	1.8	51	-10.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	21.1	49	-38.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	33.3	34	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	28.7	32	+12.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	31.5	45	+1.9
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-15.7</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	16.2	48	-25.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	25.6	48	-15.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	11.1	41	-29.2
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	10.5	48	-0.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	14.6	39	-7.6
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>24.1</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-0.4</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	21.4	41	-4.8
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	13.1	52	-9.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	17.9	51	-1.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	30.8	34	+13.8


**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	37.0	43	+3.0
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>41.6</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>-7.0</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	42.6	28	-1.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	38.5	36	+1.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	43.5	31	-20.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	33.6	29	-1.7
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	62.5	17	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	34.2	44	+0.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	52.6	30	+8.5
Access to Financial Services (WB)	6.2	39	-0.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	33.9	42	+2.9
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>27.2</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+12.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	47.1	19	+17.2
Access to Energy (WB)	7.2	54	+5.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	52.8	34	+25.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	1.7	54	+1.6
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	51.6	31	+11.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	25.0	42	+8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	44.8	37	-7.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	44.3	37	+4.6


**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	33.2	42	-11.0
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-21.2</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	-37.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	2.2	52	-15.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	5.1	53	-27.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	19.4	48	-4.7
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-17.0</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	15.8	49	-9.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	37.5	43	-25.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	15.7	53	-33.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	24.2	48	-17.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-8.7</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	32.0	39	-15.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	52.9	17	-16.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	34.9	47	-5.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	31.3	42	-6.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	47.7	15	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>66.1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+3.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	66.0	6	+24.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	78.2	26	-1.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	45.0	31	-7.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	91.4	3	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	0.0


**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	47.2	36	+6.3
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+6.7</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	58.8	17	+2.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	38.9	32	+2.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	79.2	27	+8.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	67.1	27	+1.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	65.3	36	+15.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	24.1	53	+10.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+10.2</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	52.1	21	+11.6
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	31.9	27	+3.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	50.3	29	+10.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	79.1	16	+9.0
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	50.2	20	+16.1
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>35.6</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-1.6</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	18.5	44	-8.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	44.0	29	-1.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	52.6	23	-2.3
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	27.3	30	+5.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+9.7</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	42.5	40	-4.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	38.0	35	+19.6
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	49.2	42	+9.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	47.4	47	+13.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	46.7	31	+10.8

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Cabo Verde

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
73.1	2 <sup>nd</sup>	+0.2

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>89.4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-0.5</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	100.0	1	+6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	100.0	1	+0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	71.9	4	-0.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	75.2	43	-8.5
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>88.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+6.3</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	93.5	2	-2.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	98.2	2	+7.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	81.5	3	-11.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	100.0	1	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	67.6	5	+38.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	90.2	2	+6.7
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>68.4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-9.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	100.0	1	+5.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	59.2	21	-26.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	100.0	1	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	50.0	4	-12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	32.6	20	-12.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-5.0</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	50.0	13	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	84.5	1	+1.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	77.8	5	-4.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	68.0	6	-9.4

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>83.6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-4.3</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	87.5	4	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	74.9	3	-2.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	92.5	4	-6.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	79.4	3	+3.3
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>84.0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+3.8</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	84.3	2	-1.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	98.0	1	+0.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	84.8	1	-9.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	94.7	1	-0.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	58.3	2	+30.5
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>70.4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+4.7</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	68.2	5	-0.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	92.9	1	+24.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	78.9	4	-1.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	69.6	12	-0.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	42.4	19	+1.4
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>68.2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-5.1</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	51.5	27	-22.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	88.4	12	+3.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	66.2	9	-1.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	66.7	10	+0.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	.	.	-

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

Increasing Improvement	Slowing Improvement	Bouncing Back
Warning Signs	Slowing Deterioration	Increasing Deterioration
No Change	Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>72.8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+3.5</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>73.0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	100.0	1	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	59.2	11	-5.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	71.9	3	+16.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	71.4	9	-14.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	62.5	7	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	74.3	4	+5.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	63.6	16	+3.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	68.6	12	-11.5
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>68.7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+18.9</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	49.2	16	-6.6
Access to Energy (WB)	93.3	7	+13.0
Mobile Communications (ITU)	70.7	12	+20.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	61.6	8	+49.1
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>80.6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-3.3</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	85.7	2	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	75.0	2	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	69.2	6	-13.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	92.5	2	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>67.0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-0.1</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>80.5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	64.8	8	-6.9
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	76.7	9	+10.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	98.3	2	+18.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	82.1	3	-1.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	96.7	6	+2.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	64.2	22	+6.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>70.1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	71.5	8	+3.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	54.6	5	+1.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	67.3	18	-9.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	93.2	3	+6.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	63.9	9	-0.5
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-8.8</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	58.3	8	+25.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	92.9	1	-7.1
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	60.0	18	-40.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	21.9	37	-15.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	59.2	20	-6.6
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>58.8</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+3.2</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	71.4	6	0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	48.4	24	+17.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	93.0	7	+3.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	72.9	9	-4.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	8.4	50	+0.1


**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100      2019 RANK/54      TREND 2010-2019  
**43.5**                      **37<sup>th</sup>**                      **-0.6**

**TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY**

- Increasing Improvement      ■ Slowing Improvement      ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                      ■ Slowing Deterioration      ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                              - Not Classified


**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>61.3</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-20.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	61.3	46	-38.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	11.5	51	-78.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	88.7	43	-10.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	56.1	23	+10.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	88.9	18	+12.9
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>25.6</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-0.1</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	29.1	48	-6.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	7.3	48	+5.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	25.0	45	-4.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	13.2	45	-6.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	27.7	34	+9.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	51.5	31	+1.0
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+1.6</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	31.9	35	+1.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	37.7	38	+3.7
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	18.1	33	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	19.9	38	+5.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	22.8	31	-2.3
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>29.7</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-3.3</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	26.2	34	-33.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	20.9	47	+5.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	18.6	50	+0.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	50.0	11	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	32.9	31	+11.6


**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-5.2</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-7.4</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	32.9	36	-5.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	30.1	42	-9.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	19.7	47	-2.3
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-14.2</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	22.5	44	-33.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	45.3	39	-9.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSE)	42.9	42	-11.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	44.2	37	-33.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	16.7	18	+16.7
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	42.2	32	+9.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	18.0	48	+1.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	55.2	28	-2.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	32.2	41	+2.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	37.7	29	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>54.5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	48.8	31	+8.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	79.5	24	-3.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	50.4	24	+5.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	69.0	8	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-16.7


**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+1.2</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	37.5	45	+12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	35.5	37	-5.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	51.5	14	+6.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	63.7	17	-0.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	33.9	27	-12.5
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>46.7</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+1.3</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	87.5	3	+6.2
Trade Environment (WB)	34.0	45	+7.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	56.1	25	+1.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	30.8	22	+20.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	25.3	45	-29.6
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+5.8</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	35.3	27	-10.1
Access to Energy (WB)	61.1	21	+9.8
Mobile Communications (ITU)	65.3	22	+10.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	16.0	25	+12.7
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>53.4</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	55.5	23	-5.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	45.8	28	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	54.7	27	-2.9
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	57.5	22	0.0


**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>54.4</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+7.1</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>53.3</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+7.2</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	16.8	49	+1.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	37.7	34	+0.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	75.4	33	+12.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	72.6	19	+4.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	60.2	38	+12.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	56.9	31	+11.4
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+8.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	56.6	18	+3.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	35.9	22	+3.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	57.4	25	+19.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	66.5	31	+14.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	52.0	19	-1.2
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+4.0</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	33.9	20	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	57.1	12	+3.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	43.1	34	+1.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	36.9	18	+7.2
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	90.3	8	+7.4
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+9.6</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	58.7	17	+9.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	54.9	11	+18.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	70.9	24	+16.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	65.6	17	-3.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	42.6	32	+6.8

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Central African Republic

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**30.7**                    **50<sup>th</sup>**                    **-0.9**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

<span style="color: green;">■</span> Increasing Improvement	<span style="color: grey;">■</span> Slowing Improvement	<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Bouncing Back
<span style="color: pink;">■</span> Warning Signs	<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Slowing Deterioration	<span style="color: red;">■</span> Increasing Deterioration
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> No Change	<span style="color: black;">-</span> Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	34.1	45	+2.4
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>54.1</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-11.1</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	82.0	43	-9.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	70.6	37	+8.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	20.3	53	-34.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	45.3	40	-0.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	52.1	52	-20.1
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	53.2	27	+6.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	47.4	20	+37.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	24.7	46	-4.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	-33.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	32.3	43	-4.1
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+3.8</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	42.6	29	-4.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	37.6	39	-6.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	16.7	40	+11.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	25.0	30	+25.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	10.4	41	-6.3
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+16.7</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	31.0	29	+16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	41.4	28	+21.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	31.6	37	+12.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	20.0	44	+20.0

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	25.5	50	-3.5
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-6.7</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	23.1	48	-1.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	23.5	45	-1.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	37.6	36	-20.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	21.1	44	-10.8
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>34.5</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-6.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	50.0	25	-12.5
Trade Environment (WB)	48.8	34	-4.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	34.8	45	-3.1
Access to Financial Services (WB)	13.9	35	+11.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	25.0	46	-25.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+17.2</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	.	.	-
Access to Energy (WB)	29.5	42	+23.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	31.4	51	+27.0
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	2.1	51	+0.9
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-17.8</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	5.8	50	-45.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	12.5	49	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	25.6	49	-5.9
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	17.4	49	-20.2

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	35.6	39	-1.8
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>38.6</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+6.5</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	42.7	25	+10.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	42.7	32	-10.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	56.5	18	+38.5
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>36.1</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-10.3</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	15.1	50	-9.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	24.8	50	-31.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	58.4	26	-2.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	74.0	14	-17.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	+8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-5.8</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	56.1	11	+4.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	11.0	51	-22.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	37.1	46	+2.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	11.9	54	-0.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	2.1	54	-13.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+2.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	53.2	24	+2.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	58.8	41	-5.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	29.2	45	-4.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	3.4	54	-6.8
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	75.0	1	+25.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	27.5	52	-0.9
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>35.4</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	36.8	36	-1.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	27.2	46	-0.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	37.3	54	-4.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	49.6	48	+2.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	35.4	49	+17.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	26.1	51	-1.2
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	26.2	48	+4.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	15.0	45	+4.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	20.8	50	+4.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	1.3	48	+1.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	0.0	48	-16.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-4.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	7.1	52	-8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	18.0	50	-2.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	11.4	51	-6.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	1.9	54	+0.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>52.2</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-1.1</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	26.2	48	-13.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	11.0	54	+11.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	74.6	8	-1.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	97.0	5	0.0

OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**33.9**                    **47<sup>th</sup>**                    **+3.7**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+6.5</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>77.3</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	85.4	40	-13.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	75.9	34	-4.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	96.7	34	+4.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	46.0	39	+8.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	82.5	31	+1.9
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	28.0	51	+10.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	6.2	49	-3.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	29.1	41	+8.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	50.4	11	+43.2
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	45.2	37	-11.2
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>24.6</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+11.0</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	16.0	49	+0.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	19.9	51	+2.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	18.1	33	+5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	46.7	10	+38.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	22.2	32	+8.3
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+8.0</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	21.4	41	-4.8
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	14.3	51	+5.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	10.2	53	+5.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	50.0	11	+37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	12.0	52	-3.8

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>39.6</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>-2.6</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	87.5	4	+25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	22.9	49	-17.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	23.0	46	-2.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	43.5	31	-0.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	21.1	44	-17.7
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+2.6</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	68.8	10	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	38.7	42	-2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	36.0	43	-13.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	14.1	34	+6.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	59.0	21	+16.5
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+6.4</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	20.1	41	-4.9
Access to Energy (WB)	8.0	53	+5.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	32.6	50	+22.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	3.3	46	+2.7
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>35.0</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+2.0</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	37.4	41	-1.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	33.3	34	+12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	37.5	44	+0.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	32.0	45	-4.1

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>28.7</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+1.1</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	35.2	28	+14.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	43.6	31	+3.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	23.5	44	-0.6
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>30.5</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-5.3</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	18.6	45	-2.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	37.5	43	0.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	39.0	45	-17.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	40.7	40	-7.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	16.7	18	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+3.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	15.0	54	+2.2
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	16.0	49	+4.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	27.5	54	-1.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	30.8	43	+2.2
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	19.3	45	+12.6
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>+8.9</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	37.7	41	+15.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	61.4	40	-3.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	45.3	30	+18.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	14.1	50	+14.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>35.1</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+3.8</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+7.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	21.7	46	+6.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	6.7	54	-0.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	64.7	43	+8.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	75.4	15	-0.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	22.8	54	+13.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	43.9	38	+16.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+1.2</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	18.6	52	+4.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	11.8	48	+1.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	20.6	51	+9.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	48.6	43	+0.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	22.5	42	-10.2
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+4.6</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	22.6	37	-4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	37.0	35	+7.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	41.9	35	+7.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	15.3	43	+10.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	5.4	36	+1.8
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>52.2</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+1.6</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	39.7	41	+4.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	39.5	31	-21.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	29.8	52	+13.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	83.7	4	+10.8
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	68.1	14	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Comoros

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**43.2**                    **38<sup>th</sup>**                    **-2.6**

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	42.3	39	-11.1
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>82.2</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>-2.9</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	93.8	6	-6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	98.6	30	-0.4
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	32.7	45	-9.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	85.8	24	+1.9
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>-7.4</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	25.3	52	-16.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	14.7	43	-6.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	33.5	36	-21.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	66.7	11	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	78.6	7	-0.9
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>22.6</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>-20.2</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	11.0	51	-39.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	47.6	33	-4.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	50.0	24	-25.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	0.0	53	-19.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	4.2	43	-12.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>28.0</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>-13.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	12.5	47	-50.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	22.0	46	-12.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	32.8	36	-17.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	60.0	7	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	43.5	33	-5.4
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>35.0</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-22.7</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	-25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	21.1	47	-29.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	72.8	17	-1.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	21.0	46	-34.9
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	35.6	33	-4.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	59.7	31	-5.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	60.7	19	-11.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	56.5	29	-6.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+1.2</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	55.3	15	+6.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	50.9	20	-0.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	67.9	14	-0.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	44.9	27	+4.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	38.5	27	-3.3
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+5.5</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	30.1	46	+18.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	56.5	42	+0.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	50.9	23	-2.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	35.9	35	+6.3
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	.	.	-

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	38.7	40	+1.3
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+2.7</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	31.4	43	+10.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	21.9	48	+1.4
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	33.2	37	+7.1
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	13.5	50	-5.9
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-6.0</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	37.5	33	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	65.0	13	+14.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	45.2	37	+11.3
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	50.0	28	-50.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>40.7</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+6.2</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	19.6	42	-5.4
Access to Energy (WB)	81.1	11	+12.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	56.2	32	+14.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	6.1	44	+3.4
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>34.6</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	40.1	39	+3.8
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	16.8	48	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	47.1	33	+3.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	34.3	42	+1.1

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	48.3	33	+4.9
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+7.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	31.5	42	+11.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	50.8	23	-1.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	85.8	14	+17.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	64.9	31	-0.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	72.7	26	+9.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	36.7	43	+8.4
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>56.7</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+2.5</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	59.9	17	+8.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	30.8	28	-1.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	57.9	24	+3.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	78.4	18	-0.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	.	.	-
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>25.7</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+2.0</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	16.7	47	+8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	39.1	33	-6.5
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	26.9	47	+2.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	20.2	40	+4.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	50.8	27	+19.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	70.8	25	+10.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	63.7	22	+1.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	30.1	38	0.0



**OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**36.1**                    **45<sup>th</sup>**                    **-0.2**

**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-5.4</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-1.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	87.1	19	-6.7
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	91.7	41	-3.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	22.0	51	+0.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	80.1	38	+0.8
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>16.5</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-1.3</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	29.2	47	+6.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	9.8	45	+6.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	13.2	52	-7.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	25.0	37	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	21.9	47	-13.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-7.0</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	25.7	41	+2.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	28.1	45	-0.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	5.6	45	-12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	25.0	30	-25.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-11.4</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	13.1	45	0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	19.9	48	-2.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	42.4	23	+7.5
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	-62.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	20.0	44	0.0

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-0.3</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-10.3</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	24.1	43	-1.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	37.2	37	-24.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	15.8	50	-2.8
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>32.9</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>-2.9</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	18.4	46	-4.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	62.5	28	0.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	43.5	40	+1.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	40.2	41	-2.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	-8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>27.2</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+1.6</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	39.1	34	+9.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	20.1	47	-11.3
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	28.5	53	-5.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	20.1	50	+10.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	28.3	39	+5.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+10.1</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	39.4	39	+18.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	47.4	48	-10.9
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	48.5	26	+43.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	38.5	31	+16.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-16.7

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

**FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>35.3</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>+2.6</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	37.5	45	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	25.4	47	-4.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	33.3	40	+1.4
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	57.1	24	+14.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	33.3	30	+8.3
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>18.7</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-9.6</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	32.0	46	+5.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	21.4	50	-7.2
Access to Financial Services (WB)	21.5	29	+13.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	0.0	50	-50.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>33.7</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+6.9</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	14.6	45	-18.1
Access to Energy (WB)	67.2	15	+27.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	48.9	40	+15.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	4.0	45	+2.5
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+11.7</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	53.2	28	+12.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	60.5	9	+27.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	45.2	36	+7.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	46.4	35	0.0

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>46.0</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+2.4</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>51.0</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+6.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	35.1	38	+2.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	54.9	14	+4.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	57.9	50	+1.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	53.6	45	+3.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	74.5	23	+9.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	30.0	47	+15.9
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>45.9</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	62.2	14	+16.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	27.8	30	+2.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	56.7	26	+5.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	66.2	32	-0.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	16.7	46	0.0
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>-2.5</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	18.5	44	-8.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	42.1	31	-5.5
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	30.0	44	+9.6
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	28.5	28	-23.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	34.9	31	+14.5
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	28.6	45	-14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	72.1	19	+12.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	60.7	27	-2.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	63.0	15	+8.3

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Côte d'Ivoire

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**53.9**                    **18<sup>th</sup>**                    **+9.0**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Warning Signs
- No Change
- Slowing Improvement
- Slowing Deterioration
- Not Classified
- Bouncing Back
- Increasing Deterioration

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	58.2	15	+8.8
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>84.4</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	97.8	33	+0.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	86.5	24	+8.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	95.8	37	+3.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	65.3	12	+9.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	76.9	42	+3.0
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>54.2</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+7.0</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	64.6	19	+6.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	28.4	34	-7.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	53.8	18	+1.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	63.8	16	+21.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	56.7	10	+17.7
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	57.8	23	+2.3
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+14.2</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	36.8	31	+4.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	51.2	29	+4.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	58.3	17	+27.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	36.3	18	+16.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	39.7	14	+17.7
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>49.9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+9.2</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	47.6	15	+26.2
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	50.8	20	+14.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	47.4	19	+15.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	62.5	6	-12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	41.2	23	+2.6

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	54.2	17	+3.6
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>59.0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+8.5</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	62.6	8	+18.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	71.4	18	-6.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	64.6	12	+21.9
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+6.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	33.7	35	-6.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	74.9	18	+15.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	62.5	18	-3.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	75.0	12	-1.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	41.7	4	+25.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>48.3</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	42.9	29	-21.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	41.6	29	+17.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	54.2	31	+4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	63.2	15	+0.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	39.4	26	+0.8
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>51.9</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>-0.5</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	47.5	32	-7.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	78.1	27	+5.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	58.6	17	-0.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	50.5	22	+0.7
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	0.0

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	50.8	21	+11.6
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+16.1</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	+25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	43.9	26	+5.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	46.8	21	+4.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	78.2	3	+33.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	59.8	8	+12.7
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+11.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	68.8	10	+12.5
Trade Environment (WB)	60.6	18	+15.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	55.8	27	+15.4
Access to Financial Services (WB)	30.4	23	+5.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	68.7	11	+9.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+18.2</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	49.1	17	+1.5
Access to Energy (WB)	65.6	16	+9.4
Mobile Communications (ITU)	78.5	7	+43.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	19.7	21	+18.5
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	33.0	43	+3.6
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	31.3	40	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	34.6	47	-2.4
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	30.7	46	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	52.4	26	+12.1
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+13.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	43.1	31	+19.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	42.3	27	+2.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	79.0	29	+10.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	68.9	25	+1.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	55.2	44	+11.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	86.5	5	+35.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+9.6</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	42.1	37	+15.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	26.8	31	+10.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	47.8	30	+15.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	79.6	15	+4.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	39.1	30	+1.4
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+13.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	42.3	14	+18.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	49.4	23	+20.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	59.2	19	+40.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	31.2	24	-20.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	55.6	25	+7.6
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>+12.3</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	52.4	25	+16.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	48.9	23	+27.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	56.9	37	+9.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	54.1	36	+8.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	50.3	26	0.0

**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
31.7	49 <sup>th</sup>	-2.8

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	23.5	52	-9.4
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-25.2</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	12.5	53	-74.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	0.0	54	-42.6
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	76.2	47	-10.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	24.8	50	0.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	74.1	45	+1.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-4.4</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	35.2	43	-4.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	19.8	40	-19.1
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	22.5	47	-3.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	18.6	43	-2.6
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	20.8	44	+0.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	17.6	51	+3.0
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>21.7</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	25.1	42	+0.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	37.3	40	+4.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	5.6	45	-18.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	18.8	39	+5.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	21.8	33	+4.6
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-7.5</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	4.8	50	0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	12.9	53	+1.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	18.8	49	+3.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	-37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	13.1	50	-5.0

**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	31.8	48	+0.9
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>-2.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	-25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	34.6	40	+6.7
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	30.6	41	+5.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	46.4	30	+1.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	27.0	35	-0.7
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	43.8	28	-6.2
Trade Environment (WB)	25.3	52	-3.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	40.0	41	+9.0
Access to Financial Services (WB)	19.4	30	+11.1
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	37.6	37	-20.2
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>19.6</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>+11.1</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	23.5	39	+2.1
Access to Energy (WB)	15.5	49	+6.5
Mobile Communications (ITU)	36.8	47	+33.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	2.7	48	+2.4
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>34.1</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-3.1</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	28.8	46	-8.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	29.3	41	+4.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	37.8	43	+4.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	40.4	40	-13.2

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	31.1	45	-5.7
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-12.2</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	-25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	29.8	39	+1.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	18.6	50	-15.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	31.8	32	-10.3
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>-5.9</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	27.6	40	+14.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	55.8	34	-5.2
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	43.4	41	-10.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	22.7	49	-27.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>+1.7</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	42.4	31	+5.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	35.3	39	+3.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	45.3	39	-1.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	23.1	46	+1.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	16.1	49	+0.9
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-6.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	27.7	49	+3.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	75.0	29	-4.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	28.5	47	-15.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	30.9	39	+2.3
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-16.7

**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	40.3	47	+3.0
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+9.0</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	35.0	39	-2.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	22.9	48	+1.8
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	63.3	45	+17.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	64.4	32	-0.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	58.3	41	+11.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	64.9	21	+25.5
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>45.9</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+3.3</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	50.6	25	+8.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	26.0	33	+3.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	47.2	32	+5.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	82.5	11	+4.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	23.0	41	-5.3
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>24.2</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-2.6</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	8.3	50	-8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.5	40	+0.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	44.0	33	+6.1
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	11.1	49	-8.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+2.4</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	32.5	44	+3.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	35.0	37	-10.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	46.9	44	+16.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	43.2	52	-1.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	41.2	33	+3.7

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Djibouti

100

OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
41.3	42 <sup>nd</sup>	+2.0

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	— Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	41.3	40	-2.7
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>82.1</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-2.7</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.8	16	+0.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	85.4	26	-7.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	95.5	39	-3.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	42.0	42	-4.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	88.0	20	+1.4
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+3.3</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	29.5	46	+3.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	17.2	41	-10.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	68.1	9	+4.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	33.3	34	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	25.0	37	+25.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	54.3	28	-2.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>14.8</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-7.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	20.4	44	+18.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	38.4	37	-27.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	11.1	41	-13.9
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	0.0	53	-12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	4.2	43	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>30.4</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>-4.2</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	9.5	49	+9.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	34.6	35	-2.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	35.4	34	-2.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	60.0	7	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	29.2	48	+2.4
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>21.0</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+5.2</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	19.9	48	+7.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	39.8	35	+6.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	24.3	43	+6.6
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>28.6</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	26.3	41	-2.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	45.9	38	+0.6
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	17.7	52	-5.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	44.9	35	-4.5
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	+8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+2.8</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	31.9	40	+3.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	36.9	38	+6.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	50.8	35	-1.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	33.9	37	+4.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	24.0	41	-0.1
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	50.8	28	+9.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	36.2	50	-1.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	31.0	42	+1.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	9.4	52	-0.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	.	.	-

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	46.3	31	+7.2
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+3.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	32.3	41	+7.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	46.5	22	-3.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	58.0	22	+5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	33.8	28	+7.5
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-2.8</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	62.5	17	+6.2
Trade Environment (WB)	54.9	25	+2.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	35.0	44	-19.5
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	25.0	46	0.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>43.4</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+17.1</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	33.6	28	+5.7
Access to Energy (WB)	58.7	22	+4.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	44.0	43	+27.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	37.2	12	+30.6
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+11.1</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	55.2	25	-0.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	+25.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	54.3	28	+9.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	43.9	38	+9.6

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	48.5	32	+1.2
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	47.5	27	-0.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	66.4	12	+2.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	73.9	35	+12.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	64.4	32	-2.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	76.3	19	+6.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	32.5	45	-5.9
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	47.6	30	-4.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	18.1	42	+6.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	30.9	47	+11.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	88.3	8	+4.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	33.3	35	-
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>45.9</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+4.7</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	49.4	9	+24.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	45.5	26	-14.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	46.5	28	+3.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	42.2	13	+5.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-4.2</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	36.1	42	-27.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	84.5	11	+7.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	52.0	39	+0.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	4.6	51	+2.2

OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**47.4**                    **30<sup>th</sup>**                    **+0.5**

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019        2019        2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-3.6</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>68.0</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-13.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	45.2	50	-54.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	48.5	44	-19.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.6	20	-0.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	51.9	28	+3.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	94.6	8	+3.2
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>35.9</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>-4.3</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	50.6	31	-2.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	14.9	42	-3.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	31.5	38	+4.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	29.8	39	-10.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	40.8	22	-5.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	47.6	35	-9.1
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>19.3</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-4.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	28.5	40	-9.4
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	23.0	49	+1.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	5.6	45	-12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	32.2	23	-4.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	7.1	42	+4.3
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>32.9</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+7.8</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	39.3	25	+8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	35.4	34	+3.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	37.1	29	+12.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	0.0	48	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	53.0	13	+15.3

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019        2019        2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>23.8</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-3.8</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-12.4</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	-25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	8.0	51	-14.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	11.7	51	-11.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	11.9	51	+1.3
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-6.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	32.2	37	-0.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	17.2	52	-20.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	19.7	51	-15.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	32.2	44	+6.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+1.7</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	30.1	43	+9.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	39.4	34	-1.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	40.4	43	-0.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	21.8	48	-2.2
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	31.2	35	+2.7
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	25.7	51	+11.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	52.9	45	+3.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	28.7	46	+17.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	39.5	29	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-25.0

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement    ■ Slowing Improvement    ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                ■ Slowing Deterioration    ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                      — Not Classified

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019        2019        2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+6.0</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-0.3</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	-25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	59.5	9	-7.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	25.1	44	+5.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	25.0	37	+25.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>47.7</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+6.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	51.2	30	+5.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	67.2	11	+9.4
Access to Financial Services (WB)	29.9	24	+22.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	42.7	34	-11.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>80.0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+15.7</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	72.2	3	+10.2
Access to Energy (WB)	100.0	1	+0.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	75.8	9	+5.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	72.1	5	+46.2
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+1.6</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	88.5	1	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	62.5	6	-12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	90.3	2	+9.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	73.2	5	+9.6

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019        2019        2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>65.4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+3.6</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+3.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	20.4	47	+2.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	98.6	3	+3.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	79.6	25	+2.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	17.7	54	-1.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	96.9	5	+2.8
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	96.4	1	+8.5
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+6.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	39.2	43	0.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	53.9	6	+7.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	80.5	5	+7.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	82.1	13	+7.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	45.0	25	+7.2
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>67.5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	46.4	10	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.3	43	0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	67.8	7	-2.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	95.5	1	+6.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	94.4	4	+1.8
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>65.8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	42.9	39	0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	49.8	21	+15.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	83.8	12	+2.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	95.0	2	+2.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	57.8	17	+0.1

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Equatorial Guinea

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
28.7	51 <sup>st</sup>	-0.3

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
2019	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>29.1</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>84.5</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>-2.4</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	86.9	20	+2.7
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.8	9	+0.4
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	39.9	44	-15.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	95.7	5	+0.4
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-2.3</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	11.6	54	-3.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	1.6	52	+0.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	28.8	42	+11.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	34.8	42	-22.6
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+2.7</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	6.7	53	+1.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	8.6	52	+4.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	5.6	45	+5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	10.1	49	+1.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+4.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	0.0	52	0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	19.3	49	+0.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	25.5	43	+2.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	0.0	48	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	20.0	44	+20.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
2019	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>17.0</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-4.1</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+0.7</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	24.0	44	-6.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	9.7	52	+0.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	16.1	49	+8.5
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-3.6</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	17.0	47	-0.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	26.5	48	-6.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	20.9	50	+1.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	12.2	53	-12.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	16.0	53	+6.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	4.1	52	-0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	44.4	41	+4.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	22.0	47	-6.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	14.6	50	+1.1
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>20.2</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-14.3</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	25.6	52	+9.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	33.8	52	+9.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	30.9	43	-13.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	10.5	51	-2.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	0.0	48	-75.0

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
2019	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+3.6</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>9.7</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+7.0</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	25.0	50	+25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	11.4	52	+3.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	2.3	53	-0.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	0.0	53	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-5.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	30.8	47	-9.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	14.3	52	-
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	0.0	50	0.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+12.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	.	.	-
Access to Energy (WB)	65.6	16	+0.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	40.4	46	+30.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	11.0	31	+6.2
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-0.4</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	52.0	30	-0.5
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	25.0	42	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	41.2	41	+0.1
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	26.7	47	-1.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
2019	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>43.7</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>50.8</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+7.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	30.3	44	+6.9
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	51.3	21	+3.0
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	55.0	51	-0.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	76.4	12	+1.0
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	65.7	35	+9.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	26.1	51	+26.1
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>38.7</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	63.1	13	+18.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	13.4	47	-7.7
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	27.9	48	-2.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	55.8	41	-1.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	33.3	35	-
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>29.9</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	22.6	37	-2.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	16.7	51	-
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	30.8	43	-0.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	49.4	10	-0.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-7.2</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	28.6	45	-
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	83.3	13	+7.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	59.6	30	-1.9
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	51.0	25	0.0

**OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**25.8**                    **52<sup>nd</sup>**                    **-0.8**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-0.5</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>60.5</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-2.4</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	+0.5
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	75.0	35	-6.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	49.3	51	+0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	0.6	54	+0.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	77.5	41	-7.1
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+3.3</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	14.0	53	+12.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	0.6	54	+0.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	6.3	54	+6.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	15.1	53	+1.3
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+0.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	7.1	52	0.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	1.1	54	+0.7
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	0.0	50	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	12.5	42	0.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>24.2</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-2.9</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	0.0	52	-9.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	40.6	30	+2.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	40.3	26	-7.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	0.0	48	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	40.0	24	0.0

**FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>22.3</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-11.1</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	12.5	53	-37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	5.3	54	-3.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	44.4	25	-4.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	29.0	39	-4.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	20.3	46	-6.7
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>12.4</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+3.2</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	25.0	35	+6.2
Trade Environment (WB)	18.4	54	+13.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	6.3	53	-7.1
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	0.0	50	0.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>16.3</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+1.1</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	11.7	48	-11.3
Access to Energy (WB)	47.5	29	+10.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	3.9	54	+3.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	2.1	51	+1.7
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+8.2</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	76.9	8	+7.7
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	41.8	29	+16.8
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	34.8	46	+6.1
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	47.9	32	+2.5

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+1.2</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	0.7	54	+0.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	4.7	54	+4.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	0.1	54	0.0
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	12.6	51	-12.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	0.1	54	+0.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	2.2	54	+1.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	12.3	52	+0.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>26.9</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	22.4	48	-6.0
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	0.0	54	0.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	55.8	27	+1.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	29.8	45	-0.2
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	26.7	40	+0.9
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-5.8</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	45.2	34	+2.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	30.9	53	-2.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	21.1	49	+1.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	51.3	21	+7.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-37.5

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-1.4</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>54.4</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+3.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	45.5	29	-9.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	18.2	51	+2.8
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	83.3	20	+9.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	57.3	40	+4.7
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	73.3	25	+7.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	48.8	36	+5.4
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-8.7</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	34.3	47	-4.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	16.3	44	-5.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	20.6	51	-11.2
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	72.6	26	-6.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	0.0	48	-16.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>23.2</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-3.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	15.5	48	+1.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.4	42	-6.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	32.7	41	-18.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	11.0	50	+11.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>41.3</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>+2.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	25.4	49	0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	54.2	40	+15.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	71.3	11	-3.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	14.4	46	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Eswatini

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
43.8	36 <sup>th</sup>	+2.5

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
SECURITY & SAFETY	2019	2019	2010-2019
SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	43.7	36	+2.9
SECURITY & SAFETY	82.6	23	+10.2
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	90.0	15	+3.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.7	15	-0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	60.4	18	+44.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	62.8	50	+3.7
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE	31.0	40	+1.9
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	52.6	28	+8.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	8.0	47	-3.1
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	43.9	26	-8.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	33.3	34	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	37.6	23	+6.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	10.4	54	+7.3
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY	18.9	44	-1.8
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	18.6	46	-4.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	35.7	41	+8.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	0.0	50	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	36.2	19	+1.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	4.2	43	-13.9
ANTI-CORRUPTION	42.4	22	+1.2
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	42.9	23	-7.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	59.3	16	+1.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	23.6	45	-0.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	48.7	16	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
PARTICIPATION	2019	2019	2010-2019
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	31.2	44	-2.0
PARTICIPATION	16.9	49	+4.2
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	1.3	53	+1.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	31.1	41	+1.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	22.7	45	+1.9
RIGHTS	31.4	42	-1.1
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	24.3	42	+4.8
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	47.8	37	-17.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	28.9	48	+7.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	56.1	30	0.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
INCLUSION & EQUALITY	36.2	38	-5.6
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	23.6	47	-0.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	26.0	46	-3.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	30.8	49	-17.4
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	60.8	17	-6.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	39.9	24	0.0
GENDER	40.2	41	-5.7
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	45.5	33	+12.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	53.0	44	-5.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	36.6	37	-23.0
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	41.1	28	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-12.5

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

Increasing Improvement	Slowing Improvement	Bouncing Back
Warning Signs	Slowing Deterioration	Increasing Deterioration
No Change	Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	2019	2019	2010-2019
FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	50.3	22	+8.7
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	37.9	42	+5.4
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	28.9	46	+5.3
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	47.8	20	+16.5
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	25.0	37	0.0
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	60.3	15	-4.2
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	100.0	1	+0.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	36.8	42	-8.9
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	44.0	33	-4.1
INFRASTRUCTURE	47.4	17	+18.0
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	51.4	14	-3.3
Access to Energy (WB)	75.5	12	+32.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	36.5	49	+22.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	26.0	18	+20.5
RURAL SECTOR	55.5	20	+15.5
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	62.9	19	+29.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	+16.7
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	56.6	23	+2.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	52.5	26	+13.2

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
HEALTH	2019	2019	2010-2019
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	50.1	31	+0.6
HEALTH	66.0	16	+11.9
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	60.8	12	+3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	51.0	22	+5.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	94.0	4	+14.7
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	45.2	49	+7.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	70.8	29	+11.8
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	74.4	11	+28.9
EDUCATION	55.2	21	+2.3
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	40.0	42	-2.6
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	40.8	15	+1.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	70.0	14	+8.2
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	83.0	10	+8.9
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	42.2	28	-4.7
SOCIAL PROTECTION	35.2	38	-13.7
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	26.8	32	+10.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	16.7	51	-
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	15.4	50	0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	53.8	9	-28.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	63.3	19	-17.8
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT	43.9	46	+1.9
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	28.6	45	-
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	51.2	19	+1.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	68.7	28	+21.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	46.5	48	-0.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	24.7	40	+1.2



**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
46.6	31 <sup>st</sup>	+6.7

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	47.9	30	+5.2
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>78.3</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	85.2	41	+5.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	72.3	36	+1.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	96.2	35	-2.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	51.4	31	-2.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	86.3	23	+2.3
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>29.7</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+0.1</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	39.9	37	+9.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	27.1	36	-0.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	37.9	33	+6.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	25.5	41	-1.8
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	27.5	36	-5.6
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	20.1	48	-6.9
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+8.7</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	31.4	36	+9.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	31.2	44	+7.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	11.1	41	-7.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	53.3	3	+33.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	26.2	27	-0.1
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+11.1</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	47.6	15	+21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	67.8	9	+10.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	54.9	15	+8.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	50.0	11	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	44.9	18	+3.2

**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	49.7	24	+5.6
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+6.7</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	+25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	42.0	31	-22.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	48.3	18	+2.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	78.4	2	+7.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	59.1	9	+21.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>41.3</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+3.9</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	50.0	25	+12.5
Trade Environment (WB)	58.6	21	+12.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	56.8	23	-6.7
Access to Financial Services (WB)	24.1	27	+11.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	16.7	49	-10.6
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>38.8</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+9.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	48.8	18	-14.3
Access to Energy (WB)	42.6	31	+12.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	54.5	33	+32.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	9.2	37	+8.2
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	77.5	7	+18.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	+8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	64.4	11	-9.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	41.4	39	-8.3

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	34.8	41	+6.3
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>33.2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>+13.0</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	+25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	34.5	32	+6.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	44.1	30	+11.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	29.4	34	+9.7
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>30.5</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+6.3</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	23.9	43	+0.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	37.7	42	+3.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	56.9	28	+22.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	17.3	51	+4.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	16.7	18	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>33.8</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	32.9	37	+4.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	56.3	13	+1.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	30.7	50	-6.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	32.7	39	+7.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	16.4	48	+0.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	67.7	5	+38.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	49.2	47	+4.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	20.9	50	-2.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	19.8	47	+4.8
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-25.0

**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	54.0	23	+9.6
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>64.5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+17.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	53.7	21	+19.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	18.5	50	+9.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	79.2	27	+16.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	84.9	2	+3.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	71.9	28	+16.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	78.9	6	+39.5
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	42.5	36	+2.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	25.8	35	+7.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	33.5	45	+0.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	40.8	46	-1.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	65.1	8	-2.6
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>45.5</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+9.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	26.8	32	+12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	60.1	11	+12.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	66.5	11	-14.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	18.2	42	+6.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	56.1	24	+28.0
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>64.4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+10.3</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	57.1	18	+11.9
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	50.2	20	+16.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	70.8	25	+17.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	61.1	26	+6.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	82.8	12	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Gabon

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
47.7	29 <sup>th</sup>	+1.0

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

Increasing Improvement	Slowing Improvement	Bouncing Back
Warning Signs	Slowing Deterioration	Increasing Deterioration
No Change	Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
43.5	37	-3.2

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>85.0</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-0.1</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.7	20	-0.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	86.9	20	-6.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.6	20	-0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	54.6	25	+5.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	84.0	28	+1.5
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>41.6</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-3.5</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	41.9	36	-5.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	25.6	37	-21.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	71.0	6	+4.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	33.3	34	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	21.4	43	-12.6
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	56.4	26	+14.6
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>23.9</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-8.5</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	24.1	43	+13.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	71.8	10	-12.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	11.1	41	-13.9
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	12.5	42	-12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	-18.1
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-0.3</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	22.6	39	-2.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	24.1	43	+2.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	21.5	47	-5.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	37.6	28	+3.1

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
44.6	30	-2.1

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>35.2</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	33.8	35	-8.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	53.3	23	-8.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	28.8	36	+9.1
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>42.1</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-9.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	50.0	19	+1.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	62.5	28	-12.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	54.2	32	-10.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	43.6	38	-16.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	-8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>45.7</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>-3.8</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	55.6	13	-3.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	28.4	43	+5.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	58.9	26	-4.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	45.5	26	-14.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	40.1	22	-2.4
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+6.5</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	60.6	13	+2.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	84.6	17	+6.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	46.2	29	+11.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	61.6	12	+20.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-8.3

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
41.5	39	+3.9

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+3.9</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-3.3</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	25.0	50	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	18.0	51	-8.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	17.3	51	-4.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	25.0	37	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+4.5</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	38.1	43	-6.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	43.0	40	+15.3
Access to Financial Services (WB)	51.8	6	+29.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	37.6	37	-20.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+9.4</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	31.6	35	-1.7
Access to Energy (WB)	92.7	8	+0.8
Mobile Communications (ITU)	79.7	5	+14.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	29.5	16	+24.5
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>43.5</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+4.9</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	47.5	36	-0.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	33.3	34	+8.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	46.8	34	+6.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	46.4	35	+5.4

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
61.0	11	+5.2

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>61.0</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+5.2</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>65.2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+4.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	60.5	13	+0.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	74.5	11	+2.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	60.8	47	+11.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	63.2	34	+0.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	81.0	14	+8.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	51.2	34	+3.7
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+1.4</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	43.5	35	-6.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	73.2	10	+3.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	38.3	31	+7.1
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>49.6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-3.7</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	38.1	15	-11.9
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	50.0	21	-
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	57.1	21	+12.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	38.6	16	-17.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	64.0	18	+1.8
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>77.5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+18.5</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	85.7	3	-
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	53.2	16	+14.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	90.8	9	+5.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	62.7	24	-0.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	94.9	7	+46.1


**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100      2019 RANK/54      TREND 2010-2019  
**55.9                    16<sup>th</sup>                    +9.2**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement      ■ Slowing Improvement      ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                  ■ Slowing Deterioration      ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                              — Not Classified


**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+14.2</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>82.1</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-4.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.4	24	-0.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	93.5	9	+6.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	85.8	44	-11.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	47.7	37	-20.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	84.2	27	+3.2
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+16.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	83.9	5	+56.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	68.6	9	+61.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	50.8	19	-11.8
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	40.8	31	+7.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	30.2	29	-22.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	64.3	16	+10.2
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+33.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	60.4	14	+58.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	49.7	30	+48.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	58.3	17	+58.3
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	11.9	45	-13.1
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	33.9	19	+17.2
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>50.7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+11.0</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	22.6	39	-2.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	65.1	10	+19.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	59.2	13	+10.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	50.0	11	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	56.8	10	+2.7


**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>57.0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+4.7</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+10.1</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	87.5	4	+12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	57.4	13	+28.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	41.0	33	+3.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	56.5	26	-2.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	39.5	25	+9.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>-3.3</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	62.5	17	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	53.6	27	-6.7
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	55.8	27	-16.9
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	68.9	10	+10.3
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>46.9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+10.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	41.8	20	-6.6
Access to Energy (WB)	58.6	23	+13.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	75.6	10	+27.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	11.6	30	+7.9
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>64.4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	70.2	13	+9.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	58.0	13	-7.8
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	64.9	10	+0.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	64.4	8	+4.0


**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+19.5</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+30.6</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	47.4	16	+25.8
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	67.4	20	+42.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	67.4	9	+41.8
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+25.3</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	57.0	16	+17.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	69.7	23	+28.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	75.4	7	+46.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	90.3	4	+51.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	-16.7
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>59.6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+12.1</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	54.9	17	+13.5
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	63.5	10	+20.1
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	70.6	10	+8.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	70.8	11	+11.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	38.4	28	+6.4
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>55.5</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+10.3</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	54.1	21	+6.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	83.6	19	+4.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	44.5	32	+9.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	45.5	27	+13.9
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	+16.7


**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
2019              2019              2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>51.4</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-1.8</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>55.5</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-2.0</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	61.7	10	+2.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	47.3	25	+0.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	76.1	31	+1.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	58.2	39	-1.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	63.5	37	+8.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	26.4	50	-23.1
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>57.0</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	71.9	7	+22.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	23.8	36	+3.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	46.0	33	+4.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	83.6	9	+7.0
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	59.8	12	-27.2
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>-2.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	29.8	28	-11.9
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	45.4	27	-10.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	50.1	25	+1.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	41.2	14	+6.8
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	76.0	12	+3.3
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-5.1</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	50.4	28	-7.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	38.9	32	-30.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	57.2	36	+6.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	65.0	18	+6.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	11.9	48	0.0

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Ghana

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 TREND 2010-2019  
**64.3** **8<sup>th</sup>** **+0.1**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
 2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-5.4</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>86.4</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	94.6	35	-4.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	82.3	31	-4.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.4	23	+0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	65.5	11	-6.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	90.0	13	+9.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>69.2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-9.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	80.8	8	+2.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	59.6	13	-37.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	64.1	14	-2.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	83.2	6	+2.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	50.2	12	-12.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	77.4	8	-10.6
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-3.3</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	76.8	6	-5.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	80.9	3	-9.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	94.4	4	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	38.3	16	-4.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	50.9	5	+2.8
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-7.4</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	52.4	11	-4.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	47.9	23	+2.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	44.4	22	+0.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	30.4	35	-10.4

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
 2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+6.3</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>62.8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	37.5	45	+12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	65.0	6	+13.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	73.6	1	-15.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	73.9	7	-3.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	63.9	5	-2.6
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>63.5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+5.6</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	75.0	8	+6.2
Trade Environment (WB)	54.8	26	+8.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	70.8	4	-11.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	53.5	5	+23.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	63.2	17	+1.7
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+18.1</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	41.3	21	-4.6
Access to Energy (WB)	81.6	10	+18.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	66.5	20	+25.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	37.0	13	+32.4
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>60.8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+0.5</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	70.3	12	+20.6
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	58.3	10	-12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	62.3	15	-3.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	52.5	26	-2.5

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
 2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>-2.9</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>77.5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+2.2</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	100.0	1	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	46.7	17	-3.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	87.5	8	-10.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	75.8	5	+10.2
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>68.4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-9.5</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	79.9	3	-2.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	86.0	10	-0.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	63.7	15	-29.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	79.0	9	-16.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>68.5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+3.5</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	68.7	4	+5.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	52.9	17	-5.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	81.7	2	+4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	76.6	7	+1.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	62.5	6	+11.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>64.6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-7.4</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	54.1	21	-2.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	85.0	15	-9.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	75.0	3	+0.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	83.9	5	+8.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-33.3

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
 2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
	2019	2019	2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+2.4</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>68.9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+7.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	61.6	11	+1.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	54.0	16	+4.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	80.1	23	+12.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	66.5	30	-0.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	77.8	18	+8.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	73.4	12	+16.8
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+4.9</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	53.5	20	+6.9
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	51.5	8	+5.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	69.3	15	+6.0
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	67.4	29	+9.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	69.6	6	-2.6
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-4.0</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	38.1	15	-7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	69.7	4	-9.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	46.0	30	-12.1
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	41.1	15	+8.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	89.8	9	+0.5
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>54.7</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+1.3</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	59.5	15	-6.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	54.8	12	+7.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	71.6	20	+10.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	47.5	46	-5.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	39.9	34	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Guinea

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**42.5**                    **39<sup>th</sup>**                    **+1.3**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	43.4	38	-1.7
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>81.3</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-0.4</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.0	28	+0.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	81.2	32	-4.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	96.1	36	-1.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	47.3	38	+2.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	82.7	29	+0.4
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	36.2	41	-0.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	10.6	44	-32.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	29.3	40	-2.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	47.7	28	+5.6
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	20.5	45	-1.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	35.7	41	-1.6
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-1.6</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	30.4	37	+1.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	60.3	20	-2.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	45.8	25	+5.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	15.2	41	-0.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	25.9	28	-12.2
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>26.7</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+0.8</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	19.0	43	-3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	22.1	45	+3.3
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	30.3	39	+6.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	37.3	29	+22.6

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	43.0	36	+6.0
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+3.0</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	37.8	33	-0.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	43.2	29	+10.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	58.0	22	+5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	30.5	31	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>53.2</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+6.8</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	68.8	10	-6.2
Trade Environment (WB)	50.9	31	+3.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	66.1	13	+17.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	18.2	31	+15.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	62.2	19	+3.8
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>40.9</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+19.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	49.9	15	+25.6
Access to Energy (WB)	41.6	33	+17.4
Mobile Communications (ITU)	62.2	26	+24.0
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	9.8	35	+9.0
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>31.4</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-5.1</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	7.1	49	-10.8
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	25.0	42	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	34.9	45	-9.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	58.6	19	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	38.3	36	-5.8
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>31.7</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-6.8</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	34.9	31	-7.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	46.8	28	-20.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	32.4	30	+0.4
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>45.6</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-7.5</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	44.4	23	-3.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	71.5	22	-0.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	59.3	25	-9.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	52.5	31	-16.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	-8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>37.3</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	20.1	51	-16.2
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	34.2	42	-0.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	52.4	33	-4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	33.9	37	+2.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	45.8	16	+9.7
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>38.9</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-6.6</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	38.3	40	-6.0
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	67.4	37	-1.9
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	34.1	39	-2.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	29.6	42	+15.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-37.5

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	45.2	42	+6.7
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>49.2</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>+11.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	19.3	48	+3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	37.0	35	+1.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	66.6	42	+6.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	62.9	35	-2.4
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	50.2	48	+11.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	59.1	27	+47.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>+2.5</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	26.1	49	-2.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	23.7	37	+3.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	38.1	41	+4.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	61.5	38	-6.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	37.7	32	+13.8
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	29.8	28	+7.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	38.7	34	+1.6
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	64.3	12	+11.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	27.2	31	-3.9
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>54.1</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+8.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	56.7	20	+20.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	53.4	15	+14.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	33.8	51	+13.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	74.8	7	-4.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	52.0	22	0.0

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Guinea-Bissau

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
41.4	41 <sup>st</sup>	+2.8

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	48.5	29	+8.0
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>87.3</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	99.7	4	+9.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	98.0	31	-0.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	56.9	22	+10.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	82.2	32	+2.2
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>-3.4</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	47.3	33	-11.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	46.4	21	+18.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	27.0	43	-5.8
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	66.7	11	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	25.0	37	-25.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	53.2	30	+3.5
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>40.8</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+20.8</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	47.4	23	+20.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	85.9	2	+25.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	45.8	25	+45.8
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	25.0	30	+12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>21.6</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+10.2</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	26.2	34	+26.2
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	22.9	44	+0.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	14.2	52	-0.1
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	20.0	44	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	47.5	24	+5.1
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+13.0</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	50.0	13	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	43.6	23	+7.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	75.2	15	+3.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	62.0	16	+28.8
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	42.6	26	+2.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	75.5	17	+0.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	60.0	21	+0.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	73.6	15	+14.8
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	-8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>37.7</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>+2.8</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	29.7	44	+0.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	41.5	30	-0.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	61.1	23	+5.8
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	39.3	31	+7.9
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	16.9	46	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+2.6</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	43.8	36	+15.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	74.8	30	+3.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	57.8	18	+19.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	19.6	48	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-25.0

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	30.9	49	-0.8
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-4.3</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	+12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	30.6	44	+5.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	25.4	43	-10.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	29.0	39	-21.8
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	16.1	49	-6.7
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-4.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	43.8	28	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	47.7	35	+2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	43.6	39	-2.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	75.0	2	-25.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>+12.7</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	.	.	-
Access to Energy (WB)	25.6	44	+23.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	30.1	52	+13.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	2.4	49	+1.3
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>21.5</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-6.9</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	11.0	48	-25.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	25.0	42	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	25.8	48	-2.4
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	24.3	48	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	38.7	48	-1.2
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>+4.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	8.5	53	-22.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	34.2	39	+4.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	64.0	44	+8.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	50.1	46	+3.6
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	53.2	45	+15.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	53.0	33	+17.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-6.7</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	11.3	53	-27.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	51.8	28	+6.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	33.3	35	-
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-4.8</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	33.9	20	+8.9
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	25.0	48	-19.5
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	18.4	49	-15.2
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	14.6	46	+6.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>55.8</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+2.2</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	43.3	37	-13.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	41.7	47	+16.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	52.2	38	-1.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	86.0	9	+7.6

**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**58.5**                    **14<sup>th</sup>**                    **+3.7**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement    ■ Slowing Improvement    ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                    ■ Slowing Deterioration    ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                            - Not Classified

**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	56.3	18	-2.3
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>81.8</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-1.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	88.5	38	-3.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	62.3	41	-13.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.1	25	+0.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	68.2	7	+7.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	90.6	12	-0.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>-0.5</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	57.1	25	-4.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	73.7	6	-19.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	37.1	34	+2.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	34.3	33	-11.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	48.4	16	+24.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	56.6	25	+6.2
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>51.6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-10.3</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	64.0	11	-1.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	69.5	11	+2.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	36.1	28	-16.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	47.8	8	-16.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	40.5	13	-19.2
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>40.5</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+3.2</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	47.6	15	-16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	41.0	29	+3.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	41.1	24	+13.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	35.5	30	+16.2

**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	66.7	5	+9.8
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-2.8</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	54.6	18	-6.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	59.1	7	-0.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	72.5	8	+7.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	64.8	4	-1.7
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>74.3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+8.4</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	81.3	7	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	65.9	11	+10.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	72.3	3	+1.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	80.8	3	+14.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	71.3	8	+16.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+35.9</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	68.5	4	+9.1
Access to Energy (WB)	73.9	13	+58.2
Mobile Communications (ITU)	77.3	8	+22.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	58.9	9	+54.1
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>62.6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-2.3</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	66.5	14	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	-8.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	69.2	6	-0.9
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	64.6	7	0.0

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	51.6	19	-0.6
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>40.9</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-8.7</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	56.0	9	+0.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	41.8	33	-9.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	28.4	38	-1.2
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>54.3</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>-5.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	38.8	30	-3.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	67.7	25	-16.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	56.7	29	-23.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	72.0	16	-12.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	36.1	6	+27.8
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>49.7</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	43.7	28	-10.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	47.6	23	-2.1
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	46.9	38	-2.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	72.7	10	+24.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	37.5	30	-5.9
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>61.6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+11.4</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	53.4	23	+11.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	81.9	22	-2.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	63.5	12	+32.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	59.2	16	+7.3
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	+8.3

**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	59.4	14	+8.1
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	59.6	14	+4.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	40.2	30	+2.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	84.7	18	+33.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	76.6	11	+1.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	78.8	16	+8.5
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	57.3	29	-3.3
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>62.3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+6.2</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	54.6	19	-6.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	38.7	18	+2.6
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	71.0	13	+3.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	74.8	23	+36.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	72.4	4	-5.5
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>51.6</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+8.7</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	45.2	12	+18.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	67.6	5	+10.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	64.1	13	+5.6
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	33.4	21	+5.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	47.7	27	+4.1
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>57.4</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+9.5</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	56.0	22	0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	53.8	14	+14.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	72.8	18	+10.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	66.1	16	+21.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	38.2	37	+0.3

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Lesotho

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
52.3	20 <sup>th</sup>	-0.5

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	53.9	23	-4.1
SECURITY & SAFETY	70.6	40	-4.5
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.8	16	-0.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	93.5	9	-0.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	59.6	19	-0.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	0.0	54	-21.5
RULE OF LAW & JUSTICE	62.1	13	+1.4
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	74.5	13	+3.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	40.7	25	-4.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	69.6	8	-14.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	66.7	11	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	49.0	15	+29.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	72.3	12	-5.8
ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY	39.3	29	-2.9
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	60.0	15	+7.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	49.1	31	-2.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	41.7	27	-23.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	27.9	26	-5.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	18.1	36	+9.8
ANTI-CORRUPTION	43.4	21	-10.4
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	31.0	29	-29.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	65.1	10	+9.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	57.2	14	+13.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	-37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	51.4	14	-7.1

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	55.9	15	-4.3
PARTICIPATION	62.9	12	+2.5
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	62.5	11	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	46.1	19	-18.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	74.1	16	-7.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	69.0	8	+23.0
RIGHTS	54.7	17	-11.6
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	62.7	12	-5.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	86.6	8	-7.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	59.5	22	-4.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	64.8	20	-21.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	-19.4
INCLUSION & EQUALITY	57.8	13	-2.4
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	54.7	18	-14.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	74.7	5	+11.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	60.9	24	-7.8
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	59.0	18	+0.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	39.8	25	-0.8
GENDER	48.1	30	-5.9
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	49.7	29	-19.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	72.2	34	-6.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	64.0	10	+11.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	29.7	40	+0.8
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-16.7

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	49.0	25	+3.8
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	59.5	13	-10.0
Civil Registration (GI)	87.5	4	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	55.9	15	+2.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	72.1	2	-7.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	52.3	28	-18.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	29.7	32	-25.8
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	54.4	23	+3.6
Regional Integration (AfDB)	68.8	10	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	72.7	7	+7.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	52.5	31	+4.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	36.1	17	+16.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	42.0	35	-11.5
INFRASTRUCTURE	36.3	36	+18.8
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	12.5	47	-5.9
Access to Energy (WB)	44.7	30	+31.2
Mobile Communications (ITU)	68.6	17	+33.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	19.3	22	+16.7
RURAL SECTOR	45.9	35	+3.1
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	39.8	40	+7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	33.3	34	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	59.0	19	+2.4
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	51.4	28	+2.5

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	50.4	29	+2.4
HEALTH	58.4	29	+8.5
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	78.5	3	+3.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	35.2	37	+4.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	74.9	34	+13.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	42.4	52	+1.8
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	57.9	42	+8.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	61.7	26	+20.3
EDUCATION	61.2	11	+0.1
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	83.0	1	-1.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	40.9	14	+0.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	60.9	22	-2.2
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	77.9	19	+14.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	43.5	27	-10.4
SOCIAL PROTECTION	36.3	35	-10.9
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	31.0	25	-4.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	50.2	20	+0.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	33.1	40	+2.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	43.9	12	+0.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	23.2	32	-53.3
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT	45.5	41	+11.8
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	43.3	37	-6.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	85.1	1	+55.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	48.6	43	+12.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	49.2	44	-1.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	1.4	53	0.0




**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
47.9	27 <sup>th</sup>	+1.2

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

<span style="color: green;">■</span> Increasing Improvement	<span style="color: grey;">■</span> Slowing Improvement	<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Bouncing Back
<span style="color: pink;">■</span> Warning Signs	<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Slowing Deterioration	<span style="color: red;">■</span> Increasing Deterioration
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> No Change	— Not Classified	


**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	54.9	22	+2.0
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>86.7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+1.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	+0.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	92.6	12	+2.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	97.7	33	+15.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	62.5	16	-11.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	80.9	36	+2.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+0.8</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	63.4	20	-13.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	39.9	26	+1.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	38.9	32	-0.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	49.8	27	+5.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	22.7	41	+4.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	64.1	18	+8.5
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>56.0</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	55.6	18	-7.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	74.3	8	+11.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	70.8	10	+18.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	41.6	14	+0.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	37.5	17	+3.3
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-0.1</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	47.6	15	+7.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	26.8	41	-2.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	36.2	33	-7.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	28.2	37	-8.9


**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	37.4	41	+3.2
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+7.0</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	+37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	43.6	27	+10.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	40.2	34	-3.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	60.9	19	+4.2
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	25.4	36	-13.4
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	56.3	22	+18.8
Trade Environment (WB)	23.7	53	-12.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	50.8	34	-8.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	22.8	28	+3.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	65.8	14	-3.7
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>26.8</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	18.8	43	-19.8
Access to Energy (WB)	22.8	47	+21.7
Mobile Communications (ITU)	63.3	25	+15.6
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	2.4	49	+1.8
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>32.2</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	28.3	47	-1.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	25.0	42	+0.7
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	42.9	38	+7.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	32.6	44	-0.4


**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	54.9	16	-3.5
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>65.9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-3.7</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	75.0	7	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	30.1	38	+0.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	95.3	1	-2.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	63.4	15	-0.2
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>54.7</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-7.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	67.2	9	-6.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	76.2	16	-1.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	69.6	12	-9.0
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	60.7	23	-21.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>46.1</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	55.0	16	+2.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	74.5	6	+5.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	53.8	32	-7.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	37.6	35	+3.4
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	9.4	52	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-3.8</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	62.1	11	-5.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	91.1	4	+0.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	39.5	34	-13.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	45.8	26	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	0.0


**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	44.3	43	+2.8
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>55.9</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>+12.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	30.3	44	+3.4
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	29.7	43	+3.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	70.4	41	+20.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	72.9	17	-1.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	56.9	43	+10.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	75.4	8	+38.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>48.3</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-2.2</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	44.7	34	+4.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	38.9	17	-12.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	41.3	38	-3.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	75.7	20	+11.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	40.8	29	-10.9
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>30.3</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-0.8</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	26.8	32	+12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	36.4	38	+4.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	62.7	17	-3.5
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	14.7	45	-4.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	10.7	35	-13.5
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	56.7	20	+13.4
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	38.2	34	-9.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	59.1	35	+8.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	49.4	43	-2.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	11.1	49	0.0

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**OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
35.2	46 <sup>th</sup>	-5.5


**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>26.9</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-5.3</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-29.1</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	33.8	51	-66.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	37.0	45	-49.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	82.0	46	-11.8
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	11.6	52	-19.1
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	97.9	3	+1.6
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+3.5</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	36.2	41	+15.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	38.3	29	+36.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	21.1	49	-0.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.4	46	-18.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	28.9	46	-12.2
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	46.4	25	+20.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	32.9	43	+18.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	0.0	50	-12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	12.5	42	-12.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	-4.2
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>+2.2</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	13.1	45	+3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	34.0	36	+7.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	19.7	48	-0.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	0.0	48	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	12.3	51	+1.0


**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>+0.7</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+7.8</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	-37.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	31.8	37	+27.2
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	40.8	34	+28.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	28.5	37	+13.4
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>24.0</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	16.3	48	-15.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	25.2	49	-8.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	44.9	37	+23.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	33.6	43	+10.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-14.6</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	55.8	12	+12.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	38.7	36	-30.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	45.3	39	-16.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	39.2	32	-27.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	42.9	18	-10.8
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>+7.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	41.6	38	+24.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	34.7	51	+12.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	22.3	48	+0.4
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	37.9	32	-9.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	+8.3

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	


**FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>33.9</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-4.4</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-11.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	19.7	50	-27.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	0.6	54	-6.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	0.0	53	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-6.6</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	49.3	33	-4.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	26.7	47	-6.3
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	28.4	44	-9.3
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>46.2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	14.3	46	-17.8
Access to Energy (WB)	65.6	16	-15.0
Mobile Communications (ITU)	61.5	28	+17.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	43.6	11	+34.8
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	.	.	-
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	.	.	-


**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>47.8</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-12.7</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>72.9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+2.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	51.7	24	-13.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	99.0	1	+4.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	81.1	22	+11.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	43.5	50	+1.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	98.7	1	+0.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	63.2	25	+9.7
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>48.2</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-15.3</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	51.9	23	-8.9
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	72.3	11	-10.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	20.3	45	-26.5
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>29.1</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-25.3</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	8.3	50	-50.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.3	43	-50.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	66.9	9	+0.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	8.1	52	-1.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>41.1</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-12.7</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	14.3	51	-28.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	0.0	43	-34.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	93.9	6	-0.8
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	94.1	3	+0.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	3.2	52	0.0

**OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
<b>44.4</b>	<b>35<sup>th</sup></b>	<b>+1.7</b>

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

<span style="color: green;">■</span> Increasing Improvement	<span style="color: grey;">■</span> Slowing Improvement	<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Bouncing Back
<span style="color: pink;">■</span> Warning Signs	<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Slowing Deterioration	<span style="color: red;">■</span> Increasing Deterioration
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> No Change	<span style="color: black;">-</span> Not Classified	

**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	49.9	28	+4.4
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>76.7</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>-6.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	77.5	44	-21.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	69.6	39	-20.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	48.6	36	+6.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	87.7	21	+2.4
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>45.5</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+2.2</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	59.9	23	+11.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	23.0	39	+15.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	40.2	30	-4.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	53.4	23	-4.9
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	31.9	27	-6.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	64.3	16	+1.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+15.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	44.2	28	+12.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	63.8	17	+15.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	58.3	17	+52.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	24.0	33	-4.1
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	30.8	24	+3.6
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+6.4</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	64.3	4	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	29.7	40	+8.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	36.3	32	+10.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	24.1	40	-11.2

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	48.2	22	+1.1
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>55.3</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+10.3</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	51.2	12	+1.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	78.0	14	+0.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	54.5	19	+38.9
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	47.4	21	+17.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	72.4	20	+3.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	56.0	30	-2.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	76.0	10	-13.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	-8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+0.2</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	31.9	40	+1.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	39.3	35	-2.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	49.6	36	-0.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	36.0	36	+2.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	16.7	47	-0.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	60.8	12	+10.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	83.8	18	-0.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	31.4	41	-12.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	35.5	36	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-25.0

**FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	42.2	38	+0.7
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>44.0</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-3.1</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	34.9	39	+3.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	42.2	30	+4.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	43.5	31	-1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	24.6	43	-22.5
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+4.4</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	43.8	28	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	55.1	24	+0.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	54.0	29	+7.5
Access to Financial Services (WB)	11.9	37	+8.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	57.4	23	-1.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>+4.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	33.3	30	-10.8
Access to Energy (WB)	22.7	48	+8.7
Mobile Communications (ITU)	43.5	44	+12.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	6.6	43	+5.7
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>-2.5</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	62.9	19	+7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	33.3	34	-25.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	63.5	13	-5.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	55.0	23	+12.5

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	37.4	49	+0.4
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>+7.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	39.1	35	+4.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	36.8	36	+6.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	59.2	49	+6.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	55.4	42	+1.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	74.9	22	+9.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	42.1	40	+15.8
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>-2.4</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	37.1	45	+4.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	38.5	19	+5.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	47.8	30	-1.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	31.0	47	-3.5
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	33.7	34	-16.0
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>24.9</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>-7.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	22.6	37	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	41.7	32	-4.1
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	39.9	36	-10.2
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	20.6	39	+9.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	0.0	37	-29.8
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>35.8</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+3.7</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	51.2	26	+3.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	29.3	40	+8.7
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	37.9	48	+10.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	41.4	54	-8.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	19.2	43	+4.2

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
51.5	23 <sup>rd</sup>	-1.3

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>87.4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-2.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	86.8	22	-3.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	53.5	27	-10.7
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	97.0	4	+1.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	67.2	18	+1.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	59.3	14	-3.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	57.1	16	+5.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	64.8	14	+6.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	30.2	29	-4.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	62.8	19	+4.0
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	65.5	9	-2.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	64.2	16	-7.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	70.8	10	-5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	49.2	6	+18.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	34.5	18	+6.6
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>-6.5</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	39.3	25	-13.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	37.0	33	-0.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	37.5	27	-1.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	32.8	32	-17.2

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>-7.1</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	50.0	13	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	27.3	42	-21.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	53.1	24	-33.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	41.0	24	-3.1
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>62.1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-1.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	61.2	13	-2.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	85.1	12	+6.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	63.9	14	-5.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	66.8	18	-10.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	+5.5
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>39.6</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>-5.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	34.5	35	-11.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	44.3	27	+2.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	43.9	42	-8.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	38.8	33	-7.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	36.3	32	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>45.3</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-4.8</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	49.0	30	-12.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	54.3	43	-6.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	35.9	38	+3.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	37.5	33	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-8.3

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

Increasing Improvement	Slowing Improvement	Bouncing Back
Warning Signs	Slowing Deterioration	Increasing Deterioration
No Change	Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+0.7</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>59.6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-8.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	87.5	4	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	50.0	19	-12.7
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	58.8	8	+2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	59.5	20	+1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	42.2	22	-20.9
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+5.5</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	56.3	22	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	59.8	20	-0.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	56.7	24	+0.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	27.9	25	+14.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	68.5	13	+7.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+7.7</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	27.0	38	-9.3
Access to Energy (WB)	14.5	50	+9.7
Mobile Communications (ITU)	50.1	37	+25.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	7.0	42	+4.4
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	59.1	22	+3.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	33.3	34	-8.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	46.0	35	-6.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	50.0	29	+3.6

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>53.6</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+2.7</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>64.1</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	52.2	22	-5.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	39.7	31	+3.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	85.9	12	+20.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	75.5	14	-1.7
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	75.7	21	+16.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	55.7	32	-7.9
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>51.6</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+4.5</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	48.0	29	+4.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	41.4	12	+3.6
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	59.0	23	+9.5
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	62.5	37	+11.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	46.9	24	-6.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	31.0	25	+8.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	52.6	18	+0.1
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	48.2	27	-1.8
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	18.5	41	+2.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	58.4	22	-3.8
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+1.1</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	48.8	32	+2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	27.8	41	-1.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	63.1	32	+9.8
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	44.7	51	-6.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	100.0	1	0.0

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GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**46.6**                    **31<sup>st</sup>**                    **-2.5**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019        2019        2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	45.1	33	-7.9
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-21.9</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	50.1	48	-47.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	32.1	46	-64.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	89.7	42	-6.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	50.7	33	+5.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	78.5	39	+3.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-7.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	58.8	24	-18.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	39.0	28	-8.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	35.7	35	-1.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	30.5	38	+2.8
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	24.6	40	+1.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	51.2	32	-22.3
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>47.3</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+0.2</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	44.6	27	-2.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	67.4	14	-12.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	58.3	17	+19.4
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	27.2	27	+5.5
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	39.1	16	-8.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>32.9</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	31.0	29	-38.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	44.2	26	+17.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	40.9	25	+13.9
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	23.3	42	-3.1

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019        2019        2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	48.7	26	+3.1
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>47.3</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-6.1</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	25.0	50	-37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	42.3	30	+0.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	49.7	16	+1.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	78.2	3	+1.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	41.4	23	+4.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>-1.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	68.8	10	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	58.2	22	+2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	56.1	25	-7.9
Access to Financial Services (WB)	27.4	26	+16.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	50.9	27	-25.8
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>38.3</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+16.3</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	36.0	25	-0.2
Access to Energy (WB)	48.8	28	+24.1
Mobile Communications (ITU)	59.5	29	+33.5
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	8.8	38	+7.8
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	53.8	27	+9.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	54.3	14	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	56.6	23	+4.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	63.6	9	+3.6

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019        2019        2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	42.2	34	-7.6
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>44.0</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-17.6</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	46.6	18	-25.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	55.5	22	-12.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	36.4	27	-20.4
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>48.7</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-6.3</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	42.0	27	-7.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	71.8	21	+12.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	60.6	20	-13.2
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	60.8	22	-15.4
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	-8.4
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-1.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	42.7	30	-21.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	40.5	32	+10.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	66.7	15	-1.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	44.4	28	+6.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	23.8	43	+1.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-5.7</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	44.6	35	-4.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	67.3	38	-3.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	20.9	50	-20.4
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	3.7	53	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019        2019        2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	50.3	30	+2.2
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>60.1</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+5.7</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	58.6	18	+21.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	62.8	13	+9.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	70.7	40	+3.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	77.2	9	-0.7
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	51.7	46	+14.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	39.5	42	-15.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>38.9</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	52.1	21	+23.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	14.7	46	-2.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	26.0	49	-4.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	64.8	34	+17.5
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	36.9	33	+5.3
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>52.1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-5.9</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	29.8	28	-15.4
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	34.4	39	-10.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	73.8	5	-5.2
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	29.0	26	-8.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	93.4	5	+9.2
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>50.2</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+1.3</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	46.0	35	-3.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	44.8	26	+6.8
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	55.7	38	+4.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	64.7	20	-1.9
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	39.9	34	+1.2

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Mauritania

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**41.6**                    **40<sup>th</sup>**                    **+2.0**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Warning Signs
- No Change
- Slowing Improvement
- Slowing Deterioration
- Not Classified
- Bouncing Back
- Increasing Deterioration

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019          2019          2010-2019

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>40.3</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+6.7</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>75.9</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+3.3</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	+0.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	89.7	16	-0.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	84.6	45	+4.8
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	27.1	48	+11.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	78.1	40	+0.1
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>39.5</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>+12.6</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	44.9	34	+13.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	32.9	31	+19.8
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	39.2	31	-3.2
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	18.4	44	-1.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	57.0	9	+42.4
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	44.6	38	+5.3
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>18.5</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>+2.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	19.8	45	-2.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	27.9	46	+3.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	18.1	33	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	9.6	50	+8.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	17.3	37	+6.4
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>27.4</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+8.0</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	17.9	44	+3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	33.3	37	+5.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	23.1	46	+0.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	25.4	39	+6.2

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019          2019          2010-2019

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>35.1</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>-2.5</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	27.6	40	-8.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	35.9	38	-7.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	44.7	23	+5.7
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-11.9</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	43.2	25	-3.7
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	41.5	40	-9.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	63.3	17	-12.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	27.2	47	-41.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	+8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>25.9</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-0.2</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	20.9	49	+2.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	3.0	53	-20.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	48.7	37	+0.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	16.3	51	+9.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	40.8	21	+7.4
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>44.5</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+6.0</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	32.8	44	+7.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	68.3	36	+5.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	19.0	52	+15.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	77.1	6	+27.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-25.0

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019          2019          2010-2019

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>43.1</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>53.4</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+2.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	44.1	25	+0.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	60.4	6	+13.3
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	71.0	10	+13.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	28.7	34	-1.8
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-3.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	50.0	25	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	52.2	28	+1.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	32.8	46	-6.2
Access to Financial Services (WB)	17.7	32	-0.2
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	33.1	43	-11.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+7.2</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	20.8	40	-7.5
Access to Energy (WB)	42.2	32	+11.4
Mobile Communications (ITU)	49.3	39	+18.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	7.8	40	+6.1
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>51.8</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-4.2</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	48.4	33	-11.2
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	47.6	32	-5.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	61.1	15	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
2019          2019          2010-2019

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>48.1</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+3.1</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+8.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	35.0	39	+8.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	51.6	20	+11.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	79.9	24	+17.7
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	72.2	21	-0.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	51.3	47	+9.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	30.9	46	+4.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>42.0</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	37.1	45	-0.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	26.6	32	+5.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	45.5	34	+7.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	79.7	14	-3.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	21.0	44	-5.2
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>51.8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+1.3</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	38.1	15	+4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	52.7	17	+2.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	77.5	3	+8.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	14.8	44	+2.7
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	76.0	12	-11.5
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>45.0</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+1.4</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	55.2	23	+5.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	11.3	42	-6.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	79.4	15	+8.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	60.5	28	-0.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	18.6	44	0.0



## OVERALL GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100 **77.2** 2019 RANK/54 **1<sup>st</sup>** TREND 2010-2019 **-0.5**

### TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement   ■ Slowing Improvement   ■ Bouncing Back  
■ Warning Signs   ■ Slowing Deterioration   ■ Increasing Deterioration  
■ No Change   - Not Classified



## SECURITY & RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>79.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-1.4</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>92.5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-4.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	93.8	6	0.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.7	15	-0.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	73.3	3	-24.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	95.7	5	+2.2
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>77.0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-0.3</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	80.5	9	-5.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	87.1	4	-6.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	67.5	10	-0.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	87.1	5	+0.9
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	59.6	7	+15.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	80.4	6	-5.4
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+2.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	90.0	3	+1.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	78.3	5	-0.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	100.0	1	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	58.1	2	+12.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	49.6	6	+0.7
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>73.1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-3.7</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	77.4	1	+3.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	61.8	13	+8.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	74.4	6	-4.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	75.0	2	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	77.1	4	0.0



## PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-3.5</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>80.1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	100.0	1	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	49.2	15	-0.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	93.1	3	-1.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	78.2	4	-0.7
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>72.3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-8.6</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	84.8	1	+1.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	93.6	4	-0.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	80.3	5	+0.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	69.6	17	-6.3
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	-38.9
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>84.0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	79.2	3	+11.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	77.6	3	-1.1
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	74.8	7	-7.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	90.7	2	-5.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	97.6	1	-2.4
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>74.9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>-3.4</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	63.1	10	+12.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	89.1	11	+5.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	73.1	5	+0.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	99.5	1	-0.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-33.3



## FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>76.0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+3.6</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-1.4</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	77.4	1	-7.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	37.4	38	+2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	50.0	15	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>78.1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+2.6</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	74.3	4	+1.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	64.7	14	+3.5
Access to Financial Services (WB)	93.0	1	+19.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	80.3	1	-13.6
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>83.6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+13.3</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	78.0	1	-5.8
Access to Energy (WB)	97.4	6	-2.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	85.5	1	+14.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	73.5	4	+46.6
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>82.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	81.0	4	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	100.0	1	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	85.5	4	0.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	63.6	9	0.0



## HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>75.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>-0.8</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	65.4	7	-2.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	98.8	2	+0.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	86.4	10	+6.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	38.1	53	+3.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	97.9	4	+0.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	70.4	15	+15.9
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>84.3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+3.0</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	82.7	3	+3.8
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	67.7	2	+3.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	89.0	3	+4.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	97.5	1	+3.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	84.6	2	-0.9
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-11.0</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	87.5	2	-12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	83.3	2	-16.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	57.8	20	-0.3
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	71.4	4	-24.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	92.9	6	-1.5
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>63.0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+1.1</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	85.7	3	0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	67.8	7	+3.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	97.6	4	+1.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	50.2	42	-0.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	13.9	47	+0.6

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Morocco

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
61.0	10 <sup>th</sup>	+5.3

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+4.9</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>88.2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-2.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.5	22	+0.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	89.2	17	+2.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.8	9	-0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	54.3	26	-15.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	98.5	2	-1.0
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>61.2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+10.7</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	69.2	16	+3.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	71.3	7	+36.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	56.7	17	+6.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	35.3	32	-3.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	67.7	4	+22.9
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	66.8	13	-2.5
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>42.1</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+3.4</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	47.4	23	-2.7
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	47.9	32	-5.1
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	18.1	33	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	41.4	15	+14.4
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	55.6	2	+10.1
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>51.4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+8.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	26.2	34	+16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	65.0	12	+1.3
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	54.8	16	+8.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	62.5	6	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	48.4	17	+3.6

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>46.2</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-2.8</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-6.2</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	66.0	5	-14.4
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	34.1	39	-0.7
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	33.2	29	+2.8
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	38.0	31	-7.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	48.4	36	-2.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	44.6	39	-4.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	58.5	25	-1.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	16.7	18	+16.7
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-4.5</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	41.3	33	+0.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	34.3	41	-13.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	62.4	19	-4.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	74.7	8	-4.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	56.2	9	-0.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>47.0</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	31.6	45	-1.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	72.5	33	-5.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	46.3	28	+12.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	59.6	15	+5.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-16.7

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Warning Signs
- No Change
- Slowing Improvement
- Slowing Deterioration
- Not Classified
- Bouncing Back
- Increasing Deterioration

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>70.1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+10.9</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>52.8</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	67.9	4	+9.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	43.3	28	-2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	25.0	37	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>59.0</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	68.6	9	-4.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	52.3	32	+2.4
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	56.0	24	+8.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>88.3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+25.9</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	73.1	2	+7.2
Access to Energy (WB)	100.0	1	+8.8
Mobile Communications (ITU)	81.6	4	+15.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	98.6	1	+72.6
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>80.4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+13.6</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	79.5	5	+9.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	62.5	6	+4.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	86.7	3	+13.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	92.9	1	+27.2

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
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	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>66.8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+8.2</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>74.8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+8.3</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	39.7	34	+9.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	84.7	7	+10.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	91.3	7	+11.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	42.8	51	+3.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	95.3	7	+4.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	95.2	2	+11.4
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+8.5</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	47.6	30	+12.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	58.0	4	+15.4
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	76.3	7	+13.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	90.1	6	-0.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	56.4	14	+1.2
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	46.4	10	+12.5
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.3	43	0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	44.4	32	+3.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	73.5	3	-17.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	95.4	3	+3.3
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>68.2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+15.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	71.4	6	+28.5
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	54.4	13	+7.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	94.7	5	+2.3
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	69.3	13	-1.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	51.1	24	+43.1



**OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**49.0**                    **26<sup>th</sup>**                    **-0.2**

**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	47.1	31	-3.4
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>79.3</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-7.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	93.6	37	-5.5
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	51.4	42	-32.1
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.1	25	-0.8
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	58.6	21	+2.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	93.7	9	-1.9
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	61.4	22	-2.7
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	29.5	33	+2.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	25.8	44	-1.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	59.5	18	+0.6
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	22.1	42	-1.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	42.8	39	+3.5
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-11.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	33.5	32	-7.5
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	53.1	27	-1.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	34.7	30	-36.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	27.0	28	-3.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	25.4	29	-6.3
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>34.1</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	42.9	23	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	44.2	26	-5.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	31.5	38	-2.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	27.0	38	-5.5

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	52.1	18	-5.1
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	50.0	13	+12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	50.2	14	-31.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	78.7	13	+17.8
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	27.1	41	-7.4
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>60.2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>-1.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	47.4	21	-5.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	61.2	30	-19.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	53.5	34	-7.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	94.2	2	-3.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	44.4	3	+27.7
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>46.2</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-7.1</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	53.9	20	-0.5
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	45.4	25	-19.8
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	61.3	22	-2.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	39.8	30	-11.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	30.8	37	-0.7
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-9.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	55.7	17	+4.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	90.7	6	+4.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	53.2	21	+0.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	28.4	44	+2.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-58.3

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

Increasing Improvement	Slowing Improvement	Bouncing Back
Warning Signs	Slowing Deterioration	Increasing Deterioration
No Change	Not Classified	

**FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	51.1	20	+5.4
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>-0.3</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	+25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	36.1	35	-19.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	58.4	10	+2.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	66.6	14	-5.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	29.6	33	-4.3
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>57.8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	62.5	17	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	65.8	12	+14.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	44.9	38	-1.3
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	58.1	22	-5.2
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+12.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	29.3	37	-0.9
Access to Energy (WB)	28.2	43	+13.7
Mobile Communications (ITU)	52.1	35	+29.6
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	11.0	31	+8.3
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+7.2</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	66.2	15	+7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	58.3	10	+16.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	69.6	5	+5.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	58.6	19	0.0

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	45.7	40	+2.3
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>62.2</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+15.7</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	69.3	6	+8.0
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	30.2	42	+12.4
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	72.4	39	+17.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	62.4	36	0.0
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	70.2	31	+15.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	68.6	18	+41.3
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>41.6</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	42.0	38	+7.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	32.5	26	+5.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	36.7	42	-3.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	68.6	28	+14.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	28.3	39	-23.0
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-10.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	26.8	32	-7.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	36.8	36	-12.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	32.3	42	-11.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	11.6	48	+1.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	23.2	32	-21.4
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>53.0</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+3.7</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	63.1	12	+7.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	43.2	28	-2.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	55.2	39	+12.3
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	45.6	50	-2.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	57.8	17	+3.3

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
65.1	7 <sup>th</sup>	+3.4

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

<span style="color: green;">■</span> Increasing Improvement	<span style="color: green;">■</span> Slowing Improvement	<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Bouncing Back
<span style="color: pink;">■</span> Warning Signs	<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Slowing Deterioration	<span style="color: red;">■</span> Increasing Deterioration
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> No Change	<span style="color: black;">-</span> Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>84.9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+0.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	+0.2
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	98.8	5	+5.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.7	15	+0.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	64.1	14	+1.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	62.0	51	-3.4
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-0.4</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	76.3	12	-6.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	86.8	5	+2.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	64.2	13	-2.4
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	73.0	7	+1.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	49.9	14	+1.8
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	80.5	5	+0.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>64.0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-3.8</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	71.0	7	-8.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	78.7	4	-0.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	81.9	6	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	45.9	11	+3.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	42.3	9	-14.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>57.6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-4.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	44.0	21	-4.8
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	73.1	7	-3.5
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	64.3	9	-6.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	69.2	5	-8.6

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>67.0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-1.8</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-2.5</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	75.0	7	-25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	68.0	4	+13.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	87.8	7	-10.2
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	73.8	6	+11.9
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>71.9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-1.5</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	73.0	4	+0.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	85.2	11	+1.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	80.7	4	-12.9
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	87.1	5	+3.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-4.6</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	51.3	23	-4.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	58.2	11	+0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	64.1	17	-8.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	53.4	20	-4.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	48.1	14	-5.5
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>65.1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+1.7</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	55.3	19	+17.9
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	74.0	31	+1.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	62.4	13	-2.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	58.8	18	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	75.0	1	-8.3

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>62.7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+12.8</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>63.3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+7.6</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	100.0	1	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	49.0	22	+1.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	54.3	12	+3.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	50.0	15	+25.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>73.9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+17.8</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	62.5	17	+20.9
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	70.0	5	+11.3
Access to Financial Services (WB)	88.1	2	+29.4
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	75.0	2	+9.7
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>51.0</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+13.1</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	67.3	6	-7.2
Access to Energy (WB)	51.9	26	+9.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	50.0	38	+22.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	34.7	14	+27.5
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>-</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	.	.	-

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>71.5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+4.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	59.5	15	-9.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	51.9	19	+3.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	78.9	30	+14.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	75.8	13	+1.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	84.9	12	+5.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	78.3	7	+12.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+4.4</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	48.3	28	-0.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	45.7	11	+9.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	74.4	9	+8.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	82.5	11	-3.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	53.5	15	+7.9
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+9.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	60.7	6	+4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.3	43	0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	2.4	53	+2.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	67.4	5	+4.8
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	68.9	17	+34.7
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>64.7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	57.1	18	-14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	69.1	6	-0.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	81.4	14	+8.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	58.8	33	+0.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	56.9	19	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Niger

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100      2019 RANK/54      TREND 2010-2019  
**47.8**                      **28<sup>th</sup>**                      **+0.4**

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	52.7	24	-0.4
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>75.9</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>-6.0</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	87.7	39	-11.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	51.1	43	-35.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	97.9	32	-1.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	62.2	17	+17.2
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	80.9	36	+2.5
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+7.5</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	67.3	17	+6.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	28.0	35	-10.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	47.0	24	+6.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	53.2	24	+5.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	41.2	21	+28.7
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	46.1	36	+8.9
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-3.2</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	60.5	13	-0.6
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	53.9	25	-5.2
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	58.3	17	-18.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	18.3	40	+6.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	14.9	38	+1.2
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+0.1</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	34.5	27	-13.1
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	48.2	22	+3.7
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	48.0	18	-2.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	62.5	6	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	40.0	24	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	49.5	20	-7.2
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-19.7</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	52.5	11	-14.6
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	44.9	29	-45.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	36.0	28	+7.0
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-4.2</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	40.0	28	-4.6
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	67.0	26	-6.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSE)	59.5	22	-16.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	38.5	42	-18.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	41.7	4	+25.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	62.2	7	-1.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	45.0	26	+5.9
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	72.0	9	-4.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	73.3	9	-4.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	40.0	23	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-3.9</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	29.8	47	-18.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	84.7	16	-1.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	69.4	8	+24.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	28.7	43	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-25.0

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	43.0	36	+2.8
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>50.4</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	50.0	19	+4.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	40.2	34	-0.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	63.9	16	-7.1
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	48.1	20	+17.6
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	68.8	10	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	45.6	36	-4.7
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	69.2	6	+3.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	10.5	38	+9.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	75.0	2	+25.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>18.5</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+5.5</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	15.0	44	-1.7
Access to Energy (WB)	14.1	51	+4.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	36.7	48	+11.2
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	8.2	39	+7.7
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>49.2</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>-2.7</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	36.8	42	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	50.9	29	-10.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	59.2	18	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100      RANK/54      TREND  
 2019              2019              2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	46.0	38	+6.3
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+6.3</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	42.8	32	+8.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	17.2	52	+7.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	75.6	32	+6.0
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	82.0	4	-2.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	58.4	40	+18.7
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	73.3	13	-0.4
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+3.7</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	40.5	41	+5.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	10.4	49	+8.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	34.0	44	+26.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	60.9	39	+10.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	0.0	48	-33.3
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>40.1</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	22.6	37	-16.7
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	44.0	29	+3.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	72.0	6	+7.8
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	21.9	37	+11.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+13.7</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	48.8	32	+2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	49.0	22	+17.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	43.9	46	+7.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	54.6	35	+7.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	85.5	10	+33.8

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Nigeria

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
45.5	34 <sup>th</sup>	-1.6

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>-3.2</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-24.7</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	8.3	54	-58.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	17.9	50	-30.6
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	95.6	38	+0.3
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	51.9	28	-37.0
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	81.8	33	+2.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>47.0</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	44.6	35	+3.1
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	56.4	15	-5.0
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	42.9	27	+1.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	45.1	29	+1.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	34.9	25	+21.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	58.1	22	+3.3
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>49.5</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+4.4</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	55.3	19	-10.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	61.4	18	+3.2
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	58.3	17	+27.7
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	30.3	25	+1.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	42.1	10	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+3.3</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	47.6	15	+16.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	26.4	42	+5.2
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	29.8	40	+11.3
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	-12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	19.0	49	-3.9

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>43.6</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-3.7</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-11.2</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	44.0	22	+3.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	49.9	26	-40.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	38.4	25	+5.3
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>46.0</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-4.6</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	49.9	20	-5.8
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	62.9	27	+2.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	51.8	35	-19.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	57.3	28	-7.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	+8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+1.4</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	32.4	38	-4.3
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	48.2	22	+2.0
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	61.7	21	+2.8
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	46.5	25	+6.3
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	34.6	33	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>41.1</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-0.4</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	33.0	43	-3.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	76.7	28	-2.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	38.1	36	+12.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	33.0	38	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-8.3

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>47.8</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>50.1</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>-2.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	55.9	15	-3.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	50.0	15	0.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	57.1	24	0.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	37.5	26	+4.2
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>45.5</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+0.8</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	30.5	48	+0.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	58.9	18	+0.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	38.6	12	+0.7
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	54.0	25	+1.2
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>48.4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+11.4</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	37.2	24	-5.2
Access to Energy (WB)	54.6	25	+8.8
Mobile Communications (ITU)	70.4	13	+20.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	31.2	15	+20.8
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-5.9</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	50.8	32	+3.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	33.5	33	-29.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	49.0	31	-5.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	55.0	23	+7.8

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-0.2</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>+4.9</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	11.9	50	-2.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	52.6	18	+6.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	61.3	46	+7.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	92.1	1	-2.1
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	31.0	51	+7.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	50.1	35	+12.7
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-8.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	46.7	32	+6.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	25.9	34	-0.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	44.6	35	+0.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	28.8	38	-21.1
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>50.0</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	33.9	20	+4.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	56.3	14	+10.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	48.3	26	0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	37.3	17	+0.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	74.2	16	-13.3
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	50.0	29	+7.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	38.7	33	-0.2
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	67.5	29	+9.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	53.4	37	-6.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	39.2	36	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Rwanda

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 TREND 2010-2019

**60.5** **11<sup>th</sup>** **+3.7**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND

2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	66.0	11	+0.5
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>81.8</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-1.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	98.9	29	-0.7
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	85.7	25	+6.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	63.5	50	-15.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	67.7	8	-3.5
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	93.2	10	+3.7
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>62.8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	52.1	29	+4.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	41.3	23	+5.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	79.9	4	-0.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	59.2	19	-6.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	79.8	2	+3.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	64.5	15	-1.6
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	37.7	30	-4.3
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	55.3	23	-4.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	18.1	33	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	43.2	13	+5.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	53.2	3	+7.9
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>77.8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	69.0	2	+16.6
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	76.1	5	+15.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	87.6	1	-2.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	75.0	2	-12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	81.1	2	-7.6

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND

2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	67.6	4	+13.2
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>72.7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+8.3</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	59.4	10	-7.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	61.2	5	+14.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	92.9	1	+14.7
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	87.5	1	+20.3
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>73.8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+13.0</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	100.0	1	+12.5
Trade Environment (WB)	70.2	8	+22.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	84.6	1	+11.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	43.2	10	+9.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	70.8	9	+8.3
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>44.4</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+18.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	60.2	10	+2.0
Access to Energy (WB)	31.9	41	+26.1
Mobile Communications (ITU)	72.2	11	+34.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	13.2	28	+12.2
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>79.4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+12.7</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	84.9	3	+7.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	66.8	3	+8.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	93.7	1	+19.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	72.1	6	+15.7

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND

2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	44.5	31	-2.4
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	35.0	30	-7.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	38.0	36	-3.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	47.9	21	+1.6
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>29.1</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-6.8</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	36.9	32	-14.8
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	32.4	46	-6.1
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	30.6	47	-1.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	29.0	45	-11.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	16.7	18	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>42.7</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+3.6</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	33.6	36	+14.6
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	43.3	28	-1.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	62.4	19	+1.4
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	32.3	40	+4.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	41.8	20	-0.8
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>76.1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-0.8</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	97.3	1	+11.5
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	94.8	2	-4.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	74.3	4	+13.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	63.9	11	+0.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-25.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND

2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	64.0	10	+3.6
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>73.4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+9.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	74.0	4	-5.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	40.5	29	+4.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	96.5	3	+12.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	79.5	5	+0.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	84.3	13	+14.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	65.7	20	+31.4
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	75.4	5	+5.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	34.8	24	+0.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	63.7	21	+9.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	64.0	36	+5.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	74.6	3	+7.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>49.9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-2.6</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	45.2	12	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	70.6	3	+10.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	85.8	2	-8.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	32.2	22	+13.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	15.6	34	-29.8
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+2.3</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	90.1	2	+17.1
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	79.6	2	-20.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	71.0	23	+11.0
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	59.4	31	+3.8
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	51.5	23	0.0

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - São Tomé and Príncipe

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**OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
60.4	12 <sup>th</sup>	+2.8

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

<span style="color: green;">■</span> Increasing Improvement	<span style="color: grey;">■</span> Slowing Improvement	<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Bouncing Back
<span style="color: pink;">■</span> Warning Signs	<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Slowing Deterioration	<span style="color: red;">■</span> Increasing Deterioration
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> No Change	<span style="color: black;">—</span> Not Classified	

**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>97.4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+0.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.8	9	+0.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	98.8	1	+1.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	88.3	19	+1.9
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>63.8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-4.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	77.6	10	+0.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	37.5	30	-8.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	83.6	2	+2.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	100.0	1	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	-25.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	84.0	3	+0.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	91.9	2	-0.7
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	60.6	19	-5.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	100.0	1	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	25.4	29	+8.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	13.9	40	-5.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	12.5	47	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	76.9	4	+5.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	78.8	3	+6.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	60.0	7	0.0

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-0.8</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-6.6</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	87.5	4	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	64.4	7	-3.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	92.2	5	+0.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	59.1	17	-10.7
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+3.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	72.7	5	+5.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	95.5	2	-0.3
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	72.9	9	-0.3
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	84.4	7	-6.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	27.8	16	+19.5
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-0.9</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	54.7	18	-8.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	76.5	4	+20.9
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	70.2	11	-0.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	43.2	29	-10.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	31.2	35	-7.2
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>64.7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	63.8	9	-3.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	85.3	14	+4.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	50.0	25	-3.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	59.7	14	+5.7
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	.	.	-

**FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>48.1</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+7.1</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+7.2</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	+37.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	46.2	24	-4.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	38.4	37	-8.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	59.5	20	+1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	40.4	24	+9.9
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+2.2</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	43.8	28	+12.5
Trade Environment (WB)	66.5	10	+10.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	57.7	20	+11.3
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	75.0	2	-25.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>39.8</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+13.7</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	0.6	49	+0.6
Access to Energy (WB)	69.8	14	+11.1
Mobile Communications (ITU)	70.0	14	+34.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	18.7	23	+8.7
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+5.5</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	32.4	45	-2.7
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	37.5	32	+1.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	38.2	42	+6.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	62.1	14	+17.0

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>59.3</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+4.7</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>62.8</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+1.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	70.3	5	+3.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	53.3	17	+6.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	91.7	5	+1.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	56.5	41	-2.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	90.1	9	+5.1
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	15.1	54	-8.1
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>55.6</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+4.9</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	61.9	15	0.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	47.0	10	+13.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	69.1	16	+10.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	44.5	45	-4.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	.	.	-
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>51.8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+8.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	33.3	24	+16.6
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	56.6	13	+0.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	66.6	10	-2.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	26.8	32	+19.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	75.8	14	+5.9
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	63.5	11	+7.2
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	71.2	21	+9.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	82.9	5	+2.6
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	50.1	27	0.0

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 OVERALL GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019

**63.2**                      **9<sup>th</sup>**                      **+3.3**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement    ■ Slowing Improvement    ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                      ■ Slowing Deterioration    ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                              - Not Classified

 SECURITY & RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019                      2019                      2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>68.2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+3.8</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>88.2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.8	16	+1.6
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	93.5	9	+3.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	98.9	28	+0.5
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	63.1	15	+13.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	85.6	25	+1.5
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>71.5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	82.2	6	-1.5
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	51.5	17	+11.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	65.1	12	+5.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	70.1	8	+3.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	85.5	1	+19.4
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	74.4	11	-6.0
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>53.8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	65.2	10	+6.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	51.9	28	-14.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	76.4	7	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	33.8	20	+17.7
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	41.5	11	-1.2
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>59.5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+3.9</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	52.4	11	+21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	70.9	8	-0.9
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	70.4	7	+10.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	50.0	11	-12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	53.9	11	+1.5

 FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019                      2019                      2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>67.0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+2.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	58.9	12	+7.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	57.1	11	-1.8
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	76.9	5	+5.9
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	67.4	3	+13.4
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>60.9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+4.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	87.5	3	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	51.9	29	-6.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	68.7	7	-5.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	34.4	19	+26.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	62.0	20	+8.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>56.2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+16.1</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	62.6	7	+9.7
Access to Energy (WB)	65.5	19	+10.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	78.9	6	+30.0
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	17.8	24	+14.0
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>63.3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-1.7</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	55.5	23	-1.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	64.5	5	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	59.3	18	-11.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	74.0	4	+7.0

 PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019                      2019                      2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>64.3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-1.6</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>63.4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	50.0	13	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	43.4	24	+11.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	93.5	2	+4.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	66.6	10	+4.4
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	70.4	7	+5.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	87.6	6	-5.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSE)	82.9	3	-4.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	79.7	8	-1.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	16.7	18	+8.4
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>65.0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>-6.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	60.8	9	-6.0
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	57.4	12	-1.9
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	73.0	8	-8.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	78.6	6	-13.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	55.5	10	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>-2.7</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	55.5	18	+12.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	86.3	13	-1.0
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	47.0	27	-8.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	68.2	9	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-16.7

 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND

2019                      2019                      2010-2019

	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+5.7</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>62.3</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+6.9</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	44.7	30	+0.4
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	54.1	15	+6.3
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	83.5	19	+11.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	69.0	24	-3.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	79.0	15	+12.5
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	43.8	39	+14.5
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>50.4</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+8.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	76.7	4	+17.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	22.5	38	+4.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	36.6	43	+4.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	71.3	27	+16.6
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	44.8	26	-2.4
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	33.9	20	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	56.0	15	+6.2
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	63.4	16	+3.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	57.3	7	+9.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	82.4	11	+1.0
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+3.4</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	65.9	10	+2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	55.5	10	+9.6
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	65.9	31	+4.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	67.2	15	+0.3
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	54.5	21	0.0

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Seychelles

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
72.3	3 <sup>rd</sup>	+7.8

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>72.4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+7.4</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>87.6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.7	15	+0.7
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	65.8	9	+3.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	72.3	47	-10.8
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>78.7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+11.8</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	97.3	1	+16.4
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	95.8	3	+39.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	88.3	1	+9.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	100.0	1	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	37.3	24	+2.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	53.3	29	+3.0
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>56.4</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+9.7</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	69.1	8	+7.8
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	56.2	22	+21.4
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	75.0	9	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	50.0	4	0.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	31.9	22	+19.4
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+9.3</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	50.0	13	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	77.4	3	+1.4
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	82.9	2	+2.1
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	86.8	1	+5.5

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>75.3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+6.2</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>70.9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+11.1</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	87.5	4	+25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	45.9	20	+9.5
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	86.9	9	+9.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	63.5	14	+1.0
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+10.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	62.9	11	+4.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	87.5	7	+12.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	75.9	6	+12.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	91.1	3	+2.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	36.1	6	+19.4
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>77.2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-1.3</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	52.4	22	-13.2
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	70.7	8	+0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	83.1	1	+3.0
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	91.2	1	+5.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	88.7	2	-2.3
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>82.5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+5.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	65.9	7	+23.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	95.8	1	+2.6
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	81.1	2	-1.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	87.3	4	-3.9
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	.	.	-

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>66.1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+9.1</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>59.0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+10.9</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	70.0	2	+8.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	65.8	4	+10.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	50.0	15	+25.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>70.0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+13.3</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	77.3	3	+0.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	67.0	12	+16.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	65.7	15	+22.6
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+11.7</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	52.7	13	-8.5
Access to Energy (WB)	100.0	1	+3.1
Mobile Communications (ITU)	66.3	21	+14.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	66.7	7	+37.2
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>64.1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	73.6	10	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	69.0	8	+2.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	63.6	9	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+8.3</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>86.2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+12.4</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	80.9	2	+2.3
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	97.3	4	+1.0
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	99.3	1	-0.7
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	54.6	43	+2.5
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	98.6	2	0.0
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	86.8	4	+69.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>81.0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+4.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	82.9	2	+0.9
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	52.1	7	+4.2
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	91.9	1	+4.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	89.8	7	-2.4
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	88.5	1	+13.9
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>62.9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+15.7</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	100.0	1	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	.	.	-
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	34.1	38	0.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	54.6	8	+47.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	.	.	-
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	76.2	3	-14.0
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	98.9	3	+1.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	57.4	34	-0.4
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	50.1	27	+16.6



**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**51.0**                    **24<sup>th</sup>**                    **+4.8**

**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	56.2	19	+4.0
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>84.2</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-0.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.3	25	-0.7
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	84.8	28	-5.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.2	24	+0.9
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	51.4	31	-13.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	86.4	22	+14.2
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+7.1</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	56.3	26	+1.3
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	43.8	22	+30.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	45.8	25	+3.0
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	54.4	22	+5.5
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	32.0	26	+4.7
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	50.6	34	-2.2
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+4.0</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	47.5	22	+8.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	68.3	12	+17.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	70.8	10	0.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	20.8	37	-5.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	39.5	15	-0.6
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+5.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	64.3	4	0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	39.3	31	+5.7
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	36.6	31	+3.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	42.0	22	+6.4

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	56.8	13	-1.1
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>53.1</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>-7.6</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-50.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	40.9	26	+10.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	69.4	19	-9.5
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	64.7	11	+18.5
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>63.2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+0.6</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	55.6	17	-4.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	86.3	9	-1.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	65.8	13	+1.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	75.1	11	-16.5
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	+25.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+4.5</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	49.1	25	+5.5
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	70.3	9	+15.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	54.6	30	+6.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	48.9	22	-0.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	52.7	11	-4.6
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>55.9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-1.9</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	36.8	42	-13.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	82.9	20	+6.7
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	64.0	10	-3.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	45.9	25	+0.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	0.0

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	45.3	34	+5.0
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>59.6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+8.0</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	56.1	14	+15.9
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	43.9	27	+14.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	66.6	14	-4.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	56.3	11	+13.3
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+0.2</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	62.5	17	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	39.4	40	-3.3
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	50.8	34	-5.5
Access to Financial Services (WB)	13.9	35	+0.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	45.6	32	+9.4
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>31.2</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>+13.3</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	38.1	22	+7.2
Access to Energy (WB)	22.9	46	+15.2
Mobile Communications (ITU)	56.4	30	+26.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	7.4	41	+4.6
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>48.1</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-1.4</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	42.7	37	+7.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	41.8	29	-8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	58.9	20	-4.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	48.9	30	-1.3

**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	45.6	41	+11.2
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>+21.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	34.3	41	+5.7
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	35.1	38	+7.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	72.7	37	+34.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	67.7	26	+2.4
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	28.2	53	+28.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	69.3	16	+51.1
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>51.0</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+9.1</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	49.2	27	+3.5
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	33.1	25	+1.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	56.4	27	+13.9
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	66.7	30	+10.3
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	49.6	23	+15.8
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>36.8</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+6.2</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	22.6	37	-7.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.5	40	-6.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	63.7	15	+3.8
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	24.3	33	+12.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	40.1	30	+29.4
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>43.4</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+8.0</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	49.6	30	+6.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	40.9	29	+11.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	37.9	48	+20.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	59.4	31	-3.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	29.4	39	+5.4

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Somalia

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
19.2	54 <sup>th</sup>	+5.7

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-0.5</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>30.2</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-6.4</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	16.7	52	+2.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	6.3	52	-21.3
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	9.2	54	-11.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	28.2	47	-2.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	90.8	11	+1.1
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+2.7</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	32.9	44	+11.4
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	4.4	50	+0.5
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	8.2	53	+2.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	17.7	50	+1.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-2.4</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	17.4	47	-9.7
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	4.9	53	-6.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	5.6	45	+5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	1.1	51	-1.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	0.0	52	0.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	16.4	50	+4.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	27.5	42	+16.4
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	0.0	48	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	0.0	53	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>23.1</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+8.4</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	+25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	19.5	49	+1.0
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	28.9	43	-16.9
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	25.5	42	+24.9
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>21.4</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	2.5	54	-8.0
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	18.2	51	+1.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	39.7	44	-3.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	46.5	34	+6.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+2.4</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	28.7	45	+4.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	28.2	44	+3.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	30.6	51	+3.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	14.7	52	+4.1
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	8.5	53	-2.7
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>24.1</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+11.5</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	21.9	54	+16.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	20.7	54	+1.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	12.9	54	+12.9
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	15.0	49	-6.2
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	+33.3

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>18.4</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+10.8</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+7.6</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	12.5	53	+12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	5.9	53	+0.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	18.1	49	+5.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	30.3	38	+16.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	11.8	51	+3.5
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+4.3</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	6.3	37	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	43.2	38	+14.4
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	3.1	54	-3.6
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	-
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	0.0	50	0.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>+20.4</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	.	.	-
Access to Energy (WB)	32.5	40	+14.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	44.7	42	+44.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	1.8	53	+1.8
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>-</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	.	.	-
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	.	.	-

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+6.7</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>34.0</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+7.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	8.6	52	-7.1
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	29.2	44	+10.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	49.6	53	+10.9
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	54.3	44	+0.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	33.8	50	+17.8
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	28.6	49	+13.4
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>10.7</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+8.6</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	21.4	51	+17.2
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	.	.	-
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	0.0	48	0.0
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	0.0	54	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	19.9	49	+10.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	33.7	39	+10.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	13.8	47	+0.9
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+5.1</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	9.9	53	0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	34.2	50	+15.4
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	50.8	40	+5.1
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	0.0	54	0.0

**OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
65.8	6 <sup>th</sup>	-0.9

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

**SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	67.6	8	-2.3
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	98.9	29	-0.8
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	77.6	33	-6.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	50.5	34	-9.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	14.5	53	-11.4
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>72.2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+1.5</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	82.1	7	-0.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	98.6	1	+14.4
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	70.8	7	+2.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	60.2	17	+3.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	45.6	19	-2.1
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	75.7	9	-8.5
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>77.1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	78.5	5	+3.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	87.4	1	+6.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	70.8	10	-5.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	86.1	1	+6.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	62.7	1	-8.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>52.9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	61.9	6	-15.5
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	57.2	17	-3.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	44.7	21	-6.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	50.0	11	+12.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	50.8	15	-14.8

**FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	64.1	8	+0.1
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-8.9</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	68.7	3	-3.8
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	58.6	9	+5.7
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	25.0	37	-25.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>66.6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-4.3</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	73.0	6	-1.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	80.3	2	-7.0
Access to Financial Services (WB)	74.9	4	+8.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	38.4	36	-17.9
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+12.2</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	68.2	5	-10.7
Access to Energy (WB)	90.9	9	+8.7
Mobile Communications (ITU)	67.3	18	+16.8
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	74.4	3	+34.0
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>60.8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+1.3</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	62.6	21	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	58.3	10	+8.3
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	63.8	12	-6.7
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	58.6	19	+3.6

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	67.2	7	-0.6
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>78.5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+7.7</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	75.0	7	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	77.3	2	+12.8
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	80.1	12	+12.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	81.4	2	+5.6
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>74.4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-5.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	68.1	8	-4.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	91.2	5	-2.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSE)	74.6	8	+3.6
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	74.5	13	-14.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	63.9	1	-8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	79.9	2	+7.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	87.3	2	+5.4
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	64.1	17	-1.7
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	48.4	23	-0.8
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	23.9	42	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>55.2</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-7.1</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	78.0	2	+6.6
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	81.6	23	-3.1
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	40.4	33	-13.7
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	26.2	45	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-25.0

**HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT**SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	64.3	9	-0.7
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+8.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	58.9	16	-5.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	74.6	10	+3.9
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	79.4	26	+12.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	78.7	7	+5.0
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	89.7	10	+8.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	90.5	3	+24.8
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	40.9	40	-3.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	49.5	9	+3.1
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	75.3	8	+2.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	75.2	21	-1.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	49.8	22	-4.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-10.7</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	64.9	4	-4.1
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	50.0	21	-16.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	0.0	54	-11.4
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	49.3	11	-15.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	91.8	7	-5.6
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>69.0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	85.7	3	0.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	47.1	25	-1.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	93.0	7	+9.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	48.5	45	-7.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	70.9	13	+2.2

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - South Sudan

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2011-2019
20.7	53 <sup>rd</sup>	-7.8

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2011-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-17.2</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>31.7</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-41.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	47.4	49	-40.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	19.0	49	-54.5
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	20.9	52	-62.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	3.6	53	-26.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	67.7	48	-24.2
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-10.4</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	29.0	49	-0.9
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	24.8	38	+17.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	14.2	51	-9.1
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	-66.7
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	16.7	52	-3.4
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-7.5</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	13.1	50	-10.4
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	21.1	50	-4.2
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	0.0	50	-23.6
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	10.9	47	+0.8
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-9.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	4.8	50	-8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	10.1	54	-23.6
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	3.8	54	-15.8
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	12.5	37	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	0.0	53	0.0

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2011-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>20.9</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-9.1</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-5.7</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	21.3	46	+3.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	22.0	47	-11.0
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	0.3	53	-2.4
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-17.8</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	3.3	53	-19.9
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	12.5	53	-50.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	21.4	49	-17.7
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	12.0	54	-9.9
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	16.7	18	+8.4
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>17.3</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>-9.2</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	18.5	52	-1.7
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	12.9	50	-38.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	29.7	52	+9.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	13.9	53	-1.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	11.7	51	-13.1
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>36.0</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>-3.6</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	25.2	53	+2.4
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	40.3	49	-9.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	32.0	40	-7.2
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	46.6	24	-0.1
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	.	.	.

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2011-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-4.6</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>19.6</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>-2.9</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	37.5	45	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	30.2	45	-0.6
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	8.2	52	+4.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	16.2	41	-8.4
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	6.0	52	-9.2
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>-1.6</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	25.0	35	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	28.2	50	0.0
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	17.0	51	-6.1
Access to Financial Services (WB)	.	.	.
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	50.0	28	0.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>14.4</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>+9.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	.	.	.
Access to Energy (WB)	25.1	45	+23.7
Mobile Communications (ITU)	14.8	53	+2.9
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	3.2	47	+2.2
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-23.6</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	33.0	43	-21.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	0.0	50	-25.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	20.0	50	-23.0
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	10.0	50	-24.3

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2011-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>+0.2</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	1.6	54	+1.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	11.1	53	+3.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	59.5	48	+5.1
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	70.8	22	+1.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	29.2	52	-1.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	33.7	44	-8.7
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>14.0</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>+0.9</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	8.0	54	+2.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	7.0	50	-5.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	2.7	53	-4.0
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	52.3	42	+11.1
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	0.0	48	0.0
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>12.0</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>-1.5</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	11.3	49	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	9.4	53	-4.4
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	22.1	48	-5.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	5.1	53	+3.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	.
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>45.7</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-2.0</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	12.7	52	-6.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	.
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	26.0	53	+2.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	60.1	29	-4.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	84.1	11	0.0



## OVERALL GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100 **32.5** 2019 RANK/54 **48<sup>th</sup>** TREND 2010-2019 **+2.5**



## SECURITY & RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	27.4	49	+1.5
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>58.7</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>+3.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	76.5	45	+10.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	28.5	47	-27.6
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	72.1	48	+15.6
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	26.8	49	+19.7
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	89.8	14	+0.6
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>17.6</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>+6.2</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	37.4	38	+5.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	9.8	45	+7.2
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	22.2	48	+6.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	0.0	46	0.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	0.0	47	0.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	36.0	40	+17.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>-10.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	5.3	54	-11.4
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	27.9	46	-5.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	0.0	50	-18.1
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	0.7	52	-2.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	0.0	46	-12.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+6.3</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	29.8	32	+16.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	45.5	25	+7.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	37.1	29	+7.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	0.0	48	0.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	20.0	44	0.0



## PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	22.5	51	+3.3
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>12.8</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-0.3</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	0.0	47	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	22.2	45	+5.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	26.4	45	+5.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	2.4	52	-11.7
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>+5.4</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	7.0	52	+4.1
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	31.1	47	+6.4
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	41.5	43	+12.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	20.5	50	+4.6
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	0.0	39	0.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>0.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	23.8	46	+6.9
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	26.2	45	+0.7
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	32.2	48	+3.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	20.2	49	-11.0
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	19.7	44	0.0
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>32.7</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	43.7	37	+26.0
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	49.4	46	+1.5
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	15.5	53	-5.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	29.7	40	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	+16.7

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified



## FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	37.4	41	+3.1
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	-25.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	35.5	37	+17.0
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	22.1	47	-6.6
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	42.0	35	+10.1
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	17.8	47	-1.6
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>22.8</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>-5.5</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	43.8	28	-6.2
Trade Environment (WB)	28.6	49	+2.6
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	26.2	48	-8.2
Access to Financial Services (WB)	15.6	33	+9.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	0.0	50	-25.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>38.3</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+9.9</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	33.3	30	-0.3
Access to Energy (WB)	58.1	24	+20.1
Mobile Communications (ITU)	42.0	45	+8.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	20.0	20	+11.1
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>55.1</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+9.2</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	63.8	18	+13.9
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	+12.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	59.7	17	+11.2
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	47.0	34	-0.9



## HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	42.7	45	+2.2
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>52.2</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>+9.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	11.2	51	-6.9
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	38.6	33	+8.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	72.5	38	+4.6
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	49.8	47	+1.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	74.2	24	+9.4
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	66.9	19	+39.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>29.1</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	37.4	44	+6.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	28.8	29	+5.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	33.5	45	+2.1
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	.	.	-
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	16.7	46	-16.6
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+1.3</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	4.2	53	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	33.1	47	+3.9
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	46.0	30	-1.1
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	9.2	51	-20.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	74.7	15	+23.9
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>55.9</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>-1.7</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	15.5	50	-4.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	.	.	-
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	75.3	16	+11.9
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	77.2	6	-4.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	55.8	20	-9.7

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Tanzania

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
53	19 <sup>th</sup>	+0.2

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>84.1</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.6	21	-0.4
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	83.8	30	-6.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	51.8	30	+3.8
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	85.0	26	-0.5
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-6.1</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	77.0	11	+5.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	40.8	24	-13.6
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	40.5	29	-3.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	43.7	30	-25.2
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	29.4	31	-4.4
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	56.3	27	+4.4
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>45.0</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-8.1</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	56.7	17	-14.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	54.8	24	-3.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	63.9	15	-12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	23.2	34	-10.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	26.3	26	+0.2
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>47.8</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+5.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	44.0	21	+4.7
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	61.4	14	+11.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	63.9	10	+18.2
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	25.0	26	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	44.5	20	+18.7

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>45.5</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-6.2</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>33.5</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-10.8</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	-25.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	45.1	21	-1.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	28.8	44	-22.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	47.7	22	+5.5
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>46.9</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-13.0</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	35.4	34	-33.4
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	58.6	33	-15.7
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	44.8	38	-17.8
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	62.3	21	-23.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	+25.0
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>57.2</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+3.8</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	52.6	21	+2.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	54.7	15	-12.6
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	68.7	13	+5.2
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	61.1	16	+24.7
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	48.9	13	-0.5
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>44.3</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-4.9</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	68.1	4	+3.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	69.7	35	-2.4
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	38.4	35	+7.8
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	20.4	46	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-33.3

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+2.4</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>52.4</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-0.5</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	+12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	36.9	34	-18.4
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	41.9	32	-9.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	69.7	13	-1.3
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	63.2	6	+13.3
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>54.5</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+1.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	87.5	3	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	43.1	39	+8.7
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	57.2	22	-3.9
Access to Financial Services (WB)	37.0	14	+7.3
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	47.8	31	-6.8
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>42.1</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>+15.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	60.7	8	+18.7
Access to Energy (WB)	32.8	39	+21.6
Mobile Communications (ITU)	64.4	23	+11.1
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	10.6	33	+8.8
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>-5.9</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	66.2	15	-15.4
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	+8.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	67.7	9	-12.8
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	63.6	9	-3.5

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>57.8</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>+7.2</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>68.6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+11.3</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	63.7	9	+6.4
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	47.7	24	+8.5
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	85.4	15	+29.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	78.2	8	-5.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	68.0	32	+10.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	68.8	17	+18.3
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>52.5</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+2.8</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	70.0	9	+20.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	22.3	39	-0.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	38.9	40	-16.7
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	73.0	25	+2.8
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	58.3	13	+8.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+8.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	29.8	28	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	65.8	9	+5.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	67.3	8	+4.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	32.2	22	+13.4
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	42.6	29	+16.8
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>+6.5</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	49.6	30	+0.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	62.0	9	+18.6
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	66.7	30	+7.7
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	72.2	10	+3.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	61.9	16	+2.1

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Togo

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 TREND 2010-2019

**50.1** **25<sup>th</sup>** **+4.8**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	51.3	25	+2.0
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>88.9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>+0.8</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.1	26	-0.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	92.1	14	+1.8
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.0	27	+2.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	71.7	5	-0.4
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	82.6	30	+1.3
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>43.4</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-1.0</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	29.0	49	-2.2
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	32.7	32	-8.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	42.5	28	-8.5
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	50.3	26	+3.0
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	46.5	17	+11.2
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	59.2	20	-1.5
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	29.9	39	-6.0
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	39.0	36	-11.3
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	36.1	28	+18.0
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	11.8	46	-5.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	19.8	34	+1.4
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>45.5</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+9.0</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	34.5	27	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	32.9	38	-4.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	44.9	20	+6.6
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	75.0	2	+37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	40.0	24	-20.0

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	45.4	33	+6.8
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>56.3</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+6.6</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	-12.5
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	55.6	17	+8.2
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	52.5	13	+12.0
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	56.5	26	-1.5
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	54.6	12	+26.9
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>47.7</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+5.1</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	56.3	22	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	56.5	23	+1.5
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	64.1	15	+19.0
Access to Financial Services (WB)	36.7	16	+29.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	25.0	46	-25.0
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>41.9</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>+11.0</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	35.4	26	-34.1
Access to Energy (WB)	49.3	27	+21.5
Mobile Communications (ITU)	61.9	27	+36.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	21.2	19	+20.1
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>35.8</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>+4.8</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	40.7	38	+17.1
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	25.0	42	-5.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	41.7	40	+0.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	35.7	41	+6.7

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	48.2	22	+0.4
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+0.4</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	50.6	13	+14.9
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	47.8	27	-16.6
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	37.4	26	+3.3
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+1.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	39.9	29	+3.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	74.4	19	+1.6
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	72.6	10	+7.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	41.0	39	-20.2
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	25.0	17	+16.7
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>47.8</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>-2.2</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	55.5	14	+6.8
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	40.7	31	+3.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	55.1	29	-14.1
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	50.6	21	-5.6
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	37.0	31	-1.8
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>54.4</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	54.3	20	+8.7
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	82.0	21	+1.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	51.4	22	+13.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	59.2	16	+3.4
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-16.7

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 RANK/54 TREND  
2019 2019 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	55.5	18	+9.9
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>58.1</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>+15.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	31.0	43	+3.8
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	27.3	45	+5.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	85.9	12	+18.3
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	72.8	18	+0.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	67.3	34	+8.2
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	64.0	23	+53.9
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>60.4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>+7.4</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	74.1	6	+0.7
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	41.3	13	+5.5
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	71.8	12	+16.3
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	65.1	33	-1.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	50.0	21	+16.7
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>42.0</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+6.6</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	22.6	37	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	44.8	28	+8.8
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	52.6	23	+19.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	36.3	19	-4.1
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	53.6	26	+8.4
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>61.5</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+10.4</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	54.0	24	+17.9
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	72.4	5	+9.4
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	63.0	33	+12.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	67.8	14	+12.5
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	50.0	29	0.0

## 2020 IAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Tunisia

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
70.4	4 <sup>th</sup>	+8.2

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAW

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>SECURITY &amp; RULE OF LAW</b>	<b>72.4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+13.4</b>
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>88.4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+0.5</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	94.1	36	-5.9
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	86.6	23	+2.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.8	9	+0.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	65.7	10	+9.3
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	95.7	5	-3.1
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>68.1</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>+9.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	92.0	3	+43.8
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	68.8	8	+23.9
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	58.6	15	-2.9
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	55.8	21	-6.3
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	50.2	12	-7.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	83.1	4	+8.1
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>62.9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+30.8</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	63.3	12	+32.2
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	75.8	7	+31.8
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	76.4	7	+45.8
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	48.0	7	+33.9
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	51.2	4	+10.7
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>70.1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+12.3</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	56.0	8	-8.3
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	74.1	6	+36.3
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	66.5	8	+6.5
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	100.0	1	+50.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	53.8	12	-22.9

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSION

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>71.4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>+17.6</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>82.6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>+30.6</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	75.0	7	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	79.9	1	+27.3
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	88.4	6	+48.4
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	87.0	1	+46.8
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>62.1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>+27.1</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	72.6	6	+28.5
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	80.8	15	+18.5
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	83.1	2	+38.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	65.6	19	+42.0
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	+8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>75.3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+12.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	61.5	8	+23.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	72.0	7	+11.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	81.7	2	+9.3
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	88.5	3	+14.8
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	73.0	4	+1.7
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+0.5</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	56.9	16	+6.3
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	89.7	10	+14.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	70.1	7	+4.3
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	60.9	13	+2.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-25.0

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

■ Increasing Improvement	■ Slowing Improvement	■ Bouncing Back
■ Warning Signs	■ Slowing Deterioration	■ Increasing Deterioration
■ No Change	■ Not Classified	

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>+2.7</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>58.5</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	67.1	5	-16.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	42.0	31	+8.2
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	.	.	-
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	50.0	15	0.0
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>59.0</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-0.2</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	.	.	-
Trade Environment (WB)	63.7	16	-0.1
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	63.2	17	-15.4
Access to Financial Services (WB)	37.0	14	+13.8
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	72.2	7	+1.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>82.1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+16.9</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	60.5	9	-15.5
Access to Energy (WB)	99.8	5	+0.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	81.9	2	+11.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	86.2	2	+71.5
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>65.2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-4.0</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	75.9	9	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	66.8	3	-16.5
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	63.0	14	+0.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	55.0	23	0.0

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENT

	SCORE/100 2019	RANK/54 2019	TREND 2010-2019
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>71.9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-1.6</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	50.8	25	-4.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	92.4	5	-0.6
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	73.9	35	+0.8
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	59.4	38	+0.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (ICGME/MMEIG)	98.1	3	+0.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	57.0	30	-5.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>73.5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-4.8</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	60.3	16	-0.4
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	58.6	3	+1.8
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	86.1	4	+0.4
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	97.0	2	+0.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	65.7	7	-26.0
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>73.9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>+0.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	60.7	6	+4.2
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	66.7	6	0.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	75.0	4	+11.0
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	67.3	6	-17.0
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	100.0	1	+2.6
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>68.0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>+3.4</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	71.4	6	+14.3
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	52.8	18	-11.3
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	99.7	2	+0.6
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	95.8	1	+6.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	20.2	42	+7.1





## OVERALL GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100 **51.8** 2019 RANK/54 **22<sup>nd</sup>** TREND 2010-2019 **+0.7**

### TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement
- Slowing Improvement
- Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs
- Slowing Deterioration
- Increasing Deterioration
- No Change
- Not Classified



## SECURITY & RULE OF LAW

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>78.9</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>-4.5</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	95.6	34	-0.1
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	66.9	40	-7.4
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	99.7	15	+1.1
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	58.8	20	-10.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	73.7	46	-5.2
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-3.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	49.5	32	+2.0
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	65.7	12	+9.3
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	32.1	37	-4.3
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	22.5	42	-31.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	28.6	33	-10.0
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	64.6	14	+10.9
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>43.2</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-2.6</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	45.1	26	-13.1
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	68.1	13	+2.0
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	23.6	31	-22.2
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	47.6	9	+12.0
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	31.8	23	+8.5
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>-4.1</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	56.0	8	+8.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	37.9	32	+4.8
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	27.8	41	+3.0
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	-37.5
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	23.4	41	+0.9



## FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>55.0</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+4.7</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+2.8</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	50.0	32	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	60.5	8	+9.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	44.9	24	+2.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	71.0	10	0.0
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	58.0	10	+2.5
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+1.7</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	93.8	2	0.0
Trade Environment (WB)	64.6	15	-0.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	58.8	19	-8.2
Access to Financial Services (WB)	51.6	7	+16.5
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	62.4	18	+1.1
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>37.0</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>+13.3</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	38.1	22	-2.6
Access to Energy (WB)	40.2	35	+31.9
Mobile Communications (ITU)	56.3	31	+12.3
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	13.5	27	+11.9
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+1.0</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	73.4	11	+11.3
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	55.4	25	-13.6
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	61.1	15	+6.1



## PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS &amp; INCLUSION</b>	<b>46.8</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>-1.8</b>
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>-7.5</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	25.0	29	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	34.1	33	-4.1
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	23.4	46	-28.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	30.3	33	+2.3
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+5.8</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	29.9	38	-2.3
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	59.4	32	-8.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	59.4	24	+0.1
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	49.3	32	+5.7
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	+33.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>54.1</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+3.4</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	44.8	26	+6.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	55.3	14	-6.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	50.9	34	-6.6
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	68.8	13	+18.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	51.0	12	+5.3
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-9.2</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	65.9	7	-5.8
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	90.0	9	-1.3
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	57.0	20	+1.1
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	54.2	19	+1.6
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	25.0	20	-41.7



## HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

SCORE/100 2019 RANK/54 2019 TREND 2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>54.9</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>+3.9</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>61.9</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>+9.5</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	36.8	36	-10.6
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	33.2	41	+8.7
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	88.7	9	+23.2
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	78.8	6	+0.9
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	75.8	20	+12.3
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	58.0	28	+22.6
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>47.5</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-0.6</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	51.9	23	-2.0
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	21.3	40	-6.9
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	43.8	36	-1.8
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	58.0	40	+8.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	62.3	10	-0.8
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>+0.5</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	25.6	36	0.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	61.6	10	-3.7
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	56.0	22	+0.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	28.6	27	+4.6
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>67.1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>+6.0</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	63.1	12	-3.6
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	40.3	30	+15.9
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	73.9	17	+9.1
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	62.9	23	+8.7
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	95.2	6	0.0

## 2020 IIAG Scores, Ranks &amp; Trends - Zambia

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OVERALL  
GOVERNANCE

2019 SCORE/100	2019 RANK/54	TREND 2010-2019
52	21 <sup>st</sup>	-0.8

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

<span style="color: green;">■</span> Increasing Improvement	<span style="color: grey;">■</span> Slowing Improvement	<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Bouncing Back
<span style="color: pink;">■</span> Warning Signs	<span style="color: orange;">■</span> Slowing Deterioration	<span style="color: red;">■</span> Increasing Deterioration
<span style="color: grey;">■</span> No Change	<span style="color: black;">-</span> Not Classified	

SECURITY &  
RULE OF LAWSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>85.9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+3.1</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.5	22	-0.3
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	85.1	27	+4.9
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	100.0	1	0.0
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	56.0	24	+0.9
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	89.0	16	+10.1
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>49.1</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-7.2</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	62.2	21	-15.4
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	53.3	16	-4.1
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	48.4	21	-3.7
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	52.1	25	-1.1
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	27.6	35	-20.3
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	51.2	32	+1.8
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>47.7</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>-8.3</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	47.6	21	-11.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	53.5	26	-12.5
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	63.9	15	-12.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	32.7	22	-2.6
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	40.6	12	-2.0
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>41.9</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-15.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	26.2	34	-21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	51.9	19	-10.1
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	37.2	28	-8.5
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	62.5	6	-25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	31.7	33	-12.9

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS  
& INCLUSIONSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>48.9</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>-2.1</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	37.5	17	-12.5
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	17.3	50	-28.8
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	50.2	25	-1.1
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	32.0	31	-6.4
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>53.5</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-1.5</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	53.6	18	-2.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	68.8	24	-5.0
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	53.8	33	-18.4
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	58.0	26	+1.5
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	33.3	8	+16.6
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-5.0</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	44.8	26	-4.1
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	51.9	19	-0.5
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	66.7	15	-5.9
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	38.1	34	-18.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	45.7	17	+4.3
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>+10.0</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	59.8	14	+9.1
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	90.7	6	+1.2
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	57.2	19	+27.5
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	34.3	37	+20.5
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-8.3

FOUNDATIONS FOR  
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+4.0</b>
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>55.7</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>-3.1</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	75.0	8	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	46.4	23	+1.5
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	49.2	17	+5.1
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	62.4	18	-8.6
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	45.5	21	-13.4
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>55.7</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>+2.0</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	68.8	10	+6.3
Trade Environment (WB)	50.0	32	-3.2
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	68.0	8	+0.8
Access to Financial Services (WB)	42.6	11	+14.9
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	49.1	30	-8.7
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>38.1</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>+15.6</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	32.8	32	+1.9
Access to Energy (WB)	37.2	38	+18.5
Mobile Communications (ITU)	67.0	19	+28.7
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	15.4	26	+13.1
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+1.4</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	47.8	35	0.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	0.0
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	61.2	16	+3.3
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	47.9	32	+2.5

HUMAN  
DEVELOPMENTSCORE/100  
2019 RANK/54  
2019 TREND  
2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	SCORE/100	RANK/54	TREND
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>+2.1</b>
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>+5.1</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	58.6	18	+4.5
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	34.2	39	+3.0
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	86.3	11	+15.4
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	72.3	20	-1.2
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	78.1	17	+10.9
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	63.4	24	-2.3
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	41.9	39	-3.1
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	17.9	43	-3.0
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	63.9	20	-5.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	78.7	17	+11.2
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	53.3	16	+2.4
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>35.7</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>+1.1</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	35.1	18	+5.3
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	52.1	19	-2.0
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	28.1	46	-2.9
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	27.6	29	+4.3
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	.
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>58.6</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>+1.9</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	48.8	32	+2.8
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	33.9	38	-4.1
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	68.8	27	+10.2
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	41.6	53	+1.0
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	100.0	1	0.0

**OVERALL GOVERNANCE**

2019 SCORE/100    2019 RANK/54    TREND 2010-2019  
**46.1**                    **33<sup>rd</sup>**                    **+7.4**

## TREND CLASSIFICATION KEY

- Increasing Improvement    ■ Slowing Improvement    ■ Bouncing Back
- Warning Signs                    ■ Slowing Deterioration    ■ Increasing Deterioration
- No Change                            - Not Classified

**SECURITY & RULE OF LAW**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

SECURITY & RULE OF LAW	46.4	32	+6.9
<b>SECURITY &amp; SAFETY</b>	<b>81.5</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+7.0</b>
Absence of Armed Conflict (ACLED/UCDP)	99.1	26	0.0
Absence of Violence against Civilians (ACLED/PTS)	70.4	38	+7.2
Absence of Forced Migration (IDMC/UNHCR)	98.7	29	+2.2
Absence of Human Trafficking & Forced Labour (USDS/V-DEM)	64.8	13	+18.6
Absence of Criminality (WHO)	74.3	44	+7.0
<b>RULE OF LAW &amp; JUSTICE</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>+4.9</b>
Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law (V-DEM/WJP)	37.0	39	+2.6
Impartiality of the Judicial System (GI/V-DEM)	48.3	18	+0.7
Judicial Processes (V-DEM/WJP)	47.2	23	+0.6
Equality before the Law (FH/WJP)	28.6	40	+3.4
Law Enforcement (GI/WEF/WJP)	46.1	18	+15.5
Property Rights (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	17.9	49	+6.7
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY &amp; TRANSPARENCY</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>+5.9</b>
Institutional Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	33.2	33	+1.9
Civic Checks & Balances (BS/V-DEM/WJP)	35.6	42	+5.6
Absence of Undue Influence on Government (BS/FH)	23.6	31	+5.5
Disclosure of Financial & Judicial Information (GI/IBP/WJP)	37.4	17	+27.2
Accessibility of Information (GI/WJP)	32.3	21	-10.9
<b>ANTI-CORRUPTION</b>	<b>34.0</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>+9.6</b>
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms (BS/GI)	46.4	20	+21.4
Absence of Corruption in State Institutions (V-DEM/WJP)	32.4	39	+6.0
Absence of Corruption in the Public Sector (V-DEM/WEF/WJP)	25.2	44	+2.7
Public Procurement Procedures (GI)	37.5	17	+25.0
Absence of Corruption in the Private Sector (WB/WEF)	28.6	36	-7.1

**FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY	47.2	29	+19.5
<b>PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>+8.0</b>
Civil Registration (GI)	62.5	20	0.0
Capacity of the Statistical System (GI/ODW/WB)	42.4	29	+6.1
Tax & Revenue Mobilisation (AfDB/ICTD&UNU-WIDER/WB)	45.9	23	+1.9
Budgetary & Financial Management (AfDB/WB)	47.7	29	+21.6
Professional Administration (AfDB/GI/WB)	50.3	14	+10.1
<b>BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>42.0</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>+4.2</b>
Regional Integration (AfDB)	37.5	33	+12.5
Trade Environment (WB)	44.7	37	-12.8
Business & Competition Regulation (AfDB/BS/WB/WEF)	45.5	36	+10.5
Access to Financial Services (WB)	47.5	9	+8.6
Labour Relations (GI/WEF)	34.8	41	+2.4
<b>INFRASTRUCTURE</b>	<b>40.0</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>+16.1</b>
Transport Network (WEF/UPU)	30.4	36	-7.9
Access to Energy (WB)	38.5	37	+1.3
Mobile Communications (ITU)	64.2	24	+47.4
Digital Access (ITU/WB)	26.8	17	+23.5
<b>RURAL SECTOR</b>	<b>56.9</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+49.4</b>
Rural Land & Water Access (IFAD)	78.0	6	+67.0
Rural Market Access (IFAD)	50.0	15	+33.2
Rural Sector Support (IFAD)	50.7	30	+48.5
Rural Businesses & Organisations (IFAD)	48.9	30	+48.9

**PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS & INCLUSION	36.0	38	-1.9
<b>PARTICIPATION</b>	<b>22.0</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>-3.0</b>
Freedom of Association & Assembly (FH/GI)	12.5	38	0.0
Political Pluralism (GI/V-DEM)	27.4	41	-7.7
Civil Society Space (GI/V-DEM)	19.0	49	-12.3
Democratic Elections (CDD/GI/V-DEM)	29.3	35	+8.0
<b>RIGHTS</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>-3.7</b>
Personal Liberties (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	29.9	38	-2.2
Freedom of Expression & Belief (FH/V-DEM/WJP)	40.3	41	-2.8
Media Freedom (GI/V-DEM/RSF)	36.7	46	-13.5
Digital Rights (DSP & V-DEM/GI)	44.5	36	-8.1
Protection against Discrimination (GI)	8.3	26	+8.3
<b>INCLUSION &amp; EQUALITY</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>+0.3</b>
Equal Political Power (V-DEM)	30.4	42	+1.4
Equal Political Representation (FH/IPU/V-DEM)	34.8	40	+0.2
Equal Civil Liberties (V-DEM)	38.1	45	+5.5
Equal Socioeconomic Opportunity (GI/V-DEM)	47.6	24	-5.5
Equal Access to Public Services (V-DEM)	30.2	38	+0.1
<b>GENDER</b>	<b>54.0</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>-1.1</b>
Political Power & Representation of Women (GI/IPU/V-DEM)	58.1	15	+5.2
Equal Civil Liberties for Women (V-DEM)	65.9	39	-3.8
Socioeconomic Opportunity for Women (GI/V-DEM)	58.8	16	+26.6
Equal Access to Public Services for Women (V-DEM)	37.0	34	0.0
Laws on Violence against Women (OECD)	50.0	3	-33.3

**HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

SCORE/100    RANK/54    TREND  
 2019            2019            2010-2019

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	54.9	20	+5.3
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>66.0</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>+11.7</b>
Access to Healthcare (V-DEM/WHO)	54.5	20	+8.2
Access to Water & Sanitation (WHO & UNICEF)	45.3	26	-2.2
Control of Communicable Diseases (UNAIDS/WHO)	91.7	5	+14.5
Control of Non-Communicable Diseases (IHME)	59.5	37	+6.3
Control of Child & Maternal Mortality (IGCME/MMEIG)	72.7	26	+18.6
Compliance with International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO)	72.0	14	+24.5
<b>EDUCATION</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>-4.6</b>
Equality in Education (V-DEM/WB)	50.2	26	-23.3
Education Enrolment (UNESCO)	36.5	20	+1.3
Education Completion (UNDP/WB)	67.6	17	+2.6
Human Resources in Education (UNESCO)	75.1	22	-1.7
Education Quality (BS/WB/WEF)	61.6	11	-2.0
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<b>36.4</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>+7.9</b>
Social Safety Nets (BS/GI)	22.6	37	+3.0
Poverty Reduction Policies (AfDB/BS/WB)	47.0	25	+27.3
Socioeconomic Inequality Mitigation (AfDB/WB/WID.World)	39.4	37	+19.7
Access to Housing (CAHF/UN-Habitat)	36.3	19	-18.5
Absence of Undernourishment (FAO)	.	.	-
<b>SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>59.2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>+6.4</b>
Promotion of Environmental Sustainability (AfDB/BS/WB)	44.0	36	+17.0
Enforcement of Environmental Policies (WEF/WJP)	53.2	16	+8.5
Air Quality (HEI & IHME)	52.4	41	+18.5
Sustainable Management of Land & Forests (FAO/WB/WRI)	46.5	48	-12.2
Land & Water Biodiversity (WB/Yale & Columbia)	99.7	4	0.0

## Notes

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### Synthesis of the methodology

The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) is a composite index which gives a statistical measure of governance performance in 54 African countries. Each IIAG dataset provides a window of comparable data within a ten-year period. Governance is defined by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation as the provision of the political, social and economic public goods and services that every citizen has the right to expect from their state, and that a state has the responsibility to deliver to its citizens.

The IIAG governance framework comprises of four categories: *Security & Rule of Law, Participation, Rights & Inclusion, Foundations for Economic Opportunity and Human Development*. These categories are made up of 16 sub-categories, consisting of 79 indicators. The 2020 IIAG is calculated using data from 40 independent African and global institutions.

A new IIAG dataset is released every two years. IIAG datasets are not comparable between themselves, as each iteration covers a different ten-year period, data are revised retrospectively, and revision of the theoretical framework takes place between iterations. Users of the Index should therefore always reference the most recent version of the IIAG dataset.

For the first time, citizens' assessments of various governance dimensions are given more prominence as part of a new IIAG section named *Citizens' Voices*. All the data in this section is sourced from Afrobarometer, the leading pan-African research institution conducting public opinion surveys. This section mirrors the IIAG framework and helps to contextualise the official and expert assessment data in the IIAG with the reality on the ground as perceived by citizens.

Nevertheless, *Citizens' Voices* scores are not counted in the calculation of IIAG scores. Caveats apply with regards to the direct comparison of scores from the two datasets, as the country samples differ (only 39 in the case of the new section) and, while the Afrobarometer variables are the closest available proxies, there is not always exact thematic overlap with the IIAG measures.

### Calculation stages

The following methodology is applied to calculate both the 2020 IIAG and *Citizens' Voices* scores:

1. Variables that are consistent with the Foundation's definition of governance and meet specific standards of quality, periodicity and country coverage are selected and missing raw data values are estimated.
2. Raw data come on different scales from source. To be compared and combined, data are transformed to a standardised range of 0.0-100.0, where 100.0 is the best possible score.

3. Once the 79 indicators have been transformed to a common scale, a simple method of aggregation is applied to calculate the scores. The *Overall Governance* score is the average of the underlying category scores; the category scores are the average of their underlying sub-categories; and the sub-categories are the average of their constituent indicators.

Please visit our website for a full technical Index methodology: [mo.ibrahim.foundation](http://mo.ibrahim.foundation).

For any other enquiries and clarifications please contact the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Research Team at [research@moibrahimfoundation.org](mailto:research@moibrahimfoundation.org).

### Notes

The 2020 IIAG covers a ten-year time period from 2010 to 2019. The full IIAG dataset, including underlying raw data and normalised scores, as calculated for the express purposes of the Index, is available online via the Foundation's website.

In all 2020 IIAG publications and tables, default trends shown are for the ten-year period (2010-2019). However, users of the IIAG can carry out analysis of any other time periods by using our online and offline (Excel) Data Portals, also available via our website.

Country names in all IIAG resources, included in this report, are the abbreviations used in the African Union (AU) Handbook 2020. Furthermore, country ordering is based on the alphabetical order of their official names as of 1 September 2019, also outlined in the AU Handbook 2020.

Likewise, the list of countries pertaining to each regional group and Regional Economic Community is sourced from the AU Handbook 2020.

All figures on IIAG outputs are displayed to one decimal place. The calculation method to arrive at these scores is as follows:

- Country scores are calculated on full-precision raw data values (using the exact values as they are collected from source). All scores are then rounded to one decimal place.
- Group averages are calculated on the rounded, one decimal place country scores.
- Both trends over time and ranks are calculated on the scores to one decimal place.

The exception to this are the annual average trend figures. These are calculated on the rounded trends over time and displayed to two decimal places.

The 2020 IIAG publications also explore the correlations between different measures in the Index dataset. Correlation is a statistical measure that describes the extent to which two variables are associated. The correlation coefficient indicates the strength and direction of the relationship between two variables. Correlation

does not equal causation and users are advised to take care when interpreting these statistics. Correlation coefficients shown in this report are rounded to two decimal places.

The 2020 IIAG does not include data for South Sudan prior to secession in 2011. Due to the lack of data, ten-year trends are not available for this country. Since the country trend classifications are based on a comparison of a country's ten and five-year trends, these are not provided for South Sudan.

The absence of South Sudan scores prior to 2011 means that 53 countries are ranked in 2010 and 54 countries are ranked in 2011 to 2019 inclusive. This should be taken into account when looking at rank change over time. Similarly, averages calculated for groups which include South Sudan exclude the country in pre-secession years. All group averages, including Regional Economic Communities, are calculated on their current group composition.

Data for Sudan prior to 2011 (Former Sudan) have been used in the 2020 IIAG. Despite Sudan being a new country post-secession of South Sudan, pre-2011 data for 'Former Sudan' are deemed a suitable proxy for governance in Sudan.

Data for Morocco may or may not include Western Sahara depending on the source.

While Algeria, Libya and Somalia have no underlying raw data for all indicators in the Rural Sector sub-category (2010-2019), Namibia only has data for the 2015 data year. As such, these countries do not receive a score or rank. For these cases and any years where a country does not receive a score or rank, this is indicated by ".".

As the latest data year available from source for the indicators in the Rural Sector sub-category is 2015, all data points in 2016-2019 have had to be estimated and five-year trends (2015-2019) are static. While the data source for this sub-category, IFAD, released new data in 2018, changes in the framework render the latest scores non-comparable with previous data years. The IIAG is awaiting for the release of a second comparable year of data to be able to include the variables from their new framework. As a result of all of this, trend classifications, which are based on the comparison between the ten-year and five-year trends, are not considered relevant for the 2020 IIAG Rural Sector sub-category analysis.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF) is aware that some sources update their datasets after our documentation is sent to print. IIAG raw data are correct as per the date "last accessed", which is stated for each variable in the 2020 IIAG Excel Data Portal as well as in the Metadata file (both downloadable via our website). Please see the Metadata for all information on all variables and sources used in the 2020 IIAG.

## Trend classification approach

The annual average trends for the ten and five-year periods are calculated as follows:

- The annual average trend for the ten-year period (AAT10) is the total change in score between 2010 and 2019, divided by nine (the number of annual time periods experienced).
- The annual average trend for the five-year period (AAT5) is the total change in score between 2015 and 2019, divided by four (the number of annual time periods experienced).

Trend classifications are assigned based on the full precision of the ten and five-year annual average trends. They are applied to all measures in the IIAG. Depending on the size and direction of the annual average trends in the ten and five-year periods, countries and groups are assigned different trend classifications, which are best explained as follows:


- Increasing Improvement: progress over the last ten years, with the rate of improvement increasing in the latest five years.
- Slowing Improvement: progress over the last ten years, with the rate of improvement slowing in the latest five years.
- Bouncing Back: decline (or no change) over the last ten years, but showing progress in the latest five years.
- Warning Signs: progress (or no change) over the last ten years, but showing decline in the latest five years.
- Slowing Deterioration: decline over the last ten years, but the rate of decline is slowing in the latest five years.
- Increasing Deterioration: decline over the last ten years, with the rate of decline increasing in the latest five years.









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30.2	64.9	32.7	18.5	59.5	31.0	81.2	76.2	52.4	35.1	16.2	18.5	100.0
45.1	66.7	45.3	36.5	74.1	52.8	66.5	66.7	76.1	47.2	25.6	44.0	59.2
18.1	100.0	18.1	28.6	69.4	46.1	87.5	11.2	58.3	63.9	11.1	52.6	100.0
22.0	80.3	22.3	30.6	33.3	22.6	45.4	22.4	31.2	22.9	10.5	27.3	50.0
18.9	99.2	27.7	58.9	23.6	87.5	48.7	44.9	49.0	57.4	14.6	28.7	32.6
38.4	59.2	26.0	42.3	56.7	60.2	63.8	84.9	57.6	59.6	24.1	44.7	58.6
27.4	71.4	26.2	35.7	60.7	63.1	66.7	100.0	56.0	59.5	21.4	42.5	50.0
46.3	31.9	50.1	36.9	60.9	63.4	80.1	73.5	54.8	43.9	13.1	38.0	84.5
49.0	100.0	33.3	71.2	59.7	59.8	78.7	86.2	59.4	45.2	17.9	49.2	77.8
25.0	70.8	0.0	50.5	62.5	65.0	12.5	64.5	75.0	62.0	37.5	47.4	12.5
44.6	21.9	20.3	17.1	39.7	50.0	80.9	100.0	42.6	87.2	30.8	46.7	68.0
50.4	73.6	44.1	42.3	66.1	55.0	72.8	68.5	57.4	50.7	30.2	47.2	76.2
87.4	77.4	81.2	57.6	90.8	53.5	85.3	76.2	59.6	56.3	56.2	55.6	89.4
98.7	51.9	99.8	41.8	98.7	45.8	100.0	83.0	53.6	47.6	85.1	58.8	100.0
88.8	92.2	84.3	41.0	92.6	26.9	93.8	83.1	26.0	20.1	6.3	38.9	100.0
99.8	85.1	99.5	49.9	99.9	82.5	99.8	91.2	92.9	85.0	68.6	79.2	100.0
49.8	66.9	40.7	67.1	73.8	76.8	68.5	70.6	43.5	73.2	32.2	67.1	71.9
99.7	93.3	81.8	70.7	89.2	59.5	64.6	87.8	81.8	67.9	89.0	65.3	75.2
48.8	75.0	39.9	75.0	64.7	29.6	76.4	41.5	59.0	44.2	24.8	24.1	88.5
36.3	75.7	50.9	34.7	70.9	58.2	87.5	68.7	69.8	41.5	32.4	52.7	93.5
1.6	69.3	39.4	25.5	47.6	68.4	67.4	64.6	65.8	45.7	1.8	52.1	98.2
65.8	73.7	29.6	35.6	47.4	39.3	75.8	36.2	50.3	21.1	21.1	31.9	81.5
69.1	90.2	56.3	42.7	89.4	66.5	68.5	78.7	64.6	41.1	33.3	50.3	100.0
62.8	91.8	31.1	47.8	58.3	64.1	67.9	91.4	44.2	73.8	28.7	79.1	67.6
57.4	53.2	32.0	22.1	74.7	52.8	91.3	72.4	59.1	26.0	31.5	50.2	90.2
26.9	82.2	29.2	34.6	52.0	48.0	65.9	44.3	53.4	45.3	15.6	35.6	68.4
30.2	64.9	32.7	18.5	59.5	31.0	81.2	76.2	52.4	35.1	16.2	18.5	100.0
45.1	66.7	45.3	36.5	74.1	52.8	66.5	66.7	76.1	47.2	25.6	44.0	59.2
18.1	100.0	18.1	28.6	69.4	46.1	87.5	11.2	58.3	63.9	11.1	52.6	100.0
22.0	80.3	22.3	30.6	33.3	22.6	45.4	22.4	31.2	22.9	10.5	27.3	50.0
18.9	99.2	27.7	58.9	23.6	87.5	48.7	44.9	49.0	57.4	14.6	28.7	32.6
38.4	59.2	26.0	42.3	56.7	60.2	63.8	84.9	57.6	59.6	24.1	44.7	58.6
27.4	71.4	26.2	35.7	60.7	63.1	66.7	100.0	56.0	59.5	21.4	42.5	50.0
46.3	31.9	50.1	36.9	60.9	63.4	80.1	73.5	54.8	43.9	13.1	38.0	84.5
49.0	100.0	33.3	71.2	59.7	59.8	78.7	86.2	59.4	45.2	17.9	49.2	77.8
25.0	70.8	0.0	50.5	62.5	65.0	12.5	64.5	75.0	62.0	37.5	47.4	12.5
44.6	21.9	20.3	17.1	39.7	50.0	80.9	100.0	42.6	87.2	30.8	46.7	68.0
65.8	73.7	29.6	35.6	47.4	39.3	75.8	36.2	50.3	21.1	21.1	31.9	81.5
69.1	90.2	56.3	42.7	89.4	66.5	68.5	78.7	64.6	41.1	33.3	50.3	100.0
62.8	91.8	31.1	47.8	58.3	64.1	67.9	91.4	44.2	73.8	28.7	79.1	67.6
57.4	53.2	32.0	22.1	74.7	52.8	91.3	72.4	59.1	26.0	31.5	50.2	90.2
26.9	82.2	29.2	34.6	52.0	48.0	65.9	44.3	53.4	45.3	15.6	35.6	68.4
30.2	64.9	32.7	18.5	59.5	31.0	81.2	76.2	52.4	35.1	16.2	18.5	100.0



**Annex 124**

“Press Release: Spectrum signs seismic data agreement to kick-start oil exploration offshore Somalia”, *Spectrum*, 7 September 2015



Press Release

September 7<sup>th</sup>, 2015**Spectrum signs Seismic Data Agreement to Kick-Start Oil Exploration Offshore Somalia**

OSLO, September 7<sup>th</sup> 2015 – Spectrum ASA entered into a Multi-client master co-operation agreement with the federal government of Somalia during a signing ceremony on September 5<sup>th</sup> at the SYL Hotel, Mogadishu.

The agreement allows Spectrum to acquire approximately 28,000 km of long offset 2D seismic data offshore south Somalia. The new acquisition has been specifically designed to complement 20,000 km of existing seismic that was acquired in 2014. Spectrum has also been granted the marketing rights for this data. Together, these seismic surveys will allow the in-depth study of hydrocarbon prospectivity offshore Somalia, which lies in close proximity to major discoveries on the East African margin. Spectrum will use its global reach to market both data sets and raise industry interest.

At the signing ceremony the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, His Excellency Mohamed Mukhtar Ibrahim, said “This historic seismic data agreement will be the resumption of the exploration program of the hydrocarbon reserves of our country, which will be a turning point for the economic development of our nation.”

His Excellency Omar Abdirashid A. Sharmarke, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Somalia who concluded the event stated “Seismic data can lead to good decision-making and a guided exploration strategy.”

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**About Spectrum**

*Spectrum provides innovative Multi-Client seismic surveys and high-quality seismic imaging services to the global oil and gas industry from offices in the Norway, UK, USA, Brazil, Egypt, Australia, Indonesia and Singapore. Spectrum designs, acquires and processes seismic data to deliver high quality solutions through its dedicated and experienced workforce.*

*Spectrum holds the world's largest library of Multi-Client 2D marine seismic data and a significant amount of 3D seismic. The company's strategy focuses on both the major, established hydrocarbon-producing regions of the world as well as key frontier*

*areas identified by our experienced team of geoscientists. The Spectrum library of Multi-Client data contains projects from many of the foremost oil producing regions of the world. These include new acquisition, reprocessing and interpretation reports.*

**Annex 125**


“Spectrum press statement on Somalia offshore round”, *Garowe Online*, 19 February 2019

## Spectrum Press Statement on Somalia Offshore Round

PRESS RELEASES (/EN/NEWS/PRESS-RELEASES)

By SPECTRUM([HTTPS://WWW.GAROWEONLINE.COM/EN](https://www.garoweonline.com/en))

19.02.2019, 10:55



The Federal Government of Somalia hosted a successful promotion of the Somalia Offshore Round at the Somalia Oil and Gas Conference in London on 7th February 2019. Spectrum Geo assisted the Somali Government in organizing the event.

Spectrum is a Multi-Client Seismic Services company that acquires, processes, and interprets seismic data at its own expense and subsequently licenses the data to interested clients within the oil and gas industry.

The clients typically use such data to make their assessment of the hydrocarbon bearing potential of an area.

During 2015-2016, in preparation for the Offshore Round, Spectrum completed the acquisition and processing of 20,185 km of 2D long-offset seismic data, under a co-operation agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia.

This program is promoted and data is licensed to oil and gas companies by Spectrum on behalf of the Government, with the Government receiving part of the revenues.

The seismic data acquired separately in 2014 was also made available to the Federal Government of Somalia and Spectrum also licenses these data to interested clients on behalf of the Government.

The Somalia Offshore Round event was hosted to enable interested parties to understand the Somalia Offshore potential from the seismic data, along with the selection of blocks, the legal and fiscal terms, and the bidding conditions.

The organization of the Offshore Round, the terms and any awards of blocks are managed and decided by the Somali Government.

Somalia's Offshore has significant hydrocarbon resource potential and this event marks the start of a process for the Federal Government of Somalia to attract companies to explore and develop these resources in partnership with the Government.

**Annex 126**

“Senate declares London summit on Somalia oil ‘unconstitutional’”, *Garowe Online*,  
6 February 2019

## Senate declares London summit on Somalia Oil "unconstitutional"

SOMALIA (/EN/NEWS/SOMALIA)

By STAFF REPORTER, Garowe Online([HTTPS://WWW.GAROWEONLINE.COM/EN](https://www.garoweonline.com/en))

06.02.2019, 17:52



**MOGADISHU, Somalia** - The Senate has on Tuesday warned that upcoming London conference on Somalia oil could have "extremely serious" consequences, as the country lacks petroleum law and related regulations, Garowe Online reports.

In a statement, seen by *Garowe Online*, the Upper House's national resource committee has termed the summit which is scheduled to kick off set on Thursday, the 7th February "unconstitutional" and against the law of the Horn of Africa nation.

It said the parliament is yet to approve the petroleum law and the other regulations vital for the oil sector, investment, revenue, and environmental protection as the country still remained fragile and recovering from decades of conflict.

"According to the article 44 of the constitution which clarifies the scheme of the resource sharing is still uncompleted and besides there is a dispute between the regional states and the central Government," read the Senate's statement in part.

Wadajir, the main opposition party in Somalia called in the Federal Government to cease licensing of Somali oil until open and transparent contracting systems, as well as revenue sharing agreements with the Federal Member States, are being implemented.

"The Federal government of Somalia has to stop the deals behind closed doors and open up how it awards contracts of oil deals," said the political party in a statement sent the newsrooms Tuesday.

This makes the London conference unrealistic and uncertainty is looming as Somali petroleum authority, the national body that is in charge for the managing of the oil projects is yet to be established by the UN-backed Federal Government in Mogadishu.

Therefore, any contract signed with the international oil companies in the absence of the relevant regulations and law will make the process illegitimate, according to the Senate's national resource committee.

In an interview with BBC Somali service, the country's Petroleum Minister, Abdirashid Mohamed denied all allegations by the opposition that the government is planning to sell oil blocks un auction during the forthcoming London conference.

Mohamed who is already in London, leading a large government delegation said the spectrum company, which holds the seismic data will showcase possible locations in Somalia, where offshore oil reserves can be extracted in the future.

"The February 7th event in London is only to reveal the legal and regulatory framework and present the geological gained through insight 2D seismic data," said the minister, adding that there will not be a licensing bid round to auction off offshore oil blocks.

Spectrum (<https://www.spectrumgeo.com/press-release/somalia-announce-dates-for-first-license-round>), the seismic data processing company will cover the travel and accommodation costs for the Somali delegation during their stay in London.

The Union for peace and development [UPD] party, which is chaired by former Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said the country is not ready for offshore oil blocks auction and called for a postponement of the London meeting.



**Annex 127**


“About to happen Somali petroleum corruption”, *Somali Atlantic Council*, 3 December 2020



## About to happen Somali Petroleum Corruption

December 3, 2020

As Somalia is in the midst of intense political and a constitutional crisis ahead of the upcoming elections, there are reports linking very senior officials of the government to suspicious shady, corrupt deal of an oil licensing in Turkey. This week, there are reliable reports that meetings are underway in Istanbul to sell up to eight oil blocks, six to SomaOil and 2 to Liberty Petroleum, where by all the pre contract agreement are to be finalized. Corruption occurs when both motivation and opportunity are present. Personal benefit motivates individuals to be corrupt, but they depend on opportunity as well. Official bureaucrats may have vast discretionary powers over natural resources. Opportunities for corrupt behaviour arise when decision-making accountability for these people is low. National resource exploitation without good legal system is curse and takes down everything to the benefit of view oligarch. Somalia is already listed among the most corrupted emerging oil and gas countries.



Ibrahim Ali Hussien the director of SPA and Petroleum Minister Abdirashid & NISA chief Fahad Yasin have registered in Somalia-Qatar a joint venture between the three officials. Some Qatari businessmen have also good shares in the company . The company is called AMAANA PETROLEUM.

The CEO of Somali Petroleum Authority Ibrahim Ali Hussein and regional director of Coastline Petroleum are in this week meeting with CEO of an American company called Liberty Petroleum. The Somali officials intend to sell two Blocks in Galmudug Coastline and six (where.....) to foreign company called in the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) to “the Coastline Petroleum.” The legality of the deal is in question for many reasons. Many oil companies from Britain, Norway, and Qatar are previously accused of pressure and knowing the money they paid to Somalia officials would be used for bribes.

It is alleged that the government officials had engineered the elections of the three regional states South West, Galmudud and HirShabelle and all the three presidents installed over the regions for the purpose of this contracts without the consent of local people. In at least two regions, the government used military power to enforce its will. Subsequently, the federal government appointed loyal individuals with no proper accreditation to the Board of the Somali Petroleum Agency (SPA). However, Puntland state refused to take part of the formation of the board of SPA Board citing that proper procedures were not followed as agreed. The opposition groups warned the federal government against involvement of itself in oil deals in election time and end of its term.

The government chose to ignore the dissenting voices in the country striving to be democratic. Analyst say that the officials who are rushing to sign this deals do not have legal authority from the regions they are claiming to represent and the protocol of oil extraction rights is not there. The entire process is masterminded by self interest group. The same shame scenario of SOMA Oil is likely to crop up once again if officials are not stopped in time. Somalia, at this stage, does not want officials managing Somali oil and gas resources to appoint their family members to the Somali Petroleum Authority board. The work of this important body should be transparent and all inclusive.

It is not a secret that the discredited company SOMA Oil was renamed Coastline Exploration. The public can not be fooled twice. Every body remembers very vividly the public objection to the major attempt to launch an oil licensing round in London few years ago. Despite the efforts of the federal government to conceal this deal, the Somali people will rise up again to stop the thieves looting public resources.

Foot note:

SPA officials appointed through nepotism

1 –Ibraahim Cali Xuseen (Guddoomiye),

2 -Caa’isho Cusmaan Axmed (Guddoomiye ku-xigeen)

3 –Ibraahim Axmed Leyte (Xubin),

4 –Cabdulqaadir Aadan Maxamuud (Xubin),

5 –Ibraahim Cabdulqaadir Maxamed, (Xubin),

6 –Axmed Xaaji Cabdi (Xubin),

7 –Cabdixaafid Cali Dirir (Xubin)

8 –Iyo Mahad Maxamed Sheekh Xasan (Xubin).

(Asha Osman Ahmed, representing Banadir Regional Authority is a cousin of Fahad Yasin

Ibrahim Ahmed Layte representing Hirshabeele State is close friend to Somali Minister of Petroleum;

The regional director of Coastline Petroleum is a cousin of petroleum minister as well.

It's in the public knowledge that the minister of petroleum hired his own daughter.)

**Annex 128**

“Government dissolves Benadir chamber of commerce over link to Al-Shabaab”, *Radio*

*Dalsan*, 26 January 2020



Home > Africa >

## Gov't Dissolves Benadir Chamber Of Commerce Over Alleged Link To Al-Shabab

On Jan 26, 2020



Somalia's minister of commerce and industry Abdullahi Hassan Ali has dissolved Benadir regional chamber of commerce barely two days after the leaders of the Chambers were arrested.

In a statement, the minister said his ministry will soon start the process to form leadership for the chamber.

According to statement, the directive will be effective from today.

The move comes after executive director and the deputy of the chamber arrested by the Intelligence agency last week over alleged links with AlShabaab.

## **Annex 129**

K. Lindskov Jacobsen and J. Høy-Carrasco, “Navigating changing currents -a forward-looking evaluation of efforts to tackle maritime crime off the Horn of Africa”, *University of Copenhagen Centre for Military Studies*, September 2018 (Extracts)



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# Navigating Changing Currents

A forward-looking evaluation of efforts to tackle maritime crime off the Horn of Africa

Katja Lindskov Jacobsen  
Julie Høy-Carrasco

September 2018

## Masthead

### Navigating Changing Currents

The Centre for Military Studies (CMS) is a research centre at the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. The Centre undertakes research on security and defence issues as well as military strategy. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime's Global Maritime Crime Programme (UNODC GMCP) has been working in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region to strengthen the ability of criminal justice systems to address threats of maritime crime through a multiplicity of activities since 2009.

In 2017, CMS established a partnership with UNODC GMCP. This partnership was established to make use of UNODC's unique access to primary data on crime trends in the HoA region on the one hand, and, on the other hand, CMS' expertise in carrying out policy-relevant research to inform security policy in complex and interconnected security environments.

The Government of Denmark has supported the GMCP since 2011 under the Peace and Stabilisation Programme (PSP). After more than seven years of programme delivery, the Royal Danish Embassy in Nairobi commissioned the present report to conduct an evaluation of activities delivered under the latest PSP (2015-2017) in view of counter-piracy objectives, but also of trends in other types of maritime crime.

The purpose of this report is to inform Danish policies with regard to combating maritime crime in the HoA region. It contains an analysis based on academic research methodology. Its conclusions should not be understood as a reflection of the views and opinions of the Danish Government, the Danish Armed Forces, UNODC or any other authority.

Read more about CMS and its activities at <http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/>.

#### Authors:

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Programme Development Officer, MSc. Julie Høy-Carrasco, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

#### Acknowledgements:

In the making of this report, a number of people have offered extremely valuable inputs and assistance at different stages. The authors would like to thank all those interviewed and all those who helped carry out interviews, workshop participants, colleagues at CMS, two anonymous reviewers, and Professor Christian Bueger for their time and very helpful comments. Finally, we are grateful for the assistance offered by Annemette Tønno Rasmussen, notably in the processing of interview data.

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# Abbreviations

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AIS	Automatic Identification System
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AS	Al-Shabaab
AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
BAM	Bab al-el-Mandeb Strait
BIMCO	Baltic and International Maritime Council
BPMPU	Bosasso Port and Maritime Police Unit
BPP	Bosasso Port Police
CGPCS	Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
CMS	Centre for Military Studies
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DT	Detention and Transfer Programme
ENACT	European Union Project: Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organised Crime
EUCS	EUCAP Somalia
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GI	The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime
GMCP	Global Maritime Crime Programme
GPS	Global Positioning System
HoA	Horn of Africa
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
INTERTANKO	International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IUU	Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing
KMPU	Kenyan Maritime Police Unit
MCP HoA	Maritime Crime Programme for the Horn of Africa
MDA	Maritime Domain Awareness
MLE	Maritime Law Enforcement
MPTF	Multi Partner Trust Fund for Somalia
MPU	Mogadishu Maritime Police Unit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NM	Nautical Miles
NMRs	Nelson Mandela Rules
OBP	Oceans Beyond Piracy

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OECD-DAC	Organization of Economic Development, Development Assistance Committee
OEF	One Earth Future Foundation
PAG	Piracy Action Group
PEW	PEW Charitable Trusts
PSMA	Agreement on Port State Measures
PSP1	Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2011-2014
PSP2	Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2015-2018
RMIFC	Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SEMG	Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
SLCG	Somaliland Coastguard
SMRs	UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
SMRSS	Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy
SOLAS	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SRP	Southern Route Partnership
TEPIDOIL	Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, Doctrine and concepts, Organisation, Infrastructure, Logistics
TiPSoM	Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants
TNT	Trinitrotoluene
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VBSS	Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure
VEO	Violent Extremist Offenders
VMS	Vessel Monitoring System
WBIED	Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIO	Western Indian Ocean

# Executive Summary

This report is made up of three separate sections. Section 1 offers an analysis of maritime crime trends off the Horn of Africa (HoA). Section 2 is an evaluation of a set of past programmes aimed at countering maritime crime. Finally, section 3 combines findings from sections 1 and 2 to make recommendations on how to shape future engagements. The summary below highlights key findings from each of the two analytical sections of the report and presents the main challenges identified in section 3.

## Section 1: Summary of findings of Trend Analysis

Since 2012, the problem of Somali piracy has been largely suppressed through numerous concerted efforts by Somali, regional, and international actors. A number of failed hijacking attempts in 2017 have been seen by some as indicating that a resurgence of piracy may be on the horizon. Others, however, argue that the integrity of the business model for piracy off the coast of Somalia has been broken and that those who were once involved in piracy have moved on to other ventures. Regardless of whether a resurgence of Somali piracy is at hand, there are numerous other threats to stabilisation in the HoA region emanating from the maritime domain.

This report looks specifically at *developments and drivers* of six types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity, namely: Piracy, Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (TiPSoM), Weapons Smuggling, Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU), Drugs Smuggling, and Armed Violence at Sea. It is found that each of these forms of crime negatively impact stability in the HoA region. We call this the *maritime crime-stability nexus*. Criminal networks and terrorist groups in and around Somalia thrive in lawless space, both on land and at sea. Compounding the problem is the fact that maritime crime fuels the operations of these actors, which allows them to grow in strength. This is, for example, seen in the case of arms smuggling via maritime routes where many of the weapons reaching Somalia are likely to end up in the hands of groups such as Al-Shabaab. Governance structures and rule of law are thus at risk of being undermined, which invigorates a spiral of insecurity.

Beyond individual forms of crime, this report also looks at the broader *crime complex at sea*, which is characterised by *interconnectivity* between different types of crime and dynamics, causing crime to reposition thematically (into other types of criminal ventures) and/or to reposition geographically when pressures of deterrence are exerted. These dynamics are referred to as *ballooning effects*. By way of example, there is evidence that former piracy action groups have moved into other types of crime as the piracy business model came under pressure due to various measures of deterrence. The mutually reinforcing effect of naval patrols, industry self-protection, and regional prosecutions rendered piracy a dangerous and non-profitable business. The advent of these new circumstances roughly coincided with the rapid destabilisation of Yemen, which led to TiPSoM becoming a more profitable and less risky business for former pirates, and others, to engage in. Indirect linkages are also important to consider. Highlighted in this report is

particularly how smuggling of weapons, heroin, and other contraband such as sugar and charcoal, finance terrorist groups in various locations ranging from Afghanistan to Somalia – and, more recently, Mozambique.

Having looked at the broader crime complex at sea, the main conclusion from section 1 is that it is not useful to tackle individual types of maritime crime in isolation. Since the crime complex seen off the HoA is dynamic and interconnected, interventions aimed at building stability through countering maritime crime should be equally agile and/or comprehensive both in terms of the types of crime being targeted and the geographical scope. *Reflections* revolving around these notions round off section 1.

## Section 2: Summary of findings of Evaluation

In section 2, focus is centred on specific interventions delivered by UNODC's Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) in Somalia from 2015-2017 with funding from the Danish PSP. Two engagements related to corrections and maritime law enforcement are evaluated against three parameters, namely whether *objectives* have been met, with what *impact*, and whether the *rationale* for them remains valid. This evaluation is based on findings from interviews carried out with criminal justice actors who have received GMCP support (recipient respondents) and counterparts from organisations involved in related fields of work (peer respondents). Substantiation of conclusions derived from interviews has been secured through triangulation of findings through secondary sources such as parallel assessments, monitoring reports, and reports from key actors working with criminal justice in Somalia.

In the area of *corrections*, UNODC GMCP was tasked with ensuring that prison conditions for piracy prisoners transferred from third party states to Somali prisons are humane and secure. As custodian to the 'Nelson Mandela Rules' (NMRs), UNODC seeks to support Member States in attaining the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs). Danish support to the GMCP was targeted at Garowe and Hargeisa Prisons, which both hold piracy prisoners transferred from Seychelles under the Piracy Prosecution Model. Programme delivery focused on ensuring that basic conditions of incarceration are humane and secure; that prison management follows the basic principles enshrined in the NMRs, and that prisoners receive training and support to bring about rehabilitation. In addition to material support for training programmes, a key part of GMCP's programme is the placement of two embedded mentors in each of the two prisons. These mentors work alongside staff on a day-to-day basis, deliver training programmes, and continuously monitor conditions.

Concerning the *objective* of ensuring compliance with the NMRs, it was found through our synthesis of primary and secondary data, that there are concrete examples of positive change in behaviour among prison staff. According to respondents, GMCP mentors have been an important contributing factor in achieving this change. While many challenges remain in the two prisons, statements by peer and recipient respondents suggest that conditions are considered humane and secure. When analysing the *impact* of GMCP's support, several respondents refer to conditions in prisons where UNODC is not present as a way of exploring the counterfactual question of how conditions may have been had the programme not existed. The conclusion is that detention standards in Hargeisa and Garowe Prisons are higher than in other detention facilities in Somalia. This in turn, suggests that standards achieved in Hargeisa and Garowe are to a large degree attributa-

ble to efforts of the GMCP. Again, respondents highlight that the presence of the mentors contributed enormously to the level reached in the two prisons. Finally, with regard to whether the *rationale* of the engagement remains valid, a few points for consideration are put forward.

Firstly, with regard to basic conditions, it is important to recognise the local context in which the programme is delivered when setting success criteria for support to the prison sector. Considering the Somali context, expectations for living standards for prison inmates should be compatible to the living conditions of the general Somali public which are considerably low. In terms of improvement of prison management, what might receive more attention in future engagements is increased systematisation of administrative procedures. Having a paper trail documenting the handling of complaints, sanctions, and medical emergencies for example, could bring increased accountability. This is, however, challenged by the fact that 80% of prison staff are estimated to be illiterate. Exploring how technological solutions can help overcome challenges related to written communication is suggested as a way forward. Another possibility is to consider making more strategic use of the vantage point of the mentors as intermediaries between the prison sector and international community actors supporting Somali corrections. Other areas which the programme might increase attention on relate to prisoner radicalisation, conditions for minors, healthcare including mental health in prisons, and risk of early release.

The second engagement considered in section 2 relates to UNODC GMCP support to *Maritime Law Enforcement* (MLE) units in three locations – Berbera, Bosasso, and Mogadishu. This engagement has included delivery of equipment, infrastructure, and embedded mentoring and training. The *objective* of the project was for Somali MLE authorities to carry out operations in line with basic principles on the use of force and firearms and the code of conduct for law enforcement officials. According to these principles, operations must at all times be carried out with respect to human rights and law enforcement officials are obligated to “apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms.” At outcome level, the target was for supported units to reach ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC). Thus, UNODC GMCP’s role was to support skills development of officers and provide equipment needed for this operational level to be reached while adhering to the basic principles.

To ascertain whether the programme met this objective, the analysis has been broken down into three parts. With regard to ‘patrol and control’, the conclusion from data synthesis is that the units have moved from having no capacity for at-sea operations to being at basic IOC level. Patrols are carried out at regular intervals, though these differ from unit to unit. Patrols are both routine and carried out in response to emergencies. There are also few examples of patrols being intelligence-led, however, these could usefully be stepped up. With regard to ‘adherence to basic law enforcement principles’, none of the statements made by recipient respondents suggest any deliberate application of these. This notion reverberates in statements from peer respondents. Finally, with regard to the level of ‘deterrence’ of the three MLE units supported, it was found that their presence did have some deterrent effect albeit limited to a range of approximately 100 km for each of the three units. In sum, the objective of the programme was met, though just barely.

Concerning the *impact* of GMCP's support to MLE units, the perception is that the progress made is attributable to two things: (1.) external support to the units and, (2.) the leadership within each unit. With regard to the latter, the most important factor in determining progress is perhaps the degree of ambition and drive to orchestrate change within each unit. One example is the Bosasso Port and Maritime Police Unit (BPMPU), which, when mentors first arrived, was basically only tasked with port inspection. Through strong leadership and engagement, officers in this unit have undergone professionalisation and a resultant expansion of mandate. The Mogadishu Maritime Police Unit (MPU) has, similarly, gone from being a small group of police officers primarily tasked with life-saving at Lido Beach and port security, to taking over some responsibilities related to security management around Mogadishu International Airport from troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This handover of responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security forces is a noteworthy achievement as it is the first instance where this has happened. On the contrary, lack of leadership and command vision at an institutional level is regarded, across the board, as an important inhibiting factor for progress in all MLE units supported.

Finally, looking at the *rationale* for the engagement, it seems that progress achieved could easily be lost if the programme was to stop. GMCP's approach to supporting Somali MLE is characterised by gradual professionalisation of a limited number of officers and procurement of equipment determined by their level of proficiency. This approach is deemed appropriate. Further to this point, while recipient and peer respondents highlight the need for bigger boats, it is vital to be mindful of the risk of reliance on external actors to assume maintenance responsibilities. Finally, it would be useful if the programme was underpinned by a clearer strategy which sets realistic targets in light of the unengaging political environment and limited time frame.

The broader conclusion from the evaluation is that the objectives of GMCP's engagements under the Danish PSP have been met. The progress made is, however, precarious and reversible. In terms of impact, one conclusion to be drawn is that GMCP's model of placing mentors with frontline criminal justice actors is impactful. Looking forward, both the corrections and MLE sector in Somalia would benefit from continued and perhaps more comprehensive support. Future programming should, however, be designed with an ultimate aim of self-sufficiency.

### **Section 3: Conclusion – Challenges and Recommendations**

This final section builds on findings from sections 1 and 2 and serves as the conclusion of the report. This approach is premised on the view that combining an analysis of current trends and past delivery offers a useful platform for making recommendations for future engagements. Focus is centred on *ten key challenges* identified in the amalgamation of the two previous sections. Five of these challenges relate to preconditions. These include:

1. *Changing currents*: As the maritime crime complex is dynamic, countermeasures should be correspondingly flexible if they are to be effective in navigating changing currents in maritime crime.

2. *Under-prioritisation of maritime security*: Countering maritime crime is not a top priority at government level in Somalia. This is a precondition for maritime security efforts, which needs to be acknowledged.
3. *Divergent visions for maritime governance*: The prevalence of divergent visions for how the Somali maritime domain is to be managed implies a difficult balance to strike for donors.
4. *Corruption as a fact of life*: Corruption is an important precondition to consider when formulating interventions to counter maritime crime; not only does it have implications at programme level, it is also a factor that contributes to shaping maritime crime trends.
5. *Risk of misconduct in the Somali criminal justice system*: Some degree of misconduct is likely to occur within the Somali criminal justice sector.

Five challenges are related to weaknesses, deficiencies, and gaps. These are as follows:

6. *Weak state presence and ungoverned spaces*: Ungoverned spaces at sea and on land are exploited by criminal groups.
7. *Impunity in the absence of legal finishes*: A unifying factor for all types of crime analysed, bar piracy, is the lack of 'legal finish.'
8. *Non-payment of salaries*: Lack of sufficient finances in the criminal justice sector does not only hamper efforts to establish functional institutions, it also has security implications as trained security personnel may join armed groups if they do not receive their salaries.
9. *Lack of leadership and command structures*: There is an imminent need for well-educated middle and senior managers to take over once leadership is handed over from an ageing senior command.
10. *Insufficient coordination of programmes*: Insufficient donor coordination is an obstacle to gaining multiplier effects from the investments made in criminal justice and maritime security endeavours in the region.

Each of the ten challenges comprises aspects that are within the remit of different actors to address. Accordingly, the recommendations offered are divided into the following three sub-categories to explicate which type of actor they are addressed to: recommendations requiring *Collective action*, recommendations targeted at individual *Donors*, and finally, recommendations for *Implementing* agencies delivering programmes to counter maritime crime off the HoA. Recommendations are thus presented for each of the ten challenges described in section 3.



## Introduction

More than half a decade has passed since pirates last profited from hijacking vessels off the coast of Somalia and holding crews hostage for ransom. While the number of failed hijacking attempts in 2017 has been seen by some as indicating that piracy action groups are testing the waters before making a comeback, others are more careful to draw such conclusions. Regardless of whether a resurgence of piracy is on the horizon, evidence suggests that piracy has served as a gateway to other forms of maritime crime for those who were once pirates. Moreover, there are numerous other threats to stability in the HoA region emanating from the maritime domain, including in the Southern Red Sea and wider Western Indian Ocean (WIO), which merit equivalent if not greater attention than piracy.

Unprecedented seizures of heroin consignments on the southern maritime smuggling route from the Makran Coast to East Africa indicate an increased use of this region as a transit hub for the onward movement of narcotics to consumer markets in Europe and America. Not only is this trade a primary source of terrorist financing Afghanistan, the ramifications of this trade are also felt in the detrimental increase in drug dependency in transshipment countries along the East Africa coastline. In fact, according to UNODC's 2017 World Drug Report, the increase in heroin use in Africa is among the sharpest globally. This is seen as a spill-over effect of heroin trafficking along the Southern Route. Recently, heroin trade has even been linked to the emergence of a new violent extremist movement in Mozambique.

With regard to threats at sea, the continued destabilisation of Yemen and spill-over of conflict into the maritime domain, particularly around the narrow passage of the Bab el-Mandeb (BAM) Strait, is perceived to represent a greater threat to freedom of navigation and safety of seafarers than piracy. These are but two examples of other types of maritime crime in the HoA region which have clear nexuses to regional stability. One of the arguments presented in the report is that, following a decade of counter-piracy efforts off the HoA, it is important to ensure that the focus of future efforts is targeted at current threats to stability deriving from the maritime domain and these are by no means limited to piracy. As maritime crime threats off the HoA are both interlinked and in constant flux, focus also needs to be raised from individual threats to the broader maritime crime complex at sea and the dynamics at play within this.

In addition to current maritime crime trends, the report looks at past efforts aimed at addressing maritime crime threats. Assessment is made of whether objectives have been met, with what impact, and whether the rationale for engagements remain valid. The purpose of this exercise is to examine whether activities carried out thus far remain pertinent in addressing current maritime crime threats or whether adjustments may be warranted given changes in the crime complex at sea. Report findings can help inform decisions on future programme activities to address maritime crime threats in the HoA region.

With reference to the title of this report, the aim of the analyses provided below is essentially to create a vantage point from which to better *navigate the changing currents* of maritime crime off the HoA.

### Structure and Reader's Guide

It is useful to consider both the past and present when planning for the future. In this report, past and present factors are therefore examined in the context of a foreign assistance programme. As the Danish PSP is a continuous engagement, which has so far run for seven years, the report commissioned needed to look at how activities already delivered to target maritime crime off the HoA have worked and what their current status is. The intention of having these three components (i.e. past, present, and future) incorporated into a single report is to establish a strong foundation for policy-makers to take informed decisions about future action. Following the line of reasoning outlined above, the report is made up of three sections, with the first two being entirely separate.

- Section 1: Analysis of Present Maritime Crime Trends: This in-depth analysis of current maritime crime trends around the HoA has been carried out using sources of information uniquely available through the GMCP as well as other supplementary sources of information. The purpose of this exercise is to have a thoroughly researched set of data on *developments, drivers, interlinkages* and *dynamics* at play within the maritime crime complex off the HoA, insofar as it affects stability in the region.
- Section 2: Evaluation of Past Activities: This section offers an assessment of whether GMCP activities in Somalia, that have been funded under the Danish PSP to target maritime crime, have met the *Objectives*, what *Impact* they have had, and whether the *Rationale* for these activities remain valid.
- Section 3: Recommendations for Future Action: In section 3, key *Challenges* to current counter maritime crime efforts are identified based on Past activities and Present maritime crime trends. *Recommendations* for how international actors can confront these challenges are also offered.

It is important to note that sections 1 and 2 are not directly connected. Each section can easily be read in isolation if the reader is only interested in one of the two. With regard to the distinctive model used in this report, however, it is the combination of the (1) Trend Analysis and the (2) Evaluation that together amounts to what CMS terms a (3) Forward Looking Evaluation: looking at past activities in light of current trends in order to inform future activities. Essentially, section 1 + section 2 = section 3. Thus, section 3 concludes the report based on findings from sections 1 and 2.

### Terminology

The term 'maritime crime' covers a broad range of activities, including (a) crimes that use the sea to transport illicit cargo, (b) criminal exploitation of resources at sea, (c) crimes that specifically target objects at sea, and (d) crimes that use the sea as a dumpsite.<sup>1</sup> It is important to appreciate the breadth of criminal activities covered by the term 'maritime crime' in order

to discern how these can come to represent a threat to regional and international security. The impact of maritime crime on stability is referred to as the 'maritime crime-stability nexus'.

### **Methodology**

CMS applies stringent quality assurance procedures which entail defined standards for data collection and analysis, regular internal review throughout the drafting process, and an external anonymous review (double blind peer review) of the final report as a means of validating findings. These quality assurance mechanisms have been applied throughout the process of data collection, analysis, and drafting of this report and all sections have been subject to internal and external review to ensure academic quality. While section 1 has been subject to an additional midway internal review and a validation workshop with international specialists, data collected in section 2 has been processed using quality assurance software.

As the Trend Analysis and the Evaluation are two distinct genres, we distinguish between the methodological approaches applied in each of the two sections.

### **Trend Analysis**

To undertake a systematic analysis of current trends in maritime crime around the HoA, we draw on information obtained from a mix of the following primary and secondary sources.

Interviews and workshops: In part, the findings presented in this report are based on data obtained through observations at expert workshops (ENACT workshop in Nairobi, expert workshop in Copenhagen) and conferences (SafeSeas Symposium, Nairobi), as well as on a total of 26 interviews with various actors including pirate inmates, a former hostage, maritime police units, actors collecting and recording data from various sources, international experts and front line criminal justice actors.<sup>2</sup> We have deliberately incorporated views from a broad and diverse range of actors, including UN agencies, multilateral actors, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), regional actors, UNODC staff (in Somalia and elsewhere), front-line criminal justice actors, as well as imprisoned pirates, former hostages, and others. To minimise the risk of influencing interviewee responses, all interviews were kept *conversational* in nature guided by only two, deliberately open-ended questions. These two key questions were (1) "What upward- and downward-going trends characterise maritime crime around the HoA and in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO)?", and (2) "What trends can be observed in terms of interlinkages between different types of maritime crime in this region?" Due to the sensitive nature of some of the issues addressed in this report, the source of some statements will be kept anonymous.

Reports and statistics: Findings presented in this section are also based on statistics from various sources on piracy attacks, heroin seizures, and migration flows and on various reports including flash reports on incidents of maritime crime from regional information centres, risk assessments from navy coalitions and industry, workshop background documents, weekly and annual reports from various UN bodies (the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), etc.) as well as

evaluations from several key actors, and more.<sup>3</sup> Finally, a number of academic publications, research articles and reports are used to offer important perspectives on preceding developments of relevance.<sup>4</sup> Thus the data upon which this report is based, includes a wide range of both primary sources (for example, reports with recordings of events based on information from actors involved in handling them) and secondary sources (for example, reports synthesising data from existing rather than original sources).

Having multiple sources of information enables substantiation of individual statements through a process of cross verification. This methodological principle is commonly known as *data triangulation*. The combination of primary and secondary sources also allows for overall conclusions to be drawn on key developments (reflected in numbers), whilst at the same time acknowledging the importance of detail and contextual factors<sup>5</sup> that are more likely to be discovered in qualitative data.

What we present in section 1 is a synthesis of the information obtained from the primary and secondary sources of information described above. Key factors attended to in this synthesis are developments, drivers, interlinkages, and dynamics of maritime crime and how these affect regional stability. The reason for focusing on these particular factors is based on the view that they are important when designing future engagements aimed at enhancing maritime security off the HoA.

### Evaluation

The methodological approach upon which the evaluation presented in section 2 is based on three main sources: the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines (OECD-DAC), UNODC's Handbook for Evaluation, and various academic sources.

According to the OECD-DAC Guidelines, evaluation is: "an assessment, as *systematic* and *objective* as possible, of an *on-going* or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development *efficiency*, *effectiveness*, *impact* and *sustainability*. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the *incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process* of both recipients and donors".<sup>6</sup>

This overall definition has guided the methodological approach taken in section 2. More specifically, the evaluation examines whether objectives have been met, with what impact, and whether the rationale of the engagements remain valid. In terms of the approach taken to ensure that the assessment is systematic and objective, the evaluation team has been made up of members that are both external and internal to the programme being evaluated. The internal component has enabled access to key stakeholders to the programme being delivered. And the external component, namely CMS, has ensured academic rigour in procedures related to data collection and analysis as well as quality assurance of findings and conclusions. This is in line with the approach taken in Participatory Evaluation<sup>7</sup> in which "representatives of agencies and stakeholders, including beneficiaries, work together in designing, carrying out and interpreting an evaluation".<sup>8</sup>

Crucially, in the process of carrying out this evaluation, the best efforts have been made to draw in a wide array of perspectives in order to give as nuanced a picture of programme delivery as possible. To that end, one of the main methods used is Stakeholder Interviews based on interview guides

tailored to measure whether targets set for each activity have been met. To assess this, interview guides were developed on the basis of original result frameworks.<sup>9</sup> The 22 interview respondents include two types of stakeholders with different perspectives on programme activities depending on their involvement and proximity:

1. *Recipient Respondents*: criminal justice actors who have received programme support;
2. *Peer Respondents*: counterparts from organisations involved in related fields of work, deliberately including organisations likely to represent a diverse set of perspectives, including critical views.<sup>10</sup>

While interviews have been carried out on the principle of anonymity in order to encourage open and honest responses, they have been audio-recorded with a view to carry out an analysis of the interview data through the qualitative data analysis software NVivo. This has, in turn, helped to ensure consistency and methodological rigor in the analysis of interview data which has been reviewed by two researchers independently of each other. Findings from interviews have then been triangulated using secondary sources of information, such as parallel assessments, monitoring reports, and reports from key actors working with criminal justice in Somalia.

Therefore, linking the above cited definition with the methodological approach just accounted for, and recalling that the purpose of the evaluation is to inform future engagements aimed at countering maritime crime, the evaluation contained in section 2 represents a structured assessment of the *efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability* of ongoing activities, with the aim of *enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of donors*, which seeks to institute learning and improvement.

### **Scope**

With regard to section 1, the geographical focus is the HoA. With Somalia as the epicentre, the study looks at threats in the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and further into the WIO insofar as they impact stability around the HoA. It is important to underline that general references to Somalia and separate references to Somaliland should not be interpreted as any form of stance on statehood on the part of CMS.

The Evaluation carried out in section 2 looks specifically at activities delivered by the GMCP under the second iteration of the PSP (PSP2), all of which are within Somalia. This focus has been set by the Royal Danish Embassy in Nairobi in connection with the commissioning of the report. It is important to underline that no assessment of financial management will be made as that rather belongs in an audit report.

Since the purpose of this report is to establish a platform for international community actors to address maritime crime challenges as they affect stability, recommendations are addressed to this segment specifically. This is not to ignore the primary role of regional actors in securing their maritime domain and mitigating threats to stability in the HoA region. However, while ways in which regional actors can counteract maritime crime threats should be explored further, it falls outside the scope of this report.

## 1

## Section I: Current Trends in the Maritime Crime Complex off the Horn of Africa

The maritime crime complex at sea is in constant flux, evolving according to changing geo-political circumstances and adapting to overcome pressures arising from deterrent measures. Given the nature of this complex, interventions designed to help counter maritime crime in the HoA region should be informed by a thorough consideration of both the developments and drivers of individual types and of the broader interlinked drivers at play within the complex. This section seeks to map out the maritime crime complex by taking both a narrow view at individual crimes and a broad view at the dynamics and links within it.

### Focus and Structure

The first chapter in this section focuses narrowly on six types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity off the HoA. These six segments relate to Piracy, Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (TiPSoM), Weapons Smuggling, Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU), Drugs Smuggling, and Armed Violence at Sea. Since the focus of the report is on efforts under the PSP, this section centres more strongly on Somalia than on other countries in the HoA region. This focus is reflected in the order in which the six types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity are presented – moving from Somalia-centred crimes to threats that have a wider geographical scope in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and into the WIO. The sequence should, therefore, not be seen as indicative of the level or severity of the different threats nor as a normative judgement of their respective importance or preferred prioritisation.

Each of the six segments provides a brief status of recent *developments* within the respective area of crime. Subsequently, an analysis is presented of *drivers* behind each category viewed through the prism of (1) deterrents, (2) criminal networks, and (3) enabling onshore factors. Finally, each segment is concluded with an analysis of how it affects national and/or regional stability, i.e. *the maritime crime-stability nexus*.

The second chapter in this section offers a broader picture of the overall crime complex at sea, focusing on *interlinkages* between different forms of maritime crime and insecurity and dynamics. With regard to *dynamics*, the analysis is centred around the tendency of different types of crime to adjust to changing conditions either by moving into new types of crime or by relocating geographically. This dynamic is referred to as ‘ballooning’ effects. It is important to recognise both ballooning effects and interlinkages between the different types of maritime crime when seeking to formulate targeted counter measures that go beyond pushing crimes into other areas, either thematically or geographically.


Considering the foregoing analysis of developments, drivers, interlinkages, and dynamics, section 1 is rounded off with a chapter offering general reflections on maritime crime trends. Finally, a brief conclusion closes section 1. These are therefore used in section 3 of this report to offer recommendations on how international actors might improve future action to counter maritime crime in the HoA region and further into the WIO.

### Background

The political situation in Somalia is an important contextual factor for the analysis of maritime crime presented below. Whilst progress towards stability in Somalia is slow and at times difficult to appreciate, advances have been made in the past decade. Peaceful elections in 2017 highlighted the steady progress of the Federal Government to take hold in Somalia with power transferred from one administration to another. Concerning progress towards a safer Somalia, an interviewee noted how “in 2008, Mogadishu was a war zone. Somalia in general was an extremely dangerous field of operation and international actors working in Somalia faced lethal threats on a daily basis. Today, this place has changed! Markets are bustling with people and there is a real belief in change”.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab (or the Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin) continues to have control over certain parts of the country and a militant group aligned to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has also emerged in the Bari region of Puntland.<sup>12</sup> State fragmentation and fragility combined with drought, periodic severe flooding, and lack of viable livelihood options also continue to prevent advances in stability from cementing beyond a precarious stage. Major terrorist attacks in Mogadishu in 2017, for example, showed continued strength and increased sophistication of Al-Shabaab.<sup>13</sup> In terms of maritime security, there is still very little capacity for Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) in Somalia despite the implications that maritime crime has for stability. Furthermore, and in view of the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, neither piracy nor maritime security in a broader sense is a significant political priority.

Figure 1:  
Geographic focus: Southern Red  
Sea, Gulf of Aden and Western Indian  
Ocean



Looking further into the WIO, 639 incidents of maritime crime and maritime safety were registered in 2017.<sup>14</sup> Only 24 of these were cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea.<sup>15</sup> This demonstrates that whilst the suppression of piracy has been successful, other types of maritime crime are rampant including the types of crime addressed in this section. These criminal activities, which together form the maritime crime complex off the HoA, thrive in the absence of effective maritime governance and contribute to the perpetuation of instability either directly or indirectly.


1.1

**A Narrow View: Developments and Drivers**

**Piracy off the coast of Somalia**

Successful suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia is evidenced by the stark decline in attacks since 2012. As a number of unique factors were key in paving the way for effective action to counter Somali piracy, an assessment of the current threat of piracy must take account of these. They include: (A) Interventions by *the international community* to tackle the problem through naval patrols and support for the prosecution of Somalis suspected of piracy in regional states.<sup>16</sup> (B) The substantial *engagement of the maritime industry* to tackle the problem through self-protection of vessels, including development of and adherence to Best Management Practices,<sup>17</sup> which was a deciding factor in making hijackings virtually impossible and very dangerous. (C) Finally, the *commitment of states in the region* to suppress piracy, including Somalia but also regional states that assumed the task of prosecuting and incarcerating Somali nationals, which was key to ending impunity for assailants and the practice of ‘catch and release’ of suspected pirates by Navies.<sup>18</sup> The adoption of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (and its subsequent ‘Jeddah Amendment’)<sup>19</sup> is also an indication of the commitment of regional states to tackle the issue. Some factors may have been more influential than others in deterring piracy. As illustrated in the figure below, it is, however, the mutually reinforcing effect of (A), (B), and (C) that amounted to an effective push to suppress Somali piracy, rendering the business a high risk/low profit (and therefore unattractive) enterprise.

Figure 2:  
Suppression of Piracy and Recent Activity





### Status

Statistical data points towards an ‘uptick’ in piracy activity from the inter-monsoon season of 2016 onwards, primarily around Socotra Island off Puntland. The 2017 State of Piracy Report from Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) notes that the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in East Africa has almost doubled compared to 2016.<sup>20</sup> This comes after five quiet years and coincides with the very public withdrawal of NATO forces and the general reduction in naval presence off the coast of Somalia.<sup>21</sup> Several interviewees stressed that some of the recent incidents appear to be ‘probing attacks’ carried out to ascertain the possibility of successful hijackings.<sup>22</sup> Another view is that some of the incidents in 2017 may have been reprisal attacks or vendettas “by Somali fishermen directed against Iranian fishermen accused of illegal fishing” and therefore wrongfully recorded as piracy.<sup>23</sup> These include the 2017 attacks on the Iranian fishing vessels FV Sameer and the attack on the FV Surgya Macran – both about 40 NM off Socotra. Others still speculate whether certain interests in exaggerating the threat level encourage erroneous reporting of incidents. Finally, Yemen experts have expressed concern that piracy could shift to the Yemeni coast, observing that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) currently controls 50 percent of the coastline and many commercial vessels navigate close to the coast. Since the attack on MT Leopard Sun on 22 February 2018, “several analysts have heightened the threat of ‘piracy’ in the southern Somali Basin”.<sup>24</sup> As this incident took place far from the Somali coast, there is speculation that the threat from piracy may not be limited to the coastal areas of Somalia.<sup>25</sup>

The ambiguities implicit in the above highlight the notion that statistical data should not be seen in isolation. Statistics should rather be considered alongside an analysis of the drivers behind crime including enabling on-shore factors, composition and modus operandi of criminal networks, and deterrents currently in place to counter the crime. As these factors are important to consider to understand drivers of all categories of maritime crime analysed in this section, an overview of these factors is provided for each of the six segments below.

- Deterrents: The readiness of regional states to engage in counter-piracy efforts, including support for prosecution of suspected pirates, remains. Six suspects were, for example, handed over to Seychelles for prosecution in November 2017. The international naval presence off the coast of Somalia has, however, been reduced significantly. On land, while some advances have been made in terms of raising operational capabilities of Somali MLE, there is still no investigative capacity to pursue criminal networks. Establishment of effective law enforcement capacity is also challenged by the fact that salaries are both insufficient and payment is irregular – a factor which inevitably opens up for corrupt practices. Nevertheless, the fact that the three ‘founding fathers of piracy’ (Afweyne, Boyah, and Garad) are no longer in business for various reasons may have some deterrent effect.<sup>26</sup> With regard to industry self-protection, which has arguably been the most powerful deterrent for piracy, some ships passing the coast of Somalia have become lax in their application of Best Management Practices as they, for example, sail closer to the Somali shore at lower speed. The attacks seen in 2017 from Puntland is an example of ships carelessly passing

close to the Somali coast and pirates ‘testing the waters’ to see what self-protection measures they would need to overcome in order to successfully complete a hijacking.<sup>27</sup> Ships do, however, seem to be maintaining protection teams on board and that is a factor that remains decisive in warding off attacks.<sup>28</sup>

- Criminal networks: Various attempts by pirates to hijack vessels off the coast of Somalia in recent years are seen to confirm the notion that while counter-piracy efforts were successful in suppressing piracy, not all piracy networks were eradicated.<sup>29</sup> While the ‘founding fathers of piracy’ are out of the picture, multiple sources indicate that two main Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) are still active in Somalia, although not exclusively engaged in piracy.<sup>30</sup> The first is the PAG based out of the Alula district in the remote north-eastern part of Puntland around the villages of Murcanyo and Dhurbo run by Issa Yuluh and Aragoste,<sup>31</sup> who profited greatly from past hijackings.<sup>32</sup> The second PAG is run by Garfanje out of Hobyo in Galmudug.<sup>33</sup> Garfanje is an important regional power broker who virtually controls the entire Galmudug coast. This position makes him and many from his gang untouchable.<sup>34</sup>

Importantly, various sources suggest that PAGs do not limit their activities to piracy. They are businessmen, gangsters, and ‘Swiss army knife’ criminals<sup>35</sup> who engage in various activities involving a weapon and a boat, depending on which is the most profitable activity of the day.

Finally, with regard to criminal networks, an attack on a Panama-flagged container ship and a Seychelles-flagged fishing vessel in November 2017<sup>36</sup> should be mentioned as it briefly raised two concerns.<sup>37</sup> Firstly, that a new PAG could be at play since the attack was carried out with a departure point at Merca.<sup>38</sup> Though piracy networks operated in this area for a short period around 2005, piracy activity here is a novelty. There seems to be no reason to think that Merca will become a new piracy hotspot, however.<sup>39</sup> The second concern was whether there might be a link between pirates and Al-Shabaab since Merca is known as an Al-Shabaab-controlled area. Again, there seems to be no evidence of such a connection<sup>40</sup> beyond the fact that PAGs are subject to the same forms of taxation (*zakat*) as other business operators in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas. Any deeper connection between piracy groups and Al-Shabaab is seen as unlikely since they are ideologically incompatible.<sup>41</sup>

- On-shore factors: Writing in 2011, Gjelsvik and Bjørgo note that “the problem of piracy may be understood both as an outgrowth of the war economy and an outcome of a weak or non-existent state power and an inadequate police and coast guard”.<sup>42</sup> As accounted for in the introduction, advances have been made in terms of Somali Governance since 2011 which has arguably effected a slight move away from a war economy and strengthened state-level power projection (including at sea). Tensions between the Federal Government and regional states and consequent alienation of clans such as the Ali Suleiban clan still limit the incorporation of certain sections of the country into the national security architecture. Tensions are also reflected in the inability of the National Security Council to formalise the organisational division of responsibilities in the maritime sector as a whole. As these factors

remain influential, pockets of lawless spaces where PAGs can operate freely still exist.

Also, the prevalent 'Robin Hood' narrative of pirates being a force for protection against illegal fishing in Somali waters resonated among coastal communities in the early days of piracy and, arguably, militated against firmer action on the issue. It is important to note, however, that, while pirates may initially have enjoyed the support of coastal communities, this quickly faded. Rather than being a source of positive community development, pirate money negatively impacted communities bringing with it drugs, khat, and alcohol.<sup>43</sup> Other conditions that enabled piracy to thrive still exist, however. These include lack of state control in isolated coastal areas, socio-economic disparity<sup>44</sup>, and weak institutions. As stated by a convicted pirate who will remain anonymous: "the international community has done a lot to counter piracy but the measures taken will only have an effect in the short term. Naval patrols, armed guards, and prosecutions is a great short-term fix, but if you want to stop piracy in the future, you need stability in Somalia itself, particularly political stability. The Harardhere area, where piracy has always been very active, is not under government control and pirates are still able to move around freely. Unless the Government can extend its reach to these areas, piracy will always be a problem for Somalia."<sup>45</sup>

As is often the case, poverty and lack of licit employment opportunities push people into criminal activities.<sup>46</sup> Concerns have even been raised in the past of law enforcement officers being tempted to engage in piracy due to insufficient and irregular payment of salary.<sup>47</sup> This is naturally an important on-shore factor which may have been exacerbated by the persistent drought which has hit Somalia hard in recent years. As another interviewed piracy prisoner stated, "the thing that could have stopped me from becoming a pirate is employment from the Government. If the Government creates more opportunity for the youth, it would be a good measure to counter piracy."<sup>48</sup> It is important to also acknowledge, however, that the reckless urge for adventure is a common characteristic among youth anywhere. Gjelsvik and Bjørgo further argue that the need for young Somali men to protect their self-dignity and masculine reputation enhances the appeal of criminal and armed groups.<sup>49</sup> One piracy prisoner states that "the young people that were attracted to piracy had bad habits – social vices such as smoking, drinking, and chewing khat. Feeding these habits was one of the main drivers for their going out to sea because they wanted to get rich quick."<sup>50</sup> Another statement to that effect is the point that "piracy was never something that was supported by the family. It was something you would hide from your family – something adventurous."<sup>51</sup> With ransom payments reaching upwards of USD 10 million, the attraction of engaging in piracy for youths with poor prospects is plain.

Several interviewees also mentioned impunity for piracy kingpins as a critical obstacle to effective counter-piracy efforts by the international community. The explanation of this lack of redress is to be found in the socio-political context in Somalia which is characterised by inter-clan power negotiations. Both Garfanje and Yuluh have significant political influence, which protects them from prosecution.<sup>52</sup> Gar-

fanje has been apprehended numerous times but always quickly released again – once upon issuance of a diplomatic passport.<sup>53</sup>

Finally, another important on-shore factor is the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and the extent to which that threat, understandably, means that fighting maritime crime – including but not limited to piracy – is not a top priority at Government level. As stated at a Maritime Crime Symposium in Nairobi, “Al-Shabaab kills our people, pirates don’t”.<sup>54</sup>

#### *Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus*

The frequency of piracy attacks is now back to pre-2008 levels and attempted hijackings have not been successful.<sup>55</sup> Although the view that piracy can easily flare up again has been put forward by numerous interviewees,<sup>56</sup> there are divergent views that challenge this position. Two main reasons why piracy is not likely to return were put forward at a workshop in Copenhagen in May 2018. One is that piracy kingpins have now invested in more legitimate businesses and would not want to jeopardise those investments by re-engaging in piracy.<sup>57</sup> Another reason is that ships have become such hard targets that all other revenue streams would have to be turned off to make the piracy model attractive again.<sup>58</sup>

Notwithstanding these different views, what seems to be clear is that two PAGs still operate out of Puntland and Galmudug and they have the funds, weapons, skiffs, and militia to carry out attacks if a genuine opportunity to take a ship was to present itself. Looking forward, it is therefore important to recognise that if measures of deterrence are relaxed by international actors as well as by industry and if onshore conditions remain unchanged, there could potentially be another upsurge in piracy. Also, although these PAGs have not been able to hijack a ship, they are engaged in other illicit activities which negatively impact stability in Somalia.

#### **Human Trafficking**

People have always moved between the African continent and the Saudi Peninsula via the Gulf of Aden. Today, however, these flows form the foundation of a big business of TiPSoM. Writing in 2011, Bahadur noted that: “the stretch of the Gulf of Aden linking northern Somalia and Yemen is one of the world’s busiest human smuggling routes.”<sup>59</sup> Of all the maritime crimes analysed in this chapter, TiPSoM is replete with the most horrific accounts of cruelty and human suffering, which is both an effect and a driver of instability.

#### *Status*


It is noteworthy that, despite armed conflict, humanitarian crisis, and extremely high levels of violence, a significant number of migrants are still determined to use the migration route through Yemen to Europe.<sup>60</sup> In a somewhat counter-intuitive way, it seems the conflict in Yemen has, on the one hand, prompted more TiPSoM activities across the Gulf of Aden while at the same time exacerbating the threats migrants face. Generally, there are two<sup>61</sup> migration groups:

1. *North-bound*: principally migrants from the HoA bound for wealthy countries in the Gulf and Europe.<sup>62</sup> The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) refers to this as the Eastern Route<sup>63</sup> between Somalia and Yemen. While

there are significantly more people being trafficked from the HoA to Yemen, than the other way,<sup>64</sup> International Organisation for Migration (IOM) data shows a reduction in migration flows from Somalia to Yemen from 111,500 in 2016<sup>65</sup> to around 87,000 in 2017.<sup>66</sup> This is corroborated by the DRC who note that, due to deportations from Yemen, “the number of migrants arriving into Yemen from the HoA via the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden were slightly lower than in 2016”.<sup>67</sup> Numbers might, however, rise again if political shifts in both Eritrea and Ethiopia push more people to cross.<sup>68</sup> Recently, there have been reports that those trafficked to Yemen have – upon discovering that ‘Yemen is impossible’ – decided to embark upon another journey either to Egypt or to Sudan.<sup>69</sup>

2. *South-bound*: populations fleeing cholera epidemics, famine, and armed conflict in Yemen. They primarily move via the ports of Aden and Al-Mukallah.<sup>70</sup> This group is predominantly made up of Somali migrants living in Yemen who decided to return to Somalia due to insecurity in Yemen and, to a lesser extent, Yemenis fleeing conflict.<sup>71</sup> According to the DRC, approximately 34,990 Somali refugee returnees and 10,776 Yemeni refugees and asylum seekers arrived in Somalia between 2014 and 2017. Notably, the migration flow from Yemen seems to have risen in 2017 compared to 2016.<sup>72</sup>

Figure 3:  
Migration Routes in the HoA



While the number of migrants transiting through Yemen has fallen slightly in 2017, levels of abuse have increased with amplified levels of lawlessness in Yemen.<sup>73</sup> Indeed, the Head of UNODC GMCP has received reports from both the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of people being trafficked on fishing vessels in extremely bad conditions – clearly against their will. Migrants from the HoA in Yemen report having been kidnapped by criminals who were waiting for them upon their arrival and who forced them to make phone calls to relatives pressuring them to send money. There are also frequent reports of rape and torture<sup>74</sup> and the level of abuse seems to be determined according to ethnic background.<sup>75</sup> Correspondingly, Eritreans are increasingly using the Eastern Route while Christians prefer to go through Sudan.<sup>76</sup> A newer trend

is that traffickers throw migrants overboard as they approach the Yemeni coast.<sup>77</sup> In August 2017, for example, 300 migrants were thrown overboard within 24 hours. As explained by UNHCR, “migrants were forced by their smuggler to jump overboard a few hundred meters away from the shore to avoid a possible inspection by the Yemeni Coast Guard.”<sup>78</sup> UNHCR has launched the information campaign #DangerousCrossings to warn communities in the HoA region of the dangers migrants face when traveling to Yemen to deter migrants from making the journey across the Gulf of Aden.

- Deterrents: International navies patrolling in the Gulf of Aden and around the BAM Strait tend to stay away from TiPSoM,<sup>79</sup> although International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)<sup>80</sup> obligations have led to instances of rescue at sea.<sup>81</sup> The Somaliland Coastguard and the BPMPU are frequently required to respond in cases of overloaded ships arriving from Yemen with dehydrated and famished people on board. There have also been cases of capsizing for which rescue at sea operations have been launched both from Somalia and Yemen.<sup>82</sup> In addition to search and rescue operations, there have been arrests of smugglers – particularly in Puntland.<sup>83</sup> Since launch sites are within reach of MLE authorities in Puntland, however, more effective intervention should be possible.<sup>84</sup> On the Yemeni side, as noted above, there have been instances where migrants have been thrown overboard as smugglers caught sight of the Coastguard. A concern in that context is that efforts to build capacity of the Yemeni Coastguard might inadvertently aggravate this problem.<sup>85</sup>
- Criminal networks: UNHCR describe the networks behind TiPSoM in Yemen as “well-established, transnational smuggling and human trafficking networks that actively promote their services to migrants and profit from Yemen’s weakened governance”.<sup>86</sup> As noted above, TiPSoM is highly profitable. Indicative of how lucrative the business is, the DRC estimates that Ethiopian migrants moving to Yemen via Somalia pay traffickers up to USD 1,540 for the journey.<sup>87</sup> Ethiopian and Somali migrants most frequently cited prices between USD 100 and USD 250 for boat crossings to Yemen.<sup>88</sup> Considering the volume of migrants moving via this route, this journey generates significant sums of money for smuggling networks. It is also worth noting that migrants tend to pay upon arrival. This indicates the involvement of financiers, which points towards an elevated level of organisation.<sup>89</sup> An important reason why numerous individuals are willing to travel to Yemen is that smuggling operators convince migrants that the conflict has made Yemen a ‘free run’,<sup>90</sup> omitting information about the dangers they will face upon arrival.<sup>91</sup> On the Somali side, smuggling networks operate in coastal areas using fibreglass boats that are small enough to enter shallow waters (waist high) so that they can pick up people without the direct scrutiny of port authorities.<sup>92</sup>
- On-shore factors: Key drivers of migration from Somalia to Yemen stem from many of the same on-shore factors that drive piracy: insecurity, political instability, humanitarian emergency caused by drought, and lack of opportunities. In Bosasso, which is an important transit point for migrants traveling to Yemen,<sup>93</sup> local communities hold smugglers in contempt. This is due to the drain of young men and women

who are persuaded to leave and the economic burden this imposes on the families who have to sell property and borrow money to pay for the journeys.<sup>94</sup> As a last resort, families hand youths who are determined to make the journey to corrections services in Somalia in order to prevent them from leaving.<sup>95</sup>

#### *Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus*

Interviewees have raised two key concerns about the potential for a wider impact of TiPSoM on regional stability: one relates to the significant sums of money that criminals gain from being involved in the business of irregular migration which is liable to build very powerful criminal syndicates. There is a general lack of knowledge about what happens to this money but the notion that the TiPSoM model is based on financiers is an indication that the networks already have considerable strength and organisation. The second concern relates to the lack of capacity to manage irregular migration in the region as an 'enabling on-shore factor' for violent extremism. The fear is that radicalised elements may take advantage of the lack of capacity in Somalia and Yemen to register all cross-boundary movements and move undetected on the same routes. Indeed, a number of interviewees noted the risk that 'criminal elements' may be able to move freely amid migrant flows as a key concern when asked about trends in human trafficking in the HoA region.

A number of interviewees also connect human trafficking to other types of maritime crime, notably weapons smuggling and piracy. We elaborate on such linkages in the second chapter of this section.

#### **Weapons Smuggling**

Weapons smuggling was highlighted as a prevailing form of maritime crime in numerous interviews carried out for this report.<sup>96</sup> Generally, three types of weapons smuggling can be distinguished: (a) weapons smuggling involving organised criminal networks, (b) 'ant trade', which alludes to how some weapons smuggling "is accomplished through numerous small-scale transfers"<sup>97</sup>, and (c) weapons smuggling where state actors are involved.

#### *Status*


Yemen is, according to various observers, emerging as a "key trafficking hub" for the smuggling of illegal weapons<sup>98</sup> and, according to European Union Capacity Building (EUCAP) Somalia, "it seems to be on the rise in the waters off the coast of Somalia." Weapons are generally smuggled via maritime routes from the Makran Coast to Yemen and Somalia – with lighter weapons going to Somalia and heavier weapons to Yemen.<sup>99</sup> A Conflict Armament Research report from 2016 points to the "existence of a weapons pipeline extending from Iran to Yemen and Somalia, which involves the transfer, by dhow, of significant quantities of Iranian-manufactured weapons and weapons that plausibly derive from Iranian stockpiles".<sup>100</sup>

The conflict in Yemen has caused a heightened demand for weapons and, as a result, illegal trafficking of weapons has intensified. Iranians seem to be using dhow traffic to send weapons to the Houthi faction.<sup>101</sup> The Conflict Armament Research Group has established a match between weapons seized at sea by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and weapons recovered in Yemen by United Arab Emirates forces which is seen to confirm that weapons enter Yemen via maritime routes.<sup>102</sup>

Conversely, Yemen is also a point of origin of maritime weapons smuggling, particularly to Somalia.<sup>103</sup> Some of the weapons smuggled are stolen from weapons depots in Yemen that are easy to break into.<sup>104</sup> The Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) estimates that one or two small-scale shipments of weapons from Yemen arrive to Somalia by skiff every month<sup>105</sup> with Puntland as the primary entry point.<sup>106</sup> An important pull factor for this trade is the demand for weapons from actors in Somalia, notably Al-Shabaab. An attractive feature of light weapons smuggling as an occupation is that only very limited equipment is needed – just a few speedboats.<sup>107</sup> Also, it seems that people smugglers optimise profits by investing their smuggling fee in weapons in Yemen where they are then loaded onto their boats on the journey back to Somalia and sold for considerable profit.<sup>108</sup> Seizures have also been made of much larger-scale consignments headed for Somalia in contravention of the weapons embargo<sup>109</sup>. From May to June 2016, for example, three small-arms shipments destined for Puntland were identified as originating from the Yemeni port Mukalla.<sup>110</sup>

Larger shipments of weapons also arrive in Somalia directly from the Makran Coast in medium-sized dhows. Dhows reportedly trans-ship smaller consignments to 12-18 feet, high-speed skiffs<sup>111</sup> at seven points along the Somali coastline: Maydh, Qandala, Alula, Xaafu, Eyl, Lebed, and Kismayo.<sup>112</sup> Concerning heavier weapons, an Australian Navy frigate intercepted a dhow carrying 2,197 weapons (including assault rifles and RPG-7-pattern rocket launchers) in February 2016, apparently headed for Alula in Puntland.<sup>113</sup> The following month, a French frigate seized a similar amount of Iranian-manufactured assault and sniper rifles<sup>114</sup> on a dhow that “was spotted heading toward Somalia” by a CMF helicopter.<sup>115</sup>

Figure 4:  
Weapon Smuggling Routes  
in the HoA



- Deterrents. The formulation of mandates is a critical issue for actors involved in combatting weapons smuggling in the WIO region. While CMF has a clear United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate to enforce the weapons embargo and prevent weapons flowing into Somalia, many of the nations that contribute to CMF interpret this mandate restrictively, which means that they cannot address weapons smuggling into Yemen.<sup>116</sup> Curtailing the availability of weapons in



Yemen,<sup>117</sup> however, seems to be crucial to ensuring stability in the region. The issue of restrictive mandates, therefore, unhelpfully limits the deterrent effect that can be achieved through coalitions such as CMF Task Force 150.

In September 2017, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) interdicted a skiff upon receipt of intelligence from EUNAVFOR's maritime patrol aircraft indicating that it was carrying a concealed consignment of weapons. Although a successful operation in the sense that it was launched in response to intelligence shared by EUNAVFOR, the navigators of the skiff were not apprehended by the PMPF<sup>118</sup> and, according to the SEMG, the weapons were not properly seized and may have ended up in the buyers' hands after all.<sup>119</sup> The reason for the failure to enforce the weapons embargo is unclear, but it sends a problematic message to smugglers that, even under the scrutiny of EUNAVFOR and the SEMG, there are no legal repercussions for offenders. The view that weapons seized should be cut in half in order to make sure that they are not sold on was put forward at a workshop in Copenhagen. Destruction of weapons is, however, not as simple as ivory and drug incineration, as it is difficult to rule out that there may be a legitimate owner. Adding confusion is the poor implementation of the partial lifting of the weapons embargo and inconsistent notification of consignments by the Federal Government to the SEMG, which makes it difficult to determine whether or not arms shipments are legal.<sup>120</sup>

- Criminal networks. There is a general lack of knowledge about the criminal networks behind weapons smuggling as weapons are seized at sea and little is known about who the senders on land are, at least at the higher levels.<sup>121</sup> Weapon smugglers use the same sorts of dhows as drug traffickers and fishers, namely those manufactured by the Al Mansoor Company in Iran.<sup>122</sup> Research conducted by Conflict Armament Research in 2016 suggested that two out of the three deliveries that they analysed are likely to have been supplied with the complicity of Iranian security forces.<sup>123</sup> While small-scale weapons are usually destined for Bosasso and Marrero where they enter the black market, more sophisticated weapons are commonly destined for the coastal districts of Qandala and Habbo. According to UNODC's Programme Officer in Bosasso, "both former pirates and veteran weapons traffickers are engaged in arms trafficking sharing the same common motivational denominator: profit".
- On-shore factors: Lack of access to remote areas in Puntland is a deciding enabling factor for the evolvment of Puntland as a weapons trafficking hub. Also, as highlighted by Secure Fisheries, one of the facilitating factors of weapons trade is the absence of designated landing sites for fishing vessels along the Somali coast. In the absence of such sites, fishing vessels land their catch in remote locations. Since weapons are often smuggled in fishing boats, these landing sites lend themselves to covertly bringing in other product such as weapons.<sup>124</sup> As stated in the 2017 Report of the SEMG, "weak governance of the fishing sector and a lack of institutional capacity for more effective maritime security, including the monitoring of perhaps more than 200 Iranian and Yemeni fishing dhows operating off the coast of Punt-

land, exacerbates the risk of fishing dhows being used for illicit purposes, including small arms trafficking.”<sup>125</sup> On the Yemeni side, a combination of corruption within the military and a strong tradition for weapon ownership provides for both high supply and demand in the weapons trade.

#### *Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus*

More effective deterrents are needed to combat illicit weapon trade around the HoA as it has a very direct and damaging impact on security and development in the region. Indeed, at a workshop in Copenhagen in May 2018, it was suggested that this issue needs to be further ‘securitised’<sup>126</sup>, pointing to the ramifications of the continued proliferation of weapons in the HoA region, which are not properly recognised. It is, conversely, hard to see how the issue could become further securitised as it is already subject to a Security-Council imposed arms embargo with a dedicated monitoring group. Nevertheless, the security implications of the weapons trade into Somalia are unquestionable. These are for example evident in the development of Puntland as a Somali hub for weapons smuggling as well as a hub of nascent ISIL affiliates.<sup>127</sup> The fact that numerous US drone strikes have been directed at targets in Puntland underlines the gravity of the threats in this region.<sup>128</sup> According to findings in a 2017 Report by Stable Seas, the flow of illicit weapons into Somalia also “arms Al-Shabaab and is a direct threat to the survival of the Federal Government of Somalia.”<sup>129</sup> The Report goes on to note that “illicit arms trading in the Somali region amplifies threats to governance, both within the Somali region and well beyond it.”<sup>130</sup> It is with reference to such effects that weapons seizures are considered to significantly contribute to “the stabilisation of the region”,<sup>131</sup> but sporadic interddictions at sea alone, cannot solve the problem.

In the long run, it is important to widen the scope of counter arms trafficking efforts to also include components required to manufacture Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Until now, bombs used by Al-Shabaab have typically been armed with trinitrotoluene (TNT) scraped off old military munitions at specific dump sites in Mogadishu.<sup>132</sup> Once the availability of TNT in this fashion runs out, it is likely that bombs will be made with chemicals such as fertiliser. These bags of chemicals would come by sea and would be much more difficult to identify than arms. They would, nevertheless, be hugely destructive.<sup>133</sup>

#### **Illegal Unregulated and Unreported Fishing**

To justify their attacks on foreign vessels, Somali pirates notoriously argued that they defended Somali waters from foreign fishers that ruthlessly depleted fish stocks and attacked Somali artisanal fishers.<sup>134</sup> While this may have been a sincere argument in the very early days of piracy, the applicability of illegal foreign fishing<sup>135</sup> as a justification for piracy ended when pirates began to hijack containerships in international waters, as this was clearly not aimed at deterring illegal fishing in Somalia.<sup>136</sup> It would also be erroneous to consider the problem of illegal fishing as one confined to Somalia. On the contrary, IUU affects all states in the WIO and is perceived as one of the primary threats facing the region along with heroin trafficking.<sup>137</sup>

### Status

According to the Stimson Center, the profits from IUU fishing are valued at an estimated USD 15.5 to USD 36.4 billion a year globally.<sup>138</sup> Indian Ocean states are generally heavily reliant on the blue economy with large parts of their populations employed in industries that pertain to the oceans such as industrial and artisanal fishing and coastal and marine tourism. Fish is also an important food source in coastal communities. As large-scale IUU depletes fish stocks and destroys marine life, the problem directly threatens the livelihoods of whole population sections in the WIO.<sup>139</sup> The Kenyan Maritime Police Unit (KMPU) in Malindi noted that they were frequently required to respond to cases of Tanzanian fishermen transgressing into Kenyan marine protected areas. This trend was also noted by the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar (RMIFC) as happening generally around the Indian Ocean – perhaps as an indication that artisanal fishers are finding it increasingly hard to survive off the fish stocks that remain in their traditional fishing grounds. As put by the RMIFC, “unlike the cases of IUU fishing observed between fishermen from neighbouring states, there are cases that highlight the existence of *organised illegal fishing*. These fleets, particularly trawlers, have a direct impact on the food resources on which traditional fishermen depend.” By destroying the livelihoods of coastal communities, large-scale IUU drives people into crime or – ultimately – migration.<sup>140</sup> Indeed, IUU fishing is linked to national and regional political instability and growing insecurity.<sup>141</sup>

If we zoom in on the case of Somalia, IUU is a muddier issue, which continues to be portrayed very differently by different actors.<sup>142</sup> On the one hand, illegal fishing is often raised as a serious problem which requires the assistance of the international community. On the other hand, Government action to manage fisheries does not reflect the notion that it is an issue of primary importance.<sup>143</sup> Because of the prevalent narrative of IUU in Somalia as a justification for piracy, however, there is in the Somali context a security nexus which gives the issue a different character than in other WIO states.

- Deterrents: According to the RMIFC, there is a “violent depredation of the Somali population of marine resources by Iranian and Asian fishing fleets, acting freely since Somali authorities have a limited ability to deploy law enforcement assets”.<sup>144</sup> In consequence, seven incidents, all involving Iranian fishing vessels, were reported in 2017 of Somali fishermen engaging in “IUU self-policing” – that is Somali fishermen that use force to divert foreign vessels which they consider to be fishing illegally. This practice can easily lead to retaliation and an ensuing escalation of violence at sea that can inadvertently spin out of control. These actions are also sometimes wrongly associated with piracy<sup>145</sup> and therefore contribute to distorting data on Somali piracy.

Taking a broader look at possible deterrents to IUU, new measures have been developed. The introduction of FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA),<sup>146</sup> which came into force in June 2016, engages port authorities around the world to coordinate systematic denial of port access to notorious IUU vessels. This means that they are unable to land their catch and make a profit. Use of satellite-based technology to track IUU fishing vessels also has the potential to expose IUU vessels that hide behind flags of convenience and fake vessel IDs.<sup>147</sup> Even for vessels that do not appear on Maritime Domain Aware-

ness (MDA) monitoring equipment tracking the signals that vessels transmit (which can be switched off), there is an increasing application of satellite images<sup>148</sup> in the detection of non-compliant vessels as well as algorithms that layer both vessel signals and images to pin-point suspicious activity.<sup>149</sup>

As with other types of maritime crime described in this report, one of the great challenges with addressing IUU is the legal finish, or lack thereof. In most states, IUU is treated with fines and penalties that are far too lenient to make a dent in the business model of IUU operators. Detaining vessels and crew, however, has severe implications for profitability. Many organisations working to counter IUU, therefore, propose the ‘multi door approach’<sup>150</sup> – exploring every possible legal venue for prosecution in order to keep vessels in port and ‘out of IUU action’. This can be everything from detaining a vessel for tax evasion, SOLAS infringements, or pollution – to more serious offences such as forced labour. Fish-i-Africa, an NGO that organises a network between eight states in Eastern Africa to combat IUU in the WIO, has been working with this approach to increase prosecutions for IUU and associated crimes with quite some success.<sup>151</sup>

In terms of at-sea operations at national level, it is clear that interdiction at sea is a costly form of deterrence. A country such as Seychelles, for example, has a population of ca 90,000, a landmass of 459 km<sup>2</sup>, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 1,374,000 km<sup>2</sup>. Despite being a middle-income country, patrolling such a vast maritime space is extremely challenging. For Somalia, having the longest coastline in continental Africa, power projection at sea is currently limited to ‘ink spots’ around a few key ports. At-sea patrols to interdict IUU fishers will probably never be a viable deterrent in and of itself in Somalia. One approach to finding more effective deterrents has been to make use of technology and work with regional partners in order to build targeted and intelligence-led operations for more effective fishery inspections and interdiction at sea.

- Criminal networks behind the most severe forms of IUU, namely large-scale IUU fishing, are highly organised transnational syndicates akin to drug cartels.<sup>152</sup> According to the Stimson Center, “illicit networks are known to participate in IUU fishing, such as those linked to piracy and terrorism, as well as trafficking in drugs, arms, and people. These groups often co-opt workers in the legal fishing industry, use fishing vessels to disguise operations, and take advantage of disenfranchised fishers to facilitate their illicit business.”<sup>153</sup> As drug syndicates, they make use of document forgery, bribery, money laundering, high-level fraud, as well as tax havens and complex shelf company structures that conceal beneficiary owners.<sup>154</sup>
- On-Shore Factors: In the context of IUU, the important enabling factors are found at sea. Generally, vast and anonymous ocean spaces are ideal to carry out illicit activities with little risk of detection. Although most large vessels are required to transmit two types of signals, the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and the Automatic Identification System (AIS), transponders can easily be switched off if there is a wish to ‘go dark’. In addition, IUU fishers have a number of methods at hand to conceal the identity of vessels, including use of flags of convenience

and manipulation of vessel IDs. Another factor which works in favour of IUU fishers is the difficulty of proving whether a catch is either entirely, or partially, caught illegally, unregulated, or misreported. An IUU catch can, for example, be mixed, or 'white washed'<sup>155</sup>, with legal catches through trans-shipments at sea. Skilfully forged or duplicated licences are also often used.

There are also more localised on-shore conditions that enable IUU. Despite the economic importance of the blue economy and the need for sustainable fisheries, corruption-related challenges seriously obstruct efforts to effectively address IUU. In the context of Somalia, the ambiguities related to issuance of inshore fishing licences is also an important enabling onshore factor.<sup>156</sup> Also with reference to Somalia, the RMIFC notes that "the support of local authorities [make] the activity semi-legal by delivering licences or simply tolerating it".<sup>157</sup>

#### *Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus*

In relation to Somalia, efforts to analyse overall trends in IUU simply do not add up to a coherent picture. What is found is rather a multitude of contradictory views and information. In the absence of coherent evidence to support a constructive debate on the issue, IUU is widely utilised to perpetuate misconceptions to promote political agendas. This is particularly problematic because of the perceived nexus between IUU and piracy and the security implications of this incendiary narrative. More broadly, however, it is also regrettable because fisheries are in reality one of very few renewable resources that can generate revenue in Somalia and promote economic development.

Security issues aside, it must be underlined that IUU fishery is not a problem that exclusively or even particularly affects Somalia. According to the RMIFC, incidents of IUU reported in 2017 were comparable for Somalia, Seychelles, and Comoros. There is, nonetheless, an urgent need to regulate fisheries more effectively and end large scale IUU. The gravity of the issue has in fact prompted a movement to have large scale IUU formally considered a Transnational Organised Crime.<sup>158</sup> Compounding the issue is the fact that IUU is often associated with a range of other types of organised crime including corruption, money laundering, fraud, smuggling of various contraband, and exploitation of labour – in some cases amounting to slavery. When IUU and Transnational Organised Crime coincide, it is popularly categorised as "Fish Crime."<sup>159</sup>

#### **Drugs Smuggling**


The primary focus for this segment is heroin smuggling as this trade has the gravest implications for stability. Double dynamics of violent conflicts and embargoes affect the routes along which drugs are smuggled. Whilst low-level conflict and some degree of instability may facilitate drugs smuggling, intense violent conflict may inversely impede drugs smuggling. With the primary consumer markets for Afghan heroin being in Europe and Russia, three routes have routinely been used to transport the product:

1. *The Northern Route*, through Russia. Access to Europe along this route is obstructed by the EU trade embargo imposed as a result of the Crimea conflict which entails thorough searches of all containers crossing into Europe.

2. *The Balkan Route*, crossing Iran and Turkey. Being on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict, border security between these countries has been intensified.
3. *The Southern Route*, Afghan heroin is transported to the Makran Coast from where it is shipped to the Indian Ocean island states and countries along the East Africa coast where it is believed to be containerised and shipped on to Europe.<sup>160</sup>

As conflicts and embargoes have effectively blocked the Northern and Balkan routes, smugglers seem to have adapted accordingly, now using the Southern Indian Ocean Route – also known as the ‘smack track’ and ‘hash highway’ – as the primary smuggling corridor.<sup>161</sup> According to RMIFC, heroin trafficking is the number one maritime crime affecting countries in the WIO region.

Figure 5:  
The Southern Indian Ocean Drug  
Smuggling Route



#### Status


High yields in poppy production between 2016 and 2017 have caused an 87% rise in heroin production.<sup>162</sup> With a six-month processing time, this heroin is now being trafficked – most likely on the Southern Route. In terms of calculation of volume, the rule of thumb in drug enforcement is to assume that about 15% of drugs trafficked on a given route are seized and 85% passes through to consumer markets. Due to poor enforcement capa-

bilities on the Eastern African coast, there are only very few significant seizures on land. Conversely, enormous drugs seizures have been made at sea by CMF both in 2017 and 2018 (see table). In late May 2018, the Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 also seized “6.2 tonnes of hashish in two separate interddictions in the space of two days”.<sup>163</sup> What is difficult to determine is whether the increase in the volume of drugs seized is an indication of successful application of advanced methods of identifying shipments or simply that more product is being moved on the route.<sup>164</sup> The branding put on 1 kg bags of heroin by producers are called drug stamps.<sup>165</sup> These stamps are monitored and used to track downstream movements of heroin. Drug stamps on bags seized by CMF have, for example, been identified six months after interception on streets in the UK. This data is used to extrapolate what the volume getting past enforcement efforts at sea is likely to be. Recently, CMF has noted a rise in heroin prices at street-level in the UK, which might be seen as an indication that seizures have significantly lowered product availability in consumer markets.<sup>166</sup>

Information from drug stamps is also used to track drugs ‘upstream’ to investigate the criminal networks that own the stamps. Isotope testing is further used to determine the geographic origin of the poppy used in a consignment, as isotope values are strong indicators of where the poppy gum was grown. Both isotope readings and drug stamps from CMF seizures suggest that the origin of the heroin smuggled along the Southern Route is Taliban-controlled areas in Afghanistan.<sup>167</sup> As such, there is a link between terrorist-financing and drugs smuggling.<sup>168</sup>

The volume of narcotics flowing to Eastern African states is detrimental to the social fabric of the affected countries. Facilitators in trans-shipment countries such as Kenya and Seychelles are often paid ‘in kind’ with product. As their profit comes from selling heroin to local consumers, this ‘leaks’ heroin into local markets.<sup>169</sup> Secondary effects of this trade thus include the development of consumer markets in trans-shipment countries like Pakistan, Kenya, Mauritius, and Seychelles causing increased drug dependency.

Figure 6:  
CMF CTF-150 Heroin Seizures in  
International Waters



Source: Wright<sup>170</sup>

- Deterrents: Maritime drugs smuggling in the Indian Ocean is a type of crime characterised by a stark absence of effective deterrents. One obstacle is the fact that not all international actors operating in the WIO – and not even all nations contributing to CMF – have mandates, which allow them to undertake counter-narcotics operations. Flag verification boarding on commercial vessels are difficult to carry out and so the targets for inspections are typically dhows, even though steel-hulled vessels are also known to smuggle drugs (including the Al Noor, which was seized in Kenya).<sup>171</sup>

Another form of deterrence which is currently under-exploited is prosecution. There is currently no 'legal finish' to drug interdictions. As in the early days of piracy, what is seen is a practice of 'catch and release' – in most cases, interception simply results in drugs being thrown overboard. The risk run by actors involved in heroin smuggling is therefore too trivial to serve as an effective deterrent.<sup>172</sup> Since only a limited number of skippers are sufficiently skilled to navigate along the long Southern Indian Ocean Route and also willing to take the risk involved in the drugs trade,<sup>173</sup> apprehending captains and seizing ships seems to be one effective way to disrupt the business model of smuggling networks.

- Criminal networks: As opposed to the criminal networks behind most of the other maritime crimes presented in this chapter, the networks behind drugs smuggling are "specialised purpose networks" that are well-established at both exit and entry points of the trade.<sup>174</sup> The type of vessel most commonly intercepted by CMF is the traditional Iranian dhow, typically produced by the Al Mansour 'leasing' company in Iran.<sup>175</sup> Important seizures have also involved other types of vessels including container ships (for example, MSC IVANA)<sup>176</sup> but these are rare.<sup>177</sup>

Since Iranian dhows do not transmit signals that can be detected by satellites, they are difficult to spot using MDA systems that track VMS and AIS data.<sup>178</sup> As with weapons smuggling, drugs will often be trans-shipped from dhows onto smaller boats at sea, which then carry the product to shore, landing at concealed locations including border areas. CMF reports of clusters of dhows loitering for several days around handover points quite far out.<sup>179</sup> Drug trafficking was highlighted by the KMPU as a key challenge. Keeping shipments from reaching the coast is nearly impossible as remote landing sites are out of reach to the KMPU and because smugglers have far more powerful engines that can outrun KMPU boats.<sup>180</sup> The amount of heroin going directly into Kenya and Tanzania seems to have gone down as a result of counter-measures taken – particularly in Tanzania.<sup>181</sup> This has stimulated a repositioning of the trade to Mozambique.<sup>182</sup>

Although Mozambique has long been a transit point for narcotics<sup>183</sup> with a few key families of Asian descent controlling the trade,<sup>184</sup> recent involvement of Islamic extremists in this trade is a development which is currently attracting growing concern.<sup>185</sup> Islamist militants, including individuals from the Mozambican Somali community and Tanzanian nationals<sup>186</sup>, are now reported to be at the heart of the heroin trade in Mocímboa da Praia in the northern district of Cabo Delgado<sup>187</sup> and around the port of Nacala where containers laden with



drugs arrive.<sup>188</sup> These militant groups allegedly get a cut of the profits from the heroin trade in exchange for protecting shipments. A number of affiliations to terrorist organisations have been proposed including ‘Mozambique Al-Shabaab’ (which are not to be associated with Al-Shabaab in Somalia) and ‘Swahili Sunnah’.<sup>189</sup> While the Mozambique Government approach towards tackling heroin trafficking has been rather relaxed so far,<sup>190</sup> this might change with the escalation of violence that comes with an incursion of violent extremists.<sup>191</sup>

Drugs trafficked through Mozambique ultimately end up in South Africa, which is believed to be the primary location for the onward movement of heroin to consumer markets – typically concealed within shipments of bulk export products such as wine and oranges.<sup>192</sup> Smugglers moving product in containers continuously find new ways to conceal consignments. One example is the ‘rip on, rip off’ technique where drugs are placed in containers without the knowledge of the owner using forged seals.<sup>193</sup> Anecdotally, there are reports of drug parcels with Global Positioning System (GPS) transponders having been dropped along the East Africa Coast and carried by ocean currents as far as South Africa – effectively blindsiding deterrent efforts to interdict trans-shipments at sea.<sup>194</sup>

While heroin is primarily landed along the East Africa coast and on Indian Ocean islands, there are anecdotal accounts of heroin being trans-shipped in coastal areas in Somalia and on Socotra Island. Suspicion is that, rather than moving product across land, heroin is moved on to Yemen from where it is trafficked on Red Sea routes to Egypt. Given lack seizures, however, there is little evidence to corroborate these statements. It is, nonetheless, an issue which merits further research.<sup>195</sup>

- On-shore factors: There seems to be a geographic delineation for land-based drugs smuggling which is, as mentioned above, determined by the double dynamics of violent conflicts and embargoes. The conclusion from all interviews is that Somalia as a corridor for drugs smuggling seems non-existent.<sup>196</sup> Three main reasons for this are emphasised. Firstly, as opposed to sugar, the consumer market for heroin is neither in Somalia nor in Kenya but rather in Europe. Moving product over land from Somalia into Kenya, therefore, adds a superfluous transit point to the journey. Secondly, the infrastructure required for onward movement of drugs is not ideal in Somalia. On the contrary, improved roads and ports in countries like Kenya are seen as a factor, which, unintentionally, has made Kenya a more attractive point of transit. Finally, Somalia is not used as a transit country because it is deemed too unstable. Traffickers gravitate towards a ‘sweet spot’ in terms of instability. An interviewee termed this the ‘Goldilocks rule’ as the security climate for heroin smuggling can be neither too hot, nor too cold – it has to be *just right*.<sup>197</sup> The present complex political landscape in Somalia simply means that there are too many security actors one would have to bribe to ensure collaboration – unnecessary complications considering other routes are open.<sup>198</sup>

The extent of political elite involvement and corruption associated with the drugs trade is impossible to ignore as a crucial facilitating factor for illicit trade to go unhindered at different points of entry. The

relationship between corrupt state actors and drugs trafficking networks can be characterised as symbiotic. An example of this is that ‘drug money’ paid to gain unhindered access to ports helps to fund political campaigns.<sup>199</sup> Such transactions create mutual dependency between criminal networks and political elites, a relationship which is very difficult to break. Whilst an increasing number of serious cases of drug trafficking have been heard in the Court in Mombasa, no convictions have yet been meted out.<sup>200</sup> This has largely been attributed to the protection afforded to persons involved in drug trade due to their influence on the political elite.


#### *Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus*

The set-up of criminal networks and onshore factors work in harmony to make drug-trafficking through Eastern Africa a profitable business, which is further aided by the fact that there are hardly any effective measures of deterrence. As terrorist networks seem to be involved in both production and trafficking of heroin, there is no question that heroin trade is an important source of terrorist financing – from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region to Eastern Africa through the Southern Indian Ocean smuggling route. Corruption associated with drug trafficking is also of great concern as this permeates the state apparatus in affected states to the extent that it undermines the checks and balances that are essential for democratic structures to function. Compounded by the increasing rates of drug dependency, drug trafficking can have serious implications for regional stability.

#### **Armed Violence at Sea**

In this segment, we shift the focus from the five above-mentioned types of maritime crime to looking at a different category of maritime insecurity which it is impossible to overlook when assessing current trends in insecurity at sea, looking beyond the coast of Somalia. In short, we move from maritime crime to Armed Violence at Sea. According to EUNAVFOR, “spill-over effects of the Yemeni crisis into the maritime domain led to a deterioration of the maritime security environment in the Southern Red Sea and the BAM Strait”.<sup>201</sup>

Figure 7:  
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait



In fact, “industry is more concerned about Red Sea threats to maritime security than they are about Somali piracy”.<sup>202</sup> As insecurity around the BAM is an emergent issue which is not yet fully understood by security actors operating in the area, what is provided below is an overview of the issues rather than an analysis of drivers. Therefore, in place of the analysis of deterrents, criminal networks, and enabling on-shore factors used in previous segments, we distinguish between three categories of violence at sea in this segment. These categories are armed violence related to:

- Maritime activities of terrorist groups in Somalia
- Attacks by non-state actors on vessels around the BAM Strait
- Armed Conflict between Houthi forces and Saudi Coalition forces.

#### *Maritime Activities of Terrorist Groups in Somalia*

The SEMG considers Al-Shabaab to be the most immediate threat to peace and security in Somalia.<sup>203</sup> In 2016, Al-Shabaab carried out an attack on Gaarcad, Puntland, with militants arriving by boat and taking over neighbouring coastal villages.<sup>204</sup> Although Puntland forces launched a counter-offensive dubbed ‘Operation Thunder’ restoring control over the area, the attack demonstrated the capabilities of Al-Shabaab to operate from the sea.<sup>205</sup> Since this attack resulted in major defeat and many casualties for the group, the SEMG deems it highly unlikely that Al-Shabaab will attempt to launch another sea operation in the future.<sup>206</sup> In Kenya, however, according to RMIFC, Al-Shabaab militants beheaded three fishermen in Lamu in August 2017, subsequently fleeing in skiffs towards Somali waters.<sup>207</sup> The KMPU also report, on numerous occasions, having interdicted ‘foreign fighters’ attempting to enter Somalia from Kenya by sea to join Al-Shabaab. These are mainly nationals of the Democratic Republic of Congo who, according to the KMPU, are promised USD 1,000 per day to fight for Al-Shabaab.<sup>208</sup>

Also, regarding terrorist activities in Somalia with maritime dimensions, the ISIL-aligned faction in Puntland, which is reported to have grown significantly in strength in 2017,<sup>209</sup> allegedly owns skiffs and is known to receive supplies by sea.<sup>210</sup> With a current estimated capacity of 200 fighters of mixed nationalities, SEMG assessed that the capability of the faction remains limited but signalled that a potential influx of foreign fighters fleeing military pressures in Iraq, Syria, and beyond, would present a significant threat to the region.<sup>211</sup> As such, the concern is that Somalia could become a new home for ISIL as they are pushed out of Syria. Others, however, deem this unlikely as the faction currently only has support from the Ali Suleiban clan, which is not enough to establish a stronghold in Somalia. In addition, according to SEMG, there is no noteworthy funding currently directed at the faction. Yet, it is something that the SEMG keeps an eye on.<sup>212</sup>

#### *Attacks by Non-State Actors on Vessels around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait*

There has, particularly since the onset of conflict in Yemen, been a number of incidents targeting civilian vessels passing through the narrow passage between Djibouti and Yemen, called the BAM Strait, which seem to come from non-state actors. Such attacks increased in 2018 and it is civilians from small boats that have been the primary victims of these attacks with more than 60 Somali migrants and fishing crew killed in 2017.<sup>213</sup> The suspicion is

that non-state actors, based out of Yemen, are trying to carry out a 'spectacular attack' in the Strait. The main concern to vessels transiting the Southern Red Sea is the risk of 'exploding ships'. This risk can take two forms. One is the use of water-borne IEDs which are rammed into vessels transiting through the Strait.<sup>214</sup> An example is the *Galicía Spirit* incident on 25 October 2017 where a small, allegedly remotely controlled skiff, laden with explosives, reportedly attacked before exploding roughly 20 NM from the vessel.<sup>215</sup> The second is 'suicide boats' that are also laden with explosives but manned by an attacker.<sup>216</sup> These two types of attacks have also been combined in the two separate incidents on 6 January 2018, 45 NM off the port of Al Hudaydah in Yemen.<sup>217</sup> They generally seem to have targeted the stern of the ships, which is where safe rooms are located. This is where the crew assemble when there are signs of a threat.<sup>218</sup> While there is no conclusive evidence on the source of the 'exploding ships attacks', they point to an emerging maritime terror threat from non-state actors based out of Yemen.

#### *Armed Conflict between Houthi Forces and Saudi Coalition Forces*

The conflict between Houthi forces and Saudi Coalition forces has, on various occasions, spilled into the maritime domain, particularly around the port city of Mokha at the entrance to the BAM in Yemen. As stated at a Conference in Nairobi in March 2018, there is "a continuous militarisation of the Red Sea". A maritime intelligence report from late 2017 finds that a worrying development in the safety of shipping lanes in the Southern Red Sea is "the deployment of sea mines by the Houthis" which, despite being "targeted towards the Saudi coalition", may nonetheless have an effect on civilian vessels transiting close to the coastline.<sup>219</sup> If such mines, which are essentially indiscriminate, are not identified and removed by the Saudi forces, they "will, in time, break free from their moorings and drift".<sup>220</sup> They can then drift into any ship transiting the area.<sup>221</sup> Secondly, there is also the concerning use of missiles fired by Houthi rebels against Saudi military targets at sea which have been used with much accuracy as regards targeting.<sup>222</sup> In October 2016, for example, an anti-ship missile fired from the shore and, claimed by Houthi rebels, damaged a United Arab Emirates (UEA) supply vessel. Further highlighting the threat that conflict in Yemen may spill over into the maritime domain was the attack on a World Food Programme (WFP) vessel on 3 June 2018.<sup>223</sup> The WFP vessel was attacked after having delivered a shipment at Yemen's Hodeidah Port.<sup>224</sup> According to EUNAVFOR and CMF, it is unlikely that this attack was piracy-related – rather they believe that it most likely was related to the conflict in Yemen.

There is clearly a risk of collateral damage as armed conflict moves to one of the narrowest and busiest shipping lanes in the world. The view that failures to achieve effect will deter perpetrators from attempting attacks in the future was contradicted at a workshop organised by CMS in Copenhagen. Participants were rather convinced that, considering the potentially dramatic effect of a large-scale incident at sea, Houthis will continue to try and the different assailants are learning from each other's failures.<sup>225</sup> EUNAVFOR also confirms that the risk for merchant vessels operating in the area is increasing. Whilst it is considered unlikely that merchant vessels are deliberately targeted, there is a risk of misidentification.<sup>226</sup> Adding to this is the assessment that "Yemen's civil war shows no sign of abating."<sup>227</sup>

### *Maritime Crime-Stability Nexus*

There is an escalation of violence at sea in one of the world's busiest choke points for maritime activities. Self-protection measures adopted for piracy such as armed guards and safe havens will not be effective in mitigating the risks associated with these attacks. Moreover, international navies can only serve as a very limited source of recourse and as important providers of intelligence to the shipping industry.<sup>228</sup> Although there have been no large-scale incidents to date, the escalation of violence currently seen could result in everything from an environmental disaster to a mass casualty incident and even a maritime security incident that triggers an international conflict.<sup>229</sup> Noting the littoral states surrounding the BAM Strait (Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, and Somalia), it is clear that there is no regional capacity to manage a large-scale incident at sea. Security surrounding the Strait has, correspondingly, been at the top of the agenda in international fora such as the deconfliction meetings of CMF and EUNAVFOR (SHADE) and more research is underway by UNODC to map the concrete threat landscape.

## 1.2

### **A Broad View: Interlinkages, Dynamics, and Reflections**

Whilst it is important to look at trends in maritime crime at an individual level to understand the factors that drive them, it is equally important to look at how different types of maritime crime are connected.<sup>230</sup> Understanding such *interlinkages* is particularly useful when contemplating how to effectively counter one or more types of maritime crime. Another important notion to appreciate when considering how to address maritime crime is the *dynamics* at play within the maritime crime complex which is in constant change due to the adaptability of criminal networks. If the business model for a given crime is under pressure, criminal networks have a remarkable ability to reposition either geographically or thematically to other types of crime. We use the term ballooning effect to describe this dynamic of how countermeasures that 'push' the problem (at one end of the balloon) may unintentionally displace air (or criminal activity) to the other end of the balloon.<sup>231</sup>

The importance of looking at the totality of transnational organised crime was highlighted in both interviews and workshops.<sup>232</sup> This means that countermeasures that go beyond pushing a crime in a different direction (either thematically or geographically) must take account of a fuller and more detailed picture of how the crime scene at sea is interconnected and what types of criminal network are behind the trade. As noted by an interviewee, piracy can only be understood "by putting in perspective the interactions with the other types of maritime activities, starting with IUU fishing and smuggling activities by sea."<sup>233</sup>

Therefore, based on the overview of developments and drivers for the six types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity presented in the above segments, we elaborate on how interlinkages and dynamics generated through ballooning effects are visible if looking at the totality of maritime crime off the HoA, or the maritime crime complex.

### **Interlinkages and Dynamics**

We have introduced many key concepts and conditions in the above presentation of five types of maritime crime and an additional type of maritime insecurity. In essence, we have found that it is important to understand how *criminal networks* behind maritime crime operate, and which *on-shore fac-*

tors enable their operations in order to identify effective *deterrents*. Adding to this picture, we now take a broader look at the maritime crime complex off the HoA, looking at how crimes are *interlinked* and how *dynamics* of ballooning have manifested themselves. These are seen in two main clusters described below.

#### *Piracy-TiPSoM-Weapons Smuggling-Terrorism*

When looking at piracy in relation to broader trends in maritime crime – rather than in isolation – it seems more correct to refer to those involved in PAGs as ‘poly-criminals’ rather than just ‘pirates’. Arguably, the onset of conflict in Yemen and drought in Somalia raised the demand for criminals with navigation skills in Somalia. These developments coincided with the successful suppression of Somali piracy, which rendered the business high risk/low profit. So, whilst piracy was no longer a lucrative business, a big market for TiPSoM emerged. Essentially, former pirate networks mobilised existing logistics, manpower, and financial liquidity and ballooned into other smuggling enterprises – TiPSoM being one of them.<sup>234</sup> Adding to this, and as indicated by the RMIFC, it makes no sense from a business perspective for a vessel to carry out one leg of a journey with an empty hull.<sup>235</sup> Boats ferrying people between Somalia and Yemen appear to be following this logic of profit maximisation as they have been seen to smuggle people to Yemen, purchase weapons for their smuggling fee, and return to Somalia with weapons as cargo which are then sold at great profit.<sup>236</sup>

On several occasions, the BPMPU has found consignments of small arms on the same boats used to smuggle migrants north as they return from Yemen. UNODC GMCP in Bosasso takes pictures of these arms shipments which are sometimes hidden inside bags of rice, dates, and onions. Whilst this may be no more than ‘ant-trade’ run strictly for business purposes, these weapons usually end up in the hands of terrorists.<sup>237</sup> As stated by UNODC GMCP’s Programme Officer in Bosasso, “illegally smuggled weapons primarily end up in the hands of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab assassins called *Amniyat*”. More directly, the pirate kingpin Issa Yuluh is said to have been instrumental in supplying weapons to Al-Shabaab. The leader of the ISIL-associated faction in Puntland, Abdiqadir Mu’min, whom Yuluh is related to, also uses clan kinship to receive weapons supplies from Yemen through the Yuluh PAG, or they simply use the PAG’s skiffs and dhows.<sup>238</sup> Conversely, the SEMG is aware of weapons that formerly belonged to Mu’min having changed hands to the Yuluh PAG in Alula after his faction was driven out of Qandala in late 2016.<sup>239</sup>

Considering the breath of fresh air this trade blows into PAGs as well as the complicity in the horrific practices of TiPSoM networks and the indirect supply of weapons to terrorist networks, this crime cluster and the individuals within it should not be overlooked as these types of maritime crimes drive instability. A key ‘take-away’ for policy developers, therefore, is that – if the aim is stabilisation – a wider focus that looks beyond piracy is required.<sup>240</sup>

#### *Smuggling-Terrorist Financing*<sup>241</sup>

In addition to direct terror threats at sea outlined in the segment on Armed Violence above, there are a number of smuggling activities at sea that are more indirectly connected to terrorism, as revenue generated from these activities finance terrorist networks from Afghanistan across to Eastern Africa.

The linkages between maritime smuggling and terrorism are especially important to consider in section 3 of this report, as the purpose of this report is to identify types of maritime crimes that have implications for regional stability.

It is well established that illicit trade in sugar and charcoal is taxed by Al-Shabaab and have, in effect, become an important source of terrorist financing. In fiscal terms, sugar smuggling is estimated to generate a total of USD 400 million per year, which is divided between businessmen, politicians, local border authorities, and defence forces in Kenya and Al-Shabaab.<sup>242</sup> With regard to charcoal, SEMG estimates that Al-Shabaab collects at least USD 10 million annually by taxing consignments at key checkpoints.<sup>243</sup> Although charcoal trade between Somalia and the Gulf States is banned under UNSC Resolution 2385 (2017),<sup>244</sup> SEMG reports of poor implementation in 2017, pointing out that this has “facilitated Al-Shabaab financing and undermined counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia.” Reasons for the poor implementation of the embargo include challenges related to disposal of seized charcoal shipments by international actors like EUNAVFOR or CMF.<sup>245</sup> Firstly, the product cannot be thrown overboard as is often done with drugs seized at sea because charcoal floats. If the cargo is taken back to Somalia, Al-Shabaab may benefit from being able to tax it yet again. If they transport it on to markets in the Gulf, there is a risk that the navies may absurdly come to facilitate the trade. Finally, destruction of the charcoal by incineration (as is done with ivory) cannot be justified due to the environmental implications this would have. One solution may be to distribute the charcoal to displaced families in Somalia through AMISOM.<sup>246</sup> The challenge of how to effectively implement the charcoal ban continues to be a challenging question, particularly for UNODC, which is charged by the UNSC with identifying solutions to how the trade might be disrupted.<sup>247</sup>

In interviews, it was pointed out that to grasp the extent of Al-Shabaab funding from illegal trade into and out of Somalia, it was unhelpful to focus too narrowly on sugar and charcoal – Al-Shabaab does not. A one-off tax of USD 1,000-2,000 is collected per truck of goods that arrive in Somalia by sea destined for Kenya – regardless of content.<sup>248</sup>

Looking beyond Somalia to the heroin trade and the financing of terrorism in Afghanistan, the strength of this link is evidenced by the fact that one of the main tasks of CMF is to interdict heroin smugglers and deny the use of the high seas to terrorist and illicit non-state actors. As former CTF 150 Commander, Commodore Mal Wise, stated in connection with a heroin interdiction in March 2018: “We know that heroin seizures like today’s will have a direct impact on the operations of terrorist organisations at distribution points in East Africa. Removing heroin from circulation, reduces the funding resources available for terrorists, which then reduces their ability to inflict suffering on the communities in East Africa.”<sup>249</sup>

### **Reflections on the Maritime Crime Complex**

It is clear when looking at the broader crime complex at sea, that it is not useful to tackle individual types of maritime crime in isolation. As an interviewee notes, “a narrow focus on piracy does not position the international community well in terms of tackling the wide array of other threats present in and around Somalia.”<sup>250</sup> The full spectrum of crimes at sea must be taken into account when designing future interventions aimed at countering maritime crime.

In section 3, the developments, drivers, interlinkages, and dynamics accounted for in section 1 will be considered against the outcome of the Evaluation of current Danish-funded interventions to counter maritime crime by UNODC's GMCP in Somalia (section 2). To round off this chapter, however, we offer a few overall reflections engendered by the process of data collection and analysis carried out in the course of this study of the maritime crime complex off the HoA and beyond, which will also feed into conclusions in section 3.

#### *Clusters*

Looking at the linkages between different forms of maritime crime presented above, there is evidence that maritime criminal activity happens in clusters. There is, for example, a link between maritime crime between Somalia and Yemen. This includes weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and the involvement of PAGs – all of which, in some form, support terrorist activities and other sources of instability in the HoA region. A different set of linkages appear between maritime crimes in the WIO where the most prominent types are IUU and drugs smuggling, with the latter having linkages to terrorist financing from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region to Eastern Africa. Another cluster is violence around the BAM which involves a different set of actors, including possibly AQAP and Houthi rebels who seem to have similar objectives to carry out 'spectacular attacks' and who learn from each other's mistakes. This category demonstrates how maritime crime and violence at sea represents "a diversification of the threat" in the WIO.<sup>251</sup> Equal for all three clusters, however, is that much of the criminal activity is enabled by dhow traffic going between the Makran Coast and Eastern Africa and much of the revenue generated from criminal enterprises feed terrorist groups.

#### *Terminology*

While military definitions exist on piracy and armed robbery at sea, a point to be developed further in light of emerging types of maritime threats is that there seems to be a need to introduce new categories of crime. Definitions are, for example, needed to understand attacks on merchant shipping in the Southern Red Sea whose origins are not piracy, but related to conflict and terrorism.<sup>252</sup> This is necessary in order to accurately reflect the nature of the wide array of incidents recorded at sea in statistics and, as such, it is a prerequisite for clearly understanding events unfolding in the maritime crime complex. Accordingly, CMF and EUNAVFOR are currently working on a revised template of military maritime security event definitions. This has led to wider work being undertaken by OBP to address the absence of harmonisations of global reporting standards and definitions in the three principle locations of maritime insecurity: HoA, Gulf of Guinea, and South East Asia.<sup>253</sup> The idea of developing additional definitions to reflect nuances in incidents recorded might indeed also be useful to better understand trends in piracy off the HoA – for example whether an incident is straightforward piracy or actually retaliation for illegal fishing. If all attacks seen off Somalia are simply labelled as piracy, statistics will not reflect the root of the challenge accurately. Since the data is there, it would make sense to expand terminology so that efforts to counter piracy make optimal use of the information at hand – and in so doing, have better chance of being effective.



### *Agility*

Having acknowledged that ballooning enables criminal networks to persist despite deterrents targeting their operations, it may be worthwhile for international actors to draw a lesson on adaptability from their criminal counterparts. One of the pitfalls of overly narrow mandates is the risk of fragmented and ineffective responses to interconnected types of crime. While criminal networks behind weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and piracy are interconnected, for example, responders are blinkered to only focus on individual forms of crime. Indeed, a reoccurring conclusion in the individual crime segments above is that narrow mandates limit the effectiveness of actors deterring maritime crime. Adding to this rigidity is the obstacle of accessing areas where criminal activity is concentrated, which is key to fighting maritime crime. Nevertheless, the most important areas are insecure and therefore inaccessible to external actors. What emerges from this reflection is the question of how external actors might seek to broaden their mandates and access in order to respond to current and future threats as and where they emerge and evolve? This is particularly important in light of the volatility of the situation surrounding the BAM Strait, the continuous destabilisation of Yemen, and continued insecurity and humanitarian emergency in Somalia – all of which may potentially require quick and comprehensive action by international actors in the near future.

### *Dhows*

The vessels used to transport different types of illegal goods such as weapons and drugs are Iranian dhows. Further, these are often involved in IUU fishing in the WIO region.<sup>254</sup> Rather than this being indicative of a connection between the different forms of crime,<sup>255</sup> it seems instead to be a question of accessibility and convenience in the dhow market.<sup>256</sup> Dhows involved in maritime crime in the WIO are often manufactured by the Iranian Al Mansoor Company based in Chabahar. They are known to customise dhows according to their buyers' needs, including rigging hidden compartments and fitting extra fuel tanks. The latter is required to make the long journey to the Eastern African coast without having to refuel.<sup>257</sup> While Al Mansoor dhows cater to different types of criminals, this is not in itself indicative of these crimes being linked, nor does it necessarily imply that the company is complicit in criminal enterprises.<sup>258</sup>

However, since Al Mansoor dhows seem to be an instrumental part of the logistical set-up for smuggling businesses, it may be worthwhile to explore whether they might form part of the solution either through dialogue with the company or the Government. The Southern Route Partnership (SRP), which Iran is part of, may be a suitable forum to seek dialogue and identify effective measures to counter heroin smuggling through Iran at a regional level. Like other trans-shipment countries for narcotics, Iran struggles with the crippling effects of drug dependency, which has grown explosively in recent years.<sup>259</sup> The Government has sought to address problems with drug abuse including progressive drug treatment campaigns and attempts to control the trade, which has led to numerous casualties among police and gendarmerie officers. Given the national health hazard caused by heroin trafficking at all points of trans-shipment, coming to terms with this threat might be a common point around which cooperation can be rallied regardless of political differences. Novel approaches may also be sought to obstruct the use of the Indian Ocean as a smuggling highway. For example,

information which could be useful in identifying suspicious vessels is related to the extra-large fuel tanks rigged on smuggling dhows as they need to make the long journey without docking to refuel. Since fuel is Government-subsidised, there is a paper trail for the fuelling of dhows. Any form requesting conspicuous quantities (upwards of 42,000 l.) could therefore be flagged and information shared through the SRP network.

#### *Counter-Intuitive Consequences*

While stability, rule of law, and development are generally seen as being forces for good, they may have counter-intuitive consequences. By way of example, ENACT report that “the wide availability of good mobile telephone coverage in north-east Mozambique since about 2015, makes this a sensible model for the expansion of the heroin trade there.”<sup>260</sup> As noted above, there seems to be a geographic demarcation for land-based smuggling of heroin which is drawn at the Kenya/Somalia border. All interviewees indicate that there is no heroin smuggling in Somalia. The explanation for this deviation is the ‘Goldilocks Rule’ according to which Somalia is currently too hot for drugs smuggling. But what if the ‘temperature’ in Somalia was to change to the ‘sweet spot’ that caters to drugs smuggling? Could a future scenario unfold in which improvements to security and infrastructure in Somalia coupled with effective measures to counter narcotics smuggling in other locations around the WIO could lead the trade to balloon into Somalia? And what would the societal effects be if a Somali heroin consumer market was to emerge? Although this is by no means a scenario that will unfold tomorrow, it might be worth for those monitoring trends in drug trafficking to remember that joker in the pack.

#### *Corruption Permeation*

A common denominator for the types of maritime crime analysed in this section is that they are all facilitated by corruption. Indeed, as stated by the Head of UNODC GMCP, “arguably, if you are only running one UNODC Programme in the region, it should be an anti-corruption project, because all of these things lead back to corruption. Ironically, it is the one project we are not running.” Whether piracy, human trafficking, IUU fishery, drugs, or weapons smuggling – corruption is an indispensable element of the business model. It also happens at all levels of society, from powerful political figures seeking funding for political campaigns, government officials issuing illegal fishing licences, security personnel taxing illicit goods, to the fork lift driver in the port who accepts a bribe to look the other way. The conclusion that follows from this reflection is that anti-corruption measures should have a much more prominent place in counter maritime crime strategies than what is currently the case.

#### *Impunity*

With regard to counter-piracy measures in Somalia, an important gap in efforts is arrest and prosecution of known pirate kingpins such as Garfanje and Yuluh. With their leaders at the helm, PAGs have ballooned into other trades that have destabilising effects on the region such as TiPSoM and weapons smuggling. The international community continues to push for the prosecution of piracy kingpins.<sup>261</sup> Nevertheless, while hundreds of pirate ‘foot soldiers’ have been successfully prosecuted and sentenced, only very few kingpins have been tried. One of the challenges is, as accounted for

above, their status as important power brokers in Somalia, which shields them from arrest by Somali law enforcement. With regard to prosecution abroad, there have been only two such cases – both in Belgium. The case of *Afwayne* gained much international attention as the kingpin was lured to Belgium to participate in a fictional film project, upon which he was arrested and charged for piracy offences along with an associate. It would be safe to assume that remaining piracy kingpins learnt a lesson in resisting such allure from that case, so it is doubtful that it could happen again. Therefore, with little chance of obtaining successful prosecution of remaining piracy kingpins in Somalia or abroad, it may be worthwhile to find other approaches to ‘removing the air from the balloons’ of the criminal networks behind piracy in order to end their destabilising influence on Somalia.

### 1.3

#### Section I: Conclusion

In the above, we have looked at specific *developments* in and *drivers* of types of maritime crime and maritime insecurity that are prevalent around the HoA. We have also looked at how each individual type of crime impacts regional stability – their maritime crime-stability nexus. Finally, we have looked at the broader maritime crime complex by mapping how different forms of maritime crime are *interlinked* and how the *dynamics* of ballooning are at play within the broader crime complex.

One key finding to be drawn from this analysis is that activities of maritime crime operatives impact regional stability. This can, for example, be seen in how maritime crime both enables operations of terrorist groups and finances them. It is also evident that maritime crime fuels corruption, undermining efforts to establish rule of law and, in some cases, negatively affecting democratic governance structures more broadly. Piracy, Armed Violence at Sea, and TiPSoM also directly threatens the lives of seafarers and migrants. What can also be drawn from the above analysis is that the crime complex seen off the HoA is dynamic and interconnected and so interventions aimed at building stability through countering maritime crime and its destabilising effects should take account of the full crime complex rather than only individual parts of it (i.e. just piracy).

In section 2, we move from a wide perspective on different types of maritime crime that currently prevail off the HoA and further into the WIO, to a more specific analysis of past activities, delivered by UNODC GMCP in Somalia with funding from the Government of Denmark. This analysis leads to an Evaluation of whether these activities have met objectives, with what impact, and whether the rationale for them remain valid.

As underlined in the introduction, this report was commissioned to contain both an analysis of current trends and an evaluation of past activities in order to establish a foundation on which to make decisions about future engagements. Conclusions regarding present crime trends (section 1) and lessons drawn from past activities evaluated in section 2 will be amalgamated in section 3, highlighting challenges that are important to be mindful of when formulating activities targeted at countering maritime crime and proposing recommendations. It is important to thoroughly underline that the analysis contained in section 2 does not derive from the conclusions made in section 1. Section 2 should rather be seen as a distinct undertaking which can be read in its own right.

The fact that section 2 zooms in on specific activities originally designed with a narrow focus to counter piracy, may seem to strikingly contradict the con-

clusion just reached on the importance of raising focus from being narrowly placed on individual crimes to encompassing the broader crime complex. Nevertheless, while activities delivered may have been intended to counter piracy, they have had more general application and so lessons drawn from these past activities are likewise of more general application in section 3, which looks at future engagements.

## Notes

- 1 See Katja Lindskov Jacobsen & Mark Winther. 'Store Masker i Små Net: Danske Bidrag til International Maritim Kriminalitetsbekæmpelse'. København: Center for Militære Studier, 2018.
- 2 See annex A for overview of interviews conducted.
- 3 Obtained from a broad range of sources, including CMF, EUNAVFOR, BIMCO, INTERTANKO, NGOs, the CGPCS, and UN agencies – including the Security Council and the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG).
- 4 For example: from SafeSeas, the Stimson Center, DIIS, CMS, RUSI, and Chatham House.
- 5 An example of this are narratives surrounding IUU fishing in Somali communities. Another example are political factors which are not visible in statistical data, but nonetheless can have powerful influence on whether and to what degree a given issue is addressed (for example, the influence of powerful political elites on the number of drug seizures).
- 6 OECD-DAC. 'Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance'. Paris. OECD, 1991. p. 5.
- 7 With reference to Participatory Evaluation, Livingston Armytage acknowledges that, "while this model directly conflicts with positivistic notions of objectivity, detachment and impartiality, it has received much endorsement", especially among scholars who find that classic notions of neutrality cannot be achieved. See Livingston Armytage, 'Evaluating Aid: An Adolescent Domain of Practice'. *Evaluation*, Vol. 17, no. 3 (2011): pp. 272-273.
- 8 OECD-DAC. 'Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management'. Paris: OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation, 2002. p. 28.
- 9 See annex C.
- 10 Peer Respondents involve both organisations whose work relates very closely to that of UNOCD and organisations that work in slightly different areas, but whose perspectives are nonetheless valuable. They were asked for their views on past and current conditions in places supported through the Programme as well as how GMCP may have influenced change – with an explicit request for critical views.
- 11 Interview O.
- 12 James Smith et al. 'Letter Dated 2 November 2017 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea Addressed to the President of the Security Council'. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, November 2017. p. 6

- 13 Smith et al., 2017: p. 6: "Laboratory analysis of the blast revealed traces of potassium nitrate, suggesting that Al-Shabaab may have begun to manufacture home-made explosives."
- 14 France Liaison Officer. '2017 Annual Report', RMIFC, 2018.
- 15 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 4.
- 16 These interventions were possible because the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia was open to receiving assistance in tackling the problem and because the UN Security Council resolutions provided a mandate for international actors to assume certain enforcement and prosecution functions on behalf of the TFG.
- 17 Application of Best Management Practices (guidelines developed for ships transiting through the High-Risk Area) was very effective in obstructing attempted hijackings.
- 18 Regional states had a strong interest in engaging in efforts to suppress piracy, as the problem negatively affected the blue economy in states like Kenya and Seychelles.
- 19 The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) is an initiative of the International Maritime Organisation originally to align regional efforts to counter piracy. The Jeddah Amendment widened the remit of the DCoC to include other maritime security threats. DCoC. 'The Djibouti Code of Conduct'. International Maritime Organization, 2015.
- 20 Maisie Piggeon et al. 'The State of Maritime Piracy 2017 Report', Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2018.
- 21 Interview A.
- 22 Interviews: B; C; A.
- 23 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 7.
- 24 France Liaison Officer, 2018; Interview: D.
- 25 Interview: D.
- 26 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Stig Jarle Hansen: Afweyne is in prison in Belgium, Garad is believed to have been killed, and Boyah was briefly imprisoned in Bosasso after which he is said to have 'retired' from piracy.
- 27 Interview: B.
- 28 Interview: F.
- 29 Interviews: D; G; B; H.
- 30 Interview: G; I.
- 31 'The Lobster', also known as Malable (honey man) Interview: I.
- 32 Interview: I: This PAG was behind the attack in February 2018.

- 33 According to Interviewee H, there are indications that the Garfange Group may have split into two separate groups due to a disagreement on how to handle a group of Iranian hostages.
- 34 Interview: G: Despite having been arrested many times, it always ends with the release of Garfange.
- 35 Also known as poly-criminals.
- 36 This attack resulted in the transfer of six suspects to Seychelles for prosecution.
- 37 Interview: J.
- 38 Interview: F; B; G.
- 39 Interview: G: conversations with suspects indicate they are simply fishermen who saw an opportunity to try to take a ship but weren't very good at it.
- 40 Interviewees stressed the need to distinguish between pirates and Al-Shabaab; the motive that drive pirate activity is the prospect of financial gain, which is different from Al-Shabaab's focus on ideological objectives.
- 41 Interviews: H; G.
- 42 Magnus Gjelsvik et al. 'Ex-Pirates in Somalia: Disengagement Processes and Reintegration Programming'. University of Tromsø: Centre for Peace Studies, 2012. p. 5.
- 43 The unanimous conclusion from four interviews with convicted pirates as well as an interview with UNODC Bosasso.
- 44 Peter Bauman and Sarah Hanssen. 'Strategic Review of the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia'. Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 2016. p. 16.
- 45 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 1.
- 46 Gjelsvik et al., 2012: p. 7.
- 47 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this.
- 48 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 3.
- 49 Gjelsvik et al., 2012: p. 7
- 50 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 2.
- 51 Interview: Piracy Prisoner no. 1.
- 52 Interview: I.
- 53 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 54 SafeSeas. 'SafeSeas High-Level Symposium on Maritime Capacity Building'. Nairobi, 2018.

- 55 Bauman et al., 2016; France Liaison Officer, 2018; ICC International Maritime Bureau, 'Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period of 1 January – 30 June 2018', London, United Kingdom: ICC International Maritime Bureau, July 2018.
- 56 Interviews: K; L; A; G.
- 57 There is anecdotal evidence that Issa Yuluh was involved in a major offensive against ISIL in Qandala, which may indicate willingness to support the Puntland Government and a wish to move into licit business. CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 58 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 59 Jay Bahadur, *The Pirates of Somalia*, Pantheon Books, 2011.
- 60 Primarily to access Saudi Arabia and Europe.
- 61 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 40: The third largest migrant flow within the WIO region runs between Obock in Djibouti and Aden in Yemen.
- 62 Danish Refugee Council and Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) 'RMMS Annual Trends and Analysis Summary 2017, East Africa and Yemen', RMMS, February 2018.
- 63 Danish Refugee Council et al., 2018.
- 64 Interview: M; According to the Annual Report of the RMIFC in Madagascar: "Populations are either fleeing drought/lack of fish resources in Somalia or fleeing war and cholera in devastated Yemen." See France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 15.
- 65 Deutsche Welle. 'IOM: Smugglers "Deliberately Drowned" Migrants near Yemen', 10 August 2017.
- 66 International Organization for Migration. 'Yemen 2018: Humanitarian Compendium', 7 September 2018.
- 67 Danish Refugee Council et al., 2018.
- 68 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 69 Interview: M.
- 70 Interview: M.
- 71 Interview: I; N.
- 72 Danish Refugee Council et al., 2018. p. 2.
- 73 Interview: M.
- 74 According to interviewee M: "Survivors have provided UNHCR with accounts of being shot at, suffering regular beatings, rapes of adults and children, humiliation including being forcibly stripped, made to witness summary executions, as well as denial of food." UNHCR. 'Fleeing Horn of Africa, New Arrivals Find More Peril in Yemen', 17 April 2018. See also Human Rights Watch. 'Yemen's Torture Camps'. Human Rights Watch, 25 May 2014.



- 75 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 76 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 77 Interview: M; see also Deutsche Welle, 2017: "Smugglers forced more than 120 migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia – most of them teenagers – off a boat near the coast of Yemen on Wednesday, the International Organization for Migration announced in a statement."
- 78 France Liaison Officer, 2018, p. 38: "On 9 February, passengers on a migrant ship bound for Yemen were once again forced by smugglers to go overboard a few hundred yards away from the Yemeni shores. 25 people have been missing since."
- 79 According to statements made at SHADE, CMF will, for example, not include TiPSoM (and IUU) in their mandate.
- 80 Obligations derived from the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.
- 81 EUNAVFOR: CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 82 For example, on 6 June 2018, IOM reported to have provided assistance to traumatised survivors of a capsized boat in Yemen. 46 migrants had drowned in the incident and 16 were missing, presumed dead. See International Organization for Migration, 'IOM Saddened as Nearly 50 Migrants Drown on Yemen's Shores, Others Still missing', 6 June 2018.
- 83 Interview: H.
- 84 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 85 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 86 International Organization for Migration. 'Yemen 2018: (...)', 2018.
- 87 Danish Refugee Council, 2018.
- 88 Peter Tinti, 'Migrant Smuggling Paths from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and Saudi Arabia'. Institute for Security Studies, November 2017; France Liaison Officer, 2018; Estimates by UNODC in Bosasso set the price lower. As smugglers are now using bigger skiffs, which are faster and can carry more than 130 people, they have lowered prices to USD 80-100 for Ethiopian migrants, which is paid in addition to the USD 250 for the journey from Wajaale at the Ethiopian border. Somalis pay USD 30-50 and prices range according to kinship as those with family connections get better deals. This is corroborated by the DRC who report that: "Somali migrants reported paying significantly less than their Ethiopian counterparts, paying between USD 100 to USD 250 for part or all of their journey." Danish Refugee Council, 2018, p. 2.
- 89 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 90 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 91 Interview: M.

- 92 Interview: H.
- 93 Smuggling boats do not leave from Bosasso per se, but from areas within the jurisdiction of Bosasso: Interview, UNODC Bosasso.
- 94 Interview: H.
- 95 This practice has frequently been seen by GMCP Mentors in Garowe and Hargeisa Prisons.
- 96 Interviews: E; O; D; G.
- 97 May Channing, 'Transnational Crime and the Developing World'. Global Financial Integrity, March 2017. Also, sources in Kenya pointed to a case where a consignment of AK47s were tied up in a sack and other interviewees similarly referred to the prevalence of small arms in Somalia – not only in the hands of criminals but as a broader challenge.
- 98 Curtis Bell and Ben Lawellin. 'Stable Seas - Somali Waters'. One Earth Future, 2017. p. 20.
- 99 Interview: G.
- 100 Conflict Armament Research. 'Maritime Interdictions of Weapon Supplies to Somalia and Yemen'. Conflict Armament Research, November 2016: p. 4.
- 101 Interview: P.
- 102 Conflict Armament Research, 2016: p. 4.
- 103 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: The Puntland Government reports of an increase in Iranian dhows transporting weapons to Puntland.
- 104 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, 2018.
- 105 Interview: G.
- 106 Smith et al., 2017: §103.
- 107 Interview: G; Stig Jarle Hansen at CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 108 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 109 UNSC. 'Resolution 2244 (2015)'. United Nations Security Council, October 2015
- 110 Bell and Lawellin, 2017: pp. 20-21.
- 111 Interview: P.
- 112 Interview: Q; Bell and Lawellin, 2017: pp. 20-21.
- 113 Bell and Lawellin, 2017: p. 21.
- 114 Smith et al., 2017: §115.

- 115 Including “AK47 assault rifles, machine guns and anti-tank weapons”, Combined Maritime Forces. ‘French Ship Provence Seizes Large Weapons Cache’, 28 March 2016.
- 116 SafeSeas, 2018.
- 117 Bell and Lawellin, 2017: p. 21.
- 118 Smith et al., 2017: §109: “The Police Force identified two individuals on board the skiff as Dhofaye and Buruj Farah, but stated that they had evaded capture by Puntland forces.”
- 119 Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, Presentation at Maritime Security Conference, Copenhagen, 2 May 2018 (hosted by the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, CMS and Danish Shipping).
- 120 Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, 2018.
- 121 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 122 Conflict Armament Research, 2016: p. 5.
- 123 Conflict Armament Research, 2016: p. 13.
- 124 Interview: R; Notion that weapons are concealed in fishing dhows was echoed at Workshop in Copenhagen. May 2018.
- 125 Smith et al., 2017: §84.
- 126 A term coined by Ole Wæver in 1995 and connected to the “Copenhagen School.”
- 127 Interview: O.
- 128 Interview: G.
- 129 Bell and Lawellin, 2017.
- 130 Bell and Lawellin, 2017.
- 131 Combined Maritime Forces, 2016.
- 132 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 133 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 134 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Stig Jarle Hansen.
- 135 It is important in a Somali context to note that the legislative framework surrounding fisheries is incomplete.
- 136 There is, nonetheless, considerable convergence amongst different sources that illegal fishing in Somali waters declined in the heyday of piracy. This was not simply due to the risk of piracy attacks. According to Interviewee R, the decline also coincided with the adoption of new strong measures by the EU to ban entry of IUU fish to Europe. It is very difficult to disaggregate the exact impact of either in the decline of IUU in Somalia. Much of Secure Fisheries’ information comes from word of mouth, as they do not monitor the EEZ.

137 Stimson defines IUU as follows in *Casting a Wider Net*:

ILLEGAL FISHING: Refers to fishing activities by a national or foreign vessel in the waters of a country, or by flag-state vessels that are party to a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO), in contravention of conservation and management measures;

UNREPORTED FISHING: Refers to fishing activities that have either not been reported or have been misreported to authorities. Unreported fishing is not only fraudulent, but also undermines fisheries management by skewing the accuracy of fish stock assessments upon which regulations are based;

UNREGULATED FISHING: Refers to fishing activities in areas without fisheries management or conservation measures, including the high seas and areas not managed by a RFMO. Fishing vessels without nationality or vessels of a country not party to a RFMO are also considered to be participating in unregulated fishing. See Amanda Shaver and Sally Yozell. 'Casting a Wider Net'. The Stimson Center, January 2018. .

138 Shaver and Yozell, 2018.

139 Safeseas, 2018.

140 Interview: S.

141 Shaver and Yozell, 2018.

142 As such, there are no clear legal provisions in place that define IUU offences. It is therefore questionable whether one can even talk of Illegal fishing in Somalia. Strictly speaking, it would therefore be more correct to refer to Unregulated and Unreported fishing.

143 Smith et al., 2017: §86.

144 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 15.

145 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 20.

146 FAO. 'Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA)', 2018

147 Examples of such platforms are the US Navy's SeaVision, PEW's Eyes on the Sea, and Google's Global Fishing Watch.

148 UNODC GMCP has, for example, obtained images for interdiction through EU's Copernicus project: UNODC GMCP Video.

149 For example, Vulcan Inc.'s SkyLight.

150 Also called the "full force of the law" approach, UNODC. 'Outcome of the 2nd International Symposium on Fisheries Crime, 10-11 October 2016'. UNODC, 17 May 2017.

151 See Fish-i-Africa. 'Fish-i-Africa', 2018.

152 Cathy Haenlein. 'Below the Surface'. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, July 2017: "There is also evidence that much of today's IUU fishing activity takes place on an organised, systematic scale across multiple jurisdictions."

- 153 Shaver and Yozell, 2018.
- 154 For example, the Greko Case: see Fish-i-Africa, 2018.
- 155 Term used by Fish-i-Africa.
- 156 See annex B for distinction between Inshore and Offshore Fisheries in Somalia.
- 157 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 21.
- 158 Haenlein, 2017: Recommendation 1: "Recognise large-scale IUU fishing as transnational organised crime."
- 159 For more information, see fishcrime.com.
- 160 Interview: P.
- 161 Interviews: F; P; A; Joana Wright, 'Drug Trafficking Routes Proliferate through Indian Ocean'. Jane's Intelligence Review, 2017.
- 162 UNODC. 'Afghanistan Opium Survey, November 2017'. UNODC, 2017: p. 8.
- 163 Combined Maritime Forces, 'Two Seizures in Two Days For HMAS Warramunga, 25 May, 2018.
- 164 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 165 These are images depicting, for example, a crescent moon or a tree.
- 166 CMF at Maritime Security Conference, Copenhagen, 2 May 2018 (hosted by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CMS and Danish Shipping).
- 167 Interview: P: The Global Initiative (GI) also documents how 'chemical signatures of drugs' point back to this area of origin; Joana Wright, 'Drug Trafficking on the Southern Route', Southern Route Partnership Conference Paper, November 2017: p. 2.
- 168 Such information can provide additional grounds for prosecution to the charge of narcotics smuggling, although the science is not yet strong enough to independently be accepted as evidence in court. Interview: P.
- 169 Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow, and Mark Shaw. 'Tackling Heroin Trafficking on the East Africa Coast'. ENACT Policy Brief Issue, June 2018: p. 3.
- 170 Chart credits to Joana Wright.
- 171 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018; Wright, 2017: p. 3.
- 172 Safeseas High-Level Symposium on Capacity Building for Maritime Security, Nairobi, March 2018 <http://www.safeseas.net/symposium/>.
- 173 Interviews P; F.
- 174 Interview: A; Joana Wright, Drug trafficking routes proliferate through Indian Ocean, 2017: p. 4.
- 175 These are also used for many other kinds of illicit activity, including IUU and weapons smuggling.

- 176 Notably, drugs are not directly shipped in containers from the Makran Coast because containers that depart from this region are classified as high-risk in Europe and subject to strict inspections. Drugs therefore need to pass through less conspicuous ports before being containerised – Interview: P.
- 177 Information about volumes of narcotics trafficked in container ships is scarce as boardings are rare. See France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 29.
- 178 Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS).
- 179 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018. ENACT similarly report that: “After anchoring 20 km to 100 km off the African coast in international waters, flotillas of small boats collect the drug consignments from the dhows and ferry them to various beaches, coves or islands, or offload them into small commercial harbours.” Haysom et al., 2018: p. 7.
- 180 There is suspicion that the hotel industry is involved in drug trade. Big hotels have powerful boats that are used for deep-water fishing and other tourist activities. These can go further out to sea than the vessels of the maritime police and it is suspected that they meet drug traffickers at sea to receive drug consignments. Tourists may be completely unaware of this activity. There is a reluctance to inspect these vessels. The reason for this is twofold; fear of deterring tourists from coming to Lamu; and the notion that hotels tend to accuse the maritime police of harassing tourists when they have previously made inspections, which resulted in officers being transferred to other locations. Interview: T.
- 181 According to Interviewee F, maritime drug flows into Tanzania are now assessed to be down to zero because of police efforts. This view was contested at the CMS Validation Workshop held in Copenhagen in May 2018 where the view was that the trade had likely shifted form. Drugs still seem to be containerised in Tanzania where port security is lax, especially in Zanzibar. These may also be landed in Mozambique and come into Tanzania in small boats or across land to feed the old trafficking routes.
- 182 Haysom et al., 2018, p. 12: “There is no verified figure as to how much heroin enters Mozambique this way. However, several people observing the trade along the east coast believe that the amount of heroin entering Mozambique has increased lately as a result of CMF seizures in the waters near Kenya and Tanzania, and the crackdown in Tanzania.”
- 183 Council of the European Union. ‘15457/12’. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 29 October 2012.
- 184 Haysom et al., 2018: pp. 24-25.
- 185 Interview: F; Haysom et al., 2018: p. 30.
- 186 AllAfrica. ‘Mozambique: Tanzanian Jihadists Will Be Tried in Mozambique’, 28 March 2018
- 187 Globalnyt. ‘Militante Islamister Slår Igen Til i Mozambique’, 5 June 2018.
- 188 Haysom et al., 2018: p.12

- 189 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Adam Yussuf. 'The Emergence of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique'. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 2018.
- 190 Interview: F.
- 191 According to Salvador Forquilha, João Pereira/Joseph Hanlon – Open University, Milton Keynes. AIM, O Pais, BBC, Club of Mozambique (in Globalnyt, 2018), 50 people were killed during a Government attack on the town of Mitumbate in December 2017 and more the 300 individuals have been arrested in response to attacks on civilians by militant Islamists.
- 192 Interview: P: Another suspicion is that the Kenyan horticulture industry facilitates smuggling of heroin. Flowers such as carnations and roses grown in Naivasha are put into freezer containers and shipped on cargo flights to markets in Europe before they fade. There is very little checking being done on these containers.
- 193 Interview: U: Traffickers break into containers and place drugs along with a forged seal. At the receiving end, other criminals enter the container, remove the drugs and shut container using the forged seal. This is known as the 'rip on, rip off' technique, and can be done in 5 min. at either end.
- 194 Recounted in sidelines of ENACT Expert Group Meeting, Nairobi, November 2017.
- 195 Joana Wright, 'Analysis of Maritime Security Threats in the BAM'. UNODC, 2018 (not publicly available).
- 196 The views offered in interviews conducted for this report are contradicted in a report by ENACT which finds that "sites in or near Ras Afun, Eyl, Obbia, El Maan, Brava, Bosaso, Kismayo, Gobwen, Cape Guardafui, Garowe and Barawa are used to offload heroin shipments. Kismayo is a major point for consolidation, and then onward shipment, by road and boat, to Kenya, often together with other contraband goods that are traded between the two countries." This black-market trade is allegedly controlled by the Kenya Defence Forces and Somali allies, who tax the goods. Haysom et al., 2018: p. 8.
- 197 Interview: B.
- 198 Interview: G: Echoes statements made in other interviews reasoning that there is simply no reason for drugs smuggling networks to take the added risks of smuggling through Somalia when far simpler options are available further down the coast. The number of security actors operating on the route by which drugs would travel are many and each would pose an obstacle – from Al-Shabaab to AMISOM to other local armed forces.
- 199 Haysom et al., 2018: p. 7: "Perhaps one of the most striking conclusions of this study is the degree to which illicit and grey economies have been a source of party-political funding in the various countries that are involved in the coastal criminal economy."
- 200 Interview: V.

- 201 Safeseas, 2018.
- 202 Safeseas, 2018.
- 203 Smith et al., 2017: p. 6.
- 204 Smith et al., 2017: §35: "Investigations suggest that the Al-Shabaab attack had been mounted to defeat the ISIL-aligned faction led by Mu'min in the Bari Region."
- 205 Smith et al., 2017: §33. "On 13 March 2016, an Al-Shabaab unit, the Khalid ibn al-Walid brigade, consisting of between 350 and 400 fighters, conducted an amphibious incursion into Puntland. Departing from Harardhere district aboard five dhows, the fighters went ashore at two points on the Puntland coast, near the towns of Garacad and Garmaal."
- 206 Smith et al., 2017: §37.
- 207 France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 43.
- 208 Interview: T. Interviewee W talked of a decline in terrorist offenders from Somalia in Shimo la Tewa prison in Kenya since 2016, saying also that Somalia has become more stable. Along similar lines, they noted that "locally-bred" terrorism has declined as local communities, to a much lesser extent, condone offenders now that they have felt the implications of terrorist attacks on a personal level.
- 209 Smith et al., 2017: p. 14.
- 210 Interview: G.
- 211 Interview: G; Smith et al., 2017: pp. 15-16.
- 212 Interview: G.
- 213 UNSC. 'Yemen Monitoring Group Report, 2018'. United Nations Security Council, 2018.
- 214 Risk Intelligence, closed workshop, May 2018.
- 215 Maritime Asset Security and Training. 'Maritime Intelligence Report Series', Thremhall Park, UK: MAST 13 December 2017: p. 6.
- 216 Interview: D.
- 217 Two incidents on 6 January 2018, approx. 45 NM off the port of Al Hudaydah, Yemen involved suspicious approaches towards two merchant ships by two speed boats carrying armed personnel, and one unmanned boat. After the merchant ships took evasive action, the speed boats broke off their approach. The speed boats subsequently approached a tanker under escort and the escort vessel engaged the speed boats and destroyed the unmanned vessel. International Maritime Organization. 'Interim Guidance on Maritime Security in the Southern Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb'. International Maritime Organization, 2018: p. 3.
- 218 Maritime Security Conference, Copenhagen, 2 May 2018 (hosted by Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CMS and Danish Shipping).



- 219 Combined Maritime Forces, and EUNAVFOR. "Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin" by CMF and EUNAVFOR (Not Publicly Available). Combined Maritime Forces, December 2017.
- 220 Maritime Asset Security and Training, 2017: p. 6.
- 221 As noted by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen: "The Houthis have also deployed improvised sea mines in the Red Sea, which represent a hazard for commercial shipping and sea lines of communication that could remain for as long as 6 to 10 years, threatening imports to Yemen and access for humanitarian assistance through the Red Sea ports." Ahmed Himmiche et al. 'Panel of Experts on Yemen, Letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68)'. UN, January 2018: p. 2.
- 222 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Having hit two ships from the same company and restricting damage to Saudi ships, it seems targeting techniques are sophisticated.
- 223 CMF and EUNAVFOR, 2017.
- 224 Reuters. 'U.N. Aid Boat Attacked off Yemen: Port Authority', 4 June 2018.
- 225 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018: Reference was made to a speech by Houthi leader.
- 226 Interview: D.
- 227 Maritime Asset Security and Training, 2017: p 6
- 228 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 229 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 230 According to the France Liaison Officer, 2018: p. 46, there are clear links between the different types of maritime crime that the Centre reports on, for example, between IUU, piracy, and smuggling.
- 231 See Jacobsen & Winther, 2018; Haysom et al., 2018.
- 232 Interview: L; A; F.
- 233 Interview: S.
- 234 Indeed, a number of interviews stressed that revenue generated from piracy has been invested in weapons smuggling businesses, which supply terrorist organisations including AS/ISIL in Somalia, for example, B; S; H.
- 235 Interview: S.
- 236 Interview: G.
- 237 Video UNODC, 'The Horn of Africa Programme', July 15, 2017: 5:50-6:56
- 238 Interview: H.
- 239 Interview: G.
- 240 Point made at the CMS Validation Workshop in Copenhagen, May 2018.

- 241 Stig Jarle Hansen: There has been indications that Aragoste 'Lobster' Kingpin is said to be involved in the heroin trade. CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 242 Jacob Rasmussen, 'Sweet Secrets: Sugar Smuggling and State Formation in the Kenya– Somalia Borderlands'. DIIS WORKING PAPER. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017: p. 8.
- 243 Smith et al. 2017: p. 7: "A conservative estimate suggests that Al-Shabaab receives at least USD 10 million each year from the illicit charcoal trade."
- 244 UNSC. 'Resolution 2385', November 2017, §26-31.
- 245 Interview: J.
- 246 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May 2018.
- 247 UNSC, 2017, §31.
- 248 Interview: G; Smith et al., 2017: p. 14.
- 249 Combined Maritime Forces. 'CMF Seizes 132KGS of Heroin in the Arabian Sea', 9 March 2018.
- 250 Interview: L.
- 251 CMF and EUNAVFOR, 2017.
- 252 France Liaison Officer, 2018.
- 253 CMS Validation Workshop, Copenhagen, May, 2018: EUNAVFOR.
- 254 Interviews: G; B.
- 255 While smugglers that transport heroin along the Southern Route into Eastern Africa may use similar Iranian dhows to weapons and/or people smugglers, this does not prove that there is a link between the forms of criminality. Interview: P.
- 256 While a skipper may use the same dhow to smuggle weapons and drugs, this does not necessarily mean that there is a connection between the crimes or networks behind them. It may rather be an indication that the criminal networks use the same 'postal service' (the dhow skipper). Interview: P.
- 257 Interview: P.
- 258 Interview: P.
- 259 Bethan McKernan, 'Number of Drug Addicts in Iran "Doubles" in Six Years'. The Independent, 26 June 2017.
- 260 Haysom et al.: p. 13.
- 261 For example, through the Law Enforcement Task Force, which is a group made up of UNODC, INTERPOL, and EUNAVFOR as well representation by seven states which work to maintain focus on the need to prosecute a list of 11 individuals who were involved in piracy.
- 262 I.e. under PSP2.

- 263 As both projects subject to this evaluation have run prior to the time frame in focus and will continue to run beyond 2018, we are not looking at finite projects. This can therefore also, to some degree, be seen as monitoring whether the programme is on the right track to reach its objective(s) and make recommendations for how the programme might improve.
- 264 The Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex, which was also supported under PSP2, has been withdrawn from the scope of the evaluation by agreement with the Royal Danish Embassy in Nairobi as the project is not complete and therefore not yet fit for impact evaluation.
- 265 See chapter one for details on methodology.
- 266 Seychelles, Kenya and Mauritius.
- 267 Figures from UNODC GMCP Nairobi.
- 268 The UN Standard Minimum Rules, also known as the Nelson Mandela Rules, describe the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The intention is to set out contemporary and generally accepted standards for the treatment of prisoners while acknowledging that deviations from the described standards may occur, as not all countries may be capable of applying all standards. The UN Standard Minimum Rules include standards for health-care services, how sanctions are carried out, and the management of prisoner complaints to mention a few. UNODC. 'United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) Adopted 17 Dec. 2015. A/RES/70/175'. UNODC, December 2015.
- 269 In addition, six piracy suspects transferred to Seychelles in November 2017 await trial. Kenya has, so far, not taken action to enter into prisoner transfer agreements to allow for transfers of convicted piracy prisoners and the 12 piracy suspects tried in Mauritius were acquitted and repatriated.
- 270 See annex D.
- 271 UNODC, 'United Nations Standard Minimum Rules (...)', 2015.
- 272 UNODC, 'United Nations Standard Minimum Rules (...)', 2015, Preliminary Observation 2 (§1): "In view of the great variety of legal, social, economic and geographical conditions of the world, it is evident that not all of the rules are capable of application in all places and at all times. They should, however, serve to stimulate a constant endeavour to overcome practical difficulties in the way of their application, in the knowledge that they represent, as a whole, the minimum conditions which are accepted as suitable by the United Nations."
- 273 The SMRs were formulated to be flexible in order to fit different climatic and cultural contexts. With regard to the latter, this means that while certain factors such as having beds and privacy may be important for inmates in Country A, inmates in Country B may have very different needs. In Somalia, the norm is to sleep on mats on the floor rather than in beds. Also, with a strong oral tradition and need for community engagement, being placed in a private cell in Somalia would be perceived as punishment.

- 274 Cases of cholera were, for example, seen in 2013 in Mogadishu Central Prison as potable water sources were mixed with human waste.
- 275 Interview: Peer A.
- 276 Interview: Peer A.
- 277 Francesca Caonero, 'Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison', UNODC GMCP, 22 March 2018: p. 7 (not public available).
- 278 Francesca Caonero, 'Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Garowe Prison', UNODC GMCP, 21 March 2018: Recommendation no. 3 (not public available).
- 279 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 6.
- 280 Interview: Garowe A; C; D; Hargeisa C; D.
- 281 Interview: Hargeisa A; B; Corroborated in Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison by Francesca Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 5: "As for the radical prisoners, Hargeisa prison houses around 50 of them and they are all kept together without being separated according to their risk." (not public available).
- 282 Interview Hargeisa B.
- 283 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 6.
- 284 Interview Hargeisa B.
- 285 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 6.
- 286 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 32.
- 287 Interview: Peer A makes a comparison to conditions for juveniles in other prisons in Somalia where conditions for juveniles are worse than in Hargeisa and Garowe. The juvenile section in Mogadishu Central Prison seems to hold only the ones that are clearly very young while others may be placed with adults. Conditions in Bosasso are also giving cause for concern as children are put in prison by their parents for misbehaving, which underlines the need for separate facilities for juveniles.
- 288 Caonero, 22 March: p. 5.
- 289 Caonero, 22 March: p. 8.
- 290 Caonero, 21 March 2018: Recommendation no. 4.
- 291 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 8.
- 292 Interview: Peer B; A.
- 293 Interview: Peer C.
- 294 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 30.

- 295 According to the Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Garowe Prison, 21 March 2018: p. 5, national authorities stated that visits take place on Fridays and that each detainee is allowed up to four visitors for up to 30 minutes per visit. With regard to Hargeisa “all inmates are allowed to receive visitors for about 10 minutes per person with a maximum of three visitors at a time”.
- 296 Interview: Peer A.
- 297 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 7.
- 298 Interview: Hargeisa D.
- 299 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 9.
- 300 Interview: Peer A.
- 301 Interview: Peer D.
- 302 Interview: Garowe D.
- 303 Caonero, 21 March 2018: pp. 6-7.
- 304 Caonero, 22 March 2018: Recommendation no. 5.
- 305 Interview: Peer B; A.
- 306 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 6.
- 307 Caonero, 22 March 2018: annex A; UNODC, ‘GMCP Annual Report 2017’, 2018, p. 38.
- 308 Caonero, 22 March 2018: 22 March 2018.
- 309 Formal Letter from inmates with CMS for reference (not public available).
- 310 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 7.
- 311 See annex E.
- 312 “This prisoner died at Hargeisa prison, at approximately 2:45pm, on the 08/01/2018. He died of an illness for which he was sent to Hargeisa hospital, as attested to by the physicians present at the time.” Letter from Prison commander Hussein Abdullahi Du’aale to the High Court, Attorney General, Head of prison affairs at the Custodial Corps, Head of prisons at the Ministry of Justice, Commander-in-chief of Custodial corps, and the Minister of Justice, January 9, 2018.
- 313 Penal Reform Forum, ‘UN Nelson Mandela Rules (revised SMR)’.
- 314 Formal correspondence from Detention and Transfer Programme Manager (not public available).
- 315 Interview: Peer A,
- 316 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 10.
- 317 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 5.

- 318 According to the Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison, 22 March 2018: Recommendation no. 6, "Shackles are no longer used in the prison and those who previously were shackled have been able to enjoy lock out time in the yard under the supervision of prison officers and the UNODC mentors. Restraints [read: Restraints] are used when transporting prisoners from the prison to court".
- 319 According to figures provided by the Somaliland Custodial Corps in the Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison in March 2018, the capacity of Hargeisa Prison is 460 inmates and the prison currently holds 592.
- 320 UNODC, December 2015: Preliminary Observation 1.
- 321 Outcome A.2.1. Indicator.
- 322 Interview: Hargeisa C.
- 323 Interview: Peer C.
- 324 Interview: Garowe D.
- 325 Interview: Garowe D.
- 326 Interview: Peer D.
- 327 Interview: Peer C; A; B.
- 328 Interview: Peer A.
- 329 Interview: Peer C.
- 330 Interview: Peer C.
- 331 Interview: Garowe A.
- 332 Caonero, 22 March 2018: p. 7.
- 333 Interview: Peer A.
- 334 Interview: Hargeisa A.
- 335 Interview: Garowe A.
- 336 Interview: Garowe A.
- 337 Interview: Hargeisa A.
- 338 Funded by the UK Government.
- 339 Caonero, 22 March: p. 10.
- 340 Interview: Hargeisa A; C; Garowe C.
- 341 Interview: Hargeisa B.
- 342 Interview: Garowe D.
- 343 Interview: Garowe C.

- 344 Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Garowe Prison, 21 March 2018: p. 7: "UNODC takes the view that the provision of full-time teachers funded by UNODC is not sustainable. Therefore, alternative ways of supporting the delivery of education in prison should be sought, including fitting of libraries in the blocks and developing peer-studying mechanisms." Similarly, education programmes in Hargeisa have been discontinued according to the Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison, 22 March 2018: p. 3: "provision of education will be provided through fitting of libraries and establishment of peer-studying [read: studying] groups to ensure sustainability."
- 345 Interview: Hargeisa A.
- 346 The IMC raised the limitations to the number of inmates that can take part in vocational training as an issue in their 2018 Report for Hargeisa and recommend that vocational training be "expanded to cover a larger proportion of the prison population, including the piracy convicts, to the extent possible." Report of the International Monitoring Committee for Hargeisa Prison, 22 March 2018: p. 6.
- 347 Interview: Peer D.
- 348 Interview: Hargeisa D.
- 349 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: pp. 31-32.
- 350 Interview: Garowe D.
- 351 Interview: Hargeisa A.
- 352 The objective is to "strengthen Somali agencies promoting the rule of law, focused on prisons and justice" – the latter referring to Outcome A.1.1: Establishment of the Mogadishu Prison and Court Complex.
- 353 Interview: Garowe D.
- 354 Interview: Garowe B; Hargeisa A; B; D.
- 355 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 8.
- 356 Interview: Peer D.
- 357 Interview: Peer C; Peer B: "Garowe is definitively much better than any other prison in Somalia"; Peer A: "Facilities in Garowe are better than any I've ever seen in Somalia."
- 358 Interview: Peer B.
- 359 Interview: Peer C.
- 360 Interview: Peer B.
- 361 Interview: Peer C.
- 362 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 30: "support provided as part of counter-piracy efforts has had positive 'spill-overs'. For instance, the prison infrastructure and reforms established has helped to address other issues, including al-Shabaab and separate facility for minors."

- 363 Interview: B.
- 364 Interview: Peer D.
- 365 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 31.
- 366 Interview: Garowe A.
- 367 For example, Peer A: "Transparency and oversight needs to be strengthened and lack of data collection inside the prisons is a problem."
- 368 The 'paper trail' in relation to the case of the deceased piracy prisoner outlined in §7 of the section on Basic Conditions is, for example, ineffectual.
- 369 Caonero, 21 March 2018: p. 11.
- 370 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 30.
- 371 Interview: Garowe A.
- 372 The genuineness of the request for more 'on-the-floor' training by prison staff should be seen in light of the fact that classroom training is usually preferred simply due to the fact that a free meal is often provided.
- 373 Interview: Peer D.
- 374 Funded bilaterally from the overall reserve fund of the Peace and Stabilisation Fund to cover unforeseen security-related costs in 2016. The disbursement was made in USD 1,038,000 and two no-cost extensions were granted allowing funds to be spent up to Dec. 2017.
- 375 The task of advancing the legislative framework for maritime law enforcement was taken on by EUCAP NESTOR, now EUCAP Somalia.
- 376 Endorsed in 2013 by the FGS and regional states (including Somaliland) at the Plenary meeting of the CGPCS (May); at the Somalia Conference in London (May), and at the EU's "New Deal for Somalia" Conference in Brussels (Sep.). Also endorsed in UNSCR 2125.
- 377 Now the Bosasso Port and Maritime Police Unit.
- 378 As Galmudug was not supported under the Danish grant under PSP2, it was not part of this evaluation. Outputs 3.3 and 3.4 are therefore not included either. Output 3.5 of the result framework relates mainly to the construction of the Bosasso HQ building, which was completed with the first contributions to the programme from 2014-2015. We will therefore only look at procurement under 3.5.
- 379 OHCHR. 'Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials'. Havana, August 1990.
- 380 While the MPU is made up of 60 Officers, GMCP has trained 81. The explanation for this inconsistency is that some of the officers initially trained have left the unit and new officers have taken their place. Also, some officers have received training several times, for example from crewmanship to coxwain to boat-handling.



- 381 The MPU's ad hoc Headquarters is shown in UNODC GMCP's video at 02:01-02:47.
- 382 Interview: Peer E.
- 383 Output 3.1. Target.
- 384 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
- 385 Elica Barasa, 'Report on The Somali Maritime Security Coordination Committee Meeting'. UNODC, 9-10 July 2018: p. 13 (not public available).
- 386 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
- 387 Interview: Mog. MLE A.
- 388 Interview: Mog MLE A: "They are very good and give us very good support for our operations. They help our boats for maintenance which we were lacking. Train our people to do their duties in professional way."
- 389 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
- 390 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
- 391 Interview: Peer E.
- 392 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
- 393 Interview: Mog. MLE A.
- 394 Interview: Mog. MLE A; B.
- 395 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
- 396 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
- 397 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
- 398 Interview: Mog. MLE A.
- 399 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
- 400 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 41: "The PMPF is not seen as legitimate by the FGS or the international community and currently only receives support from the UAE." UAE support to the PMPF has been controversial and previously mentioned in reports of the SEMG.
- 401 Partially funded by Denmark under PSP1.
- 402 Interview: Peer F.
- 403 Interview: Bosasso A – "restroom facility".
- 404 Interview: Peer F.
- 405 Alula, or Caalula is a known piracy hub.
- 406 Interview: Bos. MLE A.
- 407 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
- 408 Barasa, 2018: p. 14.

- 409 Interview: Bos. MLE B.
- 410 Interview: Bos. MLE A.
- 411 Interview: Bos. MLE C; point also echoed by Peer F.
- 412 Interview: Bos. MLE B.
- 413 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
- 414 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
- 415 Interview: Peer F.
- 416 Interview: Peer F.
- 417 Interview: Bos. MLE B.
- 418 Interview: Peer F.
- 419 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
- 420 Barasa, 2018: p. 8.
- 421 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
- 422 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 423 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 424 Interview: Ber. MLE A. Subsequent to the interview, the roof to the radio operations room established through collaborative efforts by UNODC/OBP/EUCAP collapsed destroying all the MDA equipment.
- 425 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
- 426 Interview: Peer F.
- 427 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 428 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
- 429 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
- 430 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 431 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
- 432 Interview: Ber. MLE B.
- 433 i.e. not counting the first years of programme delivery.
- 434 Barasa, 2018: p. 15.
- 435 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 436 Both Somaliland Coast Guard officers have 25+ years of experience and know conditions both before and after UNODC got involved.
- 437 Interview: Ber MLE A notes that the SLCG does not have a helicopter.
- 438 Interview: Ber. MLE A.

- 439 Interview: Ber. MLE A. According to the report of the Maritime Security Coordination Committee of July 2018, the Somaliland Coast Guard Law has been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in April 2017 and is now awaiting parliamentary debates and final enactment procedures at the House of Commons.
- 440 Interview: Peer F; G; H.
- 441 Interview: Peer F.
- 442 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016. p. 41.
- 443 Interview: Ber. MLE A: 80%; Ber. MLE B: 50%.
- 444 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 445 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 446 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 447 Interview: Ber. MLE A.
- 448 Interview: Peer G.
- 449 Interview: Peer H; E.
- 450 Interview: Peer F.
- 451 Interview: Peer H; E.
- 452 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016. p. 40.
- 453 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 40: "There are neither communications nor coordination between the stations in Barbera, Bosasso, Hobyo (not constructed), Mogadishu, and Kismayo. The great need to reach the ports in between remains unfilled. Police stations to stop sanctuaries for criminals and to stop boats going to sea with bad intentions are also required as are a link between the on land police and the coast guard and for policing in the small, remote coastal communities."
- 454 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 41: "The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) has been described by some as the most capable in Somalia, with 8 bases in Puntland including in Eyl, observational capacity, and the ability to mobilize and rescue ships."
- 455 Interview: Peer H.
- 456 Interview: Peer H.
- 457 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 'Mid-Term Review Report, Danish Peace and Stabilisation Programme Region Horn of Africa 2015-2018'. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, August 2017: p. 13: "The RT [review team] noted that there are seemingly no records of the operations of the MPUs in Mogadishu, Bosasso and Berbera, and only anecdotal evidence of operations was presented during the meeting the RT had with UNODC."
- 458 Interview: Peer H.

- 459 Interview: Ber. MLE A; B.
- 460 Interview: Mog. MLE B.
- 461 Interview: Bos. MLE C.
- 462 Interview: Peer H.
- 463 Interview: Peer H; G.
- 464 Interview: Peer F.
- 465 Interview: Peer F.
- 466 Interview: Peer G.
- 467 Interview: Peer E.
- 468 Interview: Peer H.
- 469 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016. p. 41.
- 470 Interview: Peer H.
- 471 Stable Seas, 'Five Ways Poor Maritime Security Fuels Rebels, Terrorists, and Criminal Networks', OEF Research, 12 January 2018: p. 12.
- 472 Interview: Peer H.
- 473 Interview: Peer H: Accordingly, gaps in Maritime Security identified by UN-SOM at the 2018 meeting of the Somali Maritime Security Coordination Committee included: Delineation of roles and responsibilities of maritime forces; Establish a Maritime Administration; Maritime governance and sharing of resources agreement.
- 474 Interview: Peer H.
- 475 Interview: Peer F.
- 476 Interview: Peer H.
- 477 Interview: Peer H; G.
- 478 Interview: Peer F.
- 479 Interview: Peer H.
- 480 Interview: Peer F.
- 481 Interview: Peer H.
- 482 Interview: Peer F.
- 483 Interview: Peer F.
- 484 Interview: Peer F.
- 485 Interview: Peer H.

- 486 Bauman and Hanssen, 2016: p. 48: "in addition to ensuring the completion and sustainability of legacy programs, the TF should begin to focus on developing Somalia's Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) capacity to secure the coastline in piracy-prone areas and address the governance issues required for maritime security."
- 487 Interview: Peer H.
- 488 Interview: Mog MLE A; Bos. MLE B; Ber. MLE A.
- 489 Interview: Peer F.
- 490 Interview: Peer H.
- 491 Interview: Ber. MLE A; Mog. MLE B; Bos. MLE B; Peer F.
- 492 Interview: Peer E: MPU officers sleep in "upturned steel ships". These would all be shut down for safety reasons according to European standards.
- 493 Interview: Mog MLE B.
- 494 Interview: Peer H.
- 495 Interview: Peer H.
- 496 Interview: J: "It is, however, essential that they are engaged in this forum to work out technical aspects of the maritime domain."
- 497 Interview: Peer H.
- 498 With regard to prison staff salaries, the Standard Minimum Rule 74, §3, prescribes that "salaries shall be adequate to attract and retain suitable men and women; employment benefits and conditions of service shall be favourable in view of the exacting nature of the work."
- 499 One of the donor strategies for addressing issues of salary payment of security sector personnel has been to subsidise these through stipends. This has, unfortunately, not always worked as intended. According to Interviewee G, there is generally a significant misappropriation of funds and goods in Somalia which is concerning. Stipends to security personnel are, for example, often collected for all officers by a single senior official with no guarantees that payment reaches individual officers. Attempts to improve these processes through use of biometrics and mobile payment have been resisted.
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**Annex 130**

“Civilians in Kenya’s northeast targeted by both jihadists and the state”, *The New Humanitarian*, 16 June 2020

Conflict News 16 June 2020

## Civilians in Kenya's northeast targeted by both jihadists and the state

'My husband was killed by al-Shabab; my brother-in-law was killed by the security forces. We are caught up between these people.'



Mohammed Yusuf [Twitter](#)

Freelance journalist covering East Africa, and a regular IRIN contributor



Security officers and residents assess the damage after suspected al-Shabab militants threw an explosive device at a teacher's house in Mandera county, 2018. (Stringer/REUTERS)

### WAJIR, Kenya

**On a stifling night in April, Ibrahim Abdi was sitting outside his home in Wajir, trying to catch a breeze after evening prayers, when his Kenya Police Reserve unit came for him. They said a group of al-Shabab jihadists had been spotted in a nearby village in the remote northeastern region, close to the Somali border, and he should get his gun and come with them.**

Abdi's wife remembers he was reluctant. He asked why he always had to prove his loyalty by confronting the Somali-based insurgents, but he went nonetheless. The next morning, **Abdi was dead**: killed in an ambush 15 kilometres from his home, along with six other reservists in the eight-man unit.

Abdi was an unlikely member of the KPR, an auxiliary home guard that in the rest of Kenya usually chases poachers. He was a relatively well-to-do shop owner – not the economic profile of a typical rough-and-ready recruit.

But Abdi, a Somali-speaking Kenyan, was struggling with a reputation problem. His brother's body had been found in a shallow grave two years earlier, and the government alleged he had been al-Shabab. The suspicion in Wajir was that he had been killed by the security forces. For Abdi, that meant a dangerous guilt by relation.

"After more than two years of being branded an al-Shabab sympathiser, my husband had no option but to try and do away with that tag," said his widow, Nurio Dubow. "To do that, he had to join the KPR. There was no other way he was going to survive."

### Everyone's a suspect

Like many people in Wajir, one of four Kenyan counties that share a border with Somalia, Abdi had to walk a difficult line between the authorities' conviction that there are al-Shabab cells among the Somali-speaking community, and the fear of the cross-border insurgents who are indiscriminate in their attacks.

[Read more → How Kenya's al-Shabab amnesty is a loaded gun](#)

"The government thinks the community is supporting al-Shabab," Otsieno Namwaya, a researcher with Human Rights Watch, told The New Humanitarian. "But the truth is most people are just scared of the government: some feel frustrated that the government has not exactly supported them."

At its most extreme, suspicion of a connection to the insurgents can be a death sentence. A 2016 [report by Human Rights Watch](#) documented 34 cases of disappearances and 11 deaths of people who were last seen in police custody or at a military barracks – and those killings have continued, said Namwaya.


The police and army routinely deny they are involved, but the local community “has deplored the violence of the security forces for years”, said Meron Elias, a Horn of Africa researcher at the International Crisis Group.

The experience of Abdi’s widow, Dubow, reflects the pressure. “My husband was killed by al-Shabab; my brother-in-law was killed by the security forces,” she told TNH. “We are caught up between these people. Who will help us? I don’t know where to turn.”

Al-Shabab has been a long-standing security threat in the border regions. That danger increased after Kenya’s military intervention into Somalia in 2011, in support of the government battling the puritanical Islamist movement.

[Read more → Gunned down in Mombasa – the clerics that have died](#)

But there has also been a recent spike in attacks. In the five months between December 2019 and April 2020, at least 38 people were killed in some 14 clashes and incidents in the border counties of Garissa, Lamu, Mandera, and Wajir.



The dead have included security forces, government officials, and commuters killed in gun and bomb attacks. In at least one bus ambush, al-Shabab separated the passengers, sparing the locals and executing those from outside the region.

Kenya’s COVID-19 lockdown has reduced road movements, but the threat has not disappeared. The latest clash – after a long pause – was on Sunday, when a police reservist and two al-Shabab fighters were killed in Mandera.

“The day-to-day life around the borderline is alertness,” Jacob Narengo, the Wajir county commissioner, who oversees local security, told TNH. “It is a daily routine for us to hunt and look for these al-Shabab fighters because you cannot allow your enemy to come to your camp or your house.”

### Lives upended

The KPR, though poorly equipped, is an essential part of the government’s rural security strategy – and its members have suffered as a result. “Lately, al-Shabab has been targeting KPR and their families, to weaken security in the region,” said Elias.

The jihadist violence has led to the near collapse of key government services, including schools and health facilities, as public service workers – many hired from outside the region – abandon their posts.

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#### + Timeline: Recent al-Shabab-linked violence in Kenya

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After an attack on a school in Garissa in January, which killed three male teachers, with a fourth abducted, the Teachers Service Commission – a state body that manages hiring and deployment – authorised the transfer of non-local teachers out of the region.

The subsequent loss of staff has reportedly thrown 10,000 children out of school. In defending her decision, TSC chief Nancy Macharia told a parliamentary education committee that 42 teachers had died in the conflict since 2014 – and she felt compelled to prevent more deaths.



The security forces believe the local community often knows more than it reveals about al-Shabab's presence. After the Garissa school attack, Hillary Mutymbai, the inspector general of police, told the parliamentary committee, "it is only the non-local teachers who were not aware about [the imminence of] that attack".

Namwaya sees this as part of a pattern of official suspicion that fuels resentment. The tendency is for the security forces to "start blaming the local community" instead of investigating "what really happened", he said.

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Ahmed Ismail, a member of the Wajir County assembly, echoed that view. "As government security forces tackle the insecurity in the region, there is a need for the security forces to work and follow the law in dealing with the community," he told TNH.

But Narengo, the county commissioner, was unapologetic over what he sees as a necessarily aggressive policy. "People can criticise the work of the security forces, but we will do everything to secure our borders, protect our people and their properties," he said.

Al-Shabab has struck as far as the capital, Nairobi, to exact a price for Kenya's military intervention in Somalia – including the storming of [Westgate Mall](#) in 2013, which killed at least 67 people, and a gun and bomb attack on the [DusitD2 hotel complex](#) last year in which 21 people died. A raid on [Garissa University](#) in 2015 killed more than 140 students.

### "Greater Somalia"

With the current wave of attacks, analysts suggest al-Shabab may be looking to entrench itself in Kenya's northeast, aiming to annex the region as part of a de facto "Greater Somalia" – re-awakening an old Somali nationalist idea that triggered a secessionist rebellion in the 1960s known as the [Shifita war](#).

"Northern Kenya is increasingly looking like an area that al-Shabab seeks to incorporate under its rule, rather than just using it as [a rear base]," said Omar Mahmood, senior Somalia analyst with the International Crisis Group.

**"Our people are against al-Shabab because they target teachers who educate our children, medics who provide health services to our people."**

Elias, the Horn of Africa researcher, said the attacks against teachers and health posts serve multiple purposes: "to drive out non-locals who work in the area, isolate residents, and deepen grievances [over a lack of services]".

But the tactic doesn't seem to be winning many friends. "Our people are against al-Shabab because they target teachers who educate our children, medics who provide health services to our people," Ahmed Ismail Dugow, a member of Wajir's county assembly, told TNH.

"They are targeting these people who are very important in our daily lives," he said. "We cannot be happy with such people who are making our homes poor in all aspects of life."

But there's also a heavy presence of Kenyan security agencies in the region, including the police anti-terrorism unit, the army, and the intelligence services. And when counter-insurgency action is indiscriminate and unlawful, it is counter-productive, say the analysts.

"The government must make the community feel protected, and then they will share what information they have," said Namwaya. "They don't want people like al-Shabab destroying their security and community."

my/oa/ag

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**Annex 131**


“Al Shabaab area of operations: October 2018”, *Critical Threats*, 5 October 2018

# Al Shabaab Area of Operations: October 2018

By James Barnett

October 05, 2018

Zoom Of  
Expand  
Print



**Support Zone:** area free of significant enemy action that permits the effective logistics and administrative support of forces.[1]

**Attack Zone:** area where units conduct offensive maneuvers.[2]

**The U.S. military intensified direct action operations against al Shabaab, which has disrupted the group's offensive campaigns but has not changed where it operates.** U.S. forces conducted over 50 airstrikes and accompanied Somali forces on dozens of counterterrorism raids targeting al Shabaab camps and high-level commanders since March 30, 2017, when the U.S. administration declared Somalia an area of active hostilities.[3] The Somali National Army (SNA) has not held the terrain captured from al Shabaab in joint operations with African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, however, which has limited the effectiveness of these efforts.[4] Al Shabaab holds territory surrounding the capital, Mogadishu, from which it coordinates complex attacks targeting the Somali Federal Government.[5] Increased counterterrorism pressure may have reduced the overall volume of attacks in Mogadishu, but the city is not yet secure.[6] Key al Shabaab sanctuaries persist in central Somalia, especially in Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, and in southern Somalia in Bay, Gedo, and Middle and Lower Jubba regions. Al Shabaab is able to project force from Somalia and safe havens along the eastern border with Kenya to attack Kenyan security forces and soft targets in Kenya's Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu counties.[7] U.S.-backed counterterrorism efforts will limit al Shabaab's ability to conduct major offensive campaigns, but are not sufficient to defeat the group. Al Shabaab will also reestablish its presence in populated areas in Somalia should Somali security forces not backfill AMISOM forces during the planned drawdown beginning in February 2019.[8]

Characterizing al Shabaab's regional operations:

- **Mogadishu:** Al Shabaab's sanctuaries in the outskirts of the capital allow it to conduct occasional complex attacks on hard targets, like federal ministries.[9] The group adapted to security conditions by striking softer targets like district offices.[10] U.S. and Somali operations reduced the number of complex attacks beginning in November 2017. Al Shabaab's tempo of assassinations, small-arms ambushes, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks remains unchanged.[11]
- **Southern Somali Coast (Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Jubba):** The SNA cleared al Shabaab from positions along the coast between Mogadishu and Marka but have not held the area.[12] Al Shabaab fixed SNA and AMISOM units near Kismayo by attacking forward-deployed units repeatedly, including a June 8 attack on a U.S. forward operating base in Sanguni that killed a U.S. soldier.[13]
- **Central Somalia (Middle Shabelle and Hiraan):** Al Shabaab has a support zone along most of the Mogadishu-Beledweyne highway and conducts frequent attacks on SNA and AMISOM forces along this axis.[14] U.S.- and AMISOM-backed SNA operations cleared al Shabaab from positions north of Mogadishu, but SNA forces did not hold the areas.[15]
- **Southwestern Somalia (Gedo, Bay, and Bakool):** Al Shabaab maintains its historical attack zones around the regional capitals Garbaharey, Baidoa, and Hudur. It increased attacks on Baidoa after seizing a nearby district in June.[16] Al Shabaab expanded its support zone along the road between Luq and Dolow in Gedo near the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders, potentially providing a base of operations for future attacks in Ethiopia's Somali region.[17]
- **Eastern Kenya:** Al Shabaab expanded its attack zones in rural Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties in eastern Kenya. Al Shabaab's campaign in these counties is an economy-of-force effort. Al Shabaab has freedom of movement in the countryside, allowing it to intimidate populations, which erodes public trust in the Kenyan government.[18]
- **Northern Kenyan coast:** Al Shabaab maintains a base of operations in Boni Forest despite a three-year Kenyan military operation to clear the area.[19] It uses this base to prepare attacks in Lamu County and southern Garissa County. Al Shabaab's IED campaign throughout the Kenya-Somali border zone has weakened Kenyan security forces.[20]
- **Puntland:** Al Shabaab conducts economy-of-force efforts to retain its base in the Galgala Mountains, which facilitates access to arms smuggling networks, by attacking Puntland forces along the highway between the administrative capital of Garowe and the commercial hub of Boosaaso.[21]
- **Somaliland:** Al Shabaab likely conducted its first suicide attack to assassinate politicians in Somaliland but did not claim the operation.[22]

[View Citations](#)

#### Editor's Notes

"Support Zone", Editor's Note, THE TOWN OF ELBUR IN CENTRAL SOMALIA IS MEANT TO BE INCLUDED IN A SUPPORT ZONE IN THE MAP. AN UPDATE TO THE MAP IS FORTHCOMING ON THIS WEBSITE.

**Annex 132**

“Jaysh al-Ayman: Kenyan unit of jihadi’s poses threat to homeland”, *The African Criminology Journal*, 21 January 2019

# The African Crime & Conflict Journal

Defence Research & Analysis| Terrorism| Counter -Terrorism| Intelligence| Organised Crime| Geo-politics| – Africa

## COUNTER TERRORISM

### Jaysh al-Ayman: Kenyan Unit of Jihadi's Poses Threat to Homeland

Date: January 21, 2019  0 Comments











After a series of deadly attacks, Jaysh al-Ayman, an elite al-Shabaab unit formed about five years ago to carry out operations inside Kenya, has emerged as the deadliest terrorist cell in the East African nation. Although it started life in Somalia, the al-Qaeda affiliate's Kenya wing portrays itself as a local movement and has set up bases in the Boni forest, an expanse of woodland in Kenya's coastal Lamu County, which extends to the border with Somalia. It is from here the faction terrorizes villages and towns, and targets the police, the military and other government institutions.

The faction is named after one of its top leaders, Maalim Ayman (a.k.a. Dobow Abdiiaziz Ali), an ethnic Somali from Mandera County. He was likely appointed to the role in the hope that having a Kenyan in charge of what is effectively al-Shabaab's Kenya wing would ease tensions. Details about Ayman are scarce, and his current role within the group is unclear. According to some reports, however, he continues to train the group's fighters in wilderness survival techniques.

### A Bloody Beginning

The unit's origins can be traced to the events on June 20, 2013, in Barawi, an ancient Somali coastal town, where differences within al-Shabaab boiled over. Barawi had become al-Shabaab's operational headquarters after it was forced out of the port of Kismayu by the Kenyan military—Kismayu had served as group's headquarters since it was established in 2006. On June 20, Ahmed Abdi Godane, then al-Shabaab's emir, was concerned that members of the group's shura council were accusing him of adopting a murderous strategy that targeted civilians and were preparing to split away from the group.

Two years prior, in 2011, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had been strengthened by Kenyan troops. Concerned with how to keep his group intact in the face of an onslaught by a better-armed foe and desperate to reassert his authority, Godane ordered the Amniyat, the group's elite spy wing, to execute Ibrahim al-Afghani, a member of al-Shabaab's shura council. Other shura members, among them Mukhtar Robow and Shaykh Dahir Aweys, were also targeted, but escaped and later defected to the Somali government.

In late 2013, following a strategy aimed at fighting a more effective asymmetrical war in Somalia and its neighbors, Godane unveiled two new wings of al-Shabaab—Jaysh al-Ustra, which he directed at Ethiopia, and Jaysh al-Ayman, which would target Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

While Jaysh al-Usra failed to penetrate Ethiopia, Jaysh al-Ayman has seen success in Kenya. So much so, in fact, that although Kenyan security agencies launched the Operation Linda Boni (Operation “Protect Boni”) in 2015 to flush the militants out of the forest, the group has remained highly elusive. The unit has become a major headache for the Kenyan security services. Experts now question whether intelligence reports were ignored early on, allowing the group to securely embed itself in the area.

### Attacks in Kenya

Jaysh al-Ayman has played a leading role in many of the recent major terrorist attacks in Kenya. Abdilatif Abubakar Ali, a commander with the group, is believed to have played a key role in planning and executing the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack, which left 67 people dead.

In June 2014, 50 heavily armed militants targeted the Mpeketoni area, killing 48 people, all non-Muslims, and killed another 29 in Hindi area, two weeks later. In June 2014, the militants descended on Lamu County, massacring nearly 100 people.

In neighboring Pandanguo, another town in Lamu, the militants carried out a different type of operation, putting away their guns and instead, since the area is predominantly Muslim, hoarding people into a mosque and preaching to them, before looting drugs, nets and mattresses from a nearby dispensary.

In April 2015, al-Shabaab gunmen, who security experts say were linked to the faction, stormed Garissa University, killing 148 people, mainly Christian students, in the most deadly attack in Kenya since the 1998 Nairobi U.S. embassy bombing by al-Qaeda, in which more than 200 people were killed.

More recently, the faction was linked to the kidnapping of the late Mariam El-Maawy, a top Kenyan government official who was abducted by militants along the Mokowe-Mpeketoni road. El-Maawy was rescued by the Kenyan military and taken for treatment in South Africa, but died of her wounds in hospital three months later.

Aside from these bloody, high-profile attacks, the group has planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) along parts of the lengthy and porous Kenya-Somali border and has killed numerous civilians, policemen and soldiers.

### Expanding Membership

Initially, Kenyans from the coastal region made-up the majority of Jaysh al-Ayman’. One of Jaysh al-Ayman’s key commanders is Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi (a.k.a. Musa Muhajir), a Kenyan from the coast city of Mombasa. Muhajir has been on the radar of the Kenyan security services for some time, and the police say he is one of the militants responsible for the Lamu attacks.

In recent years, the group has grown to include Muslim converts from some of Kenya’s non-Muslim communities, as well as foreign fighters. Among the foreign jihadists known to have joined the group was Malik Ali Jones, an American currently in jail in the United States. Another key foreign fighter is Ahmed Muller, a German citizen who uses several aliases, including Andreas Ahmad Khaled, Muller Martin Muller and Abu Nusaibah. The 42-year-old militant, who comes from Cochem, Germany, was allegedly seconded to al-Shabaab by its al-Qaeda affiliate in Pakistan in 2011.

Jones and Muller were identified after the killing of a British national, Thomas Evans, during an attempted attack on an army camp in the Buare area. In that failed attack, more than 10 al-Shabaab militants were killed while score of others fled with serious injuries. The group's commander, Issa Luqman Osman (a.k.a. "Shirwa"), was also killed.

### The Counter Terrorism Operation Against Jaysh Al Ayman













LAMU, Kenya—Tucked into the northeast end of the country’s coast, the Boni National Reserve is a fairy-tale paradise, a resplendent ecosystem packed with elephantine baobab trees and hydra-headed palms. This mix of riverine forest and swampy grassland is home to some of the country’s largest herds of game, and to rare species like the wild dog, Somali lion, and reticulated giraffe.

There are no rhinoceros left here, but Doza Diza, 66 years old, talks about seeing kifaru often. The safari word for rhino has been re-purposed by the locals as a name for the armor-plated Humvees whose machine-gun mounts recall the animal’s distinctive horn.

Tall, gaunt, and with a bad eye, Doza Diza wears a traditional Swahili sarong and a Muslim skullcap. He describes himself as a former county councilor and crab fisherman.

These motorized rhino can be distinguished by color, he says. The dark green ones are vehicles operated by the Kenya Defense Forces, KDF, he tells me. Those painted the color of sand belong to the Americans.

Doza is an elder of his tribe, the Awer (also spelled Aweer). They are hunter-gatherers who seek out honey by following birds, talk to crocodiles and hippos in tongues the beasts are said to understand, and generally stick to their ancient way of life. The Awer are also Muslims, which is highly unusual among the world’s few remaining stone-age peoples.



They've long inhabited the Boni forest region, but slowly and surely their way of life is being stripped from them. Subsistence hunting was banned in Kenya in the 1970s, so any meat the Awer procure is illegal. And now the tribe is caught in the crossfire of the global war on terror.

\*\*\*

The area around the Boni National Reserve is one of many places in Africa where American special forces personnel are deployed with little fanfare and, indeed, as secretly as Washington's representatives and proxies can manage. In this case the unit is involved in training Kenyan soldiers on counter terrorism operations.

As The New York Times reported recently, the United States has been escalating the "shadow war" inside Somalia with "the potential for the United States Army to be drawn ever more deeply into a trouble country that so far has stymied all efforts to fix it."

The Times, quoting unnamed "senior American military officials," estimated that "about 200 to 300 American Special Operations troops work with soldiers from Somalia and other African nations like Kenya and Uganda to carry out more than a half-dozen raids per month." And it outlined a program in which private contractors employed by the U.S. also play a significant role.

But the shadow war inside the failed-state borders of Somalia is almost transparent compared to the activities here on the ill-defined edge of that war. There is a long history of countries on the fringes of conflict being sucked into war themselves, the most notable example being Cambodia during the Vietnam debacle. Whether Washington will help prevent such an outcome—or provoke it—is an open question.

Repeated and detailed queries to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) for clarification of the American role here on the frontier between Kenya and Somalia were answered with a brief response explaining why not even a background briefing was possible: "As these operations are currently ongoing, and have elements of U.S. special forces assisting, we cannot comment at this time due to operational security reasons."

A major part of the mission those U.S. special forces are "assisting" in this part of the continent is, in fact, to hunt down and kill members of the Somali group known as al-Shabaab who threaten Kenya's security and, through the group's close relationship with al Qaeda, are believed to threaten America's as well.

The counterterror and counterinsurgency forces operating in the region would like the Awer to help them track the Somali guerrillas and terrorists.

U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets), other Special Operations Forces of various stripes, State Department officials, spies and commandos from countries with close ties to the United States, including the Brits, Israelis, and Jordanians, have all deployed or trained in Kenya in an undeclared if not unmentioned extension of the U.S.-backed Global War on Terror.

Kenya's government and its international partners—the heavyweights being the U.S. and the U.K.—are desperate to make this region safe for engineers, imported skilled workers, and, tourists. But the current intense counterterror focus has been a slow build. While significant progress has been made, for the moment, the expansive Boni forest remains an active operations zone. Several police and soldiers have been killed after getting blown up by IED's.

Al-Shabaab released a recruitment video in 2015 boasting about the bountiful game in the forest provided by Allah to sustain jihadi fighters.

One ranch with a tourist concession that had been a haunt of jet-setters and celebrities (Kristin Davis, one of the stars of *Sex in the City*, had been a guest) found itself converted into a haven for al-Shabaab sympathizers in 2014. They stole food and medicine then torched the facility's guest huts.

There is a long and bloody history behind such incidents. In October 2011, Kenya sent troops into Somalia. Since then al-Shabaab has carried out retaliatory hits on targets in Kenya resulting in hundreds of deaths.

Kenyan officials believe that after the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi that killed at least 70 people, and the relentless intelligence driven track and kill strategy adopted by security forces, al-Shabaab recruits from the Kenya retreated from Kenya's urban areas and melted into the dense Boni forest—which sits on the coast, right on the country's north-south border with Somalia and adjacent to what was once a Somali national park.

Officials say another massacre, the 2014 Mpeketoni attack, which left 48 dead, was staged from within the forest, and that the Garissa University attack of 2015, which left at least 148 dead, was organized within the enormous Dadaab refugee camp nearby (which the Kenyan government plans to shut down).

Jaysh al Ayman, the al-Shabaab cell in the forest, reportedly was comprised of some 300 fighters in 2015, spread out through sleeper cells in a few towns, units inside Boni Forest and in camps in Somalia where it's members receive training and logistics but its numbers certainly vary.

Following the Westgate attack national and Western forces were in an all-out scramble to protect Kenya from further cross-border terrorism. After the Garissa attack, The U.S. and other Western nations decided to offer better assistance both overt and covert.

According to human rights groups, the counterinsurgency tactics that accompanied the build-up of international assistance have featured mass police sweeps, arbitrary detentions, disappearances, and executions targeting al-Shabaab suspects, recruiters, funders and sympathizers.

During President Barack Obama's visit to Kenya in July of 2015, he stepped into the fray, allocating \$100 million for the Kenya Defense Forces for weapons, materiel, and vehicles. The allowance was a 163 percent increase in counterterrorism assistance over the previous year. Among Kenya's purchases: a Boeing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System —comprising several drones and supporting infrastructure—at a price of \$9.8 million. Each year for the past decade or longer the Kenyan government has obtained security assistance from the West.

The most recent installment—approved by the State Department and Trump's administration are light attack combat choppers designed for troop support and low, high impact attacks targeting people on the ground for elimination

Obama's theme was known as "the 3-D approach" to the region's conflicts—defense, diplomacy, and development. And in the two months following his historic visit to the land of his father, Kenya's government announced that a "multi-agency" security force had been assembled to carry out counterterror measures against al-Shabaab.

The force consisted of paramilitary units within Kenya's police, Kenya Defense Forces special forces, and various state agencies, including the National Intelligence Service, Military Intelligence, the Kenya Wildlife Service and Forest Service—all trained by Western police units and special forces.

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On Sept. 11 of 2015, Kenya formally launched “Operation Linda Boni” (Linda Boni being Swahili for “protect the Boni”). The goal set was to drive the Jaysh Al Ayman insurgents from the forest.

The first stage of this effort was cordoning off the Boni forest as a collection of “no-go zones,” and evacuation of residents in affected areas.

Security officials contend that Somali fighters have taken up residence, with their wives and children, deep inside the Boni forest.

Doza Diza and other Awer leaders say that is true.

They say al-Shabaab has coerced them into providing shelter in mosques and schools, logistical support, chiefly in the form of food and medicine, and have forced tribespeople to track game for them.

Doza reports that guerrillas took his people’s food and issued warnings not to reveal their whereabouts to Kenya security, “Otherwise, we’ll deal with you.” Aside from this, he notes, the insurgents are polite to the locals.


Linda Boni has not only run long beyond its planned two-month timetable, it has extended far beyond the forest and its region into much of northeast Kenya all the way to the Somali border.

In the process it has become apparent that the KDF’s counterterror tactics involve more than eradicating the al-Shabaab presence in the forest.

By the end of 2015, the KDF announced it was expanding its area of deployment into neighboring counties along the Somali border and south some 200 miles, to the Tana River, constructing additional police stations and military camps. The Baragoni camp on the southern fringe of the Boni-Dodori National Reserve expanded its area to 800 acres of ostensibly public land.

Kenya has started to build a 435-mile Western-funded security wall at the nation’s eastern border. On a visit to Kenya last year, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a big fan of walls in the Holy Land and in the U.S. as well, committed funds to the project. Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta reportedly has suggested building a terrorist-only prison facility.

JANUARY 2020 ATTACK BY JAYSH AL AYMAN




1 U.S. Servicemember, 2 Contractors Dead, 6 Planes Struck, Including Rare Spy Plane, In Kenya Attack



AL SHABAAB.

Another image showing an Al Shabaab terrorist possibly putting something into the aircraft's cockpit as smoke pours out, clearly showing a specially configured de Havilland Dash-8 in



SOURCE: THE DRIVE  
 REPORT BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK  
 JANUARY 5, 2020  
 THE WAR ZONE

An attack on a military outpost in Kenya where U.S. troops are stationed, as well as its associated airfield, has left a U.S. service member and two contractors dead and six aircraft and helicopters damaged or destroyed. This includes a secretive U.S. military de Havilland Dash-8 twin-engine turboprop configured for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The terrorists who carried out the raid also damaged or destroyed vehicles and fuel tanks.



Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda's franchise in Somalia, carried out the attack on the base, known as Camp Simba, and the nearby airfield, typically referred to simply as Manda Bay after the nearby body of water of the same name, occurred in the early hours local time on Jan. 5, 2020.

The terrorists reportedly used a suicide car bomb to breach the main facility and also stormed the airstrip, both of which are situated roughly 60 miles southwest of the Somali border. One U.S. service member and two Department of Defense contractors died in the attack, according to U.S. Africa Command, while another two U.S. military members were injured and are, at the time of writing, in stable condition and being evacuated.

There is no word yet on any Kenyan casualties, but the country's authorities have said that at least eight Al Shabaab terrorists died in the ensuing skirmish. U.S. and Kenyan authorities had earlier since issued statements that forces from both countries had successfully repelled the attackers. "The attack on the compound today involved indirect and small arms fire. After an initial penetration of the perimeter, Kenya Defense Forces and U.S. Africa Command repelled the al-Shabaab attack," AFRICOM's statement read. "Reports indicate that six contractor-operated civilian aircraft were damaged to some degree."

The full extent of the damage remains unclear. The Associated Press, citing an initial Kenyan police report the outlet had seen, had reported that an unspecified U.S. "Cessna," as well as a Kenyan Cessna Grand Caravan, and two unknown U.S. helicopters, along with various American vehicles had been destroyed.

Pictures that have emerged that show what appears to be the remains of a Beechcraft King Air that was destroyed and burned out during the attack, as well as a pair of M-ATV mine-resistant vehicles that very likely belong to U.S. forces. This could be the aircraft that the

Kenyan police report described as a U.S. “Cessna.”

Some reports have suggested that this could be a U.S. Air Force C-146A Wolfhound special operations transport, but the tail section seen in the image notably lacks the “stinger” style tail seen on that aircraft, along with other differences. In addition, AFRICOM has only said so far that the destroyed and damaged aircraft were contractor-operated, which the Wolfhounds are not.

Contractors do fly a mix of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters from the Manda Bay to provide transport, casualty evacuation, and personnel recovery support to American forces and their local partners in Kenya and neighboring Somalia, where U.S. special operations forces and other troops are fighting Al Shabaab and training Somali personnel to do the same. At least one contractor-operated Bell 412 helicopter is based there, which could be among the U.S. helicopters that reportedly got destroyed in the raid.



Al Shabaab has released its own pictures from the attack, clearly showing a specially configured de Havilland Dash-8 in front of what appears to be the burning fuel tanks. We don't know how severe the damage to the plane was, but one picture does show smoke coming out of the cockpit and an Al Shabaab terrorist appearing to be putting or trying to put something inside.

This U.S.-government owned, but contractor-operated Dash-8, a DHC-8-202 model, belongs to a secretive fleet of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft known as SOCOM Tactical Airborne Multi-Sensor Platforms, or STAMP. These aircraft are known to support shadowy Joint Special Operations Command.



## Satellite imagery shows that U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command U-28A ISR



GOOGLE EARTH

A satellite image from April 2019, showing various aircraft at Manda Bay, including at Beechcraft King Air at the top of the runway about to take off.

At present, the STAMP fleet includes two DHC-8-202s, as well as three Beechcraft King Airc. The paint scheme on the aircraft in the images Al Shabaab posted online, white with a large blue cheatline with a smaller red one underneath, matches the Dash-8 that presently carries the U.S. civil registration code N8200L. The other STAMP Dash-8, N8200R, has a similar paint job, but with the colors of the cheatlines reversed. Satellite imagery showed that U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command U-28A ISR aircraft and contractor-operated Beechcraft King Airc were also regular visitors to Manda Bay.



Whatever the final damage assessment is and how many aircraft and other assets Al Shabaab succeeded in destroying or damaging, the attack is a particularly brazen statement of the group's very real ability to strike outside of Somalia. Kenya, which is a significant member of the African Union-led operations targeting Al Shabaab in Somalia, has suffered a number of attacks on both military and civilian targets on its own soil from the group in recent years .


Just last year, the terrorist organization launched a major attack on an upscale Dusit D2 Hotel and associated business complex in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, killing 21 people and wounding another 28. After that operation, Al Shabaab announced the beginning of a campaign it dubbed "Al-Quds (Jerusalem) will never be Judaized," a reference to a pledge to ultimately eject Israel from the city of Jerusalem, a common refrain among Islamic extremist groups. The Somalia terrorists said that the raid on Camp Simba and Manda Bay was part of this same campaign. There is no indication that this is tied to the ongoing crisis between the United States and Iran.

This also comes as the U.S. military has significantly expanded both facilities in recent years, which coincided with U.S. President Donald Trump's decision to designate a swath of southern Somalia as an "area of active hostilities" in 2017. This enabled the U.S. military to dramatically increase its operations there and has led to a spike in airstrikes , including using drones, on Al Shabaab targets since then. Aircraft flying from Manda Bay have been providing important persistent surveillance capabilities over southern Somalia in support of those operations.

U.S. forces first began operating from Camp Simba and Manda Bay more than 10 years ago, with the U.S. Navy initially being responsible for overseeing operations at these facilities. In addition to using the airstrip as a launch point for aerial reconnaissance over neighboring Somalia, American forces have used the main base as a training base for both Kenyan and Somali forces.

In 2017, overall responsibility for both sites passed to the U.S. Air Force, which established the 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron to oversee day-to-day activities at Manda Bay. In August 2019, this unit raised the American flag over the airfield, in a ceremony that marked its transition to an "enduring" base, meaning the U.S. military now treats it as a semi-permanent operating location.

Despite this existing plan to continue operations at this site for the foreseeable future, Al Shabaab's attack has demonstrated a clear need for U.S. and Kenyan forces to reassess their defensive posture going forward.





Source: The Drive

2015 Attempted Attack on KDF Special Forces Camp





© Mo Dahir



@Wajia0

© Twitter



Since the Westgate attack, the KDF base at Baragoni has grown from a temporary camp to a permanent one, and by 2015 Kenya had deployed enough of its troops there with sufficient transport to foil a Shabaab attack aimed at destroying the Baure camp, which is 36 miles north of the Baragoni base.

In that action KDF Rangers killed 11 militants from the Jaysh Al Ayman unit, including an British man named Thomas Evans who'd been dubbed "the White Beast" in U.K. tabloids. The KDF paraded his corpse—along with others—in nearby Mpeketoni, where counter terror operations are headquartered. The British press subsequently posted video that appears to show the night time engagement filmed shortly before he died from a Kenyan bullet

The reach of the Baragoni base the jihadis attempted to attack stretches far beyond a few satellite camps.

International Recruits





### Final moments of the 'White Beast':

Thomas Evans was filming the firefight in against KDF when he was shot. Revealing images show him hugging fellow fanatics before the onslaught.

The incredible footage was discovered on the 25-year-old Briton's corpse. Evans converted to Islam in 2010 and joined Somali terror group in 2011. Man from Buckinghamshire is one of 50 British people to join Al-Shabaab.

The shadows are lengthening in the bushland of northern Kenya as two cells of Al Qaeda inspired Al Shabaab fighters come together for their final briefing in the hours before launching a blood fuelled terror attack.

At their very heart is the heavily bearded British Muslim-convert Thomas Evans, a large dagger tucked behind the ammunition pouches strapped to his chest.

The Briton from the small Buckinghamshire village of Wooburn Green – known as the 'White Beast' because of his brutality – is clearly relaxed and smiles as he embraces fellow Islamist fighters who have crossed in groups from the Al Shabaab heartland of Somalia to team up with Kenyan-based terrorists in preparation for their dawn operations.

Hours later the 25 year-old is dead, shot as he helped lead an assault on the Kenyan Defence Force base – the first case of a British Islamist militant being killed on Kenyan soil. The extraordinary pictures were found in a camera and series of videos discovered on the body of Evans, the group's second in command and cameraman, in the aftermath of the 5.45am attack at Baure, Lamu County, 11-days ago.

They provide a unique insight into the role of the Briton, who had changed his name to Abdul Hakim, and is believed to have taken part in an atrocity on a nearby village a year earlier that left 70 people dead.

Taken by Evans as he shouted instructions, they also show for the first time the final seconds of his life – and the moment he is hit by the fatal bullet.

Dawn has barely broken as the fighters, illuminated only by gunfire and explosions, move from the cover of the bush to launch their assault with Evans recording what Al Shabaab hope will be another propaganda strike on the beleaguered military.

Hunched gunmen are captured blasting off bursts of automatic fire while incoming Kenyan bullets pour-in towards the fighters.

Evans is recording the frantic, terrifying moments of attack immediately behind the gunmen and would have made an easy target.

Suddenly, the footage stops as he is hit, collapsing to the ground as comrades desperately try to drag him back into the bush.

He was one of at least 11 jihadis killed in the failed attack and five remarkable videos found on Evans chronicle the hours of build-up to attack – and the Briton's comfort in his role of jihadist.

In one sequence of his photographs, a fighter is filmed making a crude roadside bomb, packing explosives together and then squatting in the shade as he links together the wires and the detonator.

Evans then captures two fighters skinning and gutting a gazelle they have shot for a meal beside a thorn tree as a gunman, his head covered by the distinctive black and white checked head scarf popular with fighters, rests his weapon on his right shoulder.

He then hands the camera to a colleague who shows Evans, wearing a brown T-shirt, blue trousers and a camouflage cap – he is the only fighter wearing socks in his sandals, perhaps a tiny 'nod' towards his background – listening among a group of some fighters as they are briefed by a commander, who tells them: 'The war starts now, we hear from their radio channels that the Kenya are crying like babies, fear has struck in their hearts.'

'God has given Islam real lions that are feared.'

Evans, his cap reversed, sits cross-legged as men carry out final weapons' check on the arsenal laid out in front of them.

Distinctive black and white flags of Al Shabaab hang on wooden stakes. Several daggers have been driven in to the dirt in a shaded clearing.

Significantly, a second white European with thick beard and dark hair hanging beyond his muscled shoulders can be seen in many of the pictures with Evans.

He survived the attack and has been named as German, Andreas Martin Muller, alias Abu Nusaybah, who has a £64,000 bounty on his head.

The body of Evans, who is one of at least 50 Britons suspected of operating with Al Shabaab, has been buried in northern Kenya after formal identification was carried out with DNA from his family.

An intelligence official in the Kenyan capital Nairobi described the former electrician as a 'significant and totally integrated figure' within the units of Al Shabaab operating in northern Kenya during the last two years.

He is said to have taken part in the attack last year on the predominantly Christian town of Mpeketoni last year in which 70 people were killed. Gunmen went from house to house singling out Christians, shooting them in the head and chest in front of their families before torching homes.

Evans has also been linked to the horrific attack on Garissa University College in north east Kenya this April that left 147 people dead and over a hundred injured.

Gunmen took over 700 students hostage, freeing Muslims and killing those who identified

as Christians. Survivors of attacks by Evans are said to have told how he broke down doors with an axe to find victims, and personally beheaded one man whose hands were tied behind his back.

On previous attacks, most notably Mpeketoni, Al Shabaab is known to have taken photographs and video for both propaganda and to use as part of their training camps.

Officials believe Evans was tasked with capturing the build-up and attack on Baure but, it is understood, security forces had a tip-off and were waiting for the attack in which two soldiers died.

The son of a devout Christian and Conservative party agent, Evans converted to Islam in 2010, aged 19, after splitting up with his girlfriend.

His mother Sally Evans said she believed he was radicalised after leaving a moderate local mosque to attend a hard-line prayer centre.

Evans attempted to fly to Kenya in February 2011, when he was 21, but was stopped by counter-terrorism police at Heathrow. He flew to Egypt in June, telling his family he was going to learn Arabic and funding his travel through a car-boot sale.

Kenyan police revealed the following month he flew from Cairo, via Ethiopia, to Nairobi where he was stopped by Kenyan authorities because his name was on a terror watchlist provided by the UK. A police report said : 'The subject indicated his motive of visit was to spend Ramadan prayers in Kenya.' Officers said that in his luggage they found a Koran, sleeping bag, pair of boots and a black kanzu robe and perfume.

He was travelling with three friends and told officers, who sent him back to Egypt, that he planned to stay at the Incas Hotel in Mombasa, at the time seen as a hotbed of radical recruitment.

Transformed: Thomas Evans' mother Sally (pictured) said she believed he was radicalised after leaving a moderate local mosque to attend a hard-line prayer centre

She described her son as a 'normal teenager' who enjoyed visiting the pub on a Saturday night. She said she was initially happy with his decision to convert to Islam as he had 'done one or two things that I was not proud of'.

He attempted to convert his mother and brother to Islam and refused to use the same crockery as the rest of his family, resented music being played in her home and would not enter the front room during Christmas.

Evans brought a friend, Donald Stewart-Whyte, a fellow Muslim convert, to the family home. Stewart-Whyte was arrested in 2006 in connection with the liquid bomb plot to blow up planes but was later cleared of any involvement.

Despite being prevented from travelling to Kenya by police, authorities failed to contact Mrs Evans.

'I wish that they had contacted us,' she told MPs. 'I know he was 21, but as his mother and his brother, we could have helped them maybe, or if they had told us their concerns, we could have acted on it. We could have worked with them to help save Thomas.'

His brother, Michael, said a 'tipping point' came when Evans went on a charity trip in 2010 to Palestine called Road to Hope, from which he returned angry with strong views against the UK and US's presence in the Middle East.

Mrs Evans phoned a helpline for people with concerns that their relatives or friends were being radicalised but felt ignored because she was not a Muslim. When she learnt of the death on June 14th, Mrs Evans said : 'I just went numb. I couldn't believe that was my son, my little boy, my little babe who I loved.'

\*\*\*

Swaleh Msellem, a Swahili resident of Lamu Island, manages a petrol station at the Mokowe jetty a few kilometers across a channel on the mainland. Msellem, now 30, told me how one morning he'd docked his boat at the jetty where at least a dozen non-uniformed men, whom he claims were with the paramilitary wing of Kenya's National Police Service, had been waiting for him.

Someone pulled a hood over his head and tossed him into a vehicle. Familiar with the area and its roads, he said he could tell he was driven some 40 kilometers away to the Baragoni military base, where he was detained in a shipping container and interrogated aggressively to extract information on who planned a deadly attack in the nearby village of Hindi, soon after the Mpekatoni massacre. He denied any knowledge. The interrogators asked where the weapons were that were used for the attacks. "Which weapons?" he answered.

The military intelligence officers continued to grill him, insisting he had information. He said that during that detention he was driven from Baragoni to an area nearby. One afternoon he complained of feeling ill. Guards took him outside to a pond where he vomited. Through his loosened blindfold he was able to glimpse crocodiles on the berm of the pond.

Why were crocodiles being kept inside a military base, he wondered.

Msellem said soldiers later threatened that he'd be fed to the crocodiles like others had been if he didn't cooperate. After two weeks he was transferred to the port town of Mombasa, to the south, and held several months at the infamous Shimo La Tewa prison in a wing reserved for terrorists. Msellem eventually was taken into court, where he was acquitted of all murder and terror-related charges for lack of evidence (a wanted Al shabaab militant had been in contact with him by phone leading police his way.)

When I interviewed Msellem, he was grimly philosophical. Although he did not see or talk to any U.S. personnel, as far as he knew, he had no doubt they played some role behind the scenes. "The Americans are very complicated, aren't they? On the one hand they are helping us by building roads, dispensaries, schools, but they also seem to want to kill"

For information from inside the Baragoni base, I spoke with a man who identified himself as a Western-trained Kenyan Special Forces soldier serving with one of the SF battalions.

This soldier described to me the process of "enhanced interrogation"—used at Baragoni military base. He confirmed that people were were going to pay up."

Operation Linda Boni: Gains Against Jaysh Ayman Terrorists

In vast forest, the government has established a military camp; nine police stations fully staffed with staff, the police stations hosts the anti-terrorism unit for profiling and prosecution of suspected terrorists.

The government is in the process of establishing a permanent Kenya Wildlife Service camp with paramilitary rangers and combat trained forest officers.

During the operations, camps have been discovered and several weapons recovered.

Security forces drawn from KDF army, General Service Unit and regular police operations have been able to recover more than a tonne of food supplies, guns and ammunition, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and bomb-making materials in trenches.

Residents neighbouring the forest, Bondhei, Pandanguo, Witu and Pangani – which are in Garissa and Tana River counties have been very collaborative with security apparatus and have confirmed that security is sufficient.

Sources: Jamestown.org & Daily Beast News

◀ AL SHABAAB ◀ BONI FOREST ◀ COUNTER TERRORISM ◀ ELITE ◀ HINDI ◀ JAYSH AL AYMAN  
 UNIT ◀ KDF ◀ KENYA ◀ LAMU ◀ MILITARY ◀ MPEKETONI ◀ OPERATION ◀ SOMALIA ◀ TANA  
 RIVER ◀ TERRORIST ATTACK ◀ TERRORIST CELL

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**Annex 133**

S. West, “Jaysh al-Ayman: a ‘local’ threat in Kenya”, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16

Issue: 8, *The Jamestown Foundation*, 23 April 2018

# TERRORISM MONITOR

## Jaysh al-Ayman: A ‘Local’ Threat in Kenya

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 8

By: Sunguta West (<https://jamestown.org/analyst/sunguta-west/>)

April 23, 2018 05:24 PM Age: 2 years



Kenyan security forces in the Boni Forest (Source: The Star [Kenya])

After a series of deadly attacks, Jaysh al-Ayman, an elite al-Shabaab unit formed about five years ago to carry out operations inside Kenya, has emerged as the deadliest terrorist cell in the East African nation. Although it started life in Somalia, the al-Qaeda affiliate's Kenya wing portrays itself as a local movement and has set up bases in the Boni forest, an expanse of woodland in Kenya's coastal Lamu County, which extends to the border with Somalia. It is from here the faction terrorizes villages and towns, and targets the police, the military and other government institutions (Daily Nation (<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Dilemma-for-Garissa-herders-in-Boni-Forest/1056-4066854-nu3wl2z/index.html>), August 22, 2017).

The faction is named after one of its top leaders, Maalim Ayman (a.k.a. Dobow Abdiaziz Ali), an ethnic Somali from Mandera County. [1] He was likely appointed to the role in the hope that having a Kenyan in charge of what is effectively al-Shabaab's Kenya wing would ease tensions. Details about Ayman are scarce, and his current role within the group is unclear. According to some reports, however, he continues to train the group's fighters in wilderness survival techniques (The Star, ([https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/07/13/al-shabaab-unit-formed-to-cripple-kenya\\_c1166804](https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/07/13/al-shabaab-unit-formed-to-cripple-kenya_c1166804)). July 13, 2015).

## **A Bloody Beginning**

The unit's origins can be traced to the events on June 20, 2013, in Barawi, an ancient Somali coastal town, where differences within al-Shabaab boiled over. Barawi had become al-Shabaab's operational headquarters after it was forced out of the port of Kismayu by the Kenyan military—Kismayu had served as group's headquarters since it was established in 2006 (The Standard, (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001248735/why-raids-are-a-cause-for-worry-as-al-shabaab-changes-face>). July 23, 2017). On June 20, Ahmed Abdi Godane, then al-Shabaab's emir, was concerned that members of the group's shura council were accusing him of adopting a murderous strategy that targeted civilians and were preparing to split away from the group.

Two years prior, in 2011, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had been strengthened by Kenyan troops. Concerned with how to keep his group intact in the face of an onslaught by a better-armed foe and desperate to reassert his authority, Godane ordered the Amniyat, the group's elite spy wing, to execute Ibrahim al-Afghani, a member of al-Shabaab's shura council. Other shura members, among them Mukhtar Robow and Shaykh Dahir Aweys, were also targeted, but escaped and later defected to the Somali government.

In late 2013, following a strategy aimed at fighting a more effective asymmetrical war in Somalia and its neighbors, Godane unveiled two new wings of al-Shabaab—Jaysh al-Usra, which he directed at Ethiopia, and Jaysh al-Ayman, which would target Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (The Reporter, (<https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/content/al-shabaab-no-longer-exclusively-somali-problem>). August 20, 2016).

While Jaysh al-Usra failed to penetrate Ethiopia, Jaysh al-Ayman has seen success in Kenya. So much so, in fact, that although Kenyan security agencies launched the Operation Linda Boni (Operation "Protect Boni") in 2015 to flush the militants out of the forest, it has met with only limited success. The group has become a major headache for the Kenyan security services. Experts



now question whether intelligence reports were ignored early on, allowing the group to securely embed itself in the area (Daily Nation, (<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Agencies--ignored-intelligence-reports--on--Shabaab--/1056-4023478-12vodwo/index.html>) July 20, 2017).

## Attacks in Kenya

Jaysh al-Ayman has played a leading role in many of the recent major terrorist attacks in Kenya. Abdilatif Abubakar Ali, a commander with the group, is believed to have played a key role in planning and executing the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall attack, which left 67 people dead (The Star, (<https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/12/02/security-agents-say-missing-youth-have-joined-al-shabaab-c1248503>) December 2, 2015). In June 2014, 50 heavily armed militants targeted the Mpeketoni area, killing 48 people, all non-Muslims, and killed another 29 in Hindi area, two weeks later. In June 2014, the militants descended on Lamu County, massacring nearly 100 people Daily Nation, (<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/mpeketoni-Lamu-gunfire-al-shabaab-terrorism/1056-2349860-10elxgcz/index.html>) June 16, 2014; Standard Digital (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000125005/gunmen-kill-48-in-mpeketoni-s-night-orgy-of-violence>), June 17, 2014).

In neighboring Pandanguo, another town in Lamu, the militants carried out a different type of operation, putting away their guns and instead, since the area is predominantly Muslim, hoarding people into a mosque and preaching to them, before looting drugs, nets and mattresses from a nearby dispensary (The Standard (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000127827/criminals-escape-with-6-guns-after-attacking-pandanguo-in-lamu/>), July 11, 2014; The Standard, (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001248735/why-raids-are-a-cause-for-worry-as-al-shabaab-changes-face>) July 23, 2017). In April 2015, al-Shabaab gunmen, who security experts say were linked to the faction, stormed Garissa University, killing 148 people, mainly Christian students, in the most deadly attack in Kenya since the 1998 Nairobi U.S. embassy bombing by al-Qaeda, in which more than 200 people were killed.

More recently, the faction was linked to the kidnapping of the late Mariam El-Maawy, a top Kenyan government official who was abducted by militants along the Mokowe-Mpeketoni road. El-Maawy was rescued by the Kenyan military and taken for treatment in South Africa, but died of her wounds in hospital three months later (The Standard, (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001255796/public-works-ps-mariam-el-maawy-dies-in-hospital-three-months-after-al-shabaab-attack>) September 28, 2017).

Aside from these bloody, high-profile attacks, the group has planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) along parts of the lengthy and porous Kenya-Somali border and has killed numerous civilians, policemen and soldiers.

## Expanding Membership

Initially, Kenyans from the coastal region made-up the majority of Jaysh al-Ayman'. One of Jaysh al-Ayman's key commanders is Abdifatah Abubakar Abdi (a.k.a. Musa Muhajir), a Kenyan from the coast city of Mombasa (see Militant Leadership Monitor

(<https://jamestown.org/program/overseeing-al-shabaabs-kenyan-resurgence-the-ascendance-of-jaysh-al-ayman-commander-abdifatah-abubakar-abdi/>), April 4). Muhajir has been on the radar of the Kenyan security services for some time, and the police say he is one of the militants responsible for the Lamu attacks ([Daily Nation](https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Security-agencies-blame--new-outfit--for-terror-attacks-/1056-4016906-wpf3k7z/index.html), (<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Security-agencies-blame--new-outfit--for-terror-attacks-/1056-4016906-wpf3k7z/index.html>) July 16, 2017; [Daily Nation](https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/List-of-men-wanted-for-terrorism/1950946-2674992-format-xhtml-ccc5igz/index.html) (<https://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/List-of-men-wanted-for-terrorism/1950946-2674992-format-xhtml-ccc5igz/index.html>), March 4, 2015).

In recent years, the group has grown to include Muslim converts from some of Kenya's non-Muslim communities, as well as foreign fighters ([The Standard](https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001248735/why-raids-are-a-cause-for-worry-as-al-shabaab-changes-face), (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001248735/why-raids-are-a-cause-for-worry-as-al-shabaab-changes-face>) July 23, 2017). Among the foreign jihadists known to have joined the group was Malik Ali Jones, an American currently in jail in the United States. Another key foreign fighter is Ahmed Muller, a German citizen who uses several aliases, including Andreas Ahmad Khaled, Muller Martin Muller and Abu Nusaibah. The 42-year-old militant, who comes from Cochem, Germany, was allegedly seconded to al-Shabaab by its al-Qaeda affiliate in Pakistan in 2011 ([Daily Nation](https://www.nation.co.ke/news/These-are-the-most-wanted-terror-suspects/1056-2758430-eedr8e/index.html), (<https://www.nation.co.ke/news/These-are-the-most-wanted-terror-suspects/1056-2758430-eedr8e/index.html>) June 19, 2015; [Citizen TV](https://citizentv.co.ke/news/police-release-photos-of-botched-lamu-attack-suspects-89550/) (<https://citizentv.co.ke/news/police-release-photos-of-botched-lamu-attack-suspects-89550/>), June 20, 2015).

Jones and Muller were identified after the killing of a British national, Thomas Evans, during an attempted attack on an army camp in the Buare area. In that failed attack, more than 10 al-Shabaab militants were killed while score of others fled with serious injuries. The group's commander, Issa Luqman Osman (a.k.a. "Shirwa"), was also killed. Although there are indications that a new leader has since emerged, it remains unclear exactly who has replaced him ([The Standard](https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000165983/slain-al-shabaab-commander-luqman-osman-was-a-graduate-from-uganda-says-family), (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000165983/slain-al-shabaab-commander-luqman-osman-was-a-graduate-from-uganda-says-family>) June 17, 2015). Following the attack, the government released photographs of 38 militants believed to have taken part, including one of Muller.

Despite the efforts of the Kenyan security services, Jaysh al-Ayman continues to menace Kenyans in the Boni forest, and that threat appears set to grow more potent. In a recent al-Shabaab video, the group's spokesman Sheikh Ali Mahmoud Rage is seen speaking to foreign fighters graduating after attending a training camp in southern Somalia. In his speech, he calls on the Kenyan fighters among their ranks to become an "army" to "conquer" Somalia's neighbor.

## NOTES

[1] There are several variations of the group's names, often simply alternative spellings. It is variously referred to as: Jeysh Ayman, Jaysh Ayman, Jaysh Ayman al-Shabaab, Jaysh la Imani or Jaysh Ayman Majmo Ayman.



[Terrorism-Monitor-April-23-2018.pdf \(/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terrorism-Monitor-](#)

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**Annex 134**

“ACLED Resources: Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, political violence involving Al Shaabab”, *ACLED*, 2020

# ACLED RESOURCES: AL SHABAAB IN SOMALIA AND KENYA

On 28 December 2019, a truck bomb exploded in the Somali capital city of Mogadishu, reportedly killing more than 80 people. Al Shabaab claimed the attack, which is believed to be the deadliest to hit Somalia in over two years (ACLED, 10 January 2020; Al Jazeera, 30 December 2019). A week later, on 5 January 2020, the militants launched a predawn assault on an airbase in Kenya used by both Kenyan and American forces, killing one US soldier and two private contractors (The Washington Post, 5 January 2020). Despite a record number of American airstrikes targeting the group in 2019 (The Washington Post, 15 January 2020), Al Shabaab appears to be ramping up its operations. Since the US escalated its air campaign in 2017, Al Shabaab has perpetrated almost 900 civilian targeting events in Somalia, resulting in estimates of nearly 2,000 fatalities.

ACLED tracks political violence in Somalia and Kenya in real-time, with data updated each week. Access the latest data through our [Data Export Tool](#) and [Curated Data Files](#). For more information on ACLED methodology, see our [General Guides](#) and [Methodology](#) pages.

Find recent analysis of Al Shabaab activity in Somalia and Kenya below, as well as an interactive dashboard displaying ACLED data on political violence involving Al Shabaab from 1 January 2010 to 4 January 2020.

## Resilience: Al Shabaab Remains a Serious Threat – 11 February 2019

## Not with a Whimper but with a Bang: Al Shabaab’s Resilience and International Efforts Against the Rebels – 27 January 2019

## Continued Conflict: Updates on Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Somalia – 7 December 2018




## Same Tune, New Key: Al Shabaab Adapts in the Face of Increased Military Pressure – 17 November 2018

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## Political Violence Involving Al Shaabab


Data here includes all organized political violence (battles, explosions/remote violence, and violence against civilians)

Country: (All) Date: January 1, 2010 to January 4, 2020


### Key Figures

Number of Organized Violent Events	Reported Fatalities	Number of Events Targeting Civilians	Reported Civilian Fatalities
11,239	31,166	1,914	4,491

### All Organized Violent Events



### Events Targeting Civilians



Engagement type: (All) Sub-event type: (All)


### Who is Al Shabaab engaging with?

- Rebels
- Clan militia
- Political militia
- Civilians
- External forces
- State forces
- [One-sided events]


### How are civilians targeted?

- Sexual violence
- Suicide bomb
- Grenade
- Shelling/artillery/missile attack
- Abduction/forced disappearance
- Remote explosive/landmine/IED
- Attack

### Organized Violent Events & Reported Fatalities



### Civilian Targeting Events & Civilian Fatalities



**Annex 135**

“Al-Shabaab five years after westgate: still a menace in East Africa”, Africa

Report No. 265, *International Crisis Group*, 21 September 2018



# Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa

Africa Report N°265 | 21 September 2018

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## Principal Findings

**What's happening?** Five years after an attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall, Al-Shabaab appears committed to striking targets across East Africa. Security crackdowns have blunted its capacity to stage regular assaults, but complacency could roll back those gains, as could failure to engage with communities in which the group recruits.

**Why did it happen?** Al-Shabaab aims to pressure regional governments to withdraw troops from Somalia, where an African Union mission has been battling the militants since 2007. The group also uses its attacks in East Africa to raise its profile, seek new recruits and solicit funding.

**Why does it matter?** Despite losing territory in Somalia and cutting back recruitment in Kenya under pressure from authorities, Al-Shabaab has adapted by finding new areas of operation, including by building relationships with militants in southern Tanzania and northern Mozambique.

**What should be done?** Authorities should avoid blanket arrests and extra-judicial killings, involve local leaders in efforts to tackle recruitment, while taking steps to address broader grievances that Al-Shabaab taps into in its narrative, including the political and economic exclusion of Muslim minorities in East Africa.

## *Executive Summary*

Five years ago, on 21 September 2013, four Al-Shabaab militants stormed the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, killing 67 during the ensuing four-day siege and demonstrating the movement's reach outside Somalia. Kenyan authorities' subsequent indiscriminate crackdowns fuelled Muslim anger and accelerated militant recruitment. In 2015, however, top officials switched approaches, better involving community leaders in efforts against Al-Shabaab. The movement reacted by relocating operations, including by forging closer ties with militants in Tanzania, parts of which saw more attacks. Tanzanian authorities launched their own campaign, replicating some of Kenya's mistakes. Both countries' track records suggest that blanket arrests and police brutality consistently backfire. More effective is to combine steps that disrupt militant recruitment with policies aimed at addressing the grievances their propaganda exploits, notably Muslims' political and economic marginalisation. In Uganda, too, though Al-Shabaab has made no major inroads, security forces' mistreatment of Muslims risks creating problems where thus far few exist.

While Al-Shabaab remains focused on recapturing power and enforcing its variant of Islamic law in Somalia, it has long operated elsewhere in East Africa. At first it built networks to generate funds and recruits, largely refraining from attacks. That changed in March 2007, after the deployment of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), a regional force sent to prop up the body then recognised as the Somali government. The group has repeatedly struck countries that had dispatched troops to AMISOM.

After the highest-profile of these attacks, the Westgate siege, Kenyan authorities squeezed militant networks, forcing some to relocate and adapt tactics. But by casting a wide net, they also deepened frustration among Muslims at the state and aided Al-Shabaab recruitment. Militant attacks escalated between 2013 and 2015, often threatening to tip into wider ethnic or religious clashes. In mid-2015, a major attack on Garissa University College prompted a shake-up in the security forces and a re-think. Along Kenya's coast, local officials spearheaded efforts against militancy, involving communities in security provision. In the north east, another hotspot, locals assumed prominent security sector slots. At the same time, Nairobi devolved power and resources to local governments under the terms of a constitution adopted in 2010, partly redressing the inequality and resentment of central government that militants played on. Intelligence gathering improved, and though some police abuses continue, the tempo of militant attacks slowed.

Al-Shabaab has, however, deepened its ties to Tanzanian militants. As early as 2011, parts of Tanzania had suffered sporadic killings of Christians, Muslim clerics, police officers and ruling-party cadres. Officials at first blamed criminals, denying Islamist militants were responsible. But stepped-up assaults since 2015 forced the authorities to acknowledge the growing challenge. They, too, launched crackdowns. Religious and political leaders in Tanzania contend that heavy-handed policing, including extrajudicial killings, risks driving young people into militants' arms and fuelling intercommunal tension. Zanzibar's protracted crisis, involving successive

contested elections, also has pushed youths toward militancy, as traditional leaders who for years pursued reform peacefully lose credibility.

In Uganda, on the other hand, Al-Shabaab has struggled to gain traction – in large part due to better integration of Somalis, and Muslims overall, into society. No obvious ally for Al-Shabaab exists. This relatively good news story may not last, however. Over recent years, Ugandan security forces have rounded up large numbers of Muslims, creating a potential constituency. A new police chief pledges to end abuses but is still unproven. If the authorities do not change course, they could prompt disaffected youth to turn to militancy.

Al-Shabaab has not pulled off a major strike outside Somalia since Garissa. In Kenya, its influence has waned even as the threat of attacks lingers; competition among ethnic elites around elections poses a far graver threat to stability. In Tanzania, where militant violence has been on the rise, it seems unlikely to expand into a full-blown insurgency. But as regional and Western officials, as well as Al-Shabaab's own propaganda, suggest, the group is still plotting major attacks abroad. While its precise links to local groups, which revolve mostly around personal ties among militants, remain unclear, those links allow Al-Shabaab to project an image of regional potency. In turn, local groups burnish their credentials by claiming affiliation with the Somali movement and tying parochial struggles to a wider cause.

Given the diversity among the countries themselves, the fortunes of Muslims in each and the different states' varied experiences with Islamist militancy, there is no one prescription for tackling the threat. Nor, in East Africa as elsewhere, does a single, linear pathway toward militancy exist: recruits have ranged from law graduates to recent converts to Islam to poor Muslim youths in rural and urban peripheries. But there are lessons in Kenya's shift in tack, however imperfect, after 2015. Put simply, indiscriminate crackdowns make things worse. More effective policies include giving local officials the lead, consulting with communities whose youth militants attempt to lure into their ranks and appointing Muslims to top positions in the security forces, while also taking steps to tackle underlying grievances. That lesson is a valuable one for Tanzania. It also shows the dangers for Uganda of abusing its Muslim population.

Al-Shabaab will likely remain a formidable force inside Somalia and a menace outside it. Even were that to change, militancy in Kenya and Tanzania, which in places predates Al Shabaab's involvement, can be expected to endure as long as grievances linger; indeed, it already possesses its own dynamics, as groups respond to local conditions more than instruction from abroad. Al-Shabaab itself has proven adaptable, slipping away as dragnets close in. East African states need to be equally quick on their feet, fine-tuning security measures while crafting political and economic policies that weaken militancy's allure.

**Nairobi/Brussels, 21 September 2018**

## Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa

### I. Introduction

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Al-Shabaab emerged around 2004 from Somalia's state collapse and soon established itself as a formidable insurgent movement.<sup>1</sup> Though it has lost the Somali cities and towns it held at the peak of its power, in 2010, the group still controls large swathes of territory and raises considerable funds, particularly through local taxation and extortion. It stages complex attacks in the Somali capital Mogadishu and prosecutes a lethal asymmetric struggle against the 22,000-strong African Union mission (AMISOM) and Somali government forces.<sup>2</sup> Al-Shabaab is a formal al-Qaeda affiliate – one of its most potent local branches – and has traditionally received ideological support, expertise and training as well as, sometimes, money from the global movement, particularly its Yemen branch.<sup>3</sup> But the movement remains at its core a Somali organisation, focused on recapturing power and establishing its variant of Islamic law in Somalia.

Since about 2007, however, Al-Shabaab has expanded operations across East Africa. At first it did so primarily to recruit fighters and mobilise funds for its struggle at home. But as forces from other East African countries deployed into Somalia, mostly as part of AMISOM, it stepped up strikes in those countries as well. Most prominent was a 2013 complex attack on the Westgate Mall in an upmarket quarter of the Kenyan capital Nairobi, which resulted in a four-day occupation of the mall, 67 deaths and considerable embarrassment for the Kenyan security forces. Since then, Al-Shabaab has lost ground in Kenya, partly due to its own brutality and partly

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<sup>1</sup> Crisis Group Africa Report N°100, *Somalia's Islamists*, 12 December 2005; Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°74, *Somalia's Divided Islamists*, 18 May 2010. For more detail on the origins of Islamism in Somali society, see I. M. Lewis, *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-Based Society* (Lawrenceville, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> Importers bringing goods into Somalia's major ports and hoping to traverse Al-Shabaab-controlled areas will typically pay tax twice: first to government officials and second, typically at the same rates, to Al-Shabaab fighters at checkpoints in areas outside government control. Most businessmen regard Al-Shabaab as more financially competent and less corrupt than the central and local authorities it opposes. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°99, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War*, 26 June 2014, p. 15. In cities nominally controlled by the government, including Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab representatives levy "taxes" (in essence, protection money) upon businesses. These revenues give the group annual income running into the tens of millions of dollars. Crisis Group telephone interview, Mogadishu-based security official, February 2018; "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015)", S/2016/919, 31 October 2016.

<sup>3</sup> For details on Al-Shabaab's relations with al-Qaeda, see Crisis Group Special Report N°1, *Exploiting Disorder: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State*, 14 March 2016. For an exploration of al-Qaeda's ties with earlier Islamist groups in Somalia, particularly al-Itihaad al-Islami, some of whose members were founders of Al-Shabaab, see Crisis Group Report, *Somalia's Islamists*, op. cit. For more on this topic, see Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group* (New York, 2013).

due to the actions of Kenyan security forces. It has adapted and shown considerable resilience, however, and still poses a threat to Kenya, while putting down roots in parts of Tanzania, where militant violence is on the rise, and expanding its operations in Mozambique.

This report provides a snapshot of Al-Shabaab in East Africa five years after the Westgate Mall attack. Based on field research in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, it builds on previous Crisis Group work on Islamist militancy worldwide.<sup>4</sup> The next section examines Al-Shabaab's expansion beyond Somalia and the aftermath of the Westgate attack. Subsequent sections look at the movement's inroads into three areas – the Kenyan coast, Kenya's north east and Tanzania – where, often working with local allies, it has enjoyed most success in recruiting and orchestrating attacks. Section VI examines the relative success of another East African state, Uganda, in containing Al-Shabaab since a July 2010 attack in the Ugandan capital Kampala, the group's first bombing outside Somalia. The report concludes with policy lessons from the three East African states' experiences in dealing with the menace.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> This work is condensed in Crisis Group Report, *Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State*, op. cit.

<sup>5</sup> A wide range of Crisis Group work has examined Al-Shabaab's activities inside Somalia, as well as those of its predecessor al-Ittihaad al-Islami. See, for example, Crisis Group Report, *Somalia's Islamists* and Crisis Group Briefing, *Somalia's Divided Islamists*, both op. cit. See also Crisis Group Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War*, op. cit.

## II. East Africa in Al-Shabaab's Crosshairs

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### A. *Al-Shabaab's Regional Strategy*

Al-Shabaab was formed around 2004 by a small circle of militants, some of whom had been members of previous Islamist movements including al-Ittihaad al-Islami. The group initially served as the enforcement wing of the Ifka Halan Court, which was part of the Islamic Courts Union. That Union, in turn, had imposed clan and Islamic law and restored relative order to Mogadishu and much of south central Somalia after defeating warlords that had held these areas since the central government's collapse in 1991.<sup>6</sup> It was toppled by Ethiopian forces, which intervened to back the weak Transitional Federal Government that took office with international approval in 2004 and lasted until 2012, when it was replaced by the Federal Government of Somalia. Al-Shabaab's armed struggle against Ethiopian "occupiers" between 2006 and 2009 garnered considerable support among Somalis, particularly in south central Somalia. When the Ethiopians withdrew, AMISOM took over the role of protecting the internationally backed government.

A combined force of Burundian and Ugandan troops under AMISOM and Somali fighters drove Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu in August 2011.<sup>7</sup> But while the movement lost formal control of the city, it retains a heavy footprint there. It carries out regular complex attacks, particularly on government targets, and its operatives continue to extract protection money from businesses. The central government, while internationally supported, remains weak, and relies on AMISOM to keep Al-Shabaab at bay.

If Al-Shabaab's potency in Somalia has waxed and waned, so, too, has its influence across East Africa. From about 2007 to 2012, the movement sought to establish a presence across the region, often tapping into – and, in some cases, subsuming – pre-existing militant networks. Its early goals focused on recruiting and funnelling East African fighters into Somalia and mobilising resources.

State authorities, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania, largely ignored the group's activities, perceiving it as an external, rather than local, threat and primarily a challenge for Western powers and Somalia.<sup>8</sup> The Muslim Youth Centre, a group based in Nairobi's Majengo district which served as a recruitment and fundraising magnet for Al-Shabaab, operated relatively openly.<sup>9</sup> Its young members distributed DVDs espousing militant jihad in mosques, and hundreds of them travelled to fight in Somalia. Meanwhile, Kenyan clerics affiliated with Al-Shabaab, notably Sheikh Shariff Abubakar "Makaburi", visited Tanzania regularly to seek recruits and cultivate ties with

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<sup>6</sup> Crisis Group Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War*, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> "Shabaab concede control of capital to Somalia government", *The New York Times*, 6 August, 2011.

<sup>8</sup> See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°85, *Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation*, 25 January 2012.

<sup>9</sup> See "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)", S/2011/433, 18 July 2011, pp. 140-179. The report describes the Muslim Youth Centre's ties with Al-Shabaab: "From its roots as an informal self-help group in the Majengo area of Nairobi, the Centre was officially established in December 2008, and swiftly evolved from a 'rights forum' claiming to articulate the social, economic and religious grievances of impoverished and disaffected young Muslims into one of the largest support networks for Al-Shabaab in Kenya". It notes that a few core fighters travelled to join Al-Shabaab as early as 2006 but that most went after 2008.

local militants.<sup>10</sup> Al-Shabaab largely refrained from staging attacks in Kenya and focused on recruitment, though by 2009 state authorities had grown sufficiently alarmed by its influence that they began to craft responses. These included providing military training to young Kenyans of Somali origin and to youths recruited from Somalia's Jubbaland, an area that borders Kenya, with a view to deploying them in Somalia to act as a buffer against further Al-Shabaab expansion into Kenya.<sup>11</sup>

Al-Shabaab's motives shifted after East African states deployed troops as part of AMISOM. Ugandan forces were the first to arrive in 2007. In October 2011, Kenya deployed forces, too; at first these troops operated outside AMISOM, but they joined the body in July of the following year. According to Nairobi, this intervention was a response to cross-border attacks directed at tourists in Kenya.<sup>12</sup> It aimed to curtail Al-Shabaab activity in the region of Somalia adjoining Kenya, to shield its north-eastern province along the two countries' border and, eventually, ease its refugee burden by creating conditions allowing Somalis to return home.<sup>13</sup>

Al-Shabaab responded to these deployments by staging large-scale attacks outside Somalia. The deadliest included the July 2010 Kampala bombing, the siege of the Westgate Mall, the June 2014 attack on a village in the Kenyan coastal area of Lamu, which killed 48 people, and the April 2015 gun and grenade assault on Garissa University College, which killed 148. Al-Shabaab also struck a nightclub in Djibouti in March 2014, killing two foreign nationals, and attempted (but failed to carry out) a suicide bombing in a football stadium in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. Some post-2013 attacks, including the Westgate strike, appear to have been orchestrated by units dedicated to hitting targets outside Somalia.<sup>14</sup> These units had been set up

<sup>10</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Kenya and Tanzanian security officials, January to April 2018. See also, Andre Le Sage, "The rising terrorist threat in Tanzania: domestic Islamist militancy and regional threats", Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, September 2014, p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> "Ex-PM Lowassa undergoes grilling for four hours", *IPP Media*, 28 June 2017.

<sup>11</sup> See Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, *The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia*, 15 February 2012.

<sup>12</sup> See Crisis Group Briefing N°102, *Kenya: Al Shabaab – Closer to Home*, 25 September 2014.

<sup>13</sup> See Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, *The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia*, op. cit. At the time, the Dadaab refugee complex was the biggest in the world, housing more than 400,000 refugees. About 100,000 Somali refugees have since returned home under a program jointly managed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Kenyan and Somali authorities. See "The world's largest refugee camp: what the future holds for Dadaab", *The Conversation*, 12 December 2017.

<sup>14</sup> Godane reportedly established two such units: one focused on attacks in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and the other on Ethiopia. See the Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 751 (1992), 13 October 2014, p. 21. The report notes: "Not since the prominence in the Horn of Africa of the former al-Qaeda in East Africa has the region been besieged by a more determined, prolific and effective al-Qaeda-affiliated group than Al-Shabaab. The sustained counter-terrorism pressure and successful overcoming of internal divisions have forced the Al-Shabaab core to become more operationally audacious by placing greater emphasis on exporting its violence beyond the borders of Somalia. Conversely, in the past year, Al-Shabaab's overt regional strategy has relied increasingly on its entrenched support base of Amniyat-like operatives [Amniyat is Al-Shabaab's intelligence wing]. By the end of 2013, its regional strategy had become apparent: a resurgent extremist group sufficiently assertive to fully align itself with and pursue strategies adapted to transnational al-Qaeda operations, evident in its ability to conduct 'complex and spectacular' large-scale attacks, such as that on the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, repre-

that year by Al-Shabaab's then-emir, Ahmed Abdi "Godane", in part because the group's efforts to use its principal Kenyan affiliate, Al-Hijra, to stage major attacks had proved unsuccessful.

These strikes, according to the group's own media output, aim to raise the costs at home of regional states' intervention in Somalia and pressure them to withdraw their troops. A statement issued in April 2015, following the attack on Garissa University College in Kenya, was typical:

Do not dream of security in your lands until security becomes a reality in the Muslim lands, including the North Eastern province and the coast and until all your forces withdraw from all Muslim lands. We will, by the permission of Allah, stop at nothing to avenge the deaths of our Muslim brothers until your government ceases its oppression and until all Muslim lands are liberated from Kenyan occupation. And until then, Kenyan cities will run red with blood. And as we said, this will be a long, gruesome war in which you, the Kenyan public, will be the first casualties.<sup>15</sup>

Attacks also appear designed to raise the group's profile. While they prompt greater determination from regional governments to contain Al-Shabaab, and in that sense narrow its manoeuvring room, they also serve to boost recruitment abroad and morale of fighters in Somalia. In one of his last audio recordings before he was killed in a U.S. drone strike, Emir Godane discussed the Westgate Mall attack in the context of what he called jihadist victories in Afghanistan, Sinai and Syria. He enjoined Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia to persevere as they, too, would prevail against "Christian invaders" from Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>16</sup> The numbers of East African fighters deploying to Somalia swelled from 2010 when it began staging attacks.<sup>17</sup>

The movement also uses attacks outside Somalia for fundraising. It portrays them as evidence of its commitment to advancing the cause of the *umma* (Muslim community) in a struggle against regional authorities it describes as *kuffar* (non-believers). It distributes videos of attacks online, narrated in Arabic and often con-

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senting an evolution of operational tradecraft". See also Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), "Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat", March 2016.

<sup>15</sup> "Garissa attack: burying Kenya's hopes", Al-Shabaab statement, 4 April 2015.

<sup>16</sup> "Amiirka Al Shabaab, Axmed Godane oo ka hadlay weerarradii ugu dambeeyay" [Al-Shabaab's Emir, Ahmed Godane speaks on the latest attacks], Radio al-Furqan, 14 May 2014. Crisis Group interview, Kenyan Muslim cleric, Nairobi, August 2018. The cleric, who has interviewed returnees from the battlefield in Somalia, said the youths told him that they circulated videos of attacks carried out outside Somalia, particularly along the Kenyan coast and in the Kenyan north east, to demonstrate the strength of the group to would-be recruits. (In 2010, Al-Shabaab began to issue recruitment videos in Kiswahili, a language widely spoken in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and to feature fighters from across East Africa, citing the variety of nationalities as signalling its reach outside Somalia. A November 2010 video titled "Message to the umma: and inspire the believers", featured six named foreign fighters, three from Kenya and one each from Ethiopia, Tanzania and Sudan. The video was subtitled in both English and Kiswahili. Al-Shabaab's media operation targets local Somali-speaking and, increasingly, Swahili-, English- and Arabic-speaking audiences. Its media arm, Al-Kataib, produces video content for English- and Arabic-speaking audiences. Crisis Group Briefing, *Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War*, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security officials and Western diplomats, January-April 2018.



cluding with requests for funding. Some of the videos feature testimony from people of several nationalities, intended as evidence of Al-Shabaab's wide appeal.<sup>18</sup>

### B. *Westgate and After*

The attack on the Westgate Mall was Al-Shabaab's highest-profile attack outside Somalia. Godane and his team appear to have deliberately chosen a target against which a strike would generate considerable publicity.<sup>19</sup> Opened in 2007 by an Israeli businessman, the Westgate Mall was a popular destination for well-heeled Kenyans, as well as diplomats and other expatriates residing in the upscale Westlands and Gigiri neighbourhoods nearby. The 21 September 2013 attack on the mall by four gunmen highlighted the poor coordination among Kenya's security forces.

The militants, led by a Norwegian citizen of Somali origin, struck on a Saturday morning when Westgate was packed with shoppers. Regular police responded first, after reports of gunshots, assuming that a bank robbery was underway. They pulled back upon realising the gravity of the assault. The elite General Service Unit (GSU) then dispatched a squad, which might have quickly ended the attack had the army not insisted on taking control of the operation. In the confusion, a soldier killed a GSU officer, and the unit best trained to handle the emergency withdrew. The operation dragged on for days, apparently after the attackers took hostages and barricaded themselves in a strongroom in one of the mall's banks, with Al-Shabaab communication units celebrating a propaganda triumph.<sup>20</sup>

After the Westgate assault, Kenyan security forces cracked down indiscriminately on Muslims and ethnic Somalis on the premise that many might be Al-Shabaab members. In April 2014, for instance, Operation Usalama Watch rounded up thousands of ethnic Somalis in Nairobi and elsewhere, deepening the anger among Somalis at the state.<sup>21</sup> Al-Shabaab took advantage by stepping up recruitment and staging more attacks. Militants tried to instigate sectarian strife, including by shooting up churches, while playing up the country's ethnic differences. In particular, the group tried to drive a deeper wedge between members of the Kikuyu and Luo communities, whose elites have competed for power since independence in 1963. In its propaganda following attacks, Al-Shabaab highlighted the government's own attempts to blame the rising violence on opposition leaders.<sup>22</sup> The Kenyan tourism sector absorbed a major

<sup>18</sup> In an undated video released by Al-Shabaab, "Final message of the Kampala attack warrior", one of the attackers claimed that none of the bombers was of "Somali lineage", saying they were from across the region and threatened further assaults on cities around East Africa. Uganda was the first country to contribute troops to the African Union-backed campaign against Al-Shabaab in 2007.

<sup>19</sup> See the Report of the Monitoring Group, *op. cit.* It concludes that the Westgate attack was "conceived in Somalia, planned from a United Nations refugee camp and executed from Eastleigh in Nairobi". U.S. intelligence agencies blamed Godane's inner circle for planning the operation. In March 2015, Adan Garar, a member of Al-Shabaab's intelligence wing said to have been the attack's mastermind, was killed in a U.S. drone strike. "Top Al-Shabaab figure killed in U.S. drone strike, Pentagon says", CNN, 18 March 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan and Western security officials, January-April 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Crisis Group Commentary, "Losing Hearts and Minds in Kenya: The Crackdown on Somalis Will Probably Backfire", 16 April 2014.

<sup>22</sup> See Crisis Group Briefing, *Kenya: Al Shabaab – Closer to Home*, *op. cit.* In an audio message released in June 2014, Sheikh Mohammed Dulyadeyn, a senior Al-Shabaab commander said:

blow, with an 11 per cent drop in tourist arrivals in 2013 compared to 2012.<sup>23</sup> Attacks on restaurants, churches, buses and security installations continued through most of 2013 and 2014.

When the Kenyan police and local authorities improved their tactics from 2015 onward, notably through enhanced community engagement and improved intelligence gathering, Al-Shabaab adapted in several ways. First, it began recruiting fighters – both to travel to Somalia and to carry out attacks within Kenya – in areas outside previous hubs in Mombasa, Nairobi and northern Kenya, in particular in the country’s west. Secondly, and particularly in western and central Kenya, it sought to convert Christian youths, departing from its past focus on preying on anti-state sentiment among Muslims.<sup>24</sup> Lastly, militants evaded crackdowns along the Kenyan coast by slipping into Tanzania, where ethnic and cultural ties enable them to assimilate.<sup>25</sup> Despite the relative quiet in recent years – no attack has occurred in Nairobi or Mombasa since 2014 and most recent Al-Shabaab activity is concentrated near the Somalia border – Kenya remains more vulnerable to Al-Shabaab assaults than its neighbours, largely because it shares a long border with Somalia, unlike Tanzania and Uganda.<sup>26</sup> In the five years after Westgate, Al-Shabaab has killed dozens of police officers and soldiers deployed to patrol the Kenya-Somalia border.<sup>27</sup> Most have been killed in attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices in the counties of Lamu and Mandera. Efforts by authorities to stop these assaults on security officers have been less successful than those aimed at thwarting attacks in urban areas.

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“Thank God Kenyan society is divided and facing ethnic clashes between the Kikuyu and the Luo .... The opposition and the government are divided and [it] seems [they will] not come together soon .... Kenya might also be divided along Christian and Muslim lines”. Kenyan politics is heavily identity-based, with elites from the biggest five of the country’s 42 ethnic groups jockeying for political power and with the winner-take-all competition for the presidency often yielding violence along ethnic lines.

<sup>23</sup> Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, “Economic Survey 2014”, April 2014.

<sup>24</sup> These recruits, who are encouraged not to change their names, are especially valued because they can slip through intelligence dragnets more easily than those with obviously Muslim names. Crisis Group interview, Western security analyst, Nairobi, March 2018. See Anneli Botha, “Radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council”, Institute for Security Studies Paper no. 265 (September 2014), p. 10. The research indicates that some of the converts from Christianity fall easily under Al-Shabaab’s sway because of their limited knowledge of Islam.

<sup>25</sup> Crisis Group interview, security official, Kwale, Kenya, January 2018.

<sup>26</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security officials and Western diplomats, January-April 2018.

<sup>27</sup> See, “Al-Shabaab kills five Kenyan policemen who were out on patrol”, Reuters, 3 January 2018. Kenya police say Al-Shabaab attacks along the border killed 63, mainly police officers, between January 2017 and April 2018.

### III. Exploiting Grievances on the Kenyan Coast

The Kenyan coast has long been one of Al-Shabaab's prime recruitment zones. The group has carried out several attacks in the region, particularly in areas close to the border with Somalia. Between 2012 and 2014, security crackdowns and increased surveillance led militants and recruiters to relocate, particularly to Tanzania.<sup>28</sup> They did not, however, curtail Al-Shabaab's activities and in many cases inflamed local sentiment.<sup>29</sup> That changed from 2015 onward, as greater consultation with coastal Muslims, their involvement in security measures and a more prominent role for local elected leaders and civil society helped drive down militant recruitment.<sup>30</sup>

At the time of independence in 1963, both Christian and Muslim coastal elites, like those in the north east, supported a federal system granting substantial powers of self-governance to regions and only loose integration with the central government in the capital Nairobi.<sup>31</sup> Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, ignored this demand for autonomy and subsequently repealed a law granting greater power to localities. The repeal provoked a crisis of state legitimacy along the coast, which was aggravated over the years by economic grievances – triggered in particular by the fact that elites from elsewhere in Kenya appropriated land from coastal communities – and lingers in the form of strong anti-establishment sentiment.<sup>32</sup> Separatists have staged violent uprisings, notably during the 1997 general election and also in 2012 and 2014.<sup>33</sup> Although Al-Shabaab has tapped into separatist recruitment networks, no direct operational or ideological link exists between Al-Shabaab and outfits like the principal separatist movement, the Mombasa Republican Council, despite Kenyan officials' efforts to conflate them.<sup>34</sup>

Starting in late 2011, Al-Shabaab recruited heavily on the coast, selling a core message that “holy war” could help establish Islamic rule in “lost Muslim lands” and, as a corollary, restore inhabitants' social, political and economic rights.<sup>35</sup> The group sought partnerships with – and often then supplanted – pre-existing jihadist groups,

<sup>28</sup> Crisis Group interview, academic specialising in Islamist militancy, Mombasa, January 2018. See also Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°121, *Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed*, 13 July 2016.

<sup>29</sup> Crisis Group interview, Muslim cleric based in Likoni (an area where Al-Shabaab recruitment was notably high), Mombasa, January 2018.

<sup>30</sup> Crisis Group interviews, civil society campaigner, community leaders and Muslim clerics, Mombasa, January 2018.

<sup>31</sup> Before British colonial rule, coastal cities and their immediate hinterland were loosely administered by the Arab Omani sultan of Zanzibar. The British colonial protectorate leased this “ten-mile strip” in 1895 and eventually merged it with Kenya. This bureaucratic history has provided the basis for periodic claims to a special status and greater regional autonomy. Because the Omani sultan was Muslim, it also underpins the sentiment that the coast is historical Muslim land. The agitation for regional autonomy cut across Christian and Muslim lines, however, as well as Arabic- and Swahili-speaking lines. The early nationalist Ronald Ngala, a Christian, led the movement. See Crisis Group Briefing, *Kenya's Coast: Devolution Disappointed*, op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> See Karuti Kanyinga, “Struggles of access to land: The ‘squatter question’ in coastal Kenya”, Danish Institute for International Studies, Working Paper 98, 7 June 1998.

<sup>33</sup> “Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya”, Nairobi, 1999.

<sup>34</sup> Botha, “Radicalisation in Kenya”, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>35</sup> Crisis Group interview, Muslim cleric, Mombasa, January 2018.

including those that helped al-Qaeda launch a 2002 attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Malindi, a resort town 100km south of Mombasa that is popular with tourists.<sup>36</sup> Al-Shabaab recruitment in the former Coast province was heaviest in littoral Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi and Lamu counties, and lighter in the large inland Tana River county. In Kwale county, for example, security forces estimate that up to 150 youths went to Somalia between 2012 and 2015, one of the highest numbers from any part of Kenya.<sup>37</sup>

The motives of those travelling to Somalia varied. Jihadists appear to have preyed upon pervasive anti-establishment sentiment and economic woes, including some of the country's worst poverty rates.<sup>38</sup> They sold a vision in which new members would receive training in Somalia and return to install "pure Islam" in place of what they called an illegitimate Kenyan state.<sup>39</sup> One recruit told Crisis Group that some who travelled were tricked with offers of work or promised generous pay, which never materialised.<sup>40</sup> Many families have not heard from sons and nephews who left for Somalia. There is tension between families who have lost children and those whose kin led recruitment efforts.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> For more on jihadism in the region, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°95, *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, 11 July 2005. One of the most important recruiting sergeants for Al-Shabaab was Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a Kenyan cleric known for fiery sermons calling for the toppling of secular authorities in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. From 2000 onward, Rogo hosted one of al-Qaeda's main Africa operatives, Fazul Abdulla Mohamed (blamed by U.S. and Kenyan authorities for playing a key role in the 1998 embassy attacks and the 2002 Paradise Hotel bombing), at his ancestral home on the remote island of Siyu on the Kenyan coast, near the border with Somalia. Rogo, who was killed in a roadside shooting in August 2012, eventually became one of Al-Shabaab's most prominent ideologues and his CDs remain important recruitment tools deployed by Al-Shabaab across Kiswahili-speaking communities in Kenya, Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Crisis Group interviews, coastal Muslim clerics and Kenyan security officials, January-April 2018.

<sup>37</sup> Crisis Group interview, provincial administration official, Kwale, January 2018.

<sup>38</sup> Crisis Group interview, local academic, Mombasa, January 2018.

<sup>39</sup> Crisis Group interview, former Al-Shabaab fighter in Somalia, Kwale, January 2018.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. He said a cousin gulled him with a promise of construction work in Somalia that would pay \$500 per month. "Things were not what we expected" when he and his peers arrived in southern Somalia. They ended up in a remote encampment with about 150 other youths from various parts of Kenya and a large number of Somalis. The men in charge told them they would ensure that Islamic law was imposed on all "Muslim land", including in Somalia and parts of Kenya. Training was hard and the Kenyans grew disillusioned, feeling they were being deployed as cannon fodder in battles and suffering discrimination at the hands of ethnic Somalis. The Somalis accused Kenyans of having joined Al-Shabaab to make money rather than to fight for Islam. Another grievance was "colourism" within segments of Somali society, whereby lighter-skinned people mistreat and look down upon those with darker complexions. After a few months, he and two other Kenyans escaped on foot, travelling mainly by night and jumping onto trucks bearing goods to Kenya.

<sup>41</sup> In 2015, residents staged a large demonstration to stop the burial of a suspected Al-Shabaab recruiter, Ali Mwangaya, who was killed by the police at what they described as a recruitment camp. Mwangaya was the main suspect in a series of killings of Al-Shabaab returnees, some of whom had benefited from a program to help ex-militants, including with loans to buy motorbike taxis. Mwangaya's grandfather, Omar Munge, told Crisis Group that he dropped out of high school in his second year and joined a group of Somali preachers who had shown up on what they called a proselytising mission. He eventually travelled to a mosque in Kikambala in Malindi associated with the cleric Aboud Rogo. Kenyan authorities have arrested several leaders from that mosque on charges of preaching

Kenyan authorities on the coast, as in other parts of the country, have taken contradictory approaches to tackling militancy. At first, the government largely turned a blind eye as Al-Shabaab began to establish relations with local militants. But after a spate of attacks in 2012, it launched a heavy-handed crackdown reportedly including the assassination of religious leaders.<sup>42</sup> Police closed four mosques accused of being associated with jihadist recruitment, though they were subsequently reopened under new leadership.<sup>43</sup> That approach, while successful in the short term, deepened Muslim grievances against the state. But the state changed its approach again as of mid-2015, after the Garissa attack triggered a national outcry and the replacement of most of the security forces' leadership. Since then, local police and officials from the National Counter-Terrorism Centre have better engaged local leaders, consulting with and involving them in efforts to tackle militancy, even if some abuses reportedly continue.<sup>44</sup>

Local civic leaders cite the September 2015 appointment of a senior diplomat, Martin Kimani, to head the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, as marking a shift from heavy-handed policing to more collaborative approaches involving community outreach.<sup>45</sup> One human rights campaigner said:

Initially, the police saw us virtually as their enemies. But from 2015, they began to engage us and we in turn could reach out to community members who are suspicious of members of the security establishment. This changed dynamic resulted in much better relations between the authorities and the community.<sup>46</sup>

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jihad. Mwangi became a key recruitment link in Kwale. "He was a polite young man but he changed after going to Somalia", Munge said. "He was accused of killing several motorbike operators and that's why other motorbike riders tried to stop his funeral and burn the casket. We eventually prevailed on them to drop the protest but we still haven't heard from his brother and sister who went with him to Somalia". Crisis Group interview, Kwale, January 2018.

<sup>42</sup> "Kenya: Killings, disappearances by anti-terror police: donors should suspend support for abusive units", Human Rights Watch, 18 August 2014. Kenyan authorities did not respond to the Human Rights Watch report but have repeatedly denied any role in the killing of Sheikh Rogo. Benedict Kigen, the police chief in the town where Rogo was killed, told a task force formed to probe the murder that the ammunition used in the hit was different from the type issued to Kenyan police. The probe team, which an assistant commissioner of police headed, reported in August 2013 that it was unable to identify the killers. It called for a public inquest but that, too, returned an inconclusive verdict. See "Police deny role in Rogo killing", *Daily Nation*, 4 September 2012; "Aboud Rogo probe fails to find Rogo's murderers", *The Star*, 22 October 2015.

<sup>43</sup> "Four shut Mombasa mosques to reopen Thursday", *Capital FM*, 26 November 2014.

<sup>44</sup> "Haki Africa demands probe into killings of al Shabaab returnees", *The Star*, 28 February 2018. While the number of extrajudicial killings has tailed off, human rights campaigners say the police have not halted the practice entirely. In one case, an eighteen-year-old headed to a mosque to pray was abducted by individuals whom human rights groups say were police officers. The youth was not seen again, despite a court order that the police produce him in court, and human rights group fear he is dead. "Mombasa judge orders the police to produce 'abducted' teenager", *Daily Nation*, 26 June 2018. The police deny any involvement in the matter. A Kenyan security official told Crisis Group that police were under instructions to follow the law but, tellingly, he claimed that they sometimes responded in extralegal ways to Al-Shabaab operatives, "extending the war in Somalia into Kenya while expecting to be covered by the Kenyan constitution".

<sup>45</sup> Crisis Group interviews, civil society campaigners, Mombasa, Kwale and Garissa, January-April 2018.

<sup>46</sup> Crisis Group interview, prominent human rights campaigner, Mombasa, January 2018.

Local Muslim clerics, academics and elected leaders say the more nuanced approach has resulted in enhanced trust and cooperation between the public and state authorities.<sup>47</sup>

Tellingly, Al-Shabaab recruitment has slowed since 2015. According to security officials, militants have gone underground or moved to neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania.<sup>48</sup> Security has also improved; reduced tensions led foreign embassies to lift travel advisories for parts of the coast, including Mombasa, in June 2015.<sup>49</sup>

A number of factors appear to have contributed. First was the more sophisticated security policy, including improved intelligence gathering and a reduction in extra-judicial killings.<sup>50</sup> Second was the engagement of local elected officials, alarmed by the sharp decline in tourist revenue, with disaffected youth. This engagement included extensive outreach to youth susceptible to militant recruitment as well as to militants in hotspots such as Likoni and Majengo in Mombasa. It was undertaken by people such as Mombasa county Governor Hassan Joho, who alongside other local officials led an effort to persuade youths to resist militancy.<sup>51</sup> In general, locally elected officials enjoy greater credibility with youths at the grassroots than the security officers posted from Nairobi. Families of children who had travelled to Somalia were also roped in to persuade their sons to return. Third, prominent clerics stepped in to dissuade youths from succumbing to Al-Shabaab's ideology.<sup>52</sup>

A fourth factor relates to the devolution of power. The new system was introduced in a constitution endorsed by referendum in 2010 and implemented after the 2013 local and presidential election, the first vote since the charter became law. The reform has helped redress local grievances about social and economic exclusion that militants exploited to recruit youths. The devolution system grants more power and a defined portion of national resources to counties run by directly elected governors. Local authorities, controlling millions of dollars in annual budgets, have proved better able to tackle issues such as unemployment and service delivery. Devolution likewise has reduced Muslim complaints about being governed from a remote, Christian-dominated centre. To be sure, that sentiment, felt by large numbers of coastal dwellers, only partly explains jihadist recruitment, which entices only a tiny portion of those people. But it appears to have played a part in motivating some young men to join Al-Shabaab and certainly features in the group's outreach.

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<sup>47</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics, county government officials and academics, Mombasa, January 2018.

<sup>48</sup> Crisis Group interview, Kenyan security official, Mombasa, January 2018.

<sup>49</sup> Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Nairobi, March 2018. See, for example, Mombasa Governor Ali Hassan Joho's speech to a May 2016 meeting on counter-terrorism strategies in Antalya, Turkey, at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeDZ7slQY1c>. He said he could not venture into some mosques in the city that had been taken over by militant youths (particularly in the Majengo area at the height of recruitment and attacks between 2013 and 2014) and then described successful efforts to engage these young men.

<sup>50</sup> Crisis Group interviews, community leaders, Mombasa, January 2018.

<sup>51</sup> Crisis Group interviews, security, religious and political figures, Mombasa, January 2018. See "Hassan Joho pill to counter radical Islam, crime and ailing economy", *Daily Nation*, 9 May 2015.

<sup>52</sup> Crisis Group interviews, community and religious leaders, Mombasa, January 2018.

These relatively successful efforts illustrate – at least along the coast – that targeting, without stigmatising, young people, providing them with alternative employment and involving local leaders in such efforts, while at the same time addressing the broader grievances that militants tap can disrupt Al-Shabaab’s recruitment and diminish their appeal. In this light, further harnessing devolution’s potential to address inequality could help, too.<sup>53</sup> Nairobi should boost development budgets available to neglected counties and offer local officials a greater role in security management. National and county authorities should also fight the graft that limits the effectiveness of decentralisation, including by prosecuting local officials suspected of embezzling funds.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Crisis Group interview, Hassan Mwakimako, associate professor of Islamic studies, Pwani University, Mombasa, January 2018. Mwakimako said devolution had shifted the “focus of blame” from a remote centre to local elites that now wield substantive power and manage resources. He said “criticism of local authorities was not as harsh as it used to be of the national government”. Citizens feel a greater sense of ownership over local government and appreciate efforts to redress longstanding local grievances, including discrimination in employment.

<sup>54</sup> See Crisis Group Briefing, *Kenya’s Coast: Devolution Disappointed*, op. cit.

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#### IV. Northern Kenya's Evolving Security Landscape

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Kenya's vast former North Eastern province (now divided into three administrative units known as counties) has been another key theatre of operations for Al-Shabaab, with militants staging attacks and stepping up recruitment since Kenya deployed troops into Somalia in October 2011. The region, which is settled by Kenyans of Somali ethnicity, nearly all Muslim, shares characteristics with other jihadist recruitment hotspots: a history of brutality perpetrated by unaccountable security forces, along with official neglect and exclusion that nurtured anti-establishment sentiment and calls for secession. Preachers in some Wahhabi mosques and madrasas who promise a better life under "pure Islam" reportedly have been recruiting agents for Al-Shabaab.<sup>55</sup> Recruits tend to be men between the ages of sixteen and 35.<sup>56</sup>

According to Kenyan security officials, between 2011 and 2015 Al-Shabaab relied on local cells – still calling themselves Al-Shabaab (rather than al-Hijra, which had a light footprint in northern Kenya) but seemingly functioning largely autonomously – in the region. These cells conducted mainly small-scale attacks against soft targets such as restaurants and churches.<sup>57</sup>

According to several officials, Al-Shabaab's recruitment and popular support in the north east have subsided since 2015, much as they have along the coast.<sup>58</sup> The drop-off is due partly to greater local anger at the group itself, particularly its disruption of the local economy, destruction of communication infrastructure and targeting of non-local teachers and health workers. But improved security arrangements have helped, too. An important ingredient has been the deployment of local, Muslim, ethnic Somali security officials to lead operations in the region. Several interlocutors said this change has built trust in the security services, improving intelligence gathering.<sup>59</sup> Residents see locally rooted officers as more responsive to their concerns.<sup>60</sup>

One example is Mohamud Saleh, a former Kenyan ambassador to Saudi Arabia and long-serving public administrator from the north east, who was appointed regional commissioner in charge of all security forces deployed in the north east in 2015. During Saleh's three-year stint as regional commissioner (which ended in July 2018), the number of attacks in the north east, particularly in the regional hub of Garissa and also in Wajir and Mandera town, fell markedly, partly due to improved trust in the

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<sup>55</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security officials and civil society campaigners, Garissa and Mandera, January-March 2018. See Crisis Group Briefing, *Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation*, op. cit.

<sup>56</sup> Crisis Group interview, Muslim religious leader, Mandera, January 2018.

<sup>57</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan security official, Garissa, March 2018; senior security official, Wajir, July 2018.

<sup>58</sup> Crisis Group interviews, senior county official, Garissa, February 2018; security official, Garissa, February 2018; civil society campaigner, Mandera, January 2018.

<sup>59</sup> Crisis Group interviews, civil society activist, Garissa, February 2018; provincial administrator, Garissa, February 2018.

<sup>60</sup> Crisis Group interviews, civil society activists, Mandera, January 2018; community leaders, Garissa, February-March 2018.



security leadership.<sup>61</sup> One community leader in Garissa said, “what you tell Saleh is between you, him and God”.<sup>62</sup> One activist said improved information-sharing with authorities also flowed from the fact that top officials in the security forces no longer stereotyped locals as Al-Shabaab sympathisers. “In the past, people would fear telling security officials anything for fear of being accused of collusion with Al-Shabaab”, he said.<sup>63</sup>

The north east’s new security leadership also recruited hundreds of locals into the Kenya Police Reserve. This unit, established to assist the regular police, has deployed to guard towns, villages, borders and vital installations such as telecommunication masts, a favourite target of Al-Shabaab militants.<sup>64</sup> Observers credit it with improving security, particularly in Mandera, though reservists complain of low pay, inadequate equipment and poor training.<sup>65</sup>

But Al-Shabaab is by no means a spent force in the north east. Sporadic assaults on police stations and on “non-local” (mainly Christian) public servants, including teachers, continue. Since 2015, the movement has reportedly directed attacks from Somalia and dispatched its own men, a mix of Somali and Kenyan commanders, including several from north-eastern Kenya, to carry out operations.<sup>66</sup> These men are concentrated close to the border, particularly in Mandera county, and in the vast open-canopy Boni forest that straddles Garissa and Lamu county on the coast.<sup>67</sup> Government and public service vehicles generally avoid these areas. Civilians in Mandera also often take roundabout routes to bypass trouble spots. Some local administrators (known as chiefs) from southern Garissa and eastern Mandera have fled for fear of attacks. Al-Shabaab also targets communications infrastructure, forcing the security forces to switch from cellular to more expensive satellite phones.

The movement also has reportedly turned to “illiterate cattle herders” as a source of recruits, instead of the young men fresh out of high school or Islamic schools (madrasas) who traditionally composed its primary recruitment pool.<sup>68</sup> According to local sources, minority clans that perceive themselves to be losers of devolution also may be susceptible.<sup>69</sup>

Overall, devolution appears to have helped undercut support for Al-Shabaab in the north east as it has along the coast. According to one activist, for example, spreading power and resources to the local level has reduced the local grievances

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<sup>61</sup> Crisis Group interviews, community leaders, civil society campaigners and county administrators, Garissa, January-May 2018. No major Al-Shabaab attack has occurred in Garissa since the assault on Garissa University College in April 2015.

<sup>62</sup> Crisis Group interview, community leader, Garissa, March 2018. After a three-year stint in Garissa, Mohamud Saleh was transferred to Nairobi in July 2018 and replaced by another Kenyan Somali, Mohammed Birik. “County commissioners moved in reshuffle”, *Daily Nation*, 3 July 2018.

<sup>63</sup> Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Garissa, March 2018.

<sup>64</sup> Crisis Group interview, senior security official, Wajir, July 2018.

<sup>65</sup> Crisis Group Briefing, *Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security*, op. cit. Crisis Group interview, security analyst, Mandera, January 2018.

<sup>66</sup> Crisis Group interview, Kenyan security official, Garissa, February 2018.

<sup>67</sup> Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Nairobi, March 2018.

<sup>68</sup> Crisis Group interview, community elder, Garissa, February 2018.

<sup>69</sup> Crisis Group interview, local journalist covering security issues, Mandera, January 2018; civil society activist who works on counter-radicalisation initiatives, Garissa, March 2018.

over economic and political exclusion that Al-Shabaab taps in its propaganda.<sup>70</sup> But devolution also has accentuated competition among clans for local government posts, and there is some evidence that, as in Somalia, the movement has sought to exploit resulting clan disputes.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> According to that activist, “devolution has greatly helped because it has reduced resentment at the national government. Now, people hold the county governments directly responsible for improving the local economy”. Crisis Group interview, civil society activist, Garissa, March 2018.

<sup>71</sup> Crisis Group Briefing, *Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security*, op. cit.

## V. Tanzania: An Emerging Theatre

Unlike in Kenya and Uganda, where militant attacks attract sustained attention, violence perpetrated in Tanzania by Al-Shabaab and local militants, some of whom appear to have ties to the Somali movement, has passed largely under the radar. Coverage has been scant in part because, by regional standards, Tanzania is less open to Western media than its neighbours; in part because attacks in Tanzania since 2013 have hit mainly local not Western targets; and in part because local media restrictions mean that editors self-censor to avoid state retribution. The authorities' reluctance to admit that Tanzania has an Islamist militant violence problem – and their initial insistence that attacks on its territory are attributable to “bandits” – is an additional factor explaining the limited attention paid to the issue.<sup>72</sup>

Christians and Muslims have long co-existed peacefully in Tanzania.<sup>73</sup> Political mobilisation along religious lines was strongly discouraged under the socialist rule of the country's founding President Julius Nyerere between 1961 and 1985.<sup>74</sup> Starting in the early 1990s, with the advent of multi-party rule, the state eased restrictions against politically inclined religious associations. By the late 1990s, a number of Muslim clerics had begun to voice grievances over what they described as their co-religionists' political and economic exclusion.<sup>75</sup>

Two groups were most prominent in campaigning against what they described as marginalisation of Muslims by the state.<sup>76</sup> These were Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislamu (Community of Muslim Organisations), led by Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, and the Uamsho (Awakening) movement, which campaigned for full independence for the Muslim-majority archipelago of Zanzibar and the imposition of Islamic law there.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Dar es Salaam, January 2018. The diplomat said the authorities' hesitancy about the phenomenon of Islamist violence, particularly in the Pwani region, made it harder to counter militancy because civil society and community leaders did not want to undercut the official line that “bandits” were behind all attacks. Tanzanian authorities have gradually changed tack but still do not candidly admit the scale of the problem. The diplomat speculated that this stance could in part be an effort to protect the country's vital tourism industry from the negative publicity that Islamist militant violence generates.

<sup>73</sup> No reliable statistics are available for the proportions of Christians and Muslims in Tanzania. The authorities dropped the question of religious affiliation from the census in 1967, due to its political sensitivity. A 2015 Pew Research Center survey found that 61 per cent of the population are Christian, 35 per cent are Muslim, 2 per cent practice traditional religions and 1 per cent are unaffiliated. See “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050”, Pew Research Center, 2 April 2015, p. 243.

<sup>74</sup> See Martin B. Tetti, “What Went Wrong in Tanzania: How Religious Tension is Threatening National Unity and Cohesion”, *International Journal of Education and Research*, vol. 2, no. 6 (June 2014).

<sup>75</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics and academics, Dar es Salaam, January-April 2018.

<sup>76</sup> The primary Muslim grievances relate to what they describe as domination of the state by Christian officials, the priority given in the school system to Western-style education over Islamic education, which is primarily dispensed through private initiatives, and the fact that Muslim-majority areas are generally economically disadvantaged relative to Christian-dominated ones, a problem they blame on state policy. Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics, Dar es Salaam, February 2018. See Abdisaid Musse Ali-Koor, “Islamist Extremism in East Africa”, Africa Security Brief No. 32, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 2016.

<sup>77</sup> See Le Sage, *op. cit.*

The authorities reacted harshly. Seven Uamsho clerics were detained in October 2012. They were charged in 2013 with terrorism and incitement of violence but have been held without bail ever since. No further hearing has been scheduled on their case.<sup>78</sup> An opposition leader who called for their release or presentation in court in June 2017 was himself questioned by the police after current President John Magufuli criticised his stance.<sup>79</sup> Sheikh Ponda was also arrested in October 2012 and charged with incitement.<sup>80</sup>

In parallel to this political agitation, in 2011 Islamist militants began to target ruling-party officials, local bureaucrats and police.<sup>81</sup> Most violence was perpetrated by domestic militants, including a network led by the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (commonly known as Ansar Sunni), an organisation that has cultivated ties with Al-Shabaab.<sup>82</sup> Authorities have conflated these militants' actions with the more politically inclined Muslim organisations and used the killings as a pretext for wider crackdowns on groups that express political grievances but do not champion violence.<sup>83</sup> No evidence has been published or presented in court linking movements like Jumuiya and Uamsho to the militants that perpetrate attacks.

Transnational militants have long tried to build relationships with their Tanzanian counterparts. Investigations into the 1998 attack on the U.S. embassy in the Tanzanian capital Dar es Salaam revealed that al-Qaeda relied on locals for logistical support.<sup>84</sup> More recently, Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of the situation in Tanzania to forge links with domestic militants.<sup>85</sup> Leaders of Al-Shabaab's Kenyan affiliate, Al-Hijra, most prominently Sheikh Aboud Rogo and Sheikh Abubakar Shariff "Makaburi" (both of whom were killed in roadside shootings in Kenya, Rogo in August 2012 and Makaburi in April 2014, played especially important roles in building links between

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<sup>78</sup> See the U.S. State Department's annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 15 August 2017.

<sup>79</sup> "Ex-PM Lowassa undergoes grilling for four hours", IPP Media, 28 June 2017.

<sup>80</sup> See "Tanzanian Muslim cleric Ponda Issa Ponda arrested", BBC, 17 October 2012.

<sup>81</sup> See Le Sage, *op. cit.*

<sup>82</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Tanzanian security officials, Dar es Salaam, February 2018. See "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2012)", 27 June 2012. The report noted that the Muslim Youth Centre engages in recruitment and fundraising on behalf of Al-Shabaab and facilitates movement of fighters to Somalia and back to Tanzania through Kenya.

<sup>83</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomat, Tanzanian security analyst, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>84</sup> Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York, 2007), p. 272. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation named two Tanzanians, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, as participants in the attack.

<sup>85</sup> The UN Monitoring Group report (2012), *op. cit.*, notes the especially prominent role that the fiery preaching of Sheikh Rogo played in luring recruits in Tanzania. Rogo, who was one of Al-Shabaab's most effective recruiting sergeants, propagated the message of overthrowing secular states and imposing Islamic rule in their stead. His preaching remains a key part of Al-Shabaab propaganda and his CDs have been distributed far outside Kenya, including in Tanzania and northern Mozambique. Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan and Tanzanian security officials, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, January-April 2018.

Tanzanian and foreign militants, including Al-Shabaab.<sup>86</sup> For the Somali militant group, ties with groups in Tanzania – a country that does not contribute troops to AMISOM – offered, first, safe havens in which fighters could escape security crackdowns in Kenya and, second, a new pool of disaffected youth from which it could draw recruits.<sup>87</sup> Recruitment has been most concentrated in the Pwani region, where anti-state sentiment runs high.<sup>88</sup>

According to security officials, Tanzanians made up the second largest cohort of foreigners – after Kenyans – who joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia between 2009 and 2012; several Tanzanians face trial in Kenya for trying to cross into its northern neighbour.<sup>89</sup> Officials in Dar es Salaam blame Tanzanian returnees from Somalia for running training camps at home; police raids of some of these camps in recent years have involved bloody battles with militants.<sup>90</sup> Following the suspected extrajudicial killings of Sheikh Shariff and several other clerics – for which the Kenyan police deny responsibility – some of their supporters along the Kenyan coast also reportedly moved south to Tanzania. There they linked up with militants, reportedly including some close to Al Shabaab, who by then were present in the country, particularly in the heavily forested areas of the Rufiji district of Pwani region, which at the time were lightly patrolled.<sup>91</sup> Tanzanian authorities say hundreds of children and youth have disappeared from their family homes in Pwani region, particularly in Kibiti, Mkuranga, Rufiji and Ikwiriri, and may have joined these networks.<sup>92</sup>

Militant attacks on churches, entertainment venues, Muslim clerics and priests began slowly in 2013. At first, Tanzanian authorities denied that jihadists were responsible. Local media largely toed the government line, ascribing the strikes to “bandits”.<sup>93</sup> Strikes ranged in scale and were spread out over a wide geographic arc. In 2013, militants threw acid at two young British tourists and a Catholic clergyman, and killed another elderly priest, all in Zanzibar.<sup>94</sup> The next year, assailants hurled crude home-made bombs into three churches in Arusha in north-eastern Tanzania, killing at least three. Over the course of 2014-2015, militants stormed five police stations, stealing dozens of guns and, in one July 2015 attack, killing four officers. The increasing frequency of attacks, and particularly the spate of killings of police officers, prompted the state to shift tack and recognise the threat.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Rights groups blamed the police for the killings of Rogo, Shariff and several other Muslim clerics. The police denied involvement. “Kenya: Killings, disappearances by anti-terror police”, Human Rights Watch, op. cit. On these clerics’ role in forging cross-border ties, see Le Sage, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>87</sup> Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>88</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Tanzanian security officials, religious and community leaders, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>89</sup> Crisis Group interviews, senior Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018; Kenyan security official, Nairobi, March 2018.

<sup>90</sup> Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian MP, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>91</sup> Crisis Group interview, regional security analyst, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>92</sup> Jonathan Shana, then the Pwani regional commander of police, told a Kiswahili-language newspaper that some of the children had been found but that others had been taken outside the country to get military training under the cover of receiving religious education. “Watoto 1,300 waliopotea Kibiti waanza kurejea” [Some of the missing 1,300 children in Kibiti return], *Habari Leo*, 14 December 2017.

<sup>93</sup> “Bandits kill two in brazen attack on police station”, *Tanzania Daily News*, 7 September 2014.

<sup>94</sup> See Le Sage, op. cit.

<sup>95</sup> Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

How many of these strikes are directly perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, rather than by local militants with varying degrees of connection to it, is hard to assess. Indeed, links between local militant groups and Al-Shabaab are often tenuous, based on personal ties, particularly among individuals who fought or received training in Somalia and returned home, or links to other groups, like al-Hijra, that are closer to the Somali movement. It appears unlikely that Al-Shabaab's leadership in Somalia exercises any significant degree of control over local militant dynamics in Pwani. That said, the U.S. State Department's annual reports on counter-terrorism tend to pin at least larger attacks on Al-Shabaab, an assessment with which Tanzanian officials concur.<sup>96</sup>

Since 2015, the pace of assaults has accelerated further. The coast, particularly in the Tanga, Mtwara and Pwani regions, has been hit hardest. Militants have staged attacks in the bigger towns, including Mwanza, Arusha and Dar es Salaam, and have reportedly planted sleeper cells in Kigoma, Kondo, Tanga and Morogoro.<sup>97</sup> Kibiti town, in Rufiji, has emerged as a focal point for a low-intensity conflict between militants and the security forces. Since 2016, militants have abducted and beheaded local leaders of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party in a campaign security officials say is designed to sow fear and disrupt intelligence gathering.<sup>98</sup> By May 2017, the jihadists had killed at least 30 party members.<sup>99</sup> Militants also killed a number of Muslim clerics, including four hacked to death with machetes and axes in Mwanza in May 2016.<sup>100</sup> Police reported that the attackers said they were unhappy about crackdowns on Muslims in the region and murdered clerics they perceived as co-opted by the state.<sup>101</sup>

An April 2017 ambush that killed eight police officers just outside Kibiti particularly shocked Tanzanians. The security services responded harshly, including with what locals report has been a string of extrajudicial executions.<sup>102</sup> That June, during a visit to coastal towns, President Magufuli vowed that the militants would "see fire".<sup>103</sup> He launched a "special operation" spearheaded by the military and the main intelligence agency.<sup>104</sup> Local leaders accused the security forces of strong-arm tac-

<sup>96</sup> The U.S. State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism have noted increased Al-Shabaab recruitment in Tanzania and labelled the attacks on police stations and mosques and churches as terrorism. See, for example, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272229.htm#TANZANIA>. Tanzania's foreign minister, Augustine Mahiga, also discussed the threat of Al-Shabaab recruitment at a regional security meeting. "Dar aware and ready for any terrorist threat – Mahiga", *Tanzania Daily News*, 21 July 2016.

<sup>97</sup> Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>98</sup> Militants considered the ruling-party cadres to be spies. Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, 2018. He speculated that an additional militant motive may have been to provoke authorities into targeting Muslims en masse so as to recruit more youths. He said Al-Shabaab had done the same in Kenya.

<sup>99</sup> "Another CCM cadre killed in Kibiti", *The Citizen*, 14 May 2017.

<sup>100</sup> U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, op. cit.

<sup>101</sup> "Tanzania mosque attack kills three", BBC, 20 May 2016.

<sup>102</sup> Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and Muslim clerics, Dar es Salaam, February 2018. The diplomat estimated that dozens of suspects had been killed and hundreds others were in detention without trial, particularly along the coastal region.

<sup>103</sup> Speech by Tanzanian President John Magufuli, video, YouTube, 20 June 2017, [https://youtu.be/1vPntMvEPXo\\_](https://youtu.be/1vPntMvEPXo_).

<sup>104</sup> Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

tics.<sup>105</sup> Local media report dozens of unidentified bodies washing up on Coco Beach on the Indian Ocean and the banks of the Ruvu River.<sup>106</sup> Muslim leaders complain that police have arbitrarily arrested and disappeared many of their co-religionists, especially young men, without firm evidence that they are militants.<sup>107</sup> In May 2018, an MP from the area told the legislature that 380 people had disappeared since the crackdown began.<sup>108</sup> Opposition parties complain that security agents have arrested or killed their members under the guise of the counter-terrorist campaign.<sup>109</sup> This dangerous strategy could sharpen tensions.

Tanzanian authorities deny perpetrating abuses. In a press briefing on 15 January 2018, Tanzania's inspector general of police, Simon Sirro, said the state had handled militants in Kibiti, Rufiji and other areas "properly and within the bounds of the law". He said some of them had escaped to Mozambique and announced Tanzania had signed a memorandum of understanding with Mozambican authorities to pursue the militants there and prevent them from returning to wage further violence.<sup>110</sup>

Tanzanian Muslim leaders often cite neglect and maltreatment of Muslims, including higher than average incarceration levels and alleged discrimination in employment, by what they regard as a Christian-dominated state.<sup>111</sup> As in Kenya, these grievances in themselves do not explain why young people join militant groups, given that large numbers of Muslims experience them but only a small proportion take up arms. Still, they are an important backdrop to militants' recruitment efforts and feature prominently in their propaganda.<sup>112</sup> The indiscriminate crackdown against mainly male Muslim youths in the Pwani region appears certain to make things worse. Local leaders and Muslims elsewhere in the country warn as much.<sup>113</sup> According to one of the former: "Peace cannot be obtained by giving strength to the

<sup>105</sup> "Where are the missing 380 people? Tanzanian MP asks government", *The East African*, 5 May 2018.

<sup>106</sup> "Questions mount over dead bodies fished out of Ruvu River last week", *The Guardian*, 13 December 2016. President Magufuli has become increasingly authoritarian, and media reporting is heavily restricted. The Committee to Protect Journalists has criticised "an increase in hostility towards the media in Tanzania, including newspaper shutdowns, hefty fines imposed on television stations and the disappearance of an investigative journalist, Azory Gwanda, in November 2017" since Magufuli came into office in November 2015. See "Tanzania forces forums, blogs and streaming websites to comply with draconian regulations", Committee to Protect Journalists, 12 June 2018.

<sup>107</sup> Crisis Group interview, two leaders of Muslim organisations, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>108</sup> "Where are the missing 380 people? Tanzanian MP asks government", *The East African*, 5 May 2018. A diplomat estimated that in addition to those they reportedly killed, the authorities detained at least 200 people without charge following the sweeps. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>109</sup> Crisis Group interview, Tanzanian opposition MP, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>110</sup> See statement by Inspector-General of Police Simon Sirro, video (in Kiswahili), YouTube, 15 January 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDEFKTO9nBo&feature=youtu.be>.

<sup>111</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Muslim leaders, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Tanga, February 2018.

<sup>112</sup> See Simeon Mesaki, "Religion and the State in Tanzania", *Cross-Cultural Communication*, vol. 7, no. 2, (2011). The article notes that Islamist groups take advantage of "perceptions that Muslims do not benefit proportionally from Tanzanian development efforts" and claim to provide refuge to people affected by emerging socio-economic problems (since the transition from socialism to a free-market system).

<sup>113</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Muslim leaders in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, February 2018.

army. You have to listen to the people and address their grievances, otherwise, you will be pushing people to look for other means to express their discontent".<sup>114</sup>

In Tanzania, militants have proven as adaptive as they have in Kenya. Much as Kenyan militants fled to Tanzania between 2013 and 2015, so Tanzanian fighters have escaped crackdowns by retreating to remote spaces. Principally, they have moved from areas such as Tanga near the Kenyan border to densely forested Rufiji.<sup>115</sup> Security forces turned greater attention to the area from late 2016 onward.<sup>116</sup> The arrival of more troops appears, in turn, to have pushed some militants to move further south and cross the Ruvuma River into northern Mozambique.<sup>117</sup>

The political crisis in Zanzibar also appears to have played into jihadists' hands. Political elites, mainly organised around the opposition Civic United Front, have long peacefully sought greater autonomy for the archipelago, which entered a union with its mainland neighbour Tanganyika to form the republic of Tanzania in 1964. Controversial elections in Zanzibar in 1995, 2005 and 2010, which observers criticised for lack of transparency and which the opposition claims to have won, contributed to perceptions of disenfranchisement.<sup>118</sup> In the most recent vote in 2015, troops disrupted ballot counting and stopped election authorities from declaring a result. The opposition boycotted the subsequent rerun.<sup>119</sup>

Local Zanzibar leaders complain that frustrated youth, in whose eyes traditional elites increasingly lack credibility due to their failure to deliver change, are turning in increasing numbers to militancy. One described a dispute between a prominent sheikh and his two sons, who subsequently travelled to Somalia through Kenya:

Our young people are telling us: the only answer is jihad. They say "you think praying five times a day and reading the Quran while agreeing to live under an apostate government will help you get access to heaven? No. Jihad is the only answer".<sup>120</sup>

Aware of these intergenerational dynamics and the erosion of traditional leaders' authority, militants – including some linked to Al-Shabaab – appeared to have

<sup>114</sup> Crisis Group interview, political leader, Tanga, April 2018. More broadly, repeated studies show that abuses by security forces can tip young people toward militancy. For a summary, see the landmark study, "Journey to Extremism in Africa", UN Development Programme, 2017.

<sup>115</sup> Crisis Group interview, security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018.

<sup>116</sup> In March 2017, the most senior security official in the Pwani region ordered motorbike taxi drivers to stop picking up passengers after 6pm, after reports that they were involved in ferrying fighters from their hideouts in forests to villages where they attacked local officials. See "Rufiji, Kilwa in paralysis as police pursue killers", *The Citizen*, 23 May 2017.

<sup>117</sup> See statement by Inspector-General of Police Simon Sirro, op. cit. The police chief said many militants had fled to Mozambique to escape crackdowns in southern Tanzania. He said Tanzanian security officials had signed an agreement with Mozambican authorities to jointly pursue the militants.

<sup>118</sup> "Democracy, peace and unity are at stake after annulled elections", *Washington Post*, 1 November 2015.

<sup>119</sup> "Zanzibar political rift widens after rerun standoff", *The East African*, 14 February 2016.

<sup>120</sup> Crisis Group interview, prominent Zanzibari community leader, Zanzibar, February 2018.



stepped up recruitment drives, with the area producing some of the highest numbers of new members joining groups fighting along the Tanzanian coast.<sup>121</sup>

The scale of Al-Shabaab's recruitment and violence in Tanzania is lower than it was in Kenya between 2013 and 2015 and, as yet, the country has seen no major attack on civilians. The Dar es Salaam authorities should, nonetheless, be careful not to respond to the threat in a manner that further strains social cohesion, alienates more young Muslims and thus risks fuelling militancy. They could learn from Kenya's initial mistakes after Westgate and its subsequent shift in tack since about 2015. While far from perfect, Kenya's revised approach does appear to have improved relations between the state – notably the local authorities – and communities targeted by Al-Shabaab and thus undercut the militants' ability to recruit.

In Tanzania, shifting tack would mean avoiding indiscriminate crackdowns, which, if opposition leaders' accounts of hundreds detained without trial or killed are accurate, will only fuel anger. Instead, authorities should improve policing and intelligence gathering, target interventions only at those genuinely suspected of involvement in violence, consult Muslim communities themselves on what works best to diminish the appeal of militancy among their youth and avoid collective punishment. In particular, the government should avoid conflating non-violent movements, whether on the mainland or in Zanzibar, or wider Muslims' frustration, with militancy. Over time, efforts to resolve Muslim grievances, particularly by improving access to education and including more Muslims in the state bureaucracy, could improve relations between them and the state and undercut the appeal of militancy, or at least show that young Muslims do not need to take up arms to achieve their goals. In Zanzibar, for example, resolving the political crisis is a priority, including introducing reforms ahead of the 2020 elections.

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<sup>121</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Tanzanian security official, Dar es Salaam, February 2018; community leader, Zanzibar, February 2018.

## VI. Relative Quiet in Uganda

Uganda has suffered fewer Al-Shabaab attacks than its neighbours, Kenya and Tanzania. The group has not launched a successful assault in the country since coordinated July 2010 bombings in Kampala killed 74. A number of factors account for the relative calm. First, there is no obvious constituency among indigenous Muslims from which militants can recruit. Muslims make up about 14 per cent of Uganda's population.<sup>122</sup> Most are well integrated and inter-confessional relations are relatively good, with inter-marriage between Christians and Muslims quite common.<sup>123</sup> Although Muslims have similar grievances to their co-religionists in Kenya and Tanzania, notably state neglect and lower access to formal education, Muslim elites in Uganda are relatively successful in business; they dominate the hospitality and transport industries, among other sectors. According to Hajj Nsereko Mutumba, spokesperson of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council: "We historically did not have sufficient access to the education system but we focused on business and have done well".<sup>124</sup>

A nominally Islamist local militant group, the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), has long challenged President Yoweri Museveni's government. But by 2002 concerted military action had largely pushed the ADF-NALU out of Uganda, and few members remain in Kampala and other cities.<sup>125</sup> The group traditionally has not had ties to transnational jihadism, though some Ugandan and Tanzanian officials report some limited cooperation between it and Al-Shabaab and other regional militants over recent years.<sup>126</sup> The Ugandan government blames ADF-NALU militants sympathetic to Al-Shabaab for the March 2015 killing of Joan Kagezi, the prosecutor leading the case against suspects brought to trial in the July 2010 Kampala bombings.<sup>127</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Uganda Bureau of Statistics, *The National Population and Housing Census*, 2014.

<sup>123</sup> In a 2013 Pew survey, 66 per cent of Ugandan Muslims said their immediate family included Christians; in Tanzania that percentage was 39. The survey did not include figures for Kenya. See "The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society", Pew Research Centre, 30 April 2013, p. 125.

<sup>124</sup> Crisis Group interview, Hajj Nsereko Mutumba, Kampala, May 2018. Muslims in Uganda also benefited from Idi Amin Dada's presidency between 1971 and 1979. The strongman sought to remedy the traditional dominance of the state by Catholics and Protestants, who had benefited from state largesse, including free land, from the colonial and post-colonial governments. Amin stacked many government positions with Muslims, helped Muslim associations form an umbrella organisation and, when he expelled Ugandans of Asian origin, reallocated their former businesses substantially to Muslims' benefit. He also facilitated scholarships for thousands of young Muslims to study abroad. Today, Muslims complain that subsequent governments have reverted to discriminating against Muslims, particularly in allocation of slots in prominent positions within the executive and the judiciary. Crisis Group interviews, Ugandan academics and Muslim leaders, Kampala, May 2018. See M. L. Pirouet, "Religion in Uganda under Amin", *Journal of Religion in Africa*, vol. 11, no. 1 (November 1980), pp. 12-29.

<sup>125</sup> See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°93, *Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU's Lost Rebellion*, 19 December 2012.

<sup>126</sup> Crisis Group interview, security official, Kampala, May 2018; Western diplomat (citing a Tanzanian politician), Nairobi, August 2018.

<sup>127</sup> "Museveni vows to end terrorism", *Daily Monitor*, 30 March 2017.

Secondly, Uganda has better integrated its Somali population than neighbours such as Kenya, thus making them less susceptible to militant recruitment.<sup>128</sup> The ethnic Somali population in Kampala is divided into two groups: those who have lived in Uganda for decades, and speak local languages, and more recent arrivals. The first cohort is well integrated and prominent in commerce, particularly in the transportation and logistics businesses. The second is less well assimilated; donors and local NGOs focus support on them.<sup>129</sup> A likely third factor is the Ugandan security forces' close cooperation with Western intelligence agencies, which began soon after the 2010 Kampala attack.<sup>130</sup> Ugandan security officials assert that shared intelligence helped thwart attacks, including a September 2014 plot to hit bars, a hotel and a university.<sup>131</sup>

Despite this relative success, the Museveni administration's policies and the security forces' practices could yet drive young Muslims toward militancy.<sup>132</sup> Indiscriminate arrests of Muslims every time a high-profile crime occurs are an acute source of grievance. In 2012, amid a rising crime wave, Ugandan authorities rounded up dozens of Muslims, creating significant resentment among their co-religionists.<sup>133</sup> The same has happened after other high-profile crimes, including the November 2016 shooting of police Major Mohammed Kiggundu and the April 2018 killing of businesswoman Susan Magara. Following a public outcry, the most prominent detention centre where suspects were detained, the Nalufenya police station, was temporarily closed in April 2018 and suspects transferred to other stations after pictures emerged of several of them bearing serious wounds on their bodies, thought to be due to torture.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>128</sup> Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, community leaders and security analysts, Kampala, May 2018.

<sup>129</sup> Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kampala, May 2018. The diplomat noted that the Ugandan security forces do not profile or target ethnic Somalis. He said there is no proven nexus between migration and militant activity. But a growing worry is that many Somalis have been on waiting lists for years hoping to be resettled to Western countries. As their frustration grows, they could fall into the hands of human traffickers or be lured by criminal or militant networks.

<sup>130</sup> Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kampala, May 2018. Kenyan security agencies also cooperate closely with Western intelligence agencies but the ties are uneven. Relations were particularly frosty between 2010 and 2014, as the International Criminal Court pursued cases against six prominent Kenyans for their alleged role in the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Intelligence cooperation improved after wholesale changes to the leadership of the security agencies in mid-2015.

<sup>131</sup> "Uganda forces discover suicide vests, explosive vests at suspected terror cell", *Wall Street Journal*, 15 September 2014.

<sup>132</sup> Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kampala, May 2018. The diplomat said Uganda's focus, considering the relatively few jihadists in the country and the domestic goals of many nominally Islamist groups opposing the government, should be on preventing jihadism rather than countering it. The government's indiscriminate campaigns, however, could create a "radicalisation problem where there really wasn't one".

<sup>133</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Muslim clerics, civil society campaigners and diplomats, Kampala, May 2018. Crisis Group Africa Report N°256, *Uganda's Slow Slide into Crisis*, 21 November 2017, notes that the Ugandan police force has become increasingly politicised and focuses more on regime maintenance than fighting crime.

<sup>134</sup> Inspector General of Police Martin Okoth Ochola has condemned the police's reported use of torture, including on Museveni's political opponents, and said he will take steps to punish police engaging in torture. "I have worked in CID (the Criminal Investigations Department) for over ten years; I have been in the police for 30 years; so why should a police officer torture someone? Torture is a criminal case and if we arrest you, we will take you to a criminal court". *Daily Monitor*, 18 August 2018.

Police chief Martin Okoth Ochola, who replaced the long-serving Kale Kayihura in March 2018, promised to end the practice of torture in detention.<sup>135</sup> According to one cleric:

Too many Muslims are living with wounds on their bodies and in their hearts due to the indiscriminate arrest and torture of Muslims. Every time a high-profile killing occurs, Muslims shudder because we wonder who will be arrested next. My young daughter keeps asking me if I will make it home because I have spoken out about these endless arrests of Muslims. It is absurd that every high-profile crime is followed by the arrest of Muslims. It seems like an attempt to label us as undesirable citizens. This policy can be easily exploited by extremists unless the authorities stop this.<sup>136</sup>

An unexplained spate of murders of Muslim clerics has heightened the alarm. Since 2012, a dozen imams have been killed across Uganda, usually by assailants on motorbikes.<sup>137</sup> The government has blamed intra-Muslim wrangling for the killings, an explanation dismissed by clerics who blame the authorities.<sup>138</sup>

In sum, Uganda has done better than its neighbours in thwarting large-scale attacks, related in part to intelligence cooperation with the West but also to its better integration of Muslims, its amicable inter-confessional relations and its lack of a ready constituency from which militants can draw support. In this sense, policies that alienate Muslims are likely to prove self-defeating. In particular, authorities should avoid scapegoating Muslims every time a prominent person is killed.

Al-Shabaab poses only a limited immediate danger to Uganda. Evidence of its ties with the ADF-NALU is less clear than its unambiguous outreach to local militants in Tanzania.<sup>139</sup> The ADF-NALU remains a threat and could carry out attacks, but its goal is primarily political: it aims to topple the government of President Museveni.<sup>140</sup> Still, by failing to adopt nuanced security policies and by routinely stigmatising and brutalising young Muslim men, the Ugandan authorities could push these youths into the hands of militants.

<sup>135</sup> See “Closing Nalufenya will not end torture in Uganda”, *Daily Monitor*, 12 April 2018. After images of detainees bearing wounds indicative of torture circulated on social media and appeared in the press in April 2017, Uganda’s State Minister for Internal Security Kania Obiga issued a statement in parliament admitting that the police had flouted the law. He apologised for the torture of suspects and said the state would launch an investigation. “Gov’t issues apology over torture victims”, *New Vision*, 16 May 2017.

<sup>136</sup> Crisis Group interviews, prominent Ugandan cleric and several Muslim community leaders, Kampala, May 2018.

<sup>137</sup> “Uganda, living in fear”, Al Jazeera, 22 February 2016.

<sup>138</sup> Crisis Group interview, Muslim cleric, Kampala, May 2018. One possible explanation for the government’s abiding suspicion of Muslims is geopolitics. In the 1980s, the Sudanese government actively supported Islamist groups fighting against Museveni, including the ADF-NALU, as did Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, apparently in response to Museveni’s backing for Sudanese and Congolese rebels.

<sup>139</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomats and Ugandan security analysts, Kampala, May 2018.

<sup>140</sup> Crisis Group interview, Muslim clerics and security analysts, Kampala, May 2018.

## VII. Conclusion

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For more than a decade, Al-Shabaab has operated across East Africa. It initially established networks to raise funds and recruit and funnel fighters into Somalia. Then it launched a series of often high-profile strikes against AMISOM troop contributors. Over the past few years its tentacles have reached further afield, through ties to local militants, to countries that do not send forces to Somalia.

The exact relationship between local militants and Al-Shabaab itself varies and is often murky. Al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia are unlikely to exercise much control over local allies, particularly in Tanzania; militants respond to parochial dynamics more than to instruction from abroad. Where they exist, ties are based mostly on personal relationships, often involving fighters returning from Somalia, or links to other militants – like al-Hijra in Kenya – who are closer to counterparts in Somalia. Indeed, the fluidity among East African militants reflects that among jihadists more broadly. Most local groups are not formally part of Al-Shabaab, but by fighting under its flag, or just claiming some connection, they can enhance their profile and associate their local struggles with a wider cause. In turn, Al-Shabaab benefits by projecting an image of regional influence.

The threat that Al-Shabaab and Islamist militancy more broadly poses to each East African country also varies. In Kenya, the danger of violence tipping over into ethnic and religious clashes was real when attacks were regular, but for now that moment appears to have passed. Certainly, the bigger threat today to Kenya's stability emanates from ethnic elites' winner-take-all competition for political office, especially the presidency. That said, militants could still stage major attacks (U.S. and Kenyan officials say attempts have been foiled by their intelligence and security services). Such attacks would sap an economy that is reliant on tourism and foreign investment in the services sector and thus could aggravate other sources of fragility and friction.

Similarly, in Tanzania, it appears unlikely that today's low-intensity violence would escalate into a full-blown insurgency, in part due to the state's intelligence gathering and vast network of informants and the seriousness with which the authorities now regard the threat.<sup>141</sup> Militants can no longer operate with the relative freedom they had some years ago. But the hardline approach that the state, under President Magufuli, has adopted in response to Muslim mobilisation in general, and to militancy in particular, has eroded intercommunal relations in a state traditionally regarded as one of the more cohesive and inclusive countries in the region. Extrajudicial killings of youths, with hundreds reported dead, will further inflame tensions.

As for Uganda, neither Al-Shabaab nor other militants have made serious inroads, due in large part to the relatively smooth social integration of Somalis and Muslims more broadly. But the past few years' targeting of Muslims and the acute resentment this has caused, could offer an opening to militants. It remains to be seen whether the new police chief, who has taken the welcome step of recognising the force's counter-productive abuses under his predecessors, can turn a page.

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<sup>141</sup> Many informants are members of the ruling party, a legacy of socialism under the former president, Nyerere.


Given the diversity among the different countries' experiences no one prescription for tackling the threat exists. Nor, in East Africa as elsewhere, is there a single, linear pathway toward militancy. That said, some lessons can be drawn from the three countries' experiences. Notably, in Kenya, the contrast between the approach the authorities adopted in the aftermath of the Westgate attack and the course correction after 2015 is striking. The initial crackdowns between 2013 and 2015 may have squeezed militant networks, forcing some to relocate and Al-Shabaab to shift tactics. But by deepening the anger among Somalis and Muslims more broadly at the state, the crackdowns expanded the base from which militants could recruit. More effective has been to give local elected officials the lead, consult regularly with communities whose youth militant groups target for recruitment and appoint people from those communities to top local positions in the security forces, combined with measures aimed at tackling underlying grievances.

Clearly, serious shortcomings remain in Kenya. Reports of human rights abuses are still frequent. Overall, though, the shift since 2015 has worked. Security officials cite improved intelligence as relations between the state and inhabitants of the coastal and north-eastern regions improve; better information then obviates the need for the indiscriminate arrests that play into militants' hands. That lesson is a valuable one for Tanzania in particular, which may well be replicating Kenya's mistakes between 2013 and 2015. But it applies to Uganda, too, where crackdowns could create a problem where thus far there is no substantial one.

Al-Shabaab is likely to remain a threat to East Africa. It is a formidable force in its home country, where prospects for its defeat appear remote. Its leaders still see benefits in extending operations across the region. Even were that to change, local militancy would evolve and continue in some form; indeed, to some degree, it has almost certainly already taken on its own dynamics and momentum in Tanzania. Al-Shabaab has proven as resilient across parts of East Africa as in Somalia itself, adapting when under pressure by relocating its operations and reorienting its recruitment. East African authorities should show similar nimbleness, by combining cleverer security measures aimed at disrupting the group's operations and recruitment with political and economic policies aimed at diminishing militancy's allure.

**Nairobi/Brussels, 21 September 2018**

## Appendix A: Al Shabaab in East Africa



## Appendix B: Timeline: Al-Shabaab in East Africa

### August 1998

Al-Qaeda stages its first major terror attack in East Africa, bombing the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

### 2006-2009

Al-Shabaab gains regional prominence by waging war on the Ethiopian military in Somalia.

### 2009

Al-Shabaab seizes control of parts of Mogadishu and Kismayo, a major port city in Somalia. Control of the harbour allows Al-Shabaab to accumulate huge revenues by taxing imports arriving at the port.

### July 2010

Coordinated bombings kill 74 people in the Ugandan capital Kampala, marking Al-Shabaab's first major assault outside Somalia.

### October 2011

Kenya sends troops into southern Somalia to help fight Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab begins staging attacks in Kenya.

### October 2012

Kenyan defence forces drive Al-Shabaab militants out of Kismayo.

### September 2013

Four Al-Shabaab militants storm Nairobi's Westgate Mall, a symbol of Kenya's emerging middle class, and kill 67 people during a four-day siege.

### November 2013

Authorities arrest 69 people running an "Al-Shabaab child indoctrination camp" for over 50 children aged four to thirteen in Tanga, Tanzania.

### April 2014

Kenyan security forces round up thousands of ethnic Somalis in Nairobi, deepening existing feelings of alienation and exclusion.

### April 2015

Al-Shabaab launches assault on Garissa University College in Kenya, killing 148, mainly students. Public uproar pressures government to change security chiefs, better engage with youths targeted for Al-Shabaab recruitment and improve intelligence gathering. Pace of attacks in major Kenyan cities slows.

### April 2017

Militants ambush and kill eight police officers just outside Kibiti on the Tanzanian coast. Security operations in Kenya increasingly force Al-Shabaab to mobilise elsewhere. Its fighters forge alliances with local Islamist groups in Tanzania and northern Mozambique.

### October 2017

Al-Shabaab truck bomb in Mogadishu kills at least 587 people in the deadliest terror attack in Somalia's history.



## Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group

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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries or regions at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international, regional and national decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a monthly early-warning bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in up to 70 situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on its website, [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org). Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board of Trustees – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policymakers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown.

Crisis Group's President & CEO, Robert Malley, took up the post on 1 January 2018. Malley was formerly Crisis Group's Middle East and North Africa Program Director and most recently was a Special Assistant to former U.S. President Barack Obama as well as Senior Adviser to the President for the Counter-ISIL Campaign, and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf region. Previously, he served as President Bill Clinton's Special Assistant for Israeli-Palestinian Affairs.

Crisis Group's international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices in seven other locations: Bogotá, Dakar, Istanbul, Nairobi, London, New York, and Washington, DC. It has presences in the following locations: Abuja, Algiers, Bangkok, Beirut, Caracas, Gaza City, Guatemala City, Hong Kong, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Juba, Mexico City, New Delhi, Rabat, Tbilisi, Toronto, Tripoli, Tunis, and Yangon.

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**September 2018**

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## Appendix D: Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2015

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### Special Reports

*Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State*, Special Report N°1, 14 March 2016 (also available in Arabic and French).

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*Increasing the Stakes in DR Congo's Electoral Poker*, Africa Briefing N°139, 8 June 2018 (also available in French).

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*Sudan: The Prospects for "National Dialogue"*, Africa Briefing N°108, 11 March 2015.

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*Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence*, Africa Report N°262, 26 July 2018.

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**Annex 136**

“Al-Shabab kills 18 in surge of executions”, *Voice of America News*, 8 July 2019

## Africa

# Al-Shabab Kills 18 in Surge of Executions

By Harun Maruf

July 08, 2019 11:15 AM




Somali militant group al-Shabab has executed 18 people since Wednesday, an unprecedented rate of executions for the group, which is under pressure from U.S. airstrikes.

Militants put to death four people in the southern town of Jamame on Sunday, immediately after the judge in an al-Shabab court declared them guilty.

Firing squads shot and killed two men accused of being Somali government soldiers and a woman accused of being a spy for Kenya. The militants identified the woman as 20-year-old Iqra Abdi Aden.

Afterward, an 18-year-old man, Nur Bakar Jirow, was publicly stoned to death for allegedly raping a 16-year-old girl. The man argued the sex was consensual, but the judge said he deserved the death penalty because he was married at the time.



On Saturday, al-Shabab firing squads killed three men accused of being Somali government soldiers in the town of Kurtunwarey in the Lower Shabelle region. In Buale town of the neighboring Middle Jubba region, the militants executed a man accused of practicing sorcery.

On July 3 and 4, al-Shabab shot and killed 10 men in two separate executions in Hagar and Salagle towns in southern Somalia. The group accused the men of spying for the Somali government, Kenya and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

All of the victims were convicted by militant courts, according to al-Shabab affiliate media sites.

Al-Shabab courts do not allow lawyers to represent the defendants, and the evidence largely relies on alleged confessions. Critics believe that al-Shabab's militias torture the accused to force the confessions.

The group did not give a reason for the surge in executions, but has been the target of dozens of U.S. airstrikes over the past two and a half years. The airstrikes are often ordered on the basis of ground-level intelligence collected by Somali government sources.

In other violence, at least seven people were killed and 22 others were injured in Mogadishu on Monday in two separate attacks, witnesses say.

The first attack took place near a civilian hospital when Mogadishu police stopped a vehicle loaded with explosives. The driver refused to exit the vehicle, forcing police to open fire. Moments later the vehicle exploded killing two people and injuring 18 others.

Separately, a suspected militant vehicle attempted to pass through a security checkpoint on a crowded road in Mogadishu. Security forces responded killing two militants. A member of the police and two civilians were also killed according to witnesses. Four others were injured in the attack.





By  
**Harun Maruf**



**Annex 137**

“Al-Shabab executes two girl ‘spies’”, *Al Jazeera*, 28 October 2010



BREAKING | Polls open in New York and Virginia, marking the start of US Election Day



News

# Al-Shabab executes two girl 'spies'

Somali armed group publicly execute by firing squad two teenage girls accused of spying "for the enemy".



28 Oct 2010



**Al-Shabab warn that dozens of people suspected of spying 'face the same fate' as the two executed girls [Reuters]**

Al-Shabab fighters have publicly executed two teenage girls in the central Somali town of Beledweyne on charges of spying, witnesses have said.

Hundreds of people watched as a firing squad arranged by the armed group shot the pair on Wednesday, in the first known instance of such an execution of women accused of spying.

"These women were spying for the enemy and were arrested by mujahideen [holy warriors]" last week, Sheikh Yusuf Ali Ugas, al-Shabab's regional commander, told the crowd after the execution.

"After a long investigation, they confessed to their crimes," he said, adding that dozens of other people were held at Beledweyne police station on the same charges and faced the same fate.

"Anyone found to be involved in such crimes will meet the same fate and will be executed," the al-Shabab leader said.

### 'Shocking'

Beledweyne, a town which lies near the Ethiopian border, witnessed heavy fighting between the rebel group and pro-government forces earlier this month.

Ali, a resident of the town, said: "The group informed the population that a punishment was going to be carried out in public on two women they claimed had been found guilty of spying.

"I didn't know they were planning to shoot them. The two girls were sitting on the ground with their hands tied behind their back.

"Then a group of fighters covered their faces and shot them from behind.

"It was shocking, the girls were so young. They looked so desperate but nobody could help them."

Elders and residents gave conflicting information on the girls' ages but both of them were believed to be 17 or 18.

### In Depth



**Profile:** Sharif Ahmed



**Timeline:** Somalia

“Everyone was very sorry for the young girls who were killed in front of hundreds,” Maryam Ahmed, another witness, said. “I couldn’t hold back my tears.”

“I’m worried for the dozens of other people who are currently in jail on similar allegations,” she said.

Al-Shabab, listed as a terrorist organisation by the US, executed two men on spying charges outside Mogadishu earlier this month.

### Condemnation

Abdirahman Omar Osman, the central government’s information minister, issued a statement condemning the execution of the girls.

“This execution is yet another human rights abuse committed by the criminals. This act of killing innocent children does not have Islamic and humanitarian justifications,” the statement said.

In a case that grabbed the world’s attention two years to the day before Wednesday’s execution, a group of men stoned a woman to death in the southern al-Shabab bastion of Kismayo after an Islamic court found her guilty of adultery.

Al-Shabab have in recent years repeatedly executed men accused of spying or murder and chopped off the hands of thieves.

The group – formerly the youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union, of which Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the current Somali president, was a top political leader – controls three-quarters of Somalia.

It has been fighting to topple Somalia’s government and the African Union force that protects the administration.

Somalia has had no effective government for 19 years and Western nations and neighbours say the country is used as a shelter by fighters planning attacks in East Africa and further afield.



### Inside Story: What next for Somalia



### Video: Foreign fighters ‘in- vade’ Somalia



### Riz Khan: Soma- lia – From bad to worse



### Restoring Somalia



### A long road to sta- bility



### Al-Shabab: Somali fighters undeterred



### Somalia at a cross- roads



### Somaliland: Africa’s isolated state

**Annex 138**

“Suspected al Shabaab militants behead four in Kenya’s Lamu county: official”,

*Reuters*, 6 September 2017



## EMERGING MARKETS

SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 / 11:41 AM / UPDATED 3 YEARS AGO

## Suspected al Shabaab militants behead four in Kenya's Lamu County: official

By Joseph Akwiri



MOMBASA, Kenya (Reuters) - Suspected militants from the Somali group al Shabaab beheaded four men in two different attacks in Lamu County on Kenya's north coast on Wednesday, authorities said, a month after 12 people were killed in similar incidents in the region.

Lamu County Commissioner Gilbert Kitiyo said the attacks took place in Silini-Mashambani early on Wednesday where three were killed, while in a separate incident in Bobo village one person was killed.

Kitiyo said about 30 heavily-armed assailants went from house-to-house calling out victims by name before pulling some out and slitting their throats.

"They were dressed in military gear and had AK-47 rifles. They beheaded four men before fleeing into the forest. All the victims are men. Police have already arrived at the scene and taken the bodies to the mortuary," Kitiyo told Reuters by telephone.

He said the attackers surrounded all the victims' houses making it difficult for them to escape.

Abdiasis Abu Musab, al Shabaab's spokesman for military operations, said the group was behind the attack, and put the number of those killed at five, saying it had targeted non-Muslims.

In August, al Shabaab attackers killed four men in a similar manner while earlier in July, nine men were slaughtered the same way in nearby villages.

After the latest attacks, protesters burned tyres on the roads on Wednesday morning in complaint over insecurity. Riot police to fire teargas and rubber bullets to disperse them.

A government-imposed dusk-to-dawn curfew is in force in the area following past attacks.

The al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab aims to topple Somalia's United Nations-backed government and impose its own strict interpretation of Islam. They have intensified attacks in Kenya since it sent troops into Somalia in 2011.

They have also claimed responsibility for a series of cross-border attacks in recent months, including a spate of roadside bombings targeting security forces.

Editing by George Obulutsa and Toby Chopra

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**Annex 139**

“Inside Kenya shopping mall, a house of horrors”, *USA Today News*, 27 September 2013



### Inside Kenya shopping mall, a house of horrors

GARY STRAUSS | USA TODAY



Show Caption ▾

#### Story Summary

- 67 died%2C nearly 200 wounded in mall attack%2C another 70 still missing

The al-Shabab terrorists who seized a Kenyan shopping mall for four days tortured, maimed and mutilated some of their 67 victims, leaving a tattered scene of ghoulish, gruesome remains that investigators likened to scenes from a horror movie.

Hostages were left hanging and had their eyes gouged, others were dismembered. Others had their throats slashed or were castrated and had fingers amputated, according to media reports quoting soldiers, medical personnel and investigators sorting through the rubble of the collapsed mall.

Several floors of a parking garage collapsed during an attack by Somali militants at the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya.

OFFICE OF THE KENYAN PRESIDENT VIA AP

Kenya's *The Star*, quoting a forensics doctor, said all of the victims were mutilated. Britain's *Daily Mail* reported children stashed in refrigerators with knives in their bodies.

"You find people with hooks hanging from the roof. They removed eyes, ears, nose. Actually if you look at all the bodies, unless those ones that were escaping, fingers are cut by pliers, the noses are ripped by pliers," said the doctor. The *Star* said he declined to give his name.

Some of the terrorists' bodies also appeared to have been burned by fellow extremists to protect their identities.

Allegations that hostages had been raped and others beheaded could not be verified, although those claims have circulated since Kenyan military forces ended the four-day mall siege earlier this week.

More than 70 people remain missing, but it could take up to a week before the mall, much of it in ruins after the collapse of three floors, is thoroughly searched.

A cemetery worker takes away his tools after the funeral for Selima Merali 41 and her daughter Nuriana


Investigators says evidence shows Somali-based al-Shabab had planned the attack for up to a year, renting a shop in the mall and posing as businessmen, then moving weapons and supplies inside the mall weeks before the attack.

Up to 15 terrorists are believed to have conducted the attacks. Five were killed and at least 10 were arrested.


There's speculation that Samantha Lewthwaite, a Brit dubbed the "white widow," was involved in the attack, although Kenyan authorities say there's no evidence she was in Nairobi. Interpol had earlier issued an arrest warrant for Lewthwaite based on prior terrorist attacks. She was married to suicide bomber Germaine Lindsay, who killed 26 people on a London train in 2005, and in 2011 was linked to a Islamic terrorist cell in Kenya.

Al-Shabab is warning Kenya could be hit by more bloodshed if its military isn't withdrawn from southern Somalia. Kenyan troops entered the country in 2011 to help the Somali government's fight against al-Shabab.

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### Kenya mall attack



**Annex 140**

“At al Shabaab’s mercy: woman narrates gang rapes, drug abuse at camps”, *The Star*,  
23 November 2017

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## **At al Shabaab's mercy: Woman narrates gang rapes, drug abuse at camps**

by [STAR REPORTER, @TheStarKenya](#)

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News

23 November 2017 - 15:00





*Some of the items security agents found when they raided an al Shabaab hideout inside Boni Forest in Lamu, September 18, 2017. /COURTESY*

Fauzia (not her real name), 25, looks aged beyond her years, probably from what she has had to endure in the last five years.

At 16 years, she was already married with two children.

By her 18th birthday, Fauzia was already separated from her husband and needed to provide for her children.



Born in Majengo, Nairobi, Fauzia was forced to drop out of school after class eight as her parents were not able to cater for any further education for her and her nine siblings.

She opted to wash clothes and do other household chores to earn a living.

After separating from her husband, it was harder to make ends meet and it is here that her maternal cousin from Lamu convinced her to join al Shabaab where she would make money as an informant - the role generally prescribed for women militants.

The promise of employment and source of income to maintain her and her children threw all reason out and Fauzia agreed to join her cousin in Lamu, leaving her sons under the care of her mother.



At the camp, Fauzia's duties were far from what Dogo had told her they would be.

In a glum tone, she describes her despondent life at the camp, that of daily abuse and mental torture,

"I was basically a prisoner, repeatedly sexually abused by up to six men at a time. Often we [all the women] were forced to use drugs by al Shabaab, especially Bugizi. (Bugizi is a combination of heroin, marijuana and Rohypnol widely used by al Shabaab, in combination with miraa).

She added: "If you were lucky, a commander would take you as a wife and that would stop other militants from raping you." She noted it was obvious that only native Somalis became wives.

One of the items security agents found when they raided an al Shabaab hideout inside Boni Forest in Lamu, September 18, 2017.  
/COURTESY

'Alcohol and drugs all night'

The women in the camp had to cook, wash clothes for the militants and undertake other household duties. Meanwhile, the fighters frequently physically and sexually abused them. She recalls with tears how some militants would beat her if they did not like something she cooked.

Unfortunately, this happened often for Fauzia as she was not familiar with cooking the injera that the militants liked to have

The sexual and physical violence was worse when the militants returned from engaging with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

"They would drink and take drugs all day and night, whether to celebrate killing Somalia National Army and AMISOM soldiers or mourn their own, and that's when the gang rapes would take place."

Fauzia cannot count the number of times she was raped and forced to take contraceptives to avoid pregnancy. Rarely did the rapist militants use condoms.

Other girls in the camp conceived but were usually given medication that would induce abortion. The girls that were 'married' to the commanders were allowed to carry their pregnancies. Fauzia remembers that there were 15 children in the camp.

Her escape was facilitated by an older man who helped her on a day the captors went on a mission.

She says three friends she made at the camp were scared despite the fact that such missions took at least five days.





One of the items security agents found when they raided an al Shabaab hideout inside Boni Forest in Lamu, September 18, 2017.  
/COURTESY

Free but HIV+ and stigmatised

It has been a year since Fauzia's return. Sadly, she was found to be HIV positive during a medical examination. She is currently on anti-retroviral drugs and is also being treated for tuberculosis.

Her poor health limits her ability to work. When she can, she continues to washing clothes. Since her return, her financial situation, a key driver behind her recruitment by al Shabaab in the first place, remains as vague as ever.

Fauzia has been ostracised and stigmatised by her community. According to a government official in Nairobi, communities often shun the wives, widows or children of men suspected to have been involved in terror activities. The same goes for women recruited by al Shabaab.

The stigma Fauzia faces is made worse by the sexual abuse she endured. Muslim women who have had sex with men other than their husbands - even if these relations are forced - are often shamed by their communities.

The psychological trauma Fauzia endured during her time with al Shabaab has been compounded further by the banishment she has faced since her return.

Comprehensive counselling programmes are facilitated by the government for her and many other young women returnees

Fauzia is among other young girls and women who have been able to find their way back to Kenya after being captives in al Shabaab camps inside Somalia and Libya.

In August, three Kenyan girls - Firthoza AAhmed, Aisha Ashur and Tawfiqa Dahir - escaped from their captors in Libya and made their way to Cairo in Egypt, where they sort help from the Kenyan embassy to be brought back home.

Fauzia's account of events resonates with that of other female returnees interviewed earlier.

They all speak of sexual abuse by the militants and widespread abuse of drugs in the camps, drugs which female captives are forced to take.

According to a Kenyan Anti-Terror Police Unit investigator, sexual violence against women is becoming common in al Shabaab camps. They are recruited so fighters have sex with them and turn their focus from going back home.

**Annex 141**

J. Lind et al., “Tangled ties: Al-Shabaab and political volatility in Kenya”, *Institute of Development Studies*, April 2015 (Extracts)

# EVIDENCE REPORT

No 130

Addressing and Mitigating Violence

## Tangled Ties: Al-Shabaab and Political Volatility in Kenya

Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom

April 2015

The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing processes. This material has been developed under the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme.

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## TANGLED TIES: AL-SHABAAB AND POLITICAL VOLATILITY IN KENYA

Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi and Marjoke Oosterom

April 2015

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## Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit
CORD	Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
DFA	Department of Refugee Affairs
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IPOA	Independent Policing Oversight Authority
IPPG	Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
MP	Member of Parliament
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MYC	Muslim Youth Centre
NAMLEF	National Muslim Leaders Forum
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NEP	North Eastern Province
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NSC	National Security Council
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	United States
WDR	World Development Report

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## Executive summary

In recent years, a spate of attacks has destabilised a swathe of Kenya's peripheral counties as well as bringing terror to its capital, Nairobi. As violent insecurity spreads, it has fomented fear and stoked ethnic and regional divisions, precipitating security crackdowns and roiling the country's infamously tumultuous politics. These developments belie sweeping constitutional reforms that have taken place to address and prevent violence in Kenya. Since Kenya stepped up its military involvement in Somalia in 2011, ostensibly to buffer the country from violence wrought by Al-Shabaab – the Somalia-based jihadi organisation – attacks have multiplied, ranging from the September 2013 siege of Nairobi's Westgate shopping centre, to village massacres, to the targeted killings of police and religious figures. Yet Kenya's government, while widening its military engagement in Somalia, was at first slow to recognise and respond to the hand of Al-Shabaab in the country's widening violent insecurity since the start of its Somalia military operations.

This study adds to existing analyses of Kenya's shifting political and security dynamics by examining the role of external influences on its system of violence. Viewed from the perspective of the state's political and security establishments, Kenya's peace and stability are undermined by 'external stresses' from Somalia's long-running state collapse and conflict spillovers, as is evident from attacks attributed to Al-Shabaab as well as the organisation's business and recruiting activities in Kenya. This external stresses framework has purchase in wider thinking on addressing and mitigating violence. The *World Development Report 2011* posits that the risk of conflict and violence arises from a range of 'external stresses' – including cross-border conflict spillovers, international terrorism and criminal networks – interacting with 'internal stresses', such as low income levels, youth unemployment, corruption and human rights abuses (World Bank 2011). Mitigating the negative effects of external stresses requires, in the *World Development Report's* analysis, building 'buffering institutions' at the national level in the affected countries.

Since 2014, the Kenya Government has stepped up its security responses to the perceived threat of Al-Shabaab. It has instigated police swoops in majority-Somali neighbourhoods, tightened administrative controls of refugee populations, passed new security laws, and given wide leeway to the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit, which some human rights observers accuse of being involved in the extrajudicial killings of terror suspects. These responses derive from a discourse and understanding that 'sees' outsiders, namely Somalis, as a threat, both internally and with regard to conflict spillovers from Somalia. Rather than adapting its security approach to an enemy with an advanced understanding of Kenya's political psychology and sociology, the state perpetuates an 'others' approach that treats entire populations as somehow separate and threatening. However, far from strengthening security, the centre's security responses dovetail with an unseemly politicisation of worsening violence, deepening entrenched ethnic and regional divides that structure and frame Kenya's system of violence.

The nature of Kenya's security threat is, in fact, very different from how security agencies seemingly conceptualise and respond to the problem. While Al-Shabaab remains one of the greatest threats to regional stability and security, worsening violent insecurity in Kenya suggests that the more important impact of the group has been to simply unmask the country's deep, structural divisions. Stirring anxiety and fear in Kenya is integral to how Al-Shabaab seeks to advance its regional ambitions in the Horn of Africa. With minimal resources, the organisation has crawled under the skin of Kenya's domestic politics, deftly picking at regional and ethnic divisions as well as exploiting the existence of longitudinal continuities in how the centre relates toward the periphery. Deep-seated injustices and a



sense of marginalisation among Kenya's many minority ethnic and religious groups have provided fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to localise its jihad at Kenya's margins. State security responses that are seen to target Somalis and Muslims more widely play directly into Al-Shabaab's tactical approach to foment a violent insurgency at Kenya's margins.

Patterns of violence in Kenya and calculations by Al-Shabaab bring into question the adequacy of a paradigm that neatly separates between clearly distinguishable 'internal' and 'external' stresses. It is the entwining of the two, and their interconnectedness through transnational actors and processes, that feeds into Kenya's system of violence. While the centre now recognises the interconnectedness between local and regional dynamics in recent attacks, it has pursued a decidedly partisan and divisive approach that is likely to generate further violence rather than strengthen security and stability.

The failings of the state's security responses up to now can be seen through the centre's dogged adherence to a logic of externalising the threat. Nowhere is this clearer than in Kenya's continued military involvement in southern Somalia. Yet, withdrawing troops from Somalia may not necessarily lead to fewer attacks, since Al-Shabaab has localised jihad within Kenya. Rather, the security problem has morphed into one of needing to address divisions within Kenya's political and civil societies and regional imbalances in development.

The legitimate need to strengthen security, while providing support for state interventions that are ostensibly for this purpose, contrasts with the counter-productive targeting of Somalis and Muslims more generally, as well as security measures that impede a wider-reaching constitutional-based solution to worsening violence. Kenya's security will only be strengthened by the pursuit of interrelated political, governance and security reforms addressing violence happening at the country's margins and that have the greatest impacts for its marginalised populations. The report concludes with the following recommendations for macro-level political and policy actions:

- **Redressing regional inequalities and historic marginalisation** by following the moral intent of Kenya's 2010 Constitution and sincerely implementing its provisions to devolve powers and resources to new sub-national county governments
- **Removing institutionalised discrimination of Kenya's Somalis and Muslims** through systematic reforms to un-do 'hierarchies in citizenship', thereby overcoming the inherent limits of existing discrete counter-radicalisation efforts
- **Mobilising political support for security sector and policing reforms** that aim to reign-in abusive, predatory and corrupt practices as well as to promote accountability to a citizenry in need of protection.

# 1 Introduction

Violence has often been close to Kenya's politics and development. The post-election violence following its disputed December 2007 general election results cast a light on Kenya's troubled internal divisions and worsening fragmentation along regional and ethnic lines. The Kofi Annan-brokered agreement to end the violence, and subsequent constitutional and legal reforms, sought to address and mitigate the threat of violence happening in the future through devolution of power to new county-level administrations and the more equitable distribution of public resources for development. Still, Kenya's shaky political settlement for the Rift Valley is steeped in deep political-ethnic divisions that threaten renewed violence.

Elsewhere, in recent years, violence has flared in its peripheral northern counties including Marsabit, Isiolo and Tana River, while sectarian tensions and unexplained attacks have precipitated security crackdowns in Nairobi and Mombasa. These developments belie sweeping reforms that have taken place to address and prevent violence in the country. Scott-Villiers *et al.* (2014: 3) note that the adaptability of Kenya's 'system of violence' is such that 'a positive change in reducing violence in one part of the system often seems to be rapidly overwhelmed by the rule still operating undisturbed in other parts of the system'. They explain that one reason why violence endures in Kenya is the very nature of its kleptocratic politics, in which informal power extends outwards from elites at the centre through a 'rhizomatous' network of administrators, police and security officials, criminal bosses and other business interests at lower levels. Thus, far from being 'settled', violence continues to shape governance structures and political relationships at multiple levels in Kenya.

This study adds to existing analyses of Kenya's politics and political settlement by examining the role of external influences on its system of violence. While most studies dig deeply into Kenya's internal splits and the power of its informal networks to thwart the reforming power of its domestic institutions, less is known about how these networks intersect with actors, processes and flows that extend beyond its borders. Yet, the structuring of its social, political and economic relations both at the centre and periphery, as well as the functioning of its governance structures, depends in part on the power and wealth that different networks accumulate through their many associations with these 'external' factors. For example, Kenyan Somalis have been deeply involved in Somalia's political society through clan networks that span the Kenya-Somalia border, in turn affecting Somalia's security and events (Chau 2010). More than two decades of warfare and violence in Somalia, and reconfigurations over time in the political economy of the conflict, have fed into Kenya's politics at the centre as well as periphery. Further, the presence of Somali refugees in Kenya has also upturned politics in some parts of Kenya, particularly Mandera County in the country's north-east corner.

It follows that the strengthening of Kenya's domestic institutions alone – either at the centre or at new, devolved levels of governance – may not effectively address and mitigate a situation of deeply entrenched, chronic violence. At a minimum, violence mitigation efforts in Kenya must be cognisant of how its political rhizomes function through their connections with actors, processes and flows at regional and global levels, as well as the ways in which these ties both dampen and accentuate the propensity to violence in the system.

This report focuses on linkages between the regional conflict system centring on southern Somalia and Kenya's security and politics. It contributes to a growing number of works that

seek to understand the role of 'external stresses' in situations of violence and political instability. The *World Development Report 2011* (World Bank 2011) singles out a range of 'external stresses', including military invasion, external support for domestic rebels, cross-border conflict spillovers, international terrorism and criminal networks, price shocks, and the impacts of climate change. It posits that the risk of conflict and violence arises from these stresses interacting with 'internal stresses' (low income levels, youth unemployment, corruption, human rights abuses).

While spillovers from Somalia's long conflict destabilise Kenya's security and stability, the enmeshing of 'external' and 'internal' stresses is, in fact, more complex than an external stresses framing might suggest. Since Kenya stepped up its military involvement in Somalia in 2011, ostensibly to buffer the country from attacks by the Somalia-based jihadi organisation, Al-Shabaab, attacks have multiplied, ranging from the September 2013 siege of Nairobi's Westgate shopping centre, to village massacres, to the targeted killings of police and religious figures. Kenya's government, while widening its military engagement in Somalia, was slow to recognise and respond to the hand of Al-Shabaab in the country's widening violent insecurity. However, since 2014, Kenya has stepped up security activities in response to the threat of Al-Shabaab. It has instigated police swoops in majority-Somali neighbourhoods, tightened administrative controls of refugee populations, passed new security laws, and given wide leeway to the Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU) that is tasked with identifying and detaining terror suspects. These responses derive from a discourse and understanding that 'sees' outsiders, namely Somalis and Muslims, as a threat, both internally and with regard to conflict spillovers from Somalia. However, far from strengthening security, these responses dovetail with an unseemly politicisation of worsening violence, deepening entrenched ethnic and regional divides that structure and frame Kenya's system of violence.

Before considering patterns of recent violence and their associations with Al-Shabaab (in Section 3), it is useful to review Kenya's relations historically with Somalia and its Somali population (Section 2). Section 4 details state security responses to the Al-Shabaab threat and worsening violence, while Section 5 critically assesses the impacts of these within the larger frame of Kenya's divided politics. The report concludes with a number of reflections on how to strengthen Kenya's security (Section 6). While Al-Shabaab has succeeded in fomenting fear within Kenya by skilfully picking at its political divisions, a way out of the violence will need to redress the structures that perpetuate the country's deep and widening regional divisions.

### 3 ‘Head in Eastleigh and tail in Somalia’: the threat of Al-Shabaab in Kenya

The social construction of Somalis as a threatening presence plays strongly into Nairobi’s recent security assessments while justifying state responses to worsening violence. Viewed from the perspective of Kenya’s political and security establishments, the country’s peace and stability are undermined by ‘external stresses’ from Somalia’s long-running state collapse and conflict spillovers, as is evident from attacks attributed to Al-Shabaab as well as the group’s business and recruiting activities in Kenya. Announcing an imminent security crackdown in Eastleigh in 2011 to flush out suspected Al-Shabaab members, then Assistant Internal Security Minister Orwa Ojode remarked, ‘This is a big animal with its head in Eastleigh, Nairobi and its tail in Somalia’ (Standard 2011). Strongly derided by Kenya’s Somali leaders and politicians at the time, Ojode’s comments were widely publicised in Kenya because they so transparently revealed the optic informing Nairobi’s approach to reducing the spread of violent insecurity. This section examines more closely the logic underlying Kenya’s security assessments, which have stayed remarkably unchanged over the years. These are considered alongside examination of recent patterns of violence in the country and problems of youth radicalisation.

#### 3.1 External stresses

Protracted warfare and the breakdown of central state authority in Somalia is seen as a significant destabilising ‘external stress’ on Kenya, and the cause of much of its recent worsening violence. As described in Section 2, the construction of Somalis as an ‘outside’ threat to peace and stability has been a distinct characteristic of Kenya’s security thinking over time. The ‘external stresses’ framework continues to function as a platform for addressing violence in the country, as one of our respondents explained: ‘The Kenyan government has been reluctant to say that the terror threat is home grown. Everyone wants to externalise the problem’.<sup>13</sup> Kenyan government officials have long ascribed attacks in the country to a variety of outside forces rather than to radicalised domestic elements. Take, for example, comments by John Sawe, Kenya’s former ambassador to Israel, following the bombing in 2002 by militants of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and attempt to shoot down an Israeli commercial plane: ‘There is no doubt in my mind that al-Qa’eda is behind this attack, because we have no domestic problems, no terrorism in our country, and we have no problem with our neighbours, no problem whatsoever’ (Botha 2014b: 3).

The ‘external stresses’ framework has purchase in wider thinking on addressing and mitigating violence. As stated earlier, the *World Development Report 2011* (World Bank 2011) explains that the risk of conflict and violence arises from the combination of interacting ‘external’ and ‘internal’ stresses. Mitigating the negative effects of external stresses requires, in the *World Development Report’s* analysis, building ‘buffering institutions’ at the national level in the affected countries – to enhance capabilities for coping with stress – and enhancing cooperation with their regional neighbours: ‘Countries and subnational areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses’ (World Bank 2011: 7).

A weakness in this approach is its underlying premise that ‘internal’ and ‘external’ stresses are somehow separate and distinct. However, Schultze-Kraft (2013: 8) shows that the issue is not merely that internal and external stresses combine to generate stress but that they

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Kenyan journalist, Nairobi, 2 July 2014.

'actually *relate to and reinforce one another*, for they are interconnected through *transnational* actors and processes'. Further, states are not only overwhelmed by these transnational dynamics; rather, they actively shape these, as well: 'powerful political and military elites and their patronage-dependent constituencies are actively engaging in processes of... globalisation, seeking to appropriate rents to maintain positions of power and influence through patronage and clientelism' (Schultze-Kraft 2014: 33). He shows that interrelated internal, external and transnational actors drive these processes, which can promote the interests of state and non-state groups both within and outside the country that is thought to be stressed.

For example, Kenya's military operation in southern Somalia under the auspices of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), discussed below, has been dogged by reports that it profits from the illicit trade in charcoal from Kismayo port in southern Somalia as well as the trade in contraband sugar from Somalia into Kenya. Some speculate that Kenya's economic interests in becoming involved militarily in southern Somalia include buffering Lamu on Kenya's north coast, the locus of major infrastructural investment, to establish a port facility and terminus for oil exports. It is also thought that Kenya seeks to strengthen its claims over oil and gas deposits in a contested maritime zone off the coasts of Kenya and Somalia (ICG 2012). Although conventional wisdom is that Kenya has been negatively affected by spillovers from Somalia's conflict, it has benefitted greatly through an influx of Somali capital as well as the relocation of many of Somalia's professional classes to Nairobi and other large Kenyan cities, as well. Further, even before the latest episode of the conflict, the economies of southern Somalia and Kenya were intricately bound through trades in livestock, other agricultural products, charcoal and household goods – with significant benefits of the trade accruing to Kenya-based wholesalers, retailers and transporters.

As detailed below, patterns of violence in Kenya bring into question the adequacy of the World Development Report (WDR) paradigm that separates and distinguishes between 'internal' and 'external' stresses. It is the entwining of the two, and their interconnectedness through transnational actors and processes, that feeds into Kenya's system of violence.

### 3.2 Recent history of attacks

Insecurity has worsened appreciably as terrorist attacks have multiplied in recent years. Interviews with a range of analysts, diplomatic and security officials, and human rights advocates in June and July 2014 point to a deteriorating security situation growing out of hand, an assessment underlined by the November 2014 massacres by Al-Shabaab in Mandera:

*The threat of Al-Shabaab in Kenya is real and worsening. Al-Shabaab were taken back by the reaction to Westgate. It was four guys with guns and it hit the world headlines for days... It gave them a huge profile and funding to launch more attacks inside Kenya. They see there are holes in Kenya's security apparatus and capability. The context is one of huge and growing grievances in Coast, Nairobi and elsewhere. They can train fighters in Somalia and launch attacks here. They can exploit these tensions for their own gain.*

(Interview with European security official, Nairobi, 30 June 2014)

*I think we'll see attacks here, attacks there. They [Al-Shabaab] want to keep the fear up. They want to show that this government can't control national security. But I think there are Kenyan groups coming up who want to destabilise the state. So these networks are working a bit more. I think when you have these high-profile killings of Muslim clerics that it spreads discontent. It helps the groups to mobilise, whether it is Al-Shabaab, splinter groups or sympathisers.*

(Interview with human rights officials, Nairobi, 1 July 2014)

Terrorist violence in Kenya made international headlines when Al-Shabaab militants attacked the upmarket Westgate shopping complex in Nairobi and killed 67 people. Yet, even before the Westgate attack, dozens of attacks were recorded in cities, towns and villages across Kenya, though mostly concentrated in north-eastern and coastal areas. For example, in February 2009, suspected Al-Shabaab militias raided the Dadajabula police post injuring scores of policemen and causing significant damage (*The Star* 2011a). In 2010, militants struck a General Service Unit camp at Liboi injuring several paramilitary officers (*ibid.*). In July 2011, Al-Shabaab planted mines and other explosive devices in Mandera town targeting police and military personnel (*ibid.*). A spate of abductions of tourists and aid workers in September and October 2011 precipitated Kenya's military incursion into southern Somalia, Operation Linda Nchi (or 'Protect the Country'), as discussed in Section 4.

Although ostensibly launched to enhance domestic security, the scope, scale and audacity of Al-Shabaab attacks have worsened since the Operation Linda Nchi invasion in 2011. According to Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Policing Unit (ATPU), over 133 attacks occurred between October 2011 and July 2014, killing 264 and injuring 923 (Standard 2014a). Attacks have multiplied across the country, from bombed markets in Nairobi's working class neighbourhood of Gikomba, to exploding *matatus* [public minibuses] on the city's Thika superhighway, to village massacres. Since the Westgate siege, a series of larger attacks and evidence of planned attacks attest to the expanding operational capabilities of militant organisations.

In March 2014, a massive device made up of 130lb of explosives welded onto a vehicle's rear seats, enough to collapse a multi-storey building, was found in an impounded Toyota at a Mombasa police compound after being discovered by foreign intelligence officials (*Daily Telegraph* 2014). Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the June 2014 massacre in Mpeketoni in Lamu County that left 60 dead. Weeks later, new raids on 5 July in Lamu and Tana River Counties left over 20 dead. As before with the Mpeketoni attack, a heavily armed group came during the night, striking the local police station, torching homes and businesses, while targeting men on a killing spree that was rumoured to last for hours.

While Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for several attacks, the perpetrators of many of these attacks are unknown. This includes the number of the Westgate attackers, which is still unclear. Observers note that responsibility for the attacks can be divided between those directed by Al-Shabaab's command structure in Somalia, by terrorist cells in Kenya, and by criminal organisations intent on exploiting the situation of insecurity in pursuit of political and business agendas (Boru Halakhe 2014). Some respondents differentiated between Al-Shabaab and extremists of various stripes who deploy the organisation's violent tactics in pursuit of a range of aims:

*The Al-Shabaab threat level is high but this is mostly from Al-Shabaab sympathisers. They are taking advantage of the current insecurity to cause mayhem... Note that I call them sympathisers and not Al-Shabaab because I think they do not believe in the ideology, only in the tactics they use.*

(Interview with Kenyan government official, Nairobi, 7 July 2014)

The incidence of copy-cat attacks or vendetta veiled by other violence is an important development that points to the enmeshing of Al-Shabaab with local politics. As explained further below, the greatest threat from Al-Shabaab for Nairobi is how it entwines with and provides a vehicle for Kenya's own dissident actors.

### **3.3 The home-grown threat**

What began as low-profile grenade attacks on common citizens and then assassinations targeting police, religious and business figures, has morphed into a far more threatening

pattern of insecurity that is destabilising a wide area of Kenya's north-eastern and coastal counties. The trend of worsening attacks indicates an escalating campaign of violence whose ultimate goals are unclear. Further, this violence is increasingly entwined with Kenya's deepening regional and ethnic divisions, throwing into question the effectiveness of a strategy to contain 'external stresses' as a way of strengthening security. Security and political analysts in Nairobi shared the following:

*Kenya tells us, 'fix Somalis and then you'll fix our problems, get rid of Somali refugees and you'll fix our problems. We've gone into Somalia to do just that'. That makes them deaf to growing internal dynamics. You could completely seal the border and still have a significant threat in Kenya.*

(Interview with European security official, Nairobi, 30 June 2014)

*There are many reasons why insecurity has suddenly got much worse in Coast and north-east province, but these have nothing to do with Somalia, but rather are to do with contradictory internal policies in Kenya.*

(Interview with political analysts, Nairobi, 3 July 2014)

As these quotes show, the situation in Somalia is marginal relative to other more important drivers of violence in Kenya. These concern its domestic policies, politics and practices, particularly as they relate to uneven development patterns and the treatment of Kenya's Muslim populations.

The appeal of extremism among young people is a significant threat to Kenya's peace and stability. While radicalisation is not a new phenomenon in Kenya, the challenge is widening in a context of a resurgent Al-Shabaab that is actively cultivating associations with Kenyan groups and individuals as part of its regional strategy. Al-Shabaab's recruitment in Kenya can be traced back to the group's beginnings in 2006 following the demise of the Islamic Courts Union, which briefly governed parts of southern Somalia before being removed from power by United States-backed Ethiopian forces.<sup>14</sup> The 2010 United Nations (UN) Monitoring Group on Somalia report singles out the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) at Pumwani Riyadhha Mosque in Nairobi as a recruitment and training centre for would-be Al-Shabaab fighters (UN 2010). One of the MYC officials named in the UN report was picked to head Al-Shabaab's Kenya operations (Standard 2012a). The MYC later emerged as Al Hijra in 2012. It has mobilised over 700 followers to fight in Somalia (Findlay 2014). Activist Salafi-jihadi clerics have used websites and social media to spread their ideology among the Muslim faithful. The magazine *Gaidi Mtaani* as well as videos such as 'Mujahideen Moments' feature Swahili-speaking Kenyan militants who emphasise themes such as the humiliation suffered by Muslims in Kenya, Christian 'occupation' of coastal land, revenge for the killing of prominent preachers, and the liberating potential of violence (Prestholdt 2014). Kenyan and foreign intelligence services have alleged associations between Salafi-jihadi clerics and Al-Shabaab. Since 2012, a "dirty-war" of tit-for-tat killings' has escalated in the coastal counties of Mombasa and Kilifi, but also in Nairobi (ICG 2014: 10), implicating Kenyan security agencies in murderous, covert counter-terrorism operations, as explored below.

The June 2014 massacre in Mpeketoni in coastal Lamu County epitomises the evolving dynamic of Kenya's violent insecurity. Survivors and witnesses described the attackers as being a mix of Somalis, Arabs, English-speaking and local (Mijikenda) people. Many of the attackers spoke Kiswahili, with one local resident telling a Kenyan reporter: 'These people knew people by their names' (Standard 2014b). Al-Shabaab is actively cultivating non-Somali recruits as it expands its regional strategy in the Horn of Africa. Suspects in several past attacks were from various parts of Kenya, including the central and western highlands. For example, a July 2014 report of Kenya's National Intelligence Service copied to all police

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Kenyan Muslim leader, Nairobi, 4 July 2014.

stations in coastal counties identified Idris Kamau, a Kenyan of Kikuyu ethnicity, as the mastermind of the spate of terror attacks in Lamu and Tana River Counties in June and July (Standard 2014c). A report into the Westgate attack tabled by a Joint Parliamentary Committee reported:

Certain segments of Kenya's Muslim youth are becoming more and more at a risk of radicalization and recruitment into extremist groups for various reasons. This is visible because it is not Somali nationals behind most of the terrorist incidents outside Somalia's borders but Kenyan nationals. Though Somalia provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for extremists to fight the 'enemies of Islam', al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have executed attacks in the region by relying on Kenyan youth assistance and support. The Government should therefore strive for strategies that address the youth radicalization.  
(Government of Kenya 2013b: 16)

While awareness is growing of the need to address the problem of young people being drawn to extremist organisations, policy discussions tend to reify 'radicalisation', when in fact it is a compound phenomenon with many disparate antecedents (Botha 2014a). Ideology is part of the radicalisation story in Kenya. Observers trace the radicalisation of Kenya's young Muslims in part to the deepening influence of Wahabism, an orientation of Salafism that informs much of the core theological outlook of jihadi groups such as Al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab (ICG 2014: 8). Wahabi influences can be traced back to the 1970s but really took root in Kenya throughout the 1990s through the work of Saudi-funded charitable organisations such as al-Haramain and the Young Muslim Association, who laid a foundational network of *madrassas* [Islamic religious schools] and orphanages in northern Kenya and the Coast. Many *madrassa* graduates received scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, among other places, and they returned to Kenya where they set up other *madrassas* and charities (*ibid.*). Matters came to a turn in 2006, when many *madrassa* teachers and students travelled to Somalia to fight alongside the Islamic Courts Union.

Yet, more than ideology, our respondents emphasised uneven socioeconomic development and historic marginalisation of some parts of Kenya, as significant drivers of radicalisation, as the following quotes highlight:

*In the past you had a few Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, such as grenade attacks. Now it is tying into local grievances much more, organising more sophisticated attacks and targeting upcountry people. It realises you can both mobilise support locally by conducting those type of attacks using those types of grievances but you do it by hitting people close to government [Kikuyu people] and in Lamu [hit tourism].*  
(Interview with political scientist, Nairobi, 10 July 2014)

*Al-Shabaab thrives on vulnerable people. The Coast has been marginalised for some time. In Coast, there are resources, but they have a marginalised population. So it is ripe for Al-Shabaab to infiltrate and thrive on those factors. In Lamu there are historical injustices. Mzee Kenyatta created an avenue for his own people to displace the indigenous in Lamu. During the Kibaki era, the Kikuyu got an upper hand. They got access to financial institutions and infrastructure. This has created a huge division... With Al-Shabaab now coming across the border, and the injustices present at the Coast, the resources that are available, people want a hand. Al-Shabaab is recruiting off of Swahili land grievances, it is arming them, giving them an ideology that 'your land has been taken away'.*  
(Interview with Kenyan-Somali professional, Nairobi, 9 July 2014)



*I think 50 per cent of attacks are carried out by local jihadi groups in northern Kenya and the Coast. Al-Shabaab is basically instrumentalising grievances. Its work is much easier, it realises. It doesn't even need to use its own resources. This is a very conducive territory for them to operate – to seek shelter, hide, and find individuals who sympathise with their aim of destabilising the state.*  
(Interview with Kenyan journalist, Nairobi, 2 July 2014)

These views dovetail with the findings of recent research by Botha (2014a, 2014b) and ICG (2014), as well as Anderson and McKnight (2014). They argue:

*Al-Shabaab is likely to exploit the deeply rooted disaffection amongst the peoples of the Kenya coast and north-east in gaining recruits to its banner. These affiliates may only see Al-Shabaab's black standard as a temporary flag of convenience, but that may be enough to incubate and evolve an Al-Shabaab-led insurgency within Kenya.*  
(Anderson and McKnight 2014: 3)

Al-Shabaab's skilful manipulation of historic injustices and socioeconomic inequities as well as the treatment of minority groups mirrors the group's political strategy in southern Somalia, as our respondents explained:

*Al-Shabaab has been able to persist in Somalia by manipulating clan tensions and differences. That is how it is still there. It has become part of local reconciliation dialogue because it plays on those tensions, and assists those groups who are having problems. The tradeoff is that they support Al-Shabaab and provide new recruits. So if it is true [that Al-Shabaab is playing off local grievances in Kenya], this would mirror how the group operates in Somalia.*  
(Interview with human rights officials, Nairobi, 1 July 2014)

*They want to exploit local grievances and show they are fighting with them [local communities]. They did the same thing in Somalia. They said everyone is equal, there is no majority or minority community. They said everyone is equal, that is what our religion says. That is how people began to accept them... If it comes to the issue of appointment to political offices, Al-Shabaab tries to take a mix from all groups, so even those who were excluded can hold office. That is how they thrived and expanded.*  
(Interview with Kenyan-Somali professional, Nairobi, 9 July 2014)

*Al-Shabaab have used minority clans in Somalia and given them a voice. I wouldn't be surprised if they do this in northern Kenya.*  
(Interview with European donor agency official, Nairobi, 30 June 2014)

That far more complex dynamics are at play in recent violence than infiltration by Al-Shabaab operatives came to the fore during the June and July 2014 attacks in Lamu and Tana River Counties. Claiming responsibility for the first attack in Mpeketoni, Al-Shabaab proved deft at weaving together local grievances as well as regional cleavages. A statement explained why the insurgents raided Mpeketoni (a settlement scheme established in the 1960s for Gikuyu from the central highlands) – because 'it was originally a Muslim town before it was invaded and occupied by Christian settlers' (Analo 2014), adding that the attack was 'revenge for the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia and the killing of Muslims' (BBC News 2014a).

Weeks later, new raids on 5 July on the settlements of Hindi in Lamu and Gamba in Tana River left over 20 dead. Less than a day after the raids, Deputy Inspector General of the Police, Grace Kaindi, claimed in a press briefing that the outlawed Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) was behind the attacks. This was despite a broadcast on an Al-Shabaab-

affiliated radio station which stated that it was responsible for the Hindi attack (no group immediately came forward to claim responsibility for the Gamba attack). Explaining the police thinking, Kaindi revealed that a board was placed at a road junction, with the following message scrawled in chalk:

<i>Raila Tosha</i>	<i>(Raila is enough, the one who should lead)</i>
<i>MRC munalala</i>	<i>(MRC is sleeping)</i>
<i>Waislamu Ardizenu</i>	<i>(Muslims, it's your land)</i>
<i>Sina nyakuliwa</i>	<i>(Your land is being taken away)</i>
<i>Amkeni mupigane</i>	<i>(Wake up and fight)</i>
<i>you invade Muslim county</i>	
<i>and you want to stay in peace</i>	
<i>Kick Christians out Coast</i>	
<i>Uhuru down</i>	

The attacks in Lamu and Tana River – more than retribution for Kenya's military operation in southern Somalia – exposed Al-Shabaab's efforts to square long-standing marginalisation and historic injustices in Kenya's coastal areas with the organisation's regional jihadist agenda. They revealed the ease with which Al-Shabaab could exploit simmering sectarian divisions and local political disputes through providing arms, other tactical support, salaries for fighters, as well as an ideological edifice on which to hang deeply held grievances.

Mounting evidence of an enmeshing of 'external' and 'internal' stresses raises the need for more methodical and careful intelligence gathering. It also calls for a strategic rethink and different methods to address and mitigate violence, as explored in the following sections.

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**Annex 142**

“Extremists attack Kenya military base, 3 Americans killed”, *AP News*, 5 January 2020

# Extremists attack Kenya military base, 3 Americans killed

By ABDI GULED, TOM ODULA and CARA ANNA January 5, 2020



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NAIROBI, Kenya (AP) — Al-Shabab extremists overran a key military base used by U.S. counterterror forces in Kenya before dawn Sunday, killing three American Department of Defense personnel and destroying several U.S. aircraft and vehicles before they were repelled, U.S. and Kenyan authorities said.

The attack on the Manda Bay Airfield was the al-Qaida-linked group's first attack against U.S. forces in the East African country, and the military called the security situation "fluid" several hours after the assault.

Five attackers were killed, Kenyan military spokesman Paul Njuguna said.

Al-Shabab, based in neighboring Somalia, claimed responsibility for the assault.

One U.S. serviceman and two contractors with the U.S. Department of Defense were killed in the fighting, according to a statement issued late Sunday by the U.S. Africa Command, or Africom.

The attack on the compound "involved indirect and small arms fire. After an initial penetration of the perimeter, Kenya Defense Forces and U.S. Africa Command repelled the al-Shabaab attack," said the AFRICOM statement. "Reports indicate that six contractor-operated civilian aircraft were damaged to some degree. Manda Bay Airfield is utilized by U.S. forces whose missions include providing training to our African partners, responding to crises, and protecting U.S. interests in this strategically important area."

Al-Shabab claimed that there were 17 U.S. casualties, nine Kenyan soldiers killed and seven aircraft destroyed. The U.S. Africa Command dismissed the al-Shabab claims as exaggerated and said U.S. and Kenyan forces repelled the attack.

Kenya is a key base for fighting al-Shabab, one of the world's most resilient extremist organizations. A large plume of black smoke rose above the airfield Sunday and residents said a car bomb had exploded. Lamu county commissioner Irungu Macharia told The Associated Press that five suspects were arrested and were being interrogated.

An internal Kenyan police report seen by the AP said two fixed-wing aircraft, a U.S. Cessna and a Kenyan one, were destroyed along with two U.S. helicopters and multiple U.S. vehicles at the military airstrip. The report said explosions were heard at around 5:30 a.m. from the direction of the airstrip.

The Kenya Civil Aviation Authority said the airstrip was closed for all operations.

The military's Camp Simba in Lamu county, established more than a decade ago, has under 100 U.S. personnel, according to Pentagon figures. U.S. forces at the adjoining Manda Bay airfield train and give counterterror support to East African partners. A U.S. flag-raising at the camp in August signaled its change "from tactical to enduring operations," the Air Force said at the time.

According to another internal Kenyan police report seen by the AP, dated Friday, a villager that day said he had spotted 11 suspected al-Shabab members entering Lamu's Boni forest, which the extremists have used as a hideout. The report said Kenyan authorities didn't find them.

Al-Shabab has launched a number of attacks inside Kenya, including against civilian buses, schools and shopping malls. The group has been the target of a growing number of U.S. airstrikes inside Somalia during President Donald Trump's administration.

Last year, al-Shabab attacked a U.S. military base inside Somalia, Baledogle, that is used to launch drone strikes but reportedly failed to make their way inside. The extremist group also has carried out multiple attacks against Kenyan troops in the past in retaliation for Kenya sending troops to Somalia to fight it.

This attack marks a significant escalation of al-Shabab's campaign of attacks inside Kenya, said analyst Andrew Franklin, a former U.S. Marine and longtime Kenya resident.

"Launching a deliberate assault of this type against a well-defended permanent base occupied by (Kenya Defence Forces), contractors and U.S. military personnel required a great deal of planning, rehearsals, logistics and operational capability," he said. Previous attacks against security forces have mainly been ambushes on Kenyan army or police patrols.

The Sunday attack came days after a U.S. airstrike killed Iran's top military commander and Iran vowed retaliation, but al-Shabab is a Sunni Muslim group and there is no sign of links to Shiite Iran or proxies.

"No, this attack was no way related to that incident" in the Middle East, an al-Shabab spokesman told the AP on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

One analyst, Rashid Abdi, in Twitter posts discussing the attack, agreed, but added that Kenyan security services have long been worried that Iran was trying to cultivate ties with al-Shabab.

"Avowedly Wahhabist Al-Shabaab not natural ally of Shia Iran, hostile, even. But if Kenyan claims true, AS attack may have been well-timed to signal to Iran it is open for tactical alliances," he wrote.

But a former member of the U.N. committee monitoring sanctions on Somalia, Jay Bahadur, said in a tweet that "the attack is far more related to AS wanting a do over on their spectacular failure at Baledogle four months ago."

When asked whether the U.S. military was looking into any Iranian link to the attack, U.S. Africa Command spokesman Col. Christopher Karns said only that "al-Shabab, affiliated with al-Qaida, has their own agenda and have made clear their desire to attack U.S. interests."

The al-Shabab claim of responsibility said Sunday's attack was part of its "Jerusalem will never be Judaized" campaign, a rarely made reference that also was used after [al-Shabab's deadly attack on a luxury mall complex](#) in Kenya's capital, Nairobi, in January 2019.

Somalia's government, which is fighting al-Shabab with the help of a multinational African force, The Federal Republic of Somalia joins the rest of the world in condemning the cowardly attack that targeted joint Kenyan and U.S forces based at Manda Bay Airfield, Kenya earlier today.

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Anna contributed from Johannesburg

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**Annex 143**

“3 Americans die in Shabab attack on Kenyan base”, *The New York Times*, 5 January 2020

## 3 Americans Die in Shabab Attack on Kenyan Base

A service member and two contractors became the first American military-related deaths in Africa since 2018.



By Eric Schmitt and Thomas Gibbons-Neff

Jan. 5, 2020

WASHINGTON — A United States service member and two American military contractors died on Sunday in an attack on a Kenyan military base that the Pentagon said was carried out by the Islamic extremist group the Shabab.

The attack at the military airstrip at Manda Bay, Kenya, early Sunday involved small-arms and other hostile fire, according to a statement by the military's Africa Command. Fighters from the Shabab, an East African terrorist group affiliated with Al Qaeda, fought their way onto the base before Kenyan and American troops drove them back.

In the past several years, Manda Bay was used by Army Green Berets as an outstation where they both trained Kenyan Rangers — who had their own training center there — and supervised them as they crossed over the border into neighboring Somalia to fight the Shabab.

But recently, the Green Berets were replaced with units from both the Navy SEALs and Marine Special Operations teams. According to military officials, the base has been problematic at best, with cross-border operations rarely going ahead as planned, prompting American officials to consider ending their use of parts of the base altogether.

The deaths of the three Americans, whose identities were not made public pending notification of their families, were the first United States military-related deaths in Africa since an Army Special Forces soldier, Staff Sgt. Alex Conrad, died from wounds he received during a firefight with Shabab fighters in June 2018, at a small outpost near the town of Jamaame, Somalia, about 200 miles southwest of Mogadishu, the capital.

The attack in Kenya comes about a week after an explosives-laden truck blew up at a busy intersection in Mogadishu, killing at least 79 people, the latest sign of resurgent militant activity in a country plagued by an enduring strain of violent extremism. Authorities believe that attack was also carried out by Shabab fighters.

American military officials said they assessed that the attack in Kenya was not related to soaring tensions between the United States and Iran after an American drone strike last week that killed Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, one of Iran's top generals.

In Kenya, about 200 American soldiers, airmen, sailors and Marines, as well as about 100 Pentagon civilian employees and contractors, are helping train and assist Kenyan forces, who are battling local cells of the Shabab. American officials said that local Shabab fighters most likely carried out the attack on Sunday.

The Africa Command's statement said that six contractor-operated civilian aircraft were damaged, but The Associated Press, citing an internal Kenyan police report, said the damage was much more extensive, including two American helicopters and multiple American vehicles at the airstrip. An American official said five Shabab fighters were killed in the early-morning firefight.

"We will pursue those responsible for this attack and al-Shabab, who seeks to harm Americans and U.S. interests," Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, the head of the Africa Command, said in the statement. "We remain committed to preventing al-Shabab from maintaining a safe haven to plan deadly attacks against the U.S. homeland, East African and international partners."

The Pentagon is weighing whether to sharply reduce or pull out several hundred American troops stationed in West Africa as the first phase of a global reshuffling of United States forces. But Defense Department officials said it was less likely that troops would be withdrawn from Somalia because — as the recent attacks by Shabab fighters gruesomely underscore — security in the country remains fraught.

General Townsend is scheduled to testify to Congress later this month during annual hearings for each of the Pentagon's worldwide commands. He is expected to face tough questioning from lawmakers about the Pentagon's planning for the continent.

The Pentagon carried out 63 drone strikes in Somalia last year — almost all against Shabab militants, with a few against a branch of the Islamic State. That compares with 47 strikes against the Shabab in 2018.

**Annex 144**

“Piracy and armed robbery against ships – report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2019”, *ICC International Maritime Bureau*, January 2020 (Extracts)





**ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU**

**PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY  
AGAINST SHIPS**

**REPORT FOR THE PERIOD**

**1 January – 31 December 2019**

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January 2020

## INTRODUCTION

The ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialised division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The IMB is a not-for-profit organisation, established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractice. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in its resolution A 504 (XII) (5) and (9) adopted on 20 November 1981, has *inter alia*, urged governments, stakeholders and organisation to co-operate and exchange information with each other, and the IMB, with a view of maintaining and developing a coordinated action in combating maritime fraud.

This report is an analysis of world-wide reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships from 1 January to 31 December 2019.

Outrage in the shipping industry at the alarming growth in piracy prompted the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in October 1992 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The key services of the PRC are:

- Issuing daily status reports on piracy and armed robbery to ships via broadcasts on the Inmarsat-C SafetyNET service
- Reporting piracy and armed robbery at sea incidents to law enforcement and the IMO
- Helping local law enforcement apprehend pirates and assist in bringing them to justice
- Assisting shipowners whose vessels have been attacked or hijacked
- Assisting crewmembers whose vessels have been attacked
- Providing updates on pirate activity via the Internet
- Publishing comprehensive quarterly and annual reports detailing piracy statistics

The services of the PRC are provided free of charge to all ships irrespective of their ownership or flag.

The IMB also locates ships seized by pirates and recovers stolen cargoes on a chargeable basis.

The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre can be contacted at:

**ICC International Maritime Bureau (Asia Regional Office)**

**PO Box 12559, 50782 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia**

**Tel +60 3 2078 5763**

**Fax +60 3 2078 5769**

**E-mail: [imbkl@icc-ccs.org](mailto:imbkl@icc-ccs.org)**

**24 Hours Anti Piracy HELPLINE Tel: ++ 60 3 2031 0014**

Piracy report on the Internet: The IMB posts updates of attacks at [www.icc-ccs.org](http://www.icc-ccs.org). By posting the information on the internet, ship owners and authorities ashore as well as ships at sea can access these updates regularly and make informed decisions and assess associated risks with certain sea areas.

Sometimes, incidents occurring in the previous quarter(s) are reported to the PRC after a time lag. This late reporting of incidents results in changes to the figures in the tables. The PRC has, as at 31 December 2019, received reports of 162 incidents, but may receive details of more in the coming months relating to the same period.

Due to the continued debate concerning the Malacca Straits, these incident narrations are shown separately. Similarly, because of the vast area affected by Somali pirates, these incidents are grouped together with the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in the narrations section.

## DEFINITIONS OF PIRACY & ARMED ROBBERY

Piracy is defined in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Armed Robbery defined by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in its 26<sup>th</sup> Assembly session as Resolution A.1025 (26).

Article 101 of UNCLOS defines Piracy as:

*Definition of Piracy consists of any of the following acts:*

*a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed-*

*(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;*

*(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;*

*(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;*

*(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).*

The IMO defines Armed Robbery in Resolution A.1025 (26) “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” as:

*Armed robbery against ships” means any of the following acts:*

*.1 any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;*

*.2 any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above*

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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- ANIA
- Assuranceforeningen Skuld
- Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited
- Collecte Localisation Satellites - CLS
- Gard AS
- Japan P&I Club
- Justships Ltd
- Merchant Shipping Cyprus
- Standard Steam Ship Mutual P&I Association
- Steam Ship Insurance Management Services Limited
- The North of England P&I Association Ltd

The PRC is additionally non-financially supported by:

- ExactEarth ([www.exactearth.com](http://www.exactearth.com))
- Vesseltracker ([www.vesseltracker.com](http://www.vesseltracker.com))

**TABLE 1: Locations of ACTUAL and ATTEMPTED attacks, January – December: 2015 – 2019**

	<b>Location</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	
<b>S E ASIA</b>	Indonesia	108	49	43	36	25	
	Malacca Straits	5					
	Malaysia	13	7	7	11	11	
	Philippines	11	10	22	10	5	
	Singapore Straits	9	2	4	3	12	
	Thailand	1					
<b>EAST ASIA</b>	China	4	7	2	3	3	
	Vietnam	27	9	2	4	2	
<b>INDIAN SUB</b>	Bangladesh	11	3	11	12		
<b>CONTINENT</b>	India	13	14	4	6	4	
<b>SOUTH AMERICA</b>	Brazil				4	2	
	Colombia	5	4	6	1	3	
	Dominican Republic					1	
	Ecuador			2	4	3	
	Guyana		2	1	2		
	Haiti	2	4	1	3	2	
	Mexico		1			1	
	Panama					1	
	Peru		11	2	4	10	
	Venezuela	1	5	12	11	6	
	<b>AFRICA</b>	Algeria					1
		Angola		2	1		
		Benin		1		5	3
		Cameroon	1			7	6
Dem. Republic of Congo		3	2		1	1	
Dem. Rep. of Sao Tome & Principe				1		1	
Egypt		1					
Equatorial Guinea						2	
Gabon						1	
Ghana		2	3	1	10	3	
Guinea		3	3	2	3	2	
Gulf of Aden*			1	3	1		
Ivory Coast		1	1	1	1	1	
Kenya		2	2	1		1	
Liberia		2				2	
Morocco			1			2	
Mozambique		1	1	2	2	3	
Nigeria		14	36	33	48	35	
Red Sea*				1			
Senegal				1			
Sierra Leone				4		1	
Somalia*			1	5	2		
South Africa			1				
The Congo	5	6	1	6	3		
Togo		1		1	3		
<b>REST OF</b>	Oman			1			
<b>WORLD</b>	Papua New Guinea	1					
	Yemen		1	3			
<b>Total at year end</b>		<b>246</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>162</b>	

All incidents with \* above are attributed to Somali pirates

***OFF SOMALIA / GULF OF ADEN / RED SEA ATTACK FIGURES UPDATE***

**From 1 January to 31 December 2019, no incidents were reported to the IMB PRC for Somalia and Gulf of Aden.**

**The international navies patrolling these waters continue to coordinate and liaise with merchant and fishing fleets to identify and apprehend pirate action groups.**

**All vessels are advised and encouraged to adhere to the BMP 5 recommendations while transiting these waters. Vessels employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) should be cautious and not mistake fishermen for pirates in some heavy fishing areas.**

**As the IMB PRC continues to monitor the situation in the region, it cautions ship owners and masters against complacency. Somali pirates still retain the capability and capacity to carry out incidents.**

**The IMB PRC supports and compliments the role of the international navies, by relaying all reports received, to the response agencies as well as by broadcasting alerts to ships via the GMDSS Safety Net Service**

## **PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY PRONE AREAS AND WARNINGS**

*All ships are advised to report all attacks and suspicious sightings to local Authorities, flag state and to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre as per IMO Cir 1334.*

*Mariners are warned to be extra cautious and to take necessary precautionary measures when transiting the following areas:*

### **SOUTH EAST ASIA AND INDIAN SUB CONTINENT**

**Bangladesh:** Robbers normally target ships at anchor. Most incidents reported are at Chittagong anchorages and approaches. Incidents in Bangladesh have fallen significantly over the past few years because of the efforts by the Bangladesh Authorities.

**Indonesia:** Tanjung Priok – Jakarta, Belawan, Batu Ampar/Batam anchorage and surrounding waters. Pirates / robbers are normally armed with guns / knives and / or machetes. Generally, be vigilant in other areas. Many incidents may have gone unreported. Pirates / robbers normally attack vessel during the night. When spotted and alarm is sounded, the pirates / robbers usually escape without confronting the crew. Therefore, a strict anti-piracy watch is recommended.

Recent meetings and continued dialog between the Indonesian Marine Police (IMP) and the IMB PRC resulted in positive actions by the Indonesian Authorities, which have so far brought incidents down. With the assistance and actions of the IMP, the incidents appear to be decreasing each quarter with great success.

The Indonesian Marine Police have advised all ships intending to anchor to do so at / near the following areas where Indonesian Marine Police will conduct patrols for greater protection.

1. Belawan: 03:55.00N-098:45.30E
2. Dumai: 01:42.00N-101:28.00E
3. Nipah: 01:07.30N-103:37.00E
4. Tanjung Berakit/Bintan: 01:23.30N - 104:42.30E
5. Tanjung Priok: 06:00.30S-106:54.00E
6. Gresik: 07:09.00S-112:40.00E
7. Taboneo: 03:41.30S-114:28.00E
8. Adang bay: 01:40.00S-116:40.00E
9. Muara Berau: 00:17.00S-117:36.00E
10. Balikpapan: 01:22.00S-116:53.00E

The Indonesian Authorities have officially advised IMB that in accordance with the Road Map Program Police Reforms Wave III, the above given ten locations prevention action of sea robbery/piracy in Indonesian waters will continue.

Ships are advised to maintain strict anti-piracy watch and measures and report all incidents and suspicious sightings to the local authorities and the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. The IMB PRC will also liaise with the local authorities to render necessary assistance.

**Malacca Straits:** Although the number of incidents has dropped substantially (2016, 2017 and 2018 recorded zero incidents) due to the increased and aggressive patrols by the littoral states' authorities since July 2005, ships are advised to continue maintaining strict anti-piracy / robbery watches when transiting the Straits. Currently, there are no indications as to how long

these patrols will continue or reduce. In some cases, incidents may have gone unreported. Situation currently remains stable.

**Malaysia:** Bandar Penawar, Johor - vessels attacked at anchorage. Off Tanjung Piai – vessels attacked while underway.

In/off Eastern Sabah – Militant activities resulting in a number of tugs/barges/fishing vessels being attacked and crews kidnapped. There were two kidnapping incidents in 2018 and two in 2019 off Tambisan, Sabah. The local Authorities have beefed up patrols. The IMB PRC is monitoring the situation. Merchant vessels are also at risk.

Ships are advised to take precautionary measures and maintain strict anti-piracy watch and measures. Vessels transiting these waters should refer to the Sabah Notice to Mariners NTM 14 of 2017 on the Ship Reporting System. Vessels are also urged to monitor the IMB PRC Warnings on potential incidents locations issued by the Philippines and Malaysian Intel.

**Philippines:** Pirates/Militants in the southern Philippines conduct attacks on vessels in/off Sibutu passage / off Sibutu island / Tawi Tawi / Sulu sea / Celebes sea / off eastern Sabah. They attacked tugs / barges / fishing vessels / yachts / merchant ships to rob and kidnap crews for ransom.

These kidnappings by militants have stopped (for merchant ships) since March 2017. In 2018 there were two incidents where crews were kidnapped off Sabah and two in 2019 where small vessels like tugs and fishing boats were targeted. These kidnappers are believed to be affiliated to the ASG.

Vessels are advised to take precautionary measures and maintain strict anti-piracy watch and measures. Vessels transiting these waters should refer to the Sabah Notice to Mariners NTM 14 of 2017 on the Ship Reporting System. Vessels are also urged to monitor the IMB PRC Warnings on potential incidents locations issued by the Philippines Intel.

Batangas/Tabangas – Be vigilant. A number of incidents / robberies have been recorded in the past few years.

**Singapore Straits:** General Warning issued in December 2019 indicating sudden rise in attacks in Singapore Straits, especially during the night. Within a space of a few weeks, twelve incidents were recorded. Many more may have gone unreported. It appears one or more groups are targeting passing ships. Authorities notified. Vessels are advised to remain vigilant and to continue maintaining adequate security watches and measures while transiting these waters. The perpetrators attack ships underway or at anchor, especially during the night. They usually abort the attempted attack once spotted and the alarm is sounded.

**South China Sea:** Although incidents have dropped significantly in the vicinity off Tioman / off Pulau Aur / off Anambas / Natuna / Mangkai islands / Subi Besar / Merundung areas, vessels are advised to continue to remain vigilant, especially during the night. In the past, several hijackings of small product tankers occurred off the coast of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and in the South China Sea area. This trend started in April 2014, but the hijackings stopped abruptly in late 2015. The IMB is monitoring the situation. It has been reported that some criminals have been arrested by local Authorities both in Malaysia and in Indonesia.



There were three incidents reported in 2017 where two tankers were hijacked off Kuantan / Off Pulau Aur / East coast Malaysia.

### **AFRICA AND RED SEA**

**Benin** (Cotonou): Incidents have increased at Benin anchorage. In 2018, within a period of several weeks, five incidents were reported at Benin anchorage. In 2019, 35 crew have been reported kidnapped in three incidents. In the past; ships, especially gas oil tankers were hijacked and forced to sail out of Benin anchorage. It is believed that ransom was paid for their release.

Past incidents showed that the pirates / robbers in this area are well armed and violent. In some cases, ships have been fired upon. The pirates forced masters to sail to unknown locations where the ship's properties and sometimes part cargo was stolen (gas oil). Crewmembers have also been injured.

**Cameroon** (Idenao / Douala): Attacks/kidnappings incidents are increasing. Latest Warning issued showed kidnapping of crews at Anchorage and in/off Cameroon. Thirty-one crews have been kidnapped.

**Equatorial Guinea:** Two incidents occurred around 40nm from Luba involving hijacking and the other boarded with criminal intentions.

**Ghana** (Takoradi): Robberies have been reported at the anchorages.

**Guinea** (Conakry): Robberies have been reported at the anchorages.

**Ivory Coast** (Abidjan): Incidents dropped but remains risky.

**Nigeria** (Lagos/Apapa, Off Bayelsa / Brass / Bonny Island / Port Harcourt): Pirates / robbers are often well armed, violent and have attacked and hijacked / robbed ships / kidnapped crews along / far from the coast, rivers, anchorages, ports and surrounding waters. In the past, incidents reported up to about 170nm from the coast. In many past incidents, pirates hijacked the vessels for several days, ransacked the vessels and stole part cargo, usually gas oil. Several crews were also injured and kidnapped in these incidents. Generally, all waters in / off Nigeria remain risky. Vessels are advised to be vigilant, as many incidents may have gone unreported. Incidents continue to rise substantially, especially kidnapping of crews for ransom. Vessels are advised to take additional measures in these high-risk waters.

**Togo** (Lome): Attacks reported at anchorage and in/off Togo. There were seven crews reported kidnapped. The area remains at risk. In the past, pirates / robbers in this area are well armed, violent and dangerous. Incidents can occur at anchorages and off the coast and usually at night. Some past incidents resulted in vessels being hijacked for several days and ransacked and part cargo stolen (gas oil).

**The Congo:** Pointe Noire/Off Point – attacks increasing.

**Red Sea / Gulf of Aden / Somalia / Arabian Sea / Indian Ocean:** No reported attacks in 2019. In 2018, three vessels have reported being fired upon in this region. Although the

opportunity for incidents has reduced, the Somali pirates continue to possess the capability and capacity to carry out incidents. All merchant ships are advised to adhere to the latest recommendations in BMP 5, while transiting these waters. The IMB PRC will continue to alert and broadcast information to all ships in the region via GMDSS.

The threat of these incidents still exists in the waters off the southern Red Sea / Bab el Mandeb, Gulf of Aden including Yemen and the northern Somali coast, Arabian sea / off Oman, Gulf of Oman and off the eastern and southern Somali coast. In the past vessels have been attacked off Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mozambique as well as in the Indian ocean and off the west and south coasts of India and west Maldives.

Somali pirates tend to be well armed with automatic weapons, RPGs and sometimes use skiffs launched from mother vessels, which may be hijacked fishing vessels or dhows. Masters and ship owners are encouraged to register and report their vessels as per the BMP 5 procedures and ensure that their vessel is hardened prior to entering the high-risk area. While transiting through these waters it is essential to maintain a 24-hour visual and radar watch. Keeping in mind the warnings and alerts for the area, an early sighting / detection of an approaching skiff will enable an accurate assessment, allowing the Master and PCASP to make informed decisions to keep clear of small boats, dhows, fishing vessels and if necessary take evasive actions and request assistance as needed.

Masters are reminded that fishermen in this region may try to protect their nets by attempting to aggressively approach merchant vessels. Some of the fishermen may be armed to protect their catch and they should not be confused with pirates.

**Vessels transiting in / off Yemen:** Security risk due to civil war in Yemen (not piracy related)  
**Vessels transiting Strait of Hormuz / Gulf of Oman / Off Iran** – Two incidents involving explosions on tanker reported (not piracy related).

## **SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN WATERS**

**Haiti:** Port Au Prince

**Peru** (Callao): Incidents increasing. Robbery incidents continuing. Maintain vigilant watch and anti-piracy measures.

**Venezuela** (Puerto La Cruz / Puerto Jose): Robbery incidents still occurring. Ships are reminded to maintain strict anti-piracy watch and measures especially at anchor.

### **Reporting of incidents**

All incidents (actual and attempted) and suspicious sightings should be reported to local authorities, flag states and to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre as per IMO Cir 1334. Ships are advised to maintain strict anti-piracy watches and measures especially in high risk waters.

**Tel:** +60 3 2078 5763    **Fax:** +60 3 2078 5769    **E-mail:** [imbkl@icc-ccs.org](mailto:imbkl@icc-ccs.org)

**The Centre's 24 Hours Anti-Piracy HELPLINE is: +60 3 2031 0014**

***IMB Maritime Security Hotline***

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has also launched a dedicated hotline for seafarers, port workers, shipping agents, shipyard personnel, brokers, stevedores, and all concerned parties to report any information that they may have seen / heard / known etc. relating to maritime crime and security including terrorism, piracy and other illegal activities.

All information received will be treated in strict confidence and will be passed on to relevant Authorities for further action. Maritime crime and security concerns us all and with your help, we can try to minimize the risks and help save lives and property.

The Maritime Security Hotline can be contacted 24 hours every day at:

Tel: +60 3 2031 0014 Fax: +60 3 2078 5769 E-mail: [imbsecurity@icc-ccs.org](mailto:imbsecurity@icc-ccs.org)

**REMEMBER: Your information may save lives. All information will be treated in strict confidence.**

## **TRENDS**

The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) has received 162 incidents of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in 2019, compared to 201 for 2018. The 2019 figures are broken down as four vessels hijacked, 17 attempted attacks, 130 vessels boarded and, 11 vessels fired upon.

Whilst the reduction in the overall numbers is welcomed, the IMB PRC is extremely concerned over certain spikes in different parts of the world.

In 2019, an unprecedented number of crew were kidnapped from their vessels – with 134 crew taken in 19 separate incidents.

The Gulf of Guinea accounts for over 90% of global crew kidnappings and has increased more than 50% year on year – with 121 crew taken in 2019 compared to 78 in 2018. The kidnapping of crew is not just a phenomenon faced by one sector of shipping. All types of vessels have been targeted at various distances from the coastline.

The last quarter has seen 64 crew kidnapped in the Gulf of Guinea in six separate incidents – with 19 and 20 crew taken in two incidents in the first half of December. Both incidents were more than 100 NM from the coast. Whilst contributing to the overall numbers, there can be no doubt that the Gulf of Guinea presents a serious and immediate threat to the safety and security of crews and vessels operating in the region.

All four vessel hijackings occurred in the Gulf of Guinea along with ten of the 11 vessels that reported coming under fire.

There has also been a recent spike in activity in the Singapore Straits with 11 of the 12 incidents for 2019 reported in the last quarter. Vessels whilst underway were successfully boarded in ten incidents. The attacks are low level – i.e aimed at armed theft from the vessel - and tend to take place in the hours of darkness. At least seven crew have been taken hostage. The attackers are normally armed with knives and guns. This is a distraction for the crew in control of the vessel whilst navigating through congested waters. The IMB PRC is grateful to Singapore law enforcement agencies for responding promptly to some of these incidents.

Ten low level incidents are recorded for Callao anchorage in Peru – with five reported in the last quarter. Attacks in Indonesian ports have further decreased from 36 incidents in 2018 to 25 in 2019. There has been a noticeable year on year decrease in these attacks thanks to the continued efforts of the Indonesian Marine Police.

Zero incidents were received in 2019 for Somalia. The IMB PRC advises that Somali pirates continue to possess the capacity to carry out attacks in the Somali basin and wider Indian Ocean and therefore continues to recommend that Masters and crew maintain vigilance and remain cautious when transiting these waters.

Similarly, zero incidents have been received from Bangladesh.

Since 1991 the IMB PRC's 24-hour manned centre, has provided the maritime industry, governments and response agencies with timely and transparent data on piracy and armed robbery incidents – received directly from the Master of the vessel or its owners.


The IMB PRC's prompt forwarding of reports and liaison with response agencies, its broadcasts to shipping via Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) Safety Net Services and email alerts to Company Security Officers, all provided free of cost, has helped the response against piracy and armed robbery and the security of seafarers, globally.

IMB strongly urges all shipmasters and owners to report all actual, attempted and suspected global piracy and armed robbery incidents to the IMB PRC. This first step in the response chain is vital to ensuring that adequate resources are allocated by authorities to tackle piracy. Transparent statistics from an independent, non-political, international organization can act as a catalyst to achieve this goal.



# IMB Piracy Report – January to December 2019


 = Attempted Attack     = Boarded     = Fired upon     = Hijacked     = Suspicious vessel



**Total number of attacks – 162**



# IMB Piracy Report – January to December 2019

 = Attempted Attack   
  = Boarded   
  = Fired upon   
  = Hijacked   
  = Suspicious vessel



**Total attacks Red Sea / Gulf of Aden – 0**

**Total attacks east coast Somalia / Arabian Sea – 0**

**Annex 145**

K. Scott, "Prosecuting pirates: lessons learned and continuing challenges", *Oceans Beyond Piracy*, 2014 (Extracts)



# PROSECUTING PIRATES: LESSONS LEARNED AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES



a Research Report by  
**Kenneth Scott**



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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**Kenneth Scott:** Lecturer and consultant on international humanitarian law, international courts and criminal law; Senior Trial Attorney, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, January 1998 - September 2011; Assistant U.S. Attorney and Chief, Complex Prosecutions Section, U.S. Department of Justice (1985-1997); J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law School. At the ICTY, the author led teams of international lawyers, investigators, military analysts, historians and others in successfully investigating and litigating cases involving thirteen major war criminals, including top political and military leaders. He also served for many years on the Tribunal's Committee on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, helping shape the Tribunal's litigation process and evidentiary rules.

The author thanks the One Earth Future Foundation and Oceans Beyond Piracy, and in particular Jon Huggins and Jon Bellish, for their assistance and support in preparing this paper.

**Cover Images** (Clockwise from top): "Somali Pirate Chief Mohammed Abdi Hassan" by Tony Karumba, Getty Images; "VBSS team from USS Anzio" by Bryan Weyers, US Navy - Flickr, CC BY 2.0; "Hargesia Prison" by Jim Gray, Oceans Beyond Piracy

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For more information on Oceans Beyond Piracy: [oceansbeyondpiracy.org](http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org)

## FOREWORD

Oceans Beyond Piracy is pleased to share with you this extensively researched report on prosecuting pirates by Ken Scott, a top national and international prosecutor. We are particularly happy to present the report to those of you who provided valuable information and insights during the many interviews with Ken over the past months. Since most of the interviews and research were completed late last year, we wanted to note several continuing developments:

Concerning the continuing important work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS):

- Portugal has assumed the chair of Working Group 2, which is now the “CGPCS Legal Forum.” The group’s work will continue, but as a virtual forum of legal experts that will continue to support and report to the Plenary. The forum can also meet on an ad-hoc basis, if and when needed.
- Working Group 5 has been renamed “Disrupting Pirate Networks Ashore,” and will continue to focus its work on tracking financial flows and prosecuting pirate kingpins. There are continuing efforts to concentrate law enforcement expertise in a dedicated, autonomous Task Force within this group.

UNODC has continued its vital work in assisting various prosecution efforts and building incarceration and other capacity. UNODC recently completed and handed over operations of the new 500-bed Garowe Prison to the President of Puntland, Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, to support the detention and trial of pirates. The prison has accepted the initial transfer of eighteen Somalis who were convicted of piracy in the Seychelles after their prosecution there.

RAPPICC continues its transition, shifting to a broader focus on transnational crime, with the help of its member countries and other organizations and changing its name to “REFLECS-3,” or the Regional Fuel Law Enforcement Center For Safety and Security at Sea, to better describe its mission.

Finally, we would be remiss not to mention the sad and tragic loss of two of our colleagues from UNODC, Clément Gorrissen and Simon Davis, in Galkayo, Puntland. Clément and Simon were helping the Somali people tackle the organized crime that is stifling much-needed development in their country. Their deaths are a tragedy not only for their families, friends, and colleagues, but also for the Somali people who so desperately need the sort of assistance that Clément and Simon were providing. We thank those who have sent their condolences to the families and colleagues.

We invite and look forward to receiving your comments on this publication, and stand ready to participate in and assist important continuing and future work on prosecuting pirate leaders.

Sincerely,

*Ken Scott and Jon Huggins*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden, and in recent years, the Gulf of Guinea, has continued to develop into an international crisis involving very large human and economic costs and demanding the attention of States, international organizations, and industry around the world. A number of international organizations or groups, such as the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, the International Maritime Organization, the International Maritime Bureau, INTERPOL, the UN Office on Drugs and Organized Crime, and Europol, have taken active steps to improve cooperation and effective action among flag States, industry, military forces, and law enforcement. But while approximately 1,200 pirates have been, or are being prosecuted in various parts of the world, almost all of them have been, or are low-level skiff pirates, with the international community and only a few countries engaged in limited proactive efforts to prosecute pirate leaders and financiers.

This report analyzes information obtained from interviews of thirty-three participants in the fight against piracy in East Africa and considers other reports and materials on questions dealing with the current state of investigative and prosecution efforts related to piracy, as well as proposed future measures. Most of those interviewed expressed serious concern about the lack of progress made in bringing pirate leaders to justice. There is nearly universal agreement that an effective fight against piracy requires international effort and cooperation, but that there has been too much fragmentation and duplication and “too many different agendas” without a high-level coordinated approach targeting pirate kingpins. While many aspects of the fight against piracy have substantially improved, information-sharing, databases, and related tools continue to be problematic in important respects. There is also concern that ship owners, insurance carriers, and private security companies are often uncooperative or even counterproductive where investigations are concerned. And a substantial majority of those surveyed believe that there is no current or near-term capacity to prosecute pirate leaders or financiers in Somalia or most other regional countries.

In this report, international prosecutor Kenneth Scott recommends a more proactive, more focused, and better-coordinated approach. Most maritime piracy is organized crime and requires more sophisticated law enforcement approaches and techniques aimed at acquiring evidence against pirate kingpins, investors, and money launderers. Piracy databases should be fully assessed and coordinated, and care should be taken to eliminate duplicative efforts. Renewed and invigorated efforts must be made to develop and use insider witnesses and various means of surveillance, and to locate and obtain what paper, digital, and other documentation may exist. Information-sharing must be made simpler and easier, especially among the military and intelligence communities and law enforcement.

Finally, Mr. Scott recommends an international judicial mechanism (dubbed “International Lite”) to direct top-level investigations and prosecutions without developing a full international tribunal. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has broad latitude to customize an international judicial mechanism to suit the needs of the counter-piracy community. An “international lite” mechanism would consist of UN-staffed and -financed investigation and prosecution teams, a judiciary comprised of national judges with international support, and defense counsel appointed on an as-needed basis, aimed at disrupting pirate networks and bringing their leaders to justice.

*“[We note with] particular[ ] concern” that piracy off the Somali coast is “caused by lack of lawful administration . . . which allows the ‘pirate command centres’ to operate without hindrance” and “[we] strongly urge Governments to ‘take all necessary judicial, legislative and law enforcement action’ to receive and prosecute or extradite suspected pirates and armed robbers.” International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.1002 (25) (November 29, 2007).*

*“Countries that can do so should trace, track and freeze the assets of the backers of the pirates . . . They deserve to be brought to justice and prevented from harming their country, its economy and reputation. Impunity and lack of respect for human rights have no doubt encouraged piracy.” Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, UN Special Representative for Somalia, December 11, 2008.*

*“In a world where criminal groups . . . are quick to forge new alliances for mutual profit, piracy represents a major threat to international security. . . . We must follow the money! . . . [I]t is now time for the international community to integrate this fundamental financial component in its joint law enforcement strategy against maritime piracy . . .” Speech by INTERPOL Secretary-General Ronald K. Noble, January 19, 2010.*

*“As piracy has evolved into an organized transnational criminal enterprise, it is increasingly clear that the arrest and prosecution of rank and file pirates captured at sea is insufficient on its own to meet our longer term counter-piracy goals. Most pirates captured at sea are low-level operatives. The harsh reality of life in Somalia ensures there are willing replacements for pirates apprehended at sea. Prosecutions is one key to deterrence, but this must include the prosecution of the masterminds and funders along with the gunmen.” Speech by U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Thomas Kelly, October 25, 2012.*

*“To date neither the Somali Government, the “Puntland” administration or any other local authority has seriously prosecuted and jailed any senior pirate leaders, financiers, negotiators or facilitators. The leadership of the principal piracy networks and their associates have continued to enjoy freedom and impunity and have not been hindered in their travel or ability to transfer funds.” Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea, S/2013/413 (July 12, 2013), at 22, para. 65.*

*“In the persisting absence of serious national and international efforts to investigate, prosecute or sanction those responsible for organizing Somali piracy, the leaders, financiers, negotiators and facilitators will continue to operate with impunity.” Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), at 8.*

*“Since the passage of time is affecting the quality and accessibility of testimonies and evidence, the Monitoring Group reiterates the urgent need to establish a dedicated group of investigators with the mandate to collect information, gather evidence and record testimonies relating to acts of Somali piracy, including especially the identification of pirate leaders, financiers, negotiators, facilitators, support networks and beneficiaries.” Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013), at 22, para. 67.*

## INTRODUCTION

Since 2005, there has been growing consensus and frequently recurring calls in the international community for the leaders, financiers, and land-based facilitators of modern maritime piracy to be prosecuted. There is broad recognition (at least in concept and rhetoric) that successfully prosecuting the low-level skiff pirates, while part of the equation, will ultimately have limited impact on ending or substantially reducing piracy, at least in terms of the law enforcement and prosecution components of national and international counter-piracy efforts. Indeed, one of the four priorities of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia for 2013 and beyond is “[t]o strengthen and focus law enforcement efforts to disrupt pirate networks ashore, including by establishing effective information exchanges among prosecutors, investigators and private industry . . .”<sup>1</sup> Yet to date, with the exception of the conviction of two pirate negotiators (which might be considered mid-level management) and the recent arrest of pirate leader Mohamed Abdi Hassan (better known as “Afweyne”) in Belgium, there have been no prosecutions of higher- or top-level pirate leaders, financiers, or facilitators. While approximately 1,200 pirates have been, or are being prosecuted in various parts of the world (primarily in Somalia, 402; Kenya, 164; Yemen, 129; and Seychelles, 124),<sup>2</sup> almost none of them can be considered anything more than low-level skiff pirates. Why is that the case, and what lessons can the international community and national authorities learn from our experience fighting East African piracy, in fighting piracy elsewhere, or indeed dealing with other international and transnational crime?

In answering these questions, or at least in continuing a dialogue to answer them, several things should be noted. First, modern maritime piracy is a complex, multi-faceted problem and will only be overcome by complex, multi-faceted solutions. There is no doubt, for example, that an important part of the solution lies in giving young men in the regions experiencing a high incidence of piracy genuine alternatives to piracy as a means of livelihood. There is also no question that capacity-building is important in building and improving the law enforcement and criminal justice capacity in East Africa and Indian Ocean States, in terms of training law enforcement, building courtrooms and prisons, and addressing the various legal and logistical issues that arise in the context of cross-border transnational crime. This paper does not dismiss the importance of these and other components of an overall counter-piracy strategy. But conducting training programs and building good prisons are not the same as putting pirate kingpins on trial and in jail. The focus of this paper, therefore, is specifically (and unabashedly) on the criminal justice or law enforcement part of the counter-piracy equation: what more effective role can law enforcement and prosecutions play in creating a safe and sustainable rule-of-law environment for maritime commerce, vessels, and seafarers? Even more specifically, what more can be done to prosecute and bring to justice top pirate leaders, financiers, and land-based facilitators?

***Successfully prosecuting the low-level skiff pirates, while part of the equation, will ultimately have limited impact on ending or substantially reducing piracy.***

Second, the very substantial challenges and sustained effort required in investigating and prosecuting any complex organizational crime are fully appreciated. This is true whether the crime involves massive fraud at the highest levels of a corporation, public corruption in the upper echelons of government, large-scale ethnic cleansing by top nationalist politicians, drug-trafficking by international kingpins, or systematic violence at sea by top pirate leaders and financiers. In the vast majority of circumstances, such cases, even those internal to one national or domestic criminal justice system, require significant expertise, substantial resources, and sustained focus to investigate, charge, and prosecute. Looking at one current example, the recent federal indictment of SAC Capital Advisors in the United States and the

resulting guilty pleas culminated a four-year criminal investigation, which had already involved numerous SAC employees pleading guilty to insider trading charges,<sup>3</sup> which almost certainly occurred, at least in part, as stepping stones in building a case against the company and its more senior management. The numerous challenges and difficulties confronted in such cases are multiplied in situations crossing international borders, involving multiple jurisdictional lines, different national laws and systems, seriously limited (or even compromised) law enforcement resources, and failed or significantly challenged states, some of which may even obstruct or otherwise hamper prosecution efforts. Still, to attempt to stop or substantially reduce piracy by prosecuting only the lowest-level pirates would be like trying to stop (or appropriately punish) Enron by prosecuting only the lowest-level bookkeepers, or fighting the war on illicit drugs by prosecuting only the small-time, lowest-level dealers.

## METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE

The principal focus of this paper is to provide a “lessons learned” analysis of the law enforcement and prosecution aspects of international and national counter-piracy efforts concerning maritime piracy occurring off the east coast of Africa, and in particular the coast of Somalia, since approximately 2005, with a view to improving these and other efforts against international and transnational crime in the future. It is not within the scope of this paper to provide a full history of maritime piracy, in either its older or more contemporary forms, which have been covered extensively and well in a number of publications.<sup>4</sup> As background and overview, however, and to provide a foundation, framework, and context for the survey results and the observations and recommendations that follow, the paper relies on two principal sources: Robert Haywood and Roberta Spivak, *Maritime Piracy* (Oxford: Routledge, 2012) (hereafter *Maritime Piracy*) and Danielle A. Zach, D. Conor Seyle and Jens Vestergard Madsen, *Burden-Sharing Multi-Level Governance: A Study of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia* (One Earth Future Foundation, 2013) (hereafter *Burden-Sharing*).

Following the Introduction and the Methodology section, this paper begins with a brief overview of modern maritime piracy, followed by a discussion of law enforcement techniques and approaches used in investigating and prosecuting complex organized crime. The core of the paper will set out the results of an extensive survey of thirty-three participants in the recent fight against East African piracy. Those interviewed included Donna Hopkins, senior U.S. State Department official and recent head of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia; Thomas Winkler, the Chair of the Contact Group’s Working Group 2 during much of its life; and Giuseppe Maresca, the Chair of Working Group 5; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the international police and prosecution organizations INTERPOL, Europol, and Eurojust; U.S. State Department officials; various investigation and prosecution authorities in Europe, the United States, Somalia, Kenya, and Seychelles; the Seychelles Piracy Intelligence Center (SPIC); the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC); the International Maritime Organization; the shipping organizations INTERTANKO and INTERCARGO; and two notable maritime piracy scholars, Douglas Guilfoyle and Eugene Kontorovich.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, this paper takes into account the potential “Monday morning quarterbacking” involved in an effort such as this one, as well as the old saying that “hindsight is 20-20.” Both of these observations may well be true, but that is the nature of an after-action “lessons learned” project. Nothing in this paper is meant to denigrate or detract from the significant and indeed successful efforts of many talented and dedicated individuals in the fight against piracy across the entire range and nature of such efforts. Rather, the focus is on the institutions, structures, policies, and processes involved in the counter-piracy effort. Generally, the reported survey results are those which represent a consensus or majority view, or at least an important viewpoint or

observation shared by more than just one or two people. Preparation of the paper also included a review of various available reports, documentation, literature, website material and similar information related to the organizations, programs, and activities involved in recent counter-piracy operations.

## THE SCOURGE OF MODERN MARITIME PIRACY AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

The modern world is confronted by increasing transnational threats that require robust and timely responses and repeatedly challenge the very capacity of States, individually or collectively, to address them.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, collective action among States and non-State actors involves inherent and significant dilemmas in a world system built on sovereign nation-States, with no supranational authority.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps surprisingly, given that it was once considered virtually a thing of the past and a subject only for Hollywood movies, maritime piracy is a prime example of such a threat. In the early 21st century, maritime piracy surged dramatically, increasing five-fold over the course of 2008 alone. According to the International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau, ships and others engaging in maritime commerce were attacked 293 times, 49 ships were hijacked, and 889 hostages were held in 2008. Perhaps not as surprisingly, given the combination of circumstances, a large part of this increase in piracy was concentrated off the coast of Somalia, which for at least the last 20 years had been a failed state with no functioning central government and endemic lawlessness, a place "divorced from . . . the rule of law."<sup>8</sup>

Maritime piracy today, on anything other than its smallest scale, is a form of organized crime, involving land-based financiers and organizers, mother ship operators, suppliers, pirate crews, hostage negotiators and money launderers:<sup>9</sup>

As a transnational organized crime, Somali piracy entails more than armed youngsters at sea in small boats attacking ships or providing armed protection aboard hijacked vessels. The piracy business draws on a widespread network of facilitators internationally and inside Somalia from multiple layers of society. In fact, pirates and their accomplices may be bankers, telecommunications agents, businessmen of various kinds, politicians, clan elders, translators or aid workers, all using their regular occupations or positions to facilitate one or another network.<sup>10</sup>

Piracy today [is] an economy . . . which [has] taken on an industrial scope, thanks to the rapid sophistication of its methods, organizational structures and resources. Pirate behaviour -- the demand of high ransoms, use of advanced technologies and extreme talent in money-laundering -- [is] similar to that of the mafia. There's a machinery behind this and it functions quite well.<sup>11</sup>

By 2009, Somali pirates were responsible for more than half of the 406 worldwide incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea.<sup>12</sup> By 2010, more than 1,000 seafarers were being held hostage and the *New York Times* declared: "The Pirates are Winning!"<sup>13</sup>

National and international efforts to deal with modern maritime piracy date to at least 2001, with increasing attention since 2005. In November 2001, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized



United Nations agency that works closely with the shipping industry, established a Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.<sup>14</sup> In adopting the Code, the IMO Assembly was “aware that, when arrests are made, some Governments are lacking the legislative framework and adequate guidelines for investigation necessary to enable conviction and punishment of those involved in acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships” and was “also convinced of the need for Governments to co-operate and to take, *as a matter of the highest priority, all necessary action to prevent and suppress any acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships . . .*”<sup>15</sup> The IMO Assembly

urged all States, in particular coastal States, in affected regions to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent and combat incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, including through regional co-operation, and to investigate or co-operate in the investigation of such incidents wherever they occur and bring the alleged perpetrators to justice in accordance with international law . . .<sup>16</sup>

In November 2004, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 59/24, urged States to cooperate with the IMO in combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea and to undertake capacity-building efforts to deal with piracy. In November 2005, IMO Assembly Resolution A.979(24) urged States to implement protective measures, including issuing guidance to ships and sharing information with the IMO concerning piracy incidents. By December 2006, the UN General Assembly, in Resolution 61/222, called on States to confront the increasing maritime threats through the adoption and harmonization of national laws and through the provision of enforcement vessels. A year later, in December 2007, IMO Assembly Resolution A.1002(25) expressed IMO’s “grave concern” with piracy and called for “the immediate establishment of appropriate measures to protect ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia from piracy . . .” The Assembly noted with “particular[ ] concern” that piracy off the Somali coast was “caused by lack of lawful administration and the inability of the [Somali] authorities to take affirmative action against the perpetrators, which *allows the ‘pirate command centres’ to operate* without hindrance at many points along the coast of Somalia,” and called on States to “take all necessary judicial, legislative and law enforcement action” to receive and prosecute or extradite suspected pirates and armed robbers.<sup>17</sup>

Approximately six months later, in Resolution 1816 on June 2, 2008, the UN Security Council, exercising its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, made a formal finding that piracy was exacerbating “the situation in Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security . . .”<sup>18</sup> In Resolution 1816 and a continuing series of resolutions and Chapter VII findings, the Security Council authorized what might be considered extraordinary counter-piracy measures by UN member-states, including the use of armed force on Somalia’s sovereign territory and in its territorial waters.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, taking all of the circumstances together, it is not an overstatement to call the piracy situation in and around the Horn of Africa a war. In fact, “[s]uch is the threat of piracy [in that region] that the Joint War Committee of Insurers in London *has declared the waters off the coast of Somalia a war zone.*”<sup>20</sup>

***It is not an overstatement to call the piracy situation in and around the Horn of Africa a war.***

While the UN and IMO were adopting resolutions and taking some action, the surge in maritime piracy was causing dramatic increases in the economic, human, and other costs of piracy. The average ransom for a seized ship and its crew increased from approximately \$150,000 in 2005 to \$5 million in 2011.<sup>21</sup> The ransoms for the *MT Smyrni*, which was released in early 2013, reportedly totaled \$13 million.<sup>22</sup> One body of research indicates that an estimated \$300 million in ransoms was paid to Somali pirates from 2008

to 2012—a figure almost twice the amount of humanitarian assistance and development aid to Somalia during the same period.<sup>23</sup> A more recent World Bank study, released on November 1, 2013, indicates that between \$339 million and \$413 million was taken in pirate ransoms off the Horn of Africa between 2005 and 2012.<sup>24</sup> The estimated total global costs of East African piracy, including ransoms and other financial impacts (such as increased insurance premiums) were between \$7 billion and \$12 billion in 2010, almost \$7 billion in 2011, and approximately \$6 billion in 2012,<sup>25</sup> with the World Bank more recently pegging the global economic costs at \$18 billion a year.<sup>26</sup> The human costs have been equally sobering. As of May 2012, 3,741 seafarers of 125 nationalities had been taken hostage by Somali pirates, with some of the hostages held for as long as 1,178 days.<sup>27</sup> Hostages are generally held in dire conditions, with limited access to food, water, and medical care, and are often abused and sometimes tortured, with these tragic impacts not including the pain and suffering and economic losses suffered by their families.<sup>28</sup> In 2011 alone, 470 new hostages were added to the 645 that were being held at that time, and eight seafarers died in pirate custody. This plainly unfortunate human impact is suffered disproportionately by those in the developing world (from which 93% of all hostages are comprised), with 25% of hostage seafarers coming from the Philippines and India.<sup>29</sup>

## PROVING COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONAL CRIME

Organizational or organized crime can generally be described as being larger-scale, systematic crime which, in its planning, preparation, execution, and concealment, involves multiple persons acting in an organized, often hierarchical way, ranging from the most simple organizations to those which are as complex as multinational business organizations—all of which describe maritime piracy. In most (if not all) organized crime situations, the ultimate goal of law enforcement is to prosecute and convict those in the top echelons of the organization—the kingpins, rather than the mere foot soldiers or small fish.

***The ultimate goal of law enforcement is to prosecute and convict those in the top echelons of the organization***

Most, if not all, criminal investigations and prosecutions involve at least two questions: (1) was a crime committed (and can it be proved in court, according to the standard of proof and rules of procedure and evidence)? and (2) who committed, conspired, aided and abetted or is otherwise responsible for that crime (and again, can such commission or responsibility be proved in court)? The first question might be stated as “Was Crime A committed at Location B on Date C?” Dealing with this question will generally involve the proof of any jurisdictional or common elements, as well as the elements of that particular crime. The second question is: “Having established that Crime A was committed, did Person D commit, conspire to commit, or aid and abet the crime, or is he or she otherwise, on some legal basis, responsible for the crime?” In a significant number of cases concerning many areas of crime, it is often relatively easy (or at least easier) to prove that a crime was committed—e.g., there may be little or no doubt or difficulty in proving that a Tutsi or Bosnian village was attacked and atrocities committed on a particular date, or that a ship was boarded at a particular grid reference and hostages taken. The more difficult task is proving the criminal responsibility of the higher-level culprits; in linking the corporate executive to the cooked books, the national politician to the ethnic cleansing of a local minority village, or a land-based pirate leader to an act of piracy 100 miles out at sea, where the executive, politician, or pirate leader did not personally cook the books, torch the village, or seize the ship.

In many such cases, two different types or categories of evidence will be needed in order to prosecute a case successfully. The firsthand accounts of immediate victims and eyewitnesses (such as seafarers or first responders) or overhead imagery of a criminal event (by a satellite, drone, or aircraft) may prove that a crime was committed (and even identify the physical perpetrators), but contribute little or nothing to proving the responsibility of those at higher levels in the criminal chain of command. Using a war crimes example, evidence given by a Muslim victim or a Serb foot soldier in a Hague courtroom that a particular village in Bosnia was attacked on a particular date was generally of little or no value in proving that Slobodan Milosevic, at the highest political level, hundreds of miles away in Belgrade, was responsible and should be punished for the attack. Photographic or video evidence of destroyed villages and exhumations of mass graves, while often important as evidence proving that a crime was committed, usually provides few direct links to higher-level perpetrators. To prosecute and convict the higher-level culprits—that is, to convict the corporate executive, national politician, or pirate leader—a different or additional type of evidence is necessary, often from different sources.

In discussing these matters as they relate to piracy, and concerning the pirate hierarchy or chain of command, three basic levels of pirate actors can be identified: (1) the foot soldier—that is, the skiff pirate with an AK-47 or rocket-propelled grenade who boards the attacked ship; (2) middle management—those who operate higher up on the organizational chart, primarily on land, to facilitate and accomplish the pirate enterprise, such as ransom negotiators and land-based suppliers; and (3) the top pirate leaders and financiers: the kingpins. The eyewitness testimony of victimized seafarers, combined with overhead video images, may well convict the pirate foot soldiers apprehended by international navies at sea but provides no evidence for moving up the chain of command. Audio recordings of a pirate ransom negotiator engaged in telephone conversations with the ship’s owner or insurance carrier to negotiate a ransom may result in that negotiator going to jail, if identified and captured, but will not, without more evidence, convict the pirate kingpin. (Of course, and as discussed below, lower-level evidence can provide the foundation for, or be a stepping stone to, additional evidence and higher-level culprits.)

For these and other reasons, it is accepted law-enforcement wisdom that convicting higher-level criminals on the basis of what prosecutors sometimes call a purely “historical case” (that is, from an entirely after-the-fact, outside-looking-in perspective), while not impossible, is usually very difficult. To overcome these difficulties, one or more of four investigative techniques or categories of evidence are usually needed, together with a particular approach and organizational structure: (1) a proactive, top-down approach; (2) the development of insider evidence; (3) the carrying out of an undercover investigation; (4) the use of various forms of electronic or communication surveillance or interception; (5) the collection of contemporaneous documentary evidence, especially from inside the criminal organization; and (6) the use of dedicated and focused units, adequately resourced.

### ***(1) Proactive Top-Down Investigations***

Reactive approaches to criminal investigation typically attempt to build cases from the bottom up, based on or in reaction to a specific criminal incident. The First National Bank is robbed and investigators try to figure out who did it and how, and on what evidence the culprits can be convicted. A proactive top-down approach is something quite different. In many situations involving organizational or organized crime, at least some of the top bad actors, while presumed innocent, are widely known or suspected even if there is not sufficient admissible evidence to prove their criminality in court. Based on such information or “intelligence,” proactive investigations are focused from the top down, looking to build cases against the suspected criminal leaders, consistent, of course, with due process, the rules of evidence, and procedure and ethical considerations.

## *(2) Insider Evidence*

Insiders are past or present participants in the particular criminal activity or organization being investigated. Insider evidence is witness or testimonial evidence obtained from such participants. While such evidence can be helpful at any level (in simplifying the proof of the crime itself), it is especially valuable from middle managers and higher-level insiders who can explain the structure and processes of the criminal organization, how orders or directions flow down the chain of command, and how reports and information are communicated upward to persons higher in the organization. In climbing the organizational ladder, foot soldier evidence may be essential or at least very helpful in charging and convicting the lower-level or mid-level managers; lower-level managers and facilitators are important to prosecuting middle managers; and middle managers and top lieutenants are almost always essential in prosecuting and convicting the kingpins, especially in the absence of one or more of the other types of evidence identified above and discussed below, such as intercepted communications involving the top leader him- or herself or internal documents directly or indirectly (with other evidence) incriminating the criminal leader.

***Insider evidence is especially valuable from middle managers and higher-level insiders***

Insider witnesses were often the most important witnesses in cases at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Subordinate officers, for example, often gave testimony implicating their military superiors, while insiders (political or military) gave evidence concerning the internal conversations and decisions of one side or another. While such witnesses were often hostile to the prosecution and identified very closely with those “on their own side” or of their own ethnicity and were reluctant to give evidence against them (where a lower-level Croat officer, for example, was called to give evidence against a Croat commanding officer), such evidence was often ultimately forthcoming and was vital at trial in proving the links to and responsibility of higher-level culprits and indeed the very persons who, according to Security Council mandates, the tribunal was supposed to prosecute, as opposed to the “small fish.”

There are various ways in which insider evidence might become available to law enforcement. First, an innocent (or mostly innocent) person involved in the relevant organization or activity may discover criminality (or a type or level of criminality) that he or she was previously unaware of and report his or her information to the police or other authorities. Second, a person who may have knowingly engaged in or assisted criminal activity in the past may have a change of heart and decide that he or she, rather than continuing to participate in or assist the criminal activity, wants to assist law enforcement in discovering and stopping it. Third, there is often, fortunately, little honor among thieves, and former partners in crime may turn on each other for all sorts of reasons, like a disgruntled corporate employee who, in his view, has been mistreated or let go after being what he thought was a loyal but not so innocent cog in the criminal machinery. And fourth, and perhaps most common, an insider turns “state’s evidence” or becomes a “Crown witness” when he or she is prosecuted or threatened with prosecution for his or her own role in the crime and he or she hopes or seeks to obtain more lenient treatment in exchange for his or her cooperation, which includes giving evidence against others, including Mr. Big. In law enforcement circles, the development of insider evidence in this way is often known as “flipping,” in terms of the witness flipping or changing sides.<sup>30</sup>

### ***(3) Undercover Investigation***

An undercover investigation is a way to obtain inside evidence where the insider is either an infiltrating law enforcement agent or a person who is already inside the organization who agrees to stay inside (unbeknownst to his conspirators or colleagues) as a way of obtaining evidence and as part of an arrangement with the authorities. An undercover operation, of course, may require sophisticated and disciplined law enforcement techniques and personnel, and especially in relation to violent crime, can be a dangerous activity. But again, to acknowledge these realities is not to say that it cannot or should not be done.

### ***(4) Electronic or Communication Surveillance or Interception***

This important category of evidence includes all manner and means of intercepting or capturing communications, including face-to-face conversations, telephone calls, radio traffic, e-mails, texts, and other social media messaging. A face-to-face conversation might be recorded by a party to the conversation “wearing a wire,” and telephone and similar communications may be intercepted by means of wiretaps. Further, in this day of satellites, drones, and similar technology, there may be a wide array of possibilities for monitoring and intercepting communications. It goes without saying that capturing an incriminating communication in the pirate leader’s own words is worth its weight in pirate treasure. Further, and lest there be misunderstandings, the content of intercepted communications need not be expressly inculpatory, in the sense, for example, that an explicit order was given to attack a ship or “kill all the hostages.” Less explicit communications may prove important characteristics about organizational structures and processes, provide insights into “command and control,” prove knowledge of important events or circumstances, or might even be as valuable as physical evidence in proving the “known voice” of a particular pirate leader.<sup>31</sup> Of course, depending on the circumstances, the use of various intercept technology may need to comply with national and/or international law, and the admission of such evidence in court must satisfy applicable evidentiary and procedural rules.

### ***(5) Significant Contemporaneous Documentary Evidence, Especially from Inside the Criminal Organization***

#### ***Investigators and prosecutors love to follow ‘the paper trail’***

Investigators and prosecutors love to follow “the paper trail” (and also “the money”) when and where such trails exist and can be discovered and obtained, because documents, papers, and financial transactions can be compelling and highly incriminating evidence. Among other things, documents are akin to physical evidence in that they are generally prepared and communicated contemporaneously with the events under investigation, and are not dependent on witness memory months or even years after the events in question. Documentary evidence is especially valuable when it consists of a criminal organization’s own documents (including correspondence and other communications, orders, reports, operational logs, transport records, financial books, calendars, agendas, internal notes, and diaries). In effect, such items are the documentary version of insider evidence, in the form of documents rather than insider testimony.<sup>32</sup> Records of e-mails and texts (made available after the fact by service providers) cross over from communication intercepts to documentary evidence. Apart from an organization’s own “inside” documents, third-party documents can also be very important evidence; examples are bank records, police and incident reports, reports by international monitors, etc. Documents may be obtained in any number of ways; consensually (by those willing to turn them over voluntarily), or by subpoena, search warrants, and other court orders.

## (6) *Dedicated, Adequately Resourced Units*

Apart from or in addition to investigative techniques, most national law enforcement and prosecution authorities find it useful and productive to form specialized or dedicated units concerning particular types of crime that at any given time are afforded particular focus or priority, whether over a sustained period of time (or even as a permanent form of organization) or a more limited temporal basis, and as distinct from the more “usual” day-to-day or ordinary crime. In the United States at the Department of Justice, both at headquarters and in the field, there are, for example, organized crime sections and strike forces, drug task forces, counter-terrorism sections and a human rights and special prosecutions section. In the United Kingdom, there are such things as the Serious Fraud Office and the Serious Organized Crime Agency. The Netherlands’ criminal justice system has a National Prosecutor’s Office that “confronts transnational criminal organizations that otherwise appear untouchable,”<sup>33</sup> including those engaging in terrorism, human trafficking, and maritime piracy and war crimes, and there is also an international crime police team. History and experience have shown, in multiple national systems, that in order to make a real dent in such areas of crime and criminal activity, substantial resources need to be organized and dedicated on the basis of priority and directed in a focused, targeted way in conducting complex, sophisticated, and longer-term investigations and prosecutions.

## THE CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA

On December 16, 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in announcing that “the United States intends to work with partners to create a Contact Group on Somali piracy,” told the UN Security Council that the international response to piracy “has been less than the sum of its parts.” Expressing concern about the impunity being enjoyed by pirates (and especially pirate leaders), Secretary Rice expressed the hope that Security Council authorizations would allow States to “*pursue pirates into their places of operation on land,*” [as] [h]istory has demonstrated again and again that maritime operations alone are insufficient to combat piracy.<sup>34</sup> On the same day, as part of Resolution 1851, the Security Council established the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (the “Contact Group” or “CGPCS”) as a voluntary international mechanism intended to facilitate the collective efforts of States, international organizations, industry, and nongovernmental organizations to address maritime piracy emanating from Somalia as a threat to international peace and security, regional stability, and trade.<sup>35</sup> Since January 14, 2009, the Contact Group has been a “coalition of the willing” based on the voluntary cooperation of more than 60 countries and organizations. It has seen itself as a forum to facilitate discussion and coordination of actions to suppress piracy as part of a broader international effort to “secure peace and stability in Somalia.”<sup>36</sup>

The Contact Group initially established four working groups to address specific issue areas: “1. naval and capacity-building coordination and information sharing; 2. legal and judicial issues; 3. shipping industry self-protection; [and] 4. messaging and public information efforts . . .”<sup>37</sup> From the beginning, the Contact Group recognized the need for “better operational information in order to address the problem of piracy” and called on its members to contribute both information and surveillance assets to the collective effort.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>39</sup> While Working Group 2 (concerning legal and judicial issues) has been considered one of the more effective working groups and has tackled a number of legal issues from the beginning, for most of its life to date it has focused primarily on the volume prosecution of the lowest-level pirates. The development of another law-enforcement/prosecution group, more focused on higher-level prosecutions, did not evolve until later and will be discussed in another part of this paper.

The Contact Group faces limitations similar to those of the UN and other international organizations in that it has no police powers, no power to make binding decisions or enforce compliance, and its ability to mobilize action is relatively weak.<sup>40</sup> It is “organized volunteerism.”<sup>41</sup> According to James Hughes, the chair of Working Group 1, “[the Contact Group] is not so much a forcing mechanism; it’s a peer pressure mechanism.”<sup>42</sup> Put another way, the Contact Group exercises most of its influence by “cheerleading” (that is, naming-and-praising) and perhaps to a lesser extent, “naming-and-shaming.”<sup>43</sup>

In further discussing the Contact Group in the course of this paper, it should be noted that the Contact Group’s mandate and activities are broader than what might be considered law enforcement and prosecution, as illustrated by the various working groups’ issue areas, and that these other areas are mostly beyond the scope of this paper.

## THE CONSIDERATION OF JUDICIAL MECHANISMS

Soon after the Contact Group started its work in January 2009, a principal subject of discussion both there and at the UN was whether the international community should establish, or support the establishment of, one or more counter-piracy courts or judicial mechanisms other than, or in addition to, the general jurisdiction trial or first instance courts in the UN member States most directly impacted by piracy or involved in counter-piracy efforts. On April 27, 2010, the Security Council, by means of Resolution 1918, asked the UN Secretary-General to present a report on possible options “to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy . . . [including] options for creating special domestic chambers possibly with international components, a regional tribunal or an international tribunal . . . , taking into account the work of the Contact Group . . . ”<sup>44</sup>

The Secretary-General transmitted his report to the Security Council on July 26, 2010, setting out and considering the advantages and disadvantages of seven options:

9. Three categories of possible models for a new judicial mechanism were identified: an international tribunal; a regional tribunal; and a tribunal based in the national jurisdiction of a State in the region. Under the first category, the possibilities identified were an international tribunal established pursuant to a Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, or a ‘hybrid’ tribunal following the model of the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, based on an agreement with the United Nations. Under the second category, the possibilities identified were a regional tribunal established through a multilateral agreement negotiated among the States of the region, or the use of an existing court, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, located in Arusha, Tanzania. It was noted that the time required to negotiate the appropriate treaty basis for either of these options might be considerable. Under the third category, the possibilities identified were a Somali court located in a third State in the region, or a special piracy chamber within the national jurisdiction of a State in the region. It was recognized that the Somali court option would have the advantage of enabling Somalia to play a direct part in the solution to prosecuting acts of piracy. However, the fractured nature of the law on piracy in Somalia, and significant issues concerning Somali judicial and prosecutorial capacity, meant that this option may be unlikely to be viable at present.

10. The option of a specialized piracy chamber within the national jurisdiction of one or more States in the region, supported by financial or technical assistance by the international community, was considered to follow the precedent of the Bosnia War Crimes Chamber. The Chair [of Working Group 2] noted in his conclusions of the meeting in November 2009 that this would be the most feasible model, depending on one or more regional States, including Somalia, being willing and able to undertake prosecutions when it becomes possible.<sup>45</sup>

Overall, there was reasonably early recognition that neither the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague nor the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, nor the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPS) in Tanzania, presented attractive or likely practicable options as a counter-piracy judicial forum. Chief among the reasons was that all of these bodies are treaty bodies and adding piracy to their jurisdictions would almost certainly involve long and difficult treaty negotiations that might take years, if successful at all. In addition, neither ITLOS nor the ACHPS are criminal courts.<sup>46</sup> Although “[m]any analysts believe[d] that in the absence of states’ ability to prosecute [such crimes], the most effective venue for piracy cases [would be] an international court,” since “piracy is an act that directly affects global interests and is often committed in the global commons,”<sup>47</sup> the considering UN bodies and groups decided relatively early in the process that a Chapter VII international tribunal was not the right fit and “[was] not likely to be among the most cost-effective [options].”<sup>48</sup> This paper will return to this decision following a brief account of the options that were further considered, at least on paper or as continuing proposals.

***Adding piracy to treaty bodies would almost certainly involve long and difficult treaty negotiations***

Following a debate in the Security Council on August 25, 2010, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commissioned a report by his Special Adviser on piracy, Jack Lang, which was submitted to the Security Council on January 25, 2011.<sup>49</sup> The Lang Report, noting “the urgent need to combat the impunity of pirates”<sup>50</sup> and observing that “[t]he lack of consensus in the Security Council over which solution to choose mean[t] that the more radical options ha[d] been put to one side,”<sup>51</sup> recommended “the establishment, within eight months, of a court system comprising a specialized court in Puntland, a specialized court in Somaliland and a specialized extraterritorial Somali court that could be located in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania,” possibly using the facilities of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).<sup>52</sup> The estimated cost of establishing and operating the three courts over the first three years was approximately \$25 million.<sup>53</sup> Even early on, it was anticipated that each of these venues would involve substantial international components, including funding, experts, and various other support, with the extraterritorial court in Arusha in particular “act[ing] as a focal point for regional and international support for the rule of law in Somalia . . .”<sup>54</sup>

The Lang Report was followed by another Security Council resolution (No. 1976) on April 11, 2011, and another report of the Secretary-General on June 15, 2011,<sup>55</sup> which essentially proposed capacity-building in regional national courts and a specialized regional court, which might put more of its focus on the prosecution of pirate leaders and financiers. Importantly, the UN’s assessment that Puntland and Somaliland trial courts might be able to conduct piracy trials compliant with international standards by approximately June 2014 focused only on the prosecution of “*low-level’ suspects rather than on more complex cases of financing and planning piracy.*”<sup>56</sup> By contrast and of particular interest, the Secretary-General’s report stated, in reference to a possible specialized extraterritorial court:



A key question would be whether the extraterritorial court should have jurisdiction to prosecute large numbers of low-level perpetrators of acts of piracy, a more limited number of financiers and planners of piracy, or both. Whatever the jurisdiction of an extraterritorial court, consultations conducted by the Office of Legal Affairs indicate a widely held view that information sharing, *and the investigation and prosecution of the financiers and planners of piracy by States*, would be both a strategically effective and cost-effective means of supplementing current prosecution efforts.<sup>57</sup>

The June 15 report reveals, therefore, a two-part piracy prosecution strategy: (1) building capacity to prosecute low-level pirates in Somali and other regional State courts (whether general or specialized); and (2) supplementing these local efforts with investigation and prosecution of the financiers and planners of piracy by a specialized extraterritorial court and/or States outside the region. In point of fact, and while all of these discussions were continuing, none of the regional States, including Somalia, Kenya, and Seychelles, would accept specialized piracy courts or an extraterritorial Somali court in their jurisdictions, with the exception of Tanzania (which was willing to consider use of the ICTR facilities in Arusha as part of an extraterritorial court).<sup>58</sup>

In summary, while a number of general jurisdiction trial or first instance courts in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region have now handled a number of piracy cases, no international tribunal or hybrid court was created, no extraterritorial Somali or regional court was established, and no specialized or dedicated courts were set up in the regional systems.

## FIGHTING PIRACY: SURVEY RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

### *The Law Enforcement and Prosecution Effort to Date—Low-Level Pirates:*

***In the earlier years of international and national efforts against East Africa's piracy, there was no significant, focused, or sustained law enforcement or prosecution interest.***

Approximately 1,200 cases of piracy in East Africa have been brought in various jurisdictions and have either been completed or are in progress, with a substantial majority of these cases having been brought between June 2009 and June 2012. Most were brought in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region (including Yemen).<sup>59</sup> The UNODC has actively supported about 300 of these cases at an estimated cost of approximately \$30 million. With very limited exceptions, the cases against East Africa's pirates have focused on the lowest-level pirates, with the highest-level pirates convicted to date being the pirate ransom

negotiators in *United States v. Shubin* and *United States v. Ali*. Apart from the recent arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan in Belgium, no pirate kingpins—neither top leaders, facilitators, nor financiers—have been prosecuted. While those outside law enforcement, and even outside a particular case or investigation, cannot know the sensitive details of ongoing investigations or the content of sealed indictments or arrest warrants, available public information and careful, non-compromising conversations have provided a substantial window into the current state of play. The identities of some alleged or suspected pirate leaders and organizations are publicly known, for instance,<sup>60</sup> as are the existence of arrest warrants and INTERPOL “Red Notices” in some cases.<sup>61</sup>

In the earlier years of international and national efforts against East Africa's piracy, there was no significant, focused, or sustained law enforcement or prosecution interest. A substantial number of those surveyed

indicated that the law enforcement component of counter-piracy efforts was slow to develop, with no real interest in prosecution. In fact, the military dimension of counter-piracy efforts on Africa's east coast (involving various cooperating national navies, operating via NATO, the EU, or otherwise) developed before, and largely independent of, any focused or deliberate law enforcement effort. The law enforcement/prosecution effort that followed was largely an afterthought and was entirely reactive, in response to the military interdiction of low-level pirates at sea and the sheer necessity of doing something with them. The *de facto* law-enforcement regime that developed in these circumstances involved a three-part process which has remained essentially the same ever since: (1) patrolling naval forces interdict suspected pirates at sea, either during or after a pirate attack or attempted attack; (2) the apprehended suspected pirates, after the disposal of their arms and the destruction of their skiff, are either released on shore (as part of the catch-and-release practice), or, pursuant to transfer agreements, transported to regional States for prosecution;<sup>62</sup> and (3) if and when they are convicted, many of the pirates are transferred to Somalia to serve their sentences. Thus, the international community's law-enforcement model was, and remains, a predominantly reactive, decentralized, horizontal model, involving a group of roughly equal national and organizational peers, relying largely on regional States and consisting entirely of "volunteers," with no entity providing central direction, structure, or processes other than a common goal of "fighting piracy."

While the Contact Group, using or supporting the described reactive, horizontal, and largely regional model, has been successful in dramatically increasing the number of low-level pirate prosecutions from virtually zero to the approximately 1,200 mentioned above, a high percentage of interdicted pirates still are not prosecuted.<sup>63</sup> In short, even today, no particular country (with the possible exception of Seychelles and perhaps Kenya) has any real appetite for prosecuting pirate cases unless there is a strong national nexus and a perception of significant pressure or a particular need to do so, usually, if not only, in response to a specific incident. A large number of those surveyed indicated that in this fundamental respect there has been only modest progress from five or six years ago, with the first question concerning virtually every pirate incident today still being "Is anyone interested in prosecuting this attack, or willing to?" with the frequent answer being "No."<sup>64</sup> As one community participant put it (and this response was repeated or paraphrased by many): "Someone has to open a case and very often no one is interested in, or willing to do so." While not employing the same words, many of those surveyed said that, in some significant sense, a country must almost be "forced" to bring a case by either its own perceived interests or in response to external pressures of one sort or another.<sup>65</sup>

One of the specific shortcomings in the earlier days of the most recent counter-piracy efforts in East Africa was a failure to train and equip the military interveners for required law enforcement procedures, in terms of arrests, collecting evidence, and taking statements, although this situation appears to have substantially improved. Another limiting factor concerning law enforcement efforts in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region is that most national prosecutors and investigators are not trained for or experienced in conducting complex, targeted, proactive investigations into organizational crime. As one community participant stated, most regional or local prosecutors are only concerned with "the six poor bastards standing in front of them."

The natures of the prosecution cases and the evidence used in the vast majority of piracy prosecutions to date, especially in the region, have been fairly basic and straightforward, largely based on eyewitness testimony from victims (primarily seafarers) and first responders (that is, the on-scene/intervening/apprehending military and/or law enforcement personnel). Photographs and other visual imagery obtained in the course of the pirate incidents also are frequent parts of the prosecution cases. In the past several years, aerial patrolling and surveillance technology in the region have improved to the point that there is

very often a complete video record of a pirate incident from beginning to end, including the apprehension of the suspected pirates, which substantially simplifies the prosecution case. Indeed, the UNODC reports that there have been no pirate acquittals in Kenya due to lack of evidence.

Prosecution evidence has also included evidence collected as part of the crime scene investigation conducted when an attacked or seized ship is released or otherwise recovered from pirate custody, and sometimes evidence obtained from seized or recovered cell phones used by the pirates. Crime scene investigations have generally improved but are still inconsistent in quality, depending on who conducts the investigation. INTERPOL has improved crime scene investigations by acting as a central coordinator or facilitator, often working closely with the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). The NCIS has a forward-operating base in Bahrain and has largely become the crime scene investigator of choice or default, especially where no national authority indicates an interest and/or capacity to intervene. It is generally considered that NCIS conducts professional, effective investigations and has improved the quality of crime scene investigations. In some situations where NCIS, for whatever reason, has not been available or called in, the crime scene investigation has often involved cobbling together an *ad hoc* team from whatever available resources can be assembled, with mixed results. Where both become involved, there is sometimes friction between national law enforcement authorities and international investigators. When the crime scene investigation is conducted by national authorities, there is often less chance that the information will be shared with other organizations and agencies.

An important but perhaps overstated obstacle to prosecuting more pirates outside the region of East Africa, and especially in Europe, is a concern that suspected pirates transported to European countries for prosecution will seek asylum or otherwise remain in the country if their cases are dismissed or they are acquitted, or when they are released from completed prison sentences or otherwise returned to the local nation's population, rather than their being repatriated to their home countries. One counter-piracy community member said that this is the “deep, dark [but apparently open] secret”—no one wants the apprehended, processed, or released pirates staying in their country. As noted, some observers believe that, at least legally, this concern is overstated, but in the real world and whatever the legal niceties, governments may be reluctant to return persons to difficult regional environments.<sup>66</sup> Putting aside the legal debate, European and other countries might have a stronger argument on this point if large numbers of East African pirates were being prosecuted in their national systems. When the numbers, however, are eight or nine or even twenty-five or forty, the impact on a country's immigration issues seems fairly negligible and the expressed concern sounds more like an excuse to not prosecute pirates.

Several community members indicated that another ongoing issue in maritime piracy cases is finding witnesses and getting them to court, especially in national systems, including most common law countries, where live in-court testimony is the general practice. Finding seafarer witnesses some months or years after the event in question can be a serious challenge, and if they are found, the seafarer and his employer (which may or not be the same shipping company as it was previously) may have little or no desire to appear (or to have an employee appear) in a courtroom a thousand miles away. There is also a fairly common perception that many seafarers are not treated particularly well by their employers or home countries before, during, or after their involvement in a piracy incident,<sup>67</sup> which further reduces any desire or incentive they may have to give testimony in a distant courtroom.

### *The Law Enforcement and Prosecution Effort to Date—Pirate Leaders and Financiers:*

A substantial number of counter-piracy participants, approaching (if not constituting) a consensus, confirmed that counter-piracy efforts concerning the east coast of Africa have not resulted in any pirate leaders or financiers being prosecuted or convicted to date, although the recent arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan is a start in this direction. Community participants, including some of the senior and most experienced leaders, assessed that international and national prosecution efforts have been “very disappointing,” “pretty pathetic,” “modest to poor,” and “not a success story,” with a “paucity” of higher-level prosecutions to date. In terms of such prosecutions, one senior participant stated that he is “disappointed to see how little hands-on progress has been made,” while another said that the high costs of counter-piracy efforts to date have been “disproportionate to the results achieved.” Still another participant stated that there has been a “mismatch” of efforts: “There was a lot of emphasis on prosecuting the skiff pirates rather than on disrupting pirate networks and going after higher-value targets. We focused on the wrong population.” Another observer noted that the prosecution of low-level pirates to date was a matter of “picking the low-hanging fruit,” which another said has been “a mistake.” “In dealing with the urgency of pirates at sea, the international community took its eye off the ball, concerning the organized crime dimension.” Consistent with these assessments, several community members stated that while the reactive, horizontal approach has been successful in prosecuting a relatively large number of lower-level pirates, that approach is limited and “can only take you so far.” In sum, “the international community has not been successful in bringing [pirate leaders and financiers] to justice . . .”<sup>68</sup>

A few of those surveyed, while respectful of their colleagues, said that the international community’s twin emphases on international development programs (i.e., capacity-building) and naval patrolling is not really surprising, as that is what most senior politicians, diplomats, and international organization officials (especially those dealing with international development and humanitarian relief) “know” and are comfortable with. Very few foreign service personnel or humanitarian aid representatives have any background, experience in, or knowledge about investigating and prosecuting sophisticated legal cases dealing with complex organized crime, but they often have some experience or familiarity with drafting treaties, providing international aid or sending in the marines. On the military side, given the lack of regional capacity to do so, it was inevitable that national naval forces from outside the region would take on the principal role in interdicting pirates at sea. And for the most part, military people did what military people do (and are supposed to do). By contrast, law enforcement really became involved only when skiff pirates were apprehended at sea and the navies began to ask the question, “What do we do with them now?” which, in turn, actually reinforced the focus on prosecuting the lowest-level pirates, since they were the ones being apprehended and waiting to be processed. A few of the more specifically law enforcement- and prosecution-oriented participants in the Contact Group’s working groups said that they were surprised that the meetings (especially in the earlier days) were dominated by foreign service personnel and international organization representatives who had little to contribute in terms of law enforcement and criminal investigation or prosecution. Indeed, it is noteworthy that while the Contact Group identified “tracking financial flows related to piracy” as one of its six initial “focus areas” in January 2009,<sup>69</sup> it did not add a fifth working group—dedicated to “disrupt[ing] . . . the pirate enterprise ashore, through identifying and disrupting the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers”—until two-and-a-half years later, in July 2011,<sup>70</sup> almost ten years after the IMO, in November 2001, called for the prosecution of pirates “as a matter of the highest priority.”<sup>71</sup> The fifth working group was not implemented earlier based on the opposition of some States that had expressed concerns about the feasibility of the group and about sharing sensitive information and intelligence,<sup>72</sup> another important

**Community participants complained that policy- and decision-makers ‘don’t get it’**

issue addressed below. Evolution to a more law-enforcement/prosecution subgroup has continued, with additional efforts to move forward with such a group having been made at working group meetings in Copenhagen in April 2013.<sup>73</sup>

Even with the passage of time and the increasing recognition—at least in concept or rhetoric—that more sophisticated, proactive efforts were, and are needed to build cases against pirate leaders, community participants complained that policy- and decision-makers “don’t get it” (that is, most politicians and diplomats have no real understanding of the investigative/prosecution effort that is required to make such cases) and/or they “don’t fund it” (in terms of providing the necessary structure, tools, and resources to get the job done).<sup>74</sup> Senior decision-makers and donors must genuinely recognize that in building complex leadership cases, evidence from victims and most of the lowest-level pirates, crime scene evidence, and even video-recordings of the crime itself generally provide little or no evidence against pirate leaders. They must then commit to supporting and funding more sustained, proactive, and sophisticated investigations.

**One community member observed that the real problem is not a lack of information, but a lack of focus and organization**

While information from several of those surveyed suggests that there may be (or may have been) approximately a dozen high-level pirate leaders or financiers, there appear to be mixed views on the scope, depth, and accuracy of the counter-piracy community’s knowledge of the piracy organizations and operations. Some suggested that while significantly more is known today than was known several years ago, there are still substantial gaps and there is no really reliable, coherent picture, especially on the financial side, in terms of the movement and disposition of pirate proceeds.<sup>75</sup> As one community leader put it, “there are islands of good knowledge, with some missing links.” On the other hand, some community members say that the pirate structures “are not particularly sophisticated or surprising, and most of the pirate leaders are known.” Still others indicated fairly extensive knowledge of the pirate leaders, their networks, and the distribution of ransoms, as set out, for example, in the *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853, S/2010/91* (March 10, 2010), at pages 35–43, and in the recent World Bank Report, *Pirate Trails*, at pages 29–32.<sup>76</sup> One community member observed that the real problem is not a lack of information, but a lack of focus and organization: “What is needed is a coordinated approach to building cases.”

Even assuming some level of understanding and political will in some State governments and international organizations, the prosecution of pirate leaders and financiers is made substantially more difficult by (1) the international, cross-jurisdictional nature of the underlying conduct and related behavior; (2) the lack of interest, willingness, and/or capacity of some States, officials, or branches of commerce to actually take some action to assist investigations; (3) the existence of strong clan and tribal systems and powerful loyalties in some regional countries; (4) worse yet, the existence of extensive corruption and inter-connecting complicit relationships with government officials and political and financial elites in the regional countries;<sup>77</sup> and (5) the use of cash and non-conventional financial transactions which leave few of the more-traditional paper, electronic, or other trails.

Despite this overall assessment, it should be noted that there have been, and are, in fact, a small number of more extensive investigations targeting East African pirates and facilitators at some higher levels, primarily involving (1) investigations based on ongoing, *ad hoc* cooperation involving U.S., European, and Seychelles authorities, (2) the Belgian investigation leading to the October 2013 arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan; and (3) an 18-month-long joint Dutch-German investigation assisted by Europol and Eurojust called “Nemesis,”<sup>78</sup>

which has recently ended due to a lack of funding, but with charges still expected. Indeed, nothing in this paper is meant to imply that some higher-level pirates have not been investigated or charged, although it remains true that, except for the arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan, none have been prosecuted to date. The fact, however, that those criminal charges which *have* been brought and those arrest warrants which *have* been issued have not resulted in the prosecution of a single pirate leader or financier, except Mohamed Abdi Hassan—who was arrested in Belgium, not Somalia—is itself an indication of important shortcomings in the existing law enforcement apparatus or efforts to date, especially in terms of making arrests in Somalia. Several higher-level community participants suggested rather forcefully that senior international authorities should put the relevant arrest warrants squarely in front of senior Somali officials and demand that action be taken: “Here’s an arrest warrant—what are you going to do about it?” Indeed, hundreds of millions of dollars of international assistance should buy some cooperation. As for charged, higher-level pirates who move internationally, several persons confirmed that better, faster communication and coordination is needed in order to catch them when there is an opportunity to do so.

### ***The Impact of Law Enforcement Efforts to Date:***

Unfortunately, given the aforementioned circumstances and considerable challenges, and despite the dedicated efforts of a number of individuals, law enforcement and criminal justice efforts to date have not been a major factor in reducing maritime piracy on Africa’s east coast. Instead, a large number of those surveyed agreed that, to the extent that there has been a substantial decline in successful pirate attacks in East Africa, it is primarily due to three factors: (1) more effective international naval patrolling; (2) fuller implementation of best practices and countermeasures on ships transiting the area;<sup>79</sup> and (3) use of private armed security. From the perspective of accountability, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported on July 12, 2013 that the principal pirate leaders and their associates continued to enjoy impunity and had “not been hindered in their ability to travel or transfer funds.”<sup>80</sup> Prosecuting pirate kingpins would make law enforcement a much more significant factor.

### ***The Use of More Proactive, Sophisticated Law Enforcement Methods:***

To date, counter-piracy law enforcement has had only limited success, spread over several national jurisdictions, in developing and using insider witnesses. Surveyed community participants, who were appropriately discreet on this topic, either knew of no successful development or use of insider witnesses to piracy, or were only aware of such insiders being developed in a very few instances.<sup>81</sup> In these instances, however (and again as very generally described), this small group of insiders seemed to have provided valuable information and services, so efforts to develop them have been worthwhile. Altogether, there are insufficient indications that law enforcement authorities dealing with maritime piracy have tried hard enough and long enough to develop this important source of frequently necessary and often compelling evidence. One concern among some community members has been that developing suspected or convicted pirates as cooperating witnesses—i.e., turning them into a “Crown witness” or “state’s evidence”—is somehow unsavory or something not to be done. A number of people also indicated a concern (or gave as a reason for the limited success in developing insider witnesses) that Somalia’s strong clan system and loyalties make it difficult to develop such witnesses. Both of these will be addressed in the recommendations that follow.

To public knowledge, there have not been any undercover investigations into East Africa’s piracy (where such an investigation might have become publicly known, for example, in the course of a subsequent

piracy prosecution). Of course, if there are any active, ongoing undercover investigations, those outside the particular investigation would not expect to know about or comment on them.

**Generally, metadata is easier to obtain, both legally and otherwise, than content is**

Communication intercepts (“signal intelligence”) and other electronic surveillance and monitoring, again with limited exceptions, have not been successfully used in investigating and prosecuting piracy. Information concerning wire or digital communications is generally of two sorts: (1) information indicating the fact that communication took place and the details of it—i.e., the date and time of the call (or other communication), the originating number of the call (and its location), the number called (and its location), and the duration of the call (e.g., 15 minutes), all of which is sometimes known as “metadata”; and (2) communication content—that is, what Caller A said to Called B and what B said in return. Metadata can be very helpful investigative information and also important evidence, but it is not the same as getting the communication’s content. Generally, metadata is easier to obtain, both legally and otherwise, than content is. To date, to the extent that audio recordings of communication content have been used in bringing indictments and prosecuting cases, these have been almost (if not entirely) consensual recordings of ransom negotiation conversations, recorded on the consenting shipping or insurance company’s end of the conversation.<sup>82</sup> While such recordings are important (certainly as evidence against the negotiator), they are not the sort of interceptions or surveillance (“wiretapping” or non-consensual third-party interception of communications) that are likely to capture communication content involving or directly implicating the top pirates and financiers themselves. To the extent that any of this non-consensual interception has occurred (and many in the counter-piracy community believe that it has), it is likely being carried out by military forces and/or the intelligence community and unfortunately, this information or evidence is rarely, if ever, shared with law enforcement.<sup>83</sup> One type of communication content that may be easier to obtain is text messages and/or emails stored in recovered or seized pirate cellphones, depending on who takes possession of the phones and whether they are made available.

Documentary evidence, especially from inside the criminal organization, can be highly important evidence. East African piracy appears to rely heavily on oral communications and non-conventional financial transactions, and most of those surveyed considered there to be not a lot of documentary evidence “out there.” Some documentary evidence has been recovered in the course of crime scene investigations on recovered vessels, but for the most part, such documentation does not appear to have played a significant role in piracy prosecutions. To date, fingerprints and DNA recovered from papers left behind on seized ships, which are more akin to physical than documentary evidence, have probably been as important or more important than the contents of those papers. This finding likely follows in part from the fact that the lowest-level pirates have primarily been prosecuted, with those being exactly the pirates least likely to put much on paper. At higher levels, some recordkeeping and documentation must exist.

Other findings, again with limited exceptions, indicate that most of the investigations to date have been reactive and were approached from the bottom up, rather than the top down, and most investigations continue to be pursued individually by distinct law enforcement organizations, rather than cooperatively. Again, to the extent that almost all investigations and prosecutions to date have concerned only low-level pirates and have been based on particular incident evidence, this is not surprising.

All of the more advanced law enforcement techniques and categories of evidence, except for the rare windfall, require a serious sense and priority of mission, the necessary professional expertise, and mission leadership and operational direction, with commitment of significant resources and focus sustained over time. With some

exceptions, these elements have largely been missing and do not appear to exist at an institutional (rather than an individual) level at the present time, with no pirate leaders or financiers convicted to date.

### *Legal and Jurisdictional Issues:*

Most of those interviewed believe that despite the work of the past several years there continue to be significant legal and jurisdictional obstacles to more efficient and effective counter-piracy work.<sup>84</sup> At the same time, a significant number also believe that for the most part, the legal challenges involved in law enforcement efforts are not the core reasons why counter-piracy prosecutions, and especially those of pirate leaders, have not been more efficient or effective.<sup>85</sup> An equal or more important issue, despite the rhetoric, is whether modern piracy is truly taken seriously, in terms of the lack or inconsistency of political will to address it fully, as well as the structures and approaches used in addressing it to date.

In terms of needed law or system reforms, the suggestions range from very fundamental changes (including a substantially new “law of the sea,” at least in terms of maritime crime, and a new system for registering, flagging, and regulating ships and shipping, abandoning the current system in whole or part, especially flags of convenience,)<sup>86</sup> to more specific tweaking. Anyone who has labored in the vineyards of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), and other international and national laws (and/or regimes related to maritime crime and piracy) will likely agree that the juridical framework and procedures for dealing with such crime can and should be substantially improved. Relevant questions include: What is currently the accepted scope of universal jurisdiction in terms of piracy and related offenses, and how does international law contemplate dealing with land-based pirate leaders and facilitators, if at all? Many existing laws and approaches are outdated and are a poor fit with modern realities.

Apart from these broader issues, there are still serious challenges to getting adequate piracy laws on the books of many countries. The fact that the UN Secretary-General, in October 2013, was still “encourag[ing] Somali authorities to [take the most basic steps in passing] all relevant legislation to facilitate the prosecution of individuals suspected of piracy”<sup>87</sup> indicates woefully slow progress since the repeated public declarations, now many years in the past, that piracy had to be fought urgently as a top priority. And even where piracy laws are adopted, that does not mean that they will be seriously implemented and enforced. Somalia does not have extradition treaties and is not a party to mutual legal assistance arrangements. While this does not mean that indicted pirates may not be turned over, simply on the basis of comity, or that various forms of assistance may not be provided by one means or another, this state of affairs is nonetheless surprising since it concerns a failed State which has been in international receivership for a number of years and involves a much-publicized area of allegedly serious international crime.

***There are still serious challenges to getting adequate piracy laws on the books of many countries***

One community member suggested developing a “universal MLAT” (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty) process by which MLAT requests or orders would create a universal obligation to comply with them, rather than there being a need for multiple individual requests and orders.

A serious issue raised by several community participants is that sentences in a number of countries that have prosecuted pirates have been short. In Europe and Africa, a number of piracy sentences have been



as short as four-and-a-half to five years of imprisonment.<sup>88</sup> While these sentences, once again, relate only to low-level pirates, there are at least two serious issues arising from such sentences, apart from concern that the sentences themselves are deficient in terms of the crime.<sup>89</sup> First, as discussed previously, when states engage in a cost/benefit calculation to determine whether prosecuting piracy cases is “worth it,” the prospect of spending substantial time, precious effort, and scarce resources to possibly obtain, when all is said and done, a four- or five-year sentence may, in many situations, lead to the answer being “no.” Second, in those States where any sort of plea negotiation may come into play (e.g., where an accused pirate might plead guilty and agree to cooperate in exchange for a reduced sentence), a “worst-case scenario” of a three-to-five year sentence, if the charged pirate goes to trial and is convicted, leaves little negotiating room or incentive for the accused pirate to plead guilty.

While not dismissing any of these issues, and in looking at some of the more usual concerns (such as establishing the identity and age of young piracy suspects), from the perspective of prosecuting higher-level land-based pirates, there is probably less basis for genuine concern that these matters present major obstacles to serious efforts to prosecute pirate leaders. One community member commented that jurisdiction is actually rarely an issue, stating “there will almost always be jurisdiction somewhere, or in several places. It’s really a question of the political will to prosecute these cases.”<sup>90</sup> Dedicated and creative prosecutors will almost always find ways to bring cases, under international and/or national law, in one forum or another. Two exceptions, and significant ones, concern the inability to prosecute cases in Somalia against pirate leaders located there, and the inability and/or unwillingness of Somali authorities to execute arrest warrants against pirate leaders. If the international community and its constituent states are serious about prosecuting pirate leaders rather than foot soldiers, they will find a way to do so.

### *Fragmentation, Duplication, Lack of Coordinated Focus:*

#### ***An effective fight against maritime piracy must be an international effort***

Virtually everyone in the counter-piracy community agrees that an effective fight against maritime piracy must be an international effort. At the same time, there is broad consensus that current international and national counter-piracy efforts are too fragmented, involve too much duplication and competition (including for funding), and lack a coordinated focus and direction.<sup>91</sup> Perhaps not surprisingly, a number of community members indicated that “a lot of politics” are involved. “There are too many different agendas,” “it’s all empire building,” and there are too many “turf issues.” “It’s your classic international aid and development scenario.” “There is not always an appetite for advice.” “Too much talk, not enough action.” One community leader stated clearly, “Unless there is better organization and focus, we will not get to the pirate organizers, except by chance.” Another panel member said, “Someone has to make [prosecuting pirate leaders] their mission, and it’s not happening now.”

As discussed, no effective law enforcement system approaches the investigation and prosecution of particularly important and often complex crimes on a disparate, reactive, and bottom-up basis. There are, instead, dedicated, specialized units dealing with such things as organized crime, terrorism, and complex white-collar crime. No serious law enforcement effort leaves important, high-priority crimes to general-jurisdiction “catch-as-catch-can” operations, and there is no reason to believe that such a disparate, reactive, catch-as-catch-can (or catch-and-release) effort will be any more successful at the international or transnational level, but that is essentially what has been done. Counter-piracy participants said repeatedly that “there needs to be a centralized gatherer of information” and “some central coordination.”<sup>92</sup> One community member said, “What we really need is a global strike force.”

It is especially noteworthy, in this context, that the Contact Group, at its first plenary meeting in January 2009, initially identified “establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism” as one of its six “focus areas.”<sup>93</sup> Unlike the working groups formed in January 2009 to address four of the focus areas, however, and the fifth group formed in July 2011 to look at pirate leaders and financial flows, no group was ever formed to address a coordination mechanism and no “counter-piracy coordination mechanism” was ever established.

There is no single consistent or shared “standard operating procedure” for almost anything. Rules and practices vary. “[T]he lack of standardization of evidence gathering and sharing makes it difficult to produce the full range of evidence in court.”<sup>94</sup> There is a lack of consistency and transparency, resulting in process uncertainty, substantial inefficiency, higher costs and less effectiveness. “Much of the lack of clarity surrounding the legal side of piracy stems from the confusion surrounding overlapping jurisdictions. . . . This creates a vacuum of accountability and has often allowed pirates to be released without standing trial or being held accountable for their crimes.”<sup>95</sup>

The shipping industry gives voice to these concerns in saying that what the industry would like is a “one-stop shop” where it can provide information, bring questions, and provide assistance to one point of contact with one set of rules and procedures. Some States have favored increased centralization, at least in some respects, while others have been opposed. Some members suggest that decentralized efforts are more “scalable” to different needs and levels of activity.

There have been problems with slow response times among fragmented authorities, especially in getting the right information to the right people at the right time. One example concerns an opportunity to arrest a higher-level piracy suspect who was moving internationally, an opportunity which was lost by the time the necessary information could be obtained and law enforcement actions coordinated. On the other hand, INTERPOL’s increased partnership with NCIS in terms of more effective crime scene investigations has been a positive development.

All of these findings confirm what the Lang Report concluded in January 2011, almost three years ago: “The large number of actors implicated in the fight against piracy can at times be dizzying. Using the orchestra as a metaphor, each instrument must have a score that is in harmony with the ensemble, while the ensemble, in turn, must be led by a conductor.”<sup>96</sup> In this regard and in response to this finding, the Lang Report recommended that “[t]he Secretary-General, acting in close consultation with his Special Representative for Somalia, should contemplate the establishment of an *institutional structure* to facilitate the implementation of [Security Council resolutions] under the aegis of a *high-level eminent personality* with vast United Nations experience.”<sup>97</sup>

Several community members expressed concern that many of the organizations and agencies involved in counter-piracy work have never set foot in the region. Several community members commented that one cannot sit in the capitals of first-world countries and accomplish what needs to be done. Other community members noted that there are frequent “disconnects” between what first-world prosecutors and investigators talk about and the on-the-ground realities in the region—“Some of the prosecutors at the meetings talk about sophisticated surveillance systems, when the guys in Kenya are worried whether they have enough petrol to put their patrol boats to sea.”

The investigation and prosecution of pirate kingpins is also hindered by the rotation of engaged diplomatic and military personnel, who are often assigned to a particular duty station or task for a relatively short period of time and are then rotated to another location or different duties at about the time when they might be most effective in their piracy work.

### ***Information-Sharing:***

There is an interesting juxtaposition of views here. On the one hand, a number of community members commented that the counter-piracy law enforcement community is fairly small, somewhat tight-knit, and enjoys the highest levels of cooperation that some of them have ever experienced in a multi-organizational or international setting. At the same time, there was a widely-held view that information-sharing continues to be problematic. A good measure of this appears to be due to the fragmentation and “turf” (or competition) issues mentioned above.

Apart from the more specific challenges addressed below, the information-sharing problems seem to be at their worst in the earliest phases of what may eventually become an investigation. The view was expressed several times that “once a case is actually charged and in court, everyone pretty much knows about it and there are rules and procedures for getting things done. But what do you do with information when you don’t even have a suspect yet?” A cell phone is found or seized somewhere—what do you do with it? Who gets the downloaded information? Who analyzes it? How do you connect the dots when you don’t yet know what the dots are?

***Information-sharing problems seem to be at their worst in the earliest phases of what may eventually become an investigation***

Counter-piracy community meetings for the purpose of sharing information and discussing common issues and solutions seem to occur only at the widest international level in the Contact Group’s working group meetings. Apart from these, there appears to be primarily a continental European group, with information exchange and coordination facilitated by Europol and Eurojust, and a regional East Africa/Indian Ocean group which holds meetings from time to time. As mentioned, counter-piracy community members in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region feel that there is a disconnect between the European and North American communities and what happens in the region and that the two groups need to engage in more interaction. To date, UNODC appears to be the most effective in coordinating its work in Europe, based in Vienna, with its work in Nairobi and the wider region. Still, many well-intentioned African representatives return home from international conferences and meetings with no real authority or ability to do anything better or different.

Apart from these more general (but nonetheless important) concerns, there was significant consensus in the community about four larger and more challenging issues concerning the exchange of information: (1) the strict European (and perhaps other national) laws on information protection and sharing; (2) the interface (or lack thereof) between the military and intelligence communities, on one hand, and the law enforcement/prosecution community on the other; (3) the “feeding,” management, and use of law enforcement databases; and (4) obtaining full cooperation and information from the shipping and insurance industries.

As to the first of these concerns, many privacy laws and information-sharing regimes, particularly in the European Union, are rather draconian and make it very difficult to share information with and among law

enforcement and prosecution authorities. Some countries, such as Italy, have apparently been cut out of the loop because their national privacy, confidentiality, and information-sharing laws do not (allegedly) satisfy European requirements. One leading community member believes that European laws, information regimes, and judicial systems need to be substantially improved to make law enforcement-related information exchanges much easier and more fluid, as well as to allow for the more efficient transfer and use of evidence in multiple jurisdictions.

Law enforcement's second major obstacle to obtaining helpful evidence and information involves information-sharing between the military and intelligence communities and the law enforcement community. There is knowledge, or "an educated guess," on the law enforcement side, that military forces and intelligence services in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region collect extensive information through various forms of communication, imagery, and other surveillance and interception that would be helpful to law enforcement authorities,<sup>98</sup> but such information or evidence is never (or rarely) shared. There is wide concern among those in law enforcement that too much military and intelligence information is routinely classified or over-classified when it should be shared. Most of those surveyed were realistic in their understanding that concerns about terrorism and other national and international security issues may take precedence in many situations, but they nonetheless said they believe that much information is over-classified and that larger amounts of helpful information could be shared with law enforcement in ways that would not compromise other concerns.

One community member hit the nail on the head in saying that fighting piracy "is dealing with crime by military means" and that the challenges in the interface between and the information-sharing among the military, intelligence, and law enforcement communities should have been foreseen and dealt with "at the very beginning" by memoranda of understanding and other arrangements. The fact that they were not is further evidence that law enforcement efforts were not integrated into the overall program from the beginning and that they have been too much of a relatively late-developing, "add-on" feature. Through persistent individual efforts, there has been limited success in breaking through the military/intelligence barrier, with one leading member indicating having been "fighting" about this issue for more than three years.

A third substantial issue regarding information-sharing and management concerns law enforcement-oriented databases that have been or are proposed to be used in connection with counter-piracy efforts. The principal international piracy database that has been used in the past few years is an INTERPOL database that was largely funded and built by the U.S. government and then moved to INTERPOL's Lyon, France headquarters.

Due to increased concerns about the database's effective operation, its management was returned to INTERPOL's U.S. National Central Bureau in Washington, D.C. in mid-2013. A number of community members expressed concerns about the consistent and timely entry of information into the database, the sourcing, reliability, and quality of the entered information, and difficulties in running productive searches. Europol also operates a piracy database used primarily by EU states and about which there was less discussion. With the establishment of the RAPPICC in Seychelles in March 2013, there have been questions about the relationship or interaction between INTERPOL and its database and any database or analytical tools that may be set up or used by RAPPICC. There is overall concern about the relationships between the various database efforts, potential duplication and overlap, and efficiency and reliability issues.

***Information and 'intelligence' are very often not the same as 'evidence.'***

The fourth major issue concerning information-sharing is addressed below in connection with the shipping and insurance industries.

Before leaving the topic of information-sharing, it can never be forgotten that information and “intelligence” are very often not the same as “evidence.” What prosecutors need in order to convict pirate kingpins is evidence admissible in court, according to the requirements of national or international law and evidentiary rules and procedures, which means that prosecutors are sometimes less impressed by “information.” Rumors and what “everyone knows” are not evidence. Entering information into a database and sending intelligence is the relatively easy part, and pushing the real evidentiary work down to the local prosecutor is not particularly helpful. Information must be tested, developed and corroborated, and checked against applicable rules for admissibility in court.

### ***Information Synthesis and Analysis:***

If information-sharing has been less than perfect, then information synthesis and analysis may be even more serious issues. Sharing information is not productive unless someone does something with it as part of a process of synthesizing and analyzing the information. One community member stated, “There needs to be more joined-up thinking and less emphasis on individual turf.” A recurring query and concern from the shipping industry has been, and continues to be: “Assuming that there is good cooperation and information exchange between ship owners and law enforcement, what happens after all of our effort in collecting the information?” And the next industry statement is usually: “We don’t see anything happen, so what’s the point?”

Apart from a few individual prosecutors, investigators, and analysts working together on particular investigations, either within a single national system or across national systems, there has not been, and does not appear to be at the present time, an effective coordinated or centralized multi-national program or effort to synthesize and integrate law enforcement information in building cases against pirate leaders and financiers.

### ***Shipping and Insurance Companies:***

There is still widespread concern in the law enforcement community that ship owners, insurance carriers, and private security companies are often uncooperative and even obstructive in the investigation and prosecution of maritime piracy. Most shipping companies are eager to get on with business and get vessels that have been attacked and released back to sea as quickly as possible, and do not understand or appreciate the difficulties, logistics, and timelines of criminal investigations and cases. Many law enforcement officials believe that ship owners, insurance carriers, and related business interests use unjustified and inappropriate claims of “proprietary information” in order to block the sharing of information. There is a common perception that the insurance companies and private security businesses have their own separate agendas and financial incentives and that they want to control the flow of ransom and piracy incident information in order to promote their own commercial interests, since “inside information,” contacts, and insights translate into dollars, pounds, and euros for them. There are, of course, exceptions, and some shipping companies are better than others, in terms of their level of cooperation.

A particular aspect of reporting or information-sharing in which industry cooperation may actually be declining is in the reporting of pirate attacks, especially unsuccessful attacks. Some community members

expressed concern that the shipping industry has become more reticent and less reliable about reporting pirate attacks where the attacked vessels had private armed security onboard, based on concerns about possible legal liability related to the use of force.<sup>99</sup> One community participant said, “A lot of shipping companies are not reporting armed personnel on their ships, even though they are supposed to.”

Representatives of the shipping industry respond that these concerns or criticisms are not justified. They say that the shipping industry, in the earlier years of the recent bout with maritime piracy, had an “open door” policy and only wanted rules and assurances about how industry information would be managed and used. In the earlier years, they say, most law enforcement authorities did not show any interest in these matters and the shipping industry ultimately turned to INTERPOL, in which they found a more interested and willing partner. Shipping companies say they are concerned with the amount of time and effort involved in assisting investigations, especially when they feel that often “nothing comes of it.” They also express concern about getting multiple (and often conflicting) requests and competing demands from different law enforcement authorities. As mentioned above, what the shipping and insurance industries would like is a “one-stop shop” where all of these matters can be handled or dealt with at one point of contact.

As do all citizens (personal or corporate), the shipping, insurance, and security companies have an important duty to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution of crime, and ultimately, law enforcement and prosecutors, not the private companies, are in charge, or should be. At the same time, the shipping companies have a reasonable interest in wanting to deal with professional, efficient, and coordinated law enforcement authorities who appreciate their legitimate business interests.

### ***Regional Capacity and Enforcement:***

There are two dynamics at work concerning the investigation and prosecution of maritime piracy in national systems in the East Africa/ Indian Ocean region. Some members of the counter-piracy community feel strongly that law enforcement efforts should emphasize and give priority to regional domestic systems, while others believe that the international community should not put so much of the counter-piracy burden on regional systems, or at least not without very substantial international support.<sup>100</sup> Unfortunately, there is often little interest or political will among government officials in the most affected East African countries to seriously investigate and prosecute piracy, especially pirate leaders who may be part of, or closely linked to and protected by national elites. There are high levels of corruption in some of these countries, extending into law enforcement itself, which further complicates or even compromises the capacity of these systems to prosecute—or even to substantially assist with the prosecution of—pirate leaders.<sup>101</sup> As mentioned in another context, many regional representatives who attend international conferences and meetings return home to national systems in which they have no real authority or ability to change or improve their systems. In addition, each country has its own system, deals with its own particular issues, and attaches varying levels of priority to counter-piracy efforts.<sup>102</sup>

***Each country has its own system, deals with its own particular issues, and attaches varying levels of priority to counter-piracy efforts***

A substantial majority of community members believe that there is no current or near-term capacity to prosecute pirate leaders or financiers in Somalia. The Somali government has little authority outside

Mogadishu and no ability or apparent inclination to take on politically- and financially-connected pirate leaders and investors. In fact, in its report *Preliminary Observations on Responses to Organized Crime* (2010), the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa (ISS) assessed that there was no existing capacity in East African/Indian Ocean States to tackle serious transnational organized crime: “[T]here is general consensus that law enforcement agencies [in the region] do not have the required capacity . . . the personnel lack[ ] the necessary skill sets . . . the major deficiency is the prevalence of responses to crimes that are not adequately informed, not integrated, and not well resourced.”<sup>103</sup> One observer said in February 2011 that the “restoration of law and order in Somalia remains illusory.”<sup>104</sup> An important counter-piracy leader put it strongly in saying that “the international community needs a reality check” if they think pirate leaders can be prosecuted in Somalia in the near future; “that’s at least ten years away.”

Kenya and Seychelles are the two regional States that have had the most success in prosecuting lower-level pirates and they are generally the key law enforcement and judicial actors in the region. While Kenya has sometimes been considered “the lead prosecutor of suspected pirates,”<sup>105</sup> a significant number of community members expressed the view that the judicial process in Kenya, at least concerning piracy cases, has been “challenging.” By at least 2009, Kenya had already become an important part of combined national and international efforts to prosecute pirates in the region of East Africa. But in 2010, Kenya indicated on two occasions that it was terminating its agreement with the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries to accept suspected Somali pirates for prosecution, or would otherwise cease doing so, on the grounds that the nation was bearing an excessive part of the counter-piracy burden and was not receiving sufficient assistance.<sup>106</sup> After receiving international assurances of additional support, Kenya has continued to accept transferred pirates for prosecution on an *ad hoc* basis. In November 2010, a Kenyan trial court ruled in the case *In re Mohamud Mohamed Hashi, et al.*, that Kenya had no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes occurring outside Kenya’s territorial waters, which threw a substantial wrench in the counter-piracy prosecution machinery.<sup>107</sup> Fortunately, in October 2012, the Kenyan Court of Appeal in Nairobi reversed the lower court decision and confirmed that Kenya has jurisdiction to prosecute piracy occurring in international waters. A number of surveyed counter-piracy participants indicated that there is no prospect of prosecuting pirate leaders or financiers in Kenya in the near future.

On the other hand, and despite the ISS assessment, a number of community members believe that higher-level pirates can be prosecuted in Seychelles, with substantial international assistance. The Seychelles islands’ piracy effort has been the most proactive in the region, with its own Seychelles Piracy Intelligence Centre (SPIC) doing solid work. As discussed below, the Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Co-ordination Centre, a partnership involving the United Kingdom, Seychelles, The Netherlands, the United States, and Australia, officially opened in Seychelles in March 2013, and SPIC and RAPPICC are building a closer, more effective working relationship. As of late 2013, RAPPICC was slated to become part of a new Seychelles government agency called the Transnational Crime and Maritime Security Centre, with a broader focus on transnational organized crime and maritime security, including piracy.

The other countries in the East Africa/Indian Ocean region which have had some training and/or experience in prosecuting piracy cases include Mauritius and Tanzania. Mauritius is currently prosecuting 12 suspected pirates apprehended by EU naval forces. Tanzania has agreed to take piracy cases and there has been some training and other efforts there, but no prosecutions to date. As of December 2012, Yemen and India had prosecuted (or were prosecuting) 129 and 119 piracy cases, respectively,<sup>108</sup> but neither country was featured in survey conversations in response to general questions concerning regional counter-piracy efforts and the contributions by various countries.

### ***Other National Counter-Piracy Efforts:***

Outside the East Africa/Indian Ocean region, in Europe and North America, the most active law enforcement and prosecution efforts, according to those surveyed, are in the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium, with other countries also making contributions. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Denmark, do not prosecute any piracy cases in their national systems.

In the United States, maritime piracy policy is primarily set and implemented by the State Department and the Department of Defense.<sup>109</sup> The State Department's capable Donna Hopkins, who is Coordinator of the Counter Piracy and Maritime Security section in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, has played a leading role together with other State Department personnel. In the Justice Department, piracy cases are monitored by the National Security Division's Counterterrorism Section, and are primarily investigated and prosecuted in field offices in the Eastern District of Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the Southern District of New York. The principal investigative and prosecuting agencies are the United States Attorney's Offices (in the above districts), the NCIS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The U.S. has convicted the highest-level pirates to date—two pirate ransom negotiators—and is believed to be engaged in ongoing investigations against possible pirate leaders. As mentioned elsewhere, NCIS, with a forward office in Bahrain, has taken a productive lead role in international piracy crime scene investigations, working with or through INTERPOL.

The Dutch have been active in prosecuting piracy through the National Prosecutor's Office and the key work of prosecutor Henny Baan. In addition to prosecuting other piracy cases to date, the Netherlands and Germany have been involved in a significant joint investigation against higher-level pirates, called "Nemesis," which is supported by Europol, Eurojust, and INTERPOL. Germany has also been involved in other investigations. Belgium, Denmark, and Italy have also been active in investigating, prosecuting, and/or supporting piracy cases, with the notable recent arrest of Mohamed Abdi Hassan in Belgium. In Asia, Japan and South Korea have been the most active in prosecuting piracy cases.

### ***The Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia:***

Given its nature and circumstances, and faced with considerable limitations, the CGPCS has been effective on a wide range of fronts. In its broadest scope, it has succeeded in building and fostering an ongoing counter-piracy community and providing a venue or vehicle for better communication and information-sharing, which is no small accomplishment. On the law enforcement/prosecution side, in particular with reference to Working Groups 2 and 5, it has succeeded in improving and facilitating the prosecution of pirates interdicted at sea, substantially contributing to the overall prosecution effort in connection with the approximate 1,200 prosecutions to date. Community members believe that much of the Contact Group's success has been due to its having a clear, shared goal from the beginning, and that the group has been most remarkable in its flexibility, its relative informality, and its inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders, including industry and non-government organizations. A number of people specifically commented that much of the Contact Group's strength or advantage has been in avoiding or cutting through UN bureaucracy, official channels, and diplomatic formalisms.

***The CGPCS has been effective on a wide range of fronts***

In the earliest days of the CGPCS, the law enforcement-related working groups suffered a common phenomenon among international conferences and "states-parties" gatherings: being heavy on foreign-service representatives and academics and light on criminal law practitioners. Working Group 2, however,



under its capable Chair, Danish Ambassador Thomas Winkler, took on an increasingly practical and pragmatic character and its membership over time has evolved, with an increasing number of prosecutors and investigators. At the same time, Working Group 2 was in basically the same situation as law enforcement generally; being behind the curve and playing catch-up in a generally reactive mode: “The navies are apprehending pirates at sea, what do we do with them?” “How do we get apprehended pirate suspects before a judicial officer?” “What do we do about underage pirates?” “What do we do about evidence collection?” etc. In response, Working Group 2 and its members worked successfully to produce some guidance for investigations and prosecutions, including a “prosecutor’s toolkit.” Working Group 2 must also be commended for its work, with others, in putting transfer agreements in place that provide for the transfer of apprehended suspected pirates to various national jurisdictions for prosecution, and for other agreements for transferring convicted pirates from prosecuting jurisdictions (e.g., Seychelles) to Somalia for the purpose of serving their sentences. Working Group 2 has also wrestled with the issue of private armed security on vessels.<sup>110</sup> Working Group 5, with an evolving mandate to focus on pirate leaders and networks, was slow in getting established, and it must be remembered that neither Working Group 2 nor Working Group 5 are operational—that is, they do not themselves investigate or prosecute pirates, but at best only coordinate, share information, and encourage. Dealing with the financial side of piracy, in terms of tracking its profits or proceeds, has been especially difficult. As of 2013, a more specifically law enforcement/prosecution-oriented group has been in the process of becoming established as part of the existing groups or perhaps as a spin-off.

Several community members indicated that the principal value of the Contact Group has been in some of the working groups, and that overall, most of the plenary sessions have added little value. During most periods, there was no real direction from the plenary, and most of the plenary meetings quickly became routine and provided few fresh ideas.<sup>111</sup> One member summed this up by saying that most of the plenary meetings were “little more than diplomats reading prepared statements.”

***Like all volunteer organizations, the Contact Group is ultimately dependent on the goodwill and contributions of its members.***

Of course, as mentioned, the Contact Group is essentially a volunteer organization with limited ability to focus on and drive action. Like all volunteer organizations, it is ultimately dependent on the goodwill and contributions of its members, some of which are more effective than others. As one community member stated, “you are dependent on the states and other members, on people actually doing something.” While there are benefits to cheerleading and to some degree of peer pressure,

“it is important not to overstate the extent to which naming and shaming have generated compliance” with international programs and activities to improve counter-piracy efforts, such as improving national piracy laws and implementation of best practices.<sup>112</sup> A possible shortcoming of the Contact Group’s more informal approach is the absence of a regular process for feedback or evaluation. Concerns have also been expressed about whether the Contact Group has, or will have, sufficient institutional memory for its positive aspects and lessons learned to be carried forward.

### ***UNODC:***

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, headquartered in Vienna, Austria, launched its Counter-Piracy Program in May 2009. While it is not a police or prosecution office, UNODC has played a major role in counter-piracy efforts, with some of those surveyed considering UNODC to have played the lead law enforcement role, albeit in a capacity-building arena. UNODC’s counter-piracy work has involved three objectives: (1) supporting “fair and efficient trials and imprisonment of piracy suspects in regional countries”; (2) “humane and secure imprisonment in Somalia”; and (3) “In the longer term[,] fair and efficient trials in Somalia itself

(mainly taken forward by [the UN Development Program], but with UNODC support).<sup>113</sup> UNODC is widely considered successful in its regional capacity-building and in its support for the prosecution of low-level pirates, with its counter-piracy budget growing from approximately \$6 million several years ago to \$200 million in 2013. It has been helpful in drafting and implementing detainee and prisoner transfer agreements, conducting regional training programs, providing funds for defense counsel for suspected pirates, and facilitating the transportation of witnesses to regional court proceedings. Several leading community members singled out UNODC's Nairobi office as particularly successful for being in the region, taking practical steps on the ground, and cutting through red tape. While UNODC believes that pirate leaders and financiers should be prosecuted, and has, for example, worked with the World Bank in efforts to track piracy-related financial flows, it is not an investigative or prosecution agency and the prosecution of pirate leaders has not been a central part of its mission.

### ***INTERPOL:***

INTERPOL is an international intergovernmental organization which facilitates international police cooperation. It is not an operational law enforcement agency and has no police powers of its own. It created a Maritime Piracy Task Force in January 2010, seeking to fill “an important institutional gap that also plugs knowledge gaps about pirate networks.”<sup>114</sup> While its counter-piracy unit is small, INTERPOL has played an important role as a conduit between law enforcement and the shipping industry and in improving and coordinating crime scene investigations with NCIS. As discussed, however, the INTERPOL database has been problematic. A number of those surveyed complained about the process of getting data into the system, the reliability of the data, and the difficulty of conducting searches, with one member summarizing the community sentiment as being “confidence in the [INTERPOL] system has substantially declined.” As a result, the database's management was returned to Washington, D.C. in July 2013, but resources for operating the system appear to remain limited.

INTERPOL has engaged in Evidence Exploitation Initiative (EVEXI) projects to “[provide] regional investigators with an INTERPOL-supported procedure for intelligence gathering, evidence collection and information sharing.”<sup>115</sup> These or related efforts also involve the debriefing of released hostages.<sup>116</sup> The first of these projects, called EVEXI-1, involved East Africa-region states and was completed some time ago, with EVEXI-2 recently begun in collaboration with Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, Mauritius, and Tanzania. Prior to the establishment of RAPPICC, INTERPOL worked with authorities in Seychelles (including the SPIC) to collect a variety of evidence, but most community members surveyed were not familiar with any INTERPOL synthesis or analysis of counter-piracy information and evidence.

### ***Europol and Eurojust:***

Europol is an organization similar to INTERPOL, acting in a criminal intelligence, information-sharing, and coordination role, obviously focused on the European Union. While it is not itself an operational law enforcement body, it is more closely involved in investigations and investigation-related analysis and support work than INTERPOL is, at least in the area of maritime piracy. Europol has an analytical group dedicated to piracy, and operates and collects information for its own piracy database. For the past 18 months, it has provided active, hands-on support and analysis to the joint Dutch-German investigation “Nemesis.” Eurojust, in turn, is the prosecution counterpart to Europol, facilitating cooperation between European prosecution authorities. Eurojust facilitates an annual coordination meeting among its members related to piracy prosecutions, and recently issued a monitoring report on piracy cases and best practices.

**RAPPICC:**

The Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions and Intelligence Coordination Centre officially opened in Seychelles in March 2013, pursuant to a Memoranda of Understanding between the UK and Seychelles. Other international participants in and supporters of RAPPICC include Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States. Various RAPPICC constitutional documents describe three objectives or functions: (1) “To catalyse and facilitate the sharing and development of intelligence”; (2) “To support investigations and prosecutions”; and (3) “To build capacity, competence and capabilities” in the Indian Ocean/East Africa region.<sup>117</sup> Like INTERPOL and Europol, RAPPICC has been, until recently, an intergovernmental information-sharing and coordination body with no police powers of its own. The UK has seconded two prosecutors to RAPPICC who assist and participate in piracy prosecutions in the courts of Seychelles. Apart from intelligence-gathering and capacity-building, a principal concept behind RAPPICC is that it will integrate and coordinate international and regional actors in assembling intelligence and evidentiary packages that will be provided to national law enforcement authorities for further investigation and prosecution.<sup>118</sup> While there is significant community consensus that an international focal point for synthesizing pirate information and evidence has not existed to date and is clearly needed, the community largely considers RAPPICC to be a new unknown and has expressed concerns about the possibility of additional duplication and fragmentation of counter-piracy efforts. As of late September 2013, RAPPICC was transitioning from being an intergovernmental organization to being a government agency of Seychelles, with a broader mandate which will still include piracy issues.

**THE COSTS AND LIMITS OF CAPACITY-BUILDING**

Early in the recent era of the continuing fight against piracy, it was widely recognized that Somalia especially, but also Kenya, Seychelles, and other regional states, lacked the naval, law enforcement, and judicial capacity to deal with maritime crime in and around their territorial waters. In both Somalia and Nigeria, which has a substantial history of maritime crime and where the highest incidence of maritime crime is now occurring, “[c]rime and corruption on shore are rampant,” despite billions of dollars in past international aid, capacity-building, and assistance.<sup>119</sup> Despite or because of this, the international community, either deliberately or by default, made a decision to base the counter-piracy law enforcement and prosecution effort primarily in the general, non-specialized local courts in the national criminal justice systems of East Africa and the Indian Ocean—even knowing that there was not, and would not be at any reasonable foreseeable time, any capacity in those national systems to investigate, prosecute, and convict pirate leaders and financiers. As UNODC’s Alan Cole, one of the most effective actors in the counter-piracy community, has stated, the international community’s “use of the Regional Prosecutions Model was adopted largely by default,” and it “cannot address the apparent impunity of those who organize piracy.”<sup>120</sup>

***Capacity-building can be, and often is, expensive, time-consuming, difficult, and even violent***

While a number of important factors support capacity-building, such as nation-building and regional security, capacity-building can be, and often is, expensive, time-consuming, difficult, and even violent, often requiring substantial and sustained political and financial commitments, all with uncertain results.<sup>121</sup> In fact, “[s]ome efforts, such as the major focus on making regional states responsible for adjudicating the piratical activities of other neighboring states, are not supported by maritime tradition, international treaty obligations, or even a reasonable expectation that they can develop the capacity needed for an effective response.”<sup>122</sup>

## NOTES

- 1 *Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia* website, “About CGPCS, Mission,” [http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do? action=mission](http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?action=mission) (July 29, 2013) (hereafter “Contact Group website”) (emphasis added).
- 2 *UNODC Piracy Programme*, Issue 10 (December 2012), at 9-10.
- 3 “SAC Capital Pleads Guilty in Criminal Court,” *Reuters*, November 8, 2013; Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, July 25, 2013; U.S. News & World Report, July 25, 2013, <http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/07/25/feds-file-criminal-charges-against-sac-capital-advisors>.
- 4 See, e.g., Roger Middleton, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars” (Chatham House briefing paper, Africa Programme, October 2008); Martin N. Murphy, *Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa* (Hurst, 2010); Eugene Kontorovich, “‘A Guantanamo on the Sea’: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists,” *California Law Review* 98 (2010); Douglas Guilfoyle, “Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights,” *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59 (2010); *The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation* (World Bank, 2013), <http://www.worldbank.org/africa/piratesofsomalia>; Ved Nanda, “Maritime Piracy: How Can International Law and Policy Address this Growing Global Menace?” (*Denv. J. Int’l Law & Policy*, February 2011) (“Global Menace”); Kaija Hurlburt and D. Conor Seyle, *The Human Cost of Somali Piracy, 2012* (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2013), [http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop2012forweb\\_6.pdf](http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop2012forweb_6.pdf).
- 5 The interviews were conducted under the “Chatham House Rule,” which provides that those involved in a conversation or meeting “are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed,” or at least not without further permission, “as an aid to free discussion.” See the Chatham House website, [www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/about-chatham-house](http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/about-chatham-house).
- 6 *Burden-Sharing*, at 7.
- 7 *Burden-Sharing*, at 11.
- 8 *Piracy Off the Somali Coast*, 2 (November 21, 2008), available at [http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia\\_piracy\\_intl\\_experts\\_report\\_consolidated.pdf](http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf), at 33.
- 9 See, e.g., *Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment*, United Nations Office on Drugs & Organized Crime (September 2013) (identifying maritime piracy as serious organized crime and, aside from foreign aid and remittances, Somalia’s largest source of foreign exchange), [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC\\_East\\_Africa\\_2013.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_East_Africa_2013.pdf); *Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities Off the Horn of Africa* (World Bank [together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy Task Force], 2013) (“*Pirate Trails*”) at 2-3, 10-15, 47-50 (Somali piracy is carried out by criminal networks involving financiers, organizers, mother ship operators, suppliers, pirate crews, hostage negotiators and money launderers); *Speech by U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Thomas Kelly, October 25, 2012* (“As piracy has evolved into an organized transnational criminal enterprise, it is increasingly clear that the arrest and prosecution of rank and file pirates captured at sea is insufficient on its own to meet our longer term counter-piracy goals”); Pierre St. Helaire [Head of INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy Task Force], “Somali Piracy: Following the Paper Trail” (June 2012) (organized pirate criminal networks include leaders, organizers, negotiators and investors, in terms of the “organization, financing, and implementation of acts of piracy”); S. Percy & A. Shortland, *The Business of Piracy in Somalia* (2011), at 14-23, [https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw\\_01.c.358500.de/dp1033.pdf](https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.358500.de/dp1033.pdf); *The Globalization of Crime, A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, United Nations Office on Drugs & Organized Crime (2010), at vii, 11, 193-99; Security Council Resolution 1950 (2010) (urging a more effective fight against piracy as organized crime).
- 10 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013)*, at 23, para. 68.
- 11 UN Press Statement, Press Conference by Special Advisor on Legal Issues Related to Somalia Piracy, January 25, 2011.
- 12 The Gulf of Aden, southeast of the Suez Canal, and the larger Somali Basin are strategically located where East meets West, with more than 22,000 vessels transiting the area each year, carrying 8% of the world’s trade and 12% of the total oil transported by sea. *Global Menace*, at 178.
- 13 Jeffrey Gettleman, “The Pirates Are Winning!,” *New York Review of Books* (September 14, 2010).
- 14 *IMO Assembly Resolution A. 922(22)* (November 2001). The IMO’s activities related to piracy date to at least 1983, when the IMO Assembly adopted a resolution on measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

- IMO Assembly Resolution A.545 (November 17, 1983).
- 15 *International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.922(22)* (November 29, 2001) (emphasis added).
- 16 *International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.922(22)* (November 29, 2001).
- 17 *International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.1002(25)* (November 29, 2007) (emphasis added).
- 18 *UN Security Council Resolution 1816*, S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). Participants at the June 2013 Tokyo International Conference on African Development “agreed that resolving cross-border issues such as piracy [is] essential to achieving a stable African continent.” *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea Off the Coast of Somalia*, S/2013/623 (October 21, 2013) (“*Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*”), para. 33.
- 19 While a formal Chapter VII finding that a particular situation poses a “threat to international peace and security” is one of the most important and potentially empowering actions that the UN Security Council can take, the Security Council’s Chapter VII resolutions concerning Somalia have not been as strong or empowering as they might first appear. They expressly affirm Somalia’s sovereignty (despite the absence of a functioning government), require permission from Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in order for States to take actions on Somalia’s territory or in its territorial waters, and make it clear that the Chapter VII authorizations apply only to Somalia and should not be interpreted as customary law. With these conditions and limitations, the Chapter VII authorization did not in fact create any new legal rights or abilities for international actors concerning Somali piracy. *See Burden-Sharing*, at 17; *Maritime Piracy*, at 73.
- 20 *Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities Off the Horn of Africa* (World Bank [together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy Task Force], 2013) (“*Pirate Trails*”), at 39 (emphasis added).
- 21 *Burden-Sharing*, at 8-9.
- 22 *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 6.
- 23 *Burden-Sharing*, at 8-9.
- 24 *Pirate Trails*, at 1.
- 25 *Burden-Sharing*, at 8-9. *See also The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2010* (One Earth Future Foundation, 2011) (“*2010 Cost*”); *The Economic Cost of Piracy 2011* (One Earth Future Foundation, 2012) (“*2011 Cost*”); *The Economic Cost of Piracy 2012* (One Earth Future Foundation, 2013) (“*2012 Cost*”).
- 26 *Pirate Trails*, at 33. *See also Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 6 (reporting, *inter alia*, that \$63.5 million was spent in 2012 alone on the costs of “ransom delivery, vessel damage from time in captivity and the fees of negotiators, consultants and attorneys, as well as the ransoms”).
- 27 *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 29.
- 28 *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 9.
- 29 *Burden-Sharing*, at 9.
- 30 Two important matters must be considered in dealing with insider evidence. First, proper care must always be taken and diligence exercised in dealing with insiders, including the exercise of a healthy degree of skepticism in judging the credibility of the person and his evidence, which may include assessing his motives in providing such evidence, looking for corroborating evidence, etc. Dealing with such elements as rewards and other possible inducements “in exchange” for a person’s evidence must also be handled with care. To urge and exercise caution, however, is not to say that it should not be done, and in fact such evidence is developed and used in most criminal justice systems on virtually a daily basis. Second, developing insider evidence, especially in connection with violent crime or in an overall violent or potentially violent environment, may often require or raise the issue of witness protection. A potentially valuable insider witness will often be reluctant to cooperate with authorities if he fears retaliation against himself or his family if or when his cooperation becomes known. In some instances, nothing short of a full-scale witness protection program may be sufficient, including the relocation of the witness and his family. That such a program may involve additional costs is no serious strike against it, in comparison to the millions of dollars in ransom paid, lives affected and profits and property lost. Further, the number of witnesses requiring protection in any given case will likely be small, as even the testimony of two or three well-placed insiders may be sufficient, in combination with and corroborated by other evidence, to convict the crime leader.
- 31 Again, in the context of the Yugoslavia war crimes investigations, it was ultimately found that there were various military intercept programs being employed by all sides and also other ways in which important meetings and conversations were

- recorded, and many such intercepts and recordings became important ICTY evidence. It turned out, for instance, that the Republic of Croatia's then-President, Franjo Tudjman, had a recording system in his presidential offices and the transcripts of important meetings and conversation were important evidence in the case against Jadranko Prlić and other senior Bosnian Croat political and military leaders, including, as an example, a conversation discussing intentional efforts by top Croatian government officials to conceal Croatia's deep involvement in carving up Bosnia, as "providing proof that we are giving the orders there." *Prosecutor v. Prlić, et al.*, No. IT-04-74-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecution Exh. P06831.
- 32 While initially and frequently difficult to obtain, the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor ultimately found and assembled, piece by piece, a document collection involving millions of pages, much of which became critical evidence in the prosecution of now-convicted Balkan war criminals. Again, in the ICTY case against Prlić and others, the personal diary of top Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladić documented meetings with Prlić, the Croatian general Slobodan Praljak and others, where Praljak made the nationalist Croats' territorial goals abundantly clear and informed all of those at the meeting that "we're on a good path to compel [Bosnia's President] Alija [Izetbegović] to divide Bosnia." *Prosecutor v. Prlić, et al.*, No. IT-04-74-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecution Exh. P11376.
- 33 *Landelijk Parket*, The National Prosecutor's Office, lpwb\_bw\_eng\_3447.pdf; see also "About the Public Prosecution Service," [http://www.om.nl/vast-menu\\_blok/english/about\\_the\\_public/](http://www.om.nl/vast-menu_blok/english/about_the_public/); "What Does the International Crimes Team Do?" <http://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/international-crimes/what-does-the/>.
- 34 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, "Combating the Scourge of Piracy," New York, New York, December 18, 2008; <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/12/113269.htm> (emphasis added).
- 35 *See generally* the Contact Group website, at [www.thecgpcs.org](http://www.thecgpcs.org).
- 36 Contact Group website, *About CGPCS; Burden-Sharing*, at 19.
- 37 *Burden-Sharing*, at 11-12.
- 38 *Burden-Sharing*, at 28.
- 39 At the Contact Group's request, the UN Secretary-General established an international piracy trust fund in January 2010. Established as a voluntary mechanism open to contributions from governments, industry, and others, the fund seeks to "help defray expenses associated with the prosecution of suspected pirates and other activities related to implementing contact group objectives." *Burden-Sharing*, at 27. "By June 2010, the trust fund had approved seven projects, six of which concerned strengthening prosecution in Seychelles, Kenya, Somaliland, and Puntland. The seventh concerned strategic communications dissemination with local partners . . . By the end of 2012, the fund had received \$16.5 million [about the size of three pirate ransoms in 2011], and \$12.12 million had been dispersed for a total of 27 approved projects, all or virtually all of which relate to regional capacity-building and not to prosecuting pirate leaders." *Burden-Sharing*, at 27.
- 40 *See generally Burden-Sharing*, at 15, 29-30.
- 41 Scott Barrett, *Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- 42 *Burden-Sharing*, at 33.
- 43 *Burden-Sharing*, at 33.
- 44 *Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia*, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 1.
- 45 *Annex II, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, paras. 9-10.
- 46 *Annex II, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, paras. 8-9; *Burden-Sharing*, at 23.
- 47 *Maritime Piracy*, at 100. *See also Global Menace*, at 206-07.
- 48 *Burden Sharing*, at 23.
- 49 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*.
- 50 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 118 (footnote omitted).

- 51 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 78.
- 52 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, Summary at 2; Report, paras. 122-23.
- 53 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, Summary at 3; Report, para. 135.
- 54 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 123.
- 55 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*.
- 56 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, para. 10 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
- 57 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, para. 96 (emphasis added).
- 58 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, paras. 9, 52-59; *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, paras. 18, 23, 45. Opposition to a specialized piracy court in Puntland was apparently based in part on concerns regarding alleged connections between the local Puntland authorities and pirate bosses. *Burden-Sharing*, at 23.
- 59 In a strictly legal sense, a significant number of these cases are not, or were not, piracy cases under international law, in that many of them were, or may have been, charged as various domestic crimes in territorial waters. *See Penalties for Piracy*, at 8. They are nonetheless generally considered part of the escalated war against East Africa piracy in the last five or six years and are included here (and elsewhere) as piracy cases.
- 60 *See, e.g., Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia (June 19, 2013)*, Annexes 3.1.c and 3.1.d; Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2010), at 35-43; “UK-Seychelles Partnership Sprouts RAPPICC,” <http://www.neptunemarinetimesecurity.com/uk-seychelles-partnership-sprouts-rappicc> (March 1, 2013) (naming alleged pirate organizers and financiers, “including Abdullahin Hassan Afrayne and Mohamed Garfanje Ali Dulai and their financiers.”)
- 61 *See, e.g., “UK, US Pledge Added Support to RAPPICC,”* <http://maryvonnepoolseychelles.blogspot.com/2013/05/uk-us-pledge-added-support-rappicc.html> (May 3, 2013) (“We have already issued four international warrants for the arrests of several people”).
- 62 Some observers have raised questions whether these transfers-for-prosecution are legal. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea “only speaks of prosecution by the courts of the captor nations. Arguments have been made that UNCLOS does not authorize such transfers, and the practice has raised some controversy. . . . Art. 105 of UNCLOS does not establish a general universal jurisdiction, but rather one limited to the ‘jurisdiction of the state that carried out the seizure.’” *Penalties for Piracy*, at 4 (footnotes omitted). The above practice has nonetheless been widely accepted and is considered standard practice.
- 63 *Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia*, Security Council document S/2011/30, January 25, 2011, at 13.
- 64 “For many years the persistent challenge facing international efforts against Somali piracy has been finding a nation willing to prosecute and imprison those captured by the multinational forces.” *Penalties for Piracy*, at 2.
- 65 In terms of the number or volume of prosecutions, “African states have taken the primary responsibility . . . , followed by Asian and Middle Eastern states, European states, and North America.” *Burden-Sharing*, at 30. One national law enforcement system in Europe reported receiving approximately 150 pirate incident reports in recent years. For a variety of reasons, including non-identification of the pirate perpetrators and other lack of evidence, only five investigations and two prosecutions emerged from these reports.
- 66 “[The principle of] *[n]on-refoulement* [that is, not returning asylum seekers or refugees to places where their life or liberty would be at risk] has made many Europeans hesitant about bringing pirates to their shores because they are afraid that once their jail terms are over it will not be possible to send pirates home. There is no basis for this fear[,] as *non-refoulement* does not apply to violent criminals -- there is no prohibition to return individuals convicted of serious crimes to their home countries. In Europe, individuals convicted of piracy are neither subject to the rules of *non-refoulement* nor are they eligible for asylum. This is not the case for those suspects found not guilty, however, and while there is no legal restriction, popular sentiment will often not allow deportations regardless of the suspect’s innocence or guilt.” *Maritime Piracy*, at 67.
- 67 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recently stated that “concerned flag States and ship owners should ensure that appropriate attention is paid to the well-being of seafarers in captivity and their families . . .” *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 73 “In November 2012, the Board [of the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia] approved, on an exceptional basis, the Hostage Support Programme, to provide humanitarian assistance to hostages.” *Id.*, para. 29. “Security Council Resolution 1950 (2010) provides that seafarers must have an opportunity to

- give evidence in criminal proceedings. Their security must be guaranteed during the trial in order to remove any fear of reprisals.” *Lang Report*, para. 62. “Seafarers’ contracts could include clauses providing compensation for giving evidence and enshrining the right to do so, which could be enforceable against the employer.” *Id.*
- 68 See Jon Huggins & Liza Kane-Hartnett, *Somali Piracy - Are We at the End Game?* (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2013) (“*End Game*”), at 12.
- 69 Communique from the Contact Group’s First Plenary Session, January 14, 2009, available at the Contact Group’s website, at <http://www.thecgps.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=3>.
- 70 *Burden-Sharing*, at 11-12.
- 71 *International Maritime Organization Assembly Resolution A.922(22)* (November 29, 2001) (emphasis added).
- 72 *Burden-Sharing*, at 20.
- 73 The Secretary-General reported these efforts in his October 21, 2013 report: “Also in April, the Chairs of Working Group 2 and Working Group 5 hosted, with INTERPOL, a special meeting of piracy prosecutors and investigators intended to facilitate information-sharing among law enforcement agencies to target key piracy organizers and financiers.” *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 27.
- 74 As an example, INTERPOL fought hard, and successfully, to have language emphasizing the need to prosecute pirate leaders, land-based financiers and facilitators in UN Security Council resolutions like No. 1950 and No. 2077. Unfortunately, the resolution was not followed by any significant additional commitment or funding.
- 75 As of early 2012, ‘no one ha[d] [yet been able to track the money . . .]’ *Maritime Piracy*, at 87. “Low-level pirates typically receive a standard fee of between US\$30,000 and US\$75,000 (which would amount to about 0.01-0.25 percent of an average ransom payment). . . . The pirate financiers who invested in the piracy operations receive the bulk of the ransom, an estimated 30-75% of the total ransom payment depending on the Somali piracy business model.” *Pirate Trails*, at 3.
- 76 As of late 2011, “[t]wo main networks were initially active, one to the north of Puntland and one to the south. Those networks have apparently broken up, after the reinvestment by certain pirates of a proportion of the ransoms. About 10 instigators may be active currently, mostly in Puntland.” *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 95.
- 77 See footnote 86, *infra*.
- 78 See *DefenceWeb*, “German Dutch investigation team to combat piracy in Somali waters” (November 25, 2011), [http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=21504:german-dutch-investigation-team-to-combat-piracy-in-somali-waters](http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21504:german-dutch-investigation-team-to-combat-piracy-in-somali-waters).
- 79 “Best management practices,” in connection with counter-piracy, include increased vigilance, “vessel hardening” techniques (such as secured stairs and passageways, the use of perimeter razor wire and water cannon or hoses, a ship “citadel” or safe room (where a ship’s crew can take refuge pending naval or law enforcement intervention) and enhanced bridge protection), re-routing (to avoid or minimize exposure to higher risk areas) and steaming at higher speeds.
- 80 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013)*, para. 65.
- 81 In the earlier part of East Africa’s counter-piracy efforts, the more basic types of information that most detained or convicted low-level pirates could provide was more valuable in increasing law enforcement’s understanding of pirate operations. However, as knowledge of piracy operations has increased, much of the more basic information is now less valuable. In fact, many of the lowest-level or foot soldier pirates “talk” -- in the sense of being debriefed by law enforcement, providing information, etc., but they often have little or no information about higher-level pirate leaders or financiers.
- 82 In the law enforcement industry and body of law concerning communication interception, such interceptions are considered “consensual” because at least one party to the conversation (here the ship owner or insurance company) is aware of and has consented to the surveillance and recording. In many systems, including the U.S., no court order or approval is needed for law enforcement-related consensual surveillance and recording.
- 83 Of course, various communication surveillance or interception activities may raise legal issues, and should be considered and implemented with full attention to relevant legal requirements, ethical rules and rules of evidence.
- 84 See generally Douglas Guilfoyle, *Treaty Jurisdiction over Pirates: A Compilation of Legal Texts with Introductory*



Notes, prepared for the 3rd meeting of [Contact Group] Working Group 2 on legal Issues, Copenhagen, 26-27 August 2009.

- 85 The UN's Lang Report, discussed *infra*, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), states at para. 48: "There is no lack of legal bases allowing States to exercise universal jurisdiction. General international law provides for multiple forms of jurisdiction without establishing priority rules. . . . Those bases enable a large number of States to fulfil their duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy to the fullest possible extent . . ."
- 86 An international registry operating through the UN or a UN body "could assume the responsibility for implementation and enforcement of maritime standards and criminal investigation and prosecution" and the "funding for such a registry could be obtained through [registration fees] . . ." *Maritime Piracy*, at 113. Such an authority could either prosecute cases in national courts, applying international law, or in any international tribunal with jurisdiction, as might even be set up as part of an overall scheme for regulation and law enforcement jurisdiction over maritime activity.
- 87 *Secretary-General's 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 74.
- 88 *See generally* Eugene Kontorovich, *The Penalties of Piracy* (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2012) ("*Penalties for Piracy*"). The Secretary-General reported in October 2013 that globally, pirate sentences range from two to 24 years [apparently not including life sentences] and that the average sentence is twelve years' imprisonment. *Secretary-General's 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 47. The problem with the average is the large overall range, and the average is skewed by heavy sentences in a few jurisdictions. The average pirate sentence in Europe and Africa remains closer to five years.
- 89 *See generally Penalties for Piracy, at 12-14, particularly at 12-13 (footnote omitted):*  
The [financial] reward to the lowliest pirate assisting in a single [pirate] operation could exceed his total future non-piratical earnings. Spending . . . several years in a Western prison would not be a significant deterrent, particularly with the prospect of being released while still young. On the contrary, the differences in quality of life between Somalia and the West mean that a prison in the latter is like a palace in the former. Interviews with pirates facing trial in the Netherlands find them saying 'life is good.' . . . Similarly, a pirate on trial in Hamburg said he would 'not go back to Somalia for a million dollars . . ."
- 90 *See also* Douglas Guilfoyle, "Prosecuting Pirates: The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Governance and International Law," *Global Policy*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February 2013), at 74 (footnote omitted): "Despite contrary reports, [piracy] trials are not vexed by questions of jurisdiction. There are no significant jurisdictional obstacles in international law in prosecuting pirates. . . . The problems involved arise largely from a lack of national implementation and the ordinary difficulties of cooperation between national legal systems.
- 91 Both nationally and internationally, there has been "a patchwork of military and civilian institutions interfacing with shipping, leading to issues of overlap and duplication." *Burden-Sharing*, at 15. "The glaring institutional gaps pertaining to information sharing, leadership, and coordination among relevant actors at the international level imposed serious constraints on mounting an effective response. These gaps were compounded by existing gaps in enforcing compliance." *Id.* at 15.
- 92 Several community members said that a maritime element that existed in the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and provided valuable service in acting as a sort of "ringmaster" has not been replicated in the newer UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) which replaced UNPOS.
- 93 Communique from the Contact Group's First Plenary Session, January 14, 2009, available at the Contact Group's website, at <http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=3>.
- 94 *End Game*, at 8.
- 95 *End Game*, at 8.
- 96 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 145.*
- 97 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 147 (emphasis added).*
- 98 *End Game*, at 6 (describing the patrolling naval forces' heavy reliance "on expensive intelligence and surveillance assets"); at 7 (discussing military cooperation "to ensure optimal deployment of surveillance platforms").
- 99 *Burden-Sharing, at 28.* Shipping companies have also voiced concern about information provided to or learned by law enforcement authorities being used to their legal or commercial disadvantage. For example, an investigation might show that an attacked vessel failed to follow best management practices or to deploy reasonable available countermeasures, which might cause an insurance carrier to deny coverage.

- 100 Kenya officially terminated its transfer agreement with the European Union, the United Kingdom, United States and other countries (by which it agreed to accept suspected Somali pirates for prosecution) in October 2010 on the grounds that it was bearing an excessive part of the counter-piracy burden and not receiving sufficient international assistance, but has continued to accept pirates for prosecution on an *ad hoc* basis. *CNN*, “Kenya Ends Agreement with EU to Prosecute Suspected Somali Pirates” (October 4, 2010). “It is problematic to ask some States to keep up their efforts when the burden is not shared.” *Lang Report*, para. 72.
- 101 “[T]he kingpins of piracy are well-connected elites within Somalia and abroad . . .” *Burden-Sharing*, at 10. “Somalia’s prospects for stabilization and effective governance have fallen prey to political and commercial ‘elites’ who appropriate, privatize and criminalize the core functions of the Somali state, enriching themselves while perpetuating a political economy of state collapse.” Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011), para. 34. “Pirate leaders and financiers gain power and access to economic resources thanks to the ransoms they receive, which influences the balance and organization of the concerned communities, further undermining efforts to establish a legitimate government.” *Pirate Trails*, at 28. “In Somalia, [the network of pirate financiers and investors] has gained considerable economic and political capacities.” *Id.* at 50.
- 102 Illustrating the possible differences in priorities, several community members voiced the view that should some of the same persons who have been involved in maritime piracy move into other criminal enterprises perceived to have a greater negative impact on a particular country’s economy, such as kidnapping tourists for ransom as opposed to hijacking commercial vessels 50 miles at sea, some governments might be more motivated to investigate and prosecute these persons. In other areas, for example, counter-terrorism will be a higher priority than fighting piracy.
- 103 Institute for Security Studies, *Preliminary Observations on Responses to Organized Crime* (2010), available at <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/21Apr2010OCML.pdf>.
- 104 *Global Menace*, at 202.
- 105 *BBC News Africa*, “Q&A: What do you do with a captured pirate?” (January 25, 2011).
- 106 *Jurist*, “UN Announces Opening of New Kenya Courtroom for Piracy Trials” (June 25, 2010); *Jurist*, “UN Announces \$9.3 Million in Donations to Fund Piracy Courts” (June 15, 2010); *CNN*, “Kenya Ends Agreement with EU to Prosecute Suspected Somali Pirates” (October 4, 2010).
- 107 *Christian Science Monitor*, “Landmark Kenya Ruling Could See Dozens of Somali Pirates Set Free” (Nov. 10, 2010).
- 108 UNODC, *Counter Piracy Programme, Support to the Trial and Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects*, Issue 10 (December 2012), at 9-10.
- 109 President George W. Bush signed the U.S. policy on maritime piracy in 2007 and in December 2008, the U.S. National Security Council issued a document titled *Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan*. See *Global Menace*, at 197.
- 110 The use of what the shipping industry and counter-piracy community have come to call “Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel” (PCASP) has been controversial. While the use of private armed security on commercial vessels initially encountered fairly extensive opposition, it has come to be more broadly accepted (or at least tolerated) as, essentially, a matter of necessity, although it is still not officially considered an approved best management practice. There are estimates that up to 60% of the ships transiting the East Africa/Indian Ocean region in the past few years employ private armed security teams. The use of private armed security raises a number of issues concerning the use of force, “professional” standards, accountability and legal liability, with the regulation of these matters, to date, left primarily to flag or registry states or to industry self-regulation. Private armed security, or PCASP, should not be confused with uniformed military security teams which have been placed on some vessels, which are known as Vessel Protection Detachments, or VPDs. Both practices, however, raise at least some similar issues concerning the use of force. In February 2012, Italian Navy marines on the privately-owned Italian-flagged tanker *MT Enrica Lexie* fired on a fishing trawler which was suspected of being engaged in pirate activity but in fact was not, killing two Indian fishermen. Two of the Italian marines were arrested by Indian authorities and charged with murder under the Indian Penal Code and the case is still pending. More recently, in October 2013, Indian authorities arrested the crew of a privately-owned, U.S.-flagged “counter-piracy escort ship” used in connection with private security operations, after the crew failed to produce documentation authorizing them to carry or transport weapons and ammunition in Indian waters, with the resolution of this incident also still pending.
- 111 *Burden-Sharing*, at 38.
- 112 *Burden-Sharing*, at 34.

- 113 *Evaluation of UNODC's Counter Piracy Programme combating maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean*, Independent Evaluation Unit, June 2013 (XAMT72, XEAX20, XSSX11, SOMX54, MUSX55, XEAX67), at 6.
- 114 *Burden-Sharing*, at 32.
- 115 INTERPOL website, <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Maritime-piracy/Operational-support>.
- 116 *Secretary-General's 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para.11.
- 117 *Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Seychelles* (February 2012), RAPPICC Partnership Arrangement, Annex A, RAPPICC Operating Model, at 1.
- 118 As stated in *Secretary-General's 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 54: "The Centre will develop regional expertise to track financial flows linked to piracy and support the collection of evidence and intelligence that could be used in prosecutions. UNODC is providing logistical and training support to the Centre. With the support of Norway, INTERPOL seconded an officer to the Centre to support efforts to build cases against the organizers of piracy networks."
- 119 *Maritime Piracy*, at 99-100. "Unlike the situation in Somalia, a government exists in Nigeria, but massive corruption at all levels of government allows piracy to flourish. Nigeria is not a poor country, although most of its people are very poor. . . . Piracy and kidnapping . . . [are] rampant." *Maritime Piracy*, at 99.
- 120 Alan C. Cole [Regional Coordinator, Counter-Piracy Program, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime], "Large Scale Prosecution of Somali Piracy Suspects: What Have we Learned?", Briefing Paper, 3rd UAE Counter Piracy Conference (September 2013).
- 121 *Maritime Piracy*, at 107.
- 122 *Maritime Piracy*, at 122.
- 123 *Maritime Piracy*, at 67-68.
- 124 *Maritime Piracy*, at 110.
- 125 *Annex III, SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, para. 4; *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, paras. 4, 17-21.
- 126 *Annex III, SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, para. 4
- 127 *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, para. 20.
- 128 *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, para. 16.
- 129 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, paras. 30, 87.
- 130 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, paras. 42, 94. A detailed review of the proposed multi-year development program shows how sorely deficient the Puntland and Somaliland justice systems were, requiring the most basic training, construction and equipment, requiring basic legislation, the construction of police stations and courtrooms, the recruitment of an additional twelve prosecutors, etc., all of which required the extensive use of international experts and personnel. *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, paras. 116-17.
- 131 *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, para. 13 (emphasis added).
- 132 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, *Annex IV*, para. 5 (emphasis added).
- 133 In his January 2012 report, the Secretary-General emphasized again the need for substantially greater "participation and/or assistance by international judges, prosecutors and other legal professionals . . ." *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, para. 126. See also *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 117 ("Significant international support is crucial to raise legal practices to the level of international standards"); para. 120 ("International support will be crucial . . . [A]n internationally supported extraterritorial Somali court would be the vehicle for legal capacity-building by the international community in Somalia"); para. 134 ("International support should help provide such new courts with all the available expertise to enhance the expertise of judges, prosecutors and defence counsel") (footnote omitted).
- 134 *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, paras. 43-47.
- 135 *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, para. 66.
- 136 *Maritime Piracy*, at 95.
- 137 *Maritime Piracy*, at 108.
- 138 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013)*, at 22, para. 67 (emphasis added). Other observers

- have noted: “With the number of successful attacks declining, the willingness of governments to improve coordination is decreasing. It’s good that the number of crew taken is decreasing but it is reducing the pressure on governments to get together. . . . The military has the same concern; they are concerned that the financial support to their operations will decrease. *Burden-Sharing*, at 38.
- 139 *Maritime Piracy*, at 106-07.
- 140 The international community has a responsibility to intervene where “serious harm” is being done to a state’s population and “the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it.” International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) [ICISS], <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>, at XI.
- 141 *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677 (January 12, 2009), at 9 (the international community has a responsibility to take “decisive” action “when a State is manifestly failing to” protect its population). In a real sense, the shipping and insurance industries have already applied a complementarity concept to piracy. In response to their perception that the relevant coastal and flag states have generally been unable and/or unwilling to take effective action against piracy, the industries have turned, in significant part, to privatization and self-help, in employing private armed security and other measures on ships passing through pirate areas.
- 142 While some major maritime states could perhaps do more to investigate and prosecute piracy, there is no reason to believe that an even more diffuse, multiplicitous and fragmented counter-piracy effort would be productive.
- 143 *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para 36.
- 144 As part of the prosecutions in the United States concerning the *S/V Quest* incident, the guilty pleas of eleven pirate co-conspirators preceded the trial and conviction of the final three pirate perpetrators and their sentencing to life imprisonment. *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 46.
- 145 If piracy is considered too small a mandate for a more full-fledged international tribunal, consideration might be given to expanding its jurisdiction to maritime crimes generally, including human trafficking, the arms trade, ocean dumping, smuggling, etc.
- 146 *See generally Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia*, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), Annex I, *Existing Practice of the United Nations in Establishing and Participating in United Nations and United Nations Assisted Tribunals, and the Experience of Other Relevant Judicial Mechanisms*.
- 147 “Tribunal fatigue” is sometimes used as a shorthand reference to international community concerns that the various international criminal courts and tribunals since 1993 have, in some assessments, been cumbersome, slow and expensive.
- 148 *Annex II, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 8. See also Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011), para. 78* (“Most States believe that [an international tribunal] would not be well suited to the ordinary crime of piracy”).
- 149 *2010 Cost*, at 16; *2011 Cost*, at 2; *2012 Cost*, at 3.
- 150 In fact, if criminal sentences are any measure of the significance of a crime, the average global sentence for a convicted pirate -- sixteen years’ imprisonment -- is exactly on par with the average sentences for crimes against humanity and war crimes at the ICTY, East Timor and Kosovo tribunals, although less than the average sentence at the ICTR. *Penalties for Piracy*, at 10.
- 151 *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 110.
- 152 *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 100.
- 153 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 7 (footnote omitted).
- 154 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 7.
- 155 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 8.
- 156 While it has potential ancillary jurisdiction over other, related attacks, the principal jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is limited to the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the February 14, 2005 bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and killed or injured 22 others. *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), para. 11.*

- 157 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 11; *see also* the Special Tribunal for Lebanon website, <http://www.stl-tsl.org>.
- 158 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 13.
- 159 *See* the ICTY Statute, Article 9; ICTR Statute, Article 8.
- 160 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 7 (footnote omitted). An international mechanism would likely defer to a national prosecution where there was clear capacity in the national system to prosecute the particular case, but assert its primacy concerning the prosecution of a pirate leader that might be initiated in a jurisdiction with doubtful capacity to handle the case.
- 161 Indeed, while an international mechanism could handle some of the smaller- or medium-sized cases itself, such prosecutions could also be coordinated with and conducted in national courts, where both appropriate and effective.
- 162 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 23.
- 163 *Maritime Piracy*, at 101.
- 164 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 28.
- 165 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 28. On the establishment of a Chapter VII mechanism, *see generally SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, Summary at 4; para. 97.
- 166 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 28.
- 167 *SG Report, S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011)*, para. 10 (footnote omitted); paras. 94-96.
- 168 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 30; *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 99.
- 169 *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 99.
- 170 *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 99.
- 171 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 60.
- 172 *See, e.g., ICTY Rules of Procedure & Evidence*, Part Three, Section 6 (The Prosecutor), Part Four, Section 1 (Investigations), Part Five, Section 1 (Indictments), Section 2 (Orders and Warrants), Section 3 (Preliminary Proceedings), etc.
- 173 *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, Summary at 4 (disadvantages may include higher costs) and para. 101 (an international tribunal “not likely to be among the most cost-effective”); *Burden-Sharing*, at 23.
- 174 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea, S/2013/413 (July 12, 2013)*, at 22, para. 65.
- 175 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013)*, at 8.
- 176 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013)*, para. 66.
- 177 *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia & Eritrea (July 12, 2013)*, para. 67.
- 178 *Maritime Piracy*, at 108-09.
- 179 *See, e.g.,* the ICTY Statute, Article 16 (The Prosecutor), Article 18 (Investigation and preparation of indictment); Article 19 (Review of the indictment); and Article 29 (Co-operation and judicial assistance).
- 180 *See, e.g.,* the ICTY Statute, Article 27 (Enforcement of Sentences) and Article 28.
- 181 *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, para. 113 (h) (“UNDP and UNODC would assist with recruitment of the necessary judges, prosecutors, police and other legal professionals, and recruit the necessary international experts, as set out in the present report”).
- 182 *SG Report, S/2012/50 (January 20, 2012)*, para. 113 (e) (“The Security Council would encourage further donations to the Trust Fund . . . including from the shipping industry and flag States . . .”).
- 183 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 140.
- 184 *2011 Economic Cost*, at 1. Note that out of this approximate \$6.6 billion, only \$16 million was spent world-wide on prosecutions and imprisonment. *Id.* at 2.
- 185 *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 98.
- 186 Another objection that has sometime been expressed concerning an international tribunal is that it would lose the benefit

of the experience gained in the regional state courts in trying pirate cases. First, interviews with community members who have been closely involved with piracy trials in the region indicate that such trials are generally straightforward and not particularly difficult. Second, the lessons learned and experience gained could certainly be transferred to those involved at an international mechanism, and indeed, nothing would foreclose a regional prosecutor becoming part of the international mechanism's prosecution team. And third, and perhaps most important, the trials of higher-level pirate leaders at an international court would probably look considerably different than the trials of skiff pirates.

- 187 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 27.
- 188 *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010), Summary at 4; Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 27 (“All States have a legal obligation under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to cooperate with [the] ICTY and ICTR”).
- 189 The ICTY and ICTR require state cooperation and production of evidence not through mutual legal assistance treaties, but pursuant to their respective statutes and rules. *See* ICTY Statute, Articles 1, 16, 18 and 29 (1. “States shall cooperate . . . 2. States shall comply without undue delay . . .”); ICTR Statute, Articles 1, 15, 17 and 28.
- 190 *See* the ICTY Statute, Articles 19, 20, 27-29; ICTR Statute, 18, 19, 26-28. As stated in the Secretary-General’s July 2010 report, “[i]t would remain to be determined whether the international tribunal [would] enter into transfer agreements . . . , or whether the Security Council would wish to determine [the matter of transfers] in its resolution under Chapter VII.” *SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 103.
- 191 *Annex I, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 38; *also SG Report, S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010)*, para. 104.
- 192 This is not to argue that the various international criminal courts since 1993 (such as the ICTY, ICTR, etc.) are models of international justice, or that they are not in need of significant improvements. A number of steps can and should be taken to improve the efficiency of international criminal justice and shorten the length and reduce the costs of international proceedings, while remaining faithful to the core values and international standards of due process and fair trial, but are topics for another paper.
- 193 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 147 (“The Secretary-General . . . should contemplate the establishment of an institutional structure to facilitate the implementation of the Security Council resolution under the aegis of a high-level eminent personality with vast United Nations experience”).
- 194 *Penalties for Piracy*, at 1.
- 195 *See United States v. Said*, 757 F. Supp. 554, 565 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“no single court can bring order to various interpretations of [the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea] . . . Rather, enforcement actions against pirates and criminal prosecutions . . . are left to individual countries, many of which have different penalties for the crime of piracy ranging from three years to life in prison”), *vacated and remanded*, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012). “[O]ne previously unappreciated advantage of a dedicated international piracy tribunal or chamber would be the elimination of sentencing disparities.” *Penalties for Piracy*, at 15. “The disparity in sentencing raises the issue of equity among defendants, particularly because the defendants are all engaged in similar conduct but their punishments depend on where they happen to be tried.” *Id.* at 1.
- 196 *World Bank, Pirate Trails*, at 33.
- 197 Speech by U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Thomas Kelly, October 25, 2012. In its report released on November 1, 2013, the World Bank states: “While the focus has been on naval operations to combat pirates, this study proposes that interventions focused to stop the financial flows from proceeds of piracy are just as important in dealing with the problem.” *Pirate Trails*, at 34.
- 198 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Combating the Scourge of Piracy,” New York, New York, December 18, 2008; <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/12/113269.htm>.
- 199 *Lang Report, S/2011/30 (January 25, 2011)*, para. 145.
- 200 *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 70.
- 201 *End Game*, at 2-3.
- 202 *Burden-Sharing*, at 8-9. The recent World Bank study, *Pirate Trails*, estimates considerably higher piracy economic costs, of approximately \$18 billion a year. *Pirates Trails*, at 33.
- 203 “[A]t least four pirate financiers are reportedly engaged in various smuggling activities. Of these, at least two are engaged in human trafficking and/or migrant smuggling.” *Pirate Trails*, at 66. The piracy-related financial networks

which are “investing the most in militias are reported located in Puntland, where individual cases of operational cooperation between pirate financiers and [the al-Qaeda-related terrorist organization] Al-Shabaab” are reported to have occurred. *Id.* at 64. There are reports that “several pirate financiers are engaging in other criminal activities . . . and that they have built significant paramilitary capacities on land . . .” Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report, para. 8.

204 No. 1:11-cr-00106-1 (June 11, 2013).

205 *Secretary-General’s 2013 Somali Piracy Report*, para. 74.

206 Security Council Resolution 2077, S/Res/2077 (November 21, 2012).

**Annex 146**

“Situation Report – Kenya and the pest of piracy – a prospective partner for peace”,

*Institute for Security Studies, 22 February 2012*





Institute for Security Studies

# SITUATION REPORT

## KENYA AND THE PEST OF PIRACY

a prospective partner  
for peace

Maritime piracy is a problem that the world has long been faced with – and one that has again reared its ugly head more prominently with the major upswing in pirate activities off the coast of Somalia since the mid- to late 2000s. The phenomenon has posed a multi-pronged threat to global, economic, strategic and security interests. Since 2008, members of the international community have come together amid mounting pressure to tackle the piracy menace.

Yet these efforts, which have mainly taken the form of advocacy and naval deployment, have not managed to adequately address the pest of piracy. In fact, statistics and incident maps show that the number of piracy attacks (both attempted and successful), have continued to increase in 2010 and 2011<sup>2</sup> – pirates have merely adapted themselves to the naval response, revising their tactics accordingly. In essence, although the percentage of successful attacks as a portion of attempted attacks has dropped, maritime piracy is still a transnational threat that is very real and that continues to wreak havoc on the world's shipping industry, as well as the global and regional economies.

For Kenya, the threat of piracy is particularly perturbing, with impacts and effects being felt throughout the country. There are a number of reasons why piracy should be a cause for concern to Kenya, and the same reasons should in turn motivate the international community to engage Kenya, and the region, as a crucial player in the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in future. There has been a resounding call for greater action, and Kenya is well placed, at least in theory, to be a key partner in on-going efforts to prevent, curb and, with some luck, eventually eliminate Somali piracy altogether.

This report, which is based primarily on field research,<sup>3</sup> investigates the effects of piracy on Kenya; including the costs that can be seen at the local level. It also evaluates the counter-piracy efforts to date, considering specifically the contributions that Kenya has made thereto. This is further expanded by considering the ways in which Nairobi could feed into the offensive against piracy more significantly and robustly on the domestic, regional and global levels. The report concludes with a number of recommendations that encapsulate the varied approach that is needed to ensure a triumph against the scourge of maritime piracy.

### SETTING THE SCENE: KENYA AND PIRACY

Kenya has only recently begun to acknowledge the implications of Somali piracy on its security, strategic and economic imperatives. With Somalia on its border, and piracy on its doorstep, Kenya certainly has a vested interest

in its neighbour's state of affairs. Instability has plagued Somalia for two decades, and stability and security in this country would go a long way toward the protection of Kenya's interests. This is simple geopolitics. The piracy off Africa's east coast, which has arisen as a result of this political upheaval in Somalia and the weakness of its state, holds a litany of entangled consequences for Kenya.

## The country has been suffering economically as a direct result of piracy

The benefits to Kenya as a result of piracy are questionable: the construction boom due to the investment of pirate money in property in Kenya may conversely have caused property prices to rise out of the reach of locals. There are also converse reports on the reported improvement in the local fishing industry, with piracy having warded off illegal fishing trawlers. Overall, however, the country has been suffering economically as a direct result of maritime piracy. Figures calculated by Inchcape Shipping Services, based in East Africa,<sup>4</sup> estimate that the costs to the shipping industry in Kenya alone are between US\$ 300 million and US\$ 400 million a year. The costs of both imports and exports have risen dramatically due to a piracy surcharge that now has to be added to shipping tariffs, since insurance companies have had to inflate their prices to account for the risk attached to traversing pirate-invested waters. For container imports estimated at 330 000 teu (twenty-foot equivalent units) for 2011, an additional US\$ 200–300 is added to costs as a piracy surcharge – thus amounting to an extra expense nearing US\$ 100 million. For dry bulk and liquid cargoes, which are anticipated to average 13 million tons in 2012, the piracy surcharge raises costs by approximately US\$ 260 million. In the case of exports, this runs to US\$ 12,6 million.<sup>5</sup>

The cost to tourism, one of Kenya's most important industries, has also been particularly noteworthy. While security concerns in general have curbed the influx of tourists, this trend has been exacerbated by recent kidnappings of tourists in the Lamu archipelago, the Kenyan incursion into Somalia and two grenade attacks that took place in Nairobi in October 2011. However, the negative impacts to the tourism industry that can be linked directly to piracy relate to the cruise liner business. In 2008 a total of 35 cruise ships called at Kenyan ports, with hopes that these numbers might rise to 50. Since then, the number of

cruise liners operating in Kenyan waters has dwindled to zero. With roughly US\$ 300 000 worth of revenue generated by each call by way of port duties, taxes, immigration, tourist activities and shopping being lost, the Kenyan economy is forfeiting an income of about US\$ 15 million a year.<sup>6</sup> It can be further extrapolated, in the absence of supplementary figures, that piracy is indirectly costing the country's tourism industry a good deal more than this.

In addition, costs often borne by the local consumer must also be accounted for – a problem that is worsened by high levels of unemployment and poverty in Kenya. Food prices have risen dramatically, with some estimating that commodities imported by sea are now 10 per cent more expensive on average than they were the year before, specifically due to the piracy threat in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. This food price inflation has implications for food security in Kenya and the region as a whole. The fishing industry, which provides an important source of protein to local communities, has also been under threat due to piracy.<sup>7</sup>

Further to this, the risks and indeed also the costs that are now associated with doing business in Kenya have reduced the inflow of foreign currency as investors seek safer destinations for their capital. Although piracy is not the exclusive cause hereof, the reduction of foreign direct investment in the country has tangible ramifications on the economic well-being of Kenya.<sup>8</sup>

These indirect costs far outweigh those incurred directly by piracy in the way of ransoms, which in 2010 brought in an average of US\$ 238 million for the piracy industry.<sup>9</sup> Littoral states, particularly those situated adjacent to the piracy precinct, are having to shoulder significant losses on account of the phenomenon; and in East Africa, Kenya is bearing a sizeable portion thereof.

Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that a substantial portion of the upper echelons of pirate gangs or operations base themselves in Kenya.<sup>10</sup> There has certainly been a visible influx of money, often directed at the property market in what some suggest is a bid to launder the money. Bowden observes that, 'indeed, many pirates are investing in property ... in neighbouring Kenya, thereby fuelling a construction boom and turning suburbs in Nairobi and Mombasa into Somali havens'.<sup>11</sup> This also has an inflationary effect on the market. Piracy's financial ties to Kenya, however, extend beyond property. There is emerging evidence that some piracy ransoms may often be negotiated by intermediaries in Mombasa and be paid there too.<sup>12</sup> While there are still groups operating from within Somalia, Kenya is in a position to address the piracy problem indirectly by seeking a domestic solution to tackle the masterminds and bosses who manage operations at a distance, from within its territory. This may be done through a variety of options, including a disruption of the money

flow, and a reduction in the opportunities available for the organised crime in the country.

Aside from the geopolitical and cost-based grounds for disquiet, Kenya's position as one of the stronger and more stable actors in the region places Nairobi in a position where non-action or limited action cannot continue to be an option. Indeed, all these factors make Kenya an obvious partner for the so-called 'coalition of the willing' that is currently engaged in counter-piracy endeavours. Not counting the various reasons why Kenya should be involved in the bid to rid international waters of pirates, the enlistment of a local actor or actors is no doubt crucial to the success of such a bid.

## COUNTER-PIRACY TO DATE AND KENYA'S PARTICIPATION

Efforts to counter piracy off the north-east coast of Africa have been largely characterised by advocacy at the international level and combined foreign naval deployment, while a smaller role has been played by bilateral arrangements and regional organisations.

With regards to advocacy, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has been instrumental in putting the problem of piracy on the international agenda. As put by Onuoha,<sup>13</sup> the IMO has 'led the way in pushing the agenda for addressing the security challenges at international fora'. The resolution adopted by the IMO in 2005 in the wake of a rising incidence of maritime piracy, brought the threat that it poses to international security to the attention of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General. The issue was thus brought to the UN Security Council (UNSC), and between 2005 and 2007 pressure mounted for the crime, with particular reference to Somali piracy, to be recognised and responded to.<sup>14</sup> Finally, in 2008 a number of meetings were held by the UNSC to discuss how the growing problem of piracy could be addressed in order to restore international peace and security. As a result, a series of resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, calling on member states to become actively involved in counter-piracy efforts and to coordinate naval and military efforts in collaboration with the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, UNSC Resolution 1851 (2008) sought to encourage regional cooperation and promote the use of legal avenues of resolution.<sup>16</sup>

This led to a proliferation of combined naval operations in the Gulf of Aden that sought to address the problem by facilitating safe passage of vessels traversing those waters – notably those carrying humanitarian aid – and by being on hand to respond to distress calls and possible pirate attacks. The key deployments in this regard include the United States' Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), the European Union's Operation Atalanta, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's Operation Ocean Shield.

These deployments now operate under a wide remit, with Operation Atalanta offering protection to vessels of the World Food Programme, and attempting to thwart pirate attacks and turn captured pirates over for prosecution.<sup>17</sup> CTF-151 is dedicated to addressing piracy and operates in the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; while Operation Ocean Shield 'provide(s) maritime security in the region, but it also offers training to regional countries in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities'<sup>18</sup> – something Kenya could exploit.

It was hoped that the UN-brokered Djibouti Accords between the Somali parties in 2008 – initiated by the UN Special Representative Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah – would culminate in political reconciliation, possibly leading to a unity government, which could bring some much-desired stability to the country.<sup>19</sup> This is therefore also cited as one of the efforts by the international community to address piracy by way of bringing stability to Somalia.

It is not that Kenya has not been collaborating with the international community with regard to the piracy problem; in fact there are a few instances, as will be discussed below, in which the country has made some contribution. Unfortunately, however, these have borne very little fruit, with efforts not ever really taking off and ultimately fizzling out. Some analysts like Paul Wambua<sup>20</sup> proffer that Kenya has in fact done enough to contribute to counter-piracy efforts, but that the international community has not met Kenya halfway in support of these efforts; by for example, providing adequate assistance in the project of prosecuting pirates. Other non-government actors in Kenya disagree with this assertion, suggesting rather that prosecution has constituted the main thrust of its efforts.

While the international community might have been more engaged, it did previously seek to interact with Kenya on the issue of piracy, particularly with regard to the prosecution of pirates. Following an increasing trend for captured pirates to be released due to logistical concerns related to bringing them to book, the United Kingdom and Kenya signed a Memorandum of Understanding in December 2008 to allow for the transfer of suspected pirates to face trial in Kenya. The US followed suit, coming to a similar agreement with Kenya in January 2009, thereby making Kenya a 'regional leader for disposition and legal action [having] prosecuted pirates in 2006 after the US ship, the *USS Churchill*, disrupted a vessel hijacking'.<sup>21</sup> Kenya thus began holding piracy trials in 2009, but with limited success.

There have been several suggestions from stakeholders and experts alike that this approach should be replicated in the region in a bid to increase the risk related to conducting pirate activities. Nonetheless, it is evident that there are a number of challenges within the realm of the law and its enforcement that will need addressing in order for such measures to be truly successful.

These challenges have certainly hampered the success of piracy trials in Kenya, which has been seen as an ideal venue for the prosecution of pirates. Western states have been reluctant to prosecute pirates on their home soil due to concerns surrounding asylum. Five particular challenges stand out, as elucidated by Wambua.

Firstly, the question of jurisdiction has been problematic due to the substantial disparity between international and domestic law in many cases, as well as the jurisdictional quagmire that is borne of the capture of a pirate or pirates in the various ocean zones delineated within law. Kenya has seen several inconsistent court rulings in this regard, leaving the matter at the Court of Appeal. As put by Petretto,<sup>22</sup> 'this intersection between different geographical spaces and national jurisdiction represents a great challenge in the fight against piracy'.

Secondly, there are numerous challenges with regard to Kenyan evidentiary requirements and the provision hereof. Wambua calls it 'an archaic law on evidence', which does not provide for evidence that is photographic or video-based. Moreover, there is a lack of knowledge on evidentiary requirements on the part of forces capturing pirates, resulting in the accused being released due to technicalities or a provision of evidence that falls outside of the law. Stemming from this is another challenge: Kenyan law requires witnesses to provide evidence in person, and many people therefore decline to attend court due to the time-consuming and cost-incurring implications this holds, especially for seamen.

The fact that Kenyan courts are ill equipped also hinders the legal process from being followed through. Moreover, a deficiency in the training of legal officials such as prosecutors and magistrates on the subject of piracy constrains the efficiency of the courts. Indeed, as illustrated by the last two points, the question of Kenyan capacity to prosecute is of great concern.

Furthermore, the country's recent incursion into Somalia must also now be considered as playing a role in addressing piracy, even if indirectly; however, stakeholders and commentators differ on how substantial the impact on piracy will be. Wambua suggests that a causal link can be established between the incursion and a decline in pirate activities; an occurrence that some conversely suggest is attributable to the monsoon season, which results in a piracy 'low season'. Yet Wambua asserts that if Kenya can successfully capture Kismayu and transfer areas that have been occupied by Al Shabaab to Somalia's Transitional Federal Government, then piracy may well dwindle in both frequency and magnitude, as there has been much discussion surrounding possible links between pirates and Al Shabaab. Other actors in Kenya, within both the diplomatic community and the non-government sector, propose that the effect will be more limited, despite the potential of the incursion to be a game-changer; perhaps

resulting in the relocation of pirates in the short term if their strongholds or freedom of movement are affected. What is clear, however, is that an elimination of piracy can only be brought on by sustained stability in Somalia. The most solid contribution the Kenyan incursion can thus make with regard to stifling piracy is improving stability in Somalia.

Certainly, the incursion has led to an increased naval presence in the volatile upper region of Kenya's coast on the border with Somalia. This presence will have offered some deterrence to piracy by hampering the movement of pirates southwards into the Indian Ocean. Patrols now take place on a constant basis, from both the sea and the air. Members of the shipping industry assert that, for a country with limited means, this is a positive development.<sup>23</sup>

## The question of Kenyan capacity to prosecute is of great concern

Many stakeholders and commentators in Kenya seem to agree that another impact the incursion has had on piracy is that the nature of the phenomenon is being pushed into evolution. Pirates' tactics appear to be metamorphosing in response to the additional challenges they now face on land. There seems to be an increasing sense of desperation that suggests that pirates will enter into arrangements and practices that had not previously characterised them. While this is as yet unproven, there is suspicion that Somali pirates may diversify and increasingly engage in other money-generating activities such as gunrunning and the kidnapping of individuals, as well as holding entire vessels to ransom as per their traditional operations. This follows on suspicions that pirate groups might have been involved in the kidnappings in Lamu, and that they may become more amenable to cooperating with terrorist organisations.

## TOWARDS A MORE ACTIVE ROLE FOR KENYA

Kenya is strategically placed, from both a geostrategic and an interest-based perspective, to engage as a key actor in the East African region with regards to the problem of Somali piracy. As such, Kenya can generate consolidated support on three levels by approaching the international community to support Nairobi in various ways, which may include measures to strengthen naval capacity, for example; by reaching out regionally to bring forth a combined and determined effort; and by acting domestically to enact policy, for example, by sustaining a naval presence off the coast with regular patrols. Such initiatives must be informed

by a reasoned, robust and resolute anti-piracy policy that sets out the ways in which Kenya approaches and tackles piracy. While efforts are on-going by Kenyan policy-makers to develop such a policy, local commentators assert that a final draft should not be expected for some time as parliament has to consider a number of bills that carry greater political priority ahead of the next set of elections in the country, which are scheduled for the latter part of 2012.

Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Kenya has yet to put together this policy, Nairobi must take into account the wealth of information on counter-piracy measures, as well as the thrust hereof. In particular, Kenya must appreciate that a holistic counter-piracy approach that carries the highest chance of success is one that acknowledges that sea-based efforts alone are not enough. Indeed, the thrust of opinion at present, which stems from observations of Somali counter-piracy, is that a two-pronged tactic is needed – piracy must be fought both on land and at sea. Ideally Kenya should lobby the international community to assist in a productive effort to rebuild the Somali state and to reinforce stability there, considering also that Kenya has illustrated a willingness to engage in land operations by launching its military operations in Somalia in late 2011. Kenya should also inculcate this policy internally, addressing the piracy problem by following and hindering the flow of pirate money within the country, in order to find and deal with pirate bosses who are based in and operate from Kenya.

Concurrently, the onus should not be only on Kenya. Rather, with an expression of Kenyan willingness – and even regional willingness – the international community too should continue to engage in multilateral and holistic efforts to counter the piracy scourge. It is evident that Kenya, having been previously enlisted by Western actors, has been identified as an important and able player. The international community should therefore ensure that Kenya is involved to its fullest capacity in initiatives going forward, and also endeavour to support the country in terms of developing and building this capacity. It must be noted that, with piracy presently being predominant on the African continent, the inclusion of an African actor should be considered an essential part of a global action plan that seeks to tackle maritime piracy. To this end, the February 2012 international anti-piracy conference, co-hosted by Kenya and the UN, is a good start.

## AVENUES FOR CONCRETE ACTION

Based on the arguments made by various stakeholders in the counter-piracy context, it is clear that much can still be done to improve the global fight against piracy. While there are some suggestions that are cause for disagreement between actors, a number of key recommendations can be drawn from an appraisal of the contributions and views

of these actors and stakeholders. It is abundantly clear that a sea-based approach will not suffice. Instead, a multi-pronged strategy is needed to address piracy, on land as well as at sea. It is in this regard where Kenya has the potential to contribute.

This report, therefore, makes a number of recommendations applicable in the general context, but that refer in particular to Kenya:

Firstly, it is of the utmost importance that greater cooperation be fostered at a regional level. Since there will be challenges in producing buy-in from non-littoral states in particular and generating consensus in terms of policy and strategy at a continental level, it is more feasible to institute this process at a regional level. Many regional organisations are already actively working on maritime security strategies, and this work should be encouraged to continue within these communities and to be started in others. The East African Community (EAC) will likely be a good place for Kenya to start with regional engagement, as the small number of states within the community allows for a greater chance of garnering consensus in order to create a goodwill coalition that can offer a legal avenue for tackling piracy. The non-littoral states may then be motivated to buy in, as their trade will also be affected by bad order at sea, and Tanzania, being littoral, will have similar motivations to those of Kenya. If these states can manage to uphold the common good as an overarching goal, without petty politics getting in the way, they will undoubtedly receive support from members of the international community in their endeavours. The UN is already involved in supporting local and regional counter-piracy initiatives, as are several Western states, and so a coordinated advance from regional actors will be looked upon favourably. As illustrated by recent UNSC Resolution 2015 (2011), there is support, at least notionally, for a court in the region dealing with Somali pirates.

Further to this, and in order to deal with previous failings in this regard, a supranational court might be established alongside a prison, arguably in Arusha. Here pirates may be prosecuted on the basis of an EAC policy or strategy, where the applicable law has been streamlined, and by entering into multilateral agreements with states, particularly those engaged in naval-based counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and its surroundings. Such a measure would offer relief from some of the many legal and jurisdictional tribulations faced in the prosecution of pirates, as discussed previously; although it would conceivably be limited by the prolonged timeframe needed for its implementation. The draft version of the East African Integrated Maritime Strategy makes similar suggestions, and the adoption of this document would be very helpful in this regard. Such endeavours at streamlining these activities at a regional level would definitely find favour with the many bodies and states concerned with piracy, as similar suggestions have

been made in the past. On this basis, arrangements that expand the applicability of these mechanisms may be sought, and financial assistance may be acquired to aid the establishment and upkeep of these facilities. Again, Kenya is well placed to initiate activities in this vein considering that Western states have previously sought the prosecution of pirates in this country with limited success. Such an initiative may minimise Kenya's responsibility by sharing it with its neighbours, and by inviting the cooperation of the international community, therefore allowing for greater prospects of success.

Another avenue of concrete action is in peace-making in Somalia, and efforts at this should be intensified with a two-pronged approach: both military and political or diplomatic. The rebuilding and strengthening of the Somali state must be attempted, be it through the provision of a clearer mandate for the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) with Kenyan operations being brought in line herewith, or through seeking to engage with all the stakeholders, including Al Shabaab.<sup>24</sup> This has merits on the basis of not only countering piracy, but also increasing stability and allowing for the operation of more functional and effective state apparatus, which would have a drastic impact on piracy. As it stands, pirates operate under relatively low-risk conditions with comparatively high rewards, knowing that they have a safe haven in Somalia that allows them to escape the law.<sup>25</sup> With institutions in a working order there could be a greater capacity for patrolling and policing in general and the prosecution and incarceration of pirates in particular; especially since the location of pirate bases are common knowledge. Disrupting pirate strongholds will be one way in which pirates can be stopped before the crime is committed. Such a rebuilding exercise would be, without doubt, a mammoth task, but perhaps Kenya's incursion into Somalia is a first step in this regard. Moreover, it is imperative that current missions providing humanitarian, political and other assistance in Somalia be supported and reinforced. Further, it has been suggested that funding allocated to naval deployments in the Gulf of Aden might be redirected to such purposes. If, for example, naval activities are minimised during the piracy low season, the funds saved could be put toward establishing a rebuilding effort in Somalia or supporting one that exists, in an indirect bid to address the piracy problem.

A fourth avenue for Kenya to fight piracy is through following the money trail in the country. It is well established that ransom money makes its way into Kenya and that operations are often run, at least in part, from within Kenya. As established by Rotberg, 'the battle against piracy will be assisted when we know precisely where the money goes, who controls the sources of financing, and who receives the profits'.<sup>26</sup> This may even allow for the establishment of already suspected financial links between pirate and terrorist groups which, if further investigated, could expand

the remit of counter-piracy and counter-terrorist forces. As such, advanced money laundering laws should be in place: funds suspected to be associated with piracy followed and assets seized as a way through which to impede impunity.<sup>27</sup> This is particularly important in Kenya due to the roots pirate gangs have there, and as such the scope and mandate of its anti-money laundering unit must be amended. Some Western states may thus be approached for access to their expertise on this particular point.

Kenya can begin more consolidated efforts once a policy on maritime piracy has been drawn up. However, the country cannot do this alone and would need to seek support from the international community. With Kenya's important geostrategic location, it is in a position to lobby concerned actors for assistance with greater engagement in maritime security issues like piracy.

There will surely be challenges in implementing these recommendations, not least of which being the issue of will, followed by questions on finances and capacity issues. The latter issues have a better likelihood of being addressed if the former is present. Furthermore, Somali piracy is a fluid operation subject to evolution. As pirates become more desperate, they will change their tactics and amend their relationships, as has been suggested herein. Any counter-piracy initiatives must be prepared for this eventuality, and it is therefore crucial that countries and joint operations share information.

## CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that piracy has a negative impact on both Kenya's government and its people. Kenya can play a greater and more valuable role in the counter-piracy domain, and is the best-placed prospective partner of the international community for peace in the East African region. Indeed, both Kenya and the international community should step up to the plate, taking a proactive stance in seeking partnerships that will thwart bad order at sea and promote practices and initiatives that will restore peace to global waters. If Kenya can summon the necessary political will to pursue such concise and coordinated measures to tackle piracy, then the concerns regarding finances and capacity can be attended to by the international community. This is where the 'coalition of the willing' will need to come on board and fulfil commitments toward assisting the development of African mechanisms for fighting piracy. What is needed on the part of Kenya is a clear appreciation of the costs of piracy to the country, the region and also the globe; and a determination to use its political, economic and geostrategic positioning to address the pest of piracy in earnest.

## NOTES

- 1 Lisa Otto currently works as a researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg. At the time she completed this paper, she was working as a research intern in the African Conflict Prevention Programme of the ISS in Pretoria. The author wishes to acknowledge the input and suggestions made by Dr. Emmanuel Kisiangani, Cpt. Johan Potgieter and Dr Issaka K. Souaré of the ISS, as well as the anonymous external reviewer for their comments and suggestions that helped to improve the quality of the paper.
- 2 International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre, <http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracy-reporting-centre/imb-live-piracy-map-2010>. (accessed 22 November 2011).
- 3 The author conducted field research in Kenya (Nairobi and Mombasa) in November 2011, engaging with various stakeholders across the board. Her interactions and conversations with these stakeholders have informed this report to a large extent. However, in an effort to ensure the confidentiality of the individuals with whom she engaged, explicit reference may not necessarily be made to these individuals.
- 4 Figures elucidated in email correspondence between Inchcape Shipping Services and the Kenya Maritime Authority, as provided by the latter.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 L Otto, Benefits of buccaneering: The political economy of maritime piracy in Somalia and Kenya, *African Security Review* 20 (4) (2011), 45–50.
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**Annex 147**

“Fetching them on the beaches - tourist abductions from Kenyan resorts mark the expansion of Somali piracy”, *The Economist*, 8 October 2011



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**Middle East & Africa**

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**Kenya and piracy**

# Fetching them on the beaches

Tourist abductions from Kenyan resorts mark the expansion of Somali piracy

ON OCTOBER 1st a disabled French woman was dragged from her home

on Kenya's northern coast by pirates and taken by speedboat to Somalia. The kidnapping was even more shocking to residents and visitors than the killing of a British publisher and the kidnapping of his deaf wife, also by pirates, three weeks earlier. That attack took place at an isolated spot closer to the Somali border. But the French woman was snatched near the town of Lamu, a haven for foreign tourists.

The attacks are a blow to Kenya's economy, which earns over \$800m a year from tourism. Many of its half a million visitors come from Britain, so a headline in the *Daily Mail*, a British newspaper, was damaging: "Kenya is a treacherous place—and it's getting worse". The country had hoped for a record year. Not any more.

Growing numbers of tourists from China and elsewhere in Asia, together with the lure of a weak currency, could revive tourism next year. But the kidnappings highlight a longer-term problem: having a failed state as a neighbour. Kenya had turned its back on Somalia and hoped for the best. That is no longer enough. Its border is porous. The Kiunga post, just across from Ras Kamboni, a Somali town near the border, is undermanned. The mangrove swamps on the other side are home to training camps for the Shabab, a Somali militant group close to al-Qaeda that controls swathes of southern and central Somalia. Kenyan soldiers patrolling at the other end of the border have recently been snatched by them.

The French captive was apparently taken ashore at Ras Kamboni and driven to the southern Somali port of Kismayo, a Shabab stronghold. That raises suspicions that she is being used as a shield against American drone attacks on the Shabab, which have increased. Mediators have had trouble locating the British captive; she may have been sold to pirate gangs in central Somalia. If ransoms are paid, as they have been before, more kidnappings are likely. Payments for the release of ships nabbed off Somalia's coast have risen from \$100,000 to \$2m-plus.

Many Kenyans accept that robust action is required. Yet cross-border military intervention is unlikely and would probably be counterproductive. In the meantime, the growing operational range of the pirates and their ties to jihadists mean that tourists may be at risk of capture ever farther down the coast.

MOMBASA



**Annex 148**

“Feared Shabab exploit Somali banking and invest in real estate, U.N. says”, *The New York Times*, 11 October 2020

## Feared Shabab Exploit Somali Banking and Invest in Real Estate, U.N. Says

Despite sanctions, Shabab militants have found ways to extort, move and invest money using Somalia's banking system, a United Nations panel says.



By **Abdi Latif Dahir**

Oct. 11, 2020

NAIROBI, Kenya — The Shabab, the Somalia-based militant group that is Al Qaeda's most powerful ally in Africa, is not only collecting millions of dollars in tariffs and payoffs but moving the money through local banks and even investing it in real estate and businesses, according to a new United Nations Security Council report.

The report describes how the Shabab, known for suicide attacks and a severe interpretation of Islam that bans music and other pleasures, have diversified their funding streams. Although financial dealings with the Shabab are prohibited under Security Council sanctions, the report said the group had found ways to expand from strictly cash transactions into utilizing bank accounts and electronic mobile services to save, transfer and invest money.

A Security Council panel of experts that monitors Somalia produced the report, which has not yet been made public. The New York Times obtained an advance copy.

The Shabab's deadly attacks have wreaked havoc in Somalia and across East Africa. The group sustains an estimated 4,000 fighters, and expands its power, by collecting money from around south and central Somalia, including in the capital, Mogadishu, the report said.



Men convicted of complicity in the Shabab's 2013 attack on a mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The Shabab have found new ways to make and invest money in their home base, Somalia, a United Nations panel says. Brian Inganga/Associated Press

The group charges vehicles transporting goods, demands that businesses pay a monthly fee and forcibly collects zakat, the annual alms that observant Muslims are expected to pay.

The Shabab also have penetrated Mogadishu's port, blackmailing importers to pay a levy on goods, the report said. In all the cases the report documented, business owners paid up, citing threats and violence if they refused.

The report found evidence that Shabab operatives had stored and transferred the money through accounts operated by Salaam Somali Bank, a leading bank in Somalia.

In response, the bank said that it had never “opened an account for a sanctioned individual or entity” and that it had taken unspecified actions against suspicious accounts, but it did not rule out the possibility that the Shabab had found surreptitious ways to use the bank. The country’s finance minister also acknowledged the Shabab’s ability to exploit the banking system and called the group’s financiers “very cunning.”

The report comes just a few months before crucial elections in Somalia, a strategically located country in the Horn of Africa that has endured cycles of dysfunction and mayhem for decades. It also is contending with the coronavirus pandemic, swarms of locusts that are destroying crops and floods that have displaced hundreds of thousands of people.

The Shabab pose a growing threat to Somalia and the region, even though the group has lost territory in the past five years, suffered high-level defections and been degraded by sustained American airstrikes.

The report is especially damning for the Somali government, which is backed by the United States and the United Nations. They have insisted that Somalia take steps to modernize its banking so that groups like the Shabab that are under sanction cannot exploit the system’s weaknesses.

“Al-Shabab’s use of formal banking systems enables the immediate transfer and distribution of large amounts, including in areas it no longer directly controls, eliminating the risk of physically transporting cash across hostile territory,” the report said.

The Security Council’s experts on Somalia, a six-member panel based in Nairobi, are responsible for monitoring compliance with sanctions imposed on Somalia. The panel undertook the same work on Eritrea, another Horn of Africa country, until 2018, when sanctions there were lifted after Eritrea mended relations with neighboring Ethiopia.

In past years, the panel’s reports have examined topics such as how food aid in Somalia was redirected by corrupt contractors and how the Shabab’s bomb-making operations became sophisticated.



The wreckage of a car after a bomb exploded in Mogadishu in January. Feisal Omar/Reuters

But the focus this year has largely been on the Shabab’s sources and movement of funds.

During the reporting period, from last December to this August, the report’s authors found evidence that the Shabab had generated about \$13 million in revenue. This included an estimated \$2.4 million from checkpoints in the Lower Juba region in southern Somalia and \$5.8 million from charging businesses in the southern port city of Kismayo. The report includes redacted copies of receipts for these transactions.

Two bank accounts associated with the Shabab — paid into by retailers, shipping agencies and car dealerships — generated more than \$3 million.

The report linked the transfers to the Salaam Somali Bank. In two separate accounts reviewed by the panel of experts — one receiving port duties, the other alms collection — the panel found large cash deposits and frequent transfers that exceeded the \$10,000 limit that would have required the bank to report them.

In one of the accounts, \$1.7 million was transferred entirely in 87 transactions, with one person receiving \$310,000.

Over a 48-hour period in May, more than \$322,000 was transferred from these two accounts to a third bank account, the report said, showing “an institutional link between the accounts and an organized approach to the distribution of funds.”

The panel of experts recorded a total of 128 transactions that would have warranted disclosure to Somalia’s Financial Reporting Center, which investigates suspicious financial activities.

A review of the accounts “revealed no obvious legitimate outgoings or expenditures,” the report said.

In a statement, a Salaam spokesman said the bank had taken “appropriate actions against numerous accounts” believed linked to “suspicious activity.” The bank also said the United Nations had reached out to it about the panel’s investigation but that since the bank had not “received the details of these accounts” it was “unable to determine whether the appropriate action has been taken against these accounts.”

After decades of war, Somalia has achieved a modicum of peace, as it looks to build functioning public institutions. This includes oversight of financial outlets like banks and the passage of laws against money laundering and terrorism financing.



A market in Mogadishu. According to the report, the group charges vehicles transporting goods and demands that businesses pay a monthly fee. Lokman Ilhan/Anadolu Agency, via Getty Images

But enforcement by the weak Somali government remains inadequate, hindered by many obstacles, including the lack of widespread proof of legal identity. The U.N. report noted how identity documents used to open the Shabab’s bank accounts had been acquired just days before. A recent study also showed how the country’s informal hawala system of money transfer underpinned the sale and trade of illicit arms.

In an interview, Somalia’s finance minister, Abdirahman Beileh, acknowledged the Shabab’s pervasive use of domestic financial systems.

“We are meeting with the banks and informing them of the danger they are in,” he said in an interview from Mogadishu. Calling the Shabab a “mafia,” he said that whenever the authorities closed one loophole, the group figured out another way to move money. “These are people who are very smart and very cunning,” he said.

The report also described the Shabab’s well-organized financial system, with regular audits to prevent losses. Besides spending on intelligence and military expenditures, the group has invested tens of thousands of dollars in property and business enterprises in Mogadishu’s bustling Bakara Market, which sells a wide range of goods and is the country’s biggest open-air bazaar.

The findings prove how the Shabab are embedded deep into Somali society, said Rashid Abdi, an analyst and researcher who specializes in the Horn of Africa.

“It’s no longer an insurgency but an economic power,” Mr. Abdi said in a telephone interview. “It’s a shadow state that’s out-taxing the government even in areas it doesn’t control.” The Shabab, he said, are becoming a “much more entrenched, resilient and deep-rooted organization that doesn’t have to rely on might or military force to stay relevant.”