

## JUSTICE NEWS

## Department of Justice

Office of Public Affairs

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

**Man Pleads Guilty in New York to Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States**

Manssor Arbabsiar, aka Mansour Arbabsiar, pleaded guilty today in federal court in the Southern District of New York to participating in a plot to murder the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States while the Ambassador was in the United States. Arbabsiar, a 58-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen holding both Iranian and U.S. passports, was arrested on Sept. 29, 2011, at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport. He pleaded guilty today before U.S. District Judge John F. Keenan.

The guilty plea was announced by Attorney General Eric Holder; Michele M. Leonhart, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Lisa Monaco, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York; and Stephen L. Morris, FBI Houston Special Agent in Charge.

Arbabsiar pleaded guilty to a superseding information that charges him with three counts. Count one charges Arbabsiar with traveling in foreign commerce and using interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire. Count two charges him with conspiring to do so. Count three charges Arbabsiar with conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, namely, an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries. He faces a maximum potential sentence of 25 years in prison (10 years on counts one and two, and five years on count three). Arbabsiar is scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Keenan on Jan. 23, 2013, at 11:30 a.m.

In connection with his guilty plea, Arbabsiar admitted that, from the spring of 2011 to the fall of 2011, he conspired with officials in the Iranian military who were based in Iran, to cause the assassination of the Saudi Arabian Ambassador while the Ambassador was in the United States. Arbabsiar acknowledged that at the direction of these co-conspirators, he traveled to Mexico on several occasions during 2011 in order to arrange the assassination of the Ambassador. Arbabsiar admitted that, with his co-conspirators' approval, he had arranged to hire a DEA confidential source (CS-1), who claimed to be a representative of a drug cartel, and CS-1's criminal associates, to murder the Ambassador. Arbabsiar further admitted that he agreed to pay \$1.5 million to CS-1 and had discussed with CS-1 a plan to murder the Ambassador at a restaurant in Washington, D.C. – a plan that was approved by Arbabsiar's co-conspirators. Arbabsiar then arranged for a \$100,000 down payment, in two installments, to be wired to CS-1.

As noted in the complaint and indictment previously filed in Manhattan federal court, the Qods Force is a branch of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Qods Force conducts sensitive covert operations abroad, including terrorist attacks, assassinations and kidnappings, and is believed to have sponsored attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq. In October 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Qods Force under Executive Order 13224 for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations.



“A little more than a year after his arrest, Manssor Arbabsiar has admitted to his role in a deadly plot approved by members of the Iranian military to assassinate a sitting foreign Ambassador on U.S. soil,” said Attorney General Holder. “Today’s plea and the disruption of this plot should serve as a reminder of the exceptional efforts of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies in protecting America against terrorist attacks and in holding accountable those who plan such actions.”

“The dangerous connection between drug trafficking and terrorism cannot be overstated, and this case is yet another example of DEA’s unique role in identifying potentially deadly networks that wish to harm innocent Americans and our allies worldwide,” said DEA Administrator Leonhart. “Using DEA’s elaborate and sophisticated investigative expertise to infiltrate violent drug and terror organizations globally, we successfully identified this threat and worked closely with the FBI to prevent a potentially deadly outcome.”

“Thanks to the collaborative efforts of many U.S. law enforcement and intelligence professionals, this international assassination plot hatched in Iran was thwarted before anyone was harmed and a key conspirator has pleaded guilty. This case underscores the evolving threat environment we face and the need for continued vigilance at home and abroad,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco.

U.S. Attorney Bharara stated: “As was originally charged, and as Arbabsiar has now admitted, he was the extended murderous hand of his co-conspirators, officials of the Iranian military based in Iran, who plotted to kill the Saudi Ambassador in the United States and were willing to kill as many bystanders as necessary to do so. Arbabsiar traveled to and from the United States, Mexico and Iran and was in telephone contact with his Iranian confederates while he brokered an audacious plot. The audacity of the plot should not cause doubt, but rather vigilance regarding others like Arbabsiar, who are enlisted as the violent emissaries of plotting foreign officials. This office will continue to pursue the co-conspirators in this plot and others in Iran or elsewhere who try to export murder. Thanks to the great work of the FBI, DEA and the prosecutors in this office, Mr. Arbabsiar must now answer for his conduct.”

“Today’s guilty plea entered by Mr. Arababsiar is the culmination of exceptional intelligence and law enforcement efforts,” said FBI Special Agent in Charge Morris. “I would like to thank the investigators, analysts and task force officers at the FBI and DEA in Houston, our Legal Attaché Office in Mexico City, and all partners in the Intelligence Community who worked tirelessly on this case. Of special note I’d like to recognize the exemplary leadership from Department of Justice’s National Security Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York.”

According to the complaint and indictment filed in Manhattan federal court, as well as the information to which Arbabsiar pleaded:

Arbabsiar met with CS-1 in Mexico on multiple occasions between May 2011 and July 2011. During the course of these meetings, Arbabsiar inquired as to CS-1’s knowledge with respect to explosives and explained that he was interested in, among other things, attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia and the murder of the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. In a July 14, 2011, meeting in Mexico, CS-1 told Arbabsiar that he would need to use at least four men to carry out the Ambassador’s murder and that his price for carrying out the murder was \$1.5 million. Arbabsiar agreed and stated that the murder of the Ambassador should be handled first, before the execution of other attacks.



that Arbabsiar had discussed with CS-1. Arbabsiar also indicated that he and his associates had \$100,000 in Iran to pay CS-1 as a first payment toward the assassination.

During the same meeting, Arbabsiar also described to CS-1 his cousin in Iran, who he said had requested that Arbabsiar find someone to carry out the Ambassador's assassination. Arbabsiar indicated that his cousin was a "big general" in the Iranian military; that he focuses on matters outside of Iran and that he had taken certain unspecified actions related to a bombing in Iraq.

In a July 17, 2011, meeting in Mexico, CS-1 noted to Arbabsiar that one of his workers had already traveled to Washington, D.C., to surveil the Ambassador. CS-1 also raised the possibility of innocent bystander casualties. Arbabsiar made it clear that the assassination needed to go forward, despite mass casualties, telling CS-1, "They want that guy [the Ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him f\*\*k 'em." CS-1 and Arbabsiar discussed bombing a restaurant in the United States that the Ambassador frequented. When CS-1 noted that others could be killed in the attack, including U.S. senators who dine at the restaurant, Arbabsiar dismissed these concerns as "no big deal."

On Aug. 1 and Aug. 9, 2011, Arbabsiar caused two overseas wire transfers totaling approximately \$100,000 to be sent to an FBI undercover account as a down payment for CS-1 to carry out the assassination. Later, Arbabsiar explained to CS-1 that he would provide the remainder of the \$1.5 million after the assassination. On Sept. 20, 2011, CS-1 told Arbabsiar that the operation was ready and requested that Arbabsiar either pay one half the agreed upon price (\$1.5 million) for the murder or that Arbabsiar personally travel to Mexico as collateral for the final payment of the fee. Arbabsiar agreed to travel to Mexico to guarantee final payment for the murder.

On Sept. 28, 2011, Arbabsiar flew to Mexico. Arbabsiar was refused entry into Mexico and was placed on a return flight destined for his last point of departure. On Sept. 29, 2011, Arbabsiar was arrested by federal agents during a flight layover at JFK International Airport in New York. Several hours after his arrest, Arbabsiar was advised of his *Miranda* rights and he agreed to waive those rights and speak with law enforcement agents. During a series of *Mirandized* interviews, Arbabsiar confessed to his participation in the murder plot.

Arbabsiar also admitted to agents that, in connection with this plot, he was recruited, funded, and directed by men he understood to be senior officials in Iran's Qods Force. He said these Iranian officials were aware of and approved of the use of CS-1 in connection with the plot; as well as payments to CS-1; the means by which the Ambassador would be killed in the United States and the casualties that would likely result.

Arbabsiar also told agents that his cousin, who he had long understood to be a senior member of the Qods Force, had approached him in the early spring of 2011 about recruiting narco-traffickers to kidnap the Ambassador. Arbabsiar told agents that he then met with CS-1 in Mexico and discussed assassinating the Ambassador. Arbabsiar said that, afterwards, he met several times in Iran with Gholam Shakuri, aka "Ali Gholam Shakuri," a co-conspirator and Iran-based member of the Qods Force, and another senior Qods Force official, where Arbabsiar explained that the plan was to blow up a restaurant in the United States frequented by the Ambassador and that numerous bystanders would be killed. The plan was approved by these officials.

In October 2011, after his arrest, Arbabsiar made phone calls at the direction of law enforcement to Shakuri in Iran that were monitored. During these phone calls, Shakuri confirmed that Arbabsiar should move forward with the plot to murder the Ambassador and that he should accomplish the task as quickly as possible, stating on Oct. 5, 2011, "I just



do it quickly, it's late..." Shakuri also told Arbabsiar that he would consult with his superiors about whether they would be willing to pay CS-1 additional money. Shakuri, who was also charged in the plot, remains at large. The charges against Shakuri are merely accusations, and he is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

This investigation is being conducted by the FBI Houston Division, the DEA Houston Division and the FBI New York Joint Terrorism Task Force. The prosecution is being handled by the Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, specifically Assistant U.S. Attorneys Glen Kopp, Edward Kim and Stephen Ritchin. The Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department's National Security Division and the Office of International Affairs of the Justice Department's Criminal Division provided substantial assistance. The government of Mexico is also recognized for its cooperation in this matter.

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12-1251

Office of the Attorney General

*Updated September 15, 2014*





U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney  
Southern District of New York

The Silvio J. Mollo Building  
One Saint Andrew's Plaza  
New York, New York 10007

October 16, 2012

**BY E-MAIL**

Sabrina Shroff, Esq.  
Federal Defenders of New York  
52 Duane Street, 10th Floor  
New York, New York 10007

Re: **United States v. Manssor Arbabsiar**  
**S1 11 Cr. 897 (JFK)**

Dear Ms. Shroff:

On the understandings specified below, the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York ("this Office") will accept a guilty plea from Manssor Arbabsiar ("the defendant") to Counts One, Two, and Three of the above-referenced Superseding Information (the "Information").

Count One of the Information charges the defendant with traveling in foreign commerce and using interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including on or about September 29, 2011, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958. Count One carries a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years; a maximum fine of the greatest of \$250,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to persons other than the defendant as a result of the offense; a \$100 special assessment; and a maximum term of three years' supervised release.

SPS /  
DVI

Count Two of the Information charges the defendant with conspiring to travel in foreign commerce and to use or cause another to use interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including on or about September 29, 2011, in violation of Title 18, United States Codes, Section 1958. Count One carries a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years; a maximum fine of the greatest of \$250,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to persons other than the defendant as a result of the offense; a \$100 special assessment; and a maximum term of three years' supervised release.

Count Three of the Information charges the defendant with conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, namely, an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries,

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in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332b, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including on or about September 29, 2011. Count Three carries a maximum term of imprisonment of five years; a maximum fine, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3571 of the greatest of \$250,000, twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to persons other than the defendant resulting from the offense; a \$100 special assessment; and a maximum term of three years' supervised release.

The total maximum term of imprisonment on Counts One through Three is twenty-five years.

In consideration of the defendant's plea to the above offense, the defendant will not be further prosecuted criminally by this Office (except for criminal tax violations as to which this Office cannot, and does not, make any agreement) for: (i) his participation in a conspiracy to murder a foreign official, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including September 29, 2011, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1117, as charged in Count One of Indictment 11 Cr. 897 (JFK); (ii) engaging in foreign travel and using interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including September 29, 2011, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958, as charged in Count Two of Indictment 11 Cr. 897 (JFK); (iii) his participation in a conspiracy to engage in foreign travel and the use of interstate and foreign commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including September 29, 2011, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958, as charged in Count Three of Indictment 11 Cr. 897 (JFK); (iv) his participation in a conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including September 29, 2011, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a, as charged in Count Four of Indictment 11 Cr. 897 (JFK); and (v) his participation in a conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries, from at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including September 29, 2011, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332b, as charged in Count Five of Indictment 11 Cr. 897 (JFK); it being understood that this agreement does not bar the use of such conduct as a predicate act or as the basis for a sentencing enhancement in a subsequent prosecution including, but not limited to, a prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 *et seq.* In addition, at the time of sentencing, the Government will move to dismiss any open Counts against the defendant. The defendant agrees that with respect to any and all dismissed charges he is not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the "Hyde Amendment," Section 617, P.L. 105-119 (Nov. 26, 1997), and will not file any claim under that law.

The defendant hereby admits the forfeiture allegation with respect to Counts One and Two of the Information and agrees to forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461, all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the



offenses. It is further understood that any forfeiture of the defendant's assets shall not be treated as satisfaction of any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment, or any other penalty the Court may impose upon him in addition to forfeiture.

In consideration of the foregoing and pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines") Section 6B1.4, the parties hereby stipulate to the following:

**A. Offense Level**

1. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b), Counts One, Two and Three are grouped together into a single group because the counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions are connected by a common criminal objective.
2. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a), the offense level applicable to the group is the offense level for the most serious of the counts comprising the group.

**Count One – Murder-For-Hire**

3. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.4(a)(2), the applicable base offense level is 33 because U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5 provides the base offense level applicable to the underlying criminal conduct; *i.e.*, conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder.
4. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(b)(1), the offense level is increased by 4 levels because the offense involved the offer or receipt of something of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder.
5. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, because the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, the offense level is increased by 12 levels.
6. In accordance with the above analysis, the applicable Guidelines offense level for Count One is 49.

**Count Two – Conspiracy to Commit Murder-For-Hire**

7. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.4(a)(2), the applicable base offense level is 33 because U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5 provides the base offense level applicable to the underlying criminal conduct; *i.e.*, conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder.
8. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(b)(1), the offense level is increased by 4 levels because the offense involved the offer or receipt of something of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder.

9. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, because the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, the offense level is increased by 12 levels.
10. In accordance with the above analysis, the applicable Guidelines offense level for Count Two is 49.

**Count Three – Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States**

11. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, the base offense level is the base offense level for the substantive offense, *i.e.*, the commission of an act of terrorism transcending national boundaries. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2), a decrease by 3 levels is not warranted because the defendant or a co-conspirator completed all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense.
12. The Guideline applicable to the substantive offense is U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a). Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a), the base offense level is 43.
13. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, because the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, the offense level is increased by 12 levels.
14. In accordance with the above analysis, the applicable Guidelines offense level for Count Three is 55.
15. Accordingly, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a), the offense level applicable to the group is 55.
16. Assuming the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through his allocution and subsequent conduct prior to the imposition of sentence, a two-level reduction will be warranted, pursuant to § 3E1.1(a), U.S.S.G. Furthermore, assuming the defendant has accepted responsibility as described in the previous sentence, an additional one-level reduction is warranted, pursuant to § 3E1.1(b), U.S.S.G, because the defendant gave timely notice of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the Government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to allocate its resources efficiently.

In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines offense level is 52.



## **B. Criminal History Category**

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, the defendant is in Criminal History Category VI.

## **C. Sentencing Range**

Based upon the calculations set forth above, the applicable Guidelines range is life imprisonment. However, because the total statutory maximum sentence permitted by the charges in Counts One through Three is twenty-five years' imprisonment, the applicable Guidelines sentence is 300 months (the "Stipulated Guidelines Sentence"). In addition, after determining the defendant's ability to pay, the Court may impose a fine pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. At Guidelines level 52, the applicable fine range is \$25,000 to \$250,000.

The parties agree that neither a downward nor an upward departure from the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence set forth above is warranted. Accordingly, neither party will seek any departure or adjustment pursuant to the Guidelines that is not set forth herein. Nor will either party suggest that the Probation Office consider such a departure or adjustment under the Guidelines, or suggest that the Court *sua sponte* consider any such departure or adjustment.

The parties agree that either party may seek a sentence outside of the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence, suggest that the Probation Office consider a sentence outside of the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence, and suggest that the Court *sua sponte* consider a sentence outside of the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence, based upon the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).

Except as provided in any written Proffer Agreement(s) that may have been entered into between this Office and the defendant, nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the parties (i) to present to the Probation Office or the Court any facts relevant to sentencing; (ii) to make any arguments regarding the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence (or where within such other range as the Court may determine the defendant should be sentenced) and regarding the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a); (iii) to seek an appropriately adjusted Guidelines range if it is determined based upon new information that the defendant's criminal history category is different from that set forth above; and (iv) to seek an appropriately adjusted Guidelines range if it is subsequently determined that the defendant qualifies as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek denial of the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, *see* U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, regardless of any stipulation set forth above, if the defendant fails clearly to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility, to the satisfaction of the Government, through his allocution and subsequent conduct prior to the imposition of sentence. Similarly, nothing in this Agreement limits the right of the Government to seek an enhancement for obstruction of justice, *see* U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, regardless of any stipulation set forth above, should it be determined that the defendant has either (i) engaged in conduct, unknown to the

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Government at the time of the signing of this Agreement, that constitutes obstruction of justice or (ii) committed another crime after signing this Agreement.

It is understood that pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d), neither the Probation Office nor the Court is bound by the above Guidelines stipulation, either as to questions of fact or as to the determination of the proper Guidelines to apply to the facts. In the event that the Probation Office or the Court contemplates any Guidelines adjustments, departures, or calculations different from those stipulated to above, or contemplates any sentence outside of the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence, the parties reserve the right to answer any inquiries and to make all appropriate arguments concerning the same.

It is understood that the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant is determined solely by the Court. It is further understood that the Guidelines are not binding on the Court. The defendant acknowledges that his entry of a guilty plea to the charged offenses authorizes the sentencing court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence. This Office cannot, and does not, make any promise or representation as to what sentence the defendant will receive. Moreover, it is understood that the defendant will have no right to withdraw his plea of guilty should the sentence imposed by the Court be outside the Guidelines sentence set forth above.

It is agreed (i) that the defendant will not file a direct appeal; nor bring a collateral challenge, including but not limited to an application under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 and/or Section 2241; nor seek a sentence modification pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3582(c), of any sentence at or below the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence of 300 months' imprisonment, and (ii) that the Government will not appeal any sentence at the Stipulated Guidelines Sentence. This provision is binding on the parties even if the Court employs a Guidelines analysis different from that stipulated to herein. Furthermore, it is agreed that any appeal as to the defendant's sentence that is not foreclosed by this provision will be limited to that portion of the sentencing calculation that is inconsistent with (or not addressed by) the above stipulation. The parties agree that this waiver applies regardless of whether the term of imprisonment is imposed to run consecutively to or concurrently with the undischarged portion of any other sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on the defendant at the time of sentencing in this case. The defendant further agrees not to appeal any term of supervised release that is less than or equal to the statutory maximum. The defendant also agrees not to appeal any fine that is less than or equal to \$250,000, and the Government agrees not to appeal any fine that is greater than or equal to \$25,000.

The defendant hereby acknowledges that he has accepted this Agreement and decided to plead guilty because he is in fact guilty. The defendant admits that the facts set forth below and in Exhibit A are true, and were this case to go to trial, the United States would be able to prove these specific facts and others beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the defendant agrees to allocute at the guilty plea proceeding to the facts set forth below and in Exhibit A.



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From the Spring of 2011 through the Fall of 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar and his co-conspirators, officials in the Iranian military who were based in Iran (the "co-conspirators"), agreed to cause the assassination of the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States (the "Ambassador"), while the Ambassador was in the United States.

Acting at the direction of his co-conspirators and in furtherance of this agreement, Arbabsiar traveled internationally to Mexico on several occasions, including from Iran, in order to arrange the assassination of the Ambassador. These trips occurred in May, June, July and September of 2011. In Mexico, Arbabsiar met with a person ("the Individual") who claimed to be a representative of a sophisticated and violent Latin American drug cartel that had access to military-grade weaponry. With the approval of Arbabsiar's co-conspirators, Arbabsiar arranged to hire the Individual and his criminal associates to murder the Ambassador, while the Ambassador was in the United States. Arbabsiar agreed to pay \$1.5 million to the Individual.

Arbabsiar discussed with the Individual a plan for the Individual and his criminal associates to travel to Washington, D.C. to murder the Ambassador at a restaurant there. The plan was subsequently approved by Arbabsiar's co-conspirators.

Arbabsiar then arranged for a \$100,000 payment, in two installments, to be wired to the Individual at a U.S. bank account, as a down-payment for the anticipated murder of the Ambassador. Arbabsiar's co-conspirators approved this payment, which was made via wire transfers to a U.S. bank account that passed through Manhattan, New York.

By entering this plea of guilty, the defendant waives any and all right to withdraw his plea or to attack his conviction, either on direct appeal or collaterally, on the ground that the Government has failed to produce any discovery material, Jencks Act material, exculpatory material pursuant to *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), other than information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant, and impeachment material pursuant to *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), that has not already been produced as of the date of the signing of this Agreement.

It is further agreed that should the conviction following the defendant's plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, then any prosecution that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this agreement (including any counts that the Government has agreed to dismiss at sentencing pursuant to this

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Agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against the defendant, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

It is further understood that this Agreement does not bind any federal, state, or local prosecuting authority other than this Office.




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
Apart from any written Proffer Agreement that may have been entered into between this Office and defendant, this Agreement supersedes any prior understandings, promises, or conditions between this Office and the defendant. No additional understandings, promises, or conditions have been entered into other than those set forth in this Agreement, and none will be entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.

Very truly yours,

PREET BHARARA  
United States Attorney

By:   
Edward Y. Kim  
Glen A. Kopp  
Stephen J. Ritchin  
Assistant United States Attorneys  
(212) 637-2401 / 2210  
(914) 993-1947

APPROVED:


  
Michael Farbiarz / Jocelyn Strauber  
Chiefs  
Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit

AGREED AND CONSENTED TO:

  
Manssor Arbabsiar

10 / 17 / 12  
Date

APPROVED:

  
Sabrina Shroff, Esq.  
Attorney for Manssor Arbabsiar

10 / 17 / 12  
Date

## Exhibit A

From the Spring of 2011 through the Fall of 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar and his co-conspirators, officials in the Iranian military who were based in Iran (the "co-conspirators"), agreed to cause the assassination of the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States (the "Ambassador"), while the Ambassador was in the United States.

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Arbabsiar then arranged for a \$100,000 payment, in two installments, to be wired to the Individual at a U.S. bank account, as a down-payment for the anticipated murder of the Ambassador. Arbabsiar's co-conspirators approved this payment, which was made via wire transfers to a U.S. bank account that passed through Manhattan, New York.





## Security Council

Distr.: General  
17 October 2011

Original: English

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### **Identical letters dated 14 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

In my capacity as Chair of the Arab Group for the month of October 2011, I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at the Permanent Representative level at its extraordinary session held on 13 October 2011 in Cairo, regarding the attempt to assassinate the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America of America (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Meshal Hamad M. **Al-Thani**  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative



**Annex to the identical letters dated 14 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

[Original: Arabic]

**Statement issued by the Council of the League of Arab States at an extraordinary meeting at the Permanent Representative level**

**The criminal attempt to assassinate the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America**

Cairo, 13 October 2011

In the light of the presentation made by the head of the delegation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia concerning the criminal attempt to assassinate the Ambassador of that country to the United States of America, the Council of the League of Arab States, at an extraordinary meeting at the Permanent Representative level that was held at League headquarters on Thursday, 13 October 2011, expresses its condemnation and rejection of the criminal Iranian attempt to assassinate the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America. The Council notes that any attack on diplomatic personnel is considered as a blatant violation of all international norms and instruments and of the rules and conventions that govern relations between States and, in particular, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Such behaviour is incompatible with religious values and humanitarian principles and undermines efforts in support of international peace and security and stability in the Middle East. It also has a negative impact on the relations between Iran and the Arab States and, in particular, the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Council calls upon the Arab and Islamic worlds and the international community to shoulder their responsibilities with regard to such terrorist acts, which threaten the stability of States and international peace and security, and provoke enmity and hatred between States and peoples.

(Statement No. 153 — extraordinary session — 13 October 2011)





## Announcement

# Foreign Secretary welcomes EU sanctions following assassination plot in the US

**From:** Foreign & Commonwealth Office (<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office>) and The Rt Hon William Hague (<https://www.gov.uk/government/people/william-hague>)

**First published:** 21 October 2011

**Part of:** Counter-terrorism (<https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/counter-terrorism>), Iran (<https://www.gov.uk/government/world/iran>) and USA (<https://www.gov.uk/government/world/usa>)

## This news article was published under the 2010 to 2015 Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government

Foreign Secretary William Hague said that this coordinated EU action sends a strong message that EU Member States will not tolerate Iranian involvement in terrorism.



Speaking today he said:

“I welcome the EU’s agreement to impose restrictive measures on five individuals following the disrupted plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US. The EU action follows the UK’s designations earlier this week under the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act 2010. The EU measures will impose an EU-wide financial assets freeze and prevent any funds being made available to the individuals concerned.

“The assassination plot appears to constitute a escalation in Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism outside its borders. This coordinated EU action sends a strong message that EU Member States will not tolerate Iranian involvement in terrorism and underlines both the gravity of the plot, and the serious consequences it could have had if it had been successful.”

The names of the individuals concerned will be published on the website of the Official Journal of the EU (<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm>) on 22 October.



## General Assembly

Distr.: General  
14 November 2011

Original: English

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**Sixty-sixth session**

Agenda item 118

**The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

**Letter dated 14 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative  
of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General**

I would like to request that the attached letter dated 12 October 2011 be circulated to all Member States as a document of the General Assembly (see annex).

*(Signed)* Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**  
Permanent Representative

11-59322 (E) 151111





**Annex to the letter dated 14 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I would like to draw your attention to the announcement made regarding a plot to assassinate the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States, Adel Al-Jubeir. According to United States authorities, overwhelming evidence leads to the conclusion that this plot was planned, financed and directed by elements working for or belonging to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This plot is not only a heinous crime on its own, but is also a gross violation of international conventions and norms, especially those that specifically relate to the protection of diplomats.

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expresses its deep concern and outrage at this plot, and requests you to bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council. Herewith, I have also attached a press release from the Saudi Press Agency for your information (see enclosure).

*(Signed)* Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**  
Permanent Representative

**Enclosure**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia strongly denounces and condemns the outrageous and heinous attempt to assassinate its Ambassador to the United States of America, a plot which is not consistent with normal humanitarian values and ethics nor with international norms and traditions, an official source said.

The source said in a statement issued today that the Government of Saudi Arabia appreciates the efforts undertaken by the United States authorities — which were the subject of a follow-up by the Kingdom — in the detection of the assassination attempt plot, and that the Kingdom would continue its contacts and coordination with the United States authorities concerned about this despicable plot and those who stand behind it.

At the same time, the Kingdom is considering the critical procedures and steps to be taken in this regard to stop these criminal acts and to address firmly any attempts to destabilize the Kingdom and threaten its security and spread sedition among its people, the statement added.

The source also said that the Kingdom calls on the Arab and Islamic nations and the international community to assume their responsibilities relating to these terrorist acts and the attempts to threaten the stability of countries, as well as international peace and security.

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**General Assembly  
Security Council**

Distr.: General  
19 October 2011

Original: English

**General Assembly**  
**Sixty-sixth session**  
Agenda item 109  
**Measures to eliminate international terrorism**

**Security Council**  
**Sixty-sixth year**

**Identical letters dated 12 October 2011 from the Secretary-General  
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the  
President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit the attached letter, dated 12 October 2011, from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its attachments\* to the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

*(Signed)* **BAN** Ki-moon

\* The attached charging document is circulated in the language of submission only.



## **Annex**

Enclosed please find the letter that I wrote to you yesterday regarding the recently disrupted conspiracy to assassinate in Washington, D.C., the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States and to carry out additional follow-on attacks inside the United States and against other countries. As noted in the letter, we have confirmed information that this conspiracy was conceived, sponsored and directed by elements of the Government of Iran. Had this terrorist plot not been disrupted, it would likely have resulted in the injury or death of the Saudi Ambassador and others.

We request that you transmit the present letter, yesterday's enclosed letter, and the enclosed charging document to the General Assembly.

*(Signed)* Susan E. **Rice**



## Enclosure

11 October 2011

I would like to bring to your attention an attempted plot that constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. The United States has recently disrupted a conspiracy to assassinate in Washington, D.C., the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States and to carry out additional follow-on attacks inside the United States and against other countries. We have confirmed information that this conspiracy was conceived, sponsored and directed by elements of the Government of Iran. Had this terrorist plot not been disrupted, it would likely have resulted in the injury or death of the Saudi Ambassador and others.

According to our information, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and several of its high-ranking officers, including Hamed Abdollahi, Abdul Reza Shahlai and Ali Gholam Shakuri, directed and funded the conspiracy.

This plot constitutes a violation of Iran's commitments under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973). Consistent with this Convention and pursuant to United States law, on 11 October 2011, the United States brought charges in the United States Federal Court of the Southern District of New York against Manssor Arbabsiar, who is a citizen of Iran and a naturalized United States citizen, and Ali Gholam Shakuri, who is a national of Iran. Enclosed is the charging document containing the details of the conspiracy. The United States arrested Arbabsiar on 29 September 2011. He is currently in United States custody in New York City, and the United States plans to prosecute him to the full extent of United States law. Ali Gholam Shakuri remains at large.


In accordance with article 6 of the Convention, the United States requests that you notify Iran of the above measures. The United States expects Iran, in line with its obligations under this Convention, to undertake immediate, credible and verifiable action to hold accountable any other persons responsible for this conspiracy, including but not limited to Ali Gholam Shakuri. The United States has directly notified the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as the State of which the internationally protected person concerned is a national, of the above measures.

The United States notes that this incident also constitutes a violation of other international legal obligations, including the requirement contained in Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) that States "refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists". We intend to discuss this matter with other members of the Security Council.

We request that you transmit the present letter and the enclosed charging document to the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Susan E. Rice

Attachment

Approved:   
GLEN A. KOPP/EDWARD Y. KIM  
Assistant United States Attorneys

Before: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. DOLINGER  
United States Magistrate Judge  
Southern District of New York

----- X SEALED AMENDED COMPLAINT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : Violations of  
- v. - : 18 U.S.C. §§ 1117,  
 : 1958, 2, 2332a, 2332b  
MANSOR ARBABSIAR, :  
a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and : COUNTY OF OFFENSE:  
GHOLAM SHAKURI, : NEW YORK  
a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," :  
 :  
Defendants.

----- X  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.:

O. Robert Woloszyn, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and charges as follows:

COUNT ONE  
Conspiracy to Murder A Foreign Official

1. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, knowingly and intentionally combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Section 1116 of Title 18, United States Code.

2. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, would and did agree to kill a foreign official, to wit, ARBABSIAR and SHAKURI agreed with each other and with others to kill the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia, while the Ambassador was in the United States.

Overt Acts

3. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the



illegal object thereof, the following overt acts were committed, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere:

a. On or about August 1, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSJAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsjar," the defendant, caused an overseas wire transfer of approximately \$49,960 to be sent by a foreign entity from a bank located in a foreign country to an FBI undercover bank account (the "UC Bank Account"). Before reaching the UC Bank Account, the funds were transferred through a bank in Manhattan, New York.

b. On or about August 9, 2011, ARBABSJAR caused an overseas wire transfer of approximately \$49,960 to be sent by a foreign entity from a bank located in a foreign country to the UC Bank Account. Before reaching the UC Bank Account, the funds were transferred through a bank in Manhattan, New York.

c. In or about the spring of 2011, GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, provided thousands of dollars to ARBABSJAR in Iran to pay for expenses related to furthering the plot to kill the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1117.)

COUNT TWO

Foreign Travel and Use of Interstate  
and Foreign Commerce Facilities  
in the Commission of Murder-For-Hire

4. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including September 29, 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSJAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsjar," the defendant, willfully and knowingly traveled in foreign commerce and used, and caused another to use, a facility of interstate and foreign commerce, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, with the intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of the United States, to wit, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1116 and 1117, as consideration for the receipt of, and as consideration for a promise and agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value, as those terms are defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958(b), to wit, ARBABSJAR caused to be wired approximately \$100,000 into the United States, as partial consideration for the murder of the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1958 and 2.)

COUNT THREE

Conspiracy to Engage in Foreign Travel  
and Use Interstate and Foreign Commerce Facilities  
In the Commission of Murder-For-Hire

5. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958.

6. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, would and did agree together and with each other to use travel in foreign commerce and the facilities of interstate and foreign commerce, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, with the intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of the United States, to wit, Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1116 and 1117, as consideration for the receipt of, and as consideration for a promise and agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value, to wit, ARBABSIIAR, SHAKURI, and others known and unknown, caused to be wired approximately \$100,000 into the United States as partial consideration for the murder of the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

Overt Acts

7. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the acts set forth in Paragraph 3 above.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1958.)

COUNT FOUR

Conspiracy To Use A Weapon of Mass Destruction

8. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a

"Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(a)(2)(A) and (C).

9. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, would use a weapon of mass destruction, namely, a destructive device as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 921, against a person within the United States, where a facility of interstate and foreign commerce was used in furtherance of the offense, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, and ~~where a perpetrator of the offense traveled in foreign commerce~~ in furtherance of the offense, to wit, ARBABSIIAR and SHAKURI agreed with each other and with others to use an explosive device against the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia.

Overt Acts

10. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the acts set forth in Paragraph 3 above.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332a(a)(2)(A) and (C).)

COUNT FIVE

Conspiracy to Commit An Act of Terrorism  
Transcending National Boundaries

11. From at least in or about the spring of 2011, up to and including in or about October 2011, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2332b(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B).

12. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and



unknown, would kill and maim persons within the United States and would create a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to others by destroying and damaging structures, conveyances and other real and personal property within the United States, in violation of the laws of the United States, including Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1116 and 1117, where interstate and foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the offense, to wit, bank wire transfers to an account in the United States from foreign entities, and where the offense would have obstructed, delayed and affected interstate commerce had it been consummated, to wit, ARBABSJAR and SHAKURI, during meetings outside the United States, agreed with each other and with others to kill the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia, while the Ambassador was in the United States.

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Overt Acts

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13. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the illegal objects thereof, MANSSOR ARBABSJAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsjar," and GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendants, and others known and unknown, committed in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, the acts set forth in Paragraph 3 above.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 2332b(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B).)

The bases for my knowledge and the foregoing charges are, in part, as follows:

14. I have been a Special Agent with the FBI since March of 1999. I have participated in the investigation of this matter, and have spoken with other individuals, including other law-enforcement officials, about this investigation. The facts and circumstances of this investigation have been summarized for the specific purposes of the instant affidavit. No attempt has been made to set forth the complete factual history of this investigation or all of its details.

15. I make this affidavit based on, among other things, my personal review of evidence obtained in the course of the investigation, as well as information and belief. The sources of my information and belief include, but are not limited to, conversations with other law-enforcement officers; reviews of reports and other documents prepared by law-enforcement personnel; reviews of business records; draft transcripts and translations of recordings, as well as the underlying recordings themselves; and the defendant's post-arrest statements. Where the actions, statements and conversations of others, or the

contents of documents, are recounted or described herein, they are related in substance and in part, unless otherwise indicated.

I. OVERVIEW

16. As set forth more fully below, MANSSOR ARBABSJAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsjar," the defendant, is a naturalized citizen of the United States who holds both a United States and an Iranian passport. ARBABSJAR and his Iran-based co-conspirators, including GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, a member of the Qods Force, see infra ¶ 17, have been plotting the murder of the Ambassador to the United States of Saudi Arabia ("Ambassador"). In furtherance of this conspiracy, ARBABSJAR has met on a number of occasions in Mexico with a Drug Enforcement Administration confidential source ("CS-1"). In the course of these meetings, CS-1 has posed as an associate of a sophisticated and violent international drug-trafficking cartel. See infra n.2. ARBABSJAR arranged to hire CS-1 and his purported criminal associates to murder the Ambassador, and SHAKURI and other Iran-based co-conspirators were aware of and approved the plan. With SHAKURI's approval, ARBABSJAR caused approximately \$100,000 to be wired into a bank account in the United States for CS-1 – as a down-payment to CS-1 for his anticipated killing of the Ambassador.

II. BACKGROUND: THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AND THE QODS FORCE

17. During the course of my investigation, I have become familiar with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the "IRGC") and the Qods Force. Based in part on my review of publicly-available information, including findings and statements by the United States Department of State, the United States Department of Treasury, and other "open source" information, I have learned the following: the IRGC is an arm of the Iranian military; the IRGC is suspected of having been involved in a number of foreign operations; the IRGC is composed of a number of branches, one of which is the Qods Force. The Qods Force conducts sensitive covert operations abroad, including terrorist attacks, assassinations, and kidnappings, and provides weapons and training to Iran's terrorist and militant allies. Among many other things, the Qods Force is believed to sponsor attacks against Coalition Forces in Iraq, and in October 2007, the United States Treasury Department designated the Qods Force, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations.



III. THE INVESTIGATION

A. MAY 2011:  
ARBABSIAR MEETS CS-1 AND DISCUSSES WITH HIM THE  
POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK

18. On or about May 24, 2011, according to travel records, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, traveled back and forth from Texas to Mexico. In Mexico, ARBABSIAR met with CS-1.<sup>1</sup> During this May 24 meeting, and all others with ARBABSIAR, CS-1 posed as an associate of a drug-trafficking cartel ("Drug Cartel #1").<sup>2</sup> After the May 24 meeting with ARBABSIAR, CS-1 described to law-enforcement agents what had transpired. CS-1 explained that, at the meeting, ARBABSIAR inquired as to CS-1's knowledge, if any, with respect to explosives. According to CS-1, ARBABSIAR explained to CS-1 that he was interested in, among other things, attacking an embassy of Saudi Arabia. In response, and to further the discussion, CS-1 told ARBABSIAR that he was knowledgeable with respect to C-4 explosives.<sup>3</sup>

19. On or about May 30, 2011, according to travel records, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, traveled internationally, by plane from Houston, Texas.

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<sup>1</sup> CS-1 is a paid confidential source. Previously, CS-1 was charged in connection with a narcotics offense by authorities of a certain U.S. state ("State"). In exchange for CS-1's cooperation in various narcotics investigations, the State charges were dismissed. CS-1 has previously provided reliable and independently corroborated information to federal law-enforcement agents; this information has led to numerous seizures of narcotics. In addition, CS-1 has been paid by federal law-enforcement officials in connection with the work he has done.

<sup>2</sup> Drug Cartel #1 is a large, sophisticated, and violent drug-trafficking cartel. It is well-known throughout North America, and its principal places of operation are Mexico and the United States. According to published reports, Drug Cartel #1 has access to military-grade weaponry and explosives, and has engaged in numerous acts of violence, including assassinations and murders.

<sup>3</sup> "C-4" is a type of plastic explosive. Like other plastic explosives, C-4 can generally be molded, so that it can be shaped and formed with a certain degree of precision.



B. JUNE AND JULY 2011:  
ARBABSIAR RETURNS TO MEXICO AND HIRES CS-1 TO KILL  
THE UNITED STATES-BASED AMBASSADOR OF SAUDI ARABIA

20. On or about June 23, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, who had traveled internationally, see supra ¶ 19, returned by plane to Mexico.

21. According to CS-1, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, again met with CS-1 in Mexico in late June and July. Over the course of a series of meetings, ARBABSIAR explained to CS-1 that his associates in Iran had discussed a number of violent missions for CS-1 and CS-1's purported criminal associates to perform. These included, among others, the murder of the Ambassador.

22. On or about July 14, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, met with CS-1 in Mexico. At the direction of law-enforcement agents, CS-1 made an audio recording of the meeting. CS-1 and ARBABSIAR spoke English during the meeting. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the July 14 recorded meeting, I learned that at this meeting the following occurred, among other things:<sup>4</sup>

a. CS-1 told ARBABSIAR that CS-1 would need to use "[a]t least four guys" and that CS-1 was "talking to one of the guys" and would "take the one point five for the Saudi Arabia." I understand this to mean that CS-1 would need to use four men to assassinate the Ambassador and that the cost to ARBABSIAR of conducting the assassination would be \$1.5 million.<sup>5</sup> CS-1 told ARBABSIAR that he would "go ahead and work on Saudi Arabia, get all the information that we can"; ARBABSIAR agreed that the assassination of the Ambassador should be handled first.<sup>6</sup> After CS-1 stated, "you just want the, the main guy,"

<sup>4</sup> In his post-arrest statement, see infra Part IV, ARBABSIAR has admitted that he participated in each of the recorded meetings described in this Complaint, and he has confirmed that he agreed to pay CS-1 to kill the Ambassador.

<sup>5</sup> Both above, and throughout, the quoted language is taken from the draft transcripts. My understanding of the meaning of those quoted terms, where supplied, is based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation.

<sup>6</sup> Prior to the July 14, 2011 meeting, CS-1 had reported that he and ARBABSIAR had discussed the possibility of attacks on

ARBABSIAR confirmed that he just wanted the "[A]mbassador" -- which I understand to mean that ARBABSIAR wanted CS-1 to arrange for the assassination of the Ambassador before executing the other attacks they had discussed.

b. CS-1 and ARBABSIAR then discussed how ARBABSIAR would pay CS-1. ARBABSIAR asked CS-1 what bank he planned to use, and CS-1 stated that he would give ARBABSIAR "an account number." At a later time during the same conversation, ARBABSIAR stated that the "money is [in] Iran," and that he (ARBABSIAR) had received a call indicating that the money would be at the house of a certain individual ("Individual #1"). When ARBABSIAR called Individual #1, "he [Individual #1] said he had it there" and that he (Individual #1) had received "the money at nine in the morning." ARBABSIAR said the "money's a hundred thousand" but that he (ARBABSIAR) would have to "send a hundred . . . ten thousand, ten thousand, ten thousand. I don't wanna send it to one guy, one shot." I understand ARBABSIAR to mean that he had \$100,000 in Iran to pay CS-1 as a first payment toward the assassination of the Ambassador, but that ARBABSIAR wanted to send the money to CS-1 in installments and not in a single transfer.

c. During their July 14 meeting, CS-1 asked ARBABSIAR about ARBABSIAR's cousin, who, according to ARBABSIAR, was located in Iran and had requested that ARBABSIAR find someone (ultimately, CS-1) who could carry out the attack on the Ambassador described above. ARBABSIAR explained that his cousin was "wanted in America," had been "on the CNN," and was a "big general in [the] army." ARBABSIAR further explained that there were a number of parts to the army of Iran and that his cousin "work[s] in outside, in other countries for the Iranian government[.]" ARBABSIAR further explained that his cousin did not wear a uniform or carry a gun, and had taken certain unspecified actions related to a bombing in Iraq. Compare supra ¶ 17. In the portions of the July 14 meeting referenced in this sub-paragraph, I understand ARBABSIAR to be saying that his cousin works for the military of Iran, in particular, for the Qods Force, and that his cousin focuses on matters outside of Iran.

d. At the end of the July 14 meeting, CS-1 told ARBABSIAR, "[w]e're gonna start doing the guy," which I

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a number of other targets. These targets included foreign government facilities associated with Saudi Arabia and with another country, and these targets were located within and outside of the United States.



understand to mean that CS-1 and ARBABSIIAR confirmed that CS-1 would proceed to plan the assassination of the Ambassador.

23. On or about July 17, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, met with CS-1 - again, see supra ¶ 22, in Mexico. At the direction of law-enforcement agents, CS-1 recorded the meeting. CS-1 and ARBABSIIAR spoke English during the meeting. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the July 17 meeting, I learned that at this meeting the following occurred, among other things:

a. CS-1 made reference to "my guy over there . . . he's already in Washington," which I understand to be a reference to the fact that one of CS-1's workers had purportedly already traveled to Washington, D.C. to surveil the Ambassador. ~~CS-1 then asked, "I got this on the computer . . . is this the guy right here?" - to which ARBABSIIAR replied, "Yeah, that's him." Based, among other things, on my discussions with other agents, I understand that during this portion of the conversation, CS-1 showed ARBABSIIAR a photograph of the Ambassador.~~

b. CS-1 described what he had purportedly begun to learn about the Ambassador, stating that the Ambassador has "eight to seven security people around him . . . [h]e goes out and eat like two times a week in a restaurant . . . [m]y guy is already over there . . . doing surveillance." CS-1 then reflected, "I don't know what exactly your cousin [see supra ¶ 22(c)] wants me to do. . . ." After some further conversation, ARBABSIIAR replied: "[h]e wants you to kill this guy." CS-1 then explained, "there's gonna be like American people there . . . in the restaurant. You want me to do it outside or in the restaurant?" ARBABSIIAR answered: "[d]oesn't matter how you do it. I mean, if you do it by himself, kill is better, but . . . sometime, you know, you have no choice, is that right?" I understand ARBABSIIAR and CS-1 to have been discussing how the Ambassador should be killed, and ARBABSIIAR to be saying that his cousin wanted the Ambassador killed; without bystander casualties if possible ("by himself, kill is better") but not if operational necessities dictated otherwise ("sometime, you know, you have no

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<sup>7</sup> During the course of the July 17 conversation, ARBABSIIAR further described his cousin. ARBABSIIAR said that his cousin was "working for [the] government [of Iran] but he's working outside . . . He's working like . . . [l]ike [a named, non-Iranian intelligence agency]."



choice").<sup>8</sup>

c. On a number of occasions, ARBABSIAR reassured CS-1 that CS-1 and his (CS-1's) men would indeed be paid for killing the Ambassador. ARBABSIAR told CS-1 to tell the people working for him (CS-1) that he (ARBABSIAR) could "guarantee the money. . . I [ARBABSIAR] got the money coming." ARBABSIAR emphasized that "this is politics, ok . . . it's not like, eh, personal . . . This is politics, so these people [ARBABSIAR's co-conspirators in Iran] they pay this government . . . he's got [ARBABSIAR's cousin has got] the, got the government behind him . . . he's not paying from his pocket." To facilitate payment, at one point during the July 17 meeting, CS-1 gave ARBABSIAR "the account number . . . in [a U.S. bank] . . . and the U.S. routing number" -- the unique number ~~associated with the United States bank account into which~~ ARBABSIAR could arrange for payment to be made to CS-1 for the assassination of the Ambassador.

d. ARBABSIAR explained that his cousin and an individual who worked for his cousin had paid his (ARBABSIAR's) expenses related to the assassination plot. ARBABSIAR stated, "I tell him [ARBABSIAR's cousin], give me just another fifteen. Just . . . next morning they send one guy, you know, that work for him [ARBABSIAR's cousin]. He's like a colonel, the guy." CS-1 asked, "Did the colonel take the money, the money to you?" ARBABSIAR responded, "Yes, man. He opened the door for me, the colonel, he bring the envelope. He put the envelope there for me." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, including my participation in the post-arrest interview of ARBABSIAR, I understand that the "colonel" that ARBABSIAR referred to is GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, and that ARBABSIAR was stating that after he received expense money from his cousin, he received an additional expense payment from SHAKURI, see infra n.13.

e. At the end of the July 17 meeting, ARBABSIAR

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<sup>8</sup> On numerous occasions during the July 17 meeting, ARBABSIAR made it clear that the assassination needed to go forward, even if doing so would cause mass casualties. For example, ARBABSIAR said: "They want that guy [the Ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him, fuck 'em." In a similar vein, ARBABSIAR and CS-1 also discussed the means by which the Ambassador would be killed. CS-1 said: "I'm gonna blow him [the Ambassador] up or shoot him, whatever you want." ARBABSIAR responded: "Yeah, it doesn't matter . . . [w]hatever is easy for . . . how is possible for you."

declared "[l]et it hit the restaurant. If, if you can do it outside, do it. If not, restaurant, hit it, it's ok," by which I understand ARBABSIAR to mean that if CS-1 could not assassinate the Ambassador outside the restaurant, he should "hit" or bomb the restaurant. In response, CS-1 then noted that there were "from a hundred, a hundred and fifty [people in the restaurant]" and "buildings on the sides," and "senators [U.S. Senators who dine there]," all of which ARBABSIAR dismissed as "no problem" or "no big deal," meaning that the potential for such casualties should not dissuade CS-1 from killing the Ambassador.

C. JULY AND AUGUST 2011:  
PAYMENTS ARE MADE TO CS-1

24. According to travel records, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, traveled from Mexico, departing for a foreign country, on or about July 20, 2011.<sup>9</sup>

25. As noted above, see supra ¶ 23, at the July 17 meeting, CS-1 provided MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, with a bank account and routing number, so that payment could be made for the assassination of the Ambassador. The account information CS-1 provided was in fact associated with the UC Bank Account.

26. On or about August 1, 2011, an overseas wire transfer of approximately \$49,960 was sent by a foreign entity ("Foreign Entity-1") from a bank located in a foreign country (the "Foreign Bank") through a bank in Manhattan to the UC Bank Account.

27. On or about August 6, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the conversation. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, CS-1 asked ARBABSIAR whether he (ARBABSIAR) had "already finished the other half of . . . the money." ARBABSIAR replied, "I sent it yesterday." I understand that ARBABSIAR was acknowledging that the previous day he sent to CS-1 the second half of the approximately \$100,000 down-payment, see supra ¶ 22(b), for the murder of the Ambassador. I understand that "the other half" of the \$100,000 was received on or about August 9,

<sup>9</sup> Three days prior to ARBABSIAR's July 20 flight, during the July 17 meeting with CS-1, see supra, ARBABSIAR indicated to CS-1 that ARBABSIAR would be traveling to Iran on July 20 to see his cousin.



2011, see infra ¶ 28, and that the first "half" was received on or about August 1, 2011, see supra ¶ 26.

28. On or about August 9, 2011, an overseas wire transfer of approximately \$49,960 was sent by another foreign entity ("Foreign Entity-2") from the Foreign Bank through a bank in Manhattan to the UC Bank Account.

29. On or about August 11, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the conversation. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, ARBABSIIAR asked CS-1, "Did you check the bank?" CS-1 responded in the affirmative, "I check in the bank, everything is there." I understand that ARBABSIIAR was confirming that CS-1 received the \$49,960 that arrived in the UC Bank Account on or about August 9, 2011, see supra ¶ 28.

D. SEPTEMBER 2011:  
ARBABSIIAR RETURNS TO MEXICO

30. On or about September 2, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the conversation. Based on my review of draft transcripts of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, ARBABSIIAR asked CS-1 if the "building is getting painted" and CS-1 responded "we're still doing that." I understand that by asking that question, ARBABSIIAR was asking CS-1 whether the arrangements to kill the Ambassador were still underway.<sup>10</sup> ARBABSIIAR then stated, "once we do this one, you gonna open a [U/I] like, uh . . . you got the number for the safe" and "[o]nce you open the door, that's it. You know what I mean? . . . [y]ou don't have to worry about anything." I understand that ARBABSIIAR was explaining to CS-1 that after CS-1 and his team assassinated the Ambassador, CS-1 would make money from that and other projects with ARBABSIIAR and his associates, see supra n.6.

31. On or about September 12, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the

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<sup>10</sup> Based on my training and in my experience, individuals who speak explicitly about criminal activity during in-person meetings, see, e.g., supra ¶¶ 22, 23, often speak in coded language during telephone conversations, in an effort to conceal the subject matter of their discussions in the event that they are overheard or intercepted.



telephone. CS-1 recorded the telephone conversation. Based on my review of a draft transcript of the recording, I learned that ARBABSIIAR told CS-1 that "the number is gonna stay the same thing . . . [o]ne and a half . . ." I understand ARBABSIIAR was stating that CS-1 would receive the same amount of money ("[o]ne and a half": \$1.5 million) for the assassination that ARBABSIIAR and CS-1 had previously discussed. See supra ¶ 22(a). ARBABSIIAR also referred to "the number we did" and told CS-1 that he could "prepare for those too . . . but we need to at least one of them." I understand ARBABSIIAR to have been informing CS-1 that in the future CS-1 could prepare for the additional attacks previously mentioned, see supra n.6, but that CS-1 first needed to assassinate the Ambassador. ARBABSIIAR promised CS-1 that if he does "at least one . . . I'll send the balance for you," which I understand to mean that CS-1 would receive the remainder of his \$1.5 million payment after the Ambassador has been assassinated. ARBABSIIAR also stated, "[t]he first one they just want it . . . for test," which I understand to mean that CS-1's first task was designed as a test run, with future assignments to follow if the assassination was successful.

32. On or about September 20, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, spoke with CS-1 on the telephone. CS-1 recorded the telephone conversation. Based on my review of a draft transcript of the recording, I learned that CS-1 told ARBABSIIAR, "I'm ready for the . . . for the thing, for the house, man, to be painted but . . . I need to, I need, either I need you or I need half of the . . . of the check that we're gonna receive to . . . so I can go ahead and . . . be finished with the job." I understand CS-1 to have been requesting that ARBABSIIAR either pay one-half of the agreed upon price (\$1.5 million, see supra ¶ 22(a)) for the murder of the Ambassador or go personally to Mexico to serve himself as collateral for the final payment of the fee for the assassination.<sup>11</sup> Based on my training and experience, I know that this form of personal guarantee is common for large scale illicit transactions. Ultimately, based on my review of the transcript of the September 20, 2011 call, I believe that ARBABSIIAR agreed to travel to Mexico per CS-1's request to guarantee payment for the murder of the Ambassador ("I'm gonna go over there [in] two [or] three days, I'll go over there. . . . Don't wait for me. Get ready, but I'll be over there."). Later during the night of September 20, CS-1 returned a call from ARBABSIIAR. At the direction of law-enforcement agents, CS-1 recorded the telephone conversation.

<sup>11</sup> CS-1 initially requested that ARBABSIIAR send someone to Mexico as collateral in a recorded call between CS-1 and ARBABSIIAR on or about August 28, 2011.

During the call, ARBABSIAR inquired as to "how long [he] need[s] to stay in Mexico." I understand ARBABSIAR to have been asking how long he would have to stay in Mexico to supply a sufficient guarantee for payment to CS-1 and CS-1's associates following completion of the plot to murder the Ambassador.

E. THE ARREST AND SEARCH

33. On or about September 28, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, flew to Mexico. ARBABSIAR was denied entry into Mexico, and then flew on to John F. Kennedy International Airport ("JFK"), in New York City. During the flight, law-enforcement officials aboard conducted surveillance of the defendant without alerting him to their presence. After ARBABSIAR exited the plane at JFK, law-enforcement agents arrested ARBABSIAR.

34. After he was placed under arrest, law-enforcement agents recovered numerous items from MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, and from his luggage. (The luggage was searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a United States Magistrate Judge.) These items included, among other things: approximately \$3,900 in United States currency, composed of one-hundred dollar bills; a sum of Iranian currency; an Iranian passport; a United States passport; and a travel itinerary reflecting a flight departing Mexico during October of 2011, with an ultimate destination of Tehran, Iran.

IV. ARBABSIAR'S CONFESSION

35. Several hours after his arrest, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, was advised of his Miranda rights and his right to a speedy presentment. ARBABSIAR agreed to waive those rights and to speak with law-enforcement agents. As set forth more fully below in the paragraphs that follow, during a series of Mirandized interviews, ARBABSIAR confessed to his participation in the plot described above.<sup>12</sup> In particular, and as described more fully below, ARBABSIAR admitted that he had arranged for CS-1 to murder the Ambassador; that he

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<sup>12</sup> The interviews were conducted principally in English. Occasionally, ARBABSIAR spoke in Farsi. One of the law-enforcement agents who conducted the interviews is fluent in Farsi. A small portion of the substance of ARBABSIAR's oral statement is described in the instant Complaint. In addition to providing an oral statement, the defendant signed a typewritten statement admitting to the conduct that forms the basis for the charges herein.



(ARBABSIAR) had discussed with CS-1 the means by which CS-1 and his criminal associates would commit the murder; and that he (ARBABSIAR) made a down-payment to CS-1 for the murder by causing a total of \$100,000 to be deposited in the UC Bank Account. Furthermore, ARBABSIAR admitted that in connection with this plot, he (ARBABSIAR) was recruited, funded, and directed by men he understood to be senior officials in the Qods Force, see supra ¶ 17. ARBABSIAR further explained that men he understood to be senior Qods Force officials were aware of and approved, among other things, the use of CS-1 in connection with the plot; payments to CS-1; and the means by which the Ambassador would be killed in the United States and the casualties that would likely result.

36. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, ~~explained that his cousin, see supra, approached~~ ARBABSIAR in the early spring of 2011, while ARBABSIAR was in Iran, and asked ARBABSIAR to work with him (ARBABSIAR's cousin). ARBABSIAR had long understood that his cousin (hereinafter "Iranian Official #1"), was a high-ranking member of the Qods Force. ARBABSIAR told Iranian Official #1 that as a result of his business in both Mexico and the United States, he (ARBABSIAR) knew a number of people who traveled between the two countries, and some of those people, he (ARBABSIAR) believed, were narcotics traffickers. Iranian Official #1 told ARBABSIAR that he wanted ARBABSIAR to hire someone who could kidnap the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States and that ARBABSIAR should find someone in the narcotics business, because people in that business are willing to undertake criminal activity in exchange for money.

37. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, further acknowledged that Iranian Official #1 subsequently provided ARBABSIAR with thousands of dollars for expenses.<sup>13</sup> ARBABSIAR thereafter traveled to Mexico, where he met CS-1.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> In the course of his discussions with Iranian Official #1, Iranian Official #1 indicated that another individual, GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, worked for him (that is, for Iranian Official #1) as his (Iranian Official #1's) deputy. After Iranian Official #1 provided ARBABSIAR with thousands of dollars for expenses, SHAKURI separately provided ARBABSIAR with thousands of dollars for expenses.

<sup>14</sup> During the course of his interviews, ARBABSIAR explained how he came to meet CS-1.



38. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, admitted that, while he was in Mexico, he (ARBABSIAR) and CS-1 discussed, among other things, a plan to kill the Ambassador by bombing a restaurant the Ambassador frequented, for which CS-1 said he would charge \$1.5 million. ARBABSIAR then returned to Iran from Mexico.

39. MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, stated that upon his return to Iran, he (ARBABSIAR) met together on a number of occasions in Tehran with GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, and a third individual, who ARBABSIAR understood was a high-ranking member of the Qods Force (hereinafter "Iranian Official #2").<sup>15</sup> ARBABSIAR stated he also met routinely on a one-on-one basis with SHAKURI. During these meetings, the following occurred, among other things:

a. ARBABSIAR indicated that he (ARBABSIAR) had located a drug dealer in Mexico (referring to CS-1). ARBABSIAR was asked to have CS-1 kidnap or kill the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States, and told that it would need to be done fast. ARBABSIAR was also asked whether CS-1 would travel internationally, so that CS-1 could speak face-to-face with other operatives. ARBABSIAR indicated that CS-1 would not do so.

b. ARBABSIAR stated that the plan was to blow up a restaurant in the United States frequented by the Ambassador and that in light of that plan numerous people, in addition to the Ambassador, could be killed. This plan was approved.

c. ARBABSIAR was instructed to use code words when communicating with SHAKURI. For example, ARBABSIAR was instructed to use the code word "Chevrolet" for the Ambassador plot.

d. A down-payment of \$100,000 to CS-1 for the

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<sup>15</sup> ARBABSIAR has been shown an array of seven photographs. Amongst these seven photographs were one photograph of each of two men known to the United States to be senior members of the Qods Force. It is believed that these two photographs are not publicly available. ARBABSIAR identified one of these photographs as depicting Iranian Official #2. The person depicted in the photograph that ARBABSIAR identified is known to the United States to have used the alias by which ARBABSIAR knew Iranian Official #2.

murder of the Ambassador was approved.<sup>16</sup>

e. SHAKURI advised ARBABSIIAR that an individual whom ARBABSIIAR understood to be the leader of the Qods Force (hereinafter "Iranian Official #3"), was aware of what ARBABSIIAR was doing and that he (ARBABSIIAR) could meet with Iranian Official #3 in the future.

40. In or about late September 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, met with GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, in Tehran. ARBABSIIAR explained that CS-1 wanted either to receive half of the money previously promised for the completion of the murder, or to have ARBABSIIAR travel back to Mexico as a guarantee of payment, see supra ¶ 32. SHAKURI stated that no more money would be given to CS-1, and advised ARBABSIIAR against traveling back to Mexico. SHAKURI said that ARBABSIIAR was responsible for himself if he did travel. SHAKURI then told ARBABSIIAR to get in contact with him (SHAKURI) via telephone after ARBABSIIAR'S arrival in Mexico so that he (SHAKURI) could be sure ARBABSIIAR was well.

V. OCTOBER 2011: RECORDED TELEPHONE CALLS  
BETWEEN SHAKURI AND ARBABSIIAR

41. Following the arrest of MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, ARBABSIIAR agreed to place a recorded call to GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant. On October 4, 2011, at the direction of federal law enforcement agents, ARBABSIIAR placed a call to an Iranian telephone number ("Iranian Phone Number"). Agents monitored and recorded the call.<sup>17</sup> Following the call, ARBABSIIAR indicated that the person he was speaking with was SHAKURI. Based on my review of the draft translation of that recording I know that SHAKURI asked, "[a]re you ok, . . . are you well?" to which ARBABSIIAR responded, "Yes, I wanted to see how you're doing and to tell you I am well." SHAKURI responded, "Okay, thank God, stay well." SHAKURI then added, "I was waiting," and asked,

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<sup>16</sup> Subsequently, Individual #1 told ARBABSIIAR that he (Individual #1) had received a delivery of money from SHAKURI. ARBABSIIAR then arranged for this money to be sent from Tehran to the United States.

<sup>17</sup> On this call and the calls referenced in paragraphs 42 and 43, ARBABSIIAR and SHAKURI spoke in Farsi. I have reviewed draft translations of these three calls.



"what news . . . what did you do about the building?" Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand the question about "the building" to be a reference to the plot to murder the Ambassador and a question about its status. Cf. supra ¶ 30.

42. On October 5, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, placed another monitored and recorded call to the Iranian Phone Number. Following the call, ARBABSIAR indicated that the person he was speaking with was GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant. Based on my review of a draft translation of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, the following occurred, among other things:

a. ARBABSIAR stated, "I wanted to tell you, the Chevrolet is ready, it's ready, uh, to be done. I should continue, right?" See supra ¶ 39(c) (noting that "Chevrolet" was the agreed-upon code for the plot to murder the Ambassador). SHAKURI responded, "Yes. Yes, yes." SHAKURI later asked, "You mean you are buying all of it?" ARBABSIAR responded, "I don't know for now, it's ready, okay?" SHAKURI replied, "So buy it, buy it." ARBABSIAR confirmed, "Buy it? Okay." SHAKURI then stated, "Buy it, yes, buy all of it." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI confirmed by these statements that ARBABSIAR should move forward with the plot to murder the Ambassador.

b. ARBABSIAR then stated that "this boy wants, uh, some money, he wants some expenditure. What do you say, should we give him some more? He wants another 50," and SHAKURI responded, "With you, no, you . . . that amount is fine, [UI] brought me another car. Tell him to finish his work, then we'll give him the rest. He should buy the car for us first." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that on this call, SHAKURI was insisting that CS-1 should not receive any additional money until he had killed the Ambassador.

c. Thereafter, SHAKURI urged ARBABSIAR "[j]ust do it quickly, it's late, just buy it for me and bring it already." I understand that SHAKURI is urging ARBABSIAR to accomplish the agreed upon task - the murder of the Ambassador - as quickly as possible.

43. On October 7, 2011, MANSSOR ARBABSIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, placed another monitored and recorded call to the Iranian Phone Number. Following the call, ARBABSIAR indicated that the person he was speaking with was



GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant. Based on my review of a draft translation of the recorded conversation, I know that during the call, the following occurred, among other things:

a. ARBABSIAR stated, ". . . this Mexican, . . . keeps on insisting on the thing. He says, 'If - I need money, 50. I won't do the job if you don't pay.' And everything's ready." SHAKURI responded, "Okay." ARBABSIAR asked, "What do you say now?" SHAKURI replied, "I don't know. You guaranteed this yourself . . . of course, if we give it, we'll give it to you. Okay? If he gives it, fine; if not we must provide the 100 [or] 50. Tell him, [U/I]." ARBABSIAR then stated, "Well, yeah. Now, I - what do you say? What should I do? [U/I]" SHAKURI responded, "How much is he talking about?" ARBABSIAR said, "I don't know. He's saying, for instance, well how - he says well - so, I thought, so that the 100 we gave won't go to waste; that's why. On the other hand, we gave a 100 and that would go to waste as well." See supra ¶¶ 26-28 (noting that CS-1 was paid \$100,000 as a down-payment for killing the Ambassador). SHAKURI replied, "Well, yeah, but what if you give this one it goes to waste as well?" Based on my participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI was questioning whether additional payments should be made to CS-1 ("this Mexican"), in light of the fact that CS-1 had not yet killed the Ambassador, and had already been paid \$100,000 ("100").


b. Shortly thereafter ARBABSIAR stated, referring to CS-1, "That's what the Mexican . . . wants . . . What can I do?" and SHAKURI responded, "Okay, today I'll discuss it to see what they say." Based on my experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI is explaining that he would consult with his superiors regarding whether they would be willing to pay CS-1 additional money.

c. Thereafter, SHAKURI stated, "You said that for sure they're saying that much. We didn't discuss it though, we - in any case, he needs to deliver it to us, okay?" to which ARBABSIAR responded, "Completely. Yeah, yeah, I know what you're saying." SHAKURI then said: "You guaranteed it" and ARBABSIAR responded, "Well, I guaranteed it, but they . . . they're not ordinary people . . . they're not law abiding . . . people." See supra ¶¶ 32, 33 (CS-1 asked ARBABSIAR to travel personally to Mexico as a guarantee that CS-1 would be paid in full upon the killing of the Ambassador; ARBABSIAR thereafter traveled to Mexico). Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI was reminding ARBABSIAR that he (ARBABSIAR) traveled to Mexico to serve as a personal guarantee of full payment to CS-1 upon the killing of

the Ambassador.


d. SHAKURI then stated: "You said it yourself, they - from our point of view of - when we get our merchandise, we get our merchandise." SHAKURI added, "We have guaranteed the rest. You were our guarantee." Based on my training, experience and participation in this investigation, I understand that SHAKURI was stating that "we", meaning himself and others involved in the plot, had "guaranteed" full payment to CS-1 for the killing of the Ambassador by ARBABSIIAR's presence in Mexico ("You were our guarantee"). See supra ¶¶ 32, 33.

WHEREFORE, deponent respectfully requests that MANSSOR ARBABSIIAR, a/k/a "Mansour Arbabsiar," the defendant, be imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be, and that a warrant issue for the arrest of GHOLAM SHAKURI, a/k/a "Ali Gholam Shakuri," the defendant, and that he be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be.



(Signed) O. Robert Woloszyn  
Special Agent  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to before me this  
11th day of October, 2011



HONORABLE MICHAEL H. DOLINGER  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Washington, 28 November 2011

## EU-U.S. Summit joint statement

1. We, the leaders of the European Union and the United States, met today at the White House to affirm our close partnership. Drawing upon our shared values and experience, and recognizing our deep interdependence, we are committed to ensuring that our partnership brings greater prosperity and security to our 800 million citizens, and to working together to address global challenges.

2. Since our meeting in Lisbon last November, the global economy has entered a new and difficult phase. We are committed to working together to reinvigorate economic growth, create jobs, and ensure financial stability. We will do so by taking actions that address near-term growth concerns, as well as fiscal and financial vulnerabilities, and that strengthen the foundations of long-lasting and balanced growth. In that regard, the United States welcomes the EU's actions and determination to take all necessary steps to ensure the euro area's financial stability and resolve the crisis. The EU looks forward to U.S. action on medium term fiscal consolidation. We agree on the importance of working together with emerging economies to foster policies supporting sustained and balanced global growth. We recall our commitment to implement fully the outcome of the G20 Cannes Summit.

3. We recall our G20 commitment to support the multilateral trading system and resist protectionism. We stand by the Doha Development Agenda mandate and recognize the progress achieved so far, but note that in order to contribute to confidence we must pursue fresh, credible approaches in 2012 to advance the negotiations and pursue new opportunities and challenges. We look forward to the upcoming Ministerial meeting in Geneva, which provides an important opportunity to work on such approaches.

4. We applaud the success of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) on a wide range of issues and welcome the progress achieved in secure trade and supply chain security, electric vehicles and related infrastructure, regulatory practices, small and medium-sized enterprises, and in the Information Communications Technology (ICT) sector. We encourage the TEC's continued leadership in helping us avoid unnecessary divergence in regulations and standards that adversely affects trade. We urge the TEC, together with our regulators and standard-setters to step up co-operation in key sectors such as nanotechnology and raw materials to develop compatible approaches to emerging technologies. We also instruct the TEC to pursue its work on strategic economic questions, not least in the field of investment, innovation policy, and the protection of intellectual property rights to level the playing field for our companies in third countries, in particular emerging economies.



5. We must intensify our efforts to realize the untapped potential of transatlantic economic co-operation to generate new opportunities for jobs and growth, particularly in emerging sectors. We are committed to making the EU-U.S. trade and investment relationship – already the largest and most integrated in the world – stronger. To that end, we have directed the TEC to establish a joint High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, co-chaired by the European Commissioner for Trade and the U.S. Trade Representative. We ask the Working Group to identify and assess options for strengthening the EU-U.S. economic relationship, especially those that have the highest potential to support jobs and growth. The Working Group is to report its recommendations and conclusions to Leaders by the end of 2012, with an interim report in June 2012 on the status of this work.

6. We recognize the vital role of the EU-U.S. Energy Council in fostering co-operation on energy security, renewables and other clean energy technologies, energy efficiency, and effective policies for facilitating trade and bringing clean energy technologies to market. We affirm the value of common approaches toward safe and sustainable development of energy resources and the diversification of supplies. We also call for reinforced bilateral and multilateral co-operation with a special focus on critical materials, smart grid technologies, hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, and nuclear fusion.

7. On climate change, we affirm our intent to work closely together to ensure a positive, balanced outcome in Durban, including mitigation, transparency and financing. We stand fully behind the commitments we made last year in Cancun. We affirm that Durban should deliver on operationalising the Cancun agreements and helping the international community move a step further towards a comprehensive, global framework with the participation of all, including robust and transparent greenhouse gas emissions reduction commitments by all major economies, recalling the 2°C objective agreed upon in Cancun. With this in mind, we will co-operate closely in other relevant fora, notably the Major Economies Forum. We also intend to work together to address other global sources of emissions, including from the aviation and maritime sectors, in the appropriate multilateral forums and consistent with applicable agreements.

8. As the leading donors of development assistance, we reaffirm our commitment to aid effectiveness, recognizing that our joint efforts to advance division of labour, transparency, country ownership, and accountability will enhance the impact of our assistance. We are co-ordinating our preparations for the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and will continue to work closely to strengthen partnerships among all development stakeholders, accelerate progress toward the Millennium Development Goals, and address the challenges encountered in fragile states. In 2012, we have committed to make information on foreign assistance programmes more accessible and compatible with international standards, and will encourage the OECD DAC to become an international hub for aid transparency. We request the EU-U.S. Development Dialogue to pursue with vigour our joint efforts in areas such as food security, climate change, health and the MDGs. We agreed on the importance of close co-operation on security and development in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan.

9. The events in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya over the past year offer an historic opportunity for successful democratic reform in the Arab world, inclusive economic and social development, and regional integration. The unfolding democratic process in Tunisia is an encouraging example of the potential for democratic transition. Egypt today has just begun a complex election process as the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces begins to transfer authority over civilian functions to a new government. Still, considerable challenges lie ahead. As the two largest providers of foreign assistance to the region who share core principles and values that have helped our own societies and economies to integrate, we pledge to support the democratic transitions underway, as well as broader political and economic reform in the region, including the constitutional reforms in Jordan and Morocco. In Libya we are working together on short term assistance and needs assessments, and will continue to seek new opportunities for greater co-operation, in co-ordination with the Transitional National Council and the UN, to meet the needs of the Libyan people.

10. Jointly, and through the Deauville Partnership effort, we intend to promote democracy, peace, and prosperity, and to increase economic growth and integration in the Middle East and North Africa. We are committed to collaborate closely in areas such as support for democratic transitions, strengthening the positive role of civil society, and health and education programming. We also extend our support to making women's rights a legal and practical reality in the region. We share a strong interest in economic reform and will also jointly promote best practices that support trade, investment, and job creation and deepen intra-regional trade and integration. We are both eager to increase our trade and investment links with the region. We plan to work in partnership with international financial institutions to ensure robust donor co-ordination, and in particular to ratify quickly necessary changes to the agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to allow lending in the region.

11. We call on the Syrian government to end violence immediately, permit the immediate entry of human rights observers and international journalists, and allow for a peaceful and democratic transition. We also welcome the agreement for political transition in Yemen and call on all political actors to help implement it in good faith, and in accordance with UNSCR 2014.

12. We reaffirm the Quartet Statement adopted in New York on 23 September 2011 that provides a framework for direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and we call on the two parties to engage actively in this effort.

13. On Iran, we share deep concern about activities relating to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme, as highlighted in the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General's report and the November 18 Board of Governors' resolution. We stress our determination to ensure that Iran complies with its obligations, including abiding by United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to co-operate fully with the IAEA to address the international community's serious concerns over the nature of its nuclear programme. We reaffirm our commitment to work toward a diplomatic solution, implement UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) and other relevant Security Council Resolutions, and consider additional measures given Iran's continued failure to abide by its international obligations. We also note the recent plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, the sanctions we have imposed thereafter on five individuals including the head of the Qods Force, and our determination to ensure the perpetrators and their accomplices are held to account.

14. With regard to the EU's Eastern neighbours, we are working together to support democracy, resolve protracted conflicts, foster economic modernisation, and advance their political association and economic integration with the EU, recognizing in this regard the importance of the EU's Eastern Partnership. We insist that the Government of Belarus immediately release and rehabilitate its political prisoners, and make progress towards respect for the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights; and call on the Government of Ukraine to make good on commitments to uphold democratic values and the rule of law, notably to ensure a fair, transparent and impartial process in trials related to members of the former Government including any appeal in the case of Ms Tymoshenko. The right of appeal should not be compromised by imposing limitations on the defendants' ability to stand in future elections in Ukraine, including the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.

15. We pledge to continue our close co-operation in the western Balkans and reaffirm our commitment to preserve stability and to support the reforms needed to move the region forward on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration.

16. The EU and the United States have a strategic interest in enhancing co-operation on political, economic, security, and human rights issues in the Asia-Pacific region to advance peace, stability and prosperity. We intend to increase our dialogue on Asia-Pacific issues and co-ordinate activities to demonstrate an enduring, high-level commitment to the region and encourage regional integration, including through the region's multilateral organizations.

17. We note our continued efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with particular attention to plans for the December 5 Bonn Conference on Afghanistan and the international community's long-term commitment to support sustainable security and economic development in Afghanistan, based on effective and accountable institutions of governance and sustainable assistance levels, after the planned drawdown of international military forces. We support economic development and wider reforms in Pakistan and note Pakistan's important role and ongoing commitment to combating terrorism and achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan and South Asia.

18. We note the considerable progress made since our last meeting in Lisbon on our commitments on a wide range of transnational security issues that affect our citizens. We welcome the successful completion of negotiations on a new Passenger Name Record agreement, and look forward to its early adoption and ratification. We are determined to finalize negotiations on a comprehensive EU-U.S. data privacy and protection agreement that provides a high level of privacy protection for all individuals and thereby facilitates the exchange of data needed to fight crime and terrorism. We reaffirm our desire to complete secure visa-free travel arrangements between the US and all Member States of the EU as soon as possible and consistent with applicable, domestic legislation. We look forward to a positive outcome for Administration-supported legislation that would refine the criteria for the Visa Waiver Program.

19. We encourage continued efforts to extend our partnership on counter-terrorism co-operation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, including through the UN. We applaud the establishment of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, and our co-operation to combat terrorist financing. We strongly support continuation of our joint efforts to empower diaspora communities to counter violent extremism.



20. To strengthen our collaboration on conflict prevention and crisis response, already ongoing in many theatres, the EU and U.S. signed a framework agreement in May 2011 that facilitates U.S. civilian participation in EU crisis management missions. As the trans-Atlantic community faces the challenges of crisis management in an era of fiscal austerity, we encourage further work to strengthen the EU-NATO strategic partnership in crisis management, including on capabilities development, ahead of the 2012 NATO Summit, in the spirit of mutual reinforcement, inclusiveness, and decision-making autonomy.

21. We reaffirm the commitments enshrined in the joint declaration on non-proliferation and disarmament we adopted in 2009 and the joint statement on UNSCR 1540 in 2011. We support the conclusions and recommendations of the May 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, including the Action Plan and proposed 2012 Middle East conference. We are determined to promote the IAEA's safeguards, Additional Protocol, and the highest standards of safety and security for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Nuclear Security Summit objectives, a successful Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, and the convening of a Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012.

22. We share a commitment to a single, global Internet, and will resist unilateral efforts to weaken the security, reliability, or independence of its operations — recognizing that respect for fundamental freedoms online, and joint efforts to strengthen security, are mutually reinforcing. We welcome the progress made by the EU-U.S. Working Group on Cyber-security and Cyber-crime, notably the successful Cyber Atlantic 2011 exercise. We endorse its ambitious goals for 2012, including combating online sexual abuse of children; enhancing the security of domain names and Internet Protocol addresses; promotion of international ratification, including by all EU Member States, of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime ideally by year's end; establishing appropriate information exchange mechanisms to jointly engage with the private sector; and confronting the unfair market access barriers that European and U.S. technology companies face abroad.

23. Our meeting today is proof that a strong EU-U.S. partnership is crucial to building a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world. We know that our ability to respond to and overcome the global challenges we face is increased by the degree to which we can act in close co-ordination and co-operation. We will continue to seek every opportunity to increase our co-operation.



## General Assembly

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Sixty-sixth session  
Agenda item 118

### Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 November 2011

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/66/L.8 and Add.1)]

#### 66/12. Terrorist attacks on internationally protected persons

*The General Assembly,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirming its role under the Charter, including on questions related to international peace and security,

*Recalling* the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, contained in General Assembly resolution 60/288 of 8 September 2006, as well as Assembly resolutions 62/272 of 5 September 2008 and 64/297 of 8 September 2010 which reaffirmed the Strategy,

*Recalling also* the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,<sup>1</sup>

*Renewing its unwavering commitment* to strengthening international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,

*Convinced* that respect for the principles and rules of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations is a basic prerequisite for the normal conduct of relations among States and for the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter,

*Concerned* at the failure to respect the inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives,

*Noting* the note verbale dated 7 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General regarding hostile actions committed against diplomatic missions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,<sup>2</sup> and recalling the obligations of States regarding the protection, security and safety of diplomatic missions, consulates and personnel on their territories,

*Emphasizing* the duty of States to take all appropriate measures required by international law in a timely manner, including measures of a preventive nature, and to bring offenders to justice,

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1035, No. 15410.

<sup>2</sup> A/65/946.



*Noting* the letter dated 14 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General regarding a disrupted plot to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America,<sup>3</sup> and noting also the statement of the Gulf Cooperation Council of 12 October 2011 and of the Council of the League of Arab States of 13 October 2011,<sup>4</sup>

*Noting also* the letter dated 11 October 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General reporting an Iranian plot,<sup>5</sup>

*Noting further* the letter dated 11 October 2011, from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,<sup>6</sup>

*Alarmed* by the new and recurring acts of violence against diplomatic and consular representatives, which endanger or take innocent lives and seriously impede the normal work of such representatives and officials,

*Deeply concerned* by the plot to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America,

1. *Reiterates its strong and unequivocal condemnation* of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security;

2. *Strongly condemns* acts of violence against diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, as well as against missions and representatives of international intergovernmental organizations and officials of such organizations, and emphasizes that such acts can never be justified;

3. *Deplores* the plot to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America;

4. *Encourages* all States to take additional steps to prevent, on their territories, the planning, financing, sponsorship or organization or commission of similar terrorist acts and to deny safe haven to those who plan, finance, support or commit such terrorist acts;

5. *Calls upon* the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with all of its obligations under international law, including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,<sup>1</sup> particularly with respect to its obligations to provide law enforcement assistance, and to cooperate with States seeking to bring to justice all those who participated in the planning, sponsoring, organization and attempted execution of the plot to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States of America.

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<sup>3</sup> A/66/553.

<sup>4</sup> S/2011/640, annex.

<sup>5</sup> See A/66/517-S/2011/649.

<sup>6</sup> A/66/513-S/2011/633.



*61st plenary meeting  
18 November 2011*

## Annex 69

Case Number 63, Year 1997

Verdict

In the name of Azerbaijan Republic

First degree court collegium of  
the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan Republic on criminal cases

held an open trial

on 14 April 1997 in the city of Baku

in the following combination:

Member of the Supreme Court: A. J. Seyidov as the chief,

People's Representatives: O. A. Aghayev and M. M. Mirishov,

Prosecutor: B. S. Zahidov.

With lawyers for defendants: A. Najafbayli, J. Khaspoladov, F. Najafov,

and A. Balabayov participating,

and A. N. Imanov as secretary.

The court reviewed the criminal cases of the following defendants present in the court room:

Alikram Ismayil oghlu Aliyev, charged according to section 1 of article 57 of Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic, who was born in 1940 in the town of Nardaran outside the city of Baku. He is Azerbaijani, citizen of Azerbaijan Republic, married and resident of House number 14, First Alley, N. Asgarov Street, Nardaran town, City of Baku. He has had higher education, and no prior conviction. He was working as the chairman of Azerbaijan Islamic Party, when he was arrested on May 17, 1996.

Hajiagha Aliasgar oghlu Nuriyev, charged according to section 1 of article 57, and section 1 of article 220 of Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic, who was born in 1951 in the town of Nardaran outside the city of Baku. He is Azerbaijani, citizen of Azerbaijan Republic, married and resident of House number 7, Second Alley, A. Zeynalli Street, Nardaran town, City of Baku. He has had high school education, and no prior conviction. He was working as the head of the executive committee of Azerbaijan Islamic Party, when he was arrested on May 24, 1996.

Mirhasan Aslan oghlu Jafarov, charged according to section 1 of article 57 of Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic, who was born in 1964 in the town of Mashtagha outside the city of Baku. He is Azerbaijani, citizen of Azerbaijan Republic, married and resident of House number 109, Azizbeyov Street, Mashtagha town, City of Baku. He has had high school education, and no prior conviction. He was working as the head of the culture and education committee of Azerbaijan Islamic Party, when he was arrested and freed on personal bail on May 29, 1996.

Vaqif Qasim oghlu Qasimov, charged according to section 1 of article 57 of Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic, who was born in 1940 in the town of Nardaran outside the city of Baku. He is Azerbaijani, citizen of Azerbaijan Republic, married and resident of House number 17, Absheron Street, Nardaran town, City of Baku. He has had high school education, and one prior conviction. He was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment according to section 2 of article 209 of Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic, by Qusar region's People's Court in 1973. He has served his sentence. He was working as the head of the inspection and control committee of Azerbaijan Islamic Party, when he was arrested on May 27, 1996.

Ramiz Zakir oghlu Mustafayev charged according to section 1 of article 194 of Criminal Code of Azerbaijan Republic, who was born in 1943 in the city of Ganja. He is Azerbaijani, citizen of Azerbaijan Republic, married and resident of Building number 105, Abilov Street, Apartment 12, City of Baku. He has had high school education, and no prior conviction. He was working as head of the tourism firm

"Ulker", when he was arrested on November 10, 1996, and freed on personal guarantee of not going to another place.

The court concluded that:

Alikram Aliyev as chairman of the Azerbaijan Islamic Party, also Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov as members of the Supreme Council of the party, being leaders in different fields has worked against the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Republic, its defense capability and state security due to greed and other personal motives. After prior agreements with high ranking officials of "Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami" organization of Iran, they had got involved in criminal activities by signing a contract with them on February 10, 1994, which included cooperating with that organization to overthrow Azerbaijani government, to implement Islamic laws and establish an Islamic state which led to their involvement in spying activities which is contrary to section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic and article 12 of the Constitution act about state independence of Azerbaijan.

After that, acting upon the suggestions and instructions that they had received, the defendants had created political branches in the central and regional structures of the party during 1994 to 1996. Through these branches they had gathered information with state level importance and considered confidential which include sketches, maps and information on current social-political situation in the republic, and information characterizing status of economy and society, also information on land, population, numbers of members of law and order organizations and also numbers of prisoners serving their sentences, and also information reflecting activities of the military industry. The gathered information had regularly been given to officials of special services organizations of Iran in form of reports. For the works done and according to the conditions of the agreement Alikram Aliyev received a large sum of money in form of foreign currency. He received on 5 occasions 23 thousand US Dollars in the Iranian city of Ardabil, and on 3 occasions 27 thousand dollars in the Iranian Embassy in Baku, which mounted to a total of 50 thousand US Dollars. He had signed receipts for the money that he had received. He had spent part of the money on expanding "activities" of the party, and another part for personal use of himself and other defendants mentioned above.

Mirhasan Jafarov acting upon instructions of Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev and Vaqif Qasimov had sent Azerbaijani students to Iran with mediation of the Iranian embassy in Baku. He had sent the students in 3 groups of 30 persons each to Iranian city of Qum, so that they would be trained in the private school of the special services agency of Iran which prepares informers. Thus he had created conditions for their use by Iranian espionage agencies. The students who were sent as religious visitors who were strayed from being drafted for real military service.

In addition to this Alikram Aliyev and Vaqif Qasimov had prepared programs to sabotage American and Israeli institutions operating in Azerbaijan, had defended the position and interests of Iranian government in the oil production contract in the Caspian Sea known as "Deal of the Century", and had prepared secret documents for establishing Islamic Bank, all with purpose of weakening the international position of Azerbaijan Republic, and formation of anti-Western attitudes in society.

With these actions of theirs, Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov had helped special services organizations of Iran by spying and engaging in hostile acts against Azerbaijan Republic, thus, betraying the Homeland.

Hajiagha Nuriyev had hidden in his home and stored without proper permission 4 Vintovka type 7.62 mm Caliber bullets which are considered combat ammunition. They were found by his under age son Alimammad Nuriyev in a field near Nardaran town of city of Baku.

While working as director of "Ulker" tourism firm, Ramiz Mustafayev had stamped and certified foreign travel passport application forms of the following citizens of Azerbaijan Republic, despite knowing that they did not work for the firm: Tamerlan Qasimzade Yashar oghlu, Mahammadali Aliyev



Mammad oghlu, Akbar Seidov Majnun oghlu, Vahid Babayev Akbar oghlu, Matlab Hamzayev Ali oghlu, and Azer Najafov Mirzeagha oghlu.

The indicated criminal acts of the defendants were verified by their own testimonies during court questioning, testimonies of witnesses, expert opinions, the evidences present in the case, and other objective means in the following descriptions:

Alikram Aliyev partially admitted to committing the crimes that he is charged of and stated in his testimony that he has been chairman of the Azerbaijan Islamic Party from the day that the party was created, which means from 1991. In 1993, he met Haji Mansur Haghhighatpur one of the members of the military delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran which had come to Azerbaijan. He was introduced to Haji Mansur by ambassador Nahavandian who introduced him as an official in the army of Iran. After talking for 15 minutes about situation of Islam in Azerbaijan, Haji Mansur had invited him to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Towards the end of January 1994, with invitation and sponsoring of the "Imdad" charity organization of Iran, a group of 150 religious visitors were sent to Iran with purpose of participating in ceremonies of anniversary of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. They were selected by members of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan Islamic Party <AIP> Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov, who accompanied the group as its leaders.

While in Iran the Friday prayers Imam of city of Ardabil Muravvij Agha had welcomed them and after praying in the mosque a man introducing himself as Ahmadagha had approached them telling them that he had been appointed by Muravvij Agha to serve them and he had taken them to hotel. Ahmadagha had told them that he knew that they were leaders of AIP and he had asked them about their difficulties and what was needed to be done. In response, he talked about the difficult situation that Azerbaijan was in, and had requested Iran as a large Muslim country to help the AIP materially and morally. After listening carefully, Ahmadagha had given him 5 thousand US Dollars asking him, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov to sign a receipt which he had said he needed it for showing to the organization that he got the money from.

The next day they had gone to Tabriz, where they had met with Asadbegi whom they knew from Baku. Asadbegi who had been appointed by the Friday prayers Imam of the city Malakuti agha to serve them, had promised them that he would arrange a meeting of them with Haji Mansur.

After visiting the holy sites of the Iranian cities of Isfahan, Qum, and Mashhad, they had been placed in "Marmar" hotel of the city of Tehran. While in the hotel, Ahmadagha and Asadbegi had visited them in the evening and had requested that, for meeting with Haji Mansur, he, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov should separate from the group and stay in Tehran. The next day the religious visitors had returned to Baku, and around 10 O'clock they had to Shemran district of Tehran outside the city, with Ahmadagha and Asadbegi accompanying them. There, in a two story headquarters guarded by armed soldiers they had met Haji Mansur Haghhighatpur who had a military uniform on. During the meeting Haji Mansur had talked about his closeness to the Iranian president, and about the superiority of the Islamic regime of Iran and had recommended that the AIP should use their experience. Haji Mansur had said that AIP would be helped in every field and that there would be close cooperation. At the end of the meeting he had for signing of a document which its text was close to the following: " With the aim of revival and expanding of Islam in Azerbaijan Republic and preparing ground for establishing an Islamic Republic, we will cooperate with the "Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami" organization and the organization in turn would give us both material and moral support". The document had been signed by him, Hajiagha, Vaqif, and Mirhasan. The signed document was written in Farsi by Ahmadagha, and in Azerbaijani by Vaqif. After signing the document Haji Mansur had sketched the structure of the AIP and has showed that how it should be organized, and they had taken their own notes.

Haji Mansur had recommended keeping regular contact with Ahmadagha, because of proximity of Baku to Ardabil where Ahmadagha was based. They had returned to Baku, after Ahmadagha's accompanying them to Astara.

In May of 1994, he, Vaqif, Hajiagha and Mirhasan together, had gone to Ardabil. There Ahmadagha had welcomed them, had given them 5 thousand US Dollars getting receipts from them, and had taken them to Tehran to meet with Haji Mansur.

In one of the fall months of 1995, after initial agreement with Ahmadagha, he, along with Hajiagha and AIP activists Ziraddin Taghiyev, Mubariz Mammadli, Abdulbaghi Aliyev, Rovshan Safarov, and Teyyub Suleymanov had gone to city of Ardabil to make preparations for upcoming parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan Republic. There, they had traveled to resort town of Sarein with Ahmadagha, and had discussed with members of the "Sepah-e Pasdaran" organization, the situation of AIP, its active participation in elections, and the draft Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic which had been prepared by the party. Haji Mansur had participated in one of these meetings and had given a speech about 2 hours long talking about seizing power by using experiences of Islamic revolution, selecting candidates for elections and providing them with financial aid, and gathering more detailed data about the Republic by the political committees, and had given his suggestions and recommendations about the above topics. After election victory of the pro-Islamic "Rafah" party of Turkey, with intention of congratulating that party, he, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, AIP activists Ziraddin Taghiyev, Miralasar Mirmamamdoev, Ramiz Ahmadov, and Aghakarim Novruzov, together, had gone to Tehran with Ahmadagha accompanying them. There, they had met with Haji Mansur giving him information about general status of Islam in Azerbaijan, the cancellation of registration of party, prevention of it from competing in the elections and the difficulties related to this matter. After the meeting Ahmadagha had told them that the funds are limited, and giving him 3 thousand US Dollars had suggested that he, Hajiagha, and Ziraddin should go to Turkey.

He had met with Ali Akbar Bavand at the Iranian Embassy in Baku, after making sure that he is an employee of the embassy, he had received cooperation proposal from him. By telling him that he cooperates with Haji Mansur had opposed his proposal and had learned that he was working for "Ettelaat" information organization.

After a while, Bavand had approached him, showing him a copy of the agreement that they had signed about cooperation with "Sepah-e Pasdaran". From that point, he had been going to Bavand to get aid for AIP. On 3 occasions, Bavand, had given him a total of 27 thousand US Dollars, having him sign a receipt every time.

While traveling in Iran, on 5 occasions Ahmadagha had given him 23 thousand US Dollars by having him sign a receipt each time.

He had spent the money that he had received from Ahmadagha, Bavand, and travelers to the religious sites, to pay salaries of workers of central apparatus of the party, its regional branches, "Islamin Sesi" <VOICE OF ISLAM> and "Islam Dunyasi" <WORLD OF ISLAM> newspapers, also on printing the newspapers, repairing the offices of the party, community expenses, opening of prayer room in offices, institutes, high schools and colleges, and reading of Koran, and some of it was given to Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov as spending money for their personal needs in the amount of 400 to 450 thousand Manats each month. In interviews given to "Ayna" and "Azadliq" newspapers, he had defended Iran's position for being an Islamic country in the "Deal of the Century" contract about oil production in the Caspian Sea, though he had not done any counter propaganda against USA and Israel.

In the fall of 1995, Ahmadagha had come to Baku along with a person named Imami. They had been taken to Quba region by Vaqif Qasimov, to Shamakhi region by Nizami Balaoglanov, and to Aghjabadi region by Hajiagha Nuriyev which is near the area occupied by the Armenian aggressors. They had been eye witnesses to the way the given money had been spent and they had announced their



satisfaction with the way their recommendations had been acted upon. While in Baku, they had been guests at his home in Nardaran, where, he had held a meeting on the results of their trip. In the meeting, activities of AIP, dealing with recommendations and suggestions in the local branches, and future programs were discussed in detail.

Sketches, maps, and statistical information about the Republic of Azerbaijan according to suggestion and recommendations of Haji Mansur was gathered in the local branches and sent to the Supreme Council.

In accordance with suggestion of Haji Mansur regarding lack of cadre, and acting upon his orders, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov had organized and sent 3 groups of 30 students each to Iranian city of Qum, for 3 months courses, without the knowledge of governing bodies of Azerbaijan. When selecting students, special attention had been paid for their fields of study as sportsmen, painters, oil workers, and gas industry workers. Students received religious travel visas at the Iranian embassy, after passing the border and completing their studies they were not given any diplomas. When traveling to Iran, on several occasions he had been to the city of Qum, had visited the students, had shown interest in their studies and had promised them that they would be used as cadres in future.

They had based their activities on religious activities, while receiving suggestions and recommendations from the members of the "Sepah-e Pasdaran" Organization they had not understood that this is against the state, and when signing the document in the two story headquarters they had not realized that the document was subject to legal responsibility.

Hajiagha Nuriyev, who during questioning in the court has admitted to some of the charges brought against him, in his testimony showed that during travel of the group of 150 visitors to Iran with invitation and sponsorship of Imdad in February 1994 during his trip to Iran, he, as head of the executive branch of AIP traveled with the group along with Alikram Aliyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov, and after seeing the holy sites in Mashhad, Qum, and Isfahan, they had been placed in "Marmar" hotel of Tehran. There, Ahmadagha whom he knew from Ardabil, and Asadbegi whom he knew from Baku, came to see them in the hotel, and after talking about history of establishment of AIP and current difficulties, they had proposed that, him, Alikram, Vaqif, and Mirhasan, would separate from the group and stay in Tehran. After accepting the proposal to meet Haji Mansur, the next day, they went to residential district of Shemran outside Tehran, and on the second floor of a two story headquarter guarded by military personnel were seen by Haji Mansur who was introduced as a government official of Iran. At that meeting after Alikram Aliyev's talking about general situation in Azerbaijan, establishment of AIP, and existing difficulties, Haji Mansur spoke about their experiences with succeeding of Islamic revolution in Iran, made his proposals, and had him, Alikram, Vaqif, and Mirhasan sign the document about their cooperation with "Sepah-e Pasdaran".

Haji Mansur had told them to be in regular contact with Ahmadagha, the Ardabil representative of the organization, because of that city's proximity to Baku, and then he had given his, Asadbegi's and Ahmadagha's phone numbers to them, and they had left to Astara with the latter accompanying them, and from there, they had come to Baku. After returning to Baku, the same subjects were discussed, and proposals of Haji Mansur were taken into consideration and started to be implemented in the local branches.

In May 1994 he, Alikram, Vaqif, and Mirhasan together traveled to Ardabil and again met Ahmadagha, when the latter asked about general situation in Azerbaijan and activities of the party, all four of them separately gave his own report and talked about party's activities and the difficulties that they are facing regarding creating local branches. The next day, Ahmadagha gave 5000 US Dollars to Alikram, and had them sign a receipt which he said he needed to give to the organization that he got the money from. Alikram gave each of them 450 thousand Manats equivalent of 100 US Dollars for their personal needs.



After returning from Ardabil due to sickness, he could not participate in activities of the party for a while. After leaving hospital, in May of 1995, he traveled to Ardabil, along with Alikram, Vaqif and Mirhasan. Because of his good speech capabilities, he gave a report on AIP activities, and implementing the orders given by Haji Mansur, and Ahmadagha on his turn, had given them the program of works to be done in near future, and 5000 US dollars, and had taken them to Tehran to Haji Mansur. There, they accepted new orders on further improvement of the organization; the party's obtaining all kind of social-political and military information, also information on the kinds of goods manufactured in industrial facilities; expanding the relations between the central apparatus and local organizations; attracting influential people, youth and women to become party members, and returned to Baku. They printed new guidelines based on Haji Mansur's orders and recommendations and sent them to local branches demanding their implementations.

In one of the fall months of 1995, after initial agreement between Alikram and Ahmadagha, because of upcoming elections to the Azerbaijani parliament, he, Alikram, Ziraddin, Mubariz, Abdulbaghi, Rovshan and Teyyub went to city of Ardabil, and stayed in the resort town of Sarein for 5 to 6 days. There, they held a series of meetings with participation of Ahmadagha and Imami, where after Alikram's briefing about activities of the AIP, he gave detailed information about activities of the party regarding the elections. In these meetings, the draft Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic, which had been by AIP was also reviewed. Haji Mansur had gone to Sarein with another person, and had given a close to 2 hours speech in the conference held by the leaders of AIP, and in his speech he had given instructions on how to do pre-election campaigns and how to select party's candidates. Haji Mansur had also made recommendations about financially helping candidates who stay in touch. Right after returning from the trip, he collected his notes, and published them under the title "Words of Haji Mansur, the teacher".

Towards the end of 1995, after the victory of the pro-Islamic Rafah Party in Turkey, he, traveled to Ardabil with Alikram, Vaqif, Ziraddin, Miralasar, Ramiz and Aghakarim with purpose going to Turkey from there, so they could congratulate Rafah Party's victory, but, after learning that, funds were limited, Ahmadagha had taken them to Tehran, and had arranged a meeting for them with Haji Mansur. There, Alikram, had given a report on general status of Islam in Azerbaijan, failures of the party to get registration, and barring of it from participating in the elections, and the difficulties created by this, and he had given his report on activities of AIP, its future work plans and the program that they had prepared for 1996. And Haji Mansur on his turn, had given his suggestions and recommendations on how AIP should do its work, and on which program it should make its moves. After the meeting Ahmadagha had told them that the funds were limited, and had suggested that, he, Alikram, and Ziraddin could go, and had given Alikram 3000 US Dollars.

In the fall of 1995, Ahmadagha and Imami had come to Baku, and had asked about works of AIP's central apparatus, and its local branches. Acting upon the order of the party's leader, he had taken them to cities of Ganja and Aghjabedi, and while talking to members of local party organizations, they had evaluated the adherence to suggestions and recommendations of Haji Mansur. He had participated at the party at Alikram's home in Nardaran, where Ahmadagha and Imami were also participating, and there, in the meeting that the party leaders had had, results of the trip had been discussed.

He had also participated in sending of students to religious school of "Sepah-e Pasdaran" located in city of Qum, on 3 occasions. Each time a group of 30 students were sent, who could have been drafted for military service. And while in Iran, he had visited the students several times and had shown interest in their studies.

He has stated that due to lack of his experience in legal matters he was not aware of the legal aspects of his meetings with Iranian religious figures and high ranking military officers and his cooperation with their organizations during his trips to Islamic Republic of Iran, and he has sincerely shown his regretfulness.

Mirhasan Jafarov, who during questioning in the court has admitted to some of the charges brought against him, in his testimony showed that, along with AIP leaders Alikram, Hajiagha and

Vaqif, he, as the head of the cultural-education committee of the AIP, had also traveled to Iran at the end of January 1994, within the group of 150 religious visitors who had been invited by "Imdad" committee. During the trip, they had visits the Moslem holly sites at the cities of Mashhad, Isfahan and Qum, and had gone to city of Tehran. There, while staying at "Marmar" hotel, Ahmadagha and Asadbegi whom they knew from Ardabil had come to the hotel, and they had exchanged thoughts about general status of Islam in Azerbaijan, activities of AIP and existing difficulties.

The next day, with Ahmadagha's suggestion, he, Alikram, Hajiagha and Vaqif had separated from the group and had gone to the Shemran district outside Tehran, and there in a two story building which was being guarded by military personell had met Haji Mansur. During the meeting as the formation of AIP as a social-political party was being discussed, Haji Mansur had sketched the structure of the party on a white board, which included committees on politics, economy, organizing, culture-education, women and youth. After talking about specific duties of each branch, he had proposed signing of a document about working together.

Accepting the proposal, he, Alikram, Hajiagha and Vaqif, had signed the document which was about cooperation with the Organization of "Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami" and had been written in Farsi and Azerbaijani languages. The next day after meeting again, Ahmadagha had seen them off in Astara and they had returned to Baku.

After this, Ahmadagha had been contacting Alikram by phone on a regular basis, and with invitation of Ahmadagha, he had traveled to Iran three times and had participated in meetings held there. Each time Ahmadagha had met them in Astara and had taken them to Ardabil. Because of his good speech capabilities, Hajiagha had given reports on activities of AIP, and works done on the basis of Haji Mansur's suggestions and recommendations. Ahmadagha had taken notes and had given them instructions. After this, he had taken them to Tehran to Haji Mansur, after giving the latter reports about works done, they had received orders from him about works to be done in the future.

In the fall of 1995, when Ahmadagha was in Baku with Imami, they had shown interest in works of central body of the party, its Baku city committee, its newspapers offices and local its local branches, and they had stated their satisfaction with the way that orders of Haji Mansur had been implemented. After traveling to Quba, Shamakhi, Ganja, and Aghjabedi regions, Ahmadagha and Imami, he, in the consultation that Alikram held in his home in Nardaran with AIP's leading members he had given description of works done by the political branches that had been created with efforts of Haji Mansur, regarding the branches' collecting sketches, maps, and tables on statistic data about land, population, number of members of law and order organizations, also numbers of prisoners serving time and names of goods manufactured in industrial facilities.

Acting upon recommendations of Haji Mansur, during 1994 and 1995, he, with participation of Alikram, Hajiagha, and Vaqif, had sent 3 group of students to study Koran in Iranian city of Qum, the majority of whom were youth who could be drafted for military service. Students were given religious visit visas at the Iranian embassy, and conditions had been created for their passing of the border as "religious visitor". While in Iran he had shown interest in the studies of the students, and when he had visited them he had witnessed that, they are kept under surveillance in a school with no name, where coming and going to the school is prohibited, and that no diploma was given to the students who completed their studies. There he had also seen many other Azerbaijani kids studying there who had passed the border illegally.

Vaqif Qasimov who had pleaded not guilty of charges brought up against him, had stated in his testimony that, as the head of the inspection and control committee of AIP he had traveled to Iran with invitation of the "Imdad" charity organization, and after visiting the holly sites in the Iranian cities of Mashhad, Isfahan, and Qum, he had been to Tehran and had stayed in the "Marmar" hotel. There, he had met with Ahmadagha whom he knew from Ardabil, and with Asadbegi whom he knew from Tabriz.



With proposal of Ahmadagha, he, Alikram, Hajiagha and Mirhasan separated from the religious travelers and went to Shemran region outside Tehran and there met Haji Mansur in the headquarters of "Sepah-e Pasdaran" which was being guarded by armed military personnel. During the meeting Alikram and Hajiagha had given information about the social-political situation in the republic, and about the position of political parties including AIP. After Haji Mansur had illustrated ways of expanding the structure of the party with his sketching on a white board, they had discussed the matter and all four of them had signed a document about mutual cooperation. The next day Haji Mansur had given details of the branches that he had shown on the sketch. And each of the had taken their own notes. Haji Mansur had recommended keeping close contacts with Ahmadagha, the representative of "Sepah-e Pasdaran" in Ardabil because of that city's proximity to Baku, and had told Ahmadagha to see them off.

After this meeting Alikram had been on regular telephone contact with Ahmadagha. In May of 1994, and May of 1995 with Ahmadagha accompanying them and his financing, they had traveled to Tehran and met Haji Mansur. They had given him reports on implementations of his orders, and had received new orders and suggestions. Right after returning, same orders and suggestions had been discussed and taken into consideration in party structure and had began to be implemented by local organizations.

Close to the end of 1995 and after the election victory of the pro-Islamic "Rafah" party in Turkey, they wanted to congratulate the party officials. With this purpose, he, Alikram, Hajiagha, Ziraddin, Miralasar, Ramiz and Aghakarim went together to Ardabil and met Ahmadagha. After talking to Ahmadagha about their intentions he took him to Tehran and there, they met with Haji Mansur. At that meeting Alikram had talked about status of Islam in Azerbaijan, halting of AIP's activities, and preventing of it from participation in the elections and the difficulties that this situation had created. And Haji Mansur had given his program and orders for future activities of AIP and the basis for its future moves. After the meeting Ahmadagha had told Alikram about limitations in availability of funds and had suggested that, him Hajiagha and Ziraddin should go to Turkey together, and he had returned to Baku.

In the fall of 1995, Ahmadagha and Imami had come to Baku with recommendation of Haji Mansur. He acting upon the order of Alikram had taken them to Quba, and had familiarized them with works of the local organization. He had also participated in the consultation held in Alikram's home in Nardaran.

With Haji Mansur's plans and recommendations, he had been closely involved in sending of 3 groups of 30 students each to the religious school of "Sepah-e Pasdaran" in city of Qum. Most of these students were at an age that they could be drafted for military service. During his trips to Iran along with Alikram, Hajiagha, and Mirhasan, he had visited there place of study which was a building with no signs, and he had required about their studies and well being.

Although Haji Mansur Haghightapour wore military uniform, he never wore any sign that could differentiate him. Due to his illness he found out about 23 thousand US Dollars given in Ardabil, and 27 thousand received in Iranian embassy. Every now and then he had received 450 thousand Manats, which is equivalent of 100 US Dollars. A document about creating Islamic bank had been given to him by a person that he did not know. Due to his lack of understanding the document, he had shown it to the head of the political branch Mubariz Mammadov. But Muabriz and Ziraddin Taghiyev had not been able to get any positive results from the documents and had returned them to him, and he had kept them as useless paper in his office.

Ramiz Mustafayev, who during questioning in the court has pleaded guilty of the charges brought against him, in his testimony showed that starting from October 27, 1995 he had been director of "Ulker" tourism firm, he had organized travels of Azerbaijani citizens to foreign countries, and during the entire time that he held that position he had sent only 8 tourists to the Islamic Republic of Iran.



Towards the end of February of 1996, he had been to Iranian Embassy to see whether or not faxes had been received about two people who were going to be sent to Iran as tourists. There, he had come across with Abdulbaghi Aliyev of AIP. Abdulbaghi had asked him if he had his stamp with him, and after making sure that he had it, he had asked him to stamp foreign travel passport applications for 6 people. Although he knew that, those applications were to be filled out and stamped by their employer, he had illegally put the stamp of "Ulker" firm, which he was its director, on blank application forms. He has sincerely regretted that he has done.

The witness, Ziraddin Taghiyev, during his questioning in the court had stated in his testimony that, in April of 1995, he went to Mekka with financial aid of AIP. And due to his becoming of a Haji, in October 1995 he was appointed as the head of the city committee of Baku, with order of Alikram and the Supreme Council of the Party. After this with orders of AIP chairman Alikram Aliyev and members of the Supreme Council Vaqif Qasimov, Hajiagha Nuriyev, and Mirhasan Jafarov, he had prepared recommendations about gathering necessary information on districts of the city of Baku, and had distributed them among heads of regional committees and he collected the gathered information. A short while after this, chairman of the party Alikram Aliyev and head of the executive committee Hajiagha Nuriyev, together with him had taken a group of party activists and workers to Iran for "religious visit", and there, with Ahmadagha accompanying them, they had been placed in resort town of Sarein. During their stay there, he had seen that, Ahmadagha and a few other Iranian citizens, had discussed the economical, political and social situation created in Azerbaijan, the structure of AIP, the relations between central organs and regional committees, and he had been a witness to Haji Mansur giving orders on the pre-election campaign platform, and the draft Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic that the party has prepared. Haji Mansur had also talked to them on the ways to seize power and establish an Islamic state.

In January 1996, a group of AIP activists under leadership of Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev and Vaqif Qasimov traveled to Iran, and there with Ahmadagha's help, and him accompanying them went to Tehran to Haji Mansur's office building, where Hajiagha Nuriyev introduced Haji Mansur as an employee of Iran's IRNA news agency and gave him a report on social-political situation in Azerbaijan, the elections to the parliament, general status of AIP, and changes made in the structure of the party. And Haji Mansur who was in camouflage uniform had a long speech which included the following subjects: filling all the positions in the party's central and regional organizations, placement of representative of party's control committee in regions, fully implementing party's slogans and promises, preparing party's work program on the basis of Islam for politics, economy, culture-education, youth, women and intellectuals, holding of seminar type discussions on Islam in different regions with the purpose of recruiting students to go to study in Iran in 3 months and 4 years programs, making use of Iranian experts' experiences in massive advertisement and encouragements, establishing good relations with the religious leaders of the Caucasus' Religious Office, and taking advantage of the good relationship, taking footholds in the military, law and order enforcement, and places with strategic importance, strengthening of position of "Islamin Sesi" and "Islam Dunyasi" newspapers, to work to increase number of party members specially women and intellectuals, to make counter-propaganda against cooperation with governments of USA and Israel, and also against the "Deal of Century" contract on oil production in the Caspian Sea, and finding the points of weakness of American and Israeli firms or joint ventures. Ahmadagha had told them that funds are limited and had suggested that only he, Alikram, and Hajiagha should go to Turkey. After returning from Turkey, Hajiagha Nuriyev had asked him to organize his notes from Haji Mansur's speech and had told him that all these suggestions were going to be discussed in the Supreme Council and every part would be assigned for implementation to specific people.

In April of 1996, with recommendations of Alikram Aliyev and Hajiagha Nuriyev, he took a group of people including physicians, journalists, economists and oil and gas industry workers to Iran, with himself being the head of the group. There, Ahmadagha had appointed a person named Javid to accompany them in their trip. After visiting holy sites Ahmadagha had seen them off in Astara, and had told him with great displeasure that the group of Azerbaijani students who had been sent for studies in Iran by AIP, had been recalled by ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan.

Later he had learned that Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov had received a large sum of money in form of foreign currency and had signed contracts to provide "Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami", the special services organization of Iran with information about number and kinds of goods produced or manufactured in the factories or plants of Azerbaijan and sketches and maps of Baku airports and other strategically important places. He did not know where AIP was being financed from, but knew that the monthly salary of Baku city committee is from 100 to 250 thousand Manats.

The witness Mubariz Mammadli during questioning by the court has stated in his testimony that when he was active, he was both head of the political branch of AIP and editor in chief of "Islamin Sesi" newspaper, and during that time he had received a salary of 200 to 400 thousand Manats.

In the fall of 1995, when a group of AIP leaders including Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Babakhan Balakishiyev and Teyyub Suleymanov traveled to the resort town of Sarein near Ardabil, he went with them and participated in various conferences held with participation of Ahmadagha, Imami and Haji Mansur. In those meetings Alikram and Hajiagha had talked and given reports about the achievements of AIP during the passed years, preparations for elections, preparing of pre-election platform, announcing of candidates for parliament, campaign, advertisements and working with mass media to make sure that AIP would win. Haji Mansur had reviewed and given his suggestions and recommendations about the draft Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic which had been prepared by AIP.

In addition to this, towards the end of 1995 when Ahmadagha and Imami were in Baku, Alikram had a consultation in his home in Nardaran with leading members of AIP. In that meeting he had stated that prevention of AIP from participation in parliament elections was a result of AIP's inactivity, and had suggested that in order to strengthen the party and for attracting influential and respected people to the party organizing gatherings and meetings, and defending Iran's position regarding the oil contract among people and in the press was important. Although on several occasions he had asked Alikram Aliyev about which organization was financing AIP, he had told him not to get involved in this matter. When he had received the confidential document about establishing Islamic bank from Vaqif Qasimov, due to his lack of understanding of banking system, he had given the document to Ziraddin Taghiyev, and he in turn, had returned it to Vaqif.

He was surprised when drawing sketches and maps of Baku airports and other strategically important places, and gathering statistic information about goods manufactured at factories and plants, and also learning the number of prisoners who were serving time in detention centers was included in activities of the political branch of the Supreme Council of the party, and when asked Alikram Aliyev about this. He did not get any response.

The witness Miralasar Mirmammadov stated in his testimony that, in January of 1996 when he was a member of the Supreme Council of AIP and the head of the Quba regional committee of the party, Alikram, Hajiagha, Vaqif, Ziraddin, Ramiz, and Aghakarim wanted to go together to Turkey via Iran so they could congratulate the pro-Islamic Rafah party of Turkey for its election victory. When they were leaving to Tehran he had asked Alikram that why they are going to Turkey, and he had responded that this was more economical. When he had seen that Haji Mansur's headquarters was being guarded by military personnel he had figured out that some kind of military organization was located there. Haji Mansur had talked up to 2 hours with Alikram, Hajiagha and Vaqif, as if he was talking to old friends. During the discussion Haji Mansur had required about activities of the party, and each one of them had given a report about his own activities. After this Haji Mansur had given instructions on making changes to the structure of the party, and Ahmadagha had suggested that only Alikram, Hajiagha and Ziraddin should go to Turkey due to lack of funds.

In the fall months of 1995, Ahmadagha and Imami had traveled to Quba with Vaqif Qasimov accompanying them and had returned to Baku after giving their recommendations to members of the local organization on the following: The structure of AIP, preparing slogans and motives, party's propaganda about Islamic ideas and the superiority of Islamic state, attracting intellectuals and influential people and sending them to Iran as religious visitors, using pro-Iranian figures in mass gatherings, holding



conferences and seminars, organizing subscription of local people to "Islamin Sesi" and "Islam Dunyasi" newspapers.

The witness Babakhan Balakishiyev, during questioning by the court stated that he worked as an editor of the "Islam Dunyasi" newspaper since March of 1992. With Alikram Aliyev's order he traveled to Iranian resort town of Sarein along with some of the party leaders. There, he was introduced to Ahmadagha and Imami and later to Haji Mansur by Alikram, and later in the same meeting he had seen that, Alikram Aliyev and Hajiagha Nuriyev had given reports about activities of the party and that the representatives of the Iranian side had given recommendations which were not related to the work of the party. He had also seen that the "Law on elections" and the Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic which had been prepared by the party had been discussed. Later he had realized that gathering of statistic information about factories, plants and institutions, and also about professors, teachers and students at centers for science and schools, and drawing sketches and maps of military importance was done on orders of "Sepah-e Pasdaran", the special services organization of Iran.

In 1995 he had heard that Ahmadagha and Imami, at their meeting with AIP leaders in Alikram's home in Nardaran, they had blamed the party's lack of success on weakness of the local organizations and for improvement of the cadres had given orders to Mirhasan Jafarov about sending students to Iran for 3 months training.

The witness Teyyub Suleymanov in his testimony during court questioning stated that he had been as head of the AIP's Shamakhi branch, thus he had been implementing the instructions of the Supreme Council of the AIP. Once a month he had been given written reports about the works that he had done to head of the executive committee Hajiagha Nuriyev. He had also been gathering statistic data about activities of the political parties, associations, societies, local press, groups campaigning about other religions and religious sects, organizations, foreign joint ventures and independent firms, influential people in the region and over all information about the region in general, and had been passing them on to the Supreme Council of the party.

In the fall of 1995, while he was in Iranian resort town of Sarein along with Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, Ziradin Taghiyev and others, in the consultations that Ahmadagha, Imami, and later Haji Mansur were present, matters against the interests of Azerbaijani state were discussed, and the draft constitution which had been prepared by AIP had been analyzed. As long as he was working, members of the committee had been collecting salaries of 400 to 450 thousand Manats.

The witness Mazahir Akhundov, in his testimony during the court questioning certified the testimony of Teyyub Suleymanov, and added that he had been working as head of the Qobustan chapter of the party which was subject to Shamakhi regional branch. According to the orders of the Supreme Council of the party, political committees were created, and fulfilling the duties given to these committees he had been gathering statistic data about the organizations in the region, number of the prisoners serving their sentences in prisons, and factories and plants and had passed them on to Teyyub Suleymanov, who in turn had presented them to the Supreme Council. He had been receiving his salary of 150 to 200 thousand Manats a month from the head of the Shamakhi regional committee. --

It is clear from the testimony of the primary questioning of the witness Nizami Balaoghlanov that being a member of the Supreme Council of AIP, in 1995, when he was in Ardabil along with Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, Mirhasan jafarov and others, Ahmadagha Azimi had welcomed them and had taken them to Tehran. There, they had met Haji Mansur at a two story building which was guarded by armed soldiers. After that meeting they had traveled to city of Qum and had met with Azerbaijani students who were studying in 3 months courses.

In the fall months of 1995, when Ahmadagha and Imami were in Baku, acting upon Alikram Aliyev's orders he had taken them to Shamakhi, Ismayilli, Goychay, Shaki and Qobustan regions, where they had inquired about works done in the regions. They had also met with party activists and had talked to them about works of political committees in the party structure.



At the beginning of 1996 Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and others had met with Ahmadagha, Imami and others in city of Ardabil. In the meeting Hajiagha Nuriyev had given a report on social-political situation in Azerbaijan, AIP's failure in getting registered and banning of it from participating in the elections for parliament. Ahmadagha in his turn had blamed the situation on lack of strong campaign for religion of Islam in Azerbaijan and had recommended increasing party cadre, so that the next time the party would be able to get registered.

Acting upon orders of Mirhasan Jafarov head of the education and culture committee of AIP he had selected 2 students and introduced them to him. The students had been sent for 3 months courses in Iranian city of Qum after passing initial examinations.

The witness Baladayi Huseynov, in his testimony during questioning by the court stated that, when he was working as head of the Sabayil district committee, acting upon orders of party leaders Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov, and also taking into consideration the recommendations of Baku city committee leader Ziraddin Taghiyev had gathered the following and passed them on to Ziraddin Taghiyev: information on zoning of residential and industrial areas, sketches reflecting the geographic position of the lands, information on population of the district and data on goods being manufactured in the district, political parties, associations and print press located in the district and in general statistic data on the district. When he had asked Ziraddin Taghiyev that for what purposes was the data being collected, he had got the response that they were needed for party activities. He also stated that, although it had been asked for, he could not obtain the number of prisoners in the prisons located in his district.

Witnesses Isabala Ahmadov, Mammad Huseynli, Javid Rahimov, Khanali Fataliyev, Shahin Seyidov, Matlab Mammadov, Rza Rzayev and Elbrus Akhundov in their testimonies confirmed in its entirety the testimony of Baladayi Huseynov during court questioning.

The witness Madat Abdullayev, in his testimony during questioning by the court stated that, he went to Iran on his own will to study religion in the city of Qum. There, the office responsible for matters related to citizens of Azerbaijan, had given him the name "Suleyman Abbasi" and had asked him to hide his real name. While During the time that he was in the religious school meetings which were against the interests of Azerbaijan were being held at an organization called "Dar ol-Tarjomeh". In these meetings high ranking officials of the "Sepah-e Pasdaran" gave speeches in which they claimed that Azerbaijan was part of ancient Iran. They also praised the Islamic Revolution of Iran and criticized the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic which had recently been passed. In the religious school in addition to studies of Koran, lessons about Islamic Revolution of Iran and other unrelated topics were taught. Also there were lectures about military training.

AIP leaders Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev and Mirhasan Jafarov had visited the religious school several times. In their meetings with the students they had talked about party's activities and had told them that if they come to power they would use student cadres. Alikram Aliyev had had separate one on one talks with each of the students who had been participated in the gatherings and meetings against Azerbaijan. In summer breaks the students of the religious school were taken to city of Urmia, and were trained to use machine guns and mortars. They were also given other military training. After finishing the religious school employees of Iran's special services agency, the Ministry of Information and Security had tried to recruit him for cooperation but he had shown his opposition.

The witnesses Rovshan Safarov and Taleh Huseynov, in their testimonies during questioning by the court confirmed the testimony of Madat Abdullayev and added that while they were studying at the religious school Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov visited the school, met with the Azerbaijani students and talked individually to the students who had been participated in the gatherings and meetings against Azerbaijan.

The witness Alakbar Rasulov, in his testimony during questioning by the court stated that, he had gone to Iranian city of Qum for 3 months study of religion in a trip labeled as religious visit, which was organized by AIP leaders Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov. Other military draft age Azerbaijani students who had been sent with him were welcomed by a person named Majid who admitted them to the religious school. During studies in addition to lessons on religion other subjects such as necessity of Islamic Revolution were also discussed. The students were told in several speeches by members of Iran's special services agency that the Islamic Revolution was unavoidable, and it was superior to all the revolutions that had happened around the world. During the studies, all the expenses were paid by the Iranian side. There was no sign on the building to show the school's name, and no diploma was given to the students who graduated. Due to these facts he had realized that the school was working for some kind of military organization. AIP leaders Alikram, Hajiagha, Vaqif and Mirhasan had visited the school that they were studying and had promised the more successful students that they would be promoted in their party ranks.

The witnesses Ramin Dadashov, Almurad Rzayev, Huseyn Aliyev and Arif Aliyev, in their testimonies during questioning by the court confirmed the testimony of Alakbar Rasulov and added that they were sent for studying in Iran by AIP, and that in the religious school in addition to lessons on religion, there were speeches which were against the interests of Azerbaijan. They also said that the AIP leaders visited them at school and told them the students with better records would be advanced to better positions in the AIP structure.

The witness Vidadi Bayramov, in his testimony during questioning by the court stated that, he had heard in the mosque of Jalilabad region that a group was being sent to Iran for Koran studies. He had gone to the Iranian border in a bus that he did not know name of its driver. After crossing the border illegally he had been approached by special people who had taken him to city of Tabriz and from there to Karaj. In military bases of Karaj, they had been forced to wear military uniform and to adopt a new name so they could hide their real identity. Despite their disagreement they were given 3 months of military training to them in addition to the religious studies. In the military training they had been given special lessons on using different weapons and ways of handling explosives, tactics of fighting during day time and at night, secrets of military topography, ways of following suspicious people without being detected, and ways of avoiding detection during undercover observations. At the end of the training he was sent across the border to Azerbaijan by Iranian border patrol officers.

The witnesses Elmar Asadov, Ilqar Qojayev, Asad Rahimov, Elshad Aliyev and Oqtay Nayarov, in their testimonies during questioning by the court confirmed the testimony of Vidadi Bayramov in its entirety.

The witness Arif Quliyev, in his testimony during questioning by the court stated that, with orders of AIP leader Alikram Aliyev the financial work had been given to him, and he, acting upon orders of Alikram, had distributed money in form of cash among party's central and regional committees and members of the press, without getting receipts from them. When Alikram had given him the money he had not asked for any receipt.

The witness Abdulbaghi Aliyev, in his testimony during questioning by the court stated that, he worked as head of the Imam Huseyn sports club which was part of AIP. He added that in 1996, in the Iranian embassy and without participation of government agencies of Azerbaijan he had examined the students who were being sent to Iran for studies. He stated that together with Kablagha Quliyev he had prepared fake documents for the students. He had met Ramiz Mustafayev, the director of "Ulker" tourism firm in front of the embassy and had asked him to put his stamp on applications that would give the applicants the right to obtain foreign travel passports and he had stamped the blank application forms without hesitation. Later Kablagha Quliyev had filled out the applications.

The witnesses Tamerlan Qasimzade and Akbar Seidov, in their testimonies during questioning by the court stated that they took and passed tests in the Iranian embassy, and that Abdulbaghi Aliyev and



Kablagha Quliyev obtained foreign travel passports for them. They said that when leaving for Iran they were returned by the border officials who told them that their documents were not correct. They stated that they had never worked for or had any contacts with "Ulker" tourism firm. In addition to these, the evidence and documents kept with files of the defendants, or obtained during investigation prove that the defendants have committed crimes. The evidence and documents collected are the following: As indicated in pages 6 to 15 of volume 8 of the case, Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov, and Mirhasan Jafarov had identified Mahammad Rza Asadbegi, the member of "Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami" in city of Tabriz by seeing his picture in advance.

As indicated in pages 16 to 21 of volume 8 of the case, Alikram Aliyev and Mirhasan Jafarov had identified Ali Akbar Bavandi, the employee of the Iranian embassy in Azerbaijan by seeing his picture in advance. As indicated in pages 25 to 26 of volume 8 of the case, according to results of the investigation by experts of the court, during searching of Hajiagha Nuriyev's home, the four 7.62 caliber bullets found there were usable and thus are considered military ammunition.

As indicated in page 162 of volume 8 of the case, according to findings of the technical experts the 6 pages document called "From the words of Mansur the teacher" which was discovered during searching of AIP's headquarters and also its Baku city committee office had been typed with the typewriter number 31994 which is located in the office of "Islamin Sesi" newspaper. The document is shown in pages 163 to 168 of volume 8 of the case. The following are direct codes from Haji Mansur, the general of "Sepah" (Mansur the teacher):

- 1) In this struggle "Do not say that I am tired". They are waiting for command from you, a religious command. We must go and capture Karbala if there is a command about it, we must go. We must be prepared for any torture in this road.
- 2) The list of the candidates for parliamentary elections must be prepared with special care.
- 3) We consider the work that we have done during the preparations for the elections a success. This is real progress. If we compare today with AIP's situation a few years ago, we would see pleasant changes in you. At the beginning you did not have such a confidence in yourselves. It is obvious that the talk that we had three years ago has been effective.
- 4) There are several ways to seize power, through military, by revolution, by coup. The third way is the way of elections.
- 5) Positive experience of world Muslims must be implemented in Azerbaijan. If you win, you would fulfill the hopes and belief of the people.
- 6) Some instructions for winning elections
- 7) Now you are being watched in abroad, too. They are wondering what the Islamists will do in these elections? If you win the elections the opposite side could make a coup.
- 8) Call upon the people to actively participate in the elections. The opposite side could falsify elections.
- 9) When entering any coalition you should announce your conditions in advance.
- 10) You should show ways of freeing you country from the current difficult socio-political situation. For example you can give the following slogans:
  - Karabakh can not be liberated by talks.
  - Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory should be liberated from aggressors.
  - The refugees should return to their homes soon.



- 11) In regions start conversations on Islamic topics, and specially try to attract the youth to Islamic party.
- 12) Pay special attention to the problems of the ethnic minorities. Meet separately with leaders of the Lezgin, Talish, Kurdish and Tat communities. For every meeting, someone from AIP should go and should take a gift with him. These meetings should be documented and should be reflected in the press.
- 13) Families of martyrs should be approached with special care. When visiting them, gifts and grocery should be taken. Such meetings should be glorified in newspapers and television. It should be written that: "Families of the martyrs vote for AIP".
- 14) There should be meetings with writers, scientists and sportsmen and it should be written that "Scientists, writers and sportsmen vote for AIP".
- 15) If needed, small meetings should be held to awaken people.
- 16) There are different ways of campaigning, too: television, radio, the press, live conversations, and encouragements.
- 17) Send campaign caravans to different areas of the republic and call upon people to vote for AIP. Make films about the works that the AIP has done and show it to people. Arrange meetings with popular poets and let them call upon people to vote for AIP. Distribute bread among people, carrying bread in cars with the slogan "Everybody, vote for AIP" written on it.
- 18) During campaigns for parliamentary elections, your political rivals could attack you with different means. They could provoke you to act unwisely. They could inflame the Shi'at-Sunni conflict. They could accuse you of having close relations with Iran. Because of this do not put picture of Iran's leaders any where and every where. Hide yourselves, be cautious in your conversations and acts. Your home or work phones could be controlled.
- 19) Pay special attention to creating election fund. Have fixed and mobile boxes. Take pictures of the people who make the most donations. Later take out the money and repeat the process elsewhere. Let people believe that the AIP has popular support. A documentary film about this can be made, too.
- 20) During the election campaign collect damaging material about the opposition parties who have become your rivals. If required you could even accuse them and spread rumors against them. If necessary do not hesitate to use intrigue.
- 21) Use methods of secrecy, do not tell your secrets even to the parties that you enter coalition with, do not let your real opinion to be known. You should determine in advance who would occupy which post.

If you implement these accurately, God willing, you would win the elections."

As indicated in pages 191 through 192 in volume 8 of the case, according to opinion of the technical experts group of the Republic, the stamps on the back of foreign travel passport applications of citizens of Azerbaijan Republic M. A. Hamzayev, T. Q. Qasimzade, A. M. Nazarov, M. M. Aliyev, A. N. Seidov and V. A. Babayev were actually put by using the stamp of "Ulker" tourism firm.

As indicated in pages 2 to 3 of volume 10 of the case, according to June 6, 1996 letter of the Counter-intelligence Office of the Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic, Haji Mansur Haghghatpur has been one of the leaders of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Sepah-e Pasharan-e Enghelab-e Eslami), the special services of Iran and has had the rank of general (sartip); Ahmadagha has been an official of the same organization in city of Ardabil; Mahammad Rza Asadbegi has been a high ranking official of the same organization in city of Tabriz; and Ali Akbar Baband has been an employee of Information and Security Ministry of Iran which is the special services agency of that country.

As indicated on page 7 of the volume 10 of the case, according to August 27, 1996 letter of the border troops of Azerbaijan Republic, members of the Supreme Council of AIP Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov had officially been registered at the Astara border crossing post when they had legally left Azerbaijan Republic to Iran Republic.

As shown in pages 50 to 51 of volume 10 of the case, the collegium of Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan Republic, on its August 4, 1995 had annulled registration of Azerbaijan Islamic Party, due to its unlawful activities which are contrary to article 12 of Azerbaijan Republic's Constitution act.

As shown in pages 266 to 270 of volume 8 of the case, it is clear in the document found both in Shamakhi regional branch and Baku city committee of the AIP, that the party's Supreme Council and has ordered Baku city committee and regional branches to create political committees and through these committees collect data on all organizations working in the jurisdiction of region, region's geographical position, and also statistic information and pass them on to the Supreme Council.

As shown in pages 91 to 93 of volume 10 of the case, according to experts opinions, the map of Sabunchu district of city of Baku obtained by AIP, is copied from the map in the office of the governor of the district which is classified as a confidential map.

As shown on page 95 of volume 10 of the case, it is clear from the interviews published in "Ayna" and "Azadliq" newspapers, AIP's leader Alikram Aliyev has said after AIP wins elections Iranian style Islamic state will be established, and the contracts that Azerbaijan has signed with Western countries will be canceled, and that in this matter, AIP's views are the same as Iran's.

Also the following evidence further prove that the defendants have committed the crimes that they have been charged of: The article consisting of 40 sections which is about a hand written document named "notes", shown in pages 264 to 300 of volume 8 of the case; 12 receipts of distribution of salaries and 4 orders of payments of office rent which have been seized during searching of the home where Teyyub Suleymanov, head of AIP's Shamakhi regional committee was living; color photographs seized during searching of the apartment where A. A. Rasulov, an active member of AIP's Shamakhi regional committee was living, showing 22 students who had been sent to Iran to study for 3 months; a document in note book with green cover named program of AIP social activities which is about the theory of Islamic revolution and conditions for implementing it; a document titled "To heads of AIP's Baku city regional committees" which is shown in pages 2 to 141 of volume 9 of the case; the information book titled "System of showing of geo-political districts and residential areas" written in Russian which was intended for internal use; documents which consist of intelligence data gathered by heads of committees of city of Baku's Narimanov, Qaradagh, Azizbayov, Sabayil, Yasamal, Binaqadi and Nizami regions and also city of Sumqayit; map of Yasamal region, sketched map of Qaradagh and Azizbeyov regions; a document titled "Proposals about works to be done by AIP during preparation period for parliamentary elections in our republic" which has been found during search and inspection in headquarters of AIP; a document titled "Statement of Azerbaijan Islamic Party"; an audio cassette which the writing "Interview with Sharq newspaper"; results of completed criminal case of number 183 shown in pages 194 to 222 of volume 9 which concluded that the group including Haji Mansur Haghghatpur, Mahammad Reza Asadbegi and others which had come to Azerbaijan as military observers had been involved in spy activities and had sent requests to Iranian government about having special budget and funds for Azerbaijan Islamic Party so it can win the parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, AIP office phone numbers of party leaders Vaqif Qasimov and Hajiagha Nuriyev were found in the notebooks of the mentioned intelligence agents, Vaqif Qasimov and Hajiagha Nuriyev knew Asadbegi in advance, and had been told that Asadbegi and others were spying in Azerbaijan against this country; as shown in pages 224 to 225 of volume 9 of the case, the black and white photos of Azerbaijani youth studying in the religious school of "Sepah-e Pasdaran" the special service organization of Iran in city of Qum which had been taken with members of the same organization Ahmadagha Azimi and Feyzi; the black and white picture of Alikram Aliyev with head of the 3 months courses Ahmadi and his deputy Majidi.



The collegium of the court could not find any proof in the case to confirm the following claims of the defendants Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov who said: "We have based our activities on religious laws; We did not realize that our activities based on suggestions and recommendations of Mansur Haghghatpur, Ahmadagha Azimi and Mahammad Reza Asadbegi, the members of "Sepah-e Pasdaran" organization, the special services agency of Iran were against interests of Azerbaijan Republic; We did not know that they were agents of Iranian intelligence, and that the headquarters was office of military intelligence; We did not know that the document presented by Mansur Haghghatpur which we signed was legally binding; We have spent the money received from them, and from Ali Akbar Bavand the employee of Iranian embassy, on expanding activities of AIP". To the contrary, it is clear from the verified testimonies of many witnesses and work materials, and from testimonies of the defendants that after collapse of the USSR and Azerbaijan gaining independence, many political parties were established and started their activities. When Azerbaijan Islamic Party were created, members of its Supreme Council Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, Vaqif Qasimov and Mirhasan Jafarov who joined them later, stated that they take Islamic ideas and Islamic religious laws as the basis of program about establishing a state which would govern by Islam. This, had caught attention of the special service agency of our neighbor Iran. They had been invited to Iran by Mahamamd Reza Asadbegi and Mansur Haghghatpur who had come to Baku in early 1993 in the group of military observers who could supposedly help our republic in its dispute with Armenia, but while working as employees of the Iranian embassy they were engaged in spying and sabotage activities which led to their arrest and deportation from Azerbaijan.

While in Iran they had ben in close contact with Ahmadagha Azimi, and Mahammad Reza Asadbegi who had been assigned by Muravvej and Malakuti, the high ranking religious leaders and Imams of cities of Tabriz and Ardabil. When Alikram had complained about bad financial situation, Ahmadagha had taken advantage of the situation and Had given them 5000 US Dollars, thus putting them in a bad situation and preparing the ground for their cooperation with "Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami". The next day, in other words on February 10, 1994 with Ahmadagha accompanying them, the above mentioned defendants had been taken to city of Tehran. There, in a two story building which was guarded by armed military people, they had met with Mansur Haghghatpur and in the name of establishing an Islamic state in Azerbaijan they had been recruited for secret cooperation with the same organization and had signed agreements on this matter. After this they were assigned to Ahmadagha Azimi, the member of "Sepah-e Pasdaran" in city of Ardabil because of that city's proximity to Baku, and the conditions for their mutual contacts were set. Startring from that point they had had meetings in May and October of 1994, May and October of 1995, and January of 1996, and in those meetings the following were decided: to organize party structure according to plan; to open political branches with purpose of gathering intelligence information; to use Iran's experience to come to power through elections; to prepare political, economical, cultural and educational work programs for the youth, women, intellectuals, and scientific research workers; to recruit students for 3 month and 4 year studies in Iran; to use Iranian experts in campaigns and massive advertisements; to expand party ranks with recruiting more members among the youth, women, influential and well known people; to establish good relations with the leadership of the Office of the Caucasus Clergy, and to use those relations; to take positions in armed forces, police offices, and strategically important places; to establish relations and work with political parties and trade unions; to make propaganda against cooperation with governments of the USA and Israel, and against the Deal of Century contract about oil production in the Caspian Sea, with the purpose of creating anti-Western atmosphere in society; to establish Islamic bank in Azerbaijan with purpose of making impacts on the economy of the republic and bring it to a situation that it would be dependent on Iran; to work on a few medium level officials in every ministry of Azerbaijan; to train cadres for important positions. Also other suggestions and recommendations were given in those meetings. During implementing of these instructions 18 thousand US Dollars were received from the organization and 23 thousand from Ali Akbar Bavand who was supposedly working as an employee of the Iranian embassy and receipts for given for the money received. Also, in April of 1995 and January and April of 1995, 3 group of 30 students each were sent through the Iranian embassy as religous visitors to study in schools of "Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami" in city of Qum which trained intelligence agents. These students were given several lectures on the conditions under which the Islamic Revolution of Iran took place and



ways of starting it elsewhere. They were also given military training. There were reports on all the works done given to Haji Mansur Haghghatpur, Ahmadagha and Asadbegi at different times.

Under these circumstances after investigation, the defense arguments of the defendants are declared baseless and therefore rejected. After reviewing all the evidence on this case the collegium of the court has concluded that, Alikram Aliyev Ismayil oghlu, Hajiagha Nuriyev Alasgar oghlu, Mirhasan Jafarov Aslan oghlu, and Vaqif Qasimov Qasim oghlu, being citizens of Azerbaijan Republic had made agreements in advance with members of the special services organizations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, doing criminal activities with them. Driven by greed and other personal motives they have been involved in spying activities by working against sovereignty, state security, and defense capability of Azerbaijan Republic which amounts to knowingly betraying motherland -- the Azerbaijan Republic. Their actions are in violation of section 1 of Article 57 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic. Also, Hajiagha Nuriyev Alasgar oghlu has violated section 1 of Article 220 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic by obtaining and storing combat ammunition. Ramiz Mustafayev Zakir oghlu the director of "Ulker" tourism firm had put stamp of his company on foreign travel passport application for 6 people despite knowing that the applications were fake. His action is permitted according to section 1 of Article 194 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic and investigation results show that there are lawful actions.

Because the defendants have been proved guilty of committing the crimes they were charged of, they are being punished according to the laws that they have violated.

The collegium of the court takes into consideration that at the time of sentencing defendants Alikram Aliyev, Hajiagha Nuriyev, and Vaqif Qasimov are seriously ill, and that Mirhasan Jafarov has to support 4 underage kids, and Hajiagha Nuriyev has to support 3 under age kids, these create ground for reducing their sentences, on the other hand the fact that the crimes have been committed by an organized group requires more severe punishment.

The evidence present at the case, the 4 Vinovtka type 7.62 mm caliber bullets kept at the Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan Republic must be given to Yasamal regional police office, the 600 US Dollars belonging to Hajiagha Nuriyev and his 2323 numbered hunting rifle, also the 650 US Dollars belonging to Vaqif Qasimov and his VAZ-21063 model car with licence plate number 04 V968 AZ are being confiscated for the benefit of the state.

A total of 587,128 Manats for the money given for the work of experts must be collected from the defendants and transferred to state funds.

Based on the above mentioned details, and according to articles 319, 322, 332, and 335 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic the court

ordered that:

Alikram Aliyev Ismayil oghlu is guilty according to section 1 of Article 57 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic, his personal assets are hereby confiscated, and he is sentenced to 11 years prison term.

He should serve his sentence under harsh conditions in IEK. May 27, 1996, the day that he was arrested is considered the start of his prison term.

He is not eligible for parole.

Hajiagha Nuriyev Alasgar oghlu is guilty according to section 1 of article 57, and section 1 of article 220 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic. According to section 1 of article 57 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic, his assets are being confiscated, and he is sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment.

and also according to section 1 of article 220 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic he is sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment prison.

Implementing article 38 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic, by combining the more sever punishment with lesser one he is sentenced to 10 years prison term with his assets being confiscated.

He should serve his sentence under harsh conditions in IEK. May 24, 1996, the day that he was arrested is considered the start of his prison term.

He is not eligible for parole.

Mirhasan Jafarov Aslan oghlu is guilty according to section 1 of Article 57 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic, his personal assets are hereby confiscated, and he is sentenced to 10 years prison term. April 9, 1997 the day that he was arrested is considered the start of his prison term. With deducting the 3 days that he was temporarily detained by Ministry of National Security on May 27, 1996, his prison term is 9 years and 11 months and 27 days.

He should serve his sentence under harsh conditions in IEK.

He is not eligible for parole.

Vaqif Qasimov Qasim oghlu is guilty according to section 1 of Article 57 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic, his personal assets are hereby confiscated, and he is sentenced to 10 years prison term.

He should serve his sentence under harsh conditions in IEK. May 27, 1996, the day that he was arrested is considered the start of his prison term.

Ramiz Mustafayev Zakir oghlu is guilty according to section 1 of Article 194 of criminal code of Azerbaijan Republic, every month 20 per cent of his personal profit will be deducted and put into state funds, and he is sentenced to 2 years of probation, which he shall serve in places determined by authorities.

The bail on him must remain in effect until the day that he starts serving his probation.

The evidence present at the case, the 4 Vinovtka type 7.62 mm caliber bullets kept at the Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan Republic must be given to Yasmal regional police office, the 600 US Dollars belonging to Hajiagha Nuriyev and his 2323 numbered hunting rifle, also the 650 US Dollars belonging to Vaqif Qasimov and his VAZ-21063 model car with licence plate number 04 V968 AZ are being confiscated for the benefit of the state.

A total of 587,128 Manats for the money given for the work of experts must be collected from the defendants and transferred to state funds.

The verdict and sentences are final, they can not be appealed.

The chairman: signature

Representatives of the people: 1 signature

2 signatures

Is same as original.

Member of the Supreme Court A. J. Seidov.

Иш 63 1997-чи ил.

**Б Ө К М**

**Азәрбајчан Республикасы адындан**

**Азәрбајчан Республикасы Али Мәһкәмәсинин  
чинајәт ишләри үзрә 1 дәрәчәли мәһкәмә коллекиясы**

14 апрел 1997-чи ил

Бакы шәһәриндә

ашағыдакы тәркибдә:

Али Мәһкәмәнин үзвү: **Ә.Ч.Сејидовун** сәдрлији илә,

халг ичласчылары: **Ө.А.Ағајев** вә **М.М.Миришов**,

прокурор: **Б.С.Заһидов**,

мүдафиәчиләр: **А.Нәчәфбәјли**, **Ч.Хасполодов**,

**Ф.Нәчәфов**, **А.Балабәјовун** иштиракы,

**А.Н.Имановун** катиблији илә ачыг мәһкәмә ичласында

1940-чы илдә Бакы шәһәринин Нардаран  
гәсәбәсиндә анадан олмуш, азәрбајчанлы,  
Азәрбајчан Республикасы вәтәндашы,  
аилләли, али тәһсилли, мәһкум олунмамыш,  
Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасынын сәдри  
вәзифәсиндә ишләмиш, Бакы шәһәри,  
Нардаран гәсәбәси, Н.Әскәров күчәси  
далан 1, ев 14-дә јашајан, барәсиндә 17 мај  
1996-чы ил тарихдә һәбсәалма гә"ти имкан  
тәдбири сечилмиш,

**Әликрам Исмајыл оғлу Әлијевин** Азәрбајчан Республикасы  
ЧМ-нин 57-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәсилә;



1951-чи илдә Бакы шәһәринин Нардаран  
гәсәбәсиндә анадан олмуш, азәрбајчанлы,  
Азәрбајчан Республикасы вәтәндашы,



аиләли, орта тәһсилли, мәһкум олун-  
мамыш, Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасы Ичра  
органынын сәдри вәзифәсиндә ишләмиш,  
Бакы шәһәри, Нардаран гәсәбәси,  
А.Зејналлы күчәси дәнкә 2, ев 7-дә  
јашајан, барәсиндә 24 мај 1996-чы ил  
тарихдә һәбсәалма гә"ти имкан тәдбири  
сечилмиш,

**Бәчиаға Әлиәскәр оғлу Нуријевин** Азәрбајчан Респуб-  
ликасы ЧМ-нин 57-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәси, 220-чи  
маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәсилә,

1964-чү илдә Бакы шәһәринин Мәштаға  
гәсәбәсиндә анадан олмуш, азәрбајчанлы,  
Азәрбајчан Республикасы вәтәндашы,  
аиләли, орта тәһсилли, мәһкум олунмамыш,  
Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасы Мәдәни  
Маариф Комитәсинин сәдри вәзифәсиндә  
ишләмиш, Бакы шәһәри Мәштаға гәсәбәси,  
Әзизбәјов күчәси ев 109-да јашајан,  
барәсиндә 29 мај 1996-чы ил тарихдә  
шәхси заминлик гә"ти имкан тәдбири  
сечилмиш,

**Мирһәсән Аслан оғлу Чәфәровун** Азәрбајчан Респуб-  
ликасы ЧМ-нин 57-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәсилә,

1940-чы илдә Бакы шәһәринин Нардаран  
гәсәбәсиндә анадан олмуш, азәрбајчанлы,  
Азәрбајчан Республикасы вәтәндашы,  
аиләли, орта тәһсилли, 1973-чү илдә Гусар  
рајону Халг Мәһкәмәси тәрәфиндән

Азәрбајҗан Республикасы ЧМ-нин 209-чу маддәсинин 2-чи һиссәсилә 3 ил мүддәтинә азадлыгдан мәрһуметмә чәзасына мәрһум едилмиш, мәрһумлуғу өдәнилмиш, Азәрбајҗан Ислам Партијасы Тәфтиш Нәзарәт Комитәсинин сәдри вәзифәсиндә ишләмиш, Бақы шәһәри, Нардаран гәсәбәси Абшерон күчәси ев 17-дә јашајан, барәсиндә 27 мај 1996-чы ил тарихдә һәбсәалма гә"ти имкан тәдбири сечилмиш


**Вагиф Гасым оғлу Гасымовун** Азәрбајҗан Республикасы ЧМ-нин 57-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәсилә;

1943-чү илдә Кәнчә шәһәриндә анадан олмуш, азәрбајҗанлы, Азәрбајҗан Республикасы вәтәндашы, орта тәһсилли, аиләли, мәрһум олунмамыш, "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасынын директору ишләјән, Бақы шәһәри, Әбилов күчәси ев 105, мәнзил 12-дә јашајан, барәсиндә 10 нојабр 1996-чы ил тарихдә башга јерә кетмәмәк барәдә шәхси илтизам гә"ти имкан тәдбири сечилмиш

**Рамиз Закир оғлу Мустафајевин** Азәрбајҗан Республикасы ЧМ-нин 194-чү маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәсилә иттиһам олунмаларына даир чинајәт ишинә бахараг

#### м ү ә ј ј ә н е т д и :

Әликрам Әлијев Азәрбајҗан Ислам Партијасынын сәдри, Бәшиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов, Мирһәсән Чәфәров исә партијанын Али Шурасынын үзвләри - ајры-ајры сәһәләр үзрә



рәһбәр олмагла Азәрбајчан Республикасынын суверенлији, мүдафиә габилитјети вә дәвләт тәһтүкәсизлији зәрәринә олараг, тамаһ вә саир шәхси нијјәтлә 1994-чү илин феврал ајынын 10-да әввәлчәдән Иранын "Сепан-е Пастаран-е Енгеләбе Еслами" тәшкилатынын јүксәк рүтбәли шәхсләри илә разылашыб чинајәт әлагәсинә кирмиш, Азәрбајчан Республикасы Конститусијасынын 7-чи маддәсинин 1-чи бәндинә вә Азәрбајчан Республикасы дәвләт мүстәгиллији һагтында Конститусија актынын 12-чи маддәсинә зидд олараг Азәрбајчан Республикасында дәвләт гурулушунун дәјишдирилмәси, ислам ганунларынын бәргәрар олмасы вә ислам дәвләти јарадылмасы наминә һәмин тәшкилатла әмәкдашлыг етмәк һагтында көнүллү разылыг вермәклә часуслуг фәалијјәтинә чәлб едиләрәк бу барәдә илтизамнамә имзаламышлар.

Бундан сонра мүттәһимләр 1994-1996-чы илләр әрзиндә алдыглары тапшырыг вә төвсијјәләрә әсасән партијанын мәркәзи вә рекионал структурларында сијаси шә"бәләр тәшкил едәрәк бу шә"бәләр васитәсилә дәвләт әһәмијјәтли вә мәхфи характер дашыјан мә"луматлар, о чүмләдән Республикадакы мөвчуд ичти-май - сијаси, игтисади вә сосиал вәзијјәти характеризә едән, әра-зини, әһалинин тәркибини, һүтүг-мүһафизә органлары ишчилә-ринин вә чәза алан мөһбусларын сајыны, һәрби сәнајә объект-ләринин фәалијјәтләринин әкс етдирән схемләр, хәритәләр вә мә"луматлар топлајараг Иранын хүсуси хидмәт органларынын мәс"ул әмәкдашларына вахташыры һесабат формасында тәгдим етмиш вә кәстәрилән фәалијјәт мүтабилиндә Әликрам Әлијев өндәлијә ујғун олараг Иранын Әрдәбил шәһәриндә 5 дөфәјә 23 мин АБШ доллары, Бақыда исә Иран сәфирлијиндә 3 дөфәјә 27 мин АБШ доллары чәми 50 мин АБШ доллары мәблә-



финдә харичи валјута илә хусусилә кўлли мигдарда пул алараг гәбз вермиш, пулун бир һиссәсини партијанын "фәалијјәтинин" кенишләндирилмәсинә, мүәјјән һиссәсини исә адлары чәкилән мүттәһимләрлә биркә шәхси мәгсәдләри үчүн истифадә етмишләр.

Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев вә Вагиф Гасымовун тапшырығы илә Мирһәсән Чәфәров Иранын хусуси хидмәт органынын Гум шәһәриндә јерләшән ислам ингилабынын идејаларыны тәблиғ едән вә кәшфијјатчы һазырлајан хусуси мәктәбиндә һазырлыг кечмәк үчүн Иранын Бақыдакы сәфирлији васитәси илә АИП-ин фәалларындан ибарәт һәр групта 30 нәфәр олмагла 3 груп Азәрбајчан кәнчләрини һәгиги һәрби хидмәтә чағырышдан јайындырараг "зијарәт" ады алтында Ирана кәндәрмиш вә онларын Иранын кәшфијјат органларында истифадә етмәк үчүн һазырланмагла чәлб едилмәсинә шәраит јаратмышдыр.

Бундан башга Әликрам Әлијев вә Вагиф Гасымов Азәрбајчан Республикасынын бејнәлхалг мөвгеләринин зәифләдилмәси, социал мүһитдә антигәрб әһвал руһијјәсинин тәшәккүл тапмасы мәгсәдилә АБШ вә Израил дәвләтләринин Азәрбајчанда фәалијјәт кәстәрән мүәссисәләриндә позучулуг ишләри апармаг нијјәтилә програм һазырламыш, Хәзәр дәнизиндә нефт һасилаты үзрә "Әсрин сазиши"ндә Иран дәвләтинин мөвгејини вә мәнәфејини мүдафиә етмиш, ислам банкынын јарадылмасы үчүн мәхфи сәнәд ишләдиб һазырлатмышдыр.

Бу һәрәкәтләри илә Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов, Мирһәсән Чәфәров часуслуг, Азәрбајчан Республикасына ґаршы дүшмәнчилик фәалијјәти апармагла Иранын хусуси хидмәт органларына көмәк едәрәк Вәтәнә хәјанәт етмишләр.

Һәчиаға Нуријев 1995-чи илдә јеткинлик јашына чатмамыш оғлу Әлимәммәд Нуријевин Бакы шәһәри Нардаран гәсәбәси јахынлығындакы саһәдән тапдығы 4 әдәд 7,62 мм калибрли винтовка патронларыны, јә"ни дөјүш сурсатыны евиндә кизләтмәклә мұвафиг ичазә олмадан сахламышдыр.

Рамиз Мустафајев "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасынын директору вәзифәсиндә ишләмәклә Азәрбајчан Республикасы вәтәндашлары Гасымзадә Тамерлан Јашар оғлу, Әлијев Мәһәммәдәли Мәммәд оғлу, Сејидов Әкбәр Мәчнун оғлу, Бабајев Ваһид Әкбәр оғлу, Һәмзәјев Мәтләб Әли оғлу вә Нәчәфов Азәр Мирзәаға оғлунун фирманын әмәкдашлары олмадығыны билдији һалда харичи паспорт алмадан өтрү һүтүг верән анкет бланкларына мөһүр вурараг тәсдиг етмишдир.

Мүттәһимләрин тәсвир едилән чинајәт һәрәкәтләри мәһкәмә истинтагында тәдгиг едилмиш өз ифадәләри, шаһид ифадәләри, експерт рә"јләри, ишдә олан материаллар вә ишиндикәр объектив һаллары илә ашағыдакы гајдада арашдырылмышдыр.

Белә ки, Әликрам Әлијев мәһкәмә истинтагында диндиләркән өзүнү она е"лан олунмуш иттиһамда гисмән тәгсирли биләрәк ифадәсиндә кәстәрди ки, о, Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасы јарандығы күндән јә"ни 1991-чи илдән һәмин партијанын сәдри ишләмиш, 1993-чү илдә Иран Ислам Республикасындан Азәрбајчана кәлән һәрби нүмајәндә һеј"әтинин тәркибиндә олан Һачы Мәнсур Һәгигәтпурла сәфир Нәһавәндијан васитәсилә таныш олараг, сонунчунун тәгдиминә әсасән онун Иранда мәс"ул һәрби ишдә чалышдығыны билмиш, Азәрбајчанда исламын вәзијјәти барәдә 15 дәгигәлик сөһбәт етдикдән сонра





Һачы Мәнсур ону Иран Ислам Республикасына дө"вөт едөчөјини вө"д етмишдир.

1994-чү илин јанвар ајынын ахырларында "Имдад" хөјријјө чөмијјөтинин хөтти вө онларын малијјө јардымы илө Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасынын Али Шурасынын үзвлөри Һөчи-аға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вө Мирһөсән Чөфөров рөһбөрлији вө онларын сөчдиклөри 150 нөфөрлик зијарөтчилөр групу Иран Ислам Ингилабынын илдөнүмү мүнәсибөтилө кечирилөчөк тэд-бирдө иштирак етмөк үчүн Ирана јола дүшмүшлөр.

Иранда оларкөн Әрдөбил шөһөринин имам чүмөси Мүрөв-вич аға зөвварлары гаршыламыш, мөсчиддө намаз гылындыгдан сонра адыны Әһмөдаға кими төгдим едөн бир нөфөр она јахын-лашараг гуллуг көстөрмөк үчүн Мүрөввич аға төрөфиндөн ајрыл-дығыны билдирмөклө онлары отелө апармышдыр. Әһмөдаға онлара АИП-нын рөһбөрлөри олдуларыны билдијини демөклө чөтинлијин нөдөн ибарөт олмасыны вө һансы көмөк лазым олду-ғуну сорушдугда о, Азәрбајчанын дүшдүјү чөтин вөзијјөтдөн данышараг Иранын бөјүк ислам өлкөси олмагла АИП-на мадди вө мө"нөви јардым етмөсини хөһиш етмишдир. Әһмөдаға дигтөтлө динләдикдөн сонра она 5 мин АБШ доллары пул вериб, бу барөдө гөбзө она, Һөчиаға Нуријевө, Вагиф Гасымова вө Мирһөсән Чөфөрова имза етдирмиш, гөбзи исө пул көтүрдүјү төшкилата һөсабат вермөк үчүн алдығыны билдирмишдир.

Ертөси күн Төбриз шөһөринө көлмиш, орада имам чүмө Мөлөкути аға төрөфиндөн гуллуг көстөрмөк үчүн ајрылмыш вө Бакыдан таныдыглары Әсөдбеки адлы бир шөхс зијарөтдөн сонра онлары Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшдүрөчөјини вө"д етмишдир.

Иранын Исфаһан, Гум вө Мөшһөд шөһөрлөриндө мүгөд-дөс јерлөри зијарөт етдикдөн сонра Төһран шөһөриндө "Мөрмөр"





отелиндө јерләшмишләр. Отелдө оларкән ахшам Әһмәдаға вә Әсәдбеки кәләрәк хејли сөһбәт етдикдән сонра Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшмәк мөгсәдилә онун, Һәчиаға Нуријевин, Вагиф Гасымовун вә Мирһәсән Чәфәровун зәвварлардан ајрылмагла Теһранда галмаларыны хаһиш етмишләр. Ертәси күн зәвварлар Бакыја гајытмыш, онлар исә саат 10 радәләриндә Әһмәдаға вә Әсәдбекинин мүшаијәти илә шәһәрин кәнарында јерләшән Шимран мәнтәгәсинә кедәрәк орада силаһлы әскәрләр тәрәфиндән мүһафизә едилән, икимәртәбәли бинада јерләшән гәраркаһда һәрби палтарда олан Һачы Мәнсур Һәгигәтпурла көрүшмүшләр. Көрүш заманы Һачы Мәнсур өзүнүн Иранын президенти илә јахын мүнасибәтдә олдуғундан, Иран Ислам режиминин үстүнлүкләриндән данышараг АИП-нын бу саһәдә онларын тәчрүбәләриндән истифадә етмәсини төвсијјә етмишдир. Һачы Мәнсур һәр саһәдә АИП-на көмәклик кәстәриләчәјини вә сых әмәкдашлыг едиләчәјини билдирмиш, көрүшүн ахырында исә мәзмуну тәхминән "Биз Азәрбајчан Республикасында ислам дининин инкишафы вә бәргәрар олмасындан өтәри кәләчәкдә Ислам Республикасы јаратмаға зәмин јарадылмасы үчүн "Сепан-е Пастаран-е Енгелабе Еслами" тәшкилаты илә сых әмәкдашлыг едәчәјик, һәмин тәшкилат исә бизә һәм мадди, һәм дә мә"нәви јардым едәчәкдир" олан сәнәди о, Һәчиаға, Вагиф вә Мирһәсән имзаламышлар. Әһмәдаға фарс, Вагиф азәрбајчан дилиндә јаздығлары сәнәд имзalandыгдан сонра Һачы Мәнсур АИП-ин структурунун схемини ағ лөвһәдә чәкәрәк кәләчәкдә нечә тәшкил олунмасыны кәстәрмиш, онлар исә өзләриндә гејдијјатыны апармышдыр. Һачы Мәнсур Бакыја јахын олан Әрдәбил шәһәриндә фәалијјәт кәстәрән Әһмәдаға илә даим әлагә сахланмасы тапшырығыны вердикдән сонра

сонунчунун мүшәјәти илә Астарәја орадан да Бакыја гајытмышлар.

1994-чү илин мај ајында о, Вагиф, Һәчиаға вә Мирһәсән бирликдә Әрдәбилә кетмиш, орада Әһмәдаға онлары гаршыла-јараг гәбз алмагла 5 мин АБШ доллары пул вериб Теһранда Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшдүрмүшдүр.

1995-чи илин пајыз ајларынын бириндә Әһмәдаға илә разылашдыгдан сонра Азәрбајчан Республикасы парламентинә сечкиләрә һазырлыгла әлагәдар онунла бирликдә Һәчиаға вә АИП-ин фәаллары Зирәддин Тағыјев, Мүбариз Мәммәдли, Әбдүлбағы Әлијев, Рөвшән Сәфәров, Тејјуб Сүлејманов Әрдәбил шәһәринә кетмиш, Әһмәдағанын мүшәјәти илә Сәрејн курорт шәһәрчијинә кедәрәк "Сепан пастаране" тәшкилатынын әмәк-дашлары илә АИП-ин вәзијјәтини, сечкиләрдә фәал иштиракыны, партијанын һазырладығы Азәрбајчан Республикасы Конститусијасы лајиһәсини мұзакирә етмишләр. Кечирилмиш ичласларын бириндә Һачы Мәнсур иштирак едәрәк 2 саата јахын чыхыш едиб ислам ингилабынын тәчрүбәсинә әсасланараг һакимијјәтә кәлмәјин јоллары, сечкиләрлә әлагәдар намизәд-ләрин мүәјјән едилмәси вә онлара мадди јардым олунмасы, сијаси шө"бәләр тәрәфиндән Республика һагтында даһа әтрафлы мә"луматларын топланмасы барәдә өз төвсијә вә тапшырыг-ларыны вермишдир. Түркијјәнин ислам тәмајүллү "Рифаһ" партијасынын сечкиләрдә гәләбә чалмасы мұнасибәтилә тәбрик етмәк үчүн о, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов, АИП-нын фәаллары Зирәддин Тағыјев, Мирәләскәр Мирмәммәдов, Рамиз Әһмәдов вә Ағакәрим Новрузовла бирликдә Әһмәдағанын мүшәјәти илә Теһранда Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшүб Азәрбајчанда Исламын үмуми вәзијјәти, партијанын гејдијјатынын ләғв едил-



мәси, сечкиләре бурахылмамасы вә бунунла әлагәдар олараг чәтинликләрин јаранмасы барәдә мә"лумат вермишдир. Көрүшдән сонра Әһмәдаға мадди имканын зәиф олмасы илә әлагәдар олараг Түркияјә онун, Һәчиағанын вә Зирәддинин кетмәсини мәсләһәт биләрәк она 3 мин АБШ доллары пул вермишдир.

Әли Әкбәр Бавәндлә Иранын Азәрбајчандакы сәфирлијиндә көрүшмүш, әввәл онун сәфирлијин ишчиси олдуғуну јә"гин етмиш, сонра исә ондан әмәкдашлыг етмәк барәдә тәклиф ала-раг Һачы Мәнсурла әмәкдашлыг етдијини билдирмәклә е"тираз етмиш, онун исә "Иттилаат" адлы информасија тәшкилатынын әмәкдашы олдуғуну билмишдир.

Бир мүддәт кечдикдән сонра Бавәнд она јахынлашараг "Сепане пастаране" тәшкилаты илә әмәкдашлыг етмәләри барәдә имзаладылары сәнәдин сурәтини кәстәрмиш, бундан сонра о, АИП-на көмәклик едилмәси барәдә биринчијә мүрачиәт етмиш- дир. Бавәнд Иран сәфирлијиндә она һәр дәфә гәбзә имза етдир- мәклә 3 дәфәјә 27 мин АБШ доллары пул вермишдир.

Иранда сәфәрләрдә оларкән гәбзә имза етдирмәклә Әһмәдаға она 5 дәфәјә 23 мин АБШ доллары пул вермишдир.

Әһмәдагадан, Бавәнддән алдығы вә зијарәтә кедәркән зәвварларын вердикләри пуллары партијанын мәркәзи апаратынын, рајон шә"бәләринин, "Исламын сәси" вә "Ислам дүнјасы" гәзетинин редаксија ишчиләринин әмәк һагына, гәзетләрин чап олунмасына, партијанын офисләринин тә"мир олунмасына, коммунал хәрчләринә, идарә, мүәссисә, али вә орта мәктәбләрдә һәмәзгәһәләрин ачылмасына, Гур"анын гираәт олунмасына, бир гәдә- рини исә Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәрова ајда 400-450 мин манат һәчминдә шәхси еһтијачларына



сәрф етмәк үчүн вермишдир. "Ајна" вә "Азадлыг" гәзетләринә мүсаһибәләр вермәклә Хәзәр дәнизиндә нефт һасилаты илә әлагәдар олан "Әсрин сазиши"ндә Иранын ислам дөвләти олдуғуна кәрә мөвгејини мүдафиә етмиш, АБШ вә Исраил дөвләти әлејһинә һеч бир әкс тәблиғат иши апармамышдыр.

1995-чи илин пажызында Әһмәдаға Имами адлы шәхслә Бакыја кәлмиш, онлары Вагиф Гасымов Губа зонасына, Низами Баләғанов Шамаһы зонасына, Һәчиаға Нуријев исә ермәни ишғалчылары тәрәфиндән тутулмуш әразијә јахын олан Ағчабәди зонасына апарараг пулларын һансы мөгсәдә хәрчләндијинин шаһиди олмагла, верилән тапшырығын ичрасындан разы галдығларыны билдирмиш, Бакыда оларкән бир ахшам онун Нардарандакы евиндә гонаг галараг сәфәрин јекунлары барәдә јығынчаг кечирмиш, јығынчагда АИП-нын фәалијјәти, верилмиш төвсијјә вә тапшырығларын јерли тәшкилатларда ичрасы вә кәләчәк програмлар һагтында әтрафлы мүзакирәләр олмушдур.


Азәрбајчан Республикасы һагтында топланылачаг схемләр, хәритәләр вә статистик мә"луматлар Һачы Мәнсурун төвсијјә вә тапшырығына ујғун олараг јерли органларда топланараг Али Шураја кәндәрилмишдир.

Һачы Мәнсурун кадр азлығы барәдә төвсијјәсинә ујғун олараг онун кәстәришинә әсасән Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәровун тәшкилатчылығы илә Азәрбајчанын рәсми һакимијјәт органларындан хәбәрсиз олараг Иранын Гум шәһәринә 3 ајлыг курслара һәр групда 30 нәфәр олмагла 3 груп тәләбә кәндәрилмиш, онларын әсасән идманчы, рәссам, нефтчи, газ сәнајеси ишчиси олмагла сечилмәсинә чидди фикир верилмишдир. Тәләбәләрә Иран сәфирлијиндә зијарәт визалары ачылмыш, сәрһәддән кечдикдән сонра орада тәһсили баша

вурдугдан сонра онлара неч бир сәнәд верилмәмишдир. Иранда оларкән бир нечә дәфә Гум шәһәринә кедиб тәләбәләрә баш чәкмиш, тәһсилләри илә марагланараг кәләчәкдә онлардан кадр кими истифадә едәчәјини вә"д етмишдир.

Онлар дини ганунлар үзрә өз фәалијјәтләрини гурмуш, Иранын хүсуси хидмәт органы "Сепан пастаране" тәшкилатынын әмәкдашлары һачы Мәнсур, Әһмәдаға вә Әсәдбекидән төвсијјә вә тапшырыглар аларкән онларын дәвләтин зәрәринә олдуғуну дәрк етмәмиш, кәрүш заманы икимәртәбәли игамәткаһда имзаладыглары сәнәдин һүтуг мүәјјән едичи сәнәд олдуғуну билмәмишләр.

Һәчиаға Нуријев мәһкәмә истинтагында диндириләркән өзүнү она е"лан олунмуш иттиһамлар үзрә гисмән тәгсирли билмәклә ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, о АИП-ин ичра органынын сәдри олмагла 1994-чү илин феврал ајында "Имдад" хејријјә чәмијјәтинин хәтти илә 150 нәфәрлик һеј"әтин тәркибиндә Әликрам Әлијев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәровла бирликдә Ирана зијарәтә кедәркән Мәшһәд, Гум вә Исфahan шәһәрләриндә мүгәддәс јерләри зијарәт етдикдән сонра Теһран шәһәриндә "Мәрмәр" отелиндә јерләшмишләр. Орада Әрдәбилдән таныдығы Әһмәдаға вә Бакыдан таныдығы Әсәдбеки онларын јанына кәләрәк АИП-ин јаранма тарихиндән, мөвчуд чәтинликләрдән сөһбәт апармыш, онун Әликрамын, Вагифин вә Мирһәсәнин зәвварлардан ајрылмагла Теһранда галмасыны тәклиф етмишдир. һачы Мәнсурла кәрүшмәк мәгсәдилә тәклифи гәбул едәрәк сәһәриси Әһмәдаға вә Әсәдбеки илә шәһәрин кәнарында јерләшән Шимран јашајыш мәнтәгәсиндә Вәрби әскәрләрин мүһафизә етдији икимәртәбәли игамәткаһын икинчи мәртәбәсиндә Иранын





Һөкүмәт адамы кими тәгдим едилмиш Һачы Мәнсурун гәбулунда оларкән Әликрам Әлијев Азәрбајҗандакы үмуми вәзијјәтдән, АИП-нын јарадылмасындан, мөвчуд чәтинликләрдән данышандан сонра Һачы Мәнсур Иран Ислам ингилабы барәдә данышараг онларын ислам ингилабынын һәјата кечирилмәсиндә мүәјјән тәчрүбәләри олмасыны билдирмәклә өз тәклифләрини вермиш, "Сепане пастаране" тәшкилаты илә әмәкдашлыг етмәләри барәдә сәнәдә она, Әликрама, Вагифә вә Мирһәсәнә имза етдирмишдир.

Бакыја јахын олдуғу үчүн тәшкилатын Әрдәбилдә фәалијјәт кәстәрән нүмајәндәси Әһмәдаға васитәсилә даим әлагә сахламағы билдирән Һачы Мәнсур өзүнүн, Әсәдбекинин вә Әһмәдағанын телефон нөмрәләрини онлара вермиш, сонунчунун мүшаијәтилә Астараја ораданда Бакыја кәлмишләр. Бакы шәһәринә гајытдыгдан сонра Али Шуранын ичласында һәммин мәсәләләр мүзакирә едилмиш, партијанын структурунда Һачы Мәнсурун тәклиф етдији мүддәалар нәзәрә алынараг јерли тәшкилатларда ичра едилмәјә башланмышдыр.

1994-чү илин мај ајында о, Әликрам, Вагиф вә Мирһәсәнлә Әрдәбилә кедәрәк Әһмәдаға илә тәкрарән көрүшмүш, сонунчу Азәрбајҗанда үмуми вәзијјәт вә партијанын ишләри барәдә изаһат истәдикдә дөрдү дә ајры-ајрылыгда һесабат верәрәк партијанын фәалијјәтиндән, јерләрдә шө"бәләрин јарадылмасында гаршыја чыхан чәтинликләрдән данышмышлар. Ертәси күн Әһмәдаға отелдә Әликрама 5000 АБШ доллары пул вермиш, пулу кәтүрдүјү тәшкилата һесабат верәчәјини билдирмәклә гәбздә имза етдирмишдир. Һәммин пулдан Әликрам онларын һәр биринә 100 доллар һәчминдә 450 мин манат шөхси еһтијачларына сәрф етмәк үчүн вермишдир.





Әрдәбилдән гајытдыгдан сонра бәрк хәстәләндијиндән бир мүддәт партијанын ишиндә иштирак едә билмәмиш, хәстәханадан чыхандан сонра 1995-чи илин мај ајында Әлиқрам, Вағиф вә Мирһәсәнлә бирликдә Әрдәбилә кетмиш, нитги јахшы олдуғу үчүн АИП-нын фәалијјәти, һачы Мәнсурун гаршыја гојдуғу вәзифәләрин ичрасы барәдә Әһмәдаға да өз нөвбәсиндә јахын кәләчәкдә көрүләчәк ишләр барәдә програм вә 5000 АБШ доллары пул вериб, онлары Тегһрана, һачы Мәнсурун јанына апармышдыр. Орада тәшкилатын фәалијјәтинин даһа да јахшылашдырылмасы, партијанын бүтүн ичтимаи-сијаси вә һәрби мә"луматлара малик олмасы, сәнаје объектләриндә истехсал олунан мәһсулларын нөвү, мәркәзи апаратла јерли тәшкилатларын әлағәләринин күчләндирилмәси, вәзифәли вә нүфузлу шәхсләрин, кәнчләрин, гадынларын партија үзвлүјүнә чәлб едилмәси барәдә јени көстәришләр гәбул едәрәк Бақыја гајытмыш, һачы Мәнсур тәрәфиндән верилән тапшырыг вә көстәришләри чап етдирәрәк јерли тәшкилатлара көндәрмиш, сијаси шө"бәләр гаршысында ичра олунмасы тәләб етмишләр.

1995-чи илин пајыз ајларынын бириндә Әлиқрамын Әһмәдаға илә әввәлчәдән әлдә разылыға әсасән, Азәрбајчан парламентиңе гаршыдан кәлән сечкиләрлә әлағәдар о, Әлиқрам, Зирәддин, Мүбариз, Әбдүлбағы, Рөвшән вә Тејјуб Әрдәбил шәһәринә кедәрәк Сәрејн курорт шәһәрчијиндә 5-6 күн галмагла Әһмәдаға вә Имаминин иштираклары илә бир сыра јығынчаглар кечирилмиш, АИП-нын фәалијјәти барәдә Әлиқрамын вердији гыса мә"луматдан сонра о, сечкиләрлә бағлы партијанын фәалиј-јәти барәдә кениш һесабат вермиш, АИП-нын һазырладығы Азәрбајчан Республикасы Конститусијасынын дәјиһәси музакирә едилмишдир. һачы Мәнсур Сәрејнә бир

нәфәр шәхслә кәләрәк АИП-нын рәһбәр ишчиләри илә кечирилән конфрансда 2 саата јахын чыхыш етмиш, сечкиләрлә әләгәдар компанијанын һансы гәјдада кечирилмәси вә ислам ишинин әсас истигамәтләри барәдә тә"лиматлар верәрәк парламентә намизәдләрин мүәјјән едилмәси, әләгә сахламагла намизәдләрә мадди јардым олунмасы барәдә тапшырыглар вермишдир. Сәфәрдән гәјыдан кими апардығы гејдләри чәмләшдирәрәк "Мәнсур мүәллимин дедикләри" башлығы илә чап етдирмишдир.

1995-чи илин ахырларында Түркијәнин ислам тәмајүллү "Рифаһ" партијасынын сечкиләрдә гәләбәси мүнәсибәтилә онлары тәбрик етмәк үчүн о, Әликрам, Вагиф, Зирәддин, Мирәләскәр, Рамиз вә Ағакәримлә бирликдә Әрдәбилә кедәрәк Түркијәјә кетмәк үчүн мадди имканларын зәиф олдуғуну билдирдикдә Әһмәдаға онлары Теһрана апарыб һачы Мәнсурла көрүшдүрмүшдүр. Орада Әликрам Азәрбајчанда исламын үмуми вәзијјәти, партијанын гејдијјатдан кечмәмәси, сечкиләрә бурахылма-масы, бунунла әләгәдар јаранмыш чәтинликләр барәдә мә"лумат вермиш, о исә АИП-нын фәәлијјәти, кәләчәк иш планлары вә 1996-чы ил үчүн һазырладыглары програм барәдә изаһат вермишдир. һачы Мәнсур исә өз нөвбәсиндә АИП-ин кәләчәк ишини нечә гурмаг вә һансы програм әсасында һәрәкәт етмәк барәдә өз төвсијјә вә тапшырыгларыны вермишдир. Көрүшдән сонра Әһмәдаға мадди имканын мөһдуд олдуғуну билдирәрәк Түркијәјә онун, Әликрамын вә Зирәддинин кетмәсини мәсләһәт билмәклә Әликрама 3000 АБШ доллары пул вермишдир.

1995-чи илин пајызында Әһмәдаға вә Имами Бакыја кәләрәк АИП-нын мәркәзи апаратынын вә јерли тәшкилатлары-






нын ишлэри илэ марагланмыш, партијанын сэдринин кестэриши илэ онлары Жәнчә вә Ағчабәди шәһәрләринә апарараг јерли тәшкилатларын үзвләри илэ сөһбәт апарараг һачы Мәнсурун вердији төвсијјә вә тапшырыгларын јерләрдә ичра олунмасы вәзијјәтини јохламышдыр. Әһмәдаға вә Имамнин иштараклары илэ Әликрамын Нардарандакы евиндә АИП-нын рәһбәр ишчиләринин кечирдикләри јығынчагда иштирак етмиш, орада сәфәрин јекуну мүзакирә едилмишдир.

"Сепане Пастаране" тәшкилатынын Гум шәһәриндә јерләшән мәдрәсәсинә 3 дәфә һәр бири 30 нәфәр олмагла һәгиги һәрби хидмәтә чағырыш јашлы тәләбәләрин кәндәрилмәсиндә о да иштирак етмиш, Иранда оларкән бир нечә дәфә тәләбәләрә баш чәкәрәк онларын дәрсләри илэ марагланмышдыр.

О, Иран Ислам Республикасына сәфәрләри заманы дин хадимләри илэ јанашы һәрби рүтбәли шәхсләрлә вә онларын рәһбәрлик етдији тәшкилатларла әмәкдашлыг етдикләрини һүгути бахымдан тәчрүбәләринин олмамасы илэ изаһ едәрәк сәмими пешиманчылығыны билдирмишдир.

Мирһәсән Чәфәров мәһкәмә истинтагында диндиләркән өзүнү она е"лан олунмуш иттиһамлар үзрә гисмән тәгсирли билмәклә ифадә верәрәк кестәрди ки, о, АИП-нын мәдәни маариф комитәсинин сәдри вәзифәсиндә ишләмәклә 1994-чү илин јанвар ајынын сонунда "Имдад" комитәсинин хәтти илэ Иранын мүгәддәс јерләринә 150 нәфәрлик зијарәтчи групунун тәркибиндә АИП-нын рәһбәрләри Әликрам, һәчиаға вә Вагифлә бирликдә о да Ирана кетмишдир. Сәфәр заманы Мәшһәд, Исфahan вә Гум шәһәрләриндә мүсәлманларын мүгәддәс јерләрини зијарәт едәрәк Тегһран шәһәринә кетмишләр. Орада "Мәрмәр" отелиндә оларкән Әрдәбилдән таныдыглары Әһмәдаға вә Әсәдбеки кәләрәк онлар





илә Азәрбајчанда ислам дининин үмуми вәзијјәти, АИП-нын фәалијјәти вә мөвчуд олан чәтинликләр барәдә фикир мүбадиләси апармышлар.

Ертәси күн Әһмәдағанын тәклифи илә о, Әликрам, Һәчиаға вә Вагиф зәвварлардан ајрылараг Тегһран шәһәринин кәнарында Шимран мәнтәгәсиндә һәрбичиләрин мүһафизә етдији икимәртәбәли игамәткәһдә Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшмүшләр. Көрүш заманы АИП-нын ичтимаи-сијаси партија кими формалашмасы барәдә мүзакирәләр оларкән Һачы Мәнсур ағ лөвһәдә партијанын структурунун сијаси, игтисади, тәшкилат, мөдәни маариф, гадынлар вә кәнчләр шө"бәләриндән тәшкил олунмасы схемини чәкәрәк һәр бир шө"бәнин конкрет вәзифәләриндән данышдыгдан сонра биркә фәалијјәт кәстәрмәк барәдә сәнәдә имза етмәји тәклиф етмишдир.

Тәклифи гәбул едәрәк о, Әликрам, Һәчиаға вә Вагиф "Сепәһ-е пастаране Енгелабе Еслами" тәшкилаты илә әмәкдашлыг етмәк барәдә олан, фарс вә азәрбајчан дилләриндә јазылан сәнәдә имза етмишләр. Ертәси күн тәкрар көрүшдән сонра Әһмәдаға онлары Астарадан Бакыја јола салмышдыр.

Бундан сонра Әһмәдаға Әликрамла телефон васитәси илә даим әлагә сахламыш биринчинин дө"вәти илә даһа 3 дөфә Иранда көрүшләрдә иштирак етмишдир. Һәр дөфә Әһмәдаға онлары Астарада гаршылајыб Әрдәбилә апармыш, нитг габилијјәти јахшы олдуғу үчүн Һәчиаға АИП-нын фәалијјәти, Һачы Мәнсурун төвсијјә вә тапшырыглары әсасында көрүлән ишләр барәдә һесабатлар вермишдир. Әһмәдаға исә гејдијјат апарараг онлара тә"лиматлар вермиш, бундан сонра онлары Тегһрана, Һачы Мәнсурун јанына апарараг көрүлмүн ишләр барәдә сонунчуја

һесабат верилмиш вә ондан кәләчәкдә көрүләчәк ишләр барәдә кәстәришләр алмышлар.

1995-чи илин пажызында Әһмәдаға Имами илә Бакыда оларкән партијанын мәркәзи органынын, Бакы шәһәр комитәсинин, гәзет редаксияларынын вә јерли тәшкилатларын иши илә марагланмыш, апардығы сорғулар заманы Һачы Мәнсурун кәстәришләринин реал ичрасындан разы галдыгларыны билдирмишләр. Әһмәдаға вә Имами Губа, Шамаһы, Жәнчә вә Ағчабәди зоналарында сәфәрдә олдугдан сонра Әликрамын Нардарандакы евиндә АИП-нын рәһбәр ишчиләри илә кечирдији мүшавирәдә Һачы Мәнсурун тәшәббүсү илә јаранмыш сијаси шә"бәләрин фәалијјәти, әрази, әһалинин тәркиби, һүтүг-мүһафизә ишчиләринин вә чәза чәкән мәһбусларын сајы, сәнаје объектләриндә истәһсал олунан мәһсулларын ады, статистик мә"луматлар һаггында схемләр, хәритәләр вә чәдвәлләрин топланмасы барәдә изаһат вермишдир.

Һачы Мәнсурун төвсијјәләринә ујғун олараг 1994-1995-чи илләрдә Әликрамын, Һәчиағанын вә Вагифин тапшырығы илә Гур"ан тәһсили алмаг үчүн Иранын Гум шәһәринә әсасыны чағырыш јашлы кәнчләр тәшкил едән 3 груп кәндәрмишдир. Тәләбәләрә Иран сәфирлијиндә зијарәт визасы ачылараг "зәввар" ады алтында сәрһәддән кечмәләри үчүн шәраит јарадылмышдыр. Иранда оларкән тәләбәләрин дәрсләри илә марагландыгда орада үнвансыз мәктәб бинасынын мүһафизә алтында сахландығыны, кедиш кәлишин гадаған олундуғуну, мәктәби битирмиш тәләбәләрә сәнәд верилмәдијинин шаһиди олмуш, һәмин тәләбәләрдән башга сәрһәдди ганунсуз кечиб орада дәрс кечән чоҳсајлы азәрбајҗанлы ушаглар олдуғуну да көрмүшдүр.



Вагиф Гасымов мөһкәмә истинтагында диндириләркән өзүнү она е"лан олунмуш иттиһам үзрә тәгсирли билмәмиш вә ифадә верәрәк кәстәрмишдир ки, о АИП-нын тәфтиш нәзарәт комитәсинин сәдри вәзифәсиндә ишләмәклә "Имдад" хејријјә чәмијјәтинин хәтти илә 150 нәфәрлик зијарәтчи групун тәркибиндә Иранын Мөшһәд, Исфahan вә Гум шәһәрләриндә мүгәддәс јерләри зијарәт етдикдән сонра Тегһран шәһәринин "Мәрмәр" отелиндә јерләшәркән Әрдәбилдән таныдығы Әһмәдаға вә Тәбриздән таныдығы Әсәдбеки илә көрүшмүшдүр.

Әһмәдағанын тәклифи илә о, Әликрам, Һәчиаға вә Мир-һәсән зәвварлардан ајрылараг Тегһранын кәнарында јерләшән Шимран мәнтәгәсиндә силаһлы һәрбичиләрин мүһафизә етдији "Сепаһе пастаране" тәшкилатынын игамәткәһдә Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшмүшләр. Көрүш заманы Әликрам вә Һәчиаға республикада олан ичтимаи сијаси вәзијјәт, сијаси партијаларын о чүмләдән АИП-нын мөвгеји барәдә мә"лумат вермиш, партијанын структурунун тәкмилләшдирилмәси барәдә Һачы Мәнсурун ағ лөвһәдә чәкдији схем мүзакирә едиләрәк биркә фәалијјәт кәстәрмәк барәдә сәнәдә дөрдү дә имза етмишләр. Ертәси күн Һачы Мәнсур схемдә кәстәрилмиш шә"бәләрин вәзифәләрини кениш изаһ етмиш, онлар исә һәр бири өзүндә гејдијјатыны апармышлар. Бакыја јахын олдуғу үчүн "Сепаһе Пастаране" тәшкилатынын Әрдәбилдә фәалијјәт кәстәрән әмәкдашы Әһмәдаға илә даим әлагә сахламағы билдирән Һачы Мәнсур, биринчијә онлары јола салмағы тапшырмышдыр.

Бу көрүшдән сонра Әликрам Әһмәдаға илә даим телефонла әлагә сахламыш, 1994-чү илин мај ајында вә 1995-чи илин мај ајында Әһмәдағанын мүшајәти вә малијјәләшдирмәси илә Тегһранда Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшәрәк онун тапшырыгларынын



ичрасы барədə һесабат вермиш вә јени төвсијјә вә тапшырыглар алмышлар. Сәфәрдән гајыдан кими Али Шуранын ичласларында һәмин төвсијјә вә тапшырыглар мұзакирә едилмәклә партијанын структурунда нәзәрә алынараг јерли тәшкилатларда ичра едилмәјә башланмышдыр.

1995-чи илин ахырларында Түркијәдә ислам тәмајүллү "Рифаһ" партијасынын сечкиләрдә гәләбә чалмасы мұнасибәтилә онлары тәбрик етмәк үчүн о, Әликрам, Һәчиаға, Зирәддин, Мирәләскәр, Рамииз вә Ағакәримлә бирликдә Әһмәдаға илә Әрдәбилдә көрүшәрәк мәгсәдләрини она билдирмиш, сонунчу онлары Теһрана апарараг Һачы Мәнсурла көрүшдүрмүшдүр. Көрүшдә Әликрам Азәрбајчанда исламын вәзијјәти, АИП-ин фәалијјәтинин дајандырылмасы вә парламент сечкиләринә бурахылмамасы барәдә мә"лумат верәрәк, мөвчуд чәтинликләр барәдә данышмыш, Һачы Мәнсур исә АИП-нын кәләчәк ишинин нечә гурулмасы вә һансы програм әсасында һәрәкәт етмәк барәдә програм вә кәстәришләрини вермишдир. Көрүшдән сонра Әһмәдаға Әликрама мадди имканын зәиф олдуғуну билдирмәклә Түркијәјә онунла бирликдә Һәчиаға вә Зирәддинин кетмәсини мәсләһәт билмиш, о исә Бакыја гајытмышдыр.

1995-чи лин пәјызында Әһмәдаға вә Имами Һачы Мәнсурун тапшырығы илә Бакыја кәләркән Әликрамын кәстәришинә әсасән онлары Губа зонасына апарараг јерли тәшкилатларыниши илә таныш етмиш, Әликрамын Нардарандакы евиндә кечирилән мұшавирәдә иштирак етмишдир.

Һачы Мәнсурун програм вә тапшырығына әсасән "Сәпаһе пәстаране" тәшкилатынын Гум шәһәриндә јерләшән мәдрәсәсиндә тәһсил алмаг үчүн 3 ајлыг курслара, әсасыны һәгиги

Һәрби хидмәтә чағырыш јашлы кәнчләр тәшкил едән, һәр бири 30 нәфәрдән ибарәт 3 груп тәләбә кәндәрилмәсиндә јахындан иштирак етмиш, Иранда олан сәфәрләри заманы Әликрам, Һәчиаға вә Мирһәсәнлә бирликдә онларын тәһсил алдығы, үзәриндә һеч бир јазы олмајан мәдрәсәјә кедәрәк дәрсләри вә сәһһәтләри илә марагланмышлар.

Һачы Мәнсур Һәгигәтпур һәрби формада олмагла үзәриндә һеч бир фәргләндиричи нишан олмамыш, Әрдәбилдә алынмыш 23 мин вә Иран сәфирлијиндә алынмыш 27 мин АБШ доллары пулдан хәстә олдуғу үчүн хәбәри олмушдур. Һәрдән бир мөвачиб гајдада Әликрам Әлијевдән 450 мин манат јахуд 100 доллар алмышдыр. Ислам банкы һаггында олан мөхфи сәнәд она танымадығы шәхс тәрәфиндән верилмиш, анлајышы олмадығындан сијаси шө"бәнин сәдри Мүбариз Мәммәдлијә кәстәрмиш, лакин сонунчу да Зирәддин Тағыјевлә һеч бир мүсбәт нәтичә әлдә етмәдикләринә кәрә сәнәдләри она гајтармыш, о исә лазымсыз бир кағыз кими идәрәдә сахламышдыр.

Рамиз Мустафајев мөһкәмәдә диндириләркән өзүнү она е"лан олунмуш иттиһамда тәгсирли биләрәк кәстәрди ки, о 1995-чи илин октјабр ајынын 27-дән "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасынын директору олмагла харичи өлкәләрә турист кедән Азәрбајчан вәтәндашларынын сәфәрини тәшкил етмәклә мөшғул олмуш, фәалијјәт мүддәтиндә Иран Ислам Республикасына чәми 8 нәфәр турист кәндәрмишдир.

1996-чы илин феврал ајынын ахырларында Ирана турист кими кәндәрәчәји ики нәфәр һаггында факс кәлиб кәлмәмәсини өјрәнмәк мөгсәдилә Иран сәфирлијиндә оларкән, АИП-нын ишчиси Әбдүлбағы Әлијевлә растлашмыш, сонунчу ондан мөһүрүнүн үстүндә олуб олмамасыны сорушараг јә"гинлик һасил





етдикдән сонра зијарәтә кетмәк истәјән 6 нәфәрин харичи паспорт алмагдан өтәри һүгүг верән анкетләрә мөһүр вурмасыны хаһиш етмишдир. О исә бланклары паспорт аланын ишләдији мүүссисәнин долдуруб мөһүрләмәли олдуғуну билдији һалда директору олдуғу "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасынын мөһүрүнү ганунсуз олараг бош анкетләрә вурмушдур. Әмәлиндән сәмими пешимандыр.

Шаһид Зирәддин Тағыјев мөһкәмәдә диндириләркән ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, о 1995-чи илин апрел ајында АИП-нын малијјә јардымы илә Мәккә зијарәтиндән сонра һәчы олмасыны нәзәрә алараг Әликрам Әлијев вә партијанын Али Шурасынын кәстәриши илә 1995-чи илин октјабр ајында АИП-нын Бакы шәһәр комитәсинә рәһбәр тә"јин едилмишдир. Бундан сонра АИП-нын сәдри Әликрам Әлијев, Али Шуранын үзвләри Вагиф Гасымов, һәчиаға Нуријев вә Мирһәсән Чәфәровун кәстәриши илә Бакы шәһәринин рајонлары һагтында зәрури мә"луматларын топланмасы һагтында төвсијјәләр һазырламыш, рајон комитәләринин рәһбәрләринә пәјләјиб, һазыр мә"луматлары исә өзүндә чәмләшдирмишдир. Бундан аз мүддәт кечдикдән сонра партијанын сәдри Әликрам Әлијев вә ичра апаратынын сәдри һәчиаға Нуријев онунла бирликдә партијанын бир груп рәһбәр вә фәал ишчиләрини "зијарәт" ады алтында Ирана апармыш, Әһмәдағанын мүшәјәти илә Сәрејн курорт шәһәрчијиндә јерләшмишләр. Орада олдуғлары мүддәтдә һәр күн Әһмәдаға вә бир нечә Иранлы вәтәндашын АИП рәһбәрлији илә Азәрбајчанда јаранмыш игтисади, сијаси, сәсиәл вәзијјәт һагтында, АИП-нын стуктуру, рајон комитәләри илә мәркәзи органын әлағәләри барәдә мәсәләләр мүзакирә еттијини, партијанын һазырладығы Сечкигабағы платформа вә



Азәрбајҗан Республикасы Конститусија лајиһәси, ислам дөвләтинин јаранмасы, һакимијјәтә кәлмәјин јоллары барәдә һачы Мәнсурун кәстәришләр вердијини кәрмүшдүр.

1996-чы илин јанвар ајында Әликрам Әлијев, һәчиаға Нуријев вә Вағиф Гасымовун рәһбәрлији илә АИП-нын бир груп фәал ишчиләри Ирана кедәркән орада Әһмәдағанын мүшәјәти вә јардымы илә Теһранда һачы Мәнсур һәгигәт-пурун иш игамәткәһында оларкән сонунчуну Иранын "ИРНА" информасија ајентлијинин нүмајәндәси кими тәғдим едән һәчиаға Нуријев Азәрбајҗанда ичтимаи-сијаси вәзијјәт, кечирилмиш парламент сечкиләри, АИП-нын үмуми вәзијјәти, партија структурунда едилән дәјишикликләр барәдә һесабат вермишдир. Халлы униформада олан һачы Мәнсур исә кениш чыхыш едәрәк партијанын мәркәзи вә рајон тәшкилатларынын ишчи штатларыны долдурмағ, јерләрдә партијанын нәзарәт органынын нүмајәндәсини јерләшдирмәк, партијанын шүар вә вә"дләрини кениш тәтбиг етмәк, партијанын ислам әсасында сијаси, игтисади, мэдәни-маариф, кәнчләр, гадынлар вә зијалыларла иш програмы ишләјиб һазырламағ, кәнчләрин Иранда 3 ајлығ вә 4 иллик тәһсил програмларыны һәјата кечирмәк үчүн Азәрбајҗанын мүхтәлиф рајонларында ислам әсаслары үзрә семинар мүшавирәләр кечирмәк, күтләви тәблиғат вә тәшвиғат ишләриндә Иран мүтәхәссисләриндән истифадә етмәк, Гафгаз Руһаниләри идарәсинин рәһбәрлији вә әмәкдашлары илә јахшы мүнасибәт јаратмағ вә бундан истифадә етмәк, һәрби һиссәләрдә, һүтүг мүһафизә органларында, стратеги әһәмийјәтли саһәләрдә мөвгеләр әлдә едилмәси, "Исламын сәси" вә "Ислам дүнјасы" гәзетинин ишини күчләндирмәк, партија үзвләринин, хүсусилә зијалы, гадынларын сајынын

артмасы истигамәтиндә иш апармаг, АБШ вә Исраил дәвләтләри илә әмәкдашлығын, Хәзәр дәнизиндән нефт һасилаты үзрә "Әсрин сазиши"нин әлејһинә комплекс әкс тәблиғат иши апармаг, гәрб дәвләтләринин хүсусилә АБШ вә Исраилин Азәрбајчанда олан фирма вә мүштәрәк мүәссисәләринин зәиф чәһәтләрини ашкар етмәк барәдә төвсијјә вә тапшырыглар вермишдир. Әһмәдаға мадди имканын зәиф олмасыны билдирәрәк Түркіјәјә онун, Әликрамын вә Һәчиағанын кетмәсини мәсләһәт билмишдир. Түркіјәдән гајытдыгдан сонра Һәчиаға Нуријев ону јанына чағырараг Һачы Мәнсурун чыхышы үзрә гејдијјатларыны системләшдирмәји тапшырмыш, сонра бу төвсијәләрин Али Шурада мүзакирә едиләчәјини вә һәр бир бәндин конкрет ичрачыја тапшырылачағыны билдирмишдир.

1996-чы илин апрел ајында Әликрам Әлијев вә Һәчиаға Нуријевин тәкиди илә тәркибиндә һәкимләр, журналистләр, игтисадчылар, нефт вә газ сәнајеси ишчиләри олан групу рәһбәрлик етмәклә Ирана апармыш, Әһмәдағанын тә"јин етдији Чавид адлы шәхсинмүшәјәти илә мүтәддәс јерләри зијарәт етдикдән сонра Астарадан Әһмәдаға онлары гаршылајыб АИП тәрәфиндән охумаға кәндәрилән төләбәләрин Милли Тәһлүкәсизлик Назирлији әмәкдашлары тәрәфиндән кери гајтарылмаларыны бәрк нараһатчылыгла билдирмишдир.

Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәровун илтизамнамә вермәклә күлли мигдарда харичи валјута алдығыны, онларын Бақы һава лиманларынын, фабрик вә заводларда истеһсал олунан мәһсулларын сајынын, һәрбә статежи әһәмијјәтли јерләрин схем вә хәритәләринин һәқиқиәси барәдә мә"луматларын Иранын хүсуси хидмәт органы олан "Сепан-е пастаран-е Енгелабе Еслами"



тәшкилатына Һачы Мәнсур Һәгигәтпурун тапшырығы әсасында һазырладығыны сонрадан билмишдир. АИП-нын һансы мәнбәдән малијјәләшдирилдијиндән хәбәри олмамыш, лакин Бақы шәһәр комитәсинин ишчиләри ајда 100 мин манатдан 250 мин манатадәк мааш алмышдыр.

Шаһид Мүбариз Мәммәдли мәһкәмәдә диндириләркән ифадәсиндә кәстәрди ки, фәалијјәттә олдуғу дөврдә АИП-нын сијаси шә"бәсинә башчылығ етмәклә јанашы "Исламын сәси" гәзетинин редактору ишләмиш вә һәмин мүддәттә 200 мин манатдан 400 мин манатадәк мааш алмышдыр.

1995-чи илин пајызында АИП-нын бир груп рәһбәрләри Әлиқрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Бабахан Балакишијев вә Тејјуб Сүлејмановла бирликдә Әрдәбил јахынлығындакы Сәрејн курорт шәһәриндә оларкән Әһмәдаға, Имами вә Һачы Мәнсурун иштираклары илә кечирилән конфрансларда иштирак етмишдир. Әлиқрам вә Һәчиаға АИП-ин сон илләрдә газандығы наилијјәтләрдән, сечкиләрә һазырлығдан, сечкигабағы платформанын мүәјјән олунмасындан, парламент үзвлүјүнә намизәдләрин верилмәсиндән, АИП-нын сечкиләрдә галиб кәлмәк үчүн тәблиғат-тәшвиғат вә күтләви информасија органлары илә ишин гурулмасындан данышарағ һесабат вермишләр. Һачы Мәнсур АИП-нын һазырладығы Азәрбајчан Республикасы Конститусијасынын лајиһәсини нәзәрдән кечирәрәк өз төвсијјә вә тапшырығларыны вермишдир.

Бундан башга 1995-чи илин ахырларында Әһмәдаға вә Имами Бақыда оларкән Әлиқрамын Нардарандакы евиндә АИП-нын рәһбәр ишчиләри илә мүшавирә кечирәрәк парламент сечкиләринә бурахылмамасында АИП-нын гејри фәаллығыны гејд етмиш, кәләчәкдә партијанын ишинин күчләндирилмәси үчүн





нүфузлу вә сөзүкчән адамларын бу ишә чәлб олунмасыны тәшкил етмәк мәгсәди илә топланышлар, митингләр кечирилмәси, әһали арасында, мәтбуатда нефт сазыши илә әлагәдар Иранын мөвгәјинин мүдафиә олунмасына даир чыхышлар едилмәсини төвсијјә етмишләр. АИП-нын һансы тәшкилат тәрәфиндән малијјәләшдирилдијини Әликрам Әлијевдән дәфәләрлә сорушдуғуна бахмајараг сонунчу онун бу ишә гарышмамасыны билдирмишдир. Азәрбајчанда ислам банкынын јарадылмасы барәдә мәхфи сәнәди она Вагиф Гасымов вермиш, банк ишинин тәшкилиндән анлајышы олмадығына көрә Зирәддин Тағыјевә о да өз нөвбәсиндә биринчијә гајтармышдыр.

Бакынын һава лиманларынын вә стратежи чәһәтдән әһәмијјәтли јерләрин схем вә хәритәләринин чәкилмәси, фабрик, завод вә диқәр мүәссисәләрин истехсал етдији мәһсуллар барәдә статистик мә"луматларын топланмасы, азадлыгдан мәһруметмә јерләриндә чәза чәкән мәһбусларын сајынын өјрәнилмәси мәсәләси Али Шуранын сијаси шө"бәсинин гаршысына гојулдуғуна көрә онда тәәчүб доғурмуш, бу барәдә Әликрам Әлијевдән сорушдугда чаваб ала билмәмишдир.

Шаһид Мирәләскәр Мирмәммәдов мәһкәмәдә ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, АИП-нын Али Шурасынын үзвү вә Губа рајон комитәсинин сәдри ишләјәркән 1996-чы илин јанвар ајында Әликрам, Һәчиаға, Вагиф, Зирәддин, Рамиз вә Ағакәрим бирликдә ислам тәмајүллү "Рифаһ" партијасыны сечкиләрдә гәләбә чалмасы мүнасибәти илә тәбрик етмәк үчүн Түркіјәјә Ирандан кечиб кетмәк мәгсәдилә Теһрана кетмишләр. Түркіјәјә нә үчүн Ирандан кетдикләрини сорушдугда Әликрам мадди чәһәтдән белә сәрфәли олдуғуну билдирмишдир. Һачы Мәнсурун иш игамәткаһы һәрбичиләр тәрәфиндән мүһафизә едилдијини

көрөркән оранын һансыса һәрби тәшкилат олдуғуну билмишдир. Һачы Мәнсур Әликрам, Һәчиаға вә Вагифлә көһнә танышлар кими 2 саата јахын сөһбәт апараг партијанын фәалијјәти илә марагланмыш, сонунчулар исә һәр бири өз фәалијјәтләри барәдә она һесабат вермишләр. Бундан сонра Һачы Мәнсур партијанын структурунда бә"зи дәјишикләр етмәк барәдә көстәришләр вермиш, Әһмәдаға исә малијјә вәзијјәти илә әлагәдар олараг Әликрамын, Һәчиағанын вә Зирәддинин Түркијә кетмәсини мәсләһәт билмишдир.

1995-чи илин пајыз ајларында Вагиф Гасымовун мүшәјәти илә Әһмәдаға вә Имами Губаја кәләрәк исламын вәзијјәти илә марагланмыш, АИП-нын структуру, шүар вә чағырышларын һазырланмасы. партијанын ислам идејасы вә ислам режиминин үстүнлүкләринин тәблиғи, зијарәт ады илә зијальыларын, нүфузлу шәхсләрин топланыб Ирана көндәрилмәсини тәшкил етмәк, күтләви тәдбирләрдә Иран төмајүллү мүтәхәссисләрдән истифадә етмәк, конфранс вә семинарлар кечирмәк, "Исламын сәси" вә "Ислам дүнјасы" гәзетләринин әһали арасында абунәсини тәшкил етмәк барәдә јерли тәшкилатын үзвләринә төвсијјәләр верәрәк Бакыја гајытмышлар.

Шаһид Бабахан Балакишијев мәһкәмә истинтагында диндиләркән ифадә верәрәк көстәрди ки, о, 1992-чи илин март ајындан "Ислам дүнјасы" гәзетиндә редактор вәзифәсиндә ишләмәклә о, АИП-нын сәдри Әликрам Әлијевин көстәриши илә партијанын бир сыра рәһбәрләри илә бирликдә Иранын Сәрејн курорт шәһәрчијиндә оларкән биринчинин тәғдиматы илә Әһмәдаға, Имами даһа сонра Һачы Мәнсурла таныш олмуш, сонунчуларын иштирак етмәклә Әликрам Әлијев вә Һәчиаға Нуријевин партијанын фәалијјәти барәдә һесабат вердикләрини,





Иран тәрәфи әмәкдашларынын исә партијанын ишинә аид олмајан төвсијјәләр вердијини, партијанын һазырладығы "Сечки һагтында" һанун вә Азәрбајҗан Республикасы Конститусијасынын лајиһәси мұзакирә едилдијини көрмүшдүр. Сонрадан она мә"лум олмушдур ки, фабрик, завод вә мұәссисәләр һагтында, елм, тәдрис мұәссисәләринин профессор, мұәллим вә тәләбә һејјәти барәдә статистик мә"луматлар, һәрби стратеги әһәмијјәтли олан тәшкилатларын схем вә хәритәләрин топланмасы Иранын хұсуси хидмәт органы олан "Сепане пастаране" тәшкилатынын тапшырығына әсасән јығылмышдыр.

1995-чи илдә Әһмәдаға вә Имаминин Бақыда Әликрамын Нардаран кәндиндәки евиндә АИП-нын рәһбәрләри илә кечирдикләри јығынчагда партијанын парламент сечкиләриндә уғурсузулуғуну јерли тәшкилатларла ишин зәиф олмасы илә әлагәләндирдијини, кадрларын јахшылашдырылмасы үчүн Ирана 3 ајлыг курслара тәләбәләр кәндәрилмәси барәдә Мирһәсән Чәфәрова кәстәришләр вердијини ешитмишдир.

Шаһид Тејјуб Сүлејманов мәһкәмә истинтагында ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, о, 1995-чи илин мај ајындан АИП Шамаһы рајон комитәсинин сәдри вәзифәсиндә ишләмәклә АИП Али Шурасынын тапшырыгларыны даим јеринә јетирәрәк ајда бир дәфә Ичра Органынын сәдри Һәчиаға Нуријевә көрдүјү ишләр барәдә јазылы һесабат вермиш, рајон әризисиндә фәалијјәт кәстәрән сијаси партијалар, чәмијјәтләр, ичмалар, мәтбуат органлары, мұхтәлиф динләри вә тәригәтләри тәблиғ едән чәмијјәтләр, гурумлар, харичи мұштәрәк вә мұстәгил фирмалар, рајонда сөзү кечән шәхсләр, үмумијјәтлә рајон һагтында статистик мә"луматлар топлајараг партијанын Али Шурасына тәгдим етмишләр.





1995-чи илин пайызында Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов, Зирәддин Тағыјев вә дижәрләри илә Иранын Сәрејн курорт шәһәрчијиндә оларкән Әһмәдаға, Имами вә даһа сонра Һачы Мәнсурун иштирак етдикләри мүшавирәләрдә Азәрбајчан дәвләтинин зәрәринә олан мәсәләләр мүзакирә едилмиш, АИП-нын һазырладығы конститусија лајиһәси тәһлил едилмишдир. Ишләдији мүддәтдә комитәнин ишчиләри ајда 400-450 мин манат мәбләғиндә әмәк һаггы алмышдыр.

Шаһид Мәзаһир Ахундов мәһкәмә истинтагында диндириләркән Тејјуб Сүлејмановун ифадәсини тәсдиг етмәклә јанашы билдирди ки, о, АИП-нын Шамаһы рајон комитәсинин табечилијиндә олан Гобустан рајон комитәсинин сәдри вәзифәсиндә ишлә-мәклә партијанын Али Шурасынын кәстәриши илә комитәдә сијаси шә"бә ачылмыш, шә"бәнин гаршысында гојулмуш вәзифәләрә ујғун олараг рајонда олан тәшкилатлар, һәбсханаларда чәза чәкән мәһбусларын сајы, фабрик вә заводлар һаггында статистик мә"луматлар барәдә сәнәдләри топлајараг Тејјуб Сүлејманова тәғдим етмиш, ахырынчы да өз нөвбәсиндә һәмин сәнәдләри Али Шураја тәғдим етмишдир. Шамаһы рајон комитәсинин сәдриндән мәвачиб гајдада 150-200 мин манат ајда мааш алмышдыр.

Шаһид Низами Балоғлановун мәһкәмә истинтагында е"лан олунмуш ибтидаи истинтаг заманы вердији ифадәсиндән кәрүнүр ки, о, АИП-нын Али Шурасынын үзвү олмагла 1995-чи илдә Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов, Мирһәсән Чәфәров вә дижәрләри илә Әрдәбилдә оларкән Әһмәдаға Әзими онлары гаршылајыб Тегһран шәһәринә апарараг силаһлы әскәрләрин мүһафизә етдији икимәртәбәли игамәткаһда Һачы Мәнсур Һәгигәтпурла кәрүшдүрмүш, орадан Гум шәһәринә кедәрәк

3 ајлыг курсларда тәһсил алан Азәрбајҗанлы тәләбәләрлә көрүшмүшләр.

1995-чи илин пажыз ајларында Әһмәдаға вә Имами Бакыда оларкән Әликрам Әлијевин кәстәриши илә онлары Шамахи, Исмајыллы, Көјҗај, Шәки вә Гобустана апарараг јерләрдә көрүлмүш ишләр барәдә партија фәаллары илә сөһбәтләр апарылмыш, партија структурунда олан сијаси шө"бәләрин ишләри илә марагланмышлар.

1996-чы илин әввәлләриндә Әликрам Әлијев, Һәҗиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә дикәрләри илә Әрдәбил шәһәриндә Әһмәдаға, Имами вә дикәр шәхсләрлә көрүш заманы Һәҗиаға Нуријев Азәрбајҗанда иҗтимаи-сијаси вәзијјәт, АИП-нын гејдијјатдан кечмәмәси вә сечкиләрә бурахылмамасы барәдә һесабат вермиш, Әһмәдаға исә буну Азәрбајҗанда ислам дининин зәиф тәблиғ олунмасы илә әлагәләндирәрәк партијанын тәқрар гејдијјатдан кечмәси үчүн кадрларын артырылмасыны кәстәрмишдир.

АИП-нын мәдәни маариф комитәсинин сәдри Мирһәсән Чәфәровун тапшырығы илә Шамахыдан 2 нәфәр тәләбә сечәрәк она тәгдим етмиш, тәләбәләр имтаһан едиләрәк Иранын Гум шәһәринә 3 ајлыг курслара охумаға кәндәрилмишләр.

Шаһид Баладајы Һүсејнов мәһкәмә истинтагында диндириләркән ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, о, АИП Сәбајыл рајон комитәсинин сәдри вәзифәсиндә ишләмәклә партијанын рәһбәр ишчиләри Әликрам Әлијев, Һәҗиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәровун кәстәриши, Бакы шәһәр комитәсинин сәдри Зирәддин Тағыјевин тапшырығы илә рајонун јашајыш, сәнајә, инзибати објетләринин, торпаг саһәләринин чоғрафи мөвгејини әкс етдирән схемләри, рајон әһалисинин саж тәркиби

мүәссисәләрин әсас техники игтисади кәстәричиләрини, рајон әразисиндә јерләшән сијаси партијалар, чәмијјәтләр, мәтбуат органлары вә үмумијјәтлә рајон һаггында статистик мә"луматлары топлајараг сонунчуја тәгдим етмишдир. Һәмин мә"луматларын һансы мәгсәдләр үчүн јығылдығыны Зирәддин Тағыјевдән сорушдугда о АИП-нын фәалијјәти илә әлагәдар топландығыны билдирмишдир. Бундан башга тапшырыға әсасән топланмалы олан рајон әразисиндәки тәчридханаларда мәнбусларын сајыны өјрәнә билмәмишдир.

Шаһидләрдән Исабала Әһмәдов, Мәммәд Һүсејли, Чавид Рәһимов, Ханалы Фәтәлијев, Шаһин Сејидов, Мәтләб Мәммәдов, Рза Рзајев вә Елбрус Ахундов да ифадә верәрәк Баладајы Һүсејновун мәнкәмә истинтагында вердији ифадәсиндәки хүсусатлары олдуғу кими тәсдиг етдиләр.

Шаһид Мәдәт Абдуллајев мәнкәмә истинтагында ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, өз арзусу илә дини тәһсил алмаг үчүн Иранын Гум шәһәринә кетмиш, орада Азәрбајчан вәтәндашларынын мәсәләләри илә мәшғул олан идарә тәрәфиндән мәдрәсәјә гәбул едиләрәк она "Сүлејман Аббаси" ләгәби верилмәклә әсл адынын кизләдилмәси тапшырылмышдыр. Мәдрәсәдә охудуғу мүддәтдә "Дару тәрчүмә" дејилән тәшкилатда Азәрбајчанын мәнәфејинә зидд јығынчаглар тәшкил едилмиш "Сепәһе пастаране" тәшкилатынын јүксәк рүтбәли забитләри чыхыш едәрәк Азәрбајчанын гәдим Иран торпағы олдуғуну билдирмәклә Иран Ислам Ингилабынын хејринә, Азәрбајчанда гәбул едилмиш Конститутсисјанын әлејһинә тәблиғат апармышлар. Мәдрәсәдә Гур"ан тәһсилиндән башга Иран Ислам Ингилабындан вә башга аид олмајан фәннләрдән дәрс кечилмәклә



јанашы һәрби тә"лимләр һагтында, онларын кечирилмәси барәдә мә"луматлар верилмишдир.

АИП-нын рәһбәрләри Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Мирһәсән Чәфәров онларын охудуглары мәдрәсәјә бир нечә дәфә кәлмиш, партијанын фәалијјәтиндән данышараг, һакимиј-јәтә кәләрләрсә, тәләбә кадрлардан истифадә едәчәкләрини билдирмишләр. Әликрам Әлијев Азәрбајчанын әлејһинә митинг вә јығынчагларда иштирак едән тәләбәләрлә тәкбәтәк сөһбәт апармышдыр. Мәдрәсәдә охујан бүтүн тәләбәләр јәј вахтларында Урмијјә шәһәринә апарыллараг автомат, пулемјот силаһлардан атәш ачмаг вә саир һәрби тә"лимләр кечмишдир. Мәдрәсәни битирдикдән сонра она Иранын Хүсуси Хидмәт Органы Инфор-масија вә Тәһлүкәсизлик Назирлијинин әмәкдашлары тәрәфин-дән әмәкдашлыға чәлб едилмә чәһдләри олмуш, лакин о буна гәти е"тиразыны билдирмишдир.

Шаһидләрдән Рөвшән Сәфәров вә Таләһ Һүсәјнов да мәһ-кәмә истинтагында ифадә верәрәк Мәдәт Абдуллајевин ифадәсини тәсдиг етмәклә јанашы билдирдиләр ки, Гум шәһәриндәки мәдрәсәдә тәһсил аларкән Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәров ораја кәләрәк азәрбајчанлы тәләбәләрлә көрүшмүш, Азәрбајчан әлејһинә дүзәлдилмиш митинг вә јығынчагларда фәал иштирак едән тәләбәләрлә тәкбәтәк көрүшмүшләр.

Шаһид Әләкбәр Рәсулов мәһкәмә истинтагында диндири-ләркән ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, о, АИП-нын рәһбәрләри Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәров тәрәфиндән тәшкил едиләрәк 3 ајлыг дини тәһсил алмаг үчүн зијарәт ады алтында Иранын Гум шәһәринә кетмиш, онула биркә кәндәрилмиш чағырыш јашлы азәрбајчанлы ушаг-

лары Мәчиди адлы шәхс гаршылајараг мәдрәсәјә гәбул етмиш, тәдрис заманы шәриәт елмләри илә јанашы Ислам Ингилабынын вачиблији вә лабүдлүјү гејд едилмәклә онун дүнјада баш вермиш бүтүн ингилаблардан үстүнлүјү барәдә Иранын хүсуси хидмәт органы әмәкдашлары тәрәфиндән дәфәләрлә мұһазирәләр охунмушдур. Тәһсил мүддәтиндә бүтүн хәрчләр Иран тәрәфиндән өдәнилмишдир. Мәдрәсәнин үнван кәстәрән лөвһәсинин олмамасына вә ораны битирән һеч бир сәнәд верилмәдијинә кәрә һәрби тәшкилата хидмәт етдијини билмишдир. АИП-нын рәһбәрләри Әликрам, Һәчиаға, Вагиф вә Мирһәсән онларын тәһсил алдылары мәдрәсәјә кәлмиш, сөһбәт әснасында јахшы охујан ушагларын партијада вәзифәләрә ирәли чәкиләчәкләрини вә"д етмишдир.

Шаһидләрдән Рамин Дадашов, Әлмурад Рзајев, Һүсејн Әлијев, Ариф Әлијев дә мөһкәмә истинтагында ифадә верәрәк Әләкбәр Рәсуловун ифадәсини тәсдиг едәрәк АИП тәрәфиндән Ирана тәһсил алмаг үчүн кәндәрилмәләрини, орада шәриәт елмләри илә јанашы Азәрбајчанын мәнәфејинә зидд олан мұһазирәләр охунмасыны, АИП рәһбәрләринин онлара баш чәкмәсини, јахшы охујачаглары тәгдирдә АИП-дә вәзифәләрә ирәли чәкиләчәкләринин вә"д етмәләрини кәстәрдиләр.

Шаһид Видади Бајрамов мөһкәмә истинтагында диндириләркән ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, Чәлилабад рајону мәсчидиндә Гур"ан тәһсили алмаг үчүн Ирана группа кедәчәјини ешидиб, сүрүчүсүнү танымадығы автобуслар Иран сәрһәддинә кетмиш, ганунсуз олараг сәрһәдди кечдикдән сонра хүсуси адамлар тәрәфиндән гаршыланараг Тәбриз шәһәри јахынлығында Кәрәч шәһәриндә һәрби базаларда онлара һәрби палтар кәјндириләрәк мөһфи галмагдан өтәри әсл ө адлары ләгәблә





дәјишдирилмиш, наразылыгларына бахмајараг дини тәһсилдән әлавә 3 ај мүддәтинә онлара һәрби тәһсил, тә"лим, хүсуци дәрсләр, о чүмләдән мүхтәлиф нөв силаһ вә партлајычы гурғулар илә давранмаг, кечә вә күндүз дөјүшләринин тактикасы, һәрби топографијанын сирләри, һүбһә едилән шәхсләри күдмә, мәхфи мүшаһидәдән јажынма гәјдалары өјрәдилмишдир. Тәһсил баша чатдыгдан сонра Иран сәрһәдчиләри тәрәфиндән Азәрбајчан әразисинә кечирилмишләр.

Шаһидләрдән Елмар Әсәдов, Илгар Гочајев, Әсәд Рәһимов, Елшад Әлијев, Огтај Нәзәров да мәһкәмә истинтагында ифадә верәрәк Видади Бајрамовун ифадәсини олдуғу кими тәсдиг етдиләр.

Шаһид Ариф Гулијев мәһкәмә истинтагында ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, АИП-нын сәдри Әликрам Әлијевин кәстәриши илә малијјә ишләри она һәвалә едилмиш вә онун сәнәдсиз вердији нәгд пуллары өзүнүн кәстәриши әсасында гејдијјат апармадан партијанын мәркәзи вә рајон комитәләринин рәһбәрләринә, гәзет редаксиясы ишчиләринә пәјламышдыр.

Шаһид Әбдүлбағы Әлијев мәһкәмә истинтагында диндириләркән ифадә верәрәк кәстәрди ки, о, АИП-нин нәздиндә олан Имам Һүсәјн адына идман клубунун сәдри ишләмәклә 1996-чы илин апрел ајында Иранын Азәрбајчандакы сәфирлијиндә Азәрбајчанын һакимијјәт органларынын иштиракы олмадан Ирана тәһсил алмаға кедән тәләбәләрдән имтаһан кәтүрүлмүш, чағырыш јашлы ушаглара сахта сәнәдләр һазырланмасында Кәблаға Гулијевлә бирликдә иштирак етмишләр. Сәфирлијин гаршысында "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасынын директору Рамиз Мустафајевлә көрүшәрәк харичи паспорт алмагдан өтрү әсас верән бланклара мөһүр вурмағы хаһиш етмиш, сонунчу тәрәддүд





етмәдән ағ бланклара мөһүр вурмушдур. Бланклары сонрадан Кәблаға Гулијев долдурмушдур.

Шаһидләрдән Тамерлан Гасымзадә вә Әкбәр Сејидовда мөһкәмәдә диндириләркән ифадә верәрәк кәстәрдиләр ки, онлар Иран сәфирлијиндә имтаһан верәрәк гәбул олунмуш, Әбдүлбағы Әлијев вә Кәблаға Гулијев тәрәфиндән онлара харичи паспорт дүзәлдилмиш, Ирана кедәркән сәнәдәләринин дүзкүн олмадығына көрә сәрһәдчиләр тәрәфиндән кери гәјтарылмышлар. Онлар һеч вахт "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасында ишләмәмиш вә һәмин фирма илә һеч бир әлагәләри олмамышдыр.

Бундан башга муттәһимләрин тәсвир едилән чинајәт әмәлләрини төрәтмәләри ишдә олан вә мөһкәмә истинтагы заманы тәдгиг едилмиш ашағыдакы сәнәдләрлә дә тәсдиг олунур. Белә ки, чилд 8, иш вәрәги 6-15 дә олан танынмағ үчүн фотошәкилләри кәстәрмә протоколларындан көрүнүр ки, Әликрам Әлијев, һәчаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәров Иранын "Сепан-е Пастаран-е Енгелаб-е Еслами" тәшкилатынын Тәбриз шәһәри үзрә әмәкдашы Мөһәммәд Рза Әсәдбекини тәгдим едилмиш фотошәкилдән танымышлар.

Чилд 8, иш вәрәги 16-21 дә олан танынмағ үчүн фотошәкилләри кәстәрмә протоколларындан көрүнүр ки, Әликрам Әлијев вә Мирһәсән Чәфәров Иранын Азәрбајчандакы сәфирлијинин ишчиси Әли Әкбәр Бавәнди тәгдим едилмиш фотошәкилдән танымышлар. Чилд 8, иш вәрәги 25-26 да олан мөһкәмә-баллистик экспертизасынын рәј"индән көрүнүр ки, ахтарыш заманы һәчаға Нуријевин евиндән ашкар едилиб кәтүрүлмүш 4 әдәд 7,62 мм калбрли патронлар атәш үчүн јарарлы олмагла дөјүш сурсатыдыр.

Чилд 8, иш вәрәги 162 дә олан мәнкәмә техники експертизасынын рәј"индән көрүнүр ки, ахтарыш заманы АИП-нын мәркәзи гәраржаһындан вә Бакы шәһәр комитәсинин офисиндән көтүрүлмүш "Мәнсур мүәллимин дедикләри"ндән башлыглы 6 вәрәгдән ибарәт сәнәд "Исламын сәси" гәзети редаксиясындан јерләшән 31994 сажлы макинадә чап олунмушдур.

Чилд 8, иш вәрәги 163-168-дә олан "Сепан" тәшкилатынын кенералы һачы Мәнсурун (Мәнсур мүәллимин) дедикләриндән башлыглы сәнәддән көрүнүр:

1) Бу мүбаризәдә сиз "јорулмушам демәјин". Сиздән тәклиф истәјирләр. Шәри тәклиф. Әкәр тәклиф олса, кедиб Кәрбәланы алмалыјыг, демәк кетмәлијик. Бу јолда һәр бир ишкәнчәјә һазыр олмалыјыг.

2) Парламент сечкиләри үчүн намизәдләрин сijaһысы хүсуси дигтәтлә һазырланмалыдыр.

3) Сечкиләрә һазырлыг дөврүндә көрдүјүмүз ишләри уғурлу һесаб едирик. Бу һәгиги инкишафдыр. АИП-нин бир нечә ил бундан әввәлки вәзијјәти илә бу күнү мүгајисә етсәк, сиздә чох фәрәһли дәјишикликләр көрүрүк. Әввәлләр сиздә өзүнүзә белә инам јох иди. Көрүнүр 3 ил әввәлки сөһбәтләримиз сәмәрәли олуб.

4) һакимијјәти әлдә етмәјин јоллары чохдур. һәрби јолла; ингилаби јолла; чеврилишлә; 3-чү јол сечки јолудур.

5) Дүнја мүсәлманларынын мүсбәт тәчрүбәсини Азәрбајчанда һәјата кечирмәк лазымдыр. Әкәр галиб кәлсәниз, халгын үмидини, инамыны доғрултмуш олачагсыныз.

6) Парламент сечкиләриндә бә"зи фәндләрлә галиб кәлмәк



7) Инди сизи харичдә дә изләјирләр. Онлар көзләјирләр ки, көрәсән бу сечкиләрдә исламчылар нә едәчәкләр? Әкәр сиз сечкини апарсаныз рәгиб тәрәф һәрби чеврилиш едә биләр.

8) Халгы сечкиләрдә фәал иштирак етмәјә чағырын. Рәгиб тәрәф сечкиләри сахталашдыра биләр.

9) Блока кирдијиниз партијаларла шәрти шумда кәсмәлисиниз.

10) Сиз өз програмыңызда республиканызын бу чәтин игтисади-сијаси вәзијәтиндән чыхыш јолларыны көстәрмәлисиниз. Мәсәлән, шуарларыныз белә ола биләр;

- Гарабағ данышыглар јолу илә азад ола билмәз.


- Гарабағ Азәрбајчан торпаглары олмагла тәчавүзкарлардан азад олмалыдыр.

- Гачгынлар өз доғма јурдларына тезликлә гәјтарылмалыдырлар.

11) Јерләрдә ичтимаијјәтин нүмајәндәләри илә ислами сәһбәтләр апарын, хүсусилә кәнчләри Ислам Партијасына чәлб етмәјә чалышын.

12) Милли азлыглар мәсәләсинә хүсуси диғтәт јетирин. Ләзки, талыш, күрд вә тат ичмаларынын рәһбәрләри илә ајры-ајрылыгда көрүшүн. Һәр бир көрүшә АИП-дән бир нәфәр кетмәли, өзү илә һәдијјә апармалыдыр. Бу көрүшләр сәнәдләшдирилмәли вә мәтбуатда јазылмалыдыр.

13) Шәһид аилләринә хүсуси гәјгы илә јанашмағ лазымдыр. Онларла көрүшә кедәндә пәј, әрзаг апарылмалыдыр. Белә көрүшләри мәтбуатда, телевизияда ишыгландырмағ вә јазмағ лазымдыр: "Шәһид аилләри АИП-ә сәс верирләр".





14) Жазычыларла, алимләрлө вә идманчыларла көрүшләр кечирмәк лазымдыр вә ишыгландырмаг лазымдыр ки, "алимләр, жазычылар вә идманчылар АИП-ә сәс верирләр".

15) Ештијач варса кичик митингләр кечирмәк, милләти ојатмаг лазымдыр.

16) Тәблиғат апармағын јолларыда мүхтәлифдир: телевизија, радио, мәтбуат, чанлы сөһбәт, тәшвигат.

17) Республиканын мүхтәлиф мәнәтәгәләринә тәшвигат карванлары кәндәрин, халгы АИП-ә сәс вермәјә чағырын. Өзүнүзлә партијанын көрдүјү ишләр һагында филмләр чәкиб халга кәстәрин. Халгын севдији шаирләрлө телевизија көрүшләри кечирин, гој онлар һамыны АИП-ә сәс вермәјә чағырсынлар. Машынларла чамаата чөрәк верин, үзәриндә јазын: "һамы АИП-ә сәс версин".

8) Парламент сечкиләри компанијасы дөврүндә сијаси рәгибләримиз сизә чүрбәчүр зәрбәләр вура биләрләр. Сизи провакасијаја, шантажа чәкә биләрләр. Шиә-сүнни мұнагишәсини аловландыра биләрләр. Сизи Иранла сых әлагәдә иттиһам едә биләрләр. Она көрә дә һара кәлди Иран рәһбәрләринин портретләрини вурмајын. Сиз өзүнүзү кизләдин, данышығынызда, давранышынызда ештијатлы олун. Сизин хидмәт вә ја ев телефонларыныз нәзарәтә алына биләр.

19) Сечки фонду јарадылмасы мәсәләсинә хүсуси әһәмијјәт верин. Сабит вә гејри-сабит сандыглар һазырлајын. Сечки фондуна чохла пул атанларын шәкилини чәкин, сонра һәмин пулу чыхарыб башга јердә тәкрар един. Халг инансын ки, чамаат күтләви шәкилдә АИП-ә көмәк едир, ону мүдафиә едир. Бү һагда сәнәдли филм дә чәкмәк олар.



20) Сечки компанијасында сизэ рәгиб чыхан мұхалифәт партијаларыны изләјин, онларын барәсиндә ифша едичи материаллар топлајын. Шәраит тәләб едәрсә онлара гаршы иттиһамларла чыхыш едир, онлар барәсиндә шајиә јайын. Јери кәләрсә һижлә ишләтмәкдән дә чәкинмәјин.

21) Мәхфилијә ријәт едир, һәтта блока кирдијиниз партијалара белә сирринизи, һәгиги фикринизи билдирмәјин. Һансы постлара кимләр нәзарәт едәчәк буну әввәлчәдән мүәјјәнләшдијин.

Бу дејиләнләри дәгиг јеринә јетирсәниз, сечкиләрдә уғур газанарсыныз, иншаллаһ."

Чилд 8, иш вәрәги 191-192-дә олан мәһкәмә техники експертизасынын рә"јиндән көрүнүр ки, Азәрбајҗан Респуб-ликасы вәтәндашлары М.Ә.Һәмзәјев, Т.Г.Гасымзадә, А.М.Нәзәров, М.М.Әлијев, Ә.И.Сәјидов вә В.Ә.Бабајевин харичи паспорт ачдырмаг үчүн адларына долдурулмуш анкет бланкларынын арха һиссәләриндәки мөһүр әксләри "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасынын мөһүрү илә вурулмушдур.

Чилд 10, иш вәрәги 2-3-дә олан 6 ијун 1996-чы ил тарихли Азәрбајҗан Республикасы Милли Тәһлүкәсизлик Назирлијинин әкс кәшфијјат идарәсинин мәктубундан көрүнүр ки, Һачы Мәнсур һәгигәтпур Иранын хүсуси хидмәт органы, Ислам Ингилаби мұһафизә корпусунун (Сепан-е Пастаран-е Енгелаби Еслами) рәһбәрләриндән бири кенерал (сәртиб) рүтбәли: Әһмәдаға һәмин тәшкилатын Әрдәбил әразиси үзрә мәс"ул ишчиси; Мөһәммәд Рза Әсәдбеки һәмин тәшкилатын Тәбриз видајәти үзрә јүксәк рүтбәли әмәкдашы; Әли Әкбәр Бабәнд исә Иранын хүсуси органы Информасија вә Тәһлүкәсизлик Назирли-јинин әмәкдашларыдырлар.

Чилд 10, иш вәрәги 7-дә олан Азәрбајчан Республикасы Сәрһәд Гошунлары баш идарәсинин 27 август 1996-чы ил тарихли мәктубундан көрүнүр ки, АИП-ин Али Шурасынын үзвләри Әликрам Әлијев, һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәров Азәрбајчан Республикасындан Иран Республикасына рәсми гәјдада кечәркән Астара Нәзарәт Бурахылыш мәнәтәгәсиндә рәсми олараг гејдә алынмышлар.

Чилд 10, иш вәрәги 50-51-дә олан Азәрбајчан Республикасы Әдлијјә Назирлијинин коллежијасынын 04 август 1995-чи ил тарихли гәрарындан көрүнүр ки, Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасы Азәрбајчан Республикасы Конститусија актынын 12-чи маддәсинә зидд олараг фәалијјәт кәстәрдијинә көрә гејдијјаты дајандырылмышдыр.

Чилд 8, иш вәрәги 266-270-дә олан Шамахи рајон комитәсинин офисиндән ахтарыш заманы ашкар едиләрәк кәтүрүлмүш вә Бақы Шәһәр Комитәсиндән кәтүрүлмүш ејни сәнәдләрдән көрүнүр ки, АИП-ин Али Шурасы Бақы шәһәр вә рајон комитәләринә сијаси шө"бәләрин јарадылмасы вә һәмин шө"бәләр васитәсилә рајон әразисиндә фәалијјәт кәстәрән бүтүн тәшкилатлар, рајонун чоғрафи мөвгеји вә статистик мә"луматларын топланыб Али Шураја тәгдим олунамасы тапшырылмышдыр.

Чилд 10, иш вәрәги 91-93 олан мәхфи хәритәни кәтүрмә вә мұајинә протоколундан көрүнүр ки, АИП-ин әлдә етдији Бақы Шәһәри Сабунчу рајонун хәритәси һәмин рајонун Ичра һакимијјәтиндә олан мәхфи шрифли хәритәдән кәчүрүлмүшдүр.

Чилд 10, иш вәрәги 95-дә олан "Ајна" вә "Азадлыг" гәзетинин нөмрәләриндән көрүнүр ки, АИП-ин сәдри Әликрам Әлијев гәзетләрә вердији мұсабигәләрдә партијанын һакимијјәтә кәләнән сонра Ирансајағы Ислам дөвләти гурачагларыны,





Азәрбајчанын Гәрб өлкәләри илә бағладығы нефт мұғавиләләрини танымадығыны, бу мәсәләдә мөвгеләринин Иран илә үст-үстә дүшдүјүнү бәјан етмишдир.

Һәмчинин мүттәһимләрин тәсвир едилән чинајәт әмәләри төрәтмәләри ишдә олан мадди сүбутларла: чилд 8, иш вәрәги 264-300-дә олан "гејдләр" башлыгылы әлјазма һалында 40 бәнддән ибарәт сәнәдлә; АИП Шамаһы рајон комитәсинин сәдри Тејјуб Сүлејмановун јашадығы мәнзилдән ахтарыш заманы көтүрүлмүш мааш пајланмасы һаггында 12 әдәд гәбзлә вә партија офисинин кирајә һаггынын өдәнилмәси барәдә 4 әдәд ордерлә; АИП-ин Шамаһы рајон комитәсинин фәал үзвү Ә.А.Рәсуловун јашадығы мәнзилдән ахтарыш заманы көтүрүлмүш Иранда 3 ајлыг курсларда тәһсил алмыш 22 нәфәр тәләбә групунун әкси олан рәнкли фотошәкиллә; Ислам ингилабынын нәзәријјәси, һәјата кечирилмә шәртләри вә шәраити гејд едилмиш көј үзлүктү дәфтәрлә вә АИП ичтимаи комитәсинин фәалијјәт програмы адлы сәнәдлә; чилд 9, иш вәрәги 2-141-дә олан "АИП-ин Бақы шәһәр рајон комитәләринин сәдрләринә" башлыгылы сәнәдлә; рус дилиндә чапдан чыхмыш "Азәрбајчан Республикасы үзрә инзибати әрази бөлкүсү вә јашајыш мәнтәгәләри объектләринин көстәрилмә системи" адлы хидмәти истифадә үчүн нәзәрдә тутулмуш мә"лумат китабчасы илә; Бақы шәһәр Нәриманов, Гарадағ, Әзизбәјов, Сәбаил, Јасамал, Бинәгәди, Низами рајонлары вә Сумгајыт шәһәри һаггында комитә сәдрләри тәрәфиндән әлдә едилмиш кәшфијјат характерли мә"луматлары өзүндә чәм едән сәнәдләрлә; Јасамал рајонунун инзибати әразисинин хәритәси илә; Гарадағ вә Әзизбәјов рајонунун схематик хәритәләри илә; чилд 9, иш вәрәги 143-183-дә олан АИП-ин мәркәзи гаражаһында олан ахтарыш вә мүәјинә нәтичәсиндә көтүрүлмүш



"Республикамызда парламент сечкиләринә һазырлыг дөврүндә АИП-ин көрөчәји ишләр планына тәклифләр" башлыгы сәнәдлә; "Фәалијјәт програмындан" башлыгы сәнәдлә; "Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасынын бәјанаты" башлыгы сәнәдлә; үзәриндә "Шәрг гәзетинә мүсаһибә" гејд едилмиш бир әдәд аудио касетлә; чилд 9, иш вәрәги 194-222-дә олан һәрби мүшаһидәчиләр ады алтында Азәрбајчана кәлмиш һачы Мәнсур һәгигәтпур, Мөһәммәд Рза Әсәдибеки вә дижәрләриндән ибарәт групун Азәрбајчанда кәшфијјат-позучулуг, чәсуслуг ишләри апармасы, Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасынын Азәрбајчанда кечирилән парламент сечкиләриндә гәләбә чалмалары үчүн Иранын бүдчә вә вәсаит ајрылмасынын мәсләһәт көрүлмәси барәдә Ирана шифрограмлар кәндәрилмәси, партијанын рәһбәрләри Вагиф Гасымов, һәчиаға Нуријевин АИП-ин офисиндә олан телефонларынын һәмин кәшфијјатчыларын бланкнотларында ашкар едилмәси, Вагиф Гасымов вә һәчиаға Нуријевин Әсәдбекини танымалары, онлара Әсәдбеки вә дижәрләринин Азәрбајчана гаршы бу әразидә чәсуслуг ишләри апармаларынын е"лан олунмасы барәдә ичраатына хитам верилмиш 183 сәјлы чинајәт ишинин мүәјинә протоколу илә; чилд 9, иш вәрәги 224-225-дә олан Иранын хүсуси хидмәт органы "Сәпаһе Пастаране" тәшкилатынын Гум шәһәриндә јерләшән мәдрәсәсиндә тәһсил алан бир груп Азәрбајчан кәнчләринин һәмин тәшкилатын ишчиләри Әһмәдаға Әзими, Фејзи илә бирликдә чәкдирдикләри ағ-гара рәнкли фотошәкиллә; Әликрам Әлијевин 3 ајлыг курсларын рәиси Әһмәди вә онун хүсуси ишләр үзрә мүваини Мәчиди илә чәкдирдији ағ-гара рәнкли фотошәкиллә дә тәсдиг едилир.



Мәһкәмә колекијасы мүттәһимләр Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә Мирһәсән Чәфәровун "Биз дини ганунлар үзрә фәалијјәтимизи гурмушут; Иранын хүсуси органы "Сепане Пастаране" тәшкилатынын әмәкдашлары Мәнсур Һәгигәтпур, Әһмәдаға Әзими вә Мәһәммәд Рза Әсәдбекидән төвсијјә вә тапшырыглар аларкән едилән һәрәкәтләрин Азәрбајчан Республикасынын зәрәринә олмасыны дәрк етмәмишик; онларын Иран кәшфијјатынын әмәкдашлары вә көрүшдүкләри игамәткаһын һәрби кәшфијјат идарәсинин олдуғуну билмәмишик; Мәнсур Һәгигәтпурун тәғдим етдији сәнәди имзаламагла онун һүгүг мүәјјәнедичи сәнәд олдуғуну баша дүшмәмишик; онлардан вә Иран сәфирлијинин нүмајәндәси Әли Әкбәр Баввәндән алынан харичи валјутанын АИП-ин фәалијјәтинин кенишләнмәсинә сәрф етмишик; демәләри иш үзрә тәдгиг едилмиш, ифадәләринин истина едилән һиссәси ишдә олан һеч бир сүбут нөвү илә тәсдиг едилмәмишдир. Әксинә, тәдгиг едилмиш чохсајлы шаһид ифадәләри вә иш материалларыннан, мүттәһимләрин истинтага вердији ифадәләрдән көрүнүр ки, ССРИ дәвләти дағылдыгдан вә Азәрбајчан өз мүстәгиллијини е"лан етдикдән сонра Республикада бир чох сијаси партијалар јаранмыш вә фәалијјәт кәстәрмәјә башламышлар. Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасы јаранаркән онун Али Шурасынын үзвләри Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымов вә сонрадан онлара гошулан Мирһәсән Чәфәров ислам идејалары вә ислам гајда ганунлары илә низама салынан дәвләт јаранмасы мөгсәдини програмларында әсас тутдуғларыннан соншу дәвләт олан Иранын хүсуси хидмәт органынын дигтәтини чәлб етмиш, 1993-чү илин әввәләриндә Ермәнистан вә Азәрбајчан мүнагишәсиндә куја республикамыза јардым едә





биләчәк һәрби мүшаһидәчиләр группу илә Бакыја кәлән, Иранын Бакыдакы сәфирлијинин әмәкдашлары ады алтында фәалијјәт кәстәрәрәк кәшфијјат позучулуг иши апардығы үчүн республикадан чинајәт мәс"улијјәтинә чәлб едилмәклә говулан Мәһәммәд Рза Әсәдбеки вә Мәнсур Һәгигәтпур тәрәфиндән Ирана дә"вәт олунмушлар.

Иранда оларкән Әрдәбил вә Тәбриз шәһәрләринин али руһаниләри-имам чүмәләри Мүрәввич вә Мәләкутинин васитәси илә Әһмәдаға Әзими, Мәһәммәд Рза Әсәдбеки илә јахын контакт јаранмыш, Әликрам Әлијевин ағыр мадди вәзијјәтләрдән етдији шикајәтләрдән истифадә едән Әһмәдаға Әзими гәбз алмагла 5000 АБШ доллары пул вериб онлары асылы вәзијјәтдә гојараг "Сепане Пастаране Енгелабе Еслами" тәшкилаты илә әмәкдашлыға чәлб едилмәси үчүн зәмин јаратмышдыр. Ертәси күн јә"ни 1994-чү илин феврал ајынын 10-да Әһмәдағанын мүшаијәти илә адлары чәкилән мүттәһимләр Тегһран шәһәриндә Мәнсур Һәгигәтпурун силаһлы һәрбчиләр тәрәфиндән мүһафизә едилән икимәртәбәли игамәткаһында Азәрбајчанда Ислам дәвләтинин јарадылмасы наминә фәалијјәт кәстәрмәк үчүн һәмин тәшкилатла мәхфи әмәкдашлыға чәлб едилмиш вә бу бәрәдә илтизамнамә имзаламышлар. Бундан сонра АИП-ин рәһбәрләри Бакыја јахын олдуғу үчүн "Сепане Пастаране"нин Әрдәбил шәһәри үзрә әмәкдашы Әһмәдаға Әзиминин һимајәсинә верилмиш вә онлар арасында икитәрәфли әлагә үсуллар шәртләндирилмишдир. Һәмин вахтдан башлајараг 1994-чү илин мај, октјабр, 1995-чи ил мај, октјабр вә 1996-чы илин јанвар ајында көршүләри олмуш һәмин көрүшләрдә АИП-ин рәһбәрләринә партијанын структуруну схем үзрә тәшкил етмәк, кәшфијјат характерли мә"луматлар топлајан сијаси



шө"бөләр жаратмаг; сечки јолу илә һакимијјәтә кәлмәк үчүн Иранын тәчрүбәсиндән истифадә етмәк; Ислам идејалары әсасында сијаси, игтисади, мәдәни-маариф, кәнчләрлә, гадынларла, зијалыларла, елми ишчиләрлә иш програмы ишләјиб һазырламаг; кәнчләрин Иранда 3 ајлыг вә 4 иллик тәһсил програмларынын јерләрдә ичра етмәк, күтләви тәблиғат вә тәшкилат ишләриндә Иран мүтәхәссисләриндән истифадә етмәк; партијанын бој сырасынын кәнчләр, гадынлар, нүфузлу вә сөзү кечән шәхсләр һесабына артырмаг; Гафгаз Руһаниләри идарәсинин рәһбәрлији вә әмәкдашлығы илә ишкүзар мүнасибәтләр жаратмаг вә бу мүнасибәтдән истифадә етмәк; һәрби һиссәләрдә, полис идарәләриндә, стратеги әһәмијјәтли саһәләрдә мөвгеләр әлдә етмәк; сијаси партијалар вә һәмкарлар тәшкилатлары илә мүнасибәт жаратмаг вә онларла иш апармаг; Азәрбајчанда бејнәлхалг мөвгеләрин зәифләтмәси, социал мүһитдә антигәрб әһвал руһијјәсинин тәшәккүл тапмасы мәгсәди илә АБШ вә Израил дәвләтләри илә әмәкдашлығын, Хәзәр дәнизиндән нефт һасилаты илә әсрин сазиши әлејһинә комплекс әкс тәблиғат апармаг; Азәрбајчанда игтисадијјата нүфуз етмәк вә онун Ирандан асылы вәзијјәтдә сахламаг үчүн Бақыда Ислам банкы жаратмаг; Азәрбајчанын һәр бир назирлијиндән орта сәвијјәли ишчиләрин бир нечәсини әлә алмаг; јүксәк вәзифәләрә мүнасиб кадрлары јеритмәк вә дијәр тапшырыглар верилмишдир. Бу тапшырыгларын ичрасы заманы гәбз вермәклә һәмин тәшкилатдан 18 мин, Иранын Бақыдакы сәфирлијинин нүмајәндәси ады алтында фәалијјәт кәстәрән Әли Әкбәр Бавәндән исә 23 мин АБШ доллары пул алмыш, "Сәпаһе Пастаране Енгелабе Есламе" тәшкилатынын Гум шәһәриндә јерләшән, кәшфијјатчы һазырлајан мәктәбинә 1994-чү илин






апрел, 1995-чи илин январ вә апрел ајларында һәр групда 30 нәфәр олмаг 3 груп Азәрбајчан кәнчләрини сәфирлијин васитәси илә зијарәт ады алтында Ирана кәндәрилмиш, бу кәнчләр тәһсил заманы Иран Ислам ингилабынын баш вермә шәраити, шәртләри вә һәјата кечирилмәси јоллары барәдә дәфәләрлә мұһазирәләр охунмуш, һәрби тә"лимләр кечирилмишдир. Бүтүн көрүлмүш ишләр барәдә мұхтәлиф вахтларда кенерал һачы Мәнсур һәгигәтпура, Әһмәдағаја вә Әсәдбекијә һесабатлар верилмишдир.

Белә олан вәзијәтдә мұттәһимләрин ифадәләринин истина едилән һиссәләри мұдафиә характери дашыјыр, тәдгиг едилмәклә тәкзиб едилдији үчүн әсассыз һесаб едилмәклә рәдд едилир.

Мәһкәмә коллекијасы иш үзрә топланмыш сүбутлар топлусуна гијмәт вермәклә белә нәтичәјә кәлир ки, Азәрбајчан Ислам Партијасынын рәһбәр ишчиләри Әлијев Әликрам Исмајыл оғлу, Нуријев һәчиаға Әлиәскәр оғлу, Чәфәров Мирһәсән Аслан оғлу вә Гасымов Вагиф Гасым оғлу Азәрбајчан Республикасы вәтәндашлары олмагла Иран Ислам Республикасынын хүсуси хидмәт органлары әмәкдашлары илә габагчадан разылашыб чинајәт әлагәсинә кирәрәк Азәрбајчан Республикасынын суверенлији, дәвләт тәһлүкәсизлији вә мұдафиә габиліјјәти зәрәринә олараг тамаһ вә с. шәхси нијјәтлә чәсуслуг фәалијјәти апармагла гәсдән Вәтәнә - Азәрбајчан Республикасына хәјанәт етдикләри үчүн онларын әмәли Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нин 57-чи маддәсини биринчи һиссәсинә, һәмчинин Нуријев һәчиаға Әлиәскәр оғлу мұдафиг ичазә олмадан дөјүш сурсаты - патронлары әлдә едәрәк сәһләдәдигына көрә әмәли Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нин 220-





чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәсинә, Мустафајев Рамиз Закир оғлу 6 нәфәр шәхсин харичи паспорт алмағы үчүн һүгүг верән анкет бланкларынын сахта олдуғуну билдији һалда директору олдуғу "Үлкәр" туризм фирмасынын мөһүрүнү вурдуғуна көрә онун әмәли Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 194-чү маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәсинә ујғундур вә истинтаг органы тәрәфиндән дүзкүн олараг истинад едилән маддәләрлә төвсиф едилмишдир.

Мүттәһимләрин әмәлләри мөһкәмә истинтагында там сүбута јетирилдији үчүн истинад едилән маддәләрлә чәзалан-дырылмалыдырлар.

Мөһкәмә коллекијасы мүттәһимләр Әликрам Әлијев, Һәчиаға Нуријев, Вагиф Гасымова чәза тә"јин едәркән онларын ағыр дәрәчәдә хәстә олмаларыны, Мирһәсән Чәфәрөвун һимајәсиндә 4 нәфәр, Һәчиаға Нуријевин һимајәсиндә 3 нәфәр аз јашлы ушағларынын олмасыны мәс"улијјәти јүнкүләш-дирән, чинајәтин мүтәшәккил дәстә тәрәфиндән едилмәсини исә мәс"улијјәти ағырлашдыран һал кими нәзәрә алыр.

Ишдә олан мадди сүбутлар, Азәрбајчан Республикасы Милли Тәһлүкәсизлик Назирлијинин тәсәррүфат идарәсиндә сахланан 7,62 мм калибри 4 әдәд винтовка патронлары Јасамал рајон полис идарәсинә верилмәли, Һәчиаға Нуријевә мөхсус 600 АБШ доллары пул вә 2323 сәјлы ов түфәнки, Вагиф Гасымова мөхсус 650 АБШ доллары пул вә ВА3-21063 маркалы 04 В968 А3 сәјлы автомашын дәвләт кәлиринә мүсадирә едилмәлидир.

Мүттәһимләрдән мүштәрәк гајдада 587.128 манат эксперт хәрәкәтләри алынараг дәвләт кәлиринә кечирилмәлидир.



Шәрһ олуналарә әсәсән вә Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧПМ-нын 319, 322, 332 вә 335-чи маддәләрини рәһбәр тутараг

### БӨКМ ЕТДИ:

Әлијев Әликрам Исмајыл оғлу Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 57-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәси илә тәгсирли билиниб шәхси әмлақы мүсадирә едилмәклә 11 ил мүддәтинә азадлыгдан мәһруметмә чәзасына мәһкум едилсин.

Чәзасыны чидди режимли ИӘК-дә чәкмәклә чәзасынын әввәли һәбсә алындығы күндән јә"ни, 27 мај 1996-чы тарихдән һесаблинсын.

Барәсиндә сечилмиш һәбсәалма гәти имкан тәдбири дәјишдирилмәсин.

Нуријев һәчиаға Әлиәскәр оғлу Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 57-чи маддәсини 1-чи һиссәси вә 220-чи маддәсини 1-чи һиссәси илә тәгсирли билинсин.

Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 57-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәси илә шәхси әмлақы мүсадирә олунмагла 10 ил, ЧМ-нын 220-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәси илә 3 ил мүддәтинә азадлыгдан мәһрум етмә чәзасына мәһкум едилсин.

Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 38-чи маддәси тәдбиг едилмәклә аз чидди чәзаны даһа чидди чәза илә әһатә етмәк јолу илә үзәриндә гәти олараг шәхси әмлақы мүсадирә олмагла 10 ил мүддәтинә азадлыгдан мәһруметмә чәзасы сахланылсын.

Чәзасыны чидди режимли ИӘК-дә чәкмәклә чәзасынын әввәли һәбсә алындығы күндән, јә"ни 24 мај 1996-чы ил тарихдән һесаблинсын.



Барәсиндә сечилмиш һәбсәалма гәти имкан тәдбири дәјишдирилмәсин.

Чәфәров Мирһәсән Аслан оғлу Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 57-чи маддәсини 1-чи һиссәси илә тәгсирли билиниб шәхси әмлақы мүсадирә олмагла 10 ил мүддәтинә азадлыгдан мәһруметмә чәзасына мәһкум едилсин.

Чәзасынын әввәли һәбсә алындығы күндән, јә"ни 09 апрел 1997-чи илдән һесаблинсын. 27 мај 1996-чы илдә МТН-нин тәчридханасында мүвәггәти сахландығы 3 күн чыхылмагла үзәриндә чәзасы 9 ил 11 ај 27 күн сахланылсын.

Чәзасыны чидди режимли ИӘК-дә чәксин.

Барәсиндә сечилмиш һәбсәалма гәти имкан тәдбири дәјишдирилмәсин.

Гасымов Вагиф Гасым оғлу Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 57-чи маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәси илә тәгсирли билиниб шәхси әмлақы мүсадирә олунмагла 10 ил мүддәтинә азадлыгдан мәһруметмә чәзасына мәһкум едилсин.

Чәзасыны чидди режимли ИӘК-дә чәкмәклә чәзасынын әввәли һәбсә алындығы күндән, јә"ни 27 мај 1996-чы ил тарихдән һесаблинсын.

Барәсиндә сечилмиш һәбсәалма гәти имкан тәдбири дәјишдирилмәсин.

Мустафајев Рамиз Закир оғлу Азәрбајчан Республикасы ЧМ-нын 194-чү маддәсинин 1-чи һиссәси илә тәгсирли билиниб һәр ај шәхси газанчынын 20 фаизи дөвләт кәлиринә тутулмагла 2 ил мүддәтинә ислаһ ишләри чәзасына мәһкум едилсин.

Чәзасыны ислаһ ишләринә бахан органларын мүәјјән етдији әрдә чәксин.





Барәсиндә сечилмиш илтизам гәти имкан тәдбири һөкүм ичраја јөнәләнәдәк гүввәсиндә сахланылсын.

Ишдә олан мадди сүбутлар Азәрбајчан Республикасы МТН-нин тәсәррүфат идарәсиндә сахланылан 7,62 мм калибри 4 әдәд винтовка патронлары Јасамал рајон полис идарәсинә верилсин, Һәчиаға Нуријевә мәхсус 600 АБШ доллары вә 2323 сажлы ов түфәнки, Вагиф Гасымова мәхсус 650 АБШ доллары вә ВАЗ-21063 маркалы 04 В968 А3 сажлы автомашын дәвләт кәлиринә мүсадирә едилсин.

Мүттәһимләрдән мүштәрәк гајдада 587.128 манат эксперт хәрчләри алынараг дәвләт кәлиринә кечирилсин.

Һөкм гәтидир, ондан кассасија шикајәти вә протести верилә билмәз.

Сәдрлик едән: имза

Халг ичласчылары: 1 имза

2 имза

Әсли илә дүздүр

/ Али Мәһкәмәнин үзвү  Ә. СЕЛИДОВ.





Azeri, **Lebanese citizens** sentenced in **Baku** for plans to blowup Gabala radar

151 words

5 October 2009

12:26

Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire

DANWS

English

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**BAKU.** Oct 5 (Interfax) - The Azerbaijani court has sentenced six persons suspected of terrorism, espionage and other crimes to long terms of imprisonment, a source at the court secretariat told Interfax on Monday.

"The trial of two Lebanese citizens and four Azeri citizens accused of high treason, arms and drugs contraband and planning of terrorist acts against the Israeli embassy in Baku and the Gabala radar station ended today," he said.

The court sentenced Lebanese citizens Ali Mohammed Karaki and Ali Hussein Najmaddin to 15 years in custody, Azeri citizen Javid Mamedov to 12 years in custody, Azeri citizen Vidadi Rasulov to 14 years in custody, Azeri citizen Mushvig Amanov to 13 years in custody, and Azeri citizen Afgan Balashev to 12 years in custody.

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(Our editorial staff can be reached at [eng.editors@interfax.ru](mailto:eng.editors@interfax.ru))

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**ENERGY** | Wed Jan 25, 2012 | 4:09pm EST

## Azerbaijan arrests plot suspects, cites Iran link

\* Security ministry says suspects had indirect links with Iranian intelligence

\* Azeri media report Israeli ambassador, rabbi targeted

\* Israeli military says Hezbollah, others targeting Israel in attack bids abroad

By Lada Yevgrashina

BAKU, Jan 25 Authorities in Azerbaijan, a former Soviet republic bordering Iran, have arrested two men suspected of plotting to attack prominent foreigners including Israel's ambassador and a local rabbi, officials and media reported on Wednesday.

The National Security Ministry said the men were connected to an Iranian citizen who had links with Iran's intelligence.

Azerbaijan, a secular Muslim country, is home to more than 9,000 Jews and has friendly ties with Israel and the United States. A major energy producer, it exports oil to Israel and imports weapons and military hardware.

"Citizens of Azerbaijan - Rasim Aliyev and Ali Huseynov - were preparing an attack on public figures, who are foreign citizens," the National Security Ministry said in a statement.

The U.S. embassy issued a warning to its citizens saying "the possibility remains for actions against U.S. or other high-profile foreign interests in Azerbaijan".

The announcement came after several state websites in Azerbaijan were rendered inaccessible for hours this month by hackers who left threats and anti-Israel messages. That incident coincided with similar cyber attacks in Israel.

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The ministry said the Iranian citizen, identified as Balagardash Dadashev, had helped the two buy weapons including sniper rifles, handguns and explosive devices in Iran and smuggle them to Azerbaijan.

Azeri media reported the suspects had been due to receive \$150,000 and their targets included the Israeli ambassador and a local rabbi. The Israeli embassy said it was "operating as usual" and declined further comment.

On Jan. 16, hackers calling themselves the Azerian Cyber Army posted images of the devil over photographs of the Azeri and Israeli presidents, as well as messages saying "Servants of Jews" and "Enemies of Islam."

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The same day, hackers disrupted online access to the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, El Al Airlines and 3 banks in what the government described as a cyber attack against Israel.

Azeri authorities have said they had thwarted a plan by agents of Iran and Hezbollah to set off a car bomb near the Israeli embassy in Baku four years ago, as well as an alleged plot targeting the U.S. and British embassies in 2007.

In what may have been a reference to the plot, Israel's military chief said "we are witnesses to the ongoing attempts by Hezbollah and other hostile entities to execute vicious terror attacks at locations far away from the state of Israel."

Earlier, police in Thailand detained a Lebanese man earlier this month on suspicion of planning an attack. Officials said he had links with Hezbollah, a Shi'ite Islamist group in Lebanon backed by Syria and Iran that is on the U.S. blacklist of foreign terrorist organizations.

Diplomatic ties between Azerbaijan and Iran are cool, but Iranian companies operate and have stakes in oil contracts in the Caspian Sea state, which exports around 1 million barrels of crude a day (bpd) westward through a pipeline operated by a consortium led by BP. (Writing by Margarita Antidze in Tbilisi; editing by Steve Gutterman and Maria Golovnina)

NEXT IN ENERGY

**PROSECUTOR CONFIRMS FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FILLON PLACED UNDER FORMAL INVESTIGATION**



PROSECUTOR CONFIRMS FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FILLON PLACED UNDER FORMAL INVESTIGATION

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TUESDAY, 14 March 2017

## AL ARABIYA NEWS

Last Updated: Wed Mar 14, 2012 18:08 pm (KSA) 15:08 pm (GMT)

## Azerbaijan arrests 22 alleged Iran-backed attack plotters

Wednesday, 14 March 2012



The 22 people detained were allegedly cooperating with Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards. (File photo)

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By AFP  
BAKU

Azerbaijan has arrested 22 people on suspicion of plotting attacks on the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Baku on behalf of neighboring Iran, the national security ministry said Wednesday.

"Twenty-two citizens of Azerbaijan have been arrested by the national security ministry for cooperating with the Iranian Sepah," it said in a statement, referring to the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

"On orders of the Sepah they were to commit terrorist acts against the U.S., Israeli and other Western states' embassies and the embassies' employees."

The ministry said the suspects were recruited from 1999 onwards and trained in the use of weapons and spy techniques at military camps in Iran to enable them to gather information on foreign embassies, organizations and companies in Azerbaijan and stage attacks.

"Firearms, cartridges, explosives and espionage equipment were found during the arrest," the statement said, without specifying when or how the suspects were detained.

They have been charged with treason and the purchase and possession of weapons and explosives.

The ministry said that a Revolutionary Guards officer named Akbar Pakravesh gave the Azerbaijani recruits equipment and money and met them in Damascus and Moscow to avoid suspicion.

"The Azerbaijanis began spying on diplomatic missions, companies and public organizations including the Jewish center Sohnut, a U.S. fast food restaurant, British oil company BP-Azerbaijan's office and

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other objects in Baku," it said.

But the accusations were rejected by the brother of one of those arrested, Niyazi Kerimov, who comes from the town of Nardaran which is seen as a hotbed of Islamic activism in Azerbaijan.

"I believe that the allegations against my brother are unfounded and fabricated," Natiq Kerimov told Radio Azadliq.

Tensions between the Islamic republic and mainly Muslim but officially secular Azerbaijan have risen in recent months, with a series of arrests in Baku of attack plot suspects with alleged links to Tehran.

Iran has also been angered by ex-Soviet Azerbaijan's ties to Israel and its reported purchase of hundreds of millions of dollars of weapons from the Jewish state.

Tehran last month accused Azerbaijan of working with Israel's spy services and helping assassins who murdered Iranian nuclear scientists in recent years -- a claim rejected by Baku as "slander".

This week however the neighbors appeared to be taking steps to improve relations as public declarations of friendship were made in Tehran during a visit by Azerbaijan's Defense Minister Safar Abiyev.

"We are sure that we will face no problem from our brother and neighbour Azerbaijan," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was quoted by the official IRNA news agency as saying on Monday after meeting Abiyev.

Abiyev was quoted as saying that "we consider Iran as a friend and brother."

The uneasy relations between the neighbors are complicated by the presence of a huge ethnic Azeri minority in Iran, which far outnumbered Azerbaijan's own population of 9.2 million.

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## General Assembly

Distr.: General  
31 October 2016

Original: English

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**Seventy-first session**  
Agenda item 8  
**General debate**

### **Note verbale dated 27 October 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the attached letter addressed to the President of the General Assembly signed by the Permanent Representatives of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Kuwait, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of the Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of Yemen (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates would be grateful if the present note verbale and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 8.

16-18965 (E) 091116  
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**Annex to the note verbale dated 27 October 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

18 October 2016

On behalf of our respective Governments, we have the honour to write to you with reference to the right of reply made by a representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the conclusion of the general debate of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 26 September 2016, in which a series of unfounded claims were made. In this regard, we have the honour to convey to you the following:

It is with a deep sense of frustration that we note that the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its expansionist regional policies, flagrant violations of the principle of sovereignty and constant interference in the internal affairs of Arab States, continues to play a negative role in causing tension and instability in our region.

We express concerted alarm at the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, through its political and religious figures, calls for the export of its revolution to other countries. We stress that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a State sponsor of terrorism in our region, from Hizbullah in Lebanon and Syria, to Houthis in Yemen and terrorist groups and cells in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and elsewhere.

With regard to the military campaign of the coalition to restore legitimacy in Yemen referenced by the Iranian representative, we would like to recall that the legitimate Government of Yemen issued a request for assistance in March 2015, including military intervention, to the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the League of Arab States, to protect Yemen and its people from the continuing aggression of the Iran-backed Houthis. In response to this request, the coalition to restore legitimacy in Yemen was formed, under the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, for the protection of Yemen and its people and to help Yemen to counter terrorism.

This request was issued in full conformity with international law and the right of self-defence as stipulated in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council was duly informed of this request by a letter dated 24 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations, and by identical letters dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar (S/2015/217), as noted in the preamble to Security Council resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#).

Along with the Security Council, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the latest Houthi attack in the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb on 1 October on a vessel chartered by the United Arab Emirates, in clear violation of international law. In this regard, in a press statement on Yemen issued on 4 October 2016, the members of the Security Council stated that they took threats to shipping around Bab al-Mandeb, a strategically important shipping passage, extremely seriously and stressed that the continued exercise of freedom of

navigation in and around Bab al-Mandeb Strait in accordance with relevant international law must be upheld.

We strongly condemn the active influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the conflict. The Islamic Republic of Iran has supported the Houthis in Yemen financially, strategically and militarily, by training Houthi fighters and sending shipments of weapons and ammunitions into the country illegally and in flagrant violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015). Shipments of illicit weapons sent by the Islamic Republic of Iran have been intercepted on multiple occasions by several Member States and the Combined Maritime Forces, as mentioned in a letter dated 14 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/786).

We reaffirm our support for the important work of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, to reach a comprehensive agreement to end the conflict in Yemen, in accordance with the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the outcome of the National Dialogue Conference and its implementation mechanism, and the relevant Security Council resolutions, and we further ask Member States to take note of the joint communiqué on the situation in Yemen issued by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates on 22 September 2016.

We remain firm in our resolve that any interference by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the domestic affairs of Arab States is unacceptable and must be confronted. In this regard, we reiterate the reference made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain, Khalid bin Ahmed bin Mohamed al-Khalifa, in his statement to the General Assembly on 26 September 2016, that the only way forward is for the Islamic Republic of Iran to comprehensively change its foreign policies and end hostilities, thus paving the way for the region to enter a new era of stability and development.

We reaffirm our support to the nuclear agreement that was reached between the five plus one group and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The nuclear agreement gave the Islamic Republic of Iran the opportunity, after years of sanctions, to create normal relations with its neighbours and demonstrate a new commitment to regional stability and respect for the sovereignty of other nations. Unfortunately, since the signing of the nuclear deal, we have seen nothing but increased Iranian aggression in the region and the continuation of support for terrorist groups.

In addition, we reaffirm the tireless efforts of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Government and people of the Kingdom, in their role of serving the pilgrims and visitors to the holy sites during their performance of hajj and umrah. We deplore the exploitation of the tragic Mina incident by the Islamic Republic of Iran for political ends and its desperate attempt to cause sectarian strife in the region, in a reprehensible manner.

Furthermore, we reaffirm that the three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf are an integral part of the territory of the United Arab Emirates. We categorically reject the baseless claims made by the Islamic



Republic of Iran that the three United Arab Emirates islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf have and continue to be a part of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The following facts, which were most recently stated in a letter dated 14 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations (S/2016/245), serve as a rebuttal to the claims made by the Islamic Republic of Iran:

First, Iranian forces arrived on the island of Abu Musa in the Arabian Gulf for the first time on 30 November 1971. The presence of those forces on the island was sanctioned by the memorandum of understanding regarding Abu Musa that was concluded in November 1971. The provisions of that memorandum of understanding and the map delimited, inter alia, the area of Abu Musa that was to be occupied by those forces; that area conforms to the extent of Iranian jurisdiction on the island. The aforementioned memorandum of understanding is still in force and binding and is the only legal basis for the presence of Iranian forces in the area allocated to them on the island. Any unilateral revocation of that memorandum of understanding shall be null, void and without effect, because it contravenes the rules and principles of international law.

Second, Iranian armed forces occupied the two islands of Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb in the Arabian Gulf by force on 30 November 1971, in contravention of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. The illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force is an established principle of international law. Moreover, in its resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, the General Assembly emphasized that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.

We continue to call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to return the occupied islands in the Arabian Gulf to their rightful owners, either voluntarily or through peaceful means, particularly through international justice or arbitration, in order to maintain friendly relations and good-neighbourliness in the Arabian Gulf region.

We reaffirm that the stability and economic prosperity in the Arabian Gulf region is founded on the importance of maintaining good-neighbourliness and the principles of sovereignty, independence and non-interference in domestic affairs, in stark contrast with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s radical approach that undermines security and stability in our region and the Arab world.

We would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated to all States Members of the United Nations as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 8.

*(Signed)* Jamal Fares **Alrowaiei**  
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain  
to the United Nations

*(Signed)* Amr Abdellatif **Aboulatta**  
Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Sima Sami **Bahous**  
Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Mansour Ayyad SH A **Alotaibi**  
Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Omar **Hilale**  
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Khalifa Ali Issa **Al Harthy**  
Permanent Representative of the Sultanate of Oman  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Alya Ahmed Saif **Al-Thani**  
Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**  
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**  
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Sudan  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Lana Zaki **Nusseibeh**  
Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates  
to the United Nations

(Signed) Khaled Hussein Mohamed **Alyemany**  
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Yemen  
to the United Nations

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## Security Council

Distr.: General  
21 December 2015

Original: English

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### **Letter dated 10 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**


Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to attach herewith the final communiqué of the 36th Gulf Cooperation Council Summit, issued in Riyadh on 10 December 2015 (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated to all members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Abdallah **Al-Mouallimi**  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

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**Annex to the letter dated 10 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: Arabic]

**Final communiqué of the thirty-sixth session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council**

At the invitation of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia (may God preserve and protect him), the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held its thirty-sixth session in Riyadh on 27 and 28 Safar A.H. 1437 (9 and 10 December A.D. 2015). The session was chaired by King Salman as chair of the current session of the Supreme Council. The following distinguished members were in attendance:

His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashed Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister, ruler of Dubai, United Arab Emirates

His Majesty King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa, King of Bahrain

His Highness Fahd bin Mahmoud Al Said, Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for cabinet affairs of the Sultanate of Oman

His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar

His Highness Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait

His Excellency Mr. Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, also participated in the meeting.

1. The Supreme Council congratulated the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud (may God preserve and protect him), on assuming the chair of the current session of the Supreme Council. It commended his opening statement and his determination to foster cooperation among member States in all areas.
2. The Supreme Council expressed its deep appreciation for the considerable and genuine efforts and achievements of His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar (may God preserve and protect him) and his distinguished Government during his chairmanship of the thirty-fifth session of the Supreme Council.
3. The Supreme Council welcomed the vision for the promotion of joint Gulf action submitted by King Salman as chair of the current session. It thanked him for his fine contribution to the work of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which would enhance its regional and international standing. The Supreme Council adopted the vision and tasked the Ministerial Council, the competent ministerial committees and the secretariat with implementing its provisions, on the understanding that implementation would be completed in 2016.
4. The Supreme Council reviewed the status of consultations on the proposal submitted by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud (may God have mercy on his soul), for a transition from the

cooperation phase to the unity phase. It directed the ministerial council to continue consultations and complete its examination of the issue in cooperation with the chair of the pertinent committee, in accordance with the decision adopted by the Supreme Council at its thirty-third session held in Sakhir, Kingdom of Bahrain, in December 2012.

5. The Supreme Council affirmed its full support for the United Arab Emirates as host country of Expo 2020 and wished the people of the United Arab Emirates further progress and prosperity.

6. The Supreme Council affirmed its support for the State of Qatar as host of the World Cup 2022, and stressed that the States members backed Qatar in all actions conducive to making the event a success. It wished the people of Qatar further progress and prosperity.

7. The Supreme Council reviewed the recommendations and follow-up reports submitted by the Ministerial Council and the progress made since the previous session towards joint action in all areas. It commended the efforts made towards strengthening the joint cooperation process, in particular with regard to strengthening Gulf citizenship in order to ensure greater complementarity among GCC member States and integration among their citizens. The actions that had been taken constituted significant achievements towards broadening and deepening the mission of GCC. The Supreme Council examined the rapid political developments in the region and the world and took the following decisions:

#### **The joint action process**

8. In order to raise awareness of the benefits of GCC for citizens of the Gulf, the Supreme Council directed the secretariat to continue holding information meetings and awareness-raising campaigns in member States through various media, with a focus on the Council's action to ensure prosperity for Gulf citizens, keep them safe and preserve their gains.

#### **Economic and development affairs**

9. The Supreme Council discussed the joint economic and development cooperation process with a view to achieving full economic citizenship. It directed the secretariat to establish a committee of experts and intellectuals from member States to develop approaches aimed at attaining full economic citizenship, taking into consideration sustainable development needs of States members, and at improving the competitiveness of the national workforce.

10. With a view to fostering partnerships with the private sector, the Supreme Council directed the secretariat to continue to arrange regular consultative meetings between the committee on trade cooperation and heads of Chambers of Commerce in member States, and to report to the Supreme Council on the outcomes of those meetings.

11. The Supreme Council reviewed the recommendations and reports of the Ministerial Council, the ministerial committees and the secretariat.

It adopted the following documents:

(a) The harmonized consumer protection system for States members, taking the form of a binding law;

(b) The harmonized rules on financial acquisitions in Gulf States, which should be followed on an indicative basis pending the completion of a harmonized set of rules for the full integration and complementarity of financial markets in States members;

(c) The implementing regulation on GCC citizens' equal access to health services in Government hospitals and clinics managed by the ministry of health of each State;

(d) The procedural guidelines regulating the strategic reserve of medicine, vaccines and medical supplies for emergency and crisis situations and the register of medical supplies of GCC States.

The Supreme Council considered the reports on the functioning of the GCC customs union, the Gulf common market, the monetary union, the updated Gulf plan for the prevention of non-communicable diseases, the water strategy, education and youth. It also considered the GCC rail link project, stressing that it was important to remain committed to completing that strategic project in accordance with the decisions of the Council.

#### **Joint military action**

12. The distinguished representatives ratified the decisions taken by the Joint Defence Council at its fourteenth session concerning areas for joint military action, particularly the current steps to operationalize the unified military command; the adoption of a budget for that purpose, including the required human resources, and the recruitment of retired soldiers from GCC States with qualifications, experience and skills in order to provide consultancy services to secretariat bodies.

13. The distinguished representatives expressed their satisfaction at the successful steps taken to establish the unified military command. They underscored the need to complete the measures necessary for its operationalization and intensify efforts, including the required actions and studies, to accelerate the development of an integrated and multifaceted GCC defence system.

#### **Security coordination and cooperation**

14. The Supreme Council ratified the decisions taken by the distinguished ministers of the interior at their thirty-fourth meeting held in the State of Qatar in November 2015. They expressed their satisfaction at what had been achieved in the area of security. They approved the reform and development of the comprehensive GCC security strategy and decided to adopt it.

15. The Supreme Council approved the signature of a convention establishing the Gulf police headquarters in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

#### **Counter-terrorism**

16. The Supreme Council reaffirmed its consistent stand against terrorism and extremism in all their forms and manifestations, irrespective of their motives, justification or source. It stressed the need to eradicate the sources of terrorism. It emphasized its commitment to combating the deviant ideology underpinning and nourishing the terrorist groups, an ideology that distorted and was unrelated to the pure Islamic faith. The Supreme Council affirmed that tolerance and coexistence



among nations and peoples was one of the foundations of the domestic and foreign policy of GCC States. It stressed its opposition to the terrorist threats facing the region and the world.

17. The Supreme Council emphasized the need to deal resolutely with the grave threat posed by terrorism, terrorist movements and their supporters. It commended the efforts of States members at the regional and international levels, and stated that the international community should assume its responsibility to support the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre in New York and coordinate efforts and exchange information.

18. The Supreme Council directed the competent GCC authorities to take systematic action through diplomacy, outreach and the media, in order to disseminate the true image of Islam, the value of moderation and the moderate approach of the States of the Gulf. They also directed the competent authorities to make effective use of the media and social networks, and to convene conferences, seminars and meetings with domestic and international actors. The authorities should redouble their efforts to counter incitement to violence and terrorism and tackle extremism, racism, hatred, sectarian strife and the recruitment of fighters and sympathizers for terrorist and extremist organizations.

19. The Supreme Council strongly condemned the terrorist bombings of mosques in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It also condemned the acts of terrorism against Bahrain, in which a number of security officers and innocent civilians had lost their lives. It commended the security services for thwarting operations to smuggle highly hazardous explosives, weapons and ammunition from Iran to Bahrain. The Supreme Council stressed that the States of the Gulf supported all of the actions taken by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain to preserve the safety and security of their citizens and residents. It expressed its confidence in the security services' ability to detect terrorist plots, bring the perpetrators to justice and hold them to account.

20. The Supreme Council emphasized that States members would continue to take part in the international coalition to combat the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and would support all domestic and international efforts to combat terrorist organizations and eradicate their misguided ideology. The Supreme Council stressed the need to intensify coordination and bilateral and international cooperation in order to confront the challenges facing the region; eliminate terrorism and its cross-border threat; eradicate the sources of the financing of terrorism; and strengthen the security and stability of the region.

21. The Supreme Council condemned the terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIL in Paris on 13 November 2015, which had claimed numerous civilian victims. The Supreme Council stated that GCC States stood by France and the French people and supported all of their actions. It condemned the terrorist acts committed by ISIL and other terrorist organizations in Egypt, Mali, Tunisia, the United States of America, Baghdad, Beirut and elsewhere. It affirmed that it would continue to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to eradicate terrorist organizations, which were an affront to all revealed religions and human values. In that connection, the Supreme Council welcomed Security Council resolution 2249 (2014), which was adopted on 20 November 2015, concerning counter-terrorism and tackling ISIL and other terrorist groups. The Supreme Council called on competent stakeholders to highlight the true, pure image of Islam, the faith of tolerance and

peace. It called on Arab and Islamic youth to speak out with the voice of reason and eschew the forces of darkness and terrorism.

### **Legal affairs**

22. The Supreme Council welcomed the outcomes of the ninth periodic meeting of the distinguished heads of GCC legislative councils (Shura councils, parliaments and national and ummah bodies) held in Riyadh in November 2015. They commended the councils' efforts and their vision for joint parliamentary action in the Gulf.

### **Strategic discussions and negotiations**

23. The Supreme Council welcomed the progress made in implementing the outcomes of the Camp David Summit held in May 2015. It underscored the need for swift implementation of the agreements reached by the working groups and joint committees established with the United States in various areas. It welcomed the progress made in fostering strategic partnerships with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Kingdom of Morocco, and the outcomes of the meetings of ministers for foreign affairs with their counterparts in other States and groups. Those efforts had strengthened the role and profile of GCC at the regional and international levels.

### **Consultative Commission of the Supreme Council**

24. The Supreme Council considered the perspectives of the Consultative Commission on matters that it had been mandated to study:

- Fostering partnership between the public and private sectors in GCC member States.
- Growing the income and enhancing the well-being of the citizens GCC member States.
- The future of oil and gas as a resource and source of energy in GCC States and the importance of maintaining them as a strategic choice in relation to security and development.

It was decided to transmit the above-mentioned perspectives to the competent ministerial committees, so that they might benefit from them. It was further decided to mandate the Consultative Commission to consider the following matters:

- Development of a comprehensive environmental cooperation strategy for GCC member States.
- Promoting investment in farming and livestock projects by the private sector in Gulf countries.
- The productivity of the citizens of Gulf countries, its determining factors and means of increasing it.

### **Political affairs**

#### **The situation in the occupied Palestinian territories and developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict**

25. The Supreme Council reiterated its firm and long-standing positions regarding regional issues, the most significant of which is the question of Palestine, stressing

that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace could not be achieved unless Israel withdrew fully from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 and an independent Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, was established in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative and the relevant, internationally binding resolutions.

26. The Council condemned the continued occupation of Arab territories by Israel and the actions it has taken to alter the identity and features of Al-Quds al-Sharif, and the persistence of arbitrary arrest, colonization and collective punishment of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. The Council also strongly condemned the violations committed by the Israeli occupying authorities against the Palestinian people and the dangerous escalation in the systematic attacks that Israel has been carrying out since early October 2015 against the Aqsa Mosque and Al-Quds Al-Sharif. The purpose of those attacks is to divide the Holy Mosque in time and space, Judaize Al-Quds Al-Sharif and isolate it from its Palestinian and Arab environment. The Council furthermore condemned the repeated violation of the sanctity of the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque by Israeli settlers and officials, in flagrant violation of the most fundamental human rights.

27. The Supreme Council urged the international community to shoulder its responsibilities and take every measure possible to protect the Palestinian people and holy sites. The Council also called for a redoubling of efforts aimed at putting pressure on Israel and compelling it to stop such practices, which violate internationally binding resolutions and are contrary to human values.

28. The Supreme Council stressed that Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories are illegal under international law and are a major obstacle to achieving a lasting and comprehensive peace.

29. The Supreme Council welcomed the raising of the flag of the State of Palestine at United Nations Headquarters, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 2015. The Council also welcomed the outcome of the emergency ministerial meeting of the Arab Peace Commission that was held in Cairo in August 2015.

30. The Supreme Council called on donors to fulfil the pledges made at the Cairo Conference for Gaza's reconstruction and underscored the importance of lifting the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip.

#### **The occupation by Iran of the three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates**

31. The Supreme Council reaffirmed its long-standing position, which it had stressed in all its previous communiqués, rejecting the continued occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, namely, Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. In that connection, the Council:

- Reaffirmed its support for the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, and over the territorial waters, airspace, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the three islands, which are an integral part of the United Arab Emirates;
- Reiterated that the practices, decisions and actions of Iran in respect of the three islands are null and void and do not alter any historical and legal facts, all of which support the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands;



- Called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to respond to the efforts of the United Arab Emirates to resolve the question through direct negotiations or recourse to the International Court of Justice.

### **Relations with Iran**

32. The Supreme Council rejected completely the ongoing interference by Iran in the internal affairs of member States and the States of the region. The Council called for full adherence to the fundamental principles of good-neighbourliness, respect for the sovereignty of States, non-interference in internal affairs and the non-use of force or threat of force. The Council rejected the statements made by certain officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran against GCC member States, their interference in member States' internal affairs and their attempt to sow dissension and promote sectarian strife among the citizens of member States, in violation of those States' sovereignty and independence. The Supreme Council also urged Iran to cease such practices immediately and to abide by the principles of good-neighbourliness, the law and international instruments and norms, so as preserve the security and stability of the region.

### **The Iranian nuclear programme**

33. The Supreme Council affirmed the need for compliance with the agreement concluded by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the five plus one group in July 2015 regarding that country's nuclear programme. In that connection, the Council underscored the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the necessity of putting into place an effective mechanism to verify the implementation of the Agreement, conduct inspections and carry out oversight functions. Sanctions must be imposed on Iran promptly and effectively should it fail to fulfil its obligations under the agreement.

The Council stressed the importance of implementing Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) regarding the above-mentioned nuclear agreement, including with respect to ballistic missiles and other weapons. It also expressed its profound concern regarding the firing by Iran on 10 October 2015 of a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons, stressing that this was a clear violation of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

34. The Supreme Council affirmed the importance of making the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, while emphasizing the right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the need to address the environmental concerns of the States of the region and the need for Iran to become a signatory to all instruments related to nuclear safety.

### **The current situation in the Arab world**

#### **Syria**

35. The Supreme Council reaffirmed its long-standing position regarding the need to maintain the unity, stability and territorial integrity of Syria.

36. The Supreme Council expressed its profound concern at the worsening of the Syrian crisis and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation as the Assad regime and the militias supporting it continue to carry out bombing and commit murder.

The conduct of the regime has had serious repercussions for civilians, flagrantly violated human rights principles and international humanitarian law, and has led to an ever-increasing rise in the number of displaced persons and refugees, both in Syria and in neighbouring countries.

37. The Supreme Council welcomed the outcomes of the talks held in Vienna on 14 November 2015 on finding a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis. Such a solution should be based on the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the first Geneva conference and should fulfil the aspirations of the Syrian people and ensure the preservation of State institutions.

38. The Supreme Council welcomed the hosting by Saudi Arabia of a conference for the Syrian opposition from 8 to 10 December 2015 in Riyadh. The hosting of that conference reflected the support of Saudi Arabia for a political solution that would guarantee the territorial integrity of Syria, in accordance with the decisions taken at the first Geneva conference.

39. The Supreme Council welcomed the outcomes of the Third International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, which was held in Kuwait in March 2015, and called on donors to fulfil their pledges rapidly. The Council looked forward to the convening of the Fourth International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, which would be hosted by Great Britain in February 2016, and trusted that it would see a high level of participation.

40. The Supreme Council stated that it was committed to continuing to work to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people, whose lives have been profoundly affected by the crisis. It urged prompt implementation of Security Council resolution 2165 (2014) of 14 July 2014 concerning the direct, immediate and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people.

41. The Supreme Council called on the international community to assume its responsibility to support refugees from Syria. It welcomed the efforts of member States to alleviate the suffering of Syrian displaced persons and refugees, who had been expelled and seen their property destroyed by the Bashar al-Assad regime. It emphasized that Syrian brethren would be treated as residents of the Gulf States and would enjoy full rights to free health care and to education and work in accordance with the residency rules in force in the GCC States. It commended the leading role of the Gulf States, which had provided material and in-kind support to their Syrian brethren and refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and elsewhere, in coordination with host States or through international and humanitarian relief agencies. It also commended the Gulf States' initiatives to hold donor conferences in order to mobilize resources for humanitarian work in Syria.

42. The Supreme Council expressed its grave concern at the increase in hostile, racist and inhumane speech directed against refugees in general and Muslims in particular. It reiterated its call for States, humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and the media to eschew racist speech, help raise awareness and assume their responsibility to provide the necessary protection for displaced persons and refugees who had fled to escape the oppression of the authorities and terrorist groups.

43. The Supreme Council welcomed Security Council resolution 2235 (2015), adopted in August 2015, concerning the establishment of a joint mechanism between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons with the purpose of identifying those responsible for the use of chemicals including chlorine gas during the conflict in Syria. It considered that resolution to be a message from the international community in order to tackle the use of internationally prohibited weapons. It urged the international community to cooperate genuinely in that process and hold those responsible to account for their crimes.

### **Yemen**

44. The Supreme Council commended the successes of the popular resistance and the Army loyal to the legitimate authorities against the militias of Al-Houthi and Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Council welcomed the liberation of Aden and other cities and governorates of Yemen. It also emphasized that it would continue to support His Excellency President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi and his legitimate Government and work to restore security and stability throughout Yemen.

45. The Supreme Council stated that it was fully committed to the unity, sovereignty and independence of Yemen and rejected any interference in that country's internal affairs. It stressed the importance of reaching a political solution in accordance with the GCC Initiative, its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference in Riyadh. It further highlighted the need for comprehensive and unconditional implementation of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015).

46. The Supreme Council commended the efforts of the United Nations through the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to Yemen, Mr. Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2216 (2015). It welcomed the announcement that negotiations would resume in Switzerland on 15 December 2015 and that the Yemeni Government had agreed to take part.

47. The Supreme Council commended the efforts of GCC States to deliver and distribute humanitarian and medical assistance as widely as possible to the Yemeni people. In that connection, the Council expressed appreciation for the considerable humanitarian role of the King Salman Centre for Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre. It called on the international community to intensify humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni people.

48. The Supreme Council strongly condemned the Houthi and Saleh militias' grave crimes against civilians, including killings, abductions, detentions, child recruitment, the blockading of civilians and their use as human shields, the bombardment and destruction of civilian areas, the torturing of prisoners, attacks on political and media freedoms, the violation of private and public property and educational and medical facilities, and the irresponsible hindering of international efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance across Yemen, all of which amounted to clear violations of international humanitarian law and human rights instruments.

### **Iraq**

49. The Supreme Council expressed its hope that the decision of the Government of Iraq and the Council of Representatives to take tangible measures to address corruption and the deterioration of services would put the political process back on track and ensure that all components of the Iraqi people could participate effectively



and implement all of the reforms agreed in 2014 in response to the demands of the people of Iraq.

50. The Supreme Council reiterated its support for Security Council resolution 2107 (2013). It unanimously decided to refer the issue of prisoners, missing persons, Kuwaiti property and the national archives to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) for follow-up. It called on the Government of Iraq to continue cooperating with the State of Kuwait and the international community on that issue.

### **Libya**

51. The Supreme Council stressed the need for a political solution to the situation in Libya under the auspices of the United Nations. It urged all parties to put the greater good first, in order to restore security and stability in Libya.

52. The Supreme Council reaffirmed its full support for the legitimate Government. It thanked the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Bernardino León, for facilitating the political dialogue, and extended its best wishes to the incoming Special Envoy, Mr. Martin Kobler, in the search for a political solution acceptable to the parties in Libya.

53. The Supreme Council expressed concern at the escalation of armed operations and violence in Libya by armed extremist groups. It emphasized its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya.

54. The Supreme Council reappointed His Excellency Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani as Secretary-General of GCC for an additional three-year term beginning on 1 April 2017, in recognition of his considerable efforts and effective contribution to the activities of GCC. It wished him success in his forthcoming term.

55. The Supreme Council thanked King Salman, as chair of the current session of the Supreme Council, his Government and the people of Saudi Arabia for the warm and genuine hospitality extended to the leaders and delegations of the GCC States.

56. The leaders of the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council welcomed the generous offer of King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa to host the thirty-seventh session of the Supreme Council in Bahrain in 2016.

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Thursday, 28 Safar A.H. 1437 (10 December A.D. 2015)

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BRS Assigned Document Number: 000004812

Report Type:	Daily Report	AFS Number:	LD1402112289
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## Dissemination:

City/Source of Document: Tehran Domestic Service

Report Name: Near East & South Asia

Headline: Khomeyni Exhorts Muslims To 'Execute' Rushdie

Source Line: LD1402112289 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030  
GMT 14 Feb 89

## FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Text] Following the publication of a book entitled ''Satanic Verses'' in Europe and the United States, in which the sacred integrity of the highly esteemed Prophet of Islam has been impugned, Imam Khomeyni, the great leader of the revolution and the creator of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has issued a message addressed to the world's Muslim community. The text of the message is as follows:
2. In the name of God Almighty. There is only one God, to whom we shall all return. I would like to inform all the intrepid Muslims in the world, that the author of the book entitled ''Satanic Verses''--which has been compiled, printed, and published in opposition to Islam, to the Prophet, and to the Koran--as well as those publishers who were aware of its contents are sentenced to death.
3. I call on all the zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will dare to insult the Islamic sanctities.
4. Whoever is killed on this path will be regarded as a martyr, God willing. In addition, if anyone has access to the author of the book, but does not possess the power to execute him, he should point him out to the people, so that he may be punished for his actions.
5. May God's blessing be on you all.

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6. [Signed] Ruhollah Musavi Khomeyni.

7. [Dated] 14 February 1989

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## Iran resurrects Salman Rushdie threat

Iran has seized on widespread Muslim outrage over a film insulting the Prophet Mohammad to revive the death threat against Salman Rushdie, raising the reward for killing him by US\$500,000 (£320,000).




Author Salman Rushdie Photo: CLARA MOLDEN

Robert Tait

5:42PM BST 16 Sep 2012

Ayatollah Hassan Sanei, head of a powerful state foundation providing relief to the poor, said the film would never have been made if the order to execute Rushdie, issued by the late Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had been carried out.

ADVERTISING



Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced a fatwa sentencing the author to death in 1989 after declaring his novel, *The Satanic Verses*, "blasphemous", but Iranian officials later indicated it would not be implemented.

"It [the film] won't be the last insulting act as long as Imam Khomeini's historic order on executing the blasphemous Salman Rushdie is not carried out," he said in a statement.

"If the imam's order was carried out, the further insults in the form of caricatures, articles and films would not have taken place. The impertinence of the grudge-filled enemies of Islam, which is occurring under the flag of the Great Satan, America and the racist Zionists, can only be blocked by the absolute administration of this Islamic order."

Ayatollah Saeni's offer appeared to be an officially-sanctioned attempt by Iran to harness anger across the Muslim world over the film, which was produced by anti-Muslim Christians based in the United States. The film, which depicts the Prophet Mohammed in a derogatory manner, has provoked riots and violent attacks on western interests in several Muslim countries, including Libya, where Americans, including the ambassador, were killed.

Although Ayatollah Sanei has offered financial rewards for carrying out the edict in the past, he said Muslim anger over the recent film meant the time was now ripe.

"The aim [of the fatwa] has been to uproot the anti-Islamic conspiracy and now the necessity for taking this action is even more obvious than any other time," he said. "I'm adding another \$500,000 to the reward and anyone who carries out this order will immediately receive the whole amount." The total bounty is now \$3.3m (£2.1 m).

The increased bounty was issued on the eve of the publication of a memoir by Rushdie about his years spent in hiding and living under armed guard from would-be executioners intent on carrying out Khomeini's sentence.

It also re-opens an affair that appeared to have been laid to rest after Iranian officials gave assurances that the fatwa would not be put into effect.

In 1998, Iran's reformist then president, Mohammad Khatami, declared the Rushdie affair "completely finished" during an appearance at the UN General Assembly in New York. The Iranian foreign minister at the time, Kemal Kharrazi, also announced that Iran would not threaten the author's life or encourage others to kill him.



The statements led to a restoration of diplomatic ties between London and Tehran, which Britain had cut in protest. It also prompted Rushdie to come out of hiding.

However, the fatwa - passed four months before Khomeini's death - was never annulled and hardliners have frequently revived the issue as a political weapon in their internal struggle with more moderate elements in Iran's theocratic regime.

It is unlikely that Ayatollah Sanei, personal representative of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the 15th Khordad Foundation, was acting without higher approval. In 2005, Ayatollah Khamenei himself reaffirmed the fatwa while addressing pilgrims preparing to visit Mecca.

In a speech last Friday, he decried the film as the work of US imperialism and "Zionism" and linked it to other perceived western attacks on Islam, including The Satanic Verses and the Danish cartoon contest depicting the Prophet Mohammad.

"Had they not backed the previous links in this evil chain, namely Salman Rushdie, the Danish cartoonist, and the US pastors who burned the Holy Koran and had they not made orders for [production of] tens of anti-Islam movies to companies affiliated to the Zionist capitalists, things would not have lead to this great and unforgivable sin today," Ayatollah Khamenei said.

A Foreign Office spokesman said: "We are aware of the reports and take any threat to the life of a British National very seriously. Our diplomatic position has always been clear that threats to Mr Rushdie are completely unacceptable."



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Report Type:	Daily Report	AFS Number:	LD0505100789
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## Dissemination:

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Report Name: Near East & South Asia

Headline: Majlis Speaker Urges Attacks on U.S. Citizens

Source Line: LD0505100789 Tehran IRNA in English 1000 GMT 5 May 89

## FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Text] Tehran, May 5, IRNA--Iran Friday called on Palestinians to retaliate Zionist brutality with attacks against Americans and other Westerners and their interests around the world.
2. ''If in retaliation for every Palestinian martyred in Palestine they kill and execute, not inside Palestine, five Americans or Britons or Frenchmen, they (Zionists) would not continue these wrongs,'' Majlis Speaker Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani said.
3. ''It is not hard to kill Americans or Frenchmen. It is a bit difficult to (kill) Israelis. But there are so many (Americans and Frenchmen) everywhere in the world.
4. ''Those who give 10 billion dollars a year to preserve Israel and know what they are doing, is their blood worth anything?''
5. Hojjat ol-Eslam gave his strong advice to the Palestinians during Tehran's Friday prayer which preceded with massive rallies in support of the Palestinian cause on international Qods [Jerusalem] Day.
6. ''The struggle of the people of Palestine must definitely be in that phase. They must avenge the blood (of Palestinian martyrs)... I think Palestine has no other choice but to take up armed struggle'' he said.
7. ''Dear Qods (Jerusalem) would not be liberated without these

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actions and with the kinds of things the people of Palestine are doing right now.''

8. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who also called on Palestinians to hijack planes to swap prisoners in Israeli hands and to blow up factories in Western countries, said he was not concerned by Western accusations of encouraging violence, and neither should the Palestinians.

9. ''Now they will start saying that so and so, as a man in charge, and as the speaker of parliament has officially called for acts of terror... But let them say it... Aren't they saying it now?''

10. ''They (Westerners and Zionists) carry out atrocities and present it with a human rights lable on it. We too will strive in the name of our rights to defend the innocence of our people.''

11. ''They will not stop calling you anything but terrorists until you surrender completely, until you hand over Palestine.''

12. Hashemi-Rafsanjani blasted the Palestinian leadership without naming PLO chief Yasir 'Arafat, for giving up the armed struggle and declaring as outdated the Palestinian charter which calls for the uprooting of the Zionist regime from all of Palestine.

13. He warned that Israel and its allies would never allow the formation of a strong and prosperous Palestinian state, if any, within Palestine and that 'Arafat's high-level contacts with the West would not lead to Israeli concessions.

14. ''It is impossible, absolutely impossible, for Israel to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state in a section of Palestine... but even if they gave this piece of land... they will really tighten the screws to keep you weak and poor.''

15. ''If you (Palestinians) had no power, you could wait and be patient,''

Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who is also Armed Forces commander in chief said.

16. ''But God knows there is a solution if you announce today that from now on you will threaten American interests throughout the world.''

17. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, delivering an emotional sermon, sounded close to tears when describing the suffering of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

18. ''These poor people are all alone. They don't even have their own (natural) supporters on their side... Everyday, in the streets of

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dismal Palestinian towns, sisters and mothers of disarmed Palestinian commandos are suffering under the boots of Israeli soldiers.''

19. The speaker said there were other ways to respond to Zionist atrocities, namely if the oil-rich Arab states withdrew their huge investments from the West and stopped selling oil.

20. But he doubted whether this would ever happen since most Arab regimes were not eager to see the victory of the Palestinian nation either.

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۱- تهران - ۵ مه - خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی - ایران روز جمعه از فلسطین ها خواست تا بیرحمی های اسرائیل را با حمله به آمریکائیها و سایر غربی ها و مافع آنها در سرتاسر جها تلافی کنند.

۲- " اگر برای تلافی قتل هر فلسطینی که در فلسطین به شهادت میرسد پنج امریکائی یا انگلیسی یا فرانسوی در خارج از فلسطین بقتل برسد آنان ( صهیونیست ها ) عمل خلاف خود را تکرار نمیکنند" . این مطالب را اکبر هاشمی رفسنجانی رئیس مجلس اظهار داشت .

۳- " کشتن آمریکائیها یا فرانسوی‌ها کار دشواری نیست ولی کشتن اسرائیلی ها قدری مشکل است . تعداد زیادی از آنها ( آمریکائی ها و فرانسوی ها در اطراف واکناف عالم هستند " .

۴- " کسانی که سالی ۱۰ میلیارد دلار به اسرائیل میپردازند و در عین حال میانند اسرائیل چه میکند آیا خونشان ارزشی دارد؟" .

۵- - حجت الاسلام در نماز جمعه تهران قبل از تظاهرات عظیم بنفع مردم فلسطین در روز قدس توصیه های قاطعی به ملت فلسطین کرد.

۶- " مبارزه مردم فلسطین باید در این راه باشد، آنان باید انتقام خون شهدای فلسطین را بگیرند. بنظر من فلسطین چاره ای جز آن ندارد که دست به اسلحه برد" .

۷- " قدس ( اورشلیم ) عزیز را نمیتوان جز با اینگونه اقدامات و عملیاتی که در حال حاضر مردم فلسطین میکنند آزاد ساخت" .

۸- " هاشمی رفسنجانی که از ملت فلسطین خواست به هوایماریایی دست بزنند تا بتوانند زندانیان خود را با مبادله آزاد سازند و کارخانیجات را در کشور های غربی منفجر سازند گفت وی از همت های غربی ها دایر بر تشویق خشونت باکی ندارد و ملت فلسطین نیز نباید واهمه ای از این موضوع داشته باشند" .

- ۹ - " اکنون آنان فریاد برخواهند آورد که چه وجه . خواهند گفت مردی که رئیس مجلس است و مسئولیت دارد از عملیات تروریستی پشتیبانی میکند . . بگذارید هر چه دلشان میخواهد بگویند . . مگر در حال حاضر چنین چیزهایی نمیزنند" ؟ .
- ۱۰ - " آنان ( غربی ها و صهیونیست ها ) مرتکب بیرحمی میشوند ولی آنرا در لفافه ای از حقوق بشر پنهان میکنند ولی ما برای دفاع از حقوق خود و مردم بی گناه مبارزه میکنیم " .
- ۱۱ - " تا وقتی کاملاً تسلیم نشده اید و فلسطین را تحویل آنان نداده اید چیزی دیگری نخواهند گفت جز آنکه شما تروریست هستید " .

## THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

EUROPE EDITION

### About That New 'Moderate' Iranian Cabinet . . .

By Sohrab Ahmari

685 words

9 August 2013

The Wall Street Journal Europe

WSJE

14

English

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Hasan Rouhani's inauguration as Iran's president has renewed the Obama administration's dreams of rapprochement with Tehran. In a Sunday statement, White House Press Secretary Jay Carney expressed hope that "the new Iranian government will heed the will of the voters by making choices that will lead to a better life for the Iranian people." Should the Islamic Republic choose to engage, Mr. Carney added, "it will find a willing partner in the United States."

Mr. Rouhani has already been "making choices" that the U.S. might want to take into account before becoming a "willing partner" in dealing with the regime. Consider the Iranian president's new cabinet, announced on Sunday. His picks were generally hailed in the American media as "reform minded or moderate technocrats" (NBC), as "more moderate" (New York Times), or as bearers of "an olive branch to the U.S." (New Republic).

But these men have long histories in the Islamic Republic, and their statements are in the public record for anyone willing and able to run Google searches in Persian.

Start with Mahmoud Alavi, Mr. Rouhani's choice for minister of intelligence and a member of the Assembly of Experts, the body that selects and nominally oversees the country's supreme leader. "Sacrificing life is easy for a nation in which a culture of martyrdom has been institutionalized," Mr. Alavi said at a ceremony last fall. "The Iranian nation . . . will never back down against the arrogance."

"The arrogance" is the Tehran regime's shorthand for the U.S. and its allies. But Mr. Alavi isn't averse to referring more specifically to the United States. In October, he declared on Iranian state TV: "The Americans can't even take on the pupils of our revolution, namely Hezbollah and Hamas. How dare they even consider a plot against our nation when twice they've been defeated by our pupils?"

Or consider Mostafa Pourmohammadi, designated by President Rouhani as Iran's minister of justice. Speaking at an event in February convened by the Islamic Republic's inspector general's office, which he headed at the time, Mr. Pourmohammadi said: "With our actions and our resistance, we have cornered the arrogance. We have severely frightened and confused the arrogance."

Then there is Mohammad Javad Zarif, Mr. Rouhani's pick for the foreign ministry, whose role as the Islamic Republic's ambassador to the United Nations from 2002-07 won him much admiration in the West. Sen. Dianne Feinstein in 2007 described Mr. Zarif as a "positive, reasonable figure." The same year, Joe Biden, a senator at the time, praised the Iranian ambassador as a tough negotiator who is "pragmatic, not dogmatic."

Yet Mr. Zarif has also been a vehement defender of Tehran's virulent campaign against Israel and of the regime's support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Asked at an Asia Society talk in New York earlier this year if Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, Mr. Zarif flatly responded: "No."

"Is Hezbollah . . ." the interviewer said, before being cut off by Mr. Zarif: "No. Let's stop here."

How could it be that President Rouhani, whose election was greeted in the West as the triumph of a reformer and the promise of positive change, isn't quite as reasonable as he seems?



His supporters might suggest that he has matured from the days when, as the Iranian newspaper Etela'at quoted him in May 1995, Mr. Rouhani told a group of pro-regime students that "the beautiful cry of 'Death to America' unites our nation."

Fast-forward to May 8, 2013, when Mr. Rouhani was campaigning for the presidency. "Saying 'Death to America' is easy," Mr. Rouhani said in a speech in the city of Karaj, according to the state-run Mehr News Agency. "We need to express 'Death to America' with action. Saying it is easy."

Saying that the new Iranian president is a moderate is easy. Finding evidence of it is hard.

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Mr. Ahmari is an assistant books editor at the Journal.

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March 20, 2009

Clip No. 2059

## Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei in Response to President Obama's Message to the Iranian People: Change in Words Is Not Enough

*Following are excerpts from a speech by Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei, which aired on IRINN TV on March 21, 2009.*

Ali Khamenei: With regard to our country's international affairs, I will relate only to our issue with America. This issue has been one of the important tests of the revolution since day one.

[...]

From the very beginning, the U.S. government received the revolution with a scowl, a frown, and a harsh tone.

[...]

From day one of the revolution, the U.S. government – whether under a Republican or a Democratic president – treated the Islamic Republic badly, and this is clear to all.

Crowd: Death to America! Death to America!

Ali Khamenei: Listen... The first thing that the Americans did was to incite the scattered [elements] of the opposition to the Islamic Republic, and to help separatist and terrorist movements in our country. They started doing this from day one. Wherever the separatist movements were present in our country, we have seen the fingerprint of America – in the form of their money, and even their people. This has caused great damage to our people, and unfortunately, it still continues. Those evil people at the border areas of Iran with Pakistan... We have recordings of some of these evil people, and we know that they are connected to Americans. They talk to them via wireless radio, and get their orders from them. These are evil, murderous terrorists, who are connected to American officers in a neighboring country. Unfortunately, this is still going on.

They started with this, and then they moved on to confiscate and seize Iranian assets and goods. The previous regime had placed enormous amounts of money at the disposal of the Americans, in order to receive airplanes, helicopters, and weapons from them. Some of this equipment was already manufactured there, but when the revolution took place, they did not supply the equipment, nor did they return the billions of dollars. Even more extraordinary – they stored this equipment in some warehouse, and decided by themselves to charge storage fees. They turned themselves into creditors, and deducted storage fees from the account of the Algiers Accord. Plundering the property of another people and keeping it for themselves, and then charging storage fees – this behavior began back then, and it continues to this day.

[...]

Now the new U.S. administration is saying: "Let's forget about the past. We want to conduct negotiations with Iran." They are saying: "We are extending our hand to Iran." Well, what kind of hand are they extending? If they are extending an iron hand concealed in a velvet glove, then it has no positive meaning. They send greetings to the Iranian people for its holiday, but in those very greetings, they accuse the Iranian people of supporting terror, of pursuing nuclear weapons, and so on. Let me say that I do not know who the decision makers in the U.S. are – the President, Congress, or some people behind the scenes. But let me say that the Iranian people has acted with logic from day one. We do not act emotionally with regard to the issues important to us. We make decisions on the basis of calculations, rather than emotions.

They are saying: "Let's negotiate and build relations." They use the slogan of "change." Well, where is this change? What has changed? Make it clear to us – what has changed? Has your hostility to the Iranian people changed? Where is the sign of that? Have you released the Iranian assets? Have you lifted the unjust sanctions? Have you stopped the mud-slinging, the accusations, and the propaganda against this great nation and its leaders, who rose from among the people? Have you stopped your unconditional defense of the Zionist regime? What has changed? They use the slogan of change, but in fact, there is no evidence of change. We have not seen any change. Not even the discourse has changed. The new American president, from the very first moment – when he entered office and made his speech – insulted Iran and the government of the Islamic Republic. Why? If you are right, and there really is change – where is this change? Why can't we see anything? I say this to everyone. The American officials and other people should know that it is impossible to deceive or intimidate the Iranian people.

[...]

Change in words is not enough – not that we have seen such a significant change in words so far. There should be real change. We should say to the American officials: The change you are talking about is something you yourselves need. You have no choice. You need to change. If you do not change, the divine law will change you, the world will change you. Indeed, you need to change, but not in words only. This change should not be accompanied by unhealthy intentions. You say: "We want to change our policy, but we will change our tactics, not our goals." This is not real change, it is deceit. Real change should be evident in actions.

I have a piece of advice to the American officials, to all the decision makers – to the President, Congress, and all the others. The situation in which the U.S. government has found itself is detrimental to both the American people and its government. Today, you are hated throughout the world. If you don't know this, you should. The peoples burn your flag. The Islamic peoples all over the world chant: "Death to America!"

Crowd: Death to America! Death to America!

Ali Khamenei: What is the reason for all this hatred? Have you ever analyzed this? Have you learned anything from this? The reason is that you treat the world as if you were its guardians. You talk with arrogance, and you want to impose your will on the world. You interfere in the affairs of other countries. You employ double standards in the world.

[...]

My advice to you is for your own good, for your own benefit, for the sake of the future of your country: Stop your arrogant tone of speech and your condescending conduct, stop your patronizing behavior, don't interfere in the affairs of other countries, be content with what you have. Do not define interests for yourselves throughout the world. [If you do as I say], you will see that the image of America in the world will gradually change from being hated to something else. This is what has made you so hated. Listen

to these words. My advice to the American officials – to the president and to the others – is to think carefully about these things. Give it to someone to translate it for you – but don't give it to the Zionists to translate.

Seek the advice and opinion of healthy people. As long as the U.S. government continues its conduct, its actions, and its policies against us, as it has done for the past 30 years, we will be the same people we have been in these 30 years.

[...]

[You say]: "We will negotiate with Iran and exert pressure on it." This is a threat combined with enticement. Our people resents such talk. It is unacceptable to talk to our people like this.

We have no history with the new administration and president. We reserve our judgment. If you change, our conduct will change as well. If you do not change – our people has become, over the past 30 years, more resilient, stronger, and more experienced.

Crowd: Allah Akbar! Allah Akbar!





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COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
Sub-Commission on Prevention of  
Discrimination and Protection  
of Minorities

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF  
DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES  
ON ITS FORTY-SIXTH SESSION

Geneva, 1-26 August 1994

Rapporteur: Mr. Osman El-Hajjé

GE.94-14556 (E)

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United Nations system and of their families, as well as of experts and consultants, and to transmit the relevant part of their respective reports to the Secretary-General for him to include in his report to the Commission on Human Rights;

6. Welcomes the decision of the General Assembly, contained in its resolution 48/37 of 9 December 1993, to establish an ad hoc committee to elaborate an international convention dealing with the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, with particular reference to responsibility for attacks on such personnel, and expresses the hope that this convention will be adopted as soon as possible;

7. Recommends that the Commission on Human Rights continue to keep under review the human rights situation of staff members of the United Nations system and other persons acting under the authority of the United Nations.

35th meeting  
25 August 1994  
[Adopted without a vote. See chap. VII.]

1994/16. Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Recalling its relevant resolutions, including the most recent, resolution 1993/14 of 23 August 1993, calling for an end to the violation of human rights by the Islamic Republic of Iran,

Recalling also relevant resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights, including the most recent, resolution 1994/73 of 9 March 1994, as well as those of the General Assembly, including the most recent, resolution 48/145 of 20 December 1993,

Deeply concerned at extensive and continuing human rights violations by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including arbitrary and summary executions, torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, unexplained disappearances, the absence of guarantees essential for the protection of the right to a fair trial and disregard for freedom of expression and freedom of religion,

Shocked by the systematic repression of the Baha'i community and at the situation of the Iranian Kurds and the Arab minority in Iran, and at increasing intolerance towards Christians, including recent murders of Christian religious ministers,

Appalled at the continued repression of women in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the practice of gender-based discrimination and the use of unacceptable and unjustifiable means of punishment,

Aware of the mounting concern expressed by the authorities of a number of States at the involvement in, and support for, international terrorism by the Islamic Republic of Iran, causing the loss of many lives, and the call by those authorities for action against the Islamic Republic,

Reaffirming that Governments are accountable for attacks by their agents against persons on the territory of another State, and also for inciting, approving or condoning such acts,

Welcoming the recommendations contained in the report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1994/50) and the decision of the Commission to continue the Special Representative's mandate,

Expressing its profound regret that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has refused to allow the Special Representative of the Commission to make a further visit to Iran,

Also regretting that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran refuses to implement existing agreements with international humanitarian organizations,

Affirming that human rights are universal and indivisible and that the violation of internationally recognized human rights standards cannot be justified by cultural or religious considerations,

1. Endorses the call by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to address the issues covered in his report (E/CN.4/1994/50) and to take urgent and effective action to improve its record in the field of human rights;

2. Condemns the flagrant violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran which, as noted by the Special Representative of the Commission, include:

- (a) Excessive use of the death penalty;
- (b) Numerous cases of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment;
- (c) A failure to meet international standards with regard to due process and the administration of justice;
- (d) Religious discrimination, notably against the Baha'is and Christian individuals and groups;
- (e) Discrimination against women;
- (f) Restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of opinion and undue limitation of freedom of the press;



(g) The use of excessive force in suppressing public demonstrations, as at Ghazvin, followed in some cases by execution without due process of persons involved in such demonstrations, notably at Zahedan;

3. Demands that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran cease forthwith any involvement in or toleration of murder and State-sponsored terrorism against Iranians living abroad and the nationals of other States;

4. Also demands that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran withdraw its support for and condoning of repeated threats to the lives of persons of whose opinions, writings or publications it disapproves;

5. Calls upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate with the judicial authorities in countries around the world which are investigating incidents of international terrorism, and in particular to return for trial in Switzerland two persons accused of the murder of Professor Kazem Rajavi who were returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran and who are sought by the Swiss judicial authorities;

6. Urges the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with all current international norms in the field of human rights, including in particular those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a party;

7. Strongly supports the view of the Commission on Human Rights that the international monitoring of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran should be continued;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to keep the Sub-Commission informed of relevant reports and United Nations measures to prevent human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including, in particular, those concerning the situation of the Kurds and the Arab minority and the religious freedoms of the Baha'i and Christian communities in Iran;

9. Decides to consider further the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran at its forty-seventh session.

35th meeting  
25 August 1994

[Adopted by secret ballot by 15 votes to 6,  
with 3 abstentions. See chap VII.]

1994/17. Situation in Burundi

The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,

Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,



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### Resolution 1373 (2001)

#### Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 September 2001

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001,

*Reaffirming also* its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,

*Reaffirming further* that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001),

*Reaffirming* the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

*Deeply concerned* by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,

*Calling* on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,

*Recognizing* the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,

*Reaffirming* the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,



1. *Decides* that all States shall:

- (a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
- (b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
- (c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;
- (d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;

2. *Decides also* that all States shall:

- (a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
- (b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;
- (c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
- (d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
- (e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
- (f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;
- (g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;



3. *Calls* upon all States to:

(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;

(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;

(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;

(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;

(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);

(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;

(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;

4. *Notes* with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard *emphasizes* the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;

5. *Declares* that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

6. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and *calls upon* all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution;

7. *Directs* the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;

8. *Expresses* its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter.

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## Security Council

Distr.: General  
2 September 2004

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### Resolution 1559 (2004)

#### Adopted by the Security Council at its 5028th meeting, on 2 September 2004

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, resolution 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, and resolution 1553 (2004) of 29 July 2004 as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21),

*Reiterating* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders,

*Noting* the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon,

*Gravely concerned* at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, which prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its full sovereignty over all Lebanese territory,

*Reaffirming* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory,

*Mindful* of the upcoming Lebanese presidential elections and *underlining* the importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence,

1. *Reaffirms* its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon;
2. *Calls upon* all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon;
3. *Calls for* the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
4. *Supports* the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory;



5. *Declares* its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon's upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence;

6. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the Security Council for the full implementation of this and all relevant resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon;

7. *Requests* that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council within thirty days on the implementation by the parties of this resolution and *decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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**Resolution 1701 (2006)****Adopted by the Security Council at its 5511th meeting, on  
11 August 2006**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

*Expressing* its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

*Emphasizing* the need for an end of violence, but at the same time *emphasizing* the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

*Mindful* of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and *encouraging* the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

*Welcoming* the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, *welcoming also* its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and *bearing in mind* its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

*Determined* to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

*Taking due note* of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa farms area,

*Welcoming* the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of



additional forces from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

*Aware* of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,

*Determining* that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Calls for* a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, *calls upon* the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and *calls upon* the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

4. *Reiterates* its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

5. *Also reiterates* its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

6. *Calls on* the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and *calls on* it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

7. *Affirms* that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and *calls on* all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

8. *Calls for* Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements:

- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any



armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government;
- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government;
- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession;

9. *Invites* the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in paragraph 8, and *expresses* its intention to be actively involved;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in those areas where the border is disputed or uncertain, including by dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Council those proposals within thirty days;

11. *Decides*, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 and 426 (1978):

- (a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities;
- (b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2;
- (c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;
- (d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;
- (e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment of the area as referred to in paragraph 8;
- (f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 14;

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *authorizes* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations

is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, *urges* Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and *expresses* its strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past;

14. *Calls upon* the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel and *requests* UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;

15. *Decides* further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft:

(a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and

(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above;

except that these prohibitions shall not apply to arms, related material, training or assistance authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11;

16. *Decides* to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and *expresses its intention* to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis;

18. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003;

19. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Annex 84

Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Players in the Middle East Peace Process, Pages 232-3:

### **"Formation, Strength, and Role of Hezbollah in Lebanon**

An official of Hezbollah has said [Interview with a member of the central council of the Lebanese Hezbollah on 29 March 1998]: ...Following the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 1981-82 [...], some of our brothers from the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) came to Lebanon and we began our intelligence work with the help of IRGC Intelligence...We came to conclusion that we must engage in military battle with the Zionist Regime. The Islamic Revolution Guard (IRGC) members came to Lebanon first for organizational and training of the Shias in Lebanon. Early in the IRGC presence in Lebanon, a successful attack by the Lebanese Shias of Lebanon was carried out against the Israeli troops under the supervision and with consultation with IRGC. This attack and its successful outcome was very effective in Hezbollah's evolution...From 1988 to 1990 we reorganized the political, military, and intelligence aspects [of Hezbollah] with the help of IRGC."

Pages 235-6:

### **"Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran**

The alliance between Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran is deep, strategic, and unbreakable...Some of Hezbollah members fought alongside Iranians during the 8-year war with Iraq...[On 27 March 1998 Seyyed Hasan Nasrullah, Secretary General of Lebanese Hezbollah said:] In addition to the political, propaganda, and psychological support we receive from the Islamic Republic of Iran, we are the beneficiary of Iran's financial support in advancing our holy objectives (combating Israeli occupiers and liberating occupied territories in Southern Lebanon). We have previously affirmed this fact."





**بازیگران**

**روند صلح خاورمیانه**

تألیف:

محمدباقر سلیمانی

دفتر مطالعات سیاسی و بین‌المللی

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بازیگران روند صلح خاورمیانه

تألیف: محمدباقر سلیمانی

چاپ اول: ۱۳۷۹

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بازیگران روند صلح خاورمیانه

به دنبال پیروزی انقلاب اسلامی ایران، ملت‌ها و گروه‌های مسلمان منطقه عمیقاً تحت تأثیر این انقلاب قرار گرفتند. گروه‌های (به اصطلاح) تندروی فلسطینی و لبنانی نیز از تأثیرات و توانمندی‌های انقلاب ایران برای مقابله با اسرائیل بهره‌مند گردیدند (۶۶) و با بهره‌گیری از حمایت‌های ایران و کسب توانمندی‌های روانی و دلگرمی و انگیزه قوی اسلامی از انقلاب اسلامی ایران تبدیل به یک بازیگر مهم در منطقه شدند، بطوری که بازیگران دولتی منطقه‌ای و فرامنطقه‌ای، نقش آنها را در دوران مختلف جنگ و صلح نتوانستند نادیده بگیرند.

جهت تکمیل بحث، لازم دیدیم که به چگونگی شکل‌گیری حزب‌الله، توان و نقش آن در صحنه لبنان، مواضع و دیدگاه‌های مختلف نسبت به حزب‌الله و مواضع و نقش حزب‌الله در جنگ و صلح با رژیم صهیونیستی پردازیم و رابطه همه اینها را با جمهوری اسلامی ایران مشخص نماییم.

شکل‌گیری، توان و نقش حزب‌الله در لبنان

- یکی از مسئولین حزب‌الله می‌گوید، این تشکیلات ابتدا شاخه‌ای از حزب‌الدعوه عراق بود و فقط کارهای فرهنگی انجام می‌داد. بیشتر یک تشکل دانشجویی بود و با مردم خیلی سروکار نداشت و وارد کارهای سیاسی - نظامی هم نمی‌شد. در آن زمان این تشکیلات (حزب‌الدعوه) با حضرت امام خمینی (ره) آشنایی نداشت و عده‌ای هم که امام را می‌شناختند، ارتباطی با ایشان نداشتند. به غیر از شاخه حزب‌الدعوه عراق در لبنان، یک جنبش شیعی نیز در صحنه لبنان وجود داشت که روی مردم کار می‌کرد و فعالیت‌های سیاسی - نظامی هم انجام می‌داد. این تشکیلات که به «جنبش امل» معروف بود، یک تشکیلات طایفه‌گرای بود و براساس این تفکر شکل گرفت که شیعیان باید همانند سایر طایفه‌ها در لبنان، گردهم آیند و یک تشکلی را سازماندهی کنند. زمانی که انقلاب اسلامی ایران در سال ۱۹۷۹ به پیروزی رسید، یک تحولی در منطقه و طبعاً در لبنان ایجاد شد. اما اوایل این تأثیر آنچنان زیاد و قاطع نبود. زیرا خیلی‌ها فکر می‌کردند که این انقلاب، یک انقلاب کمونیستی و یا اینکه پشت این انقلاب، شوروی‌ها قرار

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نقش بازدارندگی غیرمستقیم ج.ا.ا در روند صلح

دارند. اما به مرور و طی یکی - دو سال، چهره انقلاب اسلامی برای ما کاملاً روشن شد و این \*  
 همزمان با حمله اسرائیل به لبنان در سال ۱۹۸۱-۲ بود. به دنبال حمله اسرائیل به لبنان و اشغال  
 بخش‌هایی از خاک لبنان، عده‌ای از برادران سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی از ایران به لبنان آمدند  
 و ماکار اطلاعاتی را با کمک اطلاعات سپاه پاسداران شروع کردیم. در این زمان، بحث درگیری  
 نظامی با اسرائیل و صهیونیسم مطرح نبود. اما با موضعگیری شدید حضرت امام (ره) علیه  
 تجاوز اسرائیل به لبنان، ما به این نتیجه رسیدیم که بایستی با رژیم صهیونیستی بصورت  
 مسلحانه مبارزه کنیم. در ابتدا سپاه پاسداران برای سازماندهی و آموزش شیعیان لبنان به منطقه  
 آمده بود. در همان اوایل ورود سپاه به لبنان، یک حمله موفقیت‌آمیز از سوی شیعیان لبنان علیه  
 نیروهای اسرائیلی تحت نظارت و مشاورت سپاه پاسداران انجام گرفت که این حمله و نتیجه  
 موفقیت‌آمیز آن در شکل‌گیری حزب‌الله بسیار مؤثر بود. در این زمان بود که می‌توانیم بگوییم  
 هسته اولیه حزب‌الله شکل گرفت. این هسته ابتدا در بقاع تشکیل شد و سپس در جنوب گسترش  
 پیدا کرد. تا سال ۱۹۸۸، بیشتر فعالیت‌های حزب‌الله، اطلاعاتی بود. از سال ۱۹۸۸ تا ۱۹۹۰، با  
 کمک سپاه پاسداران، ما در ابعاد سیاسی، نظامی و اطلاعاتی شروع به تجدید سازمان و تجدید  
 ساختار خود کردیم. تا سال ۱۹۹۰، جنبش امل بزرگترین رقیب ما بود، ولی از این سال، امل  
 تضعیف و حزب‌الله تقویت و حتی در کل صحنه لبنان منحصراً بفرود شد. از همین سال (۱۹۹۰)  
 بود که با دشمن اصلی خود - اسرائیل - رو در رو قرار گرفتیم و جنگ همه‌جانبه و تمام‌عیار  
 اسرائیل علیه حزب‌الله آغاز شد. در این زمان دشمنان داخلی ما، اصلاً به حساب نمی‌آمدند. در  
 حال حاضر، حزب‌الله به عنوان قوی‌ترین، مهمترین و گسترده‌ترین حزب، بر صحنه لبنان،  
 منطقه و حتی جهان تأثیرگذار بوده و در معاملات منطقه‌ای روی این حزب حساب جداگانه‌ای  
 باز می‌شود. بی‌تردید می‌توان گفت که حزب‌الله بزرگترین و شاید تنها معضله رژیم صهیونیستی  
 در رابطه با لبنان و تنها طرف اصلی جنگ با این رژیم به شمار می‌رود. (۶۷)

توانمندی‌های حزب‌الله و نقش و جایگاه، آن در صحنه لبنان و منطقه، فقط محدود به عبارات  
 فوق نمی‌شود. توانایی بالقوه و بالفعل این سازمان و جایگاه عظیم آن در لبنان را نمی‌توان در



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نائب این عبارتها بیان نمود. در عین حال برای روشن تر شدن ابعاد دیگری از این توانایی‌ها و نقشها و ارتباط آن با جمهوری اسلامی ایران، سخنانی از برخی مسئولین حزب‌الله را مطرح می‌کنیم:

- حرکت و فعالیت حزب‌الله از ۱۴ سال پیش آغاز شد و مبارزه با اشغال اسرائیل در مرکز و محور توجهات ما قرار گرفت. در ابتدای کار، یک گروه کوچکی بودیم که بصورت چریکی با رژیم صهیونیستی می‌جنگیدیم. اما امروزه تنها سازمانی هستیم که در مسایل دفاعی لبنان و منطقه مشارکت داشته و حرفهایی برای گفتن داریم. سیاست‌های دفاعی و نقش‌های دفاعی را مورد بررسی قرار می‌دهیم و در این مسایل نظر داریم. روز به روز توانمندیهای نظامی، سیاسی و فنی ما و مشارکت ما در دولت لبنان و مقبولیت داخلی و بین‌المللی ما افزایش پیدا می‌کند. بر اساس یک نظرخواهی عمومی در لبنان و همچنین از نظر تحلیل‌گران سیاسی، بزرگترین، ذی‌نفوذترین و توانمندترین گروه در لبنان، حزب‌الله است. حزب‌الله در لبنان یک حزب جوان، توانا و امید به آینده آن بالاست، در حالی که سایر احزاب، پیر و فرسوده شده‌اند. حزب‌الله در زمینه‌هایی مانند جنگ با اسرائیل، فعالیت‌های سیاسی، مجلس، روابط با گروهها و شخصیت‌های سیاسی، دانشگاهها، احداث مدارس، ارائه خدمات اجتماعی، فعالیت‌های فرهنگی، رادبو، تلویزیون، مطبوعات، کارهای اقتصادی و تجاری، فعالیت‌های ورزشی و فعالیت‌های مربوط به زنان، حضور مؤثر و قوی داشته و دارای توانمندیهای بالایی است. در لبنان هیچ پدیده‌ای را نمی‌باید که حزب‌الله در آن مؤثر نباشد و حضور نداشته باشد. وقتی صحبت از لبنان می‌شود، از جنبش امل، گروههای مسیحی و یا سایر گروهها صحبتی نمی‌شود، بلکه فقط از حزب‌الله صحبت می‌شود. حزب‌الله در معادلات منطقه‌ای تأثیرگذار است. اما در سالهای گذشته، شیعیان لبنان حتی مسلمان هم به حساب نمی‌آمدند. پست‌ترین شغل‌ها مربوط به شیعیان بود. شیعیان از نظر جایگاه اجتماعی در پایین جدول قرار داشتند. ولی شیعیان امروزه به برکت حضور و قدرت حزب‌الله، شریف، عزیز و قوی هستند. شیعیان در لبنان بسیار تأثیرگذار و جزو تصمیم‌گیرندگان اصلی هستند و همه اینها به برکت، کمک و حمایت انقلاب اسلامی ایران است. (۶۸)



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- حزب الله دارای یک هفته نامه بنام «العهد»، یک مرکز رادیویی به نام «النور» و یک مرکز تلویزیونی با عنوان «المنازه» دارد. هفته نامه العهد با ۱۷۰۰۰ نسخه تیراژ، به عنوان پرفروش ترین هفته نامه لبنان محسوب می شود. تلویزیون المناره دارای برنامه های متنوعی از قبیل فیلم، سریال، تئاتر، برنامه کودک، سرود، برنامه های آموزشی و اخبار می باشد که براساس یک نظرسنجی که توسط یک مؤسسه غربی انجام گرفته، تلویزیون المناره، از نظر بیننده در رده سوم قرار دارد. اخبار المناره حدود ۴۰ درصد بیننده دارد، در حالی که همزمان با پخش اخبار المناره، چند کانال دیگر اخبار پخش می کنند. رادیو النور، حدود ۱۸/۵ ساعت برنامه های متنوع پخش می کند که در رأس این برنامه ها، برنامه مقاومت قرار دارد. در زمان جنگ ۱۶ روزه، اکثر قریب به اتفاق مردم لبنان، به اخبار این رادیو گوش می دادند. علاوه بر این ها، شبکه کامپیوتری حزب الله بسیار مجهز و گسترده است. اتصال به اینترنت و رابطه دوطرفه با این شبکه کامپیوتری جهانی، حزب الله را به مردم دنیا بیشتر معرفی کرده است. ما هر روزه از سراسر جهان از طریق اینترنت، مواجه با افرادی علاتمند و کنجکاو هستیم که خواهان ارتباط بیشتر با ما هستند و خواستار پاسخ به پرسشهایشان می باشند. همه این توانایی ها و موفقیت ها، بدون کمک و حمایت جمهوری اسلامی ایران میسر نبود. (۶۹)

- حزب الله یک سازمانی است که بیش از ۲۰ هزار نفر مسلح دارد که در مقایسه با ارتش لبنان که از طوایف و گروه های اجتماعی مختلف تشکیل شده است، یک ارتش قدرتمند به حساب می آید. ما پیش بینی می کنیم که در مواقع حاد و بحرانی و در لحظه سرنوشت ساز، بسیاری از شیعیان ارتشی به حزب الله بپیوندند. (۷۰)

#### - حزب الله و جمهوری اسلامی ایران

پیوند حزب الله با جمهوری اسلامی ایران، پیوندی عمیق، استراتژیک و ناگسستنی است. این پیوند، ماهیتی کاملاً ایدئولوژیک دارد و بر مبنای ارزشها و اعتقادات اسلامی و شیعی استوار است. مسئولین و اعضای حزب الله، امام خمینی (ره) را امام خود و مقام معظم رهبری را

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رهبر و ولی خود می‌دانند. آنها ایران را همانند وطن خود دوست دارند و به مردم ایران مانند مردم شیعه لبنان علاقه دارند. عده‌ای از آنها در طول جنگ ۸ ساله ایران و عراق، در کنار برادران ایرانی خود علیه تجاوز عراق جنگیدند و آن را وظیفه خود می‌دانستند.

در سطور قبلی به برخی از اظهارات مسئولین حزب در مورد جمهوری اسلامی ایران اشاره کردیم و در اینجا نیز برخی دیگر از این اظهارات را می‌آوریم:

- توانمندی حزب‌الله که آن را در میان تمامی گروه‌های لبنانی برجسته و سرآمد کرده است و باعث حفظ انسجام و یکپارچگی آن شده، پیروی از ولایت فقیه است. ما کاملاً مطیع رهبری و مقام ولایت فقیه هستیم و هر چه ایشان بفرمایند، ما عمل می‌کنیم. ایشان مرجع حل اختلاف داخلی احتمالی ما هستند. (۷۱)

- ما علاوه بر برخورداری از حمایت‌های سیاسی، تبلیغاتی و روانی جمهوری اسلامی ایران، از پشتیبانی‌های مالی این کشور در راستای اهداف مقدسمان (مبارزه با اشغالگران اسرائیلی و آزادسازی سرزمین‌های اشغالی جنوب لبنان)، بهره‌مند می‌شویم و این مسأله را ما قبلاً هم اعلام کردیم. (۷۲)

- ما افتخار می‌کنیم که از شاگردان مکتب امام خمینی هستیم. ما همچنان در خط ولایت فقیه باقی خواهیم ماند. ولایت در قلب و جان ما جا دارد. (۷۳)

- مواضع و دیدگاه‌های مختلف نسبت به حزب‌الله

عده‌ای از صاحب‌نظران، حزب‌الله را یک سازمان به اصطلاح تروریستی تحت حمایت ایران و سوریه تلقی می‌کنند و برخی دیگر، آن را یک نیروی مقاومت قوی علیه اشغالگران اسرائیلی می‌دانند که تحت تأثیر و حمایت ایران و سوریه قرار دارد. این عده حزب‌الله را همانند نیروهای مقاومت علیه اشغال نازیها در جنگ جهانی دوم، دارای مشروعیت می‌دانند و عده‌ای نیز این سازمان را صرفاً تحت تأثیر و نظر جمهوری اسلامی ایران قلمداد می‌کنند. در خصوص قدرت و توانایی‌های حزب‌الله نیز اختلاف نظر وجود دارد. اما تمامی نظرات روی این نکته اشتراک دارد



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که: «حزب‌الله تحت تأثیر و حمایت جمهوری اسلامی ایران قرار دارد و به عنوان یک بازیگر مهم در صحنه لبنان تلقی می‌شود و نقش مهمی در رابطه با بازدارندگی پروژه صلح آمریکایی اعراب و اسرائیل ایفا می‌نماید.» در این بخش به برخی از این مواضع و دیدگاهها اشاره خواهیم کرد:

- سفیر سابق جمهوری اسلامی ایران در لبنان اعتقاد دارد که جنگهای اخیر رژیم صهیونیستی علیه لبنان، صرفاً به منظور نابودی حزب‌الله و خارج کردن این برگ برنده از دست لبنان و وارد کردن لبنان به صلح با خود بوده است. وی گفت، مهمترین جنگهایی که اسرائیل طی سالهای اخیر بر لبنان تحمیل کرده، جنگ تموز در سال ۱۹۹۳ و جنگ نیسان در سال ۱۹۹۶ با هدف نابودی حزب‌الله بوده که موفقیتی کسب نمی‌کند. قدرت حزب‌الله در جنگ تموز تا حدود زیادی برای اسرائیلی‌ها مشخص شد ولی آن را خیلی به حساب نیاوردند و لذا قرارداد آتش‌بس را با سوریه متعقد کردند. اما در جنگ نیسان، قدرت واقعی حزب‌الله را مشاهده کردند. فهمیدند که حزب‌الله یک سازمان کوچک به اصطلاح تروریستی نیست. در این جنگ، حزب‌الله را به عنوان یک طرف درگیر شناسایی کردند. حزب‌الله که تا دیروز یک سازمان به اصطلاح تروریستی بود، امروزه به عنوان یک نیروی مقاومت علیه اشغال، شناسایی شد. (۷۴)

- حزب‌الله قبل از جنگهای تموز و نیسان در صحنه لبنان و منطقه آنچنان به حساب نمی‌آمد. حداکثر آن را به عنوان یک گروه کوچک و ضعیف که منشأ اثری نیستند، باور داشتند و گاه اصولاً اسمی از حزب‌الله به میان نمی‌آوردند. مثلاً ادوارد جرجیان، معاون امور خارجه نزدیک وزارت امور خارجه آمریکا طی گزارشی در کمیسیون سیاست خارجی کنگره در ۲۴ ژوئن ۱۹۹۲ اعلام کرد، ما به حمایت از بی‌سطح حاکمیت دولت مرکزی در کلیه مناطق لبنان، خلع سلاح کلیه نیروهای شبه نظامی! و ... ادامه می‌دهیم. (۷۵) اما پس از جنگ تموز و بخصوص جنگ نیسان ملاحظه می‌کنیم که نه تنها نام حزب‌الله در صفحات مقالات، روزنامه‌ها و مجلات معروف و معتبر جهان و همچنین در صدر اخبار مهم دنیا قرار گرفته بلکه به عنوان یک بازیگر و طرف درگیر، در مذاکرات آتش‌بس مورد توجه قرار گرفته است. بطوریکه وارن کریستوفر وزیر امور



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خارجه وقت آمریکا ضمانت حزب الله را در کنار تضمین سوریه و ایران نسبت به توافق حاصله (قرارداد آتش بس جنگ نیسان) ضروری دانست. (۷۶)

- هیأت دولت اسرائیل طی بیانیه ای اعلام کرد، هیأت دولت اسرائیل، حکومت ایران را محکوم می کند که از (به اصطلاح) تروریست های حزب الله حمایت مستقیم به عمل می آورد. (۷۷)

- رییس ستاد ارتش رژیم صهیونیستی طی گزارشی گفت، می توانم بگویم تا امروز و از زمان تأسیس حزب الله در ۱۲ سال پیش، هنوز راهی نیافته ایم که بتوانیم حزب الله را از نقشه لبنان حذف کنیم. هدف اصلی حزب الله، بیرون راندن ما از جنوب است. (۷۸)

۴- از نظر رییس ضد اطلاعات ارتش اسرائیل، ایران به حزب الله کمک میکند تا به تل آویو فشار آورد. (۷۹)

۵- مارتین اندیک مدیر بخش خاورمیانه شورای عالی امنیت ملی آمریکا عقیده دارد که ایران و آمریکا، در مواردی با یکدیگر اختلاف دارند که از جمله پشتیبانی ایران از حرکت حماس و حزب الله برای ناکام ساختن روند صلح می باشد. (۸۰)

- رفیق حریری نخست وزیر سابق لبنان در یک گفتگوی خبری تأکید کرد که مشکل حزب الله با زور حل نمی شود. وی گفت اسرائیل در باز داشتن حزب الله ناکام مانده و فقط در کشتن غیر نظامیان و ویرانی بخشی از مناطق لبنان موفق شده است. حریری خاطرنشان کرد که مشکل اصلی در اشغال لبنان است و حزب الله نتیجه این اشغال می باشد... (۸۱)

- یک نظرسنجی در اسرائیل حاکی است که ۷۵ درصد از صهیونیست ها بر این عقیده هستند که ارتش این رژیم قادر به غلبه بر نیروهای حزب الله لبنان نیست. (۸۲)

- رفیق حریری نخست وزیر سابق لبنان در مورد قدرت، نفوذ و تأثیر حزب الله در لبنان گفت، لبنان نه میخواهد و نه میتواند حزب الله را خلع سلاح کند. (۸۳)



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## Iranian IRGC Missile Unit Commanders: We've Developed 2,000-km Range Missiles And Equipped Hezbollah With 300-km Range Missiles; Fars News Agency: Israel's Illusions About Its Natural Gas Fields Will Be Buried In The Mediterranean

By: A. Savyon and Yossi Mansharof and U. Kafash\*

### Introduction

Two weeks before November 24, 2014, the end date of the Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1, websites close to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) began reporting about the capabilities of the IRGC missile unit, and in particular about this unit's capability to strike and destroy Israel. At the same time, there has been a marked increase in threats by IRGC officials on behalf of Hezbollah about the latter's readiness to strike any point in Israel. Furthermore, the IRGC-affiliated Fars news agency is touting the capability of Hezbollah's Iranian missiles to damage Israel's natural gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as Israeli naval vessels.

On November 24, IRGC commander Ali Jafari said at a conference at Shahid Modares University: "Today, the entire area of the occupied territories [Israel] is within range of the missiles of the resistance - meaning the fall of the Zionist regime. Of course, the matter does not end here, and certainly the final liberation [of Palestine] will come about." [1]

Also in November, the Iranian news agency Fars published statements by IRGC Aerospace Force and missile unit commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh and his deputy Majid Mousavi, both of whom claimed that the missile unit had been established in order to attack Israel. They said that Hezbollah is in possession of Iranian missiles with a range of 300 km, covering Israeli territory as far south as Dimona. Hajizadeh added that the IRGC and Hezbollah were a single apparatus.

Hajizadeh explained in detail the history of the establishment of the missile unit, which originally copied Libyan missile systems and was based on knowhow provided by North Korea, and that training for it had been carried out in Syria. He noted that it was Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who had demanded that Iranian missiles be precise to within 10 meters. He also underlined the IRGC's advanced missile capability against naval vessels.

In addition, just prior to the November 24 deadline, on November 17, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnimnews.com posted a diagram showing the ranges of several Iranian missiles, up to 2,000 km, covering Greece, southern Italy, southeast Europe, Turkey, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states. The diagram emphasized the Iranian missile threat to Israel and to U.S. military bases in the region.

On November 26, two days after Iran and the P5+1 agreed to extend the Joint Plan of Action to June 2015, Tasnimnews posted links to video clips of the launch of 2000-km range Sejil ballistic missiles (download the clip from MEMRI.org here); of 1,350-km range Qadr F and Qadr H missiles (here) and of 1,350-km range Shahab 3 missiles; of 300-km range Hormuz 1 and 2 missiles (here), of 300-km range Zelzal missiles (here and here), of 300-km range Zelzal Raad 307 missiles (here); and of the simultaneous launch of several ballistic missiles (here).

This paper will review at length statements by IRGC officials on Iran's missiles, on the missile unit, on the missile threat to Israel and to U.S. military bases in the region, and on the missile capabilities of Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance, which are now armed with Iranian missile technology. It will also review statements by Hezbollah deputy secretary general Naim Qassem: on Iran's aid to Hezbollah to arm itself with missiles against Israel.

### Part I: Tasnim's Diagram Of Iranian Missiles' Striking Range Up To 2,000 Km, Including U.S. Military Bases



Source: [Multimedia.tasnimnews.com/Media/Gallery/560065](http://Multimedia.tasnimnews.com/Media/Gallery/560065).

The translation of the diagram is as follows:

"On the Firing Line

"The commanders of the army of the Islamic Republic [of Iran] have said several times that with its attainment of long-range missiles with a range of up to 2,000 km, Iran has arrived at the range ceiling that it considers desirable, and that 'in the meantime' there is no need to increase this range. Although the U.S. is 11,000 km from Iran, in recent years it has approached the borders of Iran, [and therefore] its military bases, equipment, and forces are a target for Iran's missiles.



"Likewise, the Zionist regime is the most important enemy of Iran in the region, and is less than 1,200 km away. Therefore, short- and medium-range missiles are sufficient to strike U.S. bases near Iran, and long-range missiles are sufficient to strike the occupied territories [Israel]. The diagram shows several of these American bases and [also] the missiles that are counting [down] to the moment [when they will be able to] strike them."

Thumrait [U.S. Air Base, Oman]	963 km
Manas Airport [Kyrgyzstan]	1,344 km
Shamsi [Air Field, Pakistan]	199 km
Shahbaz [drone base in Pakistan used by U.S. forces]	527 km
Incirlik [U.S. Air Base, Turkey]	875 km
U.S. Air Base Al-'Udeid [Qatar], where there are B-1B (stealth) bombers	278 km
Ali Al Salem Air Base [Kuwait] with two [U.S.] Air Force bases and six U.S. Army camps	115 km
Bagram Air Field [Afghanistan], with four military airports and U.S. cargo planes and fighter planes	730 km
Shaikh-Isa Air Base [Bahrain/Saudi Arabia region] with two 3,800-meter long landing strips and P-13, C-17, Orion, and F-16 fighter jets	238 km
U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet. Large number of fully armed and equipped American warships	200 km
Al-Dhafra Air Base [UAE], with two 4,300-meter long landing strips and large aircraft	253 km by coast and 184-225 km from Iran's Persian Gulf islands

## Part II: In Interview, IRGC Aerospace Force And Missile Unit Commander Hajizadeh Tells The Story Of The Missile Unit

IRGC Aerospace Force and missile unit commander Hajizadeh gave an interview for a November 11, 2014 special publication titled *The Sejil Protest* (the Sejil is Iran's 2,000-km range ballistic missile) marking the 30th anniversary of IRGC missile capabilities.[2] In the interview, he discussed the formation of the missile unit as a powerful independent force in Iran's security branches, and gave details about the aid and guidance that the unit had provided to pro-Iran organizations in the Middle East, such as Hizbullah and the Palestinian factions.

### Khamenei Urged Us To Develop Missile Capabilities Based On Missiles Taken From Libya

Hajizadeh said that the missile unit was based on copied Libyan missile systems and on training in Syria, and added that it was Leader Khamenei, then Iranian president, who urged the IRGC to advance the missile project based on missiles stolen from Libya: "Between 1984 and 1986, the enemy forced [Libyan Leader Mu'ammarr Al-Qadhafi] to stop supporting Iran... But in 1984, we began producing missiles. That is, two missiles were secretly removed from [the Libyan] missile [stockpile in Iran] and were handed over to the initial team of the IRGC missile industry in order to reverse-engineer them... Back then, the [missile] industrial complex was small... and had not yet done anything of note. But because of the importance of the work, president [Khamenei] came to a meeting [of the missile unit]... and stressed that the reverse-engineering must yield results..."

"Following that visit, [Khamenei] noticed that the two missiles were still in their crate and that no one had yet touched them or disassembled them. The guys were busy reading the relevant material prior to disassembly. They wanted to work patiently and diligently so that nothing would be wrecked... I noticed that that very day, Mister [Khamenei] said in surprise: 'Why haven't we opened [these missiles] yet? Why are you afraid?'... The essence of his statement was: 'Fear not, proceed.' He threatened that if no one opened up [the missiles] someone might come and take them away, motivating them to start working on [the disassembly] as soon as possible."

### North Korea Helped Us Obtain Missile Technology

Hajizadeh explained that by 1986, the American and Soviet pressure on Libya to stop firing Libyan missiles at Iraq from Iran had yielded results, and that "in effect, we were disarmed and didn't even know it... But there was one thing that the Libyans didn't know... that our forces had received training and were on top [of things]. They [the Libyans] did their job [i.e. fired missiles at Iraq from Iran] and we helped them, but they thought that our guys knew nothing about the missiles... But we had already begun efforts to manufacture [missiles] and taken initiatives to purchase missiles from North Korea.

"At that time, North Korea was manufacturing missiles, and was more advanced than us... I was in North Korea with several colleagues [at that time] in order to accept a shipment of missiles, and we did not know what was happening in Iran... At the [Iranian] Embassy, they told me that Iran wanted [to talk] to me..."

"At that time, it was hard to maintain contact between Iran and North Korea - that is, this country [North Korea] has certain unique aspects and its communications are not like those of other countries... In any case, I arrived at the [Iranian] Embassy and, after much planning and coordination, I managed to get in touch with the martyr [Hassan] Tehrani Moghaddam [who was in charge of promoting Iran's missile project, and is considered the father of Iran's missile project]. We began speaking in code so that if anyone was listening in, they wouldn't understand [what we were talking about].

"Hassan [Tehrani Moghaddam] told me that there had been a number of incidents in Iran and that they were missing certain items. He asked me to obtain these items for him and ship them to Iran. I remember that 10 missile units were ready to be shipped [from North Korea to Iran] and that at the last minute, Mr. Hassan [Tehrani Moghaddam] raised this new issue.

"I borrowed money from the Iranian Embassy in Pyongyang, which was [highly] irregular, and bought the parts that Hassan had ordered from the same company from which we had purchased the missiles [that were already set to be shipped], and they [in North Korea] cooperated with us. We loaded the missiles in weather that was 20-25 [degrees Celsius] below zero... In the morning, and after we finished making arrangements, we set out. After arriving [in Iran], all the guys mobilized to prepare the missiles. But we encountered difficulties, because they hadn't been near the equipment for two years, and no drills or maneuvers had been held; in effect, no missiles had been launched. The Libyans had damaged the equipment, and the work was incredibly difficult. [The team] copied the parts we had brought from North Korea, but [these parts] had been adapted to the Russian mechanism [and had to be changed to fit ours]. [But] despite the difficulties, the mechanism worked, and the first missile was launched."



#### The Difficulty Of Retaining Manpower In The Missile Unit

"One difficulty in this work, especially in the IRGC system during the [Iran-Iraq] war, was retaining the manpower through the lengthy hiatuses between missile tests. Most of the pressure was on Hassan [Tehrani-Moghaddam], who would always preach to us [about the importance of this work], but [the effect of] his preaching only lasted for so long. When there was no work for a month, everyone would gather around him and say: 'Hassan, stop. This work will yield nothing. Leave us alone so that we can go to other [IRGC] units.' Likewise, between missile tests, when there was a planned months-long interval, many of the guys would join other units to help with testing, and would come back when they done, but they didn't like this and would say, 'Allow us to leave.'

"On several occasions, Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam held meetings... but from the outset the guys were unwilling [to do what he asked]. We were [helpless]. Eventually, we decided to get everyone together and take them to talk with Mr. Mohsen [Rezaee], the IRGC commander, so that they could receive some encouragement to keep working for another few months. We had a very interesting meeting, attended by Mr. Mohsen and 40 or 50 of the guys who were the backbone [of the unit]. Mohsen spoke with them, but we obtained an effect that was the opposite of the one we wanted. He said: 'The world made one mistake and gave us missiles... and it will never give us missiles again. The equipment and means we have received are the last we will ever get.' [Mohsen] added commentary in this vein... and when we left the meeting, they all gathered around Hassan [Tehrani Moghaddam] and said: 'That is exactly what we say.' Hassan said: 'What were we thinking, and what will we be in the end[?]' Our work has become extremely difficult'... In short, between 1984 and 1986 it was very hard to retain the guys in the missile unit..."

#### After The Iran-Iraq War: Israel Is The Target

"After the war, a new phase began for the missile [unit] guys... They assessed that if one day Iran's missile capabilities could not handle threats from the Zionist regime, then [the latter] might attack [Iran]..."

"The first contract that the martyr Tehrani Moghaddam signed with the guys from [the Iranian government-affiliated] defense industries group was for a limited number of rockets, and was worded so that we told Hassan: 'You have signed the [1828] Treaty of Turkmenchay!'<sup>[3]</sup> We said this because the refueling of these rockets was not [being carried out] in a safe way, and they [defense industry representatives] told us: 'Whenever you want to participate [in rocket tests] let us know, so that we can inject the fuel [into the rockets]'..."

"Furthermore, the first rocket tests we conducted were at a firing range in the desert. We situated the observers... 20 km from the spot from where we thought [the rockets would land]. But in several [initial] tests, we never saw any of the rockets - they landed behind us, exploded at high altitude, or went so far off course that we couldn't find them.



Hajizadeh. Source: Fars, November 12, 2014.

"We went to Hassan [Tehrani Moghaddam] and said: 'What is this contract you signed? How does it benefit us, and what good is it?' ... Hassan said: 'Look, if we don't fulfill this contract and create confidence [in us] among the industrialists, and if there is no demand [for rockets], we will achieve nothing. We had to sign this contract so that they are certain that we want this. If we don't want this, they will not be able to achieve a thing.' He [also] said: 'I too know this won't help anyone.' But Hassan's approach was like that of parents teaching a child to walk. They reach out to the child, who thinks he has only [a few steps] to go, but when he moves forward, [the parents] keep moving their hands back."

#### The Manufacturing Process Of The First Missile With A Range Greater Than 1,000 Km - In Order To Strike Israel

Hajizadeh continued: "We worked simultaneously on liquid and solid fuel missiles. We copied the Shahab 1 missile from the Scud B, which was productive, and in less two years, we created the 500-km range Shahab 2. Hassan [Tehrani Moghaddam]... said: 'We need a missile that we can use to hit Israel.'

"[We succeeded] then to produce prototype missiles to 'hit Israel' with a range of no more than 1,100 km, because of our pressure on the [Iranian defense] industries. We had to take [these missiles] to Gilanharb [on Iran's eastern] border in order to reach [Israel].

"Hassan believed that we had to attain a range for our missiles that would allow us to threaten the Zionist regime - that is, if it was not enough to reach the occupied territories [i.e. Israel], then we'd have a problem. It was as if he predicted today's situation. We attained these first missiles with the minimal range that I have already mentioned, and later on said that we needed to increase the range.

"Since those first missiles had to be fueled when they were vertical, their range was limited, and they were not very accurate. These issues resolved themselves in several stages, until we arrived at liquid fuel missiles with ranges of 1,650 and 2,000 km."

#### The IRGC Has A Plethora Of 2,000-km Range Missiles

"At that time, due to the desire to create rockets and missiles, many industries were working [in that field], both at the Defense Ministry and at the [Ministry] of Jihad-e Agriculture, which back then was called the [Ministry] of Jihad. The IRGC engineering [department] was engaged in [developing missiles] and many places were recruited for specific missions. Our aim was for all of this research to yield results, so that the abovementioned production could be directed towards the centers that made up the [Iranian] defense industry complex. Thus, we achieved a solid fuel missile with a guidance [system], like the Fateh 110, which had a range of 250 km, and, later, 300 km.



"At the same time, a request came in for work on a solid fuel missile with a range of 2,000 km. The project was named 'Ashura,' and, through trial and error, it led to today's Sejil missiles, which are multi-phase solid fuel and have a range of 2,000 km, and which now [have their own production line]; our missile unit has many of these.

"Currently, [we] have a wide array of missiles; and now, after many years [of work], we have design capability. At first we would reverse-engineer them - like how we created the Shahab 1 from the Scud B or the Shahab 3 from the Scud C. However, thanks to round-the-clock work by our dear scientists, we developed missile-design capabilities - that is, from idea to [final] product, everything is completely Iranian."

About the Iranian Qiam 1 missile, Hajizadeh said: "Engineering aspects of this missile are close to those of the Shahab 1, but [it] has no fins, that is, we removed even its external fins. Its length and diameter are the same as the Shahab 1, but its range has jumped from 300 km to 800 km. This attests to [our] high-level abilities and great potential, and, praise to God, with regard to surface-to-surface missiles today, almost every idea we came up with either has already become an [actual] product or can become one."



Launch of 2000-km range Sejil ballistic missile. Source: Fars, November 12, 2014.

#### Khamenei Demanded Improved Missile Accuracy

"After a time, Mister [Khamenei demanded] that [missile accuracy] be improved, to pinpoint precision. He had stressed this for a long time. Since our targets were large, we hadn't focused on accuracy. The missile deviation was between 200 and 1,000 meters, but because the warheads were heavy, we thought it was good enough.

"Every so often, even during my time, [Khamenei] demanded that the commanders and supervisors focus on accuracy. Everyone threw themselves into the task, until the prototype missiles reached an accuracy of 100-120 meters. But [Khamenei] said: 'This is impossible. If you want to hit a target, how can you say it hits 100 meters away from it[?]'

"Efforts continued until we had achieved accuracy of 35 meters, and we thought we had done a good job. At an exposition, while the first report was being submitted [to Khamenei], he said: 'Your work is excellent and top-notch, but if you can attain 35-meter [accuracy], then you can also attain 10-15 meter [accuracy].' We were in shock. With [Khamenei's orders for] improvement, the guys once again went to work, and within five or six months, we had reached accuracy of better than 10 meters."

#### Developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles

"The [missile] field expanded, and the missiles gained anti-ship capabilities - that is, [we developed] ballistic anti-ship missiles. Usually, cruise missiles are used for this, not ballistic missiles, but cruise missiles have limitations, and can only hit their target at low speed. Using ballistic missiles [for this] was an Iranian idea and this idea was developed until the Khalij-e Fars missile was achieved, and later until today's Hormuz 1 and Hormuz 2 missiles were achieved; each of these has unique capabilities and can target ships and naval vessels at various distances."

#### Syria's Missile Workshops Were Built By Iran; Hizbullah, Palestinian Resistance Have Many Iranian Missiles

"Today, our situation is good, and even the countries that once helped us, such as Syria, later purchased our missiles. Today, the missile workshops in Syria are Iran-built and manufacture missiles of Iranian design. In fact, we learned from them how to use [missiles], but [later] taught them how to make them. Syria's missile manufacturers have copied Iran. The resistance front has learned from Iran how to manufacture its missiles.

"[Both] Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance have excellent missile capabilities, and [Iranian] missiles are widely found and have special status."

#### Despite The Sanctions, Iran Obtained Missile Technology That The West Cannot Restrict

Hajizadeh concluded the interview by saying: "There is no comparison between the sophistication of missile industry technology and that of any other industry. But Iran has nevertheless become self-sufficient in this field. This shows that we can become self-sufficient in other industries [as well]. Our missile experience shows that we can completely neutralize the sanctions. The missile industry already has 72 martyrs; it is thanks to their round-the-clock efforts that we now stand on our own two feet and express [our] will, which is no longer under the enemy's control.

"In my opinion, those who believe, those who yearn for Islam, the Revolution, the Imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini], and the leadership [of Khamenei] are more important than missiles - [because] it is they who produce the missiles and weapons, and they who provide what is missing, on both the military and civilian levels.

"[The Westerners] restrict us and refrain from giving us even the simplest of things. Later, they notice the missiles, and say: 'Let's negotiate.' They do not say they will restrict [us], because if they could, they would have done so already. They say: 'Let's negotiate. Either you restrict yourselves, or shut down your production.' This shows that they cannot directly force their will on us. The control is no longer in their hands, but in ours."

Deputy IRGC Aerospace Force And Missile Unit Commander: "The Ideal... Was To Attack The Zionist Regime"



In a November 12, 2014 interview with Fars, Hajizadeh's deputy, Majid Mousavi, said: "The ideal to which Hassan [Tehrani Moghaddam] aspired was to attack the Zionist regime. He always [stressed] that we must attack them, and was always preoccupied with this... Leader [Khamenei] set a particular [goal] for us based on the assumption that the Zionist regime is our main enemy, and that if it is decided that we should confront it, missiles with a 2,000-km range would be sufficient."

#### Iran's Missile Program

On December 3, 2014, according to the Iranian news agency Mehr, senior advisor to the representative of Khamenei in the IRGC, Yadollah Javani, said: "Iran's missile projects are defined primarily in order to enhance might and to create deterrence, so that our enemies will sense our might and so that any thought of any kind of threat or obstacle to our interests will go right out of their heads. The U.S. and the Zionist regime have threatened us, but because of our deterrence capability, they have not acted on their threats. We have explicitly said that we support liberation movements that fight evil. Our support is actualized in the wars of Hizbullah and the [Palestinian] resistance against the Zionist regime, and in the defeat of the Zionist regime in the last four wars."

Javani quoted Ramadhan Abdallah Shelah, secretary-general of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as saying that without Iran's support, the resistance would not have emerged, and that today everything in the resistance's hands, from bullets to missiles, is thanks to Iran.

Referring to concerns among American officials about Iran's missiles, he said, "According to what the Leader [Khamenei] said, their desire to oversee our missile program is indeed an idiotic and stupid move. They are constantly threatening us. What intelligent country under constant threat would agree to restrict its defensive might? On the contrary, we have advances and plans that will put the [Americans] in a state of constant worry." He added, "They fear the might of our missiles, such that if anyone sins even a little [against Iran], Iran will respond on their soil, and, indeed, has the strength to make the enemy sorry for what it did."

#### Fars: Iran Develops "Smart" Warheads, Cluster Warheads For Long-Range Missiles

In a November 14, 2014 article, Fars discussed Iran's development of "a smart homing warhead, which operates in concert with the missile's other smart subsystems to increase accuracy both on land and at sea." According to Fars, only some of the developed countries have this strategic capability, and "according to Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan, this warhead can be mounted on all missiles, including long-range Ghadr, Qiam, and Sejil missiles. The warhead allows control even after reentry into the atmosphere, and can destroy targets with pinpoint accuracy. Missiles equipped with this system can strike targets with an accuracy of under five meters."

The article continued: "On November 2, 2014, the defense industries successfully tested a long-range missile equipped with a cluster warhead aimed at destroying enemy vehicles and equipment. This warhead can evade missile defense systems and destroy large targets as well as diffuse ones. The [Iranian] defense industries provided the IRGC with a large number of missiles, including Ghadr H, Qiam, Fateh, and Khalij-e Fars. The cluster warhead is fitted to at least two missiles: the [1,300-km range] Ghadr H1 and the medium [800-km] range Qiam.

"Both these missiles can carry blast warheads and cluster warheads, can be launched from stationary or mobile platforms from various positions, and can penetrate enemy missile defenses while evading radar detection.

"In April 2014, Leader [Khamenei] visited the IRGC achievements exposition, at which the Zelzal cluster missile was unveiled; it contains 17 bombs, each weighing 17 kg, that disperse at low altitude and are used to hit airfields or equipment on the ground. The Zelzal uses solid fuel and has a range of some 300 kilometers." [4]

#### Secretary-General Of Committee For Support For The Palestinian Intifada: Israel Has Both Nuclear Weapons And Ballistic Missiles, So Our Most Important Strategy For Creating A Balance Of Terror Is Our Missiles; I Hope West Bank Palestinians Are Equipped With Iranian Missiles

In a November 30, 2014 interview, Hossein Sheikholeslam, secretary-general of the Tehran-based Committee for Support for the Palestinian Intifada and an advisor to Majlis speaker Ali Larijani, said: "Our main enemy [Israel] is equipped with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and therefore our most important strategy in dealing with it is these missiles, which allow us to create a balance of terror in light of possible aggression by the enemy towards Iran... We hope that the missile strategy that has become established, in Hizbullah in Lebanon and in Gaza, will also spread to the West Bank in the near future..."

"Iran's top-notch missile capabilities are a strong dam against the Western strategy that is aimed at sowing chaos in the region in order to provide security for the Zionist regime. Iran's missile capabilities have several aspects, one of which is the rockets that have proven their operational worth in Lebanon and Gaza. [Another is] Iran's [successful] ballistic missile tests and satellite launches... We control the whole of the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Sea of Oman, and also have full control of the line for transferring energy, and of the warships and bases of the arrogance [the U.S.]. We are nearly invulnerable to possible attacks." [5]

#### Iranian Navy Official: We Have Acquired Such Capability That A Naval Attack By Iran Against Hostile Countries Will Seriously Endanger Them

In an November 23, 2014 interview with Fars, Iranian Navy Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Office director Gholamzadeh said, "Fortunately, Iran has achieved a level of ability that enables it to produce and operate a variety of missiles and munitions for various ranges. Iran produces both short-range missiles and missiles with a range of thousands of kilometers. The missiles' range conforms to what Iranian officials define as [Iran's] 'first line,' and all the officials need to do is define the required [missile] range and the Navy will attain it..."

"Our navy is in international waters, and therefore it obtains information about the most up-to-date equipment used by America, Britain, and the Zionist regime... We are completely overseeing them in order to learn about the latest updates in their equipment and technology. Just as they follow all our maneuvers, we [follow all theirs].

"Our military capability is such that all the abovementioned hostile countries talk about our navy, which is a bad sign for them, [since] they are only vaguely aware of our capabilities. We have acquired such capability that a naval attack [by Iran against them] will seriously endanger them... Our naval vessels are equipped with the Raad and Sayyad missile systems, as well as with short-range surface-to-air missiles. Now, we are attempting to improve [these systems] and to increase the vessels' defensive capabilities." [6]

#### Part III: Hizbullah's Missile Threat To Israel

##### Hajizadeh: "The IRGC And Hizbullah Are A Single Apparatus Joined Together... They Have No Shortage Of Missiles"

In a November 29, 2014 interview, Hajizadeh told Fars: "Knowing Hizbullah's missile and drone capability as I do, I say that this capability today is so advanced that it is not comparable to Hizbullah's capability in the 2006 Lebanon war. The capability that the Palestinian resistance demonstrated in the most recent war that lasted 51 days [i.e. the July 2014 Gaza war] reflects only part of Hizbullah's capability... In the past, Hizbullah was dependent on us [i.e. Iran], but today it has progressed so much that sometimes we use its capabilities. If they [still] need our support, we will help them. In effect, the IRGC and Hizbullah are a single apparatus joined together, and according to what I know, they have no shortage of missiles and drones." [7]



In another speech, the same day, Hajizadeh said: "By virtue of Iran's support, Tel Aviv is today under fire, across its length and breadth, by the fighters of Gaza and Hizbullah. The oppressing, accursed Zionist regime cannot stand fast against the resistance front, and it is doomed to defeat..." [8]

IRGC Affiliate Fars News Agency: With Its Missiles, Hizbullah Can Wreak Havoc On Israel's Natural Gas Fields And Navy

A November 29, 2014 Fars article titled "The Illusion Of Israel's Natural Gas Will Be Buried In The Mediterranean" stated: "The Hormuz 1 and Hormuz 2 ballistic missiles are anti-radar and are for striking warships. According to Hajizadeh, the range of the Hormuz 1 is some 300 km, and the speed of the Hormuz 2 is four to five times the speed of sound. In contrast to the Khalij-e Fars, whose navigational system is optic, and in contrast to the Fateh 110, whose navigational system is precise, the Hormuz 1 has searchers that identify radar waves and then attack their source... It can be estimated that the weight of the missile's warhead is between 450 and 600 kg... The Hormuz 1 has successfully destroyed a radar-equipped container that was only six meters long. This is considered exceptionally precise execution.



Hormuz 1 and 2 anti-radar missiles for naval targets (source: Fars, November 29, 2014).

"Hajizadeh said, 'The Hormuz 1 can destroy radar installations on aircraft carriers, a site of Patriot [missiles] on land or a site of searcher radar. A Hormuz missile installed on a launcher has very high mobility (which will be a nightmare for Israel's antitank batteries). The launching of this missile together with a Khalij-e Fars [missile] can be a real nightmare for an enemy at sea, because he will need to deal with two types of very fast missiles, each of which has a completely different navigational system, and dealing with each of them entails problems that are unique to each missile..."

"In recent years, the Zionist regime has discovered natural gas resources in the Mediterranean, particularly the Tamar gas field, which is 80 km from Haifa port, and the Leviathan, which is five kilometers underwater... [They] will be suitable targets for Hizbullah's Fateh naval missiles... These fields begin from the area of Ras Al-Naqoura [Rosh HaNikra in Israel] which is close to the Lebanon border, and end at Ashkelon beach, on the northern border of the Gaza strip... In addition to these two gas fields, there are smaller fields - Mary B and Dalit.



Israel's Tamar and Leviathan natural gas fields (source: Fars, November 29, 2014).

"If, eight years ago [during the 2006 Lebanon war], Hizbullah managed to strike Israel's modern and advanced [Sa'ar] missile boats in the Mediterranean only with short-range cruise missiles, by means of equipping the resistance with Khalij-e Fars and Hormuz missiles (both of which are from the family of the Fateh missile) it will be able to wreak havoc on [Israel's] navy, anti-tank defense systems, and huge gas reserves." [9]

IRGC Air Force Deputy Commander: Hizbullah And The Palestinian Resistance Have The Capability To Attack Anywhere In The Occupied Territories

In a November 12, 2014 Fars interview, Hajizadeh's deputy Mousavi said: "The policy of the Islamic Republic [of Iran] with regard to supporting the resistance forces and the resistance front gives them the capability to build and manufacture the products by themselves... From the outset, the idea was that we would teach them manufacturing capability. [This] strategy has advanced with regard to missiles.

"The Zionist regime tasted the bitterness of missile strikes in the 2006 Lebanon war, the 22-day war [i.e. the 2008 Gaza war], the eight-day war [November 2012] and the 51-day war [July-August 2014]. The main founder of this move was [Hassan Tehrani] Moughaddam, who helped and supported the relevant industries so that both Hizbullah and the Palestinians would, in a short time, have the required capability to manufacture and operate the systems..."



"As far as the range of the missiles is concerned, [the resistance organizations] can today attack with the missiles in their possession any target in the occupied territories [Israel], south or north. According to statements, these organizations have a secret capability for extensive missile campaigns to the level of the Fateh missiles [with a range of 250-300 km]..." [10]

Missile Unit Official: Iran Liaised Among Hizbullah, Hamas, And Islamic Jihad In The West Bank And Gaza - And Armed Them With Missiles

In a Tasnimnews interview published November 29, 2014, a commander of the IRGC missile unit, Ahmad Sayyed Hosseini, said: "Our officials liaised between Hizbullah and Hamas, as well as between Hizbullah and the West Bank and Gaza - most of them there are Islamic Jihad and Hamas members. That is how those organizations were armed and trained by Hizbullah, and received indirect support from Iran. Some of them even came to Iran for training, and they very gradually equipped themselves [with missiles]. The Palestinian resistance has repeatedly announced that it attained its [missile] capabilities thanks to the efforts of the father of Iran's missile [program, Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam], who armed them and guided them, bringing them to their current situation of supplying their own needs in their steadfastness against the Israeli regime." [11]

Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General: Without Iranian Missiles, We Could Not Have Struck Israel

In a November 11, 2014 Tasnimnews interview, Hizbullah deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem said: "Iran plays a central and major role in expanding Hizbullah's rocket capabilities in Lebanon, in terms of quantity and quality, training activists, and conducting maneuvers. Furthermore, Iran provided a lot of training in order to establish several missile units in Hizbullah. When we speak of missile capabilities, we do not mean just transferring missiles from Iran to the resistance, but also everything that goes with that - from [Iranian instructors'] presence in Lebanon to transferring [missiles], preparation, training, instruction in launching and striking targets, and specialized guidance for various people on using this capability..."



Hizbullah deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem (source: Tasnimnews, November 11, 2014).

"In the 2006 Lebanon War... we used various rockets transferred to us from Iran, including the Fajr [missile, with a range of 75 km], and the Raad [missile with a range of 300 km], and others. These missiles played a major role in moving the war into various areas inside [the territory of] the oppressive Israeli regime. At that time, these missiles could reach about half of the occupied territories, and half of the Jews [there] were under constant danger from these rocket attacks... This is an important weak point for the Israelis and a major strong point for Hizbullah. Without these rockets, we could not inflict such effective and painful blows upon the domestic front of the Zionist regime, that is, the enemy's military home front..."

"Therefore, the missiles that Iran transferred to Hizbullah in Lebanon played an important part in the resistance's winning formula in the 2006 Lebanon war, because they penetrated to the depth of the Israeli regime. Hizbullah also used missile capabilities that were transferred to them by [the regime in] Syria.

"According to the information in my possession, the Iranians also cooperated with the Syrian regime and military to establish missile facilities. This played a crucial role in the Syrian regime's various battles against terrorist circles since 2011 [i.e. the Syrian opposition], and in Damascus's support for Hizbullah, by transferring some of those missiles to them.

"Gaza is situated in the heart of Palestine, and its distance from Haifa, Jaffa, and Tel Aviv is minimal compared to [the distance from] Lebanon to southern Israel. Therefore, shorter-range rockets can carry out effective missions for the resistance, and even sensitive sites in occupied Palestine will be under a shower of missiles. Fajr missiles played an important role in these missile salvos on Tel Aviv in the [2008] 22-day war and changed the equation of the war in Gaza. This scenario recurred in the 51-day war [in July-August 2014], when even more missiles were fired at Tel Aviv and other sensitive sites in occupied Palestine." [12]

Diagram: Iran's 300-km Range Fateh 110 Missile And Israel



Source: Media.farsnews.com/media/Uploaded/Files/Images/1393/08/25/13930825000659.jpg.

Also in November, Fars published a diagram showing how the 300-km range Fateh missile could strike any of Israel's major cities and important sites. The following is the translation of the diagram:

"Fateh 110: The Fateh 110 is powered by solid fuel, has a range of 300 kilometers, and is considered Iran's most accurate ballistic missile. This missile, with its pinpoint accuracy, is a nightmare for the Zionist regime.

"Dimona [in crosshairs on map] is within range of Iran's most accurate missile: The Dimona nuclear reactor, located in the 'Negev' research center, is considered Israel's most important nuclear reactor. It comprises 10 buildings and some 3,000 scientists and technical experts. Israel's plutonium research workshop is also situated there. Israel's nuclear site creates nuclear fuel at over 90% enrichment for nuclear bombs and missiles.

"Additionally, the joint Israeli-American lab for cyber-attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities is located in Dimona.

Rocket name	Range	Length	Payload Weight	Warhead Weight	Fuel Type	Mission
Fateh	300 km	8.9 m	3,670 kg	500 kilos	Solid	Surface-to-surface
Khalij-e Fars	300 km	8.9 m	3,730 kg	450 kilos	Solid	Surface-to-sea

"Haifa: Population 270,000. Third largest city in Israel and the site of the largest oil refinery and most marine traffic.

"Netanya: Population 174,000. Area: 28,954 square kilometers [sic].

"Herzliya : Population 84,000. This city is considered Israel's most expensive place to live.

"Tel Aviv: Population 403,700. Israel's capital [sic] and second-largest city in terms of population.

"Ashdod Port: Population 200,000. Israel's largest port.

"Ashkelon Port: Population 107,900. Area: 47,788 square kilometers [sic].

"Beersheba: Population 185,000. Fourth most populous city." [13]

\* U. Kafash and Y. Mansharof are Research Fellows at MEMRI; A Savyon is director of the Iranian Media Project at MEMRI.

Endnotes:

- [1] Sepahnews.com (Iran), November 24, 2014.
- [2] As published by Fars (Iran), November 12, 2014.
- [3] Under the Treaty of Turkmenchay, Russia forced Iran to relinquish Afghanistan.
- [4] Fars (Iran), November 14, 2014.
- [5] Tasnimnews.com (Iran), November 30, 2014.
- [6] Fars (Iran), November 23, 2014.
- [7] Fars (Iran), November 29, 2014.
- [8] Yjc.ir (Iran), November 29, 2014.



[9] Fars (Iran), November 29, 2014.

[10] Fars (Iran), November 12, 2014.

[11] Tasnimnews.com (Iran), November 29, 2014.

[12] Tasnimnews.com (Iran), November 11, 2014.

[13] Farsnews.com, November 2014.

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WORLD | MIDDLE EAST

# Hezbollah claims 'pinpoint' Iranian missiles added to its arsenal

The Lebanese Shiite militant group and close ally of Iran said it has received more advanced missiles, with greater range, as talks over Iran's nuclear program wind down in Vienna.

By Nicholas Blanford, Correspondent

NOVEMBER 23 2014

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Hussein Malla/AP | View Caption

BEIRUT, LEBANON — On the eve of a deadline in nuclear talks between six world powers and Iran, Lebanon's militant Shiite Hezbollah organization has revealed that it has acquired advanced Iranian missiles with "pinpoint accuracy" that it could use against Israel in any future war.

"They [the Israelis] are well aware that Hezbollah is in possession of missiles with pinpoint accuracy, and thanks to the equipment Hezbollah acquired, and with the Islamic Republic's support and Hezbollah's readiness for any future war, [the next] war will be much tougher for the Israelis," Naim Qassem, the deputy head of Hezbollah, said in an interview with Iran's Tasnim news agency.

Sheikh Qassem's comments on Hezbollah's enhanced missile capabilities and the threat they pose to Israel came amid waning hopes that a deal could be struck by a Monday deadline in Vienna between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States plus Germany, the so-called P5+1. The six leading nations want Iran to curb its uranium enrichment capacity, which could be used to make nuclear weapons, in exchange for a lifting of international sanctions.

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By late Sunday, negotiators were reportedly looking for a way to extend the talks beyond the deadline.

Watching the Vienna talks closely from the sidelines is Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, has said he is concerned that any final deal between the P5+1 and Iran will be insufficient to curb what he says is Iran's goal of building nuclear weapons. Iran says its nuclear program is for civilian use only.



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In an Israeli cabinet meeting Sunday, Mr. Netanyahu said that Israel is delivering a "firm stance" to its allies in insisting that Iran should not be allowed to become a "nuclear threshold state".



PHOTOS OF THE DAY | Photos of the weekend

"Therefore, no deal would be preferable to a bad deal that threatens Israel, the Middle East and all of humanity," he said.

If there is no diplomatic breakthrough in Vienna, the drumbeat for military action against Iran will almost certainly be heard once more, raising tensions in a region already ravaged by conflict and radicalism.

Over the past decade, Iran has turned Hezbollah into a powerful military force with weapons capabilities unmatched by any other non-state actor. In May, a top Israeli army general said Hezbollah's arsenal "would not shame any army in the world".

Iran's considerable military and financial investment in Hezbollah is intended to bolster Iran's deterrence against a possible attack on its nuclear facilities. If Israel chooses to bomb Iran's nuclear plants, it must first assess the response of Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon.

The stronger Hezbollah's military capabilities, the greater the stakes for Israel in launching an attack on Iran. Twenty years ago, Hezbollah's arsenal of unguided 12-mile range rockets allowed it to pepper parts of northern Israel only. Today, the missiles suspected to be in Hezbollah's arsenal could slam half a tonne of high-grade explosive into specific targets in Tel Aviv, such as the Israeli defense ministry or Ben Gurion International Airport.

Two weeks ago, a senior officer in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said that Iran had provided Hezbollah with its indigenously produced Fateh A-110 short-range ballistic missiles.

"Considering the range of their [Hezbollah's] missiles, they are able now to attack targets from southern to northern parts of the occupied territories [Israel]," said Brigadier General Sayed Majid Moussavi, the IRGC's air defense commander, according to a report by the Iranian Fars news agency.



The specific missile system to which Moussavi and Hezbollah's Qassem referred is likely to be the 4th-generation version of the Fateh which has a range in excess of 186 miles and can carry a 1,430 pound warhead. Armed with that missile, Hezbollah could launch it from its camouflaged bases in southern Lebanon and hit Israel's nuclear reactor at Dimona in southern Israel, 140 miles south of the border with Lebanon, achieving a degree of reciprocity for any Israeli air strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.


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
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Will lifting of nuclear sanctions on Iran help cash-strapped Hezbollah?



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## In first, Hezbollah confirms all financial support comes from Iran



Nasrallah: “We are open about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran.” (Photo: screengrab)

In a speech broadcast on Friday, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanese militant group Hezbollah scoffed at the recent US sanctions stating that these sanctions will not impact his group whatsoever due to the fact that Hezbollah receives full financial and arms support from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He **pointed** out that “We do not have any business projects or investments via banks...” Nasrallah added that “We are open



about the fact that Hezbollah's budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic Republic of Iran," and he emphasized that his group "will not be affected" by any fresh sanctions.

Speaking in a speech to mark 40 days after the death of a high level Hezbollah commander Mustafah Bedreddine in the Syrian capital Damascus, Nasrallah stated that: "As long as Iran has money, we have money... Just as we receive the rockets that we use to threaten Israel, we are receiving our money. No law will prevent us from receiving it..."



## First public confirmation

It has been long known to political observers that the Islamic Republic played a key role in giving birth to the Lebanese Shiite militant group in 1982. For over three decades, Iran's financial, military, intelligence, logistical, and advisory assistances to Hezbollah have been well known. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite force, the Quds force, transformed Hezbollah to be one of Iran's most important and powerful regional and international proxies.

Nevertheless, what highlights the significance of Nasrallah's speech is the fact that this is the first time in which he is announcing and publicly confirming that his group is receiving full monetary and arms support from the Iranian government.

The United States has long listed Hezbollah as a global terrorist group (since 1995) and accused it in several attacks such as the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing, that killed 241 US marines, the April 1983 US embassy bombing, and the



1984 US embassy annex bombing.

On Dec. 18, 2015, the US president signed the **Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act**. The US Congress voted to impose fresh sanctions on Hezbollah by targeting those banks that are "knowingly facilitating a significant transaction or transactions for" Hezbollah and those financial institutions that "knowingly facilitating a significant transaction or transactions of a person identified on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked persons."

Nasrallah **pointed** out in his recent speech: "We totally reject this [United States] law until the Day of Judgment ... Even if the law is applied, we as a party and an organizational and jihadist movement, will not be hurt or affected," He added: "We have no money in Lebanese banks, neither in the past nor now ... We don't transfer our money through the Lebanese banking system."

## How this plays out in Washington

On the other hand, since Hezbollah is receiving full funding and arms support from Iran, according to Nasrallah, the US is now seemingly playing a critical role in assisting and facilitating the ways through which Hezbollah receives this significant aid from the Iranian government.

The Obama administration and Hassan Rowhani's government were two key players in getting the nuclear agreement signed. When the nuclear terms started being implemented, the Obama administration began immediately transferring billions of dollars to Iran's Central Bank. One of the payments **included** 1.7 billion dollars transferred, in January 2015.

Two of the major primary beneficiaries of these sanctions reliefs and flow of money are Hezbollah and the IRGC. Iran also immediately **increased** its military budget by \$1.5 billion from \$15.6 billion to \$17.1 billion. Iran also began witnessing the flow of money due to the lifting of international sanctions.

Nasrallah's speech also indicates that the US money transfer to Iran's bank and the sanctions reliefs appear to have empowered and emboldened both the Iranian government and the Hezbollah leader.

Previously, when sanctions were imposed on Iran, Tehran had to reduce Hezbollah and its TV's (Al-Manar channel) funding from the **approximately** \$200 million a year. However, thanks to Washington, the money that Iran is receiving from the US or the market is again going on its way to Hezbollah, the major benefactor.

President Obama had given hope to world powers that engaging with Iran and the nuclear deal with Tehran would more likely force the Iranian government to moderate its behavior. Obama **pointed out** in an interview with NPR's Steve Inskeep that as a result of the nuclear agreement Iran would start "different decisions that are less offensive to its neighbors; that it tones down the rhetoric in terms of its virulent opposition..."

Hezbollah's confirmation of receiving money and arms from Iran is intriguing. Almost all signs indicate that the continuation of sanctions relief, and US transfer of billions of dollars to Iran militarily and financially assisting and ending up in the hands of Iran's primary proxy, Hezbollah as well as Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Quds force.

*Last Update: Saturday, 25 June 2016 KSA 20:23 - GMT 17:23*

## Iranians train Taliban to use roadside bombs: report



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THE Taliban fighters scurried up the craggy mountainside.

As they neared the top, their 30-strong platoon split into three sections and they launched a ferocious assault on an enemy fort, opening fire from numerous positions.

The bullets they sprayed at the forts mud-coloured walls were blank, however.

They merely pretended to fire their rocket-propelled grenades.

When they reached the desert at the foot of the mountain, they did not race away on motorbikes, but filed into sand-coloured tents to refresh themselves with tea and naan.



The attack was a training exercise overseen by Iranian security officials in plain clothes. The Taliban do not know whether they were police officers, soldiers or secret service agents. What they can say is that in camps along the border between Afghanistan and Iran, Taliban recruits are being taught how to ambush British, American and other Nato troops using guns and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They are learning to attack checkpoints as well as mountain bases. Iranian instructors are also giving them target practice on desert ranges with Kalashnikov assault rifles.

In the past, Shiite Iran has opposed the Sunni Taliban. But western officials say Iran now wants to expand its influence within the Taliban movement. A Taliban commander who has been trained in Iran said last week: Our religions and our histories are different, but our target is the same we both want to kill Americans. In recent months, senior American officials have accused Iran of playing a double game by training and arming the Taliban while supporting the Afghan government. Taliban leaders interviewed by The Sunday Times last week provided the first direct evidence of how Iran is training insurgents on its own soil. According to one Taliban source, emissaries travelled to Iran early last year to discuss a training programme with Iranian officials. The training began during the winter. Working through local mediators, this newspaper persuaded two Taliban commanders who had attended the programme in Iran to travel to Kabul, the Afghan capital, to tell their stories. The men, interviewed separately in a partially constructed concrete building on the edge of the city, were both extremely nervous. How do I know you are not spies and that you will not follow me when I leave? said one before the interview began. At times, their voices dropped to whispers as they spoke about their role in the insurgency and drank cups of tea on dirty cushions. One of the commanders, from the central province of Wardak, described how he travelled to Iran with 20 of his men. His journey took him south into Pakistan, then west to the border with Iran and on to Zahedan, a city of 600,000 people in southeast Iran. The second Taliban commander, from Ghazni province in southern Afghanistan, took a group of his men on a five-day drive to Nimroz, in the southwest. From there, he crossed into Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan province, a hotbed of drug smuggling and tribal rivalry. The militants paid a \$500 fee to Afghan people-smugglers using routes usually taken by refugees looking for work in Iran. They crossed the border at night in cars with the help of Baluch traffickers who guided the groups along dirt tracks to avoid checkpoints. After stopping to rest in the mountains, they headed out again at first light. Finally, they were met by their Iranian instructors in white Toyota pick-up trucks and were taken to a village on the outskirts of Zahedan, an hours drive from the training camps.



There they were placed in basic compounds, each housing up to 30 Taliban fighters, mostly from the south and southeast of Afghanistan where the insurgency against British and American forces is fiercest.

Battered buses and pick-up trucks ferried the militants back and forth between the village and the camps every morning and night.

Iran paid for the whole trip.

We paid the travel fees to begin with and once we got to Iran they refunded us.

They paid for our food, our mobile phone cards, any expenses, said the Ghazni commander.

At one camp, a cluster of low tents erected in the shadow of a mountain, the Taliban fighters conducted live firing exercises, physical training and mountain assaults under the watchful eye of the plain-clothes Iranians, the commander said.

During a course lasting three months, the Iranian instructors worked in groups of two to five men.

Their programme was split into three parts, each taking a month to complete.

For the first month, the recruits were taught how to launch complex ambushes on moving convoys.

They learnt where to set up firing positions, when to trigger the ambush and how to escape before the enemy had time to respond.

They were strong on the planning side.

We would sit in the tents and they would take us through things like where the best escape routes were, making sure we had good cover and where to place our lookouts, the commander said.

The second month was spent learning how to plant the roadside bombs that are responsible for most of the deaths of British soldiers in Helmand province.

The insurgents were taught to use carefully positioned secondary and tertiary devices to kill or wound rescuers organising medical evacuations.

During the third month, the instructors taught the Taliban how to storm fixed enemy positions, climbing mountains in formation to launch attacks on checkpoints and bases.

We were told ambushing was a very useful tool compared with a straightforward attack.

They taught us how to select a good hiding position and how to limit the enemys response to our attacks by laying well- positioned mines, said the commander.

We can kill a lot of our enemies this way.

Both commanders said Iran also supplied them with weapons, often paying nomads to smuggle ammunition, mines and guns across the desert and mountain passes between Iran and Afghanistans western provinces.

The nomads used donkeys, camels and horses to carry the military supplies into provinces such as Ghazni and Wardak, the commanders said.

Although the commanders believed that, after years on the battlefields of Afghanistan, they already possessed some of the skills that were taught in Irans camps, they agreed the training had improved their ability to launch more sophisticated attacks.

I found some elements of the training in Iran very useful, especially the escape and evasion techniques I was taught, said the commander from Wardak as he showed me video footage of his men patrolling on motorbikes with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenade launchers slung over their shoulders.

The commanders gave no indication of precisely who was behind the training.

Late last year General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander of foreign troops in Afghanistan, accused Iran's al-Quds force an elite wing of the Revolutionary Guard of undermining the efforts of the Afghan government and Nato forces.

The problem with dealing with the Iranian regime is knowing to what extent these initiatives are conducted by local commanders and to what extent they are backed by the government, said a western defence source.

He added that, although he had seen no direct evidence, the accounts of Taliban training camps in Iran were credible.

American officials believe Iran's support for the Taliban has reached troubling proportions, although it is not on the same scale as its backing for Shiite insurgents in Iraq.

The commanders accounts suggest the number of Taliban fighters trained in Iran may already have reached the hundreds.

Taliban militants still receive much of their training in neighbouring Pakistan.

Elements of the ISI, Pakistan's secret service, are known to train, equip and fund the Taliban.

But a recent crackdown on Taliban safe havens in Pakistan has forced many insurgents to look to Iran for support.

The military is pressuring the Taliban in Pakistan.

It is certainly harder to reach places that were once easy to get into.

I think more of my fighters will travel to Iran for training this year, said the Ghazni commander.

Two weeks ago Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said of the Iranians: They want to maintain a good relationship with the Afghan government.

They also want to do everything they possibly can to hurt us, or for us not to be successful.

Days later, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran insisted he wanted to rebuild Afghanistan and criticised the presence of foreign troops.

The Taliban commander from Ghazni province said he had no doubt Iranian police and intelligence services knew about the training camps, however.

The government is not sleeping, he said.

You just have to wiggle your ears in Iran and they will know about it.

(The Sunday Times)



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## FROM OUR BUREAUS

# Captured Taliban Commander: 'I Received Iranian Training'

August 23, 2011

FARAH, Afghanistan -- A Taliban commander captured in southwestern Afghanistan claims to have received military training in Iran to target a major dam in the region.

The claim was made by Mullah Dadullah, who was captured recently in the Lash-e Zoveyn region of Farah Province, close to the Iranian border.

"I was trained in Iran for three months. Our trainers were a mix of Pakistanis, Iranians, and Arabs," Dadullah, the head of a group of some 150 Taliban fighters, told journalists under police supervision on August 23 in the provincial capital, Farah.

"Ali Talibi and Hussein Rezai were two of my Iranian instructors. They taught me to fire rockets and to plant mines," he added. "I was trained in setting up remote-controlled mines and planting antitank mines. Even developed countries would have been unable to discover the mines I planted."

Senior U.S. and Afghan officials have long accused Iran of supporting Afghan insurgents. But Tehran has consistently denied such accusations.

Dadullah claimed to have been involved in insurgent attacks in the southwestern provinces of Farah, Helmand, and Nimroz during the past three years.



He said that recently Iranian officials offered him \$50,000 in return for destroying the Kamal Khan Dam in Nimroz Province, east of Farah.

Farah's provincial police chief, Gahussudin, said that Dadullah was tasked with sabotaging major infrastructure projects in the region.

"He was trained for blowing up the Kamal Khan Dam. He was also tasked to attack other major infrastructure projects in the provinces bordering Iran," Gahussudin said. "Fortunately, he was arrested by the police" before he could act on his plans.

The Kamal Khan Dam is located in the Char Borjak district of Nimroz Province. After completion it will significantly reduce water flow to the neighboring regions of southeastern Iran, which already face severe water shortages.

Afghans also accuse Tehran of attempting to slow down the construction of Salma Dam in western Herat province which borders northeastern Iran.

**Derestricted 19 June 2003**

*(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 19 June 2003)*

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2003/40**

Date: 6 June 2003

Original: English

### **For official use only**

Item 7 (b) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2003/32)

# Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

## **A. Introduction**

1. At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 2003, the Director General reported on discussions taking place with the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) on a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and actions that needed to be taken with regard to the implementation of the Agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement)<sup>1</sup>. This report provides further information on the nature of the safeguards issues involved and the actions that need to be taken, and describes developments in this regard since March. More general reporting of safeguards implementation in Iran is not addressed in this document, but in the Safeguards Implementation Reports.<sup>2</sup>

## **B. Recent Developments**

2. At the September 2002 regular session of the IAEA General Conference, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh, stated that Iran was “embarking on a long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6000 MW within two decades”. He also stated that such a sizeable project entailed “an all out planning, well in advance, in various field of nuclear technology such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management”.

<sup>1</sup> The Safeguards Agreement, reproduced in document INFCIRC/214, entered into force on 15 May 1974.

<sup>2</sup> The Agency has been applying safeguards at a range of facilities in Iran since the mid-1970s pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement. The list of facilities under safeguards is set out in the Annex to this report.

3. During the General Conference, the Director General met with the Vice President, and asked that Iran confirm whether it was building a large underground nuclear related facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak, as reported in the media in August 2002. The Vice President provided some information on Iran's intentions to develop further its nuclear fuel cycle, and agreed on a visit to the two sites later in 2002 by the Director General, accompanied by safeguards experts, and to a discussion with Iranian authorities during that meeting on Iran's nuclear development plans.
4. The visit to Iran was originally scheduled for October 2002, but finally took place from 21 to 22 February 2003. The Director General was accompanied by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG) and the Director of the Division of Safeguards Operations (B).
5. During his visit, the Director General was informed by Iran of its uranium enrichment programme, which was described as including two new facilities located at Natanz, namely a pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) nearing completion of construction, and a large commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant (FEP) also under construction. These two facilities were declared to the Agency for the first time during that visit, at which time the Director General was able to visit both of them. Iran also confirmed that the heavy water production plant<sup>3</sup>, referred to in paragraph 3 above, was under construction in Arak.
6. During the visit, the Director General was informed that Iran would accept modifications to its Subsidiary Arrangements, as requested by the Board of Governors in 1992<sup>4</sup>, which would henceforth require the early provision of design information on new facilities and on modifications to existing facilities, as well as the early provision of information on new locations outside of facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs). This was confirmed to the Agency in a letter dated 26 February 2003 (see paragraph 15 below).
7. In addition, in response to the Agency's enquiry about certain transfers of nuclear material to Iran, only recently confirmed by the supplier State in response to repeated Agency enquiries, Iran acknowledged the receipt in 1991 of natural uranium, which had not been reported previously to the Agency, in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> (1000 kg), UF<sub>4</sub> (400 kg) and UO<sub>2</sub> (400 kg), which was now being stored at the previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). Iran also informed the Agency that it had converted most of the UF<sub>4</sub> into uranium metal in 2000 at JHL. This information was subsequently confirmed by Iran in a separate letter to the Agency dated 26 February 2003.
8. During the discussions in Iran in February between DDG-SG and the Iranian authorities, reference was made by the Agency to information in open sources on the possible conduct of enrichment activities at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. The Iranian authorities acknowledged that the workshop had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development programme involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any other location in Iran. According to the Iranian authorities, all testing had been carried out using simulation studies. While a centrifuge component production facility is not a nuclear facility required to be declared to the Agency under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran was requested, in light of its stated policy of transparency, to permit the Agency to visit the workshop and to take environmental samples there to assist the Agency in verifying Iran's declaration and confirming the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The request was initially declined. The Iranian authorities

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<sup>3</sup> Heavy water production facilities are not nuclear facilities under comprehensive NPT safeguards agreements, and are thus not required to be declared to the Agency thereunder.

<sup>4</sup> GOV/2554/Att.2/Rev.2; GOV/OR/777, paras. 74-76.



told the Agency that Iran considered such visits, and the requested environmental sampling, as being obligatory only when an Additional Protocol was in force. However, they subsequently agreed to permit access to the workshop (to limited parts of the location in March, and to the entire workshop in May), and have recently indicated that they would consider permitting the taking of environmental samples during the visit of the Agency's enrichment experts to Iran scheduled to take place between 7 and 11 June 2003 (see paragraph 11 below).

9. On 26 February 2003, a list of additional questions and requests for clarification was submitted to Iran regarding its centrifuge and laser enrichment programmes and its heavy water programme, and a written reply requested. A written response was received from Iran on 4 June 2003, and its contents will be followed up with the Iranian authorities.

10. In a letter dated 5 May 2003, Iran informed the Agency for the first time of its intention to construct a heavy water research reactor at Arak (the 40 MW(th) Iran Nuclear Research Reactor IR-40). Iran also informed the Agency of its plan to commence construction in 2003 of a fuel manufacturing plant at Esfahan (FMP).

11. During a meeting between the Vice President and the Director General on 5 May 2003, the Director General reiterated the Agency's earlier request for permission to send Agency inspectors to the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, and to take environmental samples. The Director General also referred to an earlier proposal the Agency had made in April for a group of Agency experts to visit Iran to discuss the centrifuge research and development programme to seek to assess how the current status of the project could have been achieved without using any nuclear material during tests. Iran agreed to consider the proposal for an expert mission, and subsequently agreed that the mission could take place from 7 to 11 June 2003.

## **C. Implementation of Safeguards**

12. Article 8 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement requires Iran to provide the Agency with information "concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material."

13. As provided for in Article 34(c) of the Safeguards Agreement, nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is subject to all of the safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement. These procedures include, inter alia, requirements for Iran to report to the Agency changes in the inventory of nuclear material through the submission of inventory change reports (ICRs).<sup>5</sup> Certain inventory changes entail additional reporting requirements. These include the import of nuclear material in quantities in excess of one effective kilogram, which, in accordance with Article 95 of the Safeguards Agreement, requires reporting to the Agency in advance of the import.

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<sup>5</sup> Inventory changes, as defined in Article 98.J of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, include, for example, imports, exports, domestic receipts and shipments, production of nuclear material in a reactor, loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other elements or isotopes as a result of nuclear reactions, accidental losses of nuclear material and the generation of waste from processing which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored.

14. To enable the Agency to verify the inventory and flow of nuclear material, Iran is also required to provide design information on facilities (as defined in Article 98.I of Iran's Safeguards Agreement), and information on LOFs. Pursuant to Article 42 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, the time limit for the provision of design information on new nuclear facilities is to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, but in any event it is to be provided "as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility". Article 49 requires that information on LOFs be provided "on a timely basis".

15. The Subsidiary Arrangements General Part in force with Iran from 1976 to 26 February 2003 included what was, until 1992, standard text which called for provision to the Agency of design information on a new facility no later than 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into the facility, and the provision of information on a new LOF together with the report relating to the receipt of nuclear material at the LOF. With the acceptance by Iran on 26 February 2003 of the modifications to the Subsidiary Arrangements proposed by the Agency, the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part now requires Iran to inform the Agency of new nuclear facilities and modifications to existing facilities through the provision of preliminary design information as soon as the decision to construct, to authorize construction or to modify has been taken, and to provide the Agency with further design information as it is developed. Information is to be provided early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.

### **C.1. Imported Nuclear Material**

16. The UF<sub>6</sub>, UF<sub>4</sub> and UO<sub>2</sub> imported by Iran in 1991 are materials that, as provided for in Article 34(c) of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, are subject to all of the safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement, including, in particular, the requirement to report inventory changes. Therefore, Iran was obliged to have reported the import of the material in question at the time of import. Equally, Iran was obliged to have reported design information as soon as possible before nuclear material was introduced to the receiving facility, and a Facility Attachment concluded for that facility.

17. In its letter of 26 February 2003 confirming its receipt of the material in question, Iran stated that its interpretation of Articles 34(c) and 95 of the Safeguards Agreement had been that no reporting to the Agency was required since the total amount of uranium did not exceed one effective kilogram. However, as indicated in paragraph 13 above, all material referred to in Article 34(c) of the Safeguards Agreement must be reported to the Agency. Article 95 simply imposes an additional requirement, that of advance notification, with respect to imports of material in excess of one effective kilogram.

18. Iran submitted on 15 April 2003 an ICR with regard to the import of the nuclear material, and, on 5 May 2003, preliminary design information for JHL, where most of the material is currently being stored.

#### **C.1.1. Processing of UF<sub>6</sub>**

19. The Iranian authorities have stated that the imported UF<sub>6</sub> has not been processed, and specifically that it has not been used in any enrichment, centrifuge or other tests. The one large and two small UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders declared as containing the imported UF<sub>6</sub> were shown to the Agency in February. The cylinders were made available for Agency verification at JHL in March, at which time, after the Agency inspectors noted that one of the small cylinders was lighter than declared, the State authorities explained that a small amount of the UF<sub>6</sub> (1.9 kg) was missing due to leaking valves on the two small cylinders. It was explained during the subsequent inspection in April that the leaks had only been noticed a year before. Final evaluation will be completed when destructive samples have been taken, environmental samples have been analysed, and supporting documentation provided by the operator has been examined.

### **C.1.2. Processing of UF<sub>4</sub>**

20. Iran has informed the Agency that most of the imported UF<sub>4</sub> was converted to uranium metal at JHL. While the equipment for the conversion process has been dismantled and stored in a container (shown to the Agency during the February visit), Iran is now refurbishing that part of the facility as a uranium metal processing laboratory. The uranium metal, together with the remaining UF<sub>4</sub> and the related waste, has been presented for Agency verification. Final evaluation will be done when the results of destructive analysis become available, and supporting documentation provided by the facility operator has been examined. The role of uranium metal in Iran's declared nuclear fuel cycle still needs to be fully understood, since neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel.

### **C.1.3. Processing of UO<sub>2</sub>**

21. During the February 2003 discussions, the Agency was informed by Iran that some of the imported UO<sub>2</sub> had been used at JHL for the testing of uranium purification and conversion processes. The experiments involved the dissolution of UO<sub>2</sub> with nitric acid, and the use of the resulting uranyl nitrate for testing a pulse column and ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC) production processes envisioned for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), a facility declared to the Agency in 2000 and currently under construction at Esfahan. In April, in response to Agency enquiries, the Iranian authorities informed the Agency that some of the UO<sub>2</sub> had also been used for isotope production experiments, including the undeclared irradiation of small amounts of the UO<sub>2</sub>, at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). In addition, they informed the Agency that another small amount of UO<sub>2</sub> had been used in pellets to test the chemical processes of the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility). The unused UO<sub>2</sub> has been presented for Agency verification at JHL.

22. Most of the UO<sub>2</sub> used in the UCF-related experiments has been presented for Agency verification as liquid waste at Esfahan; the remaining waste has been disposed of at a location near Qom and cannot be verified. The whereabouts of the AUC produced during the UCF-related experiments is being discussed. Final evaluation of the accountancy will be completed when the results of destructive analysis become available, and the supporting documentation provided by the facility operator has been examined.

23. With respect to the isotope production experiments, Iran has stated that small amounts of the imported UO<sub>2</sub> were prepared for targets at JHL, irradiated at TRR, and sent to a laboratory belonging to the MIX Facility in Tehran for separation of I-131 in a lead-shielded cell. Iran has informed the Agency that the remaining nuclear waste was solidified and eventually transferred to a waste disposal site at Anarak. The operators at TRR and the MIX Facility have provided supporting documentation, which is being examined. The Agency is still awaiting relevant updated design information for the MIX Facility and TRR. Plans are in place to visit the waste site at Anarak in June.

24. With respect to the UO<sub>2</sub> to test the chemical processes of the MIX Facility, the material, including the resulting waste, has been presented for Agency verification at JHL. Final evaluation will be completed when the results of the destructive analysis become available, and supporting documentation provided by the facility operator has been examined.

## **C.2. Uranium Enrichment Programme**

25. During the visit of the Director General in February 2003, the Vice President informed the Agency that over 100 of the approximately 1000 planned centrifuge casings had already been installed at the pilot plant and that the remaining centrifuges would be installed by the end of the year. In addition, he



informed the Agency that the commercial scale enrichment facility, which is planned to contain over 50 000 centrifuges, was not scheduled to receive nuclear material in the near future.

26. The Agency has been informed that the pilot enrichment plant is scheduled to start operating in June 2003, initially with single machine tests, and later with increasing numbers of centrifuges. The Iranian authorities have also informed the Agency that the commercial enrichment plant is planned to start accepting centrifuges in early 2005, after the design is confirmed by the tests to be conducted in the pilot enrichment plant. Iran has also stated that the design and research and development work, which had been started about five years ago, were based on extensive modelling and simulation, including tests of centrifuge rotors both with and without inert gas, and that the tests of the rotors, carried out on the premises of the Amir Khabir University and the AEOI in Tehran, were conducted without nuclear material.

27. In May 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information on the enrichment facilities under construction in Natanz, which are being examined by the Agency. Since March 2003, Agency inspectors have visited facilities at Natanz three times to conduct design information verification and to take environmental samples at the pilot enrichment plant. A first series of environmental and destructive analysis samples has been taken at a number of locations. Additional samples are expected to be taken in the near future. Iran has co-operated with the Agency in this regard. The Agency has presented to the Iranian authorities a safeguards approach for the pilot enrichment plant.

28. As indicated above, on 26 February 2003, the Agency forwarded a number of questions regarding Iran's research and development on centrifuges, including the chronology of its enrichment programme, with a view to assessing, inter alia, Iran's declaration that it had been developed without the centrifuges having been tested with UF<sub>6</sub> process gas. Similar questions and concerns have been raised by the Agency in relation to the UO<sub>2</sub>, UF<sub>4</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub> production at the large scale conversion facility UCF, which is stated to have been constructed without any testing, even on a small scale, of key processes.

29. The Agency is also pursuing enquiries into Iran's laser programme. Iran has acknowledged the existence of a substantial programme on lasers, and Agency inspectors have visited some locations said to have been involved in that programme. However, Iran has stated that no enrichment related laser activities have taken place.

### **C.3. Heavy Water Programme**

30. According to information provided by the Iranian authorities (see Section B above), the Iranian heavy water reactor programme consists of the heavy water production plant currently under construction at Arak; the 40 MW(th) IR-40, construction of which is planned to start at Arak in 2004; and the FMP at Esfahan, construction of which is planned for 2003, commissioning for 2006 and commencement of operation for 2007.

31. The stated purposes of the IR-40, which will use natural UO<sub>2</sub> fuel and heavy water (both as a coolant and as a moderator), are reactor research and development, radioisotope production and training. The stated purpose of the FMP is fabrication of fuel assemblies for the IR-40 and for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP).

## D. Findings and Initial Assessment

32. Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed. These failures, and the actions taken thus far to correct them, can be summarized as follows:

- (a) Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing.

On 15 April 2003, Iran submitted ICRs on the import of the UO<sub>2</sub>, UF<sub>4</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub>. Iran has still to submit ICRs on the transfer of the material for further processing and use.

- (b) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom.

Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, ammonium uranyl carbonate, UO<sub>2</sub> pellets and uranium wastes. Iran must still submit ICRs on these inventory changes.

- (c) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including the waste) was received, stored and processed.

On 5 May 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information for the facility JHL. Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the undeclared processing of the imported natural uranium was conducted (TRR and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre), and provided access to those locations. It has provided the Agency access to the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that access would be provided to Anarak, as well as the waste disposal site at Qom.

- (d) Failure to provide in a timely manner updated design information for the MIX Facility and for TRR.

Iran has agreed to submit updated design information for the two facilities.

- (e) Failure to provide in a timely manner information on the waste storage at Esfahan and at Anarak.

Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the waste has been stored or discarded. It has provided the Agency access to the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that access will be provided to Anarak.

33. Although the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been large<sup>6</sup>, and the material would need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material component of a nuclear explosive device, the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern. While these failures are in the process of being rectified by Iran, the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the Iranian declarations is still ongoing.

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<sup>6</sup> The total amount of material, approximately 1.8 tonnes, is 0.13 effective kilograms of uranium. This is, however, not insignificant in terms of a State's ability to conduct nuclear research and development activities.

34. The Agency is continuing to pursue the open questions, including through:

- (a) The completion of a more thorough expert analysis of the research and development carried out by Iran in the establishment of its enrichment capabilities. This will require the submission by Iran of a complete chronology of its centrifuge and laser enrichment efforts, including, in particular, a description of all research and development activities carried out prior to the construction of the Natanz facilities. As agreed to by Iran, this process will also involve discussions in Iran between Iranian authorities and Agency enrichment experts on Iran's enrichment programme, and visits by the Agency experts to the facilities under construction at Natanz and other relevant locations.
- (b) Further follow-up on information regarding allegations about undeclared enrichment of nuclear material, including, in particular, at the Kalaye Electric Company. This will require permission for the Agency to carry out environmental sampling at the workshop located there.
- (c) Further enquiries about the role of uranium metal in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle.
- (d) Further enquiries about Iran's programme related to the use of heavy water, including heavy water production and heavy water reactor design and construction.

35. The Director General has repeatedly encouraged Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol. Without such protocols in force, the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited. This is particularly the case for States, like Iran, with extensive nuclear activities and advanced fuel cycle technologies. In the view of the Director General, the adherence by Iran to an Additional Protocol would therefore constitute a significant step forward. The Director General will continue to keep the Board informed of developments.



**LIST OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS**

<b>LOCATION</b>	<b>AS IN SEPTEMBER 2002</b>	<b>NEW FACILITIES AS OF JUNE 2003</b>
<b>TEHRAN</b>	Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)	
	Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)	
		Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)
<b>BUSHEHR</b>	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)	
<b>ESFAHAN</b>	Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)	
	Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)	
	Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWSPR)	
	Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL)	
	Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL)	
	Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)	
	Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor, decommissioned (GSCR)	
		Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
<b>NATANZ</b>		Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)
		Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
<b>ARAK</b>		Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40)

## Board of Governors

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Item 5 (b) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2003/44)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

## A. Introduction

1. On 6 June 2003, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors for its consideration a report (GOV/2003/40) on a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and actions that needed to be taken in connection with the implementation of the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214) (the Safeguards Agreement).
2. In that report, the Director General stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material imported into Iran and the subsequent processing and use of the material, and the declaration of facilities and other locations where the material was stored and processed. He described these failures and the actions being taken by Iran to correct them. In his report, the Director General also referred to the Agency's ongoing activities to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations and the safeguards measures the Secretariat intended to take in order to pursue questions that remained open.
3. At the conclusion of the Board's consideration of the Director General's report, the Chairperson summarized the Board's discussion. In the summary, the Chairperson stated that the Board shared the concern expressed by the Director General at the number of past failures by Iran to report material, facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations, and noted the actions taken by Iran thus far to correct these failures. The Board urged Iran promptly to rectify all safeguards problems identified in the Director General's report and to resolve questions that remained open. The Board welcomed Iran's reaffirmed commitment to full transparency and expressed its expectation that Iran would grant the Agency all necessary access. The Board encouraged Iran, as a confidence-building measure, not to introduce nuclear material at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) located at Natanz

pending the resolution of related outstanding issues. The Board called on Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency in its on-going work, and took note of the introductory statement of the Director General, in which he called on Iran to permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. The Board welcomed Iran's readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol, and urged Iran promptly and unconditionally to conclude and implement such a protocol, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared material and activities. Finally, the Board of Governors requested the Director General to provide a further report on the situation whenever appropriate.

## **B. Chronology since June 2003**

4. As foreseen in GOV/2003/40, an Agency team of centrifuge technology experts visited Iran from 7 to 11 June 2003 to discuss Iran's centrifuge enrichment research and development (R&D) programme. On 24 June 2003, the Agency submitted to Iran for comments a summary report reflecting the results of those discussions and the findings of the Agency's centrifuge technology experts, and proposed a follow-up meeting with the Agency experts in July. That meeting ultimately took place from 9 to 12 August 2003 as indicated below.

5. On 11 June 2003, the Agency provided to the Permanent Mission of Iran in Vienna "talking points" on the results of environmental samples taken from the chemical traps of PFEP at Natanz indicating the presence of high enriched uranium particles, which was not consistent with the nuclear material declarations made by Iran. The Agency emphasized the need to clarify this issue promptly, and suggested that it be addressed during the proposed centrifuge technology expert meeting.

6. On 9 July 2003, the Director General, accompanied by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the Director of the Division of Safeguards Operations (B), visited Iran to discuss safeguards implementation issues. He met with the President, H.E. Mr. M. Khatami; the Foreign Minister, H.E. Mr. K. Kharrazi; and Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh. During these meetings, the Director General emphasized the importance of the urgent resolution of outstanding safeguards issues, such as those raised by the results of environmental sampling at PFEP and the findings by the Agency's centrifuge technology experts, and in that connection, the need for full transparency by Iran. He also stressed the importance of the conclusion of an Additional Protocol by Iran to enable the Agency to provide comprehensive and credible assurances about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The President of Iran assured the Director General of the readiness of Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency and reiterated Iran's positive attitude towards the conclusion of an Additional Protocol, but indicated that some technical and legal aspects needed to be clarified. It was agreed that technical discussions should follow the Director General's visit, and that the Agency should dispatch a team to clarify technical and legal aspects related to the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)).

7. During the follow-up technical discussions, which were held from 10 to 13 July 2003 in Iran, the Agency team raised again the issue of the results of the environmental sampling at PFEP, and reiterated the Agency's request that, in fulfilment of Iran's stated commitment to full transparency, Iran permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. The team also inquired as to whether, in accordance with that policy, Iran would permit the Agency to visit two locations near Hashtgerd (Lashkar Ab'ad and Ramandeh) at which it had been alleged, according to recent reports in open sources, that nuclear related activities were being



or had been conducted. The Iranian authorities indicated that they were not yet ready to discuss the findings of the Agency's centrifuge technology experts, nor were they willing at this stage to permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company or to accede to the Agency's request to visit the two locations near Hashtgerd. The Iranian authorities indicated that they would like to propose a comprehensive solution to all of the enrichment related issues, but that it would take some time on their side. During the discussions, the specific issues that needed to be resolved were identified, and the Iranian side agreed to propose at an early date a timetable for resolving those issues.

8. In response to Iran's request for the clarification of aspects of the Additional Protocol, a team of Agency legal and technical experts participated in a meeting held in Tehran on 5 and 6 August 2003 with officials from a number of ministries of the Iranian Government. During the meeting, the Agency provided clarification of the Model Additional Protocol, and responded to detailed questions raised by the Iranian officials.

9. On 23 July 2003, the Agency received from the AEOI Vice President of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards a letter proposing a timetable for actions to be taken by 15 August 2003 in relation to urgent outstanding issues. In its reply of 25 July 2003, the Agency agreed to send to Iran a team of technical experts, with the understanding that the team would: (a) discuss the results of the environmental samples taken at Natanz; (b) take environmental samples at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company; (c) discuss the findings of the Agency centrifuge technology experts; and (d) visit the sites near Hashtgerd. This mission took place from 9 through 12 August 2003.

10. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, the AEOI provided additional information on the issues identified in the timetable, including Iran's heavy water reactor programme, Iran's use of previously imported  $UO_2$  in experiments to produce  $UF_4$ , "bench scale" conversion experiments and Iran's past interest in laser fusion and spectroscopy.

11. In a letter dated 24 August 2003, the Resident Representative of Iran to the Agency informed the Director General that Iran was "prepared to begin negotiation with the [IAEA] on the Additional Protocol" and expressed the hope that, "in this negotiation the concerns of [Iran] and the ambiguities on the Additional Protocol are removed".

## **C. Implementation of Safeguards**

### **C.1. Uranium Conversion**

12. In GOV/2003/40, the Director General identified a number of corrective actions by Iran which were necessary to enable the Agency to verify the previously unreported nuclear material declared to have been imported by Iran in 1991. These actions included:

- (a) The submission of inventory change reports (ICRs) on the transfer of the imported  $UO_2$ ,  $UF_4$  and  $UF_6$  for further processing and use.
- (b) The submission of ICRs on the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, ammonium uranyl carbonate,  $UO_2$  pellets and uranium wastes from the imported material.

- (c) The provision of design information on the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and the granting of access to that facility as well as to Anarak and Qom, where waste resulting from the processing of the imported material is stored or has been disposed of.
- (d) The submission of updated design information for the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility and for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) to reflect activities involving the imported nuclear material.

13. Since the June report of the Director General, Iran has provided ICRs on the transfer of the imported natural uranium for its further processing and use, as well as physical inventory lists (PILs) and material balance reports (MBRs) reflecting its use in the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate,  $UO_2$  pellets and wastes (Iran has stated that no ammonium uranyl carbonate was produced from that material). In addition, Iran provided updated design information for MIX and TRR on the use of the imported material in experiments at those facilities. Iran has also provided information on the storage of waste at Esfahan, and has granted Agency inspectors access to that location and to the waste sites at Anarak and Qom.

14. Iran stated on a number of occasions between February and July 2003 that no R&D using nuclear material, even on a laboratory scale, had been conducted on the conversion and production of any other nuclear material at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) (specifically,  $UO_2$ ,  $UF_4$  and  $UF_6$ ). The Agency was told that the basic design of the UCF processes, and test reports for those processes, had been obtained from abroad. According to the AEOI, this information was sufficient to permit Iran to complete indigenously the detailed design and manufacturing of the equipment for UCF.

15. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, however, the Iranian authorities acknowledged that, in the early 1990s, there had been "bench scale" uranium conversion experiments. Iran has indicated that more time will be needed to find the people involved in these experiments and to trace any other closed down facilities. The Iranian authorities have indicated that they are currently preparing a response to the Agency questionnaires on closed down and decommissioned facilities in Iran and on Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, and that further information on the conversion experiments will be included in that response.

16. Drawing on this information, the Agency will continue with the verification of the imported nuclear material and its subsequent processing. In addition to physical verification activities and the evaluation of the ICRs, PILs and MBRs, this task involves the auditing of source documents on the shipment and subsequent processing of the nuclear material at various installations. Since some of the experiments took place a number of years ago and some of the imported material has been mixed with other nuclear material, the auditing and verification process is expected to be difficult and time consuming.

#### **C.1.1. Processing of Imported $UF_6$**

17. In March 2003, the Agency took environmental samples from the surfaces of all three of the cylinders said to have contained the imported  $UF_6$  (two small S-type cylinders and a large 30B-type cylinder). The results of the analysis of those samples are now available and are consistent with the declaration by Iran that the material contained in them was natural uranium.

18. As previously reported to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/40, para. 19), the Iranian authorities have stated that none of the imported  $UF_6$  had been processed, and, specifically, that it had not been used in any centrifuge tests. It was observed during Agency verification in March 2003, however, that some of the  $UF_6$  (1.9 kg) was missing from the two small cylinders. The Iranian authorities have stated that this might be due to leakage from the cylinders resulting from mechanical failure of the valves and possible evaporation due to their storage in a place where temperatures reach

55°C during the summer. On 18 August 2003, the Agency took environmental samples at the locations where Iran indicated that the small cylinders had been stored; these samples will need to be analysed and the results assessed. Investigation of this issue is continuing.

19. Verification of the contents of the large cylinder entail the weighing of the cylinder, non-destructive analysis (NDA), and destructive analysis of samples taken from the contents of the cylinder. While the weighing and NDA have been carried out, the taking of samples for destructive analysis can only be carried out when the equipment necessary for UF<sub>6</sub> transfer and sample taking has been installed at Natanz.

### **C.1.2. Processing of Imported UF<sub>4</sub>**

20. As described in the previous report (GOV/2003/40, para. 20), most of the imported natural UF<sub>4</sub> had been converted to uranium metal. As further noted therein, the Secretariat was seeking more information about the role of uranium metal in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle.

21. This matter was discussed further in the technical meetings held on 10–13 July in Iran. In a letter to the Agency dated 23 July 2003, the Iranian authorities stated that 113 experiments had been carried out at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) using the imported UF<sub>4</sub> with a view to optimizing reaction conditions and parameters for producing uranium metal. In that same letter, Iran stated further that, "In the early [90's] when the country decided to reconsider its nuclear program, we were not sure whether it will consist of CANDU reactors, Magnox reactors<sup>1</sup> or light water reactors. Therefore it was decided to include a U-metal production line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) which could also be used to produce shielding material. However, as the picture is now more clear, uranium metal experiments could be considered as a process to gain know-how in nuclear material production". The Secretariat is pursuing this matter further with the Iranian authorities in light of the construction at JHL of a uranium metal purification and casting laboratory.

22. Recent results from the destructive analysis referred to in the previous report (GOV/2003/40, para. 20) indicated the presence of depleted uranium in a UF<sub>4</sub> sample taken from JHL. The Agency requested Iran to explain the source of that material, since no such material is reflected in the declared inventory of Iran. The Agency also reiterated its request that Iran investigate further whether any experiments on the conversion processes had been conducted using nuclear material.

23. In its letter of 19 August 2003, Iran stated that, after intensive investigations, it had been found that, "around the 1990's", some laboratory scale experiments had been carried out in the radiochemistry section of the NRC (the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre) to produce UF<sub>4</sub> using depleted UO<sub>2</sub> imported by Iran in 1977, but that neither the laboratory nor the radiochemistry section still existed.

### **C.1.3. Processing of Imported UO<sub>2</sub>**

24. The report in GOV/2003/40 described (paras 21–24) experiments said by Iran to have been carried out using the imported natural UO<sub>2</sub>. These involved the testing of processes envisioned for UCF, isotope production experiments at TRR, and the use of pellets for testing chemical processes for the MIX Facility. Waste from these experiments was said to have been transferred to Esfahan, Anarak and Qom.

25. During the 9–12 August 2003 meeting with Iranian authorities, the Agency referred to earlier discussions which had taken place with Iran on samples taken at the hot cells of TRR and at the MIX

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<sup>1</sup> A reactor type that uses uranium metal.



Facility which indicated the presence of depleted uranium, material which is not included in Iran's declared nuclear material inventory. Iran was provided with a summary of these sampling results. It was suggested by Iran that the presence of depleted uranium could, in some cases, have originated from shielded containers received from other countries (identified by Iran during that meeting). The Agency has investigated the matter further through a comparison of the recent sample analysis results with analytical results of environmental samples taken in those other countries, and it has concluded that the depleted uranium particles could have originated from the imported containers.

26. As anticipated in the Director General's June report, Agency inspectors have now visited the waste disposal site at Qom and the waste storage location at Anarak where uranium bearing wastes from some of the experiments have been stored. Iran has informed the Agency that the waste currently located at Anarak will be transferred to JHL. Based on explanations provided by Iran, the nuclear material in the waste transferred to and disposed of at Qom is considered to be measured discard.

## **C.2. Uranium Enrichment**

### **C.2.1. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Programme**

27. The Agency is continuing its analysis of Iran's enrichment R&D programme. This process has included thus far a visit by Agency centrifuge technology experts to Iran in June 2003 and subsequent technical discussions with the Iranian authorities. The primary focus of these discussions has been to seek clarification of the statement made by the Iranian authorities in February 2003 that the design and development work, which had been started in 1997, had been based on information from open sources and extensive modelling and simulation, including tests of centrifuge rotors both with and without inert gas, and that the tests of the rotors, carried out on the premises of the Amir Khabir University and the premises of the AEOI in Tehran, had been conducted without nuclear material.

28. During the Agency's June visit, AEOI officials stated that the enrichment factor used in Iran's calculations had been obtained from some original centrifuge drawings, not from experiments. The Agency requested to be shown the original drawings. In August 2003, the AEOI presented redrawn copies of those documents, which included a design of a 164-machine cascade. The Iranian authorities have yet to show the Agency the originals.

29. In their summary report prepared after that visit, the experts judged that:

- (a) Machines at PFEP at Natanz can be recognized as an early European design; and
- (b) It is not possible to develop enrichment technology, to the level seen at Natanz, based solely on open source information and computer simulations, without process testing with UF<sub>6</sub>.

30. These findings were provided to Iran, and were discussed with Iranian officials during the meetings that took place on 9–12 August 2003. In that discussion, in contrast to earlier information provided about the launch dates of the programme and its indigenous nature, AEOI officials stated that the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichment programme had actually been taken in 1985, and that Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary around 1987. The officials described the programme as having consisted of three phases: activities during the first phase, from 1985 until 1997, had been located mainly at the AEOI premises in Tehran; during the second phase, between 1997 and 2002, the activities had been concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran; during the third phase, 2002 to the present, the R&D and assembly activities were moved to Natanz.

31. The Iranian authorities also explained that during the first phase, components had been obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or directly by Iranian entities, but that no help had been

received from abroad to assemble centrifuges or provide training. Efforts were concentrated on achieving an operating centrifuge, but many difficulties had been encountered as a result of machine crashes attributed to poor quality components. According to the AEOI officials, no experiments with inert or UF<sub>6</sub> gas were conducted. Iran indicated its willingness to make available for interview key scientists responsible for that phase of the enrichment programme. According to Iranian officials, from 1997 through 2002, the activities were concentrated at Kalaye Electric Company, and involved the assembly and testing of centrifuges, but again without inert or UF<sub>6</sub> gas.

32. During their 9–12 August 2003 visit to Iran, Agency inspectors were permitted to take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, with a view to assessing the role of that company in Iran's enrichment R&D programme. The results of the analysis of these samples are not yet available. It was noted by inspectors that there had been considerable modification of the premises since their first visit in March 2003. Iranian authorities have informed the Agency that these modifications are attributable to the fact that the workshop is being transformed from use as a storage facility to its use as a laboratory for non-destructive analysis. This modification may impact on the accuracy of the environmental sampling and the Agency's ability to verify Iran's declarations about the types of activities previously carried out there.

33. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF<sub>6</sub> into the first centrifuge for the purpose of single machine testing, and on 19 August 2003 began the testing of a small ten-machine cascade with UF<sub>6</sub>. Iran continues to co-operate with the Agency in implementing safeguards measures now in place at PFEP for monitoring single machine and small cascade testing.

34. In accordance with its standard practice, the Agency took baseline environmental samples at PFEP at Natanz before nuclear material was introduced in the facility. This baseline sampling campaign was conducted during inspections carried out between March and June 2003, and samples were taken at many locations within the facility. While the Agency has already received the results from some of the samples (see below), which have been provided to Iran, other samples are still being analysed by a number of laboratories that participate in the Agency's Network of Analytical Laboratories.

35. Iran has stated that it has not carried out any enrichment and that no nuclear material was introduced to the PFEP prior to the Agency's having taken its first baseline environmental samples there. However, the sampling results which were provided to Iran on 11 June 2003, revealed particles of high enriched uranium. During the 10–13 July and 9–12 August 2003 technical meetings, more complete environmental sampling results were provided to Iran and the matter was discussed further.

36. The PFEP environmental sample results indicate the possible presence in Iran of high enriched uranium, material that is not on its inventory of declared nuclear material. During the August meeting, Iranian authorities indicated that they had carried out extensive investigation with a view to resolving this question, and had come to the conclusion that the high enriched uranium particles which had been detected must have resulted from contamination originating from centrifuge components which had been imported by Iran.

37. At that meeting, Agency inspectors explained that subsequent environmental sample analysis revealed the presence of two types of high enriched uranium, and noted that there had been differences among the samples taken from the surfaces of the centrifuge casings installed for the single machine tests. The Agency asked the Iranian authorities to investigate whether there were differences in the manufacturing history of those pieces of equipment. To investigate this matter further, the Agency took two additional samples from centrifuge components which were said to have been imported and those said to have been produced domestically. The results are not yet available.

38. Conceptually, it is possible to envisage a number of possible scenarios to explain the presence of high enriched uranium in environmental samples at Natanz. As part of the Agency's ongoing detailed plan of investigation each scenario will be considered carefully by Agency experts.

39. The Agency also intends to follow up with Iran information about other sites at which unreported nuclear activities allegedly are being or have been carried out.

### **C.2.2. Laser Programme**

40. Iran has a substantial R&D programme on lasers. Iran has stated that it currently has no programme for laser isotope separation.

41. In May 2003, the Agency requested additional information about two sites near Hashtgerd owned by the AEOI which had been referred to in open source reports as locations allegedly engaged in laser and centrifuge uranium enrichment activities. The Agency was permitted to visit those locations on 12 August 2003.

42. One of the locations was Ramandeh, which belongs to the AEOI and is part of the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre. This location is primarily involved with agricultural studies said to be unrelated to nuclear fuel cycle activities. The other location visited was a laser laboratory at Lashkar Ab'ad belonging to the Research and Development Division of the AEOI. During that visit, Iranian officials stated that the laboratory had originally been devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, but that the focus of the laboratory had been changed, and the equipment not related to current projects, such as a large imported vacuum vessel, had been moved. Among other activities observed by the Agency were the production and testing of copper vapour lasers of up to 100 watts. However, there appeared to be no activities directly related to laser spectroscopy or enrichment being carried out at the laboratory. The Iranian authorities were asked to confirm that there had not been in the past any activities related to uranium laser enrichment at this location or at any other location in Iran. The Agency has requested permission to take environmental samples at the laboratory, which the Iranian authorities have undertaken to consider.

43. In the letter from Iran dated 19 August 2003, the Agency was informed that, in the past, apart from planned co-operation in laser fusion and laser spectroscopy which never materialized, there had been a research thesis on laser spectroscopy of SF<sub>6</sub> prepared by a university student in co-operation with the laser division of AEOI. While such a study could be seen as relevant to laser enrichment, the underlying experiments appear not to have involved nuclear material.

### **C.3. Heavy Water Reactor Programme**

44. On 13 July 2003 the Iranian authorities made a presentation on some technical features of the 40 MW(th) heavy water reactor (the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, IR-40), construction of which is planned to start in 2004. The reactor, which Iranian officials have stated is based on indigenous design, is currently moving from the basic design phase to the detailed design phase. Iranian officials have further stated that Iran had tried unsuccessfully on several occasions to acquire from abroad a research reactor suitable for medical and industrial isotope production and for R&D to replace the old research reactor in Tehran. Iranian officials had concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor, which could use the UO<sub>2</sub> produced in UCF and the Zirconium Production Plant in Esfahan. According to the Iranian authorities, to meet the isotope production requirements, such a reactor should have a neutron flux of 10<sup>13</sup> to 10<sup>14</sup> n/cm<sup>2</sup>/s, which would require power on the order of 30–40 MW(th) when using natural UO<sub>2</sub> fuel.

45. The Agency was provided on 4 August 2003 with an updated DIQ, which is currently being reviewed. The DIQ does not contain any references to hot cells, contrary to what would be expected



given the radioisotope production purposes of the facility. Iran has been asked to look into this matter further, particularly in light of recent open source accounts of alleged efforts by Iran to import remote manipulators and windows that would be suitable for use in hot cells.

46. In its 19 August 2003 letter, the AEOI provided information on the heavy water reactor programme, stating that a decision to start the R&D had been taken in the early 1980s. It further stated that, in the mid-1980s, laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, and that a decision to construct a heavy water reactor had been taken in the mid-1990s. The letter provided additional information on the amount of heavy water initially needed for the IR-40, and on the design capacity of the heavy water production plant under construction at Khondab near Arak. According to the information provided in the letter, Iran plans to start the production of heavy water next year.

## **D. Findings, Assessments and Next Steps**

47. In connection with the nuclear material imported by Iran in 1991, Iran has submitted ICRs, PILs and MBRs, as well as relevant DIQs. The Agency has verified nuclear material presented to it and is currently auditing relevant source data. The issue of depleted uranium in the UF<sub>4</sub> remains to be resolved, and the environmental samples taken in connection with the UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders need to be analysed. To confirm that the pellet irradiation experiments have been solely for radioisotope production, the Agency has taken samples from the hot cells and lead shielded cells at the laboratories of the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre. The analytical results are not yet available.

48. In its letter of 19 August 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had carried out uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990s, experiments that Iran should have reported in accordance with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement. Iran has stated, however, that it is taking corrective action in that regard. The Agency will continue its evaluation of the uranium conversion programme.

49. As regards enrichment, and as mentioned earlier, during the meeting of 9–12 August 2003, the Agency team received new information about the chronology and details of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme. Agency evaluation of the new information will require, inter alia, an assessment of the various phases of the programme and analysis of environmental samples taken at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop.

50. Additional work is also required to enable the Agency to arrive at conclusions about Iran's statements that there have been no uranium enrichment activities in Iran involving nuclear material. The Agency intends to continue its assessment of the Iranian statement that the high enriched uranium particles identified in samples taken at Natanz could be attributable to contamination from imported components. As agreed to by Iran, this process will involve discussions in Iran with Iranian officials and staff involved in the R&D efforts and visits by Agency inspectors and enrichment technology experts to facilities and other relevant locations. In that connection, Iran has agreed to provide the Agency with all information about the centrifuge components and other contaminated equipment it obtained from abroad, including their origin and the locations where they have been stored and used in Iran, as well as access to those locations so that the Agency may take environmental samples. It is also essential that the Agency receive information from Member States either from which nuclear related equipment or other assistance relevant to the development of Iran's nuclear programme has been exported to Iran, or which have information on such assistance.

51. In connection with the Agency's investigation of Iran's heavy water reactor programme, the Agency is currently evaluating design information provided on the heavy water reactor.

52. Since the last report was issued, Iran has demonstrated an increased degree of co-operation in relation to the amount and detail of information provided to the Agency and in allowing access requested by the Agency to additional locations and the taking of associated environmental samples. The decision by Iran to start the negotiations with the Agency for the conclusion of an Additional Protocol is also a positive step. However, it should be noted that information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, and that, as noted above, some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran. In addition, as also noted above, there remain a number of important outstanding issues, particularly with regard to Iran's enrichment programme, that require urgent resolution. Continued and accelerated co-operation and full transparency on the part of Iran are essential for the Agency to be in a position to provide at an early date the assurances required by Member States.

53. The Director General will inform the Board of additional developments for its further consideration at the November meeting of the Board, or earlier, as appropriate.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2003/75**

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Item 3 (b) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2003/71)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. This report on safeguards issues in the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) responds to paragraph 7 of the Board of Governors' resolution GOV/2003/69 of 12 September 2003. It covers relevant developments from the time of the Director General's visit to Iran on 20-21 February 2003 and Iran's acknowledgement of its centrifuge enrichment programme, but concentrates on the period since his last report (GOV/2003/63 of 23 August 2003). This report begins with the background to the issues in question (Section A) and a chronology of recent events (Section B). Information on the Agency's verification activities is summarized in Section C, organized according to the various technical processes involved (the details of which are set out in Annex 1). Section D provides a summary of the Agency's findings, while Section E sets out its current assessment and next steps. Annexes 2 and 3 to this report contain, respectively, a list of the locations identified to date as relevant to the implementation of safeguards in Iran, and a map showing those locations. Annex 4 is a list of relevant abbreviations and terms used in the text of the report.

## **A. Background**

2. At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 2003, the Director General reported on discussions taking place with Iran on a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and actions that needed to be taken in connection with the implementation of the Agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214) (the Safeguards Agreement).

3. On 6 June 2003, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors a report (GOV/2003/40) providing further information on the nature of the safeguards issues involved and the actions that needed to be taken, and describing developments in that regard since March 2003. In that report, the Director General stated that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material imported into Iran and the subsequent



processing and use of the material, and the declaring of facilities and other locations where the material had been stored and processed. He described these failures and the actions being taken by Iran to correct them.

4. On 18–19 June 2003, the Board considered the above report of the Director General. In its conclusions, the Board noted its concern about the number of past failures by Iran to report material, facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations, and noted the actions taken by Iran to correct those failures. The Board urged Iran to rectify promptly all of the safeguards problems identified in the Director General's report and to resolve questions that remained open. It welcomed Iran's reaffirmed commitment to full transparency and expressed its expectation that Iran would grant the Agency all necessary access. The Board encouraged Iran, as a confidence building measure, not to introduce nuclear material at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) located at Natanz pending the resolution of related outstanding issues. The Board called on Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency in its ongoing work. It welcomed Iran's readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol, and urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement such a protocol, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared material and activities.

5. On 26 August 2003, the Director General submitted to the Board for its consideration a further report (GOV/2003/63) on relevant developments since June 2003. The report included: a summary of the state of the Agency's understanding of Iran's nuclear programme at that time; the Agency's findings and assessments, including the identification of some additional failures to report and the issues that needed to be clarified (particularly with regard to enrichment); and the corrective actions that needed to be taken. In the report, the Director General noted an increased degree of co-operation by Iran, while noting that some of the information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, and that some of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran.

6. At its meeting on 12 September 2003, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2003/69) in which it, inter alia:

- Called on Iran to provide accelerated co-operation and full transparency to allow the Agency to provide at an early date the assurances required by Member States (GOV/2003/69, para. 1).
- Called on Iran to ensure that there were no further failures to report material, facilities and activities that Iran is obliged to report pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/2003/69, para. 2).
- Called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment related activities and, as a confidence building measure, any reprocessing activities, pending provision by the Director General of the assurances required by Member States and pending satisfactory application of the provisions of the Additional Protocol (GOV/2003/69, para. 3).
- Decided that, in order to ensure Agency verification of non-diversion of nuclear material, it was essential and urgent that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and co-operate fully with the Agency by taking certain specified actions by the end of October 2003 (GOV/2003/69, para. 4).
- Requested all third countries to co-operate closely and fully with the Agency in the clarification of open questions on the Iranian nuclear programme (GOV/2003/69, para. 5).
- Requested that Iran work with the Secretariat to sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol promptly and unconditionally, and as a confidence building measure to act henceforth in accordance with the Additional Protocol (GOV/2003/69, para. 6).

7. The Board also asked the Director General to submit a report to the Board, in November 2003 or earlier if appropriate, on the implementation of the Board's resolution, enabling it to draw definitive conclusions.

## **B. Chronology since September 2003**

8. Between 14 and 18 September 2003, the Agency conducted a safeguards inspection at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and at the PFEP in Natanz. The inspection activities at TRR included physical inventory verification and design information verification, as well as a number of activities to follow up on issues related to the natural uranium imported in 1991, including further examination of the cylinders from which imported UF<sub>6</sub> gas was said to have leaked (see GOV/2003/63, para. 18).

9. On 16 September 2003, the Agency met representatives of Iran to discuss the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at the Kalaye Electric Company in August 2003, which had revealed the presence of high enriched uranium (HEU) particles and low enriched uranium (LEU) particles which were not consistent with the nuclear material in the declared inventory of Iran. Also discussed were the results of the environmental sampling taken at PFEP, which had revealed the presence of other types of HEU particles, as well as LEU and other particles, not of a type on Iran's inventory.

10. The Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG) and the Director of Safeguards Operations Division B (DIR-SGOB) travelled to Iran on 2–3 October 2003 to discuss the most urgent safeguards implementation issues that remained open. Following these discussions, a technical team of the Agency visited Iran from 4 to 12 October 2003 in order to carry out activities related to the verification of Iran's activities in the areas of uranium conversion and laser and gas centrifuge enrichment. Following up on recent open source reports of enrichment activities being undertaken at an industrial complex in Kolehdoz in western Tehran, the team was permitted on 5 October 2003 to visit three locations which the Agency had identified as corresponding to those mentioned in the reports. While no work was seen at those locations that could be linked to uranium enrichment, environmental samples were taken.

11. In a letter to the Agency dated 9 October 2003 from Mr. E. Khalilipour, Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Iran provided information that had not been provided earlier on research activities carried out on uranium conversion processes, including acknowledgement of laboratory and bench scale experiments. Specifically, Iran confirmed that, between 1981 and 1993, it had carried out at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) bench scale preparation of UO<sub>2</sub> and, at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC), bench scale preparation of ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC), UO<sub>3</sub>, UF<sub>4</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub>.

12. Between 13 and 22 October 2003, an Agency inspection team conducted safeguards inspections at PFEP and other facilities in Esfahan and Tehran. These inspections included follow-up activities related to the HEU and LEU particles found at the Kalaye Electric Company and at Natanz and to the newly acknowledged existence of nuclear material resulting from uranium conversion experiments.

13. On 16 October 2003, at the invitation of the Iranian Government, the Director General met in Tehran with H.E. Dr. H. Rohani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, to discuss the open issues requiring urgent resolution. These issues related to the use of nuclear material in the testing of centrifuges (including the presence of LEU and HEU particles at the Kalaye Electric Company and at Natanz); the testing of conversion processes; the purpose of uranium metal

production; the existence of laser isotope enrichment; and details of Iran's heavy water reactor programme. At this meeting, Dr. Rohani stated that a decision had been taken to provide the Agency, in the course of the following week, with a full disclosure of Iran's past and present nuclear activities. He also expressed Iran's readiness to conclude an Additional Protocol and, pending its entry into force, to act in accordance with the Protocol and with a policy of full transparency.

14. Upon the request of the Iranian authorities, a meeting was held on 18–19 October 2003, also in Tehran, between legal, policy and technical staff of the Agency and Iranian officials to discuss issues related to the conclusion by Iran of an Additional Protocol.

15. As a follow-up to the 16 October 2003 meeting, in a letter to the Director General dated 21 October 2003 and received on 23 October 2003, H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the AEOI, reaffirmed that “the Islamic Republic of Iran ha[d] decided to provide a full picture of its nuclear activities, with a view to removing any ambiguities and doubts about the exclusively peaceful character of these activities and commencing a new phase of confidence and co-operation in this field at the international level.” Mr. Aghazadeh stated further in his letter that Iran was prepared “to provide, in full transparency, any additional clarifications that the Agency may deem necessary.”<sup>1</sup>

16. In that letter, Iran acknowledged that: between 1998 and 2002 it had carried out some testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company using UF<sub>6</sub> imported in 1991; between 1991 and 2000 it had had a laser enrichment programme, in the course of which it had used 30 kg of uranium metal not previously declared to the Agency; and between 1988 and 1992 it had irradiated 7 kg of UO<sub>2</sub> targets and extracted small quantities of plutonium. Attached to the letter was significant additional information with respect to those activities, as well as information concerning Iran's conversion and heavy water reactor programmes.

17. Between 27 October and 1 November 2003, a technical team from the Agency, led by DIR-SGOB and including centrifuge technology experts, visited Iran to follow up on these and other issues, including, in particular, the source of HEU and LEU contamination.

18. On 10 November 2003, the Agency received from the Government of Iran a letter of the same date in which Iran conveyed its acceptance of the draft text of the Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) Iran indicated that it was prepared to sign the Additional Protocol, and that, pending its entry into force, Iran would act in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.

19. On the same day, the Iranian Government informed the Director General that it had decided to suspend, with effect from 10 November 2003, all enrichment related and reprocessing activities in Iran<sup>2</sup>, and specifically: to suspend all activities on the site of Natanz, not to produce feed material for enrichment processes and not to import enrichment related items.

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<sup>1</sup> In his letter, Mr. Aghazadeh also referred to his Government's expectation that the Agency would “take cognizance, in preparing its report, of Iran's concerns and constraints for the full disclosure of detailed information about these activities in the past, notably the concern about expansion of illegal sanctions to prevent Iran from exercising its inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes stipulated in Article IV of the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons].”

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted also that, on 21 October 2003, the Iranian Government and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom issued in Tehran an agreed statement on Iran's nuclear programme. In that statement, Iran indicated that it had “decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.”



## C. Verification Activities

### C.1. Uranium Conversion

20. The Agency received preliminary design information on the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) under construction at ENTC in July 2000, and has been carrying out continuous design information verification (DIV) since then. In that design information, the facility was described as being intended for the conversion of uranium ore concentrate into UF<sub>6</sub>, for enrichment outside Iran, and for the subsequent conversion (at UCF) of the enriched UF<sub>6</sub> into low enriched UO<sub>2</sub>, enriched uranium metal and depleted uranium metal. Following its declaration of the enrichment facilities at Natanz in February 2003, Iran acknowledged that it intended to carry out the enrichment activities domestically using UF<sub>6</sub> to be produced by UCF.

21. At the time of the Director General's last report to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/63), questions remained about the completeness of Iran's declarations concerning the chronology and details of its uranium conversion activities, in particular in light of its previous assertion that it had designed UCF without having used nuclear material to test the most difficult conversion processes.

22. While Iran acknowledged in February 2003 having used some of the *natural* uranium imported in 1991 for testing certain parts of the conversion process (i.e. uranium dissolution, purification using pulse columns and the production of uranium metal), it denied having tested other processes (e.g. conversion of UO<sub>2</sub> to UF<sub>4</sub> and conversion of UF<sub>4</sub> to UF<sub>6</sub>), stating that they had been developed based on the supplier's drawings. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, Iran further acknowledged that it had carried out UF<sub>4</sub> conversion experiments on a laboratory scale during the 1990s at the Radiochemistry Laboratories of TNRC using imported *depleted* UO<sub>2</sub> which had previously been declared as having been lost during processing (process loss). This activity was acknowledged by Iran only after the Agency's July 2003 waste analysis results indicated the presence of depleted UF<sub>4</sub>.

23. On 9 October 2003, Iran further acknowledged that, contrary to its previous statements, practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion had been produced in laboratory and bench scale experiments (in kilogram quantities) between 1981 and 1993 without having been reported to the Agency. These activities were carried out at TNRC and ENTC.

24. The information provided in Iran's letter of 21 October 2003 reveals that, in conducting these experiments, Iran had used nuclear material imported by Iran in 1977 and 1982, some of which had been exempted from safeguards, as well as safeguarded nuclear material which had been declared to the Agency as a process loss. Iran also declared that, using nuclear material imported in 1991 and reported to the Agency in February 2003, experiments had been carried out on the conversion of some of the UF<sub>4</sub> to UF<sub>6</sub>, and on the conversion of UO<sub>2</sub> to UF<sub>4</sub>. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all relevant inventory change reports (ICRs) and design information to cover these activities.

25. In addition to the issues associated with the testing of UCF processes, the Agency had previously raised with Iran questions related to the purpose and use of nuclear material to be produced at UCF, such as uranium metal. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that the uranium metal had been intended not only for the production of shielding material, as previously stated, but also for use in the laser enrichment programme (as discussed below).

### C.2. Reprocessing Experiments

26. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged the irradiation of depleted UO<sub>2</sub> targets at TRR and subsequent plutonium separation experiments in a hot cell in the Nuclear Safety Building of TNRC. Neither the activities nor the separated plutonium had been reported previously to the Agency.

27. In the meetings held 27 October–1 November 2003, Iran provided additional information about these experiments. According to Iranian officials, the experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved pressed or sintered  $\text{UO}_2$  pellets prepared at ENTC using depleted uranium that had been exempted from safeguards in 1978. The capsules containing the pellets had been irradiated in TRR in connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon. The plutonium separation was carried out at TNRC in three shielded glove boxes, which, according to Iran, were dismantled in 1992 and later stored in a warehouse at ENTC along with related equipment. Iran stated that these experiments had been carried out to learn about the nuclear fuel cycle, and to gain experience in reprocessing chemistry.

28. According to Iran, a total of about 7 kg of  $\text{UO}_2$  was irradiated, 3 kg of which was processed to separate plutonium. The small amount of separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory of Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL), while the remaining 4 kg of unprocessed irradiated  $\text{UO}_2$  targets was placed in containers and stored at the TNRC site, and the wastes disposed of at the Qom salt marsh.

29. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all nuclear material accountancy reports, and design information for ENTC and JHL, covering these activities. On that date, Iran also presented the separated plutonium and the irradiated unprocessed targets to Agency inspectors at JHL. Verification of the material, as well as of possible nuclear material hold-up in the dismantled glove boxes, is foreseen to take place during the 8–15 November 2003 inspection.

### **C.3. Uranium Enrichment**

#### **C.3.1. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment**

30. In February 2003, Iran acknowledged the existence of two centrifuge enrichment plants under construction at Natanz: PFEP and a large commercial-scale Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). In February 2003, Iran also acknowledged that the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no testing of these components involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any other location in Iran. According to Iran, its enrichment programme was indigenous and based on information from open sources.

31. During the visit of 2–3 October 2003, the Agency was shown, for the first time, the centrifuge drawings previously requested by it (see GOV/2003/63, para. 28).

32. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that “a limited number of tests, using small amounts of  $\text{UF}_6$ , [had been] conducted in 1999 and 2002” at the Kalaye Electric Company. In a meeting with enrichment technology experts held during the 27 October–1 November 2003 visit, Iranian authorities explained that the experiments that had been carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company had involved the 1.9 kg of imported  $\text{UF}_6$ , the absence of which the State authorities had earlier attempted to conceal by attributing the loss to evaporation due to leaking valves on the cylinders containing the gas (see GOV/2003/63, para. 18).

33. During that visit, the Agency was able to meet with the individual who had been in charge of the centrifuge research and development work during the period 1992–2001 with a view to clarifying issues associated with these activities. Iran has agreed to provide the relevant ICRs and design information, and to present the nuclear material for Agency verification during the inspection scheduled for 8–15 November 2003.

34. As mentioned above, environmental samples taken by the Agency at PFEP and at the Kalaye Electric Company revealed particles of HEU and LEU indicating the possible presence in Iran of

nuclear material that had not been declared to the Agency. The Iranian authorities attributed the presence of these particles to contamination originating from centrifuge components which had been imported by Iran. In connection with its efforts to verify that information, the Agency requested, and Iran provided in October 2003, a list of imported and domestically produced centrifuge components, material and equipment, and an indication of the batches of items that Iran claims to have been the source of the contamination. The Agency carried out another sample-taking campaign in October 2003, at which time all major imported and domestically produced components, as well as various pieces of manufacturing equipment, were sampled.

35. In a meeting on 1 November 2003, the Iranian authorities stated that all nuclear material in Iran had been declared to the Agency, that Iran had not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges and that, therefore, the contamination could not have arisen as a result of indigenous activities. The Agency has now obtained information about the origin of the centrifuge components and equipment which Iran claims to be the source of HEU contamination. The Agency will continue its investigation of the source of HEU and LEU contamination, including through follow up with other relevant parties.

### **C.3.2. Laser Enrichment**

36. As reflected in GOV/2003/63 (para. 41), Iran permitted the Agency to visit in August 2003 a laboratory located at Lashkar Ab'ad, which was described by Iran as originally having been devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, but whose focus had been changed to research and development and the manufacture of copper vapour lasers (CVLs). In its 19 August 2003 letter to the Agency, Iran stated that it had had a substantial research and development programme on lasers, but that it currently had no programme for laser isotope separation.

37. During discussions which took place in Iran from 2 to 3 October 2003, in response to Agency questioning, the Iranian authorities acknowledged that Iran had imported and installed at TNRC laser related equipment from two countries: in 1992, a laser spectroscopy laboratory intended for the study of laser induced fusion, optogalvanic phenomena and photoionization spectroscopy; and in 2000, a large vacuum vessel, now stored at Karaj, for use in the spectroscopic studies referred to in the previous paragraph.

38. On 6 October 2003, Agency inspectors were permitted to take at Lashkar Ab'ad the environmental samples requested by the Agency in August 2003. The inspectors also visited a warehouse in the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre of the AEOI, where a large imported vacuum vessel and associated hardware were stored. The Iranian authorities stated that the equipment had been imported in 2000, that it had never been used, and that it had now been packed for shipment back to the manufacturer, since the contract related to its supply had been terminated by the foreign partner in 2000. The inspectors were informed that later during their visit to Tehran the equipment related to the laboratory imported in 1992 would be made available for examination and environmental sampling and the individuals involved in the projects would be available for interviews. However, these interviews and the presentation of the equipment were deferred by Iran.

39. In its letter dated 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that, starting in the 1970s, it had had contracts related to laser enrichment with foreign sources from four countries. These contracts are discussed in detail in Annex 1 to this report.

40. During the inspectors' follow-up visit to Iran between 27 October and 1 November 2003, Iran provided more information on Lashkar Ab'ad and acknowledged that a pilot plant for laser enrichment had been established there in 2000. The project for the establishment of the plant consisted of several contracts covering not only the supply of information, as indicated in Iran's letter of 21 October 2003 to the Agency, but also the delivery of additional equipment. Iran also stated that uranium laser



enrichment experiments had been conducted between October 2002 and January 2003 using previously undeclared natural uranium metal imported from one of the other suppliers. According to Iranian authorities, all of the equipment was dismantled in May 2003 and transferred to Karaj for storage together with the uranium metal. The equipment and material were presented to Agency inspectors at Karaj on 28 October 2003.

41. In the meeting of 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all of the relevant ICRs and design information, and to present the nuclear material for Agency verification during the inspection scheduled for 8–15 November 2003.

#### **C.4. Heavy Water Reactor Programme**

42. On 12 July 2003, the Iranian authorities made a presentation on the technical features, said to have been based on indigenous design, of the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) to be constructed at Arak. The purpose of the reactor was declared to be research and development and the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial use. Iran explained that it had tried to acquire a reactor from abroad to replace the old research reactor in Tehran (TRR), but that those attempts had failed, and that Iran had concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor which could use domestically produced UO<sub>2</sub> and zirconium. In order to have a sufficient neutron flux, a reactor with power on the order of 30–40 MW(th) was said to be required.

43. During their visit in July 2003, Agency inspectors were provided with drawings of the IR-40. Contrary to what would have been expected given the declared radioisotope production purpose of the facility, the drawings contained no references to hot cells. The Agency raised this issue during that visit, particularly in light of open source reports of recent efforts by Iran to acquire from abroad heavy manipulators and leaded windows designed for hot cell applications. The Agency indicated to the Iranian authorities that, given the specifications of the manipulators and windows which were the subject of those reports, a design for hot cells should have existed already and that therefore the hot cell, or cells, should already have been declared, at least on a preliminary basis, as part of the facility or as a separate installation.

44. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that two hot cells had been foreseen for this project. However, according to the information provided in that letter, neither the design nor detailed information about the dimensions or the actual layout of the hot cells was available yet, since they did not know the characteristics of the manipulators and shielded windows which they could procure. On 1 November 2003, Iran confirmed that it had tentative plans to construct at the Arak site yet another building with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. Iran has agreed to submit the relevant preliminary design information with respect to that building in due course.

### **D. Findings**

45. Iran's nuclear programme, as the Agency currently understands it, consists of a practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a light water reactor, a heavy water research reactor and associated research and development facilities.

46. Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme. In that context, Iran has admitted that it produced small amounts of LEU using both centrifuge and laser enrichment processes,

and that it had failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.

47. Based on all information currently available to the Agency, it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored. In his June and August 2003 reports to the Board of Governors (GOV/2003/40 and GOV/2003/63), the Director General identified a number of instances of such failures and the corrective actions that were being, or needed to be, taken with respect thereto by Iran.

48. Since the issuance of the Director General's last report, a number of additional failures have been identified. These failures can be summarized as follows:

- (a) Failure to report:
  - (i) the use of imported natural  $UF_6$  for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 2002, and the consequent production of enriched and depleted uranium;
  - (ii) the import of natural uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium, the loss of nuclear material during these operations, and the production and transfer of resulting waste;
  - (iii) the production of  $UO_2$ ,  $UO_3$ ,  $UF_4$ ,  $UF_6$  and AUC from imported depleted  $UO_2$ , depleted  $U_3O_8$  and natural  $U_3O_8$ , and the production and transfer of resulting wastes;
  - (iv) the production of  $UO_2$  targets at ENTC and their irradiation in TRR, the subsequent processing of those targets, including the separation of plutonium, the production and transfer of resulting waste, and the storage of unprocessed irradiated targets at TNRC;
- (b) Failure to provide design information for:
  - (i) the centrifuge testing facility at the Kalaye Electric Company;
  - (ii) the laser laboratories at TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad, and locations where resulting wastes were processed and stored, including the waste storage facility at Karaj;
  - (iii) the facilities at ENTC and TNRC involved in the production of  $UO_2$ ,  $UO_3$ ,  $UF_4$ ,  $UF_6$  and AUC;
  - (iv) TRR, with respect to the irradiation of uranium targets, and the hot cell facility where the plutonium separation took place, as well as the waste handling facility at TNRC; and
- (c) Failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, through concealment.

49. As corrective actions, Iran has undertaken to submit ICRs relevant to all of these activities, to provide design information with respect to the facilities where those activities took place, to present all nuclear material for Agency verification during its forthcoming inspections and to implement a policy of co-operation and full transparency.

## E. Assessment and Next Steps

50. The recent disclosures by Iran about its nuclear programme clearly show that, in the past, Iran had concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. Iran's policy of concealment continued until last month, with co-operation being limited and reactive, and information being slow in coming, changing and contradictory. While most of the breaches identified to date have involved limited quantities of nuclear material, they have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. And although the materials would require further processing before being suitable for weapons purposes, the number of failures by Iran to report in a timely manner the material, facilities and activities in question as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement has given rise to serious concerns.

51. Following the Board's adoption of resolution GOV/2003/69, the Government of Iran informed the Director General that it had now adopted a policy of full disclosure and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of all of its nuclear activities. Since that time, Iran has shown active co-operation and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran's granting to the Agency unrestricted access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available for interviews. This is a welcome development.

52. The Agency will now undertake all the steps necessary to confirm that the information provided by Iran on its past and present nuclear activities is correct and complete. To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme. However, given Iran's past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the Agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. To that end, the Agency must have a particularly robust verification system in place. An Additional Protocol, coupled with a policy of full transparency and openness on the part of Iran, is indispensable for such a system.

53. In that context, Iran has been requested to continue its policy of active co-operation by answering all of the Agency's questions, and by providing the Agency with access to all locations, information and individuals deemed necessary by the Agency. One issue requiring investigation as a matter of urgency is the source of HEU and LEU contamination. The Agency intends to pursue the matter with a number of countries, whose full co-operation is essential to the resolution of this issue.

54. The recent announcement of Iran's intention to conclude an Additional Protocol, and to act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol pending its entry into force, is a positive development. The draft Additional Protocol is now being submitted to the Board for its consideration.

55. Iran's decision to suspend its uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities is also welcome.<sup>3</sup> The Agency intends to verify, in the context of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, the implementation by Iran of this decision.

56. The Director General will inform the Board of additional developments for its further consideration at the March 2004 meeting of the Board, or earlier, as appropriate.

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<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that Iran introduced UF<sub>6</sub> into the first centrifuge at PFEP on 25 June 2003, and, on 19 August 2003, began testing a small ten-machine cascade. On 31 October 2003, Agency inspectors observed that no UF<sub>6</sub> gas was being fed into the centrifuges, although construction and installation work at the site was continuing.



## DETAILED TECHNICAL CHRONOLOGY

### Uranium Conversion

#### The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)

1. According to Iran, UCF was originally based on a design provided by a foreign supplier in the mid-1990s. The plant was supposed to have been constructed by the supplier under a turnkey contract, but the contract was cancelled in 1997 and, according to Iran, the supplier did not provide any equipment to Iran. The AEOI has acknowledged having received from the supplier the blueprint of the facility, including equipment test reports and some design information on the equipment, but has stated that all the parts and equipment for the plant were manufactured domestically based on detailed designs developed without external assistance. Construction of the plant was begun in 1999.

2. Preliminary design information on UCF was submitted to the Agency on 31 July 2000. The Agency has performed DIV at UCF since then on a regular basis with a view to monitoring progress in construction and equipment installation, and to develop a safeguards approach. The proposed safeguards approach was given to the Iranian authorities in February 2002.

3. The design information provided to the Agency in July 2000 described the purpose of this facility as the conversion of uranium ore concentrate (UOC or  $U_3O_8$ ) into natural  $UO_2$ ,  $UF_6$  and uranium metal. The production design capacity was said to be 200 t of  $UF_6$  annually. The facility was described as having the following process lines: conversion of natural UOC into  $UF_6$ ; conversion of low enriched  $UF_6$  into  $UO_2$  (30 t per year of  $UO_2$  enriched to 5% U-235); conversion of depleted  $UF_6$  to  $UF_4$  (170 t per year of depleted  $UO_4$ ); conversion of low enriched  $UF_6$  LEU metal (30 kg per year of uranium metal enriched to 19.7% U-235), and the conversion of depleted  $UF_4$  to depleted uranium metal. According to information provided by Iran, commissioning of the first line (for the conversion of  $U_3O_8$  to ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC)) is expected to begin in November 2003.

4. While conducting a DIV at the facility in 2002, inspectors noticed that the depleted uranium metal line had been changed to a line for natural uranium metal production. The updated design information, which was provided to the Agency on 9 April 2003, now includes an additional line for conversion to natural  $UO_2$  and a line for conversion to natural uranium metal. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, Iran stated that the uranium metal production line could be used to produce shielding material, and that the natural  $UO_2$  line was envisaged to meet the needs of the heavy water reactor programme.

#### Uranium Conversion Experiments and Testing

5. The explanations by Iran that it had not conducted any tests using nuclear material on certain parts of the conversion process and that those processes had been based on the supplier's drawings and test reports, raised questions, particularly given that the simpler steps of the conversion process (such as  $U_3O_8$  dissolution and uranium purification using pulse columns) had undergone extensive testing. According to Agency experts, such an approach would be inconsistent with the normal practice of first validating the processes and carrying out pilot scale production before proceeding to the final design and construction of a commercial conversion plant.

6. As indicated in GOV/2003/63, Iran acknowledged in August 2003 that it had carried out some bench scale uranium conversion experiments in the early 1990s, experiments that Iran should have reported in accordance with its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement.

7. On 9 October 2003, the Agency received acknowledgement that, contrary to Iran's previous communications, practically all of the materials important to uranium conversion (AUC, UO<sub>3</sub>, UF<sub>4</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub>) had been produced in laboratory and bench scale experiments (kilogram quantities) conducted between 1981 and 1993 without having been reported to the Agency. On 1 November 2003, Iran explained that, due to foreign involvement in the design and construction of UCF, it was decided in 1993 to terminate domestic research and development on UF<sub>4</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub>. Iran further explained that the facilities related to the UF<sub>4</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub> experiments had been dismantled, and that the equipment had been moved to waste storage at Karaj. This is being evaluated by the Agency.

8. For ease of reference, a summary of major processing experiments by Iran using imported uranium, based on information currently available to the Agency, is provided in Table 1.

**TABLE 1: Major Processing Experiments by Iran Using Imported Uranium**

Year of Import	Material Type & Quantity	Use by Iran
1977	20 kg U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (depleted)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At Iran's request the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> was exempted from safeguards in 1978 (de-exempted in 1998).</li> <li>Processing activities were carried out between 1981 and 1993 and reported to the Agency in 1998. 5.2 kg U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> was declared a process loss from the experiments.</li> </ul>
	50 kg UO <sub>2</sub> (depleted)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At Iran's request the UO<sub>2</sub> was exempted from safeguards in 1978 (de-exempted in 1998).</li> <li>Fuel fabrication research was carried out between 1985 and 1993 at FFL and reported to the Agency in 1998; 13.1 kg depleted UO<sub>2</sub> was declared as a process loss from these experiments.</li> <li>Lab-scale experiments using UO<sub>2</sub>, reported in 1998 as a loss, were used between 1989 and 1993 to produce UF<sub>4</sub> at TNRC.</li> <li>UO<sub>2</sub> targets were produced from 1988 to 1992 at ENTC using about 6.9 kg UO<sub>2</sub>, previously declared as a process loss in 1998, subsequently irradiated at TRR; the resulting plutonium separated at TNRC was stored together with the irradiated unprocessed targets at TNRC.</li> </ul>
1982	531 t U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> concentrate (natural)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Processing of 85 kg U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> between 1982 and 1993 was carried out at UCL and reported to the Agency in 1998; 45 kg was declared as a process loss from these experiments.</li> <li>Between 1982 and 1987 about 12.2 kg UO<sub>2</sub> was produced using U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> declared in 1998 as a loss. This UO<sub>2</sub>, combined with some other materials, was used between 1989 and 1993 to produce about 10 kg UF<sub>4</sub> at TNRC.</li> </ul>
1991	1005 kg UF <sub>6</sub> (natural)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.9 kg UF<sub>6</sub> was used for testing of centrifuges at Kalaye Electric between 1999 and 2002.</li> </ul>
	402 kg UF <sub>4</sub> (natural)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>376.6 kg UF<sub>4</sub> was converted to U metal in 113 experiments at JHL; and about 9.4 kg UF<sub>4</sub>, which had been declared earlier in 2003 as a process loss, was used to produce 6.5 kg UF<sub>6</sub> at TNRC between 1991 and 1993.</li> </ul>
	401.5 kg UO <sub>2</sub> (natural)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>44 kg UO<sub>2</sub> was used in testing of pulse columns and pellet production at JHL.</li> <li>1-2 g UO<sub>2</sub> was irradiated in experiments in TRR and processed at JHL.</li> <li>2.7 kg UO<sub>2</sub> was used to produce UF<sub>4</sub>.</li> </ul>
1993	50 kg uranium metal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8 kg uranium metal was used for AVLIS experiments from 1999 to 2000 at TNRC.</li> <li>22 kg uranium metal was used for AVLIS experiments from October 2002 to February 2003 at Lashkar Ab'ad.</li> </ul>

9. In 1977, Iran imported 20 kg of depleted  $U_3O_8$  and 50 kg of depleted  $UO_2$ . Upon request by Iran in 1978, these materials were exempted from safeguards. In 1982, Iran imported 531 t of natural  $U_3O_8$  concentrate, which it reported to the Agency in 1990.

10. In 1981 and 1984, respectively, Iran commissioned with a foreign supplier the construction at ENTC of a Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL) and a Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL). The existence of these laboratories was disclosed to the Agency during a visit of the then DDG-SG in 1993, and formally reported to the Agency in 1998. Between 1981 and 1993, Iran carried out at UCL and FFL unreported activities involving the exempted depleted  $U_3O_8$ , the exempted depleted  $UO_2$ , and the  $U_3O_8$  concentrate (see paras. 11 and 12 below). These activities were only reported to the Agency in 1998 after lengthy discussions between the Agency and Iranian officials. The material was de-exempted in 1998, and what remained of it was stored at ENTC. In 1998, Iran declared that UCL had been closed down since 1987. FFL is still in operation.

11. Between 1981 and 1993, processing activities involving the 20 kg of exempted depleted  $U_3O_8$  and some of the 531 t of natural  $U_3O_8$  concentrate were carried out at UCL. Of the original 20 kg of depleted  $U_3O_8$ , 5.2 kg was reported in 1998 as process losses by Iran. Iran also reported in 1998 that it had processed 85 kg of the 531 t of  $U_3O_8$  concentrate, of which 45 kg was declared as process losses.

12. During the period 1985 through 1993, FFL was used for research in fuel fabrication, the main activity having been the manufacture of sintered pellets using the imported 50 kg of exempted depleted  $UO_2$ . Iran reported the existence of FFL, and the processing of the nuclear material there, in 1998, at which time it declared that 13.1 kg of the material had been lost during processing.

13. In a letter dated 19 August 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had carried out  $UO_2$  to  $UF_4$  conversion experiments on a laboratory scale during the 1990s at the Radiochemistry Laboratories of the TNRC using some of the imported depleted  $UO_2$  referred to in the previous paragraph. Until August 2003, Iran had claimed that it had carried out no  $UF_4$  production experiments. This activity was acknowledged by Iran only after the July 2003 waste analysis results of samples taken to verify experiments using nuclear material imported in 1991 indicated the presence of depleted  $UF_4$  mixed with natural  $UF_4$ . Iran acknowledged that the  $UO_2$  which had been used had been part of that previously declared by Iran as having been lost during experiments at FFL.

14. On 9 October 2003, Iran provided further details on these  $UF_4$  experiments, stating that, between 1987 and 1993, there had been bench scale production of  $UF_4$  at the Radiochemistry Laboratories. This information was further amplified in Iran's letter dated 21 October 2003 and in a subsequent meeting on 1 November 2003. According to that information, the  $UF_4$  production experiments included testing of wet and dry production methods. Between 1982 and 1987, approximately 12.2 kg of natural  $UO_2$  was produced at UCL using imported  $U_3O_8$  concentrate that had been reported as a process loss in 1998 (see para. 11 above). This material, together with 1 kg of the  $UO_2$  imported in 1991, and 1.23 kg of depleted  $UO_2$  that had been reported in 1998 as a process loss at UCL (see para. 12 above), was used for the production of  $UF_4$  at the Radiochemistry Laboratories through the wet method. In addition, 2.5 kg of  $UF_4$  was produced with the dry method, using  $UO_2$  imported in 1991 as the source material.

15. Between 1991 and 1992, 0.2 kg of  $UO_3$  and 4.45 kg of AUC were produced in the Radiochemistry Laboratories using, as source material, some of the  $U_3O_8$  concentrate imported in 1982.

16. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed, as a corrective measure, to submit ICRs for UCL, FFL, JHL and the waste storage facility at Karaj, as well as design information for the waste storage facility.



17. Final evaluation of the information provided on these conversion experiments will depend on the results of the destructive and environmental sample analysis and the assessment of the experiment reports provided by Iran.

18. Following the import in 1991 of natural uranium (1005 kg of UF<sub>6</sub>, 402 kg of UF<sub>4</sub> and 401.5 kg of UO<sub>2</sub>), Iran carried out a number of experiments, on a laboratory scale, at JHL located at TNRC. The import of the nuclear material in question was only acknowledged by Iran in March 2003. The status of the imported material, as currently declared, is as follows:

- Of the 1005 kg of UF<sub>6</sub>, 1.9 kg was found to have been missing from two cylinders in which the material is said to have been delivered. This loss was originally attributed by Iran to evaporation of the material due to high temperatures during storage of the material. Iran has now acknowledged that it used that material for testing centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company, as described below.
- Of the 402 kg of UF<sub>4</sub>, 376.6 kg was converted to uranium metal. The conversion was declared by Iran in March 2003, and in June 2003, it was described as having been achieved through 113 experiments carried out at JHL in the early 1990s. In October 2003, Iran also acknowledged having used 9.43 kg of the UF<sub>4</sub> for conversion to UF<sub>6</sub>, as described below.
- Of the 401.5 kg of UO<sub>2</sub>, 44 kg was used in testing pulse column process and pellet production experiments at JHL. In addition, between June 1987 and February 1999, small amounts (1 to 2 g) of UO<sub>2</sub> were irradiated in TRR in about 50 experiments and sent to the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility) for separation of I-131. In October 2003, Iran acknowledged having used 2.7 kg of the UO<sub>2</sub> in conversion experiments to produce UF<sub>4</sub>.

19. Iran has provided ICRs on its import of the material referred to in the preceding paragraph, as well as on its subsequent processing. Iran has also submitted physical inventory listings (PILs) and material balance reports (MBRs) reflecting the current status of nuclear material at JHL, including uranium metal, uranyl nitrate, UO<sub>2</sub> pellets and waste containing uranium.

20. JHL, where many of these experiments are declared to have been carried out, consists of several rooms where conversion activities took place using the nuclear material imported in 1991. The facility was declared to the Agency in March 2003. In May 2003, design information for JHL was received, and verification thereof commenced. Iran has been informed that the design information is not yet complete, and has been requested to provide an update.

### ***Production and use of UF<sub>6</sub>***

21. Until recently, the Iranian authorities repeatedly asserted that the UF<sub>6</sub> imported in 1991 had not been processed, and specifically that it had not been used in any centrifuge, enrichment or other tests. The State authorities explained that the small amount of UF<sub>6</sub> (1.9 kg) missing from the two smaller cylinders in which the material had been imported might have been due to leaking valves, an explanation challenged by the Agency on the basis of its technical assessment and verification activities. In the information submitted on 23 October 2003, however, Iran acknowledged that it had used 1.9 kg of the imported UF<sub>6</sub> to test centrifuge machines at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop between 1999 and 2002, before the dismantling of the test facility at the end of 2002. This material is currently declared as hold-up in the dismantled equipment currently stored at PFEP.

22. The remaining container of the UF<sub>6</sub> imported in 1991, a large 30 B-type cylinder currently stored at Natanz, was presented to Agency inspectors, and appeared to have been intact. However, destructive analysis sampling of its contents need to be performed. This will be done as soon as the

necessary equipment is installed. In the meantime, environmental samples and non-destructive measurements have been taken in order to confirm the presence of natural uranium.

23. In contrast to its earlier declarations that it had not used nuclear material to test the production of UF<sub>6</sub>, Iran acknowledged in its letter dated 21 October 2003 that, between 1987 and 1993, it had carried out in the Radiochemical Laboratories at TNRC bench scale preparation of UF<sub>6</sub> using as feed 9.43 kg of the UF<sub>4</sub> which had been imported in 1991. The laboratory equipment has since then been dismantled. On 12 October 2003, the equipment was presented for Agency verification in a container at the Karaj Nuclear Research Centre for Medicine and Agriculture, together with a number of cylinders containing approximately 6.5 kg of UF<sub>6</sub>. Final evaluation will depend on the results of environmental sampling and assessment of experiment records provided by Iran.

24. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit ICRs for JHL, PFEP and the waste storage facility at Karaj and to provide design information for those facilities.

### ***Production of uranium metal***

25. In March 2003, Iran informed the Agency that most of the natural UF<sub>4</sub> imported in 1991 had been converted to uranium metal at JHL between 1995 and 2000 in the course of 113 experiments. Neither the experiments nor the facility where these experiments were conducted were declared to the Agency at the time the experiments were conducted. The nuclear material resulting from these experiments was verified by the Agency during its May 2003 inspection, and Iran has submitted the relevant ICRs, PILS and MBRs, as well as updated design information for JHL.

26. In its letter dated 21 October 2003, Iran admitted that the uranium metal production capabilities had also been intended for use in Iran's laser enrichment programme (see discussion below).

## **Reprocessing Experiments**

27. In March 2003, Iran stated that some of the UO<sub>2</sub> imported in 1991 had been used for pellet fabrication experiments. In April 2003, Iran informed the Agency that some of the UO<sub>2</sub> had also been used in isotope production experiments involving irradiation at TRR of the *natural* UO<sub>2</sub> targets and the subsequent separation of molybdenum, xenon and iodine. The liquid uranium-containing waste resulting from these experiments is said by Iran to have been sent to Esfahan.

28. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged the irradiation of *depleted* UO<sub>2</sub> targets at TRR and subsequent plutonium separation experiments in a hot cell in the Nuclear Safety Building of TNRC between 1988 and 1992. Neither the activities nor the separated plutonium had been reported to the Agency previously.

29. In the meetings held 27 October–1 November 2003, additional information was provided about the experiments involving the depleted uranium. Iran stated that they had been carried out to learn about the nuclear fuel cycle, and to gain experience in reprocessing chemistry. The experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved 7 kg of pressed or sintered UO<sub>2</sub> pellets prepared at ENTC using depleted uranium that had been exempted, at the request of Iran, in 1978. In 1997, this material was reported as a process loss at FFL. The capsules containing the pellets were irradiated typically for two weeks in TRR in connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes of molybdenum, iodine and xenon. The plutonium separation, based on the Purex process, was carried out on the site of TNRC, on a laboratory scale, in three shielded glove boxes, which, according to Iran, were dismantled in 1992 and later stored in a warehouse at ENTC along with related equipment.

30. The Agency was informed that a total of about 7 kg of UO<sub>2</sub> was used, of which 3 kg had been irradiated and processed to separate plutonium. The remaining 4 kg of irradiated UO<sub>2</sub> targets was

placed in containers and stored on the TNRC site; the separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory of JHL following the dismantling of the glove boxes; and the wastes were disposed of at Qom.

31. In August 2003, Agency inspectors visited the waste storage location at Anarak where the waste referred to in paragraph 27 above had been stored. Iran has agreed to transfer that waste to JHL.

32. On 1 November 2003, Iran agreed to submit all nuclear material accountancy reports from 1988 through the present covering the manufacture of the UO<sub>2</sub> targets, their irradiation and subsequent processing and the storage of the remaining nuclear material and wastes. In addition, Iran has agreed to submit design information covering these activities and nuclear material at ENTC and JHL.

33. On 1 November 2003, Iran presented both the separated plutonium and the irradiated unprocessed targets to Agency inspectors at JHL. Verification of that material, as well as possible hold-up in dismantled glove boxes, is foreseen to take place during the forthcoming inspection.

## **Uranium Enrichment**

### **Gas Centrifuge Enrichment**

34. In February 2003, in response to inquiries by the Agency, Iran acknowledged the existence of two centrifuge enrichment plants under construction at Natanz: PFEP and the large commercial scale FEP. In February 2003, Iran also acknowledged that the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development programme involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any other location in Iran. According to Iran, all testing had been carried out either in vacuum or using simulation studies. Iranian officials stated that the enrichment programme had been started in 1997 and that it was indigenous and based on information available from open sources, such as scientific publications and patents.

35. A team of Agency centrifuge technology experts met on 7–11 June 2003 with Iranian officials to seek clarification about Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme, in particular about its statement that the design and development, which was said to have been begun in 1997, had been based on information from open sources and extensive modelling and simulation, and that the tests of centrifuge rotors at the Amir Khabir University and on the premises of the AEOI in Tehran had been conducted without nuclear material. This meeting was followed by a round of technical discussions in Tehran in July 2003, and further meetings of the centrifuge technology experts with Iranian officials in Iran on 9–12 August 2003, 4–9 October 2003 and 27 October–1 November 2003.

36. Following up on recent open source reports of enrichment activities being undertaken at an industrial complex in Kolehdoz in western Tehran, the Agency was permitted on 5 October 2003 to visit three locations which the Agency had identified as corresponding to those mentioned in the reports. Iran stated that there were no nuclear related activities being carried out at this site. While no work was seen at those locations that could be linked to uranium enrichment, environmental samples were taken.



### ***The Natanz Facilities***

37. At the time Iran disclosed the construction of PFEP, in February 2003, over 100 of the approximately 1000 planned centrifuge casings had already been installed. Iran informed the Agency that the remaining centrifuges were scheduled to be installed by the end of 2003. Iran also informed the Agency that the commercial scale FEP, which is planned to contain over 50 000 centrifuges, was scheduled to start accepting centrifuges in early 2005, after the design is confirmed by the tests to be conducted in PFEP, but that FEP was not scheduled to receive nuclear material in the near future.

38. The Agency took baseline environmental samples at PFEP on several occasions between March and May 2003 before nuclear material was introduced in the facility, the results of which revealed particles of HEU indicating the possible presence in Iran of nuclear material that had not been declared to the Agency. In June 2003, the results were provided to Iran for comments. In August 2003, the Iranian authorities attributed the presence of HEU particles to contamination originating from centrifuge components that had been imported by Iran.

39. Subsequent environmental samples revealed the presence in Iran of natural uranium, LEU and at least two other types of HEU particles. It was also noted that there had been differences among the samples taken from the surfaces of the centrifuge casings installed for the single machine tests. The Agency asked the Iranian authorities to investigate whether there were differences in the manufacturing history of those pieces of equipment.

40. In August 2003, the IAEA was allowed to take swipe samples of imported components stored at Natanz, as well as of some of the newly machined components that had been produced in Iran. At the request of the Agency, Iran provided a list of imported and domestically produced centrifuge components and equipment in October 2003.

41. Agency inspectors were told in early October 2003 that all of the centrifuges from the Kalaye Electric Company had been scrapped, and therefore were not available for inspection, whereas it became clear later that the centrifuges had in fact been stored at another location in Tehran and were finally shown to the inspectors at Natanz on 30–31 October 2003, at which time Agency experts examined the centrifuges and associated equipment, and took environmental samples. All major imported and domestically produced components, as well as various pieces of manufacturing equipment have now been sampled. The results of the sample analyses are not expected to be available before December 2003. The nuclear material held in this equipment will be verified during the forthcoming inspections. The Agency has now also obtained information about the source of the components that Iran claims to have been contaminated.

42. On 25 June 2003, Iran introduced UF<sub>6</sub> into the first centrifuge at PFEP for the purpose of single machine testing. On 19 August 2003, Iran began the testing of a small ten-machine cascade at PFEP with UF<sub>6</sub>. As of October 2003, some single machine testing using UF<sub>6</sub> had been carried out at PFEP and the installation of a 164-machine cascade was being finalized. Agency inspectors visited PFEP on 31 October 2003, and observed that no UF<sub>6</sub> gas was being fed into the first centrifuges of the 164-centrifuge machine cascade. However, construction and installation work at the site was continuing.

### ***Kalaye Electric Company***

43. In March 2003, during an Agency visit to the workshop at the Kalaye Electric Company, the Iranian authorities refused Agency access to one of the workshop buildings, claiming that the building was used for storage and that no keys to the building were available.

44. During their 9–12 August 2003 visit to Iran, Agency inspectors were permitted to take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, with a view to assessing the role of that company in Iran's enrichment research and development programme. During that visit, the inspectors noted that there had been considerable modification of the premises since their visits in March and May 2003, which the Iranian authorities attributed to the transformation of the workshop from use as a storage facility to its use as a laboratory for non-destructive analysis. As reflected in the Director General's previous report to the Board, this could impact on the accuracy of the environmental sampling and the Agency's ability to verify Iran's declarations about the types of activities previously carried out there.

45. On 16 September 2003, the Agency informed representatives of Iran of the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at the Kalaye Electric Company in August 2003, which had revealed the presence of HEU and LEU particles which were not consistent with the nuclear material in the declared inventory of Iran.

46. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that "a limited number of tests, using small amounts of UF<sub>6</sub>, [had been] conducted in 1999 and 2002" at the Kalaye Electric Company. The equipment used between 1999 and 2000 at Kalaye Electric Company was suitable for pilot scale uranium isotope separation. As an isotope separation plant is defined in Article 98.I.(a) of the Safeguards Agreement as a facility, the existence of this facility should have been declared to the Agency.

#### ***Enrichment research and development activities***

47. As indicated in the Director General's previous report, in contrast to the initial information provided about the chronology of the enrichment programme and its indigenous nature, Iran informed the Agency in August 2003 that the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichment programme had actually been taken in 1985, and that Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary around 1987. Iranian officials further described the programme as having consisted of three phases: the first phase, from 1985 until 1997, during which related activities had been located mainly at the AEOI premises in Tehran (with laboratory work at the Plasma Physics Laboratories of TNRC); the second phase, between 1997 and 2002, during which the activities had been relocated and concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran and Iran was able to make all components had some success in mechanically testing centrifuges and decided to construct the enrichment facilities at Natanz; and the third phase, 2002 to the present, when the research and development and assembly activities were moved to Natanz.

48. According to information provided by Iran in August 2003, during the first phase, about 2000 components and some subassemblies had been obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or directly by Iranian entities, but no help was received from abroad in the assembly of centrifuges or in training, nor were any completed centrifuges imported. Efforts had been concentrated on achieving an operating centrifuge, but many difficulties were encountered as a result of machine crashes attributed to poor quality components. Iran described the second phase of activities as having involved the assembly and testing of centrifuges, but again without inert (e.g. xenon) or UF<sub>6</sub> gas.

49. In pursuit of its verification of Iran's statement that it had not tested any centrifuges using nuclear material, the Agency's team of centrifuge technology experts inquired of Iran how it had developed the 'enrichment factor'<sup>4</sup> and 'separative output'<sup>5</sup> used in the relevant calculations. The Agency was

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<sup>4</sup> The "enrichment factor" of a centrifuge is the ratio of the amount of U-235 in the product to the amount of U-235 in the feed.

told that they had been obtained from an original centrifuge ‘sketch’, supported by theoretical calculations using open literature, and not from experiments.

50. The Agency’s centrifuge technology experts remained of the view that, based on all information available to them, Iran’s assertion that no UF<sub>6</sub> or any simulation gas had ever been introduced into a centrifuge machine in Iran was inconsistent with other countries’ experience, and they still could not conclude that the then current status of the centrifuges installed at Natanz could have been achieved solely on the basis of open source information and computer simulations without additional confirmation through the use of UF<sub>6</sub> in laboratory testing.

51. No new information was provided by Iran with respect to the issue of testing of centrifuges using nuclear material until October 2003. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that, in order to ensure the performance of centrifuge machines, a limited number of tests using small amounts of UF<sub>6</sub> imported in 1991 had been carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company. According to Iran, the first test of the centrifuges was conducted in 1998 using an inert gas (xenon). Series of tests using UF<sub>6</sub> were performed between 1999 and 2002. In the course of the last series of tests, an enrichment level of 1.2% U-235 was achieved.

52. In a meeting with enrichment technology experts held during the 27 October–1 November 2003 visit, Iran provided additional information about its gas centrifuge programme. The authorities explained that the experiments which had been carried out at the Kalaye Electric Company had involved the 1.9 kg of imported UF<sub>6</sub> the absence of which the State authorities had earlier attributed to evaporation due to leaking valves on the cylinders containing the gas. The individual who had been in charge of the actual research and development work during the period 1992–2001 was made available for discussions with the Agency. Although there were no detailed technical or nuclear material accountancy reports available, the individual interviewed by the Agency was able to provide, as supporting documentation, his personal notebooks.

53. On 1 November 2003, the Iranian authorities stated that all nuclear material had been declared to the Agency and that Iran had not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges, and that, therefore, the contamination could not have arisen as a result of indigenous activities. In the course of these investigations and interviews of individuals involved in the nuclear programme, the Agency has obtained information on the origin of the centrifuge components and equipment which Iran claims to be the source of HEU, LEU and other particle contamination at the Kalaye Electric Company and at PFEP. The Agency will continue to investigate this matter.

54. As a corrective measure, Iran has agreed to submit ICRs for JHL and for PFEP, and to provide updated design information for PFEP.

### **Laser Enrichment**

55. During the Agency’s 12 August 2003 visit to the laser laboratory located at Lashkar Ab’ad, the Iranian authorities described the laboratory as originally having been devoted to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, but stated that its focus had been changed and the equipment unrelated to the site’s current projects, including a large vacuum vessel imported by Iran in 2000, had been moved. The Agency requested that Iran confirm that there had not been in the past any activities related to uranium laser enrichment at this location or at any other location in Iran, and requested permission to take environmental samples at the laboratory.

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<sup>5</sup> The “separative output” of a centrifuge defines the amount of enrichment achieved by the centrifuge. The “separative output” multiplied by the number of centrifuges in an enrichment plant defines the total output achievable by the plant.



56. In response to that request, in its 19 August 2003 letter to the Agency, Iran stated that, in the past, apart from planned co-operation in laser fusion and laser spectroscopy which never materialized, there had been a research thesis on laser spectroscopy of SF<sub>6</sub> prepared by a university student in co-operation with the laser division of AEOI. As indicated in the Director General's previous report to the Board, Iran stated that it had a substantial research and development programme on lasers, but that it currently had no programme for laser isotope separation.

57. During discussions which took place in Iran from 2 to 3 October 2003, the Iranian authorities informed Agency inspectors that Iran had received from a foreign source, in 1992, a laser spectroscopy laboratory intended for the study of laser induced fusion, optogalvanic phenomena and photoionization spectroscopy, and from another foreign source, in 2000, the large vacuum vessel referred to above, but that the equipment had been only for spectroscopic studies. It was agreed that the Agency would be shown the equipment and permitted to take environmental samples, as had been requested by the Agency on 12 August 2003.

58. On 6 October 2003, Agency inspectors were permitted to take environmental samples at Lashkar Ab'ad. The inspectors also visited a warehouse in the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Centre of the AEOI, where a large imported vacuum vessel (approximately 5 m long, 1 m in diameter) with associated hardware were stored. The Iranian authorities stated that it was the equipment which had been imported in 2000, that it had never been used, and that it had now been packed for shipment back to the manufacturer, since the contract related to its supply had been terminated by the foreign partner in 2000. The inspectors were informed that the individuals involved with the projects would be made available for interviews, but that the interviews would take place later in Tehran, where the equipment related to the laboratory imported from another country in 1992 would be made available for examination and environmental sampling. However, these interviews and the presentation of the other equipment were deferred by Iran until the end of October 2003.

59. In its letter dated 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that, starting in the 1970s, it had had contracts related to laser enrichment using atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) techniques with foreign entities from four countries:

- (a) 1975 – a contract for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic behaviour of uranium metal, which had been abandoned in the 1980s as the laboratory had not functioned properly. The laboratory had also contained two mass spectrometers, purchased from the same source in 1976, which had been used to analyse samples of nuclear material obtained from enrichment experiments at Kalaye Electric Company, TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad. While the import of the nuclear material used in that project had been reported to the Agency, the laboratory where the laser equipment had been installed (at TNRC) was not. None of these activities involving the nuclear material had been reported to the Agency.
- (b) Late 1970s – a contract with a second supplier to study MLIS, under which four 5 µm CO lasers and four vacuum chambers were delivered, but which was ultimately terminated due to the political situation prevailing at that time.
- (c) 1991 – a contract with a third supplier for the establishment of a laser laboratory, consisting of two parts: the "Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory" (LSL), for the spectroscopic study of uranium metal; and the "Comprehensive Separation Laboratory" (CSL), at which enrichment would be carried out on a milligram scale. The contract also provided for the supply to Iran of 50 kg of natural uranium metal (which was imported in 1993). The equipment was able to enrich uranium up to the contracted level of 3% U-235, and even slightly beyond, in the course of the

experiments. It was used until October 2002, when the laboratories, and the nuclear material, were moved from TNRC to Lashkar Ab'ad. None of these activities involving nuclear material were reported to the Agency.

- (d) 1998 – a contract with a fourth supplier to obtain information related to laser enrichment, and the supply of relevant equipment. However, due to the inability of the supplier to secure export licences, only some of the equipment was delivered (to Lashkar Ab'ad).

60. The equipment imported in connection with the above mentioned AVLIS and MLIS projects was presented to the Agency inspectors in October 2003, and the inspectors were able to discuss the projects with individuals who had been involved with them and to take environmental samples. Final assessment must await evaluation of the recently available information and the environmental sampling results.

61. In October 2003, Iran provided more information on Lashkar Ab'ad, and acknowledged that it had in fact contained a pilot plant for laser enrichment using AVLIS techniques, which had been established in 2000 pursuant to a project involving the fourth country. As indicated above, this contract was not fully implemented, since export licences were not obtained for all of the equipment. The project had consisted of several contracts covering not only the supply of information, as indicated in Iran's letter of 21 October 2003 to the Agency, but also delivery of more powerful copper vapour lasers (CVLs) up to 150 kW. Since the delivery of the CVLs was blocked due to the lack of export licences, the equipment at LSL and CSL was moved to Lashkar Ab'ad in October 2002, and, taking advantage of the CVL and dye lasers from these laboratories and the large vacuum chamber and associated equipment imported in 2000 and already located there, experiments were conducted from October 2002 through January 2003 using 22 kg of the 50 kg of imported natural uranium metal. According to Iranian authorities, the uranium metal was located at Lashkar Ab'ad from December 2002 through May 2003. The equipment was dismantled in May 2003 and transferred together with uranium metal to Karaj, where they were presented to Agency inspectors on 28 October 2003. The Agency took environmental samples from the equipment and nuclear material presented to it.

62. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran also informed the Agency that it had used for separation experiments at LSL and CSL at TNRC 8 kg of the 50 kg of natural uranium metal imported in 1993.

63. The equipment received in 1992 and 1999 was suitable for pilot plant scale operations of uranium isotope separation using AVLIS. As an isotope separation plant is defined in Article 98.I.(a) of the Safeguards Agreement as a facility, the existence of these facilities should have been declared to the Agency, and information provided on an as-built basis at Lashkar Ab'ad, and its subsequent transfer to Karaj.

64. Iran had failed to report the receipt and use of uranium metal and to provide design information for LSL, CSL and Lashkar Ab'ad. In the meeting of 1 November 2003, Iran agreed, as a corrective measure, to submit the relevant ICRs concerning the use of the uranium metal, which will be presented for Agency verification during the inspection scheduled for 8–15 November 2003. Iran also agreed to submit design information for a new storage facility at Karaj, where the waste from the laser enrichment programme is being stored along with the dismantled equipment, and to amend the design information for JHL to cover the mass spectrometer and laser laboratories as well as some waste tanks containing nuclear material.

65. Final assessment is pending evaluation of the new information, the verification results from the November 2003 inspection and the results of environmental and other sample taking.

## Heavy Water Reactor Programme

66. In response to Agency enquiries in September 2002, Iran confirmed in February 2003 its construction of a Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak. In explaining the need for such a plant, Iranian officials said that they had not known whether their uranium enrichment programme would succeed, and that, therefore, they had considered in the 1980s the possibility of constructing a natural uranium nuclear power plant using heavy water as the moderator and coolant. They further explained that, now that the enrichment programme had succeeded, there was no need for heavy water production, and they were not sure whether the plant would be completed. On 26 February 2003, the Agency submitted a number of questions to Iran about its heavy water reactor programme, requesting that it provide further information, in particular on any plans Iran had to build heavy water reactors.

### **Design and Purpose of the IR-40**

67. The Agency was first informed of Iran's construction of a heavy water reactor in a letter from Iran dated 5 May 2003. In that letter, Iran stated that it intended to construct a 40 MW(th) heavy water reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak. Enclosed with the letter was only preliminary design information on the reactor, in which the reactor power output of 40 MW(th) was confirmed; it did not include information on the fuel or the reactor design. At the same time, Iran provided preliminary information on a facility intended to manufacture fuel for IR-40, namely the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) to be built on the Esfahan site.

68. During a technical visit to Iran by the Agency on 10–13 July 2003, the Iranian authorities made a presentation on some of the technical features of the IR-40, and informed the Agency that the construction was planned to start in 2004. According to statements made in the course of this presentation, Iran had decided to replace TRR because, after 35 years of operation, it was reaching the safety limits for which it had been designed and because of its location within what had become the suburbs of the city of Tehran. However, as it had tried, unsuccessfully, on several occasions to import a research reactor suitable for medical, industrial isotope production and for research and development, Iran had decided in the mid-1980s to construct its own reactor. The only alternative was a heavy water reactor which could use  $\text{UO}_2$  and zirconium produced in Esfahan. According to the Iranian authorities, to meet its isotope production requirements, such a reactor should have a neutron flux of  $10^{13}$  to  $10^{14}$  n/cm<sup>2</sup>/s, based on a power of the order of 30-40 MW(th) when using natural  $\text{UO}_2$  fuel.

69. During the presentation, the Iranian authorities informed the Agency that the facility was based on indigenous design, and that it was currently in the detailed design phase and would be built in the Khondab area near Arak. The core fuel assemblies would be made from natural  $\text{UO}_2$  and supplied by FMP, the feed for which would be supplied by UCF, currently under construction at Esfahan. The Agency was informed that the construction of FMP would begin in 2003 and be completed in 2006, and that operations were planned to start in 2007. Iran provided updated design information on the IR-40 on 26 July 2003, and preliminary design information on FMP in 2003.

70. In a letter to the Agency dated 19 August 2003, the AEOI provided more information on Iran's heavy water reactor programme, stating that a decision to start the research and development had been made in the early 1980s.

71. As indicated above, Iran previously stated that the IR-40 was of indigenous design. According to the information provided by Iran in its letter of 21 October 2003, however, foreign experts had been consulted in the development of some parts of the design of the reactor. When asked, Iranian



authorities stated that they had conducted extensive reactor core calculations for the fuel management strategies and to control the excess reactivity<sup>6</sup> of the core. In that letter, Iran stated further that the reactor design had been 90% completed by the end of 2002, and the detailed design was expected to be completed by the end of 2005.

72. On 29 October 2003, Iran informed the Agency that the production of both “short lived” and “long lived” isotopes had been considered for this project, and that the exact amount and type of these isotopes would be decided upon during the detailed design stage of the project.

### **Hot Cells**

73. During its July 2003 visit to Tehran, the Agency was provided with drawings of the reactor. Contrary to what would have been expected given the declared radioisotope production purpose of the facility, the drawings contained no references to hot cells. The Agency raised this issue during that visit, particularly in light of open source reports of recent efforts by Iran to acquire from abroad heavy manipulators and leaded windows designed for hot cell applications. The Agency indicated to the Iranian authorities that, given the specifications of the manipulators and windows which were the subject of those reports, a design for hot cells should exist already and that, therefore, the hot cell, or cells, should already have been declared, at least on a preliminary basis, as part of the facility or as a separate installation. On 4 August 2003, the Agency was provided with updated design information on the IR-40 which did not contain any references to hot cells. Later in August, Iran informed the Agency that, as Iran had not been certain about the success of its procurement efforts, the design of the hot cell(s) had not been included in the preliminary drawings of the IR-40 Research Reactor.

74. In its letter of 21 October 2003, Iran acknowledged that two hot cells had been foreseen for this project. However, according to the information provided in that letter, neither the design nor detailed information about the dimensions or the actual layout of the hot cells were available at the present time, since they did not know the characteristics of the manipulators and shielded windows for the hot cells which they could procure. Iran indicated in that letter that manipulators would be needed for: 4 hot cells for the production of medical radioisotopes, 2 hot cells for the production of Co-60 and Ir-192 sources, 3 hot cells for waste processing, and 10 back-up manipulators. The 21 October 2003 letter included a drawing of a building which Iran said would contain hot cells for the production of isotopes. In the meeting on 1 November 2003, upon further Agency inquiry, Iran confirmed that there were tentative plans to construct at the Arak site an additional building with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. Iran stated that that first building was to contain hot cells for the production of “short lived” isotopes, and that it intended to construct the other building to produce “long lived” radioisotopes. Iran agreed to provide preliminary design information for the second building.

75. Agency experts will examine in detail all of the available information with a view to making a technical assessment of the explanations provided by Iran concerning the prospective use of the hot cells at Arak and the associated equipment and manipulators.

### **Heavy water production capacity and inventory**

76. According to Iranian statements, the estimated annual need for heavy water at the IR-40 is less than 1 t. In a 19 August 2003 letter to the Agency, Iran provided additional information on the amount of heavy water initially needed for the reactor (approximately 80–90 t), and on the design capacity of

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<sup>6</sup> Excess reactivity is the maximum deviation from criticality attainable at any time by adjustment of the reactor’s control rods.

the heavy water production plant under construction at Khondab near Arak (8 t of heavy water per year with expansion capabilities to twice its design capacity). According to the information provided in that letter, Iran plans to start the production of heavy water in 2004. In that letter, Iran stated further that laboratory scale experiments to produce heavy water had been conducted in Esfahan in the 1980s using electrolysis techniques.

77. In a meeting held on 29 October 2003, Iran confirmed that the construction of a second production line, with a production capacity of 8 t, had been started. It was further stated that the Khondab facility was actually a pilot plant, and that no laboratory or other experiments using the Girdler-Sulphide method (to be used at the Arak facility) had been carried out in the past in Iran.

## LIST OF LOCATIONS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS

LOCATION	AS OF NOVEMBER 2003	STATUS
<b>TEHRAN NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTRE</b>	Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)	Operating
	Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)	Constructed, but not operating
	*Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)	Operating
	*Waste Handling Facility (WHF)	Operating
<b>TEHRAN</b>	*Kalaye Electric Company	Dismantled pilot enrichment facility
<b>BUSHEHR</b>	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)	Under construction
<b>ESFAHAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CENTRE</b>	Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)	Operating
	Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)	Operating
	Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWSPR)	Operating
	Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL)	Operating
	Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL)	Closed down
	Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)	Under construction, first process units being commissioned for operation
	Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR)	Decommissioned
	*Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)	In detailed design stage, construction to begin in 2004
<b>NATANZ</b>	*Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)	Operating
	*Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)	Under construction



<b>KARAJ</b>	*Radioactive Waste Storage	Under construction, but partially operating
<b>LASHKAR AB'AD</b>	*Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant	Dismantled
<b>ARAK</b>	*Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40)	In detailed design phase
	*Hot cell facility for production of radioisotopes	In preliminary design stage
	*Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)	Under construction Not subject to Safeguards Agreement
<b>ANARAK</b>	*Waste storage site	Waste to be transferred to JHL

\* Locations declared in 2003

## MAP OF IRAN



## ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

AEOI	Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
AUC	ammonium uranyl carbonate
AVLIS	atomic vapour laser isotope separation
BNPP	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Bushehr
CO	carbon monoxide
CSL	Comprehensive Separation Laboratory, TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad
CVL	copper vapour laser
DIV	design information verification
ENTC	Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre
FEP	Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz
FFL	Fuel Fabrication Laboratory, ENTC
FMP	Fuel Manufacturing Plant, ENTC
GSCR	Graphite, Sub-Critical Reactor, ENTC
HEU	high enriched uranium
HWPP	Heavy Water Production Plant, Arak
HWSPR	Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, ENTC
ICR	inventory change report
IR-40	Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, Arak
JHL	Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories, TNRC
LEU	low enriched uranium
LSL	Laser Separation Laboratory, TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad
LWSCR	Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor, ENTC
MBR	material balance report
MIX Facility	Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Facility, TNRC
MLIS	molecular laser isotope separation
MNSR	Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, ENTC
PFEP	Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz
PIL	physical inventory listing

SF <sub>6</sub>	sulphur hexafluoride
TNRC	Tehran Nuclear Research Centre
TRR	Tehran Research Reactor, Tehran
UCF	Uranium Conversion Facility, ENTC
UCL	Uranium Chemistry Laboratory, ENTC
UF <sub>4</sub>	uranium tetrachloride
UF <sub>6</sub>	uranium hexafluoride
UO <sub>2</sub>	uranium dioxide
UO <sub>3</sub>	uranium trioxide
U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	urano-uranic oxide
UOC	uranium ore concentrate
WHF	Waste Handling Facility, TNRC
WSF	Waste Storage Facility, Karaj



## Board of Governors

**GOV/2004/49**

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Item 8(e) of the agenda  
(GOV/2004/45)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

## Resolution adopted by the Board on 18 June 2004

The Board of Governors.

- (a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004 (GOV/2004/21), 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81), and on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69) and the statement by the Board of 19 June 2003 (GOV/OR.1072),
- (b) Noting with appreciation the Director General's report of 1 June 2004 (GOV/2004/34), on the implementation of safeguards in Iran,
- (c) Reiterating its appreciation that Iran has continued to act as if its Additional Protocol were in force, and noting with satisfaction that Iran has submitted to the Agency the initial declarations pursuant to that Protocol,
- (d) Noting, however, that Iran has yet to ratify the Protocol as called for in previous Board resolutions,
- (e) Recalling Iran's voluntary decisions to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to permit the Agency to verify that suspension; noting with concern that, as detailed in the Director General's report, this verification was delayed in some cases, and that the suspension is not yet comprehensive because of the continued production of centrifuge equipment; also noting with concern that Iran's decision to proceed with the generation of UF<sub>6</sub> is at variance with the Agency's previous understanding as to the scope of Iran's decision regarding suspension; and further noting that Iran has withheld 10 assembled centrifuge rotors for research activities,
- (f) Encouraged by the Director General's assessment that there has been good progress on the actions agreed during the Director General's visit to Tehran in early April 2004 and that the Agency continues to make progress in gaining a comprehensive understanding of Iran's nuclear programme, but noting with concern that after almost two years from when Iran's undeclared programme came to the Agency's knowledge a number of questions remain outstanding, and in particular two questions that are key to understanding the extent and nature of Iran's enrichment

programme: the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran and the extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the P-2 advanced centrifuge design,

(g) Noting in this context with serious concern that important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has often been forthcoming only after repeated requests, and in some cases has been incomplete and continues to lack the necessary clarity and also that the information provided to date relating to contamination issues has not been adequate to resolve this complex matter,

(h) Noting with appreciation that the Agency has received some information from other states that may be helpful in resolving some contamination questions,

(i) Noting with concern that the Agency's investigations have revealed further omissions in the statements made by Iran, including in the October declaration, in particular concerning the importation of P-2 components from abroad and concerning laser enrichment tests, which have produced samples enriched up to 15%, and also that Agency experts have raised questions and doubts regarding the explanations provided by Iran concerning those programmes, which require further clarification,

(j) Recognising the inalienable right of states to the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, consistent with their treaty obligations, with due consideration for the needs of the developing countries,

(k) Stressing the need for effective safeguards in order to prevent the use of nuclear material for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards agreements and underlining the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, and

(l) Acknowledging the statement by the Director General on 14 June that it is essential for the integrity and credibility of the inspection process to bring these issues to a close within the next few months,

1. Acknowledges that Iranian cooperation has resulted in Agency access to all requested locations, including four workshops belonging to the Defence Industries Organisation;
2. Deplores, at the same time, the fact that, overall, as indicated by the Director General's written and oral reports, Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been, and, in particular, that Iran postponed until mid-April visits originally scheduled for mid-March - including visits of Agency centrifuge experts to a number of locations involved in Iran's P-2 centrifuge enrichment programme - resulting in some cases in a delay in the taking of environmental samples and their analysis;
3. Underlines that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data and persons; and calls on Iran to continue and intensify its cooperation so that the Agency may provide the international community with required assurances about Iran's nuclear activities;
4. Calls on Iran to take all necessary steps on an urgent basis to help resolve all outstanding questions, especially that of LEU and HEU contamination found at various locations in Iran, including by providing additional relevant information about the origin of the components in question and explanations about the presence of a cluster of 36% HEU particles; and also the question of the nature and scope of Iran's P-2 centrifuge programme, including by providing full documentation and explanations at the request of the Agency;

5. Welcomes Iran's submission of the declarations under Articles 2 and 3 of its Additional Protocol; and stresses the importance of Iran complying with the deadlines for further declarations required by Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol, and that all such declarations should be correct and complete;
6. Emphasises the importance of Iran continuing to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to provide reassurance to the international community about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme; and urges Iran to ratify without delay its Protocol;
7. Recalls that in previous resolutions the Board called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities; welcomes Iran's voluntary decisions in that respect; regrets that those commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings, and to remove the existing variance in relation to the Agency's understanding of the scope of Iran's decisions regarding suspension, including by refraining from the production of UF<sub>6</sub> and from all production of centrifuge components, as well as to enable the Agency to verify fully the suspension;
8. In the context of Iran's voluntary decisions to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, calls on Iran, as a further confidence-building measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and also, as an additional confidence building measure, to reconsider its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore international confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
9. Recalls that the full and prompt cooperation with the Agency of all third countries is essential in the clarification of certain outstanding questions, notably contamination;
10. Commends the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement Iran's safeguards agreement, and, pending its entry into force, Iran's Additional Protocol, as well as to verify Iran's suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and to investigate supply routes and sources;
11. Requests the Director General to report well in advance of the September Board - or earlier if appropriate - on these issues as well as on the implementation of this and prior resolutions on Iran; and
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.



## Board of Governors

**GOV/2005/77**

Date: 24 September 2005

Original: English

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**For official use only**

Item 6(d) of the agenda  
(GOV/2005/70)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

## Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005

### The Board of Governors.

- (a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 11 August 2005 (GOV/2005/64), 29 November 2004 (GOV/2004/90), 18 September 2004 (GOV/2004/79), 18 June 2004 (GOV/2004/49), 13 March 2004 (GOV/2004/21), 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) and on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69), the statement of the Board of 19 June 2003 (GOV/OR.1072) and the Chairman of the Board's conclusions of March 2005 (GOV/OR.1122) and of June 2005 (GOV/OR.1130),
- (b) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
- (c) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
- (d) Recalling Iran's failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 214) with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored, as reported by the Director General in his report GOV/2003/75 dated 10 November 2003 and confirmed in GOV/2005/67, dated 2 September 2005,
- (e) Recalling also that, as deplored by the Board in its resolution GOV/2003/81, Iran's policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement,



- (f) Recalling that the Director General in his report to the Board on 2 September 2005 noted that good progress has been made in Iran's correction of the breaches and in the Agency's ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran's current declarations,
- (g) Noting that, as reported by the Director General, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation and that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue,
- (h) Uncertain of Iran's motives in failing to make important declarations over an extended period of time and in pursuing a policy of concealment up to October 2003,
- (i) Concerned by continuing gaps in the Agency's understanding of proliferation sensitive aspects of Iran's nuclear programme,
- (j) Recalling the emphasis placed in past resolutions on the importance of confidence building measures and that past resolutions have reaffirmed that the full and sustained implementation of the suspension notified to the Director General on 14 November 2004, as a voluntary, non legally binding confidence building measure, to be verified by the Agency, is essential to addressing outstanding issues,
- (k) Deploring the fact that Iran has to date failed to heed the call by the Board in its resolution of 11 August 2005 to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities including the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the Uranium Conversion Facility,
- (l) Also concerned that Iran has to date failed to heed repeated calls to ratify the Additional Protocol and to reconsider its decision to construct a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as these measures would have helped build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme,
- (m) Noting that the Director General reported that the Agency "continues to follow up on information pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities that could be relevant to that programme" and that "the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited" (GOV/2005/67),
- (n) Endorsing the Director General's description of this as a special verification case, and
- (o) Noting that the Agency is still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
1. Finds that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute;
  2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities referred to in the Director General's report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

3. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous Resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his report of 2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67) to the Board. The Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article III.B.4;
4. In order to help the Director General to resolve outstanding questions and provide the necessary assurances, urges Iran:
  - (i) To implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General in his report, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations;
  - (ii) To re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity, as in GOV/2005/64, and reprocessing activity;
  - (iii) To reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
  - (iv) Promptly to ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
  - (v) Pending completion of the ratification of the Additional Protocol to continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
5. Calls on Iran to observe fully its commitments and to return to the negotiating process that has made good progress in the last two years;
6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement provisionally the Additional Protocol to that Agreement, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities, and to compensate for the confidence deficit created; and
7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2006/14**

Date: 4 February 2006

Original: English

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The adopted agenda  
(GOV/2006/13)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

**Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006**

The Board of Governors.

- (a) Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,
- (b) Recalling also the Director General's reports,
- (c) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,
- (d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,
- (e) Recalling the Director General's description of this as a special verification case,
- (f) Recalling that in reports referred to above, the Director General noted that after nearly three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
- (g) Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002,
- (h) Recalling that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues (GOV/2005/67),

- (i) Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area (as indicated by the Director General in GOV/2005/67),
- (j) Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General reported (GOV/2005/87) that Iran possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms,
- (k) Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran,
- (l) Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and
- (m) Recognising that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realising the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
1. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for Iran to:
- re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
  - reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
  - ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
  - pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
  - implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;
2. Requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;
3. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and, noting that the decision to put this document under Agency seal is a positive step, requests Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;
4. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;



5. Calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Iran's intentions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous Resolutions, and outstanding issues; and to reconsider its position in relation to confidence-building measures, which are voluntary, and non legally binding, and to adopt a constructive approach in relation to negotiations that can result in increased confidence;
6. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable and overdue, and in particular to help the Agency clarify possible activities which could have a military nuclear dimension;
7. Underlines that the Agency's work on verifying Iran's declarations is ongoing and requests the Director General to continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with a view to providing credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities;
8. Requests the Director General to report on the implementation of this and previous resolutions to the next regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and immediately thereafter to convey, together with any Resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security Council; and
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2006/15**

Date: 27 February 2006

Original: English

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**For official use only**

Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2006/8)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. A meeting of the Board of Governors was held from 2 to 4 February 2006 to discuss the implementation of the Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>1</sup> The meeting was called in response to the announcement by Iran of its decision to resume from 9 January 2006 “R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension.”<sup>2</sup>

2. On 4 February 2006, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution (GOV/2006/14) in paragraph 1 of which it, inter alia, underlined that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deemed it necessary for Iran to:

- re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
- reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
- ratify promptly and implement in full the Additional Protocol;
- pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003;
- implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement

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<sup>1</sup> INFCIRC/214.

<sup>2</sup> See GOV/2006/11.

and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may require in support of its ongoing investigations.

3. As requested by the Board in paragraph 2 of that resolution, on 4 February 2006, the Director General reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that the steps set out in paragraph 1 of the resolution were required of Iran by the Board and reported to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue.

4. In paragraph 8 of GOV/2006/14, the Board also requested the Director General to report on the implementation of that resolution, and previous resolutions, to the next regular session of the Board, for its consideration, and immediately thereafter to convey, together with any resolution from the March Board, that report to the Security Council.

5. This report is being submitted to the Board in response to its request in paragraph 8 of GOV/2006/14.<sup>3</sup> It provides an update on the developments that have taken place since November 2005, and an update of the Agency's September 2005 overall assessment, in connection with the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran and on the Agency's verification of Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

## **A. Developments since November 2005**

### **A.1. Enrichment Programme**

6. As detailed in the Director General's report of 18 November 2005 (GOV/2005/87), during meetings that took place in October and November 2005, the Agency requested Iran to provide additional information on certain aspects of its enrichment programme. Responses to some of these requests were provided during discussions held in Tehran from 25 to 29 January 2006 between Iranian officials and an Agency team headed by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG). Another Agency team visited Iran from 12 to 14 February 2006 to further discuss, inter alia, the outstanding issues related to both uranium enrichment and the plutonium experiments. On 26 February 2006, the DDG-SG visited Iran again to discuss with Iranian authorities issues related to the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) and the so-called Green Salt Project (see paras 33–39 below).

#### **A.1.1. Contamination**

7. As part of its assessment of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations concerning its enrichment activities, the Agency is continuing to investigate the source(s) of low enriched uranium

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<sup>3</sup> The initial report to the Board of Governors on this matter was provided by the Director General orally at the Board's meeting on 17 March 2003. The Director General has since then submitted 16 written reports to the Board: GOV/2003/40, dated 6 June 2003; GOV/2003/63, dated 26 August 2003; GOV/2003/75, dated 10 November 2003; GOV/2004/11, dated 24 February 2004; GOV/2004/34, dated 1 June 2004, and Corr.1, dated 18 June 2004; GOV/2004/60, dated 1 September 2004; GOV/2004/83, dated 15 November 2004; INFCIRC/648, dated 1 August 2005; GOV/2005/61, dated 8 August 2005; GOV/2005/62, dated 10 August 2005; GOV/2005/67, dated 2 September 2005; GOV/INF/2005/13, dated 2 November 2005; GOV/2005/87, dated 18 November 2005; GOV/INF/2006/1, dated 3 January 2006; GOV/INF/2006/2, dated 10 January 2006; and GOV/INF/2006/3, dated 6 February 2006. In addition, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards made oral statements to the Board on 1 March 2005 (GOV/OR.1119), 16 June 2005 (GOV/OR.1130) and 2 February 2006.

(LEU) particles, and some high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, which were found at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used and/or stored.<sup>4</sup>

8. As reported by the Director General in November 2005,<sup>5</sup> the analysis of the environmental samples collected at a location in a Member State where, according to Iran, the centrifuge components had been stored by the procurement network in the mid-1990s prior to their shipment to Iran, did not indicate any traces of nuclear material. This could be explained, for example, by the fact that the storage locations had changed ownership and been renovated over the past decade, and the components had mainly been stored in their original packing.

9. To further understand the source of some of the contamination found in Iran, the Agency sampled in December 2005 a centrifuge which had been received by a Member State from the procurement network. The results of the analysis of those samples, together with earlier findings,<sup>6</sup> tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the HEU contamination. However, the origin of some HEU particles, and of the LEU particles, remains to be further investigated. The Agency is awaiting additional information from another Member State from which contaminated components originated.

10. Due to the fact that it is difficult to establish a definitive conclusion with respect to the origin of all of the contamination, it is essential to make progress on the scope and chronology of Iran's experiments with UF<sub>6</sub> in its centrifuge enrichment programme.

#### **A.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 centrifuge technology**

11. As previously reported to the Board,<sup>7</sup> the Agency was shown by Iran in January 2005 a copy of a handwritten one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. The document concerned the possible supply of a disassembled centrifuge (including drawings, descriptions and specifications for the production of centrifuges); drawings, specifications and calculations for a "complete plant"; and materials for 2000 centrifuge machines. The document also made reference to: auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment; a complete set of workshop equipment for mechanical, electrical and electronic support; and uranium re-conversion and casting capabilities. Iran has declined the Agency's request for a copy of the one-page document.

12. On 25 January 2006, Iran reiterated that that document was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and content of the 1987 offer, attributing this to the secret nature of the programme and the management style of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) at that time. Iran stated that no other written evidence exists, such as meeting minutes, administrative documents, reports, personal notebooks or the like, to substantiate its statements concerning that offer.

13. Iran has maintained that only some components of one or two disassembled centrifuges, and supporting drawings and specifications, were delivered by the network, but that a number of other items of equipment referred to in the document were purchased directly from other suppliers.<sup>8</sup>

14. During the Agency's visit to Iran between 12 and 14 February 2006, Iran provided some clarification of supporting documentation previously shown to the Agency concerning items procured

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<sup>4</sup> GOV/2005/67, paras 9–12.

<sup>5</sup> GOV/2005/87, para. 3.

<sup>6</sup> GOV/2005/67, para. 12.

<sup>7</sup> GOV/2005/67, para. 14.

<sup>8</sup> GOV/2005/87, paras 5–6.



by Iran. Iran also showed the Agency delivery documents for most of the items said to have been purchased directly by Iran from other suppliers, which tend to confirm the Iranian statement concerning its acquisition of those items.

15. As previously reported to the Board,<sup>9</sup> according to Iran, there were no contacts by Iran with the network between 1987 and mid-1993. Statements made by Iran and key members of the network about the events leading to the mid-1990s offer are still at variance with each other. In this context, Iran has been requested to provide further clarification of the timing and purpose of certain trips taken by AEOI staff members in the mid-1990s.

16. Iran has said it is unable to supply any documentation or other information about the meetings that led to the acquisition of 500 sets of P-1 centrifuge components in the mid-1990s. The Agency is still awaiting clarification of the dates and contents of the shipments.

17. During the Agency's 12–14 February 2006 visit to Iran, no additional information related to the timing of the mid-1990s trips, or to the chronology or contents of the shipments, was made available by Iran. Iran agreed, however, to provide the Agency with further clarifications in writing regarding the latter issue.

### **A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 centrifuge technology**

18. Iran still maintains that, as a result of the discussions held with the intermediaries in the mid-1990s, the intermediaries supplied only drawings for P-2 components containing no supporting specifications, and that no P-2 components were delivered by the intermediaries along with the drawings or thereafter. Iran continues to assert that no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges during the period 1995 to 2002, and that at no time during this period did it ever discuss with the intermediaries the P-2 centrifuge design, or the possible supply of P-2 centrifuge components. In light of information available to the Agency indicating the possible delivery of such components during that period, which information was shared with Iran, Iran was asked in November 2005 to check again whether any deliveries of P-1 or P-2 components had been made after 1995. Iran reiterated to the Agency during its 12–14 February 2006 visit that there had been no such deliveries after 1995.

19. In connection with the research and development (R&D) work on a modified P-2 design, said by Iran to have been carried out by a contracting company between early 2002 and July 2003, Iran has confirmed that the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased, magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design. During the Agency's mid-February 2006 visit, Iran provided some additional clarification about the types of P-2 magnets it had received, but maintained that only a limited number of magnets had been delivered. In response to Agency questioning about Iran's inquiries into the delivery of larger quantities of magnets (900 pieces) from a foreign entity in mid-2003, Iran stated that it had never ordered or received such magnets. The Agency is still awaiting clarification of all of Iran's efforts to acquire such magnets.

## **A.2. Uranium Metal**

20. As reported to the Board in the Director General's report of November 2005,<sup>10</sup> among the documents shown by Iran to the Agency, said to have been the centrifuge enrichment related drawings, specifications and supporting documentation provided by the intermediaries, was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal in small quantities, and

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<sup>9</sup> GOV/2005/87, para. 11.

<sup>10</sup> GOV/2005/87, para. 6.

for the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document was provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI, but it is not able to establish when Iran received the document. Iran has declined the Agency's request to provide it with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency, during its visit in January 2006, to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal. During the visit in mid-February 2006, the Agency again requested a copy of the document in order for the Agency to complete its assessment of the document, which Iran again declined to provide.

21. As described in the Director General's report of November 2004, during the period between 1995 and 2000, Iran conducted a series of experiments to produce uranium metal from UF<sub>4</sub>.<sup>11</sup> Based on the results of the Agency's investigations, it appears that Iran's motivation for conducting uranium reduction experiments was initially to make uranium metal for its laser programme and, later, to develop an alternative process for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).<sup>12</sup> While Iran also made a few simple attempts at casting and machining, neither these nor the reduction experiments appear to have followed the procedures outlined in the 15-page document referred to above.

22. Although there is no indication about the actual use of the document, its existence in Iran is a matter of concern. It is related to uranium re-conversion and casting which was part of the original 1987 offer by the intermediaries but which was not, according to Iran, pursued. However, the Agency is aware that the intermediaries had this document, as well as other similar documents, which the Agency has seen in another Member State. Therefore, it is essential to understand the full scope of the offer made by the network in 1987.

### **A.3. Plutonium Experiments**

23. As indicated earlier,<sup>13</sup> the Agency has been following up with Iran information provided by Iran concerning its plutonium separation experiments.

24. In order to clarify differences between findings by the Agency and statements made by Iran, a number of plutonium discs were brought by the Agency to Vienna for further analysis to determine the exact isotopic composition of the plutonium. The Agency's analysis showed, in particular, that the Pu-240 content measured on eight of the discs was significantly lower than the Pu-240 content of the solution from which the plutonium deposited on the discs was said to have originated.

25. In August 2005, the Agency also conducted detailed verification of unprocessed irradiated UO<sub>2</sub> targets stored in containers in Iran. The results of these non-destructive and destructive analysis measurements indicate that the duration of irradiation was longer than the duration derived from the irradiation parameters provided by Iran.

26. On 6 February 2006, the Agency provided Iran with a summary report of the results of the Agency's analysis of all data available to it as of that date and requested further clarifications in light

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<sup>11</sup> GOV/2004/83, paras 13–22.

<sup>12</sup> The Agency has noted in past reports that the role of uranium metal in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle still needed to be fully understood. Iran has told the Agency that its rationale for such work was the use of uranium metal: for Iran's possible future Magnox reactors; for the production of radiation shielding; as feed material for its laser enrichment programme; for radiation shielding; and to gain know-how in nuclear material production. The rationale given by Iran for the production of depleted uranium metal was to reduce the storage requirements for depleted UF<sub>6</sub>. See GOV/2003/40, paras 20 and 34; GOV/2003/63, paras 20–21; GOV/2003/75, para. 25; GOV/2004/11, para. 15; and GOV/2004/83, para. 20.

<sup>13</sup> GOV/2005/67, paras 21–25.

of the above inconsistencies. During its 12–14 February 2006 visit to Iran, the Agency met with Iranian officials to discuss the Agency's findings; in the course of the discussion, Iran agreed to provide such clarifications. In a letter dated 15 February 2006, Iran provided some clarifications in connection with the issue referred to in paragraph 25 above, which the Agency is now assessing.

#### **A.4. Other Implementation Issues**

27. There are no new developments to report with respect to Iran's uranium mining activities<sup>14</sup> or with respect to Iran's activities involving polonium and beryllium,<sup>15</sup> which the Agency is still assessing.

28. On 19 February 2006, the Agency visited the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) at Arak to carry out design information verification, and confirmed that the civil engineering work was still ongoing. However, according to Iran, the commissioning date for the reactor is likely to be postponed until 2011.

29. On 9 October 2005, the Agency also carried out a design information verification visit at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan. The civil engineering construction of the plant is ongoing; however, the Agency was informed that the commissioning date of 2007, as indicated in the design information provided by Iran, was likely to be postponed.

#### **A.5. Voluntary Implementation of the Additional Protocol**

30. Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency and, until 6 February 2006, implemented the Additional Protocol as if it were in force, including by providing, in a timely manner, the requisite declarations and access to locations. Since November 2005, the Agency has conducted complementary access at three locations.

31. On 6 February 2006, Iran informed the Agency, inter alia, that:<sup>16</sup>

- “1. As stipulated in Para 7 of INFCIRC/666, from the date of this letter, our commitment on implementing safeguards measures will only be based on the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency (INFCIRC/214).
2. From the date of this letter, all voluntarily suspended non-legally binding measures including the provisions of the Additional Protocol and even beyond that will be suspended.

Therefore based on the above mentioned, it is requested the following measures be taken by the Agency:

- a. The Agency's inspector presence in the Islamic Republic of Iran for the verification activities should be scheduled only on the basis of the Safeguards Agreement.
- b. All the Agency's containment and surveillance measures which were in place beyond the normal Agency safeguards measures should be removed by mid February 2006.

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<sup>14</sup> GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31.

<sup>15</sup> GOV/2005/67, para. 34.

<sup>16</sup> GOV/INF/2006/3.

- c. From now on, the regular channels of communication (code 1.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement) should only be through the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA in Vienna.”

## **A.6. Transparency Visits and Discussions**

32. On 1 November 2005, the Agency was given access to a military site at Parchin where several environmental samples were taken.<sup>17</sup> The Agency did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited, and the results of the analysis of environmental samples did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations.

33. Since 2004, the Agency has been awaiting additional information and clarifications related to efforts made by the PHRC, which had been established at Lavisan-Shian,<sup>18</sup> to acquire dual use materials and equipment that could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion activities. The Agency also requested interviews with the individuals involved in the acquisition of those items, including the former Head of the PHRC.

34. In that connection, on 26 January 2006, Iran presented to the Agency documentation on efforts by Iran, which it has stated were unsuccessful, to acquire a number of specific dual use items (electric drive equipment, power supply equipment and laser equipment, including a dye laser). Iran stated that, although the documentation suggested the involvement of the PHRC, the equipment had actually been intended for a laboratory at a technical university where the Head of the PHRC worked as a professor. Iran declined to make him available to the Agency for an interview. The Secretariat reiterated its request to interview the professor, explaining that it was essential for a better understanding of the envisioned and actual use of the equipment in question, as well as other equipment that could be relevant to uranium enrichment (balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment).

35. As indicated by the DDG-SG in his February 2006 statement to the Board, in January 2006, the Agency presented to Iran a list of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to see the equipment in situ, and to be permitted to take environmental samples from it. Some of the equipment on the Agency's list was presented to the Agency at a technical university, and environmental samples were taken from it, the results of which are still pending. The Agency subsequently wrote to Iran requesting additional clarifications regarding the procurement efforts of the PHRC and the relationship between the PHRC and the technical university. During the Agency's visit in mid-February 2006, Iran declined to discuss this matter further.

36. On 26 February 2006, the Agency met in Iran with the former Head of the PHRC, referred to above. He stated that the electric drive equipment, the power supply equipment, the laser equipment and the vacuum equipment had been used for R&D in various departments of the university. The professor explained that his expertise and connections, as well as resources available at his office in the PHRC, had been used for the procurement of equipment for the technical university. He was not aware, however, of the type of research in which other professors at the university were engaged. To the best of his knowledge, the vacuum equipment referred to above had been ordered for the physics department of the university. In this connection, Iran stated that this equipment had been used for vacuum coating, and was currently being utilized for nano technology applications. The Agency is

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<sup>17</sup> GOV/2005/87, para. 16.

<sup>18</sup> According to Iran, the PHRC was established at Lavisan-Shian in 1989, inter alia, to “support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence” (see GOV/2004/60, para. 43).



assessing this information. Iran also agreed to provide the requested clarifications in relation to the balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment.

37. As also indicated by the DDG-SG in his February 2006 statement to the Board, in January 2006, Iran provided additional clarification of its efforts in 2000 to procure some other dual use material (high strength aluminium, special steel, titanium and special oils), as had been discussed in January 2005. High strength aluminium was presented to the Agency, and environmental samples were taken therefrom. Iran stated that the material had been acquired for aircraft manufacturing, but that it had not been used because of its specifications. Iran agreed to provide additional information on inquiries concerning the purchase of special steels, titanium and special oils. Iran also presented information on Iran's acquisition of corrosion resistant steel, valves and filters, which were made available to the Agency on 31 January 2006 for environmental sampling. The results of the environmental samples are still pending.

38. On 5 December 2005, the Secretariat repeated its request for a meeting to discuss information that had been made available to the Secretariat about alleged studies, known as the Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF<sub>4</sub> (often referred to as "green salt"), as well as tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could involve nuclear material and which appear to have administrative interconnections. On 16 December 2005, Iran replied that the "issues related to baseless allegations." Iran agreed on 23 January 2006 to a meeting with the DDG-SG for the clarification of the alleged Green Salt Project, but declined to address the other topics during that meeting. In the course of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the Agency presented for Iran's review a copy of a process flow diagram related to bench scale conversion and a number of communications related to the project. Iran reiterated that all national nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the allegations were baseless and that it would provide further clarifications later.

39. On 26 February 2006, the DDG-SG met with Iranian authorities to discuss the alleged Green Salt Project. Iran repeated that the allegations "are based on false and fabricated documents so they were baseless," and that neither such a project nor such studies exist or did exist. It stated that all national efforts had been devoted to the UCF project, and that it would not make sense to develop indigenous capabilities to produce UF<sub>4</sub> when such technology had already been acquired from abroad. According to information provided earlier by Iran, the company alleged to have been associated with the so-called Green Salt Project had, however, been involved in procurement for UCF and in the design and construction of the Gchine ore processing plant.

40. The Agency is assessing this and other information available to it, and is waiting for Iran to address the other topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, as mentioned above.

## **A.7. Suspension**

41. In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006, "those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension".<sup>19</sup> On 7 January 2006, the Agency received a letter from Iran requesting that the Agency remove seals applied at Natanz, Farayand Technique and Pars Trash for the monitoring of suspension of enrichment related

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<sup>19</sup> GOV/INF/2006/1.

activities.<sup>20</sup> The seals were removed by Iran on 10 and 11 January 2006 in the presence of Agency inspectors.

42. Since the removal of the seals, Iran has begun substantial renovation of the gas handling system at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz. Iran has also informed the Agency that quality control of components, and some rotor testing, was being carried out at Farayand Technique and at Natanz. Due to the fact that no centrifuge related raw materials and components are under Agency seal, the Agency is unable effectively to monitor the R&D activities being carried out by Iran except at PFEP, where containment and surveillance measures are being applied to the enrichment process. On 29 January 2006, the two cylinders at PFEP containing UF<sub>6</sub> from which seals had been removed on 10 January 2006 were again placed under Agency containment and surveillance.

43. On 8 February 2006, updated design information for PFEP and for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) were received by the Agency. Equipment such as process tanks and an autoclave are currently being moved into the FEP; commencement of the installation of the first 3000 P-1 machines at FEP is planned for the fourth quarter of 2006.

44. On 11 February 2006, Iran started enrichment tests by feeding a single P-1 machine with UF<sub>6</sub> gas. At that time, other single P-1 machines were ready for operation and a 10-machine cascade was undergoing vacuum tests. The feeding of the 10-machine cascade was begun on 15 February 2006, and, on 22 February 2006, a 20-machine cascade was subjected to vacuum testing. The enrichment process at PFEP is covered by Agency safeguards containment and surveillance measures.

45. In the letter received from Iran on 6 February 2006, referred to in paragraph 31 above, Iran stated, *inter alia*, that the implementation of safeguards measures would only be based on its NPT Safeguards Agreement and requested that “[a]ll the Agency’s containment and surveillance measures which were in place beyond the normal Agency safeguards measures should be removed by mid February 2006.”<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, on 12 February 2006, the Agency modified the containment and surveillance measures at UCF. The UF<sub>6</sub> filling stations, all filled UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and all UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF, however, remain under Agency safeguards containment and surveillance measures. The uranium conversion campaign which was begun at UCF in November 2005 is continuing and is now expected to end in April 2006. Since September 2005, approximately 85 metric tons of UF<sub>6</sub> has been produced at UCF.

## **B. Current overall assessment**

46. A detailed overall assessment of Iran’s nuclear programme and the Agency’s efforts to verify Iran’s declarations with respect to that programme was provided by the Director General in November 2004<sup>22</sup> and again in September 2005.<sup>23</sup> As indicated in those reports, Iran has made substantial efforts over the past two decades to master an independent nuclear fuel cycle, and, to that end, has conducted experiments to acquire the know-how for almost every aspect of the fuel cycle. Many aspects of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research, had not been declared to the Agency in accordance with Iran’s

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<sup>20</sup> GOV/INF/2006/2.

<sup>21</sup> GOV/INF/2006/3.

<sup>22</sup> GOV/2004/83, paras 106–114.

<sup>23</sup> GOV/2005/67, paras 42–52.

obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. Iran's policy of concealment continued until October 2003, and resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement, as summarized in the Director General's report of September 2005.<sup>24</sup>

47. Since October 2003, Iran has taken corrective actions with respect to those breaches. The Agency has been able to confirm certain aspects of Iran's current declarations, in particular in connection with uranium conversion activities, laser enrichment, fuel fabrication and the heavy water research reactor programme, which the Agency has been following up as routine implementation matters under Iran's Safeguards Agreement and, until 6 February 2006, its Additional Protocol.

48. Two important issues were identified in the Director General's November 2004 report as relevant to the Agency's efforts to provide assurance that there are no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran, specifically: the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs.

49. With respect to the first issue — contamination — as indicated above, based on the information currently available to the Agency, the results of the environmental sample analysis tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of most of the observed HEU contamination. It is still not possible at this time, however, to establish a definitive conclusion with respect to all of the contamination, particularly the LEU contamination. This underscores the importance of additional information on the scope and chronology of Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes, which could greatly contribute to the resolution of the remaining contamination issues.

50. With respect to the second issue — the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes — although some progress has been made since November 2004 in the verification of statements by Iran regarding the chronology of its centrifuge enrichment programme, the Agency has not yet been able to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's statements concerning those programmes. While Iran has provided further clarifications, and access to additional documentation, concerning the 1987 and mid-1990s offers related to the P-1 design, the Agency's investigation of the supply network indicates that Iran should have additional supporting information that could be useful in this regard. Iran has also been asked to provide additional details on the process that led to Iran's decision in 1985 to pursue centrifuge enrichment and on the steps leading to its acquisition of centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987. However, Iran maintains that no information, other than that already provided to the Agency, exists.

51. No additional information or documentation has been provided with respect to Iran's statement that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002. As indicated above, Iran has been requested to search for more information, and any supporting documentation, relevant to the P-2 programme, in particular with regard to the scope of the original offer in connection with the P-2 centrifuge design and Iran's acquisition of items linked to that programme. Iran, however, maintains that no such information exists.

52. The Agency continues to follow up on all information pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities. Although absent some nexus to nuclear material the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited, the Agency has continued to seek Iran's cooperation as a matter of transparency in following up on reports related to equipment, materials and activities which have applications both in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area. In this regard, Iran has permitted the Agency to visit defence related sites at Kolahdouz, Lavisian and Parchin. The Agency did not observe any

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<sup>24</sup> GOV/2005/67, paras 4–8.

unusual activities in the buildings visited at Kolehduz and Parchin, and the results of environmental sampling did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations. The Agency is still assessing the available information, and awaiting other additional information, in relation to the Lavisan site and the PHRC.

53. As indicated to the Board in November 2004, and again in September 2005, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for. Although the Agency has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Agency is not at this point in time in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The process of drawing such a conclusion, under normal circumstances, is a time consuming process even with an Additional Protocol in force. In the case of Iran, this conclusion can be expected to take even longer in light of the undeclared nature of Iran's past nuclear programme, and in particular because of the inadequacy of information available on its centrifuge enrichment programme, the existence of a generic document related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components, and the lack of clarification about the role of the military in Iran's nuclear programme, including, as mentioned above, about recent information available to the Agency concerning alleged weapon studies that could involve nuclear material.

54. It is regrettable, and a matter of concern, that the above uncertainties related to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme have not been clarified after three years of intensive Agency verification. In order to clarify these uncertainties, Iran's full transparency is still essential. Without full transparency that extends beyond the formal legal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol — transparency that could only be achieved through Iran's active cooperation — the Agency's ability to reconstruct the history of Iran's past programme and to verify the correctness and completeness of the statements made by Iran, particularly with regard to its centrifuge enrichment programme, will be limited, and questions about the past and current direction of Iran's nuclear programme will continue to be raised. Such transparency should primarily include access to, and cooperation by, relevant individuals; access to documentation related to procurement and dual use equipment; and access to certain military owned workshops and R&D locations that the Agency may need to visit in the future as part of its investigation.

55. The Agency will pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear programme, and the Director General will continue to report to the Board as appropriate.





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### Resolution 1696 (2006)

#### Adopted by the Security Council at its 5500th meeting, on 31 July 2006

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Noting* with serious concern the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,

*Noting* with serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

*Noting* with serious concern the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,

*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's report of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38) Iran has not taken the steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, reiterated by the Council in its statement of 29 March and which are essential to build confidence, and in particular Iran's decision to resume enrichment-related activities, including research and development, its recent expansion of and announcements about such activities, and its continued suspension of cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol,



*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere,

*Welcoming* the statement by the Foreign Minister of France, Philippe Douste-Blazy, on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and the High Representative of the European Union, in Paris on 12 July 2006 (S/2006/573),

*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme, *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and *being determined* to prevent an aggravation of the situation,

*Acting* under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA,

1. *Calls upon* Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

2. *Demands*, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA;

3. *Expresses* the conviction that such suspension as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, *underlines* the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, *encourages* Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and *stresses* that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

4. *Endorses*, in this regard, the proposals of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, for a long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme (S/2006/521);

5. *Calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes;

6. *Expresses* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commends and encourages* the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the Agency, *underlines* the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, and *calls upon* Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the

Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the IAEA may request in support of its ongoing investigations;

7. *Requests* by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

8. *Expresses* its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and *underlines* that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

9. *Confirms* that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event that Iran complies with this resolution;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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## Board of Governors

**GOV/2006/53**

Date: 31 August 2006

Original: English

### **For official use only**

Item 8(c) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2006/50)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 8 June 2006, the Director General reported on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2006/38). This report covers developments since that date.
2. On 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1696 (2006), which, inter alia,
  - called upon Iran without further delay to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;
  - demanded, in this context, that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
  - underlined the necessity of the Agency continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;
  - called upon Iran to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol and to implement without delay all transparency measures as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations; and
  - requested by 31 August a report from the Director General primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration.
3. This report is being submitted to the Board and in parallel to the Security Council.



## **A. Suspension of Enrichment Related Activities**

4. Iran has continued the testing of P-1 centrifuges in the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Since 6 June 2006, centrifuges in the single machine test stand and in the 10-machine and 20-machine cascades have been run mostly under vacuum, but with the feeding of UF<sub>6</sub> into single machines of the 20-machine cascade for short periods of time. Between 6 and 8 June 2006, the 164-machine cascade was also tested with UF<sub>6</sub>. Further testing of the 164-machine cascade with UF<sub>6</sub> was carried out between 23 June and 8 July 2006. During these tests, a total of approximately 6 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into the machines and enriched to various levels of U-235. The feeding of UF<sub>6</sub> into the 164-machine cascade was resumed on 24 August 2006.

5. In June 2006, Iran stated that it had achieved enrichment levels of 5% U-235 in a test run in the 164-machine cascade. Iran provided measurement results from the on-line mass spectrometer to substantiate this statement. The Agency collected environmental samples, the results of which are still pending. Iran has refused the Agency access to operating records concerning product and tail assays which the Agency requires to complete its auditing activities. However, on 30 August 2006, Iran provided the Agency with some information about product assays, which the Agency is currently assessing.

6. The installation of a second 164-machine cascade is proceeding. Iran has informed the Agency that it expects to be able to run the cascade under vacuum in September 2006. In August 2006, the Agency installed additional cameras to monitor this cascade. The Agency has also proposed the implementation of remote monitoring to compensate for the fact that measures normally used for verification at operational enrichment facilities (e.g. limited frequency unannounced access) are not feasible at PFEP. However, Iran continues to decline to discuss the implementation of remote monitoring at PFEP.

7. On 26 July 2006, design information verification (DIV) was carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, where construction was ongoing. In the course of the inspectors' visit to Iran between 11 and 16 August 2006, Iran declined to provide the Agency with access to carry out DIV at FEP, stating that the frequency of DIV activities was, in its view, too high and that the Agency had performed 3 DIVs there in 2003, 3 DIVs in 2004, 15 DIVs in 2005 and 12 DIVs as of August 2006. Iran also expressed concern about the frequency of DIV at PFEP, the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40). The Agency explained that DIV was an ongoing and continuing process, and that it is carried out during all construction, commissioning, operation and subsequent phases of a facility to establish the safeguards measures to be implemented and to ensure that there are no undeclared design features which would permit the diversion of nuclear material. Between December 2003 and February 2006, the Agency, with the consent of Iran, also took advantage of DIV activities to monitor Iran's suspension of enrichment activities. The Agency explained that DIV also enables the Director General to fulfil the reporting requirements set by the Board of Governors and the Security Council. Between 26 and 30 August 2006, Iran allowed the Agency access to carry out DIV at FEP and at the other facilities mentioned above.

## **B. Suspension of Reprocessing Activities**

8. The Agency has been monitoring the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility, and the construction of hot cells at the IR-40, through inspections, DIV and satellite imagery. There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran.

## **C. Heavy Water Research Reactor**

9. On 12 July and 30 August 2006, the Agency carried out DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. Construction of the facility is continuing.

## **D. Outstanding Issues**

10. As indicated in the Director General's report of April 2006 (GOV/2006/27, para. 6), on 27 April 2006, the Agency received from Iran a letter in which it was stated that "Iran is fully prepared to continue granting the Agency's inspection in accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards provided that the Iran's nuclear dossier will remain, in full, in the framework of the Agency and under its safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to resolve the remaining outstanding issues reflected in [the Director General's] report GOV/2006/15 of 27 February 2006, in accordance with the international laws and norms. In this regard, Iran will provide a time table within next three weeks." No such timetable has as yet been received.

### **D.1. Enrichment Programme**

#### **D.1.1. Contamination**

11. There has been no further progress on the resolution of the contamination issue (GOV/2006/27, paras 8–9). As mentioned in the Director General's last report (GOV/2006/38, para. 4), given the difficulty of establishing a definitive conclusion in connection with this long outstanding issue, a full understanding of the scope and chronology of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme, as well as full implementation of the Additional Protocol, are necessary for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. These are also essential for clarification of the source of the uranium particle contamination found at the technical university, as discussed in paragraph 24 below.

#### **D.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology**

12. The Agency has continued its investigation of the outstanding questions related to Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes (GOV/2006/27, paras 10–14). However, Iran has not made any new information available to the Agency.

13. As indicated in the Director General's last report, following public statements made by high level Iranian officials that Iran was conducting research on new types of centrifuges, the Agency wrote to Iran on 24 April 2006 seeking clarification of the scope and content of such research (GOV/2006/38, para. 6). On 16 June 2006, the Agency received from Iran a letter stating, inter alia, that Iran was studying different types of centrifuge machines, and that this was "an ongoing and progressing R&D activity without using nuclear materials."

### **D.2. Uranium Metal**

14. The Agency is carrying out investigations on information and documentation which may have been provided to Iran by foreign intermediaries (GOV/2006/27, paras 15–16; GOV/2006/38, para. 7). To understand the full scope of the offers made by the intermediaries to Iran, it is still necessary for the Agency to have a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres (first mentioned in GOV/2005/87, para. 6). Iran continued to decline the Agency's request to have a copy of the document, but had agreed to allow the Agency to review the document, to take notes from it and to keep it under seal in Iran. In the course of a visit to Iran

in mid-August 2006, Agency inspectors continued their examination of the document. However, Iran informed the inspectors that the taking of notes would not be permitted, and the notes which had been taken thus far by the inspectors during that visit had to be destroyed. The document remains under seal in Iran.

### **D.3. Plutonium Experiments**

15. The Agency has continued to seek clarification from Iran about its plutonium separation experiments (GOV/2006/38, paras 8–9). Since the Director General's last report, the Agency has been able to evaluate the explanations provided by Iran in June and examine the copy of the notebook kept by the researcher responsible for the plutonium experiments, and has concluded that they did not provide sufficient clarification of the outstanding issues. In an effort to acquire further information about the irradiation parameters, the Agency also met, on 11 July 2006, with a reactor operator and the researcher, who also did not provide the data necessary to clarify the issues. Iran has stated that no other relevant information is available.

16. In a letter dated 10 August 2006, the Agency informed Iran that, given the information received from Iran to date, the Agency would not be able to resolve the outstanding inconsistencies unless additional information were made available by Iran.

17. The depleted uranium targets which had been irradiated in the course of the plutonium experiments are stored in containers located at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility (GOV/2005/67, para. 24). On 8 August 2005, the Agency took environmental samples from one of those containers. The results from their analysis, recently finalized by the Agency, indicate the presence of high enriched uranium particles. On 15 August 2006, Iran was requested to provide information about the source of the contamination and the past use of the containers.

## **E. Other Implementation Issues**

### **E.1. Uranium Conversion**

18. Since the Director General's last report to the Board, the Agency has completed its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) of nuclear material at UCF carried out between 20 and 24 May 2006 (GOV/2006/38, para. 11). The Agency concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with similar size conversion plants.

19. In April 2006, the movement of a 48X UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder<sup>1</sup> by the operator into and out of one of the withdrawal stations without prior notification to the Agency resulted in a loss of continuity of knowledge of nuclear material in the process. However, in light of the results of the PIV, the Agency will continue to follow up on this question as a routine part of its verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations.

20. On 27 June 2006, Iran provided the Agency with the anticipated operational programme for UCF, including details of the new conversion campaign involving approximately 160 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate which was begun on 6 June 2006 and is expected to be completed by January 2007. As of 25 August 2006, approximately 26 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced during this campaign. All UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF remains under Agency containment and surveillance. In a

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<sup>1</sup> A standard 48X cylinder is capable of containing up to 9.5 tonnes of UF<sub>6</sub>.

letter dated 18 July 2006, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to build at UCF a “standby” process line for converting ammonium uranyl carbonate to  $UO_2$ .

## **E.2. Other Matters**

21. On 8 July 2006, DIV was carried out at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan. Iran informed the inspectors that full commissioning of the FMP is scheduled for 2007. The civil engineering construction of the facility is approximately 80% completed and equipment is being installed.

22. There are no new developments to report with respect to the other implementation issues referred to in the previous report (GOV/2006/38, para. 14; GOV/2006/27, paras 19 and 20).

23. Between the end of July 2006 and 29 August 2006, Iran declined to provide one-year multiple entry visas to designated Agency inspectors as agreed to by Iran in the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. On 30 August 2006, Iran provided such visas for two inspectors, and on 31 August 2006 informed the Agency that “following the normal administration process the multiple one year visa for remaining designated inspectors will be issued by 10 September 2006”.

## **F. Transparency Measures**

24. Analysis of the environmental samples taken from equipment at a technical university in January 2006, referred to in paragraph 25 of GOV/2006/27, showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium. This equipment had been shown to the Agency in connection with its investigation into efforts made by the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) to acquire dual use material and equipment (GOV/2006/27, paras 24–25).

25. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s requests for clarification concerning, and access to carry out environmental sampling of, other equipment and materials related to the PHRC. Nor has Iran provided the Agency with access to interview the other former Head of the PHRC. As noted in GOV/2006/38, paragraph 17, the clarification and access sought by the Agency have taken on added importance in light of the results of the environmental sampling referred to in the previous paragraph.

26. The Agency has continued to follow up on information concerning studies related to the so-called Green Salt Project, to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/27, paras 27–29). However, Iran has not expressed any readiness to discuss these topics since the issuance of the Director General’s report in February 2006 (GOV/2006/15, paras 38–39).

## **G. Summary**

27. Iran has been providing the Agency with access to nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required reports. Although Iran has provided the Agency with some information concerning product assays at PFEP, Iran continues to decline Agency access to certain operating records at PFEP.

28. Iran has not addressed the long outstanding verification issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its activities. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities; nor has Iran acted in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.

29. The Agency will continue to pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran’s nuclear activities. However, the Agency remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations with a view to confirming the



peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2006/64**

Date: 14 November 2006

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Item 4(d) of the agenda  
(GOV/2006/68)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 31 August 2006, the Director General reported on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2006/53). This report covers developments since that date.

## **A. Suspension of Enrichment Related Activities**

2. Since 31 August 2006, centrifuges in the single machine test stand, and the 10-machine, 20-machine and first 164-machine cascades at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) have been run, mostly under vacuum, with UF<sub>6</sub> being fed during intermittent periods. The installation of the second 164-machine cascade was completed and, on 13 October 2006, testing of the cascade with UF<sub>6</sub> gas was begun. Between 13 August and 2 November 2006, a total of approximately 34 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> was reported by Iran as having been fed into the centrifuges and enriched to levels below 5% U-235.

3. Between 16 and 18 September 2006, the Agency performed a physical inventory verification (PIV) at PFEP, the evaluation of which remains open pending receipt of sample results.

4. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken by the Agency to confirm Iran's statement in June 2006 that it had achieved enrichment levels of 5% U-235 in a test run in the first 164-machine cascade at PFEP are still pending (GOV/2006/53, para. 5). Iran has not provided the Agency full access to operating records concerning product and tail assays which the Agency requires to complete its auditing activities.

5. Iran continues to decline to discuss the implementation of remote monitoring at PFEP, a proposal made by the Agency to compensate for the fact that measures normally used for verification at operational enrichment facilities (e.g. limited frequency unannounced access) are not feasible at PFEP (GOV/2006/53, para. 6).

6. On 5 November 2006, design information verification (DIV) was carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, where construction was ongoing.

## **B. Suspension of Reprocessing Activities**

7. The Agency has been monitoring the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility, and the construction of hot cells at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40), through inspections, DIV and satellite imagery. There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities at those facilities, or at any other declared facilities in Iran.

## **C. Heavy Water Research Reactor**

8. Since 31 August 2006, the Agency has been monitoring through satellite imagery the construction of the IR-40 reactor, which, along with the construction of associated buildings, has been continuing.

## **D. Outstanding Issues**

9. On 16 October 2006, the Agency wrote to Iran referring to the long outstanding verification issues relevant to Iran's nuclear activities, and to the fact that Iran had not addressed those issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its nuclear activities. In its letter, the Agency urged Iran to provide all the necessary information and required access to facilitate the resolution of all long outstanding verification issues. In its reply of 1 November 2006, Iran stated, *inter alia*, that it "is prepared to remove ambiguities, if any, and gives access and information in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement". With regard to the outstanding issues, Iran referred to its letter of 27 April 2006, in which it had "declare[d] its preparedness to resolve the remaining issues providing timetable, within next three weeks, provided that the nuclear dossier is returned back in full in the framework of the Agency".

### **D.1. Enrichment Programme**

#### **D.1.1. Contamination**

10. There has been no further progress on the resolution of the contamination issues referred to in GOV/2006/53, para. 11 (i.e. the sources of low enriched uranium particles, and some high enriched uranium (HEU) particles, found at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used and/or stored). In addition, clarification is still required of the particles of natural and high enriched uranium which were found in the samples taken from equipment at a technical university in January 2006 (GOV/2006/53, para. 24).

#### **D.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology**

11. Iran has not made available to the Agency any new information concerning Iran's P-1 or P-2 centrifuge programme (GOV/2006/53, paras 12–13).

### **D.2. Uranium Metal**

12. Iran has still not provided a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres (GOV/2005/87, para. 6). The document was resealed by the Agency in August 2006.

### **D.3. Plutonium Experiments**

13. The Agency has continued to seek clarification from Iran about its plutonium separation experiments (GOV/2006/53, paras 15–17). Iran has not provided sufficient clarification of the outstanding issues concerning these experiments and has stated that no other relevant information is available.

14. As reflected in the Director General's previous report (GOV/2006/53, para. 17), the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility (where containers which had been used to store depleted uranium targets used in the experiments are located) indicate the presence of HEU particles. In response to the Agency's request of 15 August 2006 for information about the source of the particles, and about the past use of the containers, Iran informed the Agency in a letter dated 6 September 2006 that the containers had been used for the temporary storage of spent fuel from TRR, which, in its view, could explain the presence of the HEU particles. Additional samples have been taken from other containers, located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, which had also been used to store spent fuel from TRR. The results from these samples are still pending.

15. Under cover of the Agency's letter of 16 October 2006 (referred to in para. 9 above), Iran was provided with a detailed assessment of the results of further analysis of the samples taken from the containers at Karaj, and was requested to provide further clarification of the presence of the HEU particles and clarification of an additional finding of plutonium in the samples. On 13 November 2006, Iran provided a response to that request, which the Agency is currently assessing.

## **E. Other Implementation Issues**

### **E.1. Uranium Conversion**

16. In June 2006, Iran started at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) a uranium conversion campaign involving approximately 160 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate. As of 7 November 2006, approximately 55 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced during this campaign. All UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

### **E.2. Other Matters**

17. There are no new developments to report with respect to the other implementation issues referred to in previous reports (GOV/2006/38, para. 14; GOV/2006/27, paras 19–20).

## **F. Transparency Measures**

18. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency's long outstanding requests for clarification concerning, and access to carry out further environmental sampling of, equipment and materials related to the Physics Research Centre (PHRC); nor has Iran provided the Agency with access to interview another former Head of the PHRC.

19. Iran has not expressed any readiness to discuss information concerning alleged studies related to the so-called Green Salt Project, to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/53, para. 26).

## **G. Summary**

20. Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with such material and facilities. However, Iran has not provided the Agency with full access to operating records at PFEP.



21. While the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, the Agency will remain unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues, including through the implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provides the necessary transparency. Progress in this regard is a prerequisite for the Agency to be able to confirm the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

22. The Agency will continue to pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear activities, and the Director General will continue to report as appropriate.



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### Resolution 1737 (2006)

#### Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on 23 December 2006

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Reiterating* its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,

*Reiterating* its serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

*Reiterating* its serious concern over the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,

*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution

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\* Reissued for technical reasons.



1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and *welcoming* the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,

*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,

*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Affirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

2. *Decides*, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:

(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and

(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;

3. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:

(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;

(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:

(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;

(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;

(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;

(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

4. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;

(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;

5. *Decides* that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:

(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and

(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and

(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;

6. *Decides* that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;



7. *Decides* that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

8. *Decides* that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and *calls upon* Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

9. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran's technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:

(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and

(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

10. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and *decides* in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein "the Annex"), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;

11. *Underlines* that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

12. *Decides* that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such

time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and *decides further* that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;

13. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;

(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

14. *Decides* that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

15. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:

(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;

(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;

and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization;

16. *Decides* that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;

17. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

18. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;

(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;

(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;

(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;

(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;

19. *Decides* that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;

20. *Expresses* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, *underlines* the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, *encourages* Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and *stresses* that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

21. *Welcomes* the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;

22. *Reiterates* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commends* and *encourages* the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, *underlines* the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;

23. *Requests* within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

24. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and *underlines* that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

25. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



## **Annex**

### **A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme**

1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Arak)
3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear programme)

### **B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme**

1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate entity of AIO)

### **C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme**

1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
5. Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the production of valves for centrifuges)
6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company
7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted experiments on beryllium)

### **D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme**

1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)
2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO

3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO

**E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes**

1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)
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### Resolution 1747 (2007)

#### Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on 24 March 2007

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and *reaffirming* their provisions,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Recalling* its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),

*Recalling* the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of 22 February 2007 and *deploring* that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),

*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and *welcoming* the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,

*Recalling* the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such



time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

*Recalling* the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,

*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, *affirms* its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

2. *Calls upon* all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and *decides* in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein "the Committee") of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;

3. *Underlines* that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

4. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;

5. *Decides* that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;



6. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of arms;

7. *Calls upon* all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;

8. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;

9. *Expresses* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, *underlines* the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, *encourages* Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and *stresses* that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

10. *Welcomes* the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and *encourages* Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and *acknowledges* with appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;

11. *Reiterates* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commends and encourages* the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, *underlines* the necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;

12. *Requests* within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian

compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

13. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## Annex I

### Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran's centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran's (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran's nuclear programme)
4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition, explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEOI's research division)
6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran's nuclear programme)
7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group) (Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles including cruise missiles)
8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment on AIO's behalf for the missile programme)
10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in international purchases of missile equipment)

### Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities

1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171, used by IRGC Air Force)
3. Sho'a' Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

**Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities**

1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)
2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)
3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center, which is part of the AEOI's Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran's ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme. The Shahab-3 is Iran's long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah, which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG, both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

**Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons**

1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)
2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)
4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)
5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)
7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)



## Annex II

### Elements of a long-term agreement

Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We propose a fresh start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an agreement would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and endorsed in a Security Council resolution.

To create the right conditions for negotiations,

We will:

- Reaffirm Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
- Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT.
- Agree to suspend discussion of Iran's nuclear programme in the Security Council upon the resumption of negotiations.

Iran will:

- Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full cooperation with IAEA.
- Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council, and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
- Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.

### Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a long-term agreement

#### 1. Nuclear

We will take the following steps:

##### Iran's rights to nuclear energy

- Reaffirm Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and cooperate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power programme.
- Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement.

### **Light water reactors**

- Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power reactors safe against earthquakes.
- Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.

### **Research and development in nuclear energy**

- Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation, including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture.

### **Fuel guarantees**

- Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
  - Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran's nuclear reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) produced in Iran.
  - Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of up to five years' supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with the participation and under supervision of IAEA.
  - Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next meeting of the Board of Governors.

### **Review of moratorium**

The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow:

- Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it, including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have been resolved;
- Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's civil nuclear programme has been restored.

## **2. Political and economic**

### **Regional security cooperation**

Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues.

**International trade and investment**

Improving Iran's access to the international economy, markets and capital, through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran (including a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to key goods and technology.

**Civil aviation**

Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to Iran, thereby widening the prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.

**Energy partnership**

Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.

**Telecommunications infrastructure**

Support for the modernization of Iran's telecommunication infrastructure and advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States and other export restrictions.

**High technology cooperation**

Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.

**Agriculture**

Support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to United States and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment.



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**Resolution 1803 (2008)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5848th meeting,  
on 3 March 2008**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and *reaffirming* their provisions,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Recalling* the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

*Noting* with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA's right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, *emphasizing* that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency's right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right,





which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

*Reiterating* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commending* the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme in the work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), *welcoming* the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the IAEA Director General's reports of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), *underlining* the importance of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of Iran's declaration,

*Expressing* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

*Stressing* that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and *noting* the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Having regard* to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,

*Welcoming* the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),

*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to

build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, *affirms* its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and *underlines* that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

2. *Welcomes* the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General's report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), *encourages* the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, *stresses* that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and *supports* the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran's nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

3. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and *decides* in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein "the Committee") of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

4. *Underlines* that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

5. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

6. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified

on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

8. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

9. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

10. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

11. *Calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

12. *Requires* all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a

written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

13. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

14. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

15. *Stresses* the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;

16. *Encourages* the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;

17. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

18. *Requests* within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

19. *Reaffirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;



(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

20. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

#### **Annex I**

1. Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)
2. Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
3. Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining Affairs)
4. Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)
5. Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)
6. Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research Institute)
7. Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak)
8. M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))
9. Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)
10. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))
11. Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
12. Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
13. Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine)

**Annex II****A. Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)**

1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
3. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)

**B. Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)**

1. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
2. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center, which is part of the AEOI's Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

**Annex III**

1. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge components)
2. Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
4. Ettihad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
5. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)
6. Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
7. Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
8. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of centrifuges components)
9. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)
10. Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
11. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
12. TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established, including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2007/22**

Date: 23 May 2007

Original: English

### **For official use only**

Item 6(e) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2007/18)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions<sup>1</sup> in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 24 March 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1747 (2007), in which the Council, inter alia:
  - re-affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) shall without further delay take the steps required by the Board of Governors in resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirmed its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006); and
  - requested within 60 days a report from the Director General on whether Iran had established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the Board of Governors and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), to the Board and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration.
2. This report, which is being submitted to the Board, and in parallel to the Security Council, covers developments since the Director General's report of 22 February 2007<sup>2</sup> on the implementation in Iran of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions.

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<sup>1</sup> Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007).

<sup>2</sup> GOV/2007/8.

## **A. Enrichment Related Activities**

3. Since 22 February 2007, Iran continued to test single machines, as well as the 10- and 20-machine cascades and the two 164-machine cascades (one of which Iran has since disconnected), at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between 21 February and 17 March 2007, Iran fed 4.8 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> into the single machines and the 10-machine cascade.

4. In the light of the increasing number of installed centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP),<sup>3</sup> on 22 March 2007, Iran agreed to a modified safeguards approach for that facility which includes, in addition to a monthly interim inspection and design information verification visit, a combination of, inter alia, unannounced inspections and containment and surveillance measures (GOV/INF/2007/10). The first unannounced inspection was carried out on 13 May 2007.

5. Since the Director General's last report, Iran has fed approximately 260 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> into the cascades at FEP. Iran has declared that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, which the Agency is in the process of verifying. On 13 May 2007, eight 164-machine cascades were operating simultaneously and were being fed with UF<sub>6</sub>; two other similar cascades had been vacuum tested and three more were under construction.

6. Since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, including pursuant to the Additional Protocol, for example information relevant to the assembly of centrifuges, the manufacture of centrifuge components or associated equipment and research and development of centrifuges or enrichment techniques.

## **B. Reprocessing Activities**

7. The Agency has been monitoring the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and at the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) through inspections and design information verification. There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing activities at those facilities. The follow-up on the construction of hot cells at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor) at Arak has been limited, however, to the analysis of satellite imagery since, as of 13 April 2007, Iran has not provided the Agency with access to the reactor site to carry out design information verification (GOV/INF/2007/10) (see Section E.2 below).

## **C. Heavy Water Related Projects**

8. Satellite imagery indicates that civil construction of the IR-40 reactor and the operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant are continuing.

## **D. Outstanding Issues**

9. Iran has not responded to the Agency's long standing requests related to:
- the uranium contamination at the Physics Research Centre (GOV/2007/8, paras 16–17);
  - Iran's acquisition of P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology (GOV/2007/8, para. 18); and
  - the documentation concerning uranium metal and its casting into hemispheres (GOV/2007/8, para. 19).

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<sup>3</sup> GOV/2007/8, para. 8.



10. On 18 April and 2 May 2007, Iran provided information regarding the two leaking reactor fuel assemblies taken from TRR that, according to Iran, were the source of the high enriched uranium contamination found in environmental samples taken at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility (GOV/2007/8, para. 21). The Agency is currently analysing this information.

## **E. Other Implementation Issues**

### **E.1. Uranium Conversion**

11. The Agency conducted the annual physical inventory verification (PIV) at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in March 2007. During the PIV, Iran presented 269 tonnes of UF<sub>6</sub> for Agency verification, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance measures. The Agency is evaluating the results of the PIV.

### **E.2. Design Information**

12. On 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had “suspended” the implementation of the modified Code 3.1, which had been “accepted in 2003, but not yet ratified by the parliament”, and that it would “revert” to the implementation of the 1976 version of Code 3.1, which only requires the submission of design information for new facilities “normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time.” In a letter dated 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision.<sup>4</sup>

13. Iran has taken issue with the Agency’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1 concerning the IR-40 reactor at Arak.<sup>5</sup> The basis for Iran’s contention is that, under the 1976 version of Code 3.1, to which it had “reverted”, the verification of such information is not justified, given the preliminary construction stage of the facility (described as “far beyond receiving nuclear material”) and the Agency’s previous activities at Arak.

14. In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be modified unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in Subsidiary Arrangements. Moreover, Code 3.1 is related to the provision of design information, not to the frequency or timing of verification by the Agency of such information. The Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right,<sup>6</sup> which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility.

### **E.3. Other Matters**

15. On 29 April 2007, Iran informed the Agency that the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) would receive natural uranium oxide powder soon in preparation for “preliminary process tests”.

16. There are a number of other matters about which the Agency has received no new information, such as Iran’s uranium mining activities (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31), its experiments involving polonium (GOV/2005/67, para. 34), and the designation of inspectors to Iran (GOV/2007/8, para. 23).

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<sup>4</sup> Both letters are reproduced in GOV/INF/2007/8.

<sup>5</sup> Iran’s letters are dated 13 April 2007, 25 April 2007, and 14 May 2007; the Agency’s replies are dated 18 April 2007 (GOV/INF/2007/10) and 7 May 2007.

<sup>6</sup> GOV/2554/Att.2/Rev. 2.

The Director General will report further on these matters as and when the Agency receives any such information.

## **F. Transparency Measures**

17. Iran has not agreed to any of the required transparency measures, which are essential for the clarification of certain aspects of the scope and nature of its nuclear programme. These measures include discussions about information provided to the Agency concerning alleged studies related to the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF<sub>4</sub>, to high explosives testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2007/8, para. 25).

## **G. Summary**

18. Although the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, the Agency remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountability reports in connection with declared nuclear material and facilities. Iran has, however, ceased to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements with respect to the early provision of design information, and has not permitted the Agency to perform design information verification at the IR-40 reactor.

19. As previously stated, unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues, and implements the Additional Protocol and the required transparency measures, the Agency will not be able to fully reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme and provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme. It should be noted that because the Agency has not been receiving for over a year information that Iran used to provide, including under the Additional Protocol, the Agency's level of knowledge of certain aspects of Iran's nuclear related activities has deteriorated.

20. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation of PFEP. It has also continued with the construction of FEP and has started feeding cascades with UF<sub>6</sub>. Iran has also continued with its heavy water related projects. Construction of the IR-40 reactor and the operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant are continuing.

21. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2007/48**

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Original: English

### **For official use only**

Item 7(d) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2007/38)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 23 May 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/22). The report was submitted in parallel to the Security Council pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007). This report covers developments regarding the implementation in Iran of its NPT Safeguards Agreement since May 2007.

2. On 24 June 2007, the Director General met with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran (SNSC). During that meeting, it was agreed that, within the following 60 days, a plan should be developed on modalities for resolving the remaining safeguards implementation issues, including the long outstanding issues (GOV/2007/22, para. 9). The modalities were discussed in meetings, led by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the Deputy Secretary of the SNSC, which took place on 11–12 July 2007 and 20–21 August 2007 in Tehran, and on 24 July 2007 in Vienna. On 21 August 2007, a plan (hereinafter referred to as the “work plan”), which includes understandings between the Secretariat and Iran on the modalities, procedures and timelines for resolving these matters, was finalized. A copy of that work plan (issued also as INFCIRC/711, 27 August 2007) is attached hereto.

## **A. Enrichment Related Activities**

3. Since May 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10- and 20-machine cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between 17 March and 22 July 2007, Iran fed 14 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> into the single machines; there was no feeding of nuclear material into the cascades.

4. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 690 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> into the cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), which is well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest enrichment level measured from environmental samples taken so far by the Agency from cascade components and related equipment is 3.7%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy, which is necessary to confirm the

actual enrichment level, will be carried out when the product and tails are withdrawn from the cascades. As of 19 August 2007, twelve 164-machine cascades were operating simultaneously and were being fed with UF<sub>6</sub>; one other cascade was operating without UF<sub>6</sub>; another cascade was being vacuum tested; and two more were under construction.

5. Since 22 March 2007, the Agency has implemented safeguards at FEP through interim inspections, design information verification, unannounced inspections and the use of containment and surveillance measures (GOV/INF/2007/10). To date, four unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.

6. The Agency provided Iran with a draft document detailing the safeguards approach for FEP and a draft Facility Attachment on 24 and 26 July 2007, respectively. The documents were discussed during a technical meeting in Tehran held on 6–8 August 2007. Further discussions will be held with the aim of finalizing the Facility Attachment by the end of September 2007.

## **B. Reprocessing Activities**

7. The Agency has been monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 reactor) through inspections and design information verification. There are no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.

## **C. Heavy Water Related Projects**

8. As agreed by Iran on 12 July 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the IR-40 reactor on 30 July 2007, and noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. Satellite imagery indicates that the operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant was also continuing.

## **D. Outstanding Issues**

### **D.1. Plutonium Experiments**

9. As agreed in the meeting of 11–12 July 2007, the Agency provided Iran in writing on 1 August 2007 with the remaining open questions regarding plutonium separation experiments carried out by Iran at TRR (GOV/2007/8, paras 20–21). On 7 August 2007, during a technical meeting in Tehran, Iran provided additional information on the neutron flux distribution for the reactor core and reflector/moderator regions, details about earlier neutron flux measurements and information on the irradiation conditions. Using this additional information, the Agency made revised estimates of the Pu-240 abundance that could be expected from irradiation of the targets. The revised estimates derived from this new information were not inconsistent with the Agency's previous findings from samples taken during its investigations. Taking all available information into account, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements concerning these experiments are consistent with the Agency's findings with respect to the dates, and quantities and types of material involved in the experiments (GOV/2006/53, paras 15–16). This issue is therefore considered resolved.

10. In the meeting on 7 August 2007, the presence and origin of high enriched uranium (HEU) particle contamination found in samples taken from the spent fuel containers at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility (GOV/2006/53, para. 17) was addressed. Iran has maintained that the reason for the contamination was leaking TRR fuel assemblies, which had in the past been stored temporarily in these containers. During the meeting, Iran presented a copy of a report describing its investigations into the fuel leakage problem at TRR, in connection with which Agency technical support had been



provided in the early 1990s. Based on this information, the Agency has concluded that the main sources of irradiated HEU in the coolant system likely included both leaks from the fuel itself and irradiated HEU contamination from the surface of the fuel cladding. It can be further estimated that the natural uranium content in the cooling water of TRR was sufficient to dilute the level of enrichment of the HEU particles to that found in the Agency's samples taken from the containers at Karaj. Iran also provided information on the burnup and the uranium mass for all fuel assemblies at the time of the intermediate and final fuel discharges. The data indicate that several control fuel assemblies had in fact leaked, and that the stated burnup matched that calculated for a majority of the HEU particles. The Agency has concluded, therefore, that the statements of Iran are not inconsistent with the Agency's findings, and now considers this issue as resolved.

## **D.2. Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge Technology**

11. In order to complete its investigation of the scope and nature of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme, the Agency needs access to additional information (GOV/2006/27, paras 10–13). This includes information related to the acquisition of P-1 technology in 1987, and P-1 and P-2 technology in the mid-1990s, as well as appropriate supporting documentation and clarifications by relevant individuals. The Agency is still waiting for, inter alia: a copy of a handwritten offer made to Iran by the network in 1987; clarification of the dates and contents of shipments in the mid-1990s; and information concerning the purchase of magnets suitable for P-2 centrifuges. Iran has, however, undertaken, as part of the work plan, to provide, over the course of the next two months, answers to written questions from the Agency, as well as clarifications and access to information, such as supporting documentation, with a target date of November 2007 for resolving this issue.

## **D.3. Contamination**

12. As indicated previously to the Board of Governors (GOV/2007/8, paras 16–17; GOV/2006/53, para. 24), analysis of environmental samples taken in January 2006 from equipment purchased by a former Head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) and located at a technical university in Tehran showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium. The Agency has requested clarifications, permission to take samples from other equipment and materials procured by the PHRC and access to another former Head of the PHRC (GOV/2006/53, para. 25). These requests have not yet been acceded to by Iran. However, as reflected in the work plan, Iran has undertaken to hold further discussions on this matter, on the basis of written questions from the Agency, following resolution of the P-1 and P-2 issue.

## **D.4. Uranium Metal Document**

13. To understand the full scope of the offers made by the intermediaries that provided centrifuge enrichment technology to Iran, the Agency has requested a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal and the casting and machining of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres (GOV/2005/87, para. 6). As reflected in the work plan, Iran has now agreed to cooperate in this regard.

## **D.5. Polonium-210**

14. As indicated in the work plan, Iran has agreed to provide the Agency, two weeks after the issue of the provision of a copy of the uranium metal document is resolved, with explanations in connection with the remaining questions concerning Iran's activities involving polonium extraction (GOV/2004/83, paras 79–84).

## **D.6. Gchine Mine**

15. As indicated in the work plan, Iran has agreed to provide the Agency, two weeks after the issue on polonium-210 is resolved, with the requested explanations concerning uranium mining and concentration activities at the Gchine mine and mill (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31).

## **E. Alleged Studies**

16. In order to clarify certain aspects of the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme, the Agency has requested discussions with Iran about alleged studies related to the conversion of uranium dioxide to UF<sub>4</sub>, to high explosive testing and to the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/15, paras 38–40). To that end, the Agency has offered to provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its possession regarding such studies. As indicated in the work plan, while Iran considers the allegations "as politically motivated and baseless", it has undertaken to review the documentation and to inform the Agency of its assessment thereof.

## **F. Other Implementation Issues**

### **F.1. Uranium Conversion**

17. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) of nuclear material at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) carried out in March 2007, and has concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with conversion plants of a similar throughput.

18. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007 following the PIV, approximately 63 t of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced as of 14 August 2007, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

### **F.2. Design Information**

19. As indicated in the Director General's previous report (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), on 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had "suspended" the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, concerning the early provision of design information. In a letter dated 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision (GOV/INF/2007/8). There has been no progress on this issue.

### **F.3. Inspector Designation and Visas**

20. On 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to the designation of five new Agency inspectors (GOV/2007/8, para. 23), bringing the total number of inspectors designated for Iran to 219. Iran also agreed to provide thirteen Agency inspectors with one year multiple entry visas.

### **F.4. Other Matters**

21. On 25 July 2007, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant, at which time it verified a small quantity of natural uranium oxide powder intended as feed material for preliminary process testing. The installation of process equipment is at an advanced stage, but the facility is not yet operational.

## **G. Summary**

22. The Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and facilities. However, the Agency remains unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It should be noted that since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, including pursuant to the Additional Protocol, for example information relevant to ongoing advanced centrifuge research.

23. The work plan is a significant step forward. If Iran finally addresses the long outstanding verification issues, the Agency should be in a position to reconstruct the history of Iran's nuclear programme. Naturally, the key to successful implementation of the agreed work plan is Iran's full and active cooperation with the Agency, and its provision to the Agency of all relevant information and access to all relevant documentation and individuals to enable the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues. To this end, the Agency considers it essential that Iran adheres to the time line defined therein and implements all the necessary safeguards and transparency measures, including the measures provided for in the Additional Protocol.

24. Once Iran's past nuclear programme has been clarified, Iran would need to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present and future nuclear programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally important, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, through the implementation of the Additional Protocol. The Director General therefore again urges Iran to ratify and bring into force the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date, as requested by the Board of Governors and the Security Council.

25. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued with the operation of PFEP, and with the construction and operation of FEP. Iran is also continuing with its construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

26. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

**Understandings**  
  
**of**  
  
**the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA**  
  
**on**  
  
**the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues**  
  
**Tehran – 21 August 2007**

Pursuant to the negotiations between H.E. Dr. Larijani, I. R. of Iran's Secretary of Supreme National Security Council and H.E. Dr. ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, in Vienna; following the initiative and good will of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the agreement made, a high ranking delegation consisting of the directors of technical, legal and political departments of the IAEA, paid a visit to Tehran from 11 to 12 July 2007 during which "Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues, Tehran 12 July 2007" were prepared.

A second meeting took place in Vienna on 24 July 2007 followed by a further meeting in Iran from 20 to 21 August 2007. The Agency's delegation had the opportunity to have meetings with H.E. Dr. Larijani during both visits to Tehran. Following these three consecutive meetings, both Parties reached the following understandings:

**I. Latest Developments:**

Based on the modalities agreed upon on 12 July 2007, the following decisions were made:

**1. Present Issues:**

**A. Enrichment Programme**

The Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate in preparing the safeguards approach for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant in accordance with Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The draft text of the safeguards approach paper, and the facility attachment of IRN- were provided to Iran on 23 July 2007. The safeguards approach and the facility attachment were discussed during technical meetings in Iran between the Agency and the AEOI from 6 to 8 August 2007. Further discussions will be held with the aim of finalizing the facility attachment by the end of September 2007.



## **B. Heavy Water Research Reactor in Arak**

Iran agreed with the Agency's request to visit the heavy water research reactor (IR40) site in Arak. A successful visit took place on 30 July 2007.

## **C. Designation of new inspectors**

On 12 July 2007, Iran accepted the designation of five additional inspectors.

## **D. Issue of multiple entry visas**

On 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to issue one year multiple entry visas for 14 inspectors and staff of the Agency.

## **2. Past Outstanding Issues:**

### **A. Plutonium Experiments**

In order to conclude and close the file of the issue of plutonium (Pu), the Agency provided Iran with the remaining questions on 23 July 2007. During a meeting in Iran between representatives of the Agency and Iran, Iran provided clarifications to the Agency that helped to explain the remaining questions. In addition, on 7 August 2007, Iran sent a letter to the Agency providing additional clarifications to some of the questions. On 20 August 2007 the Agency stated that earlier statements made by Iran are consistent with the Agency's findings, and thus this matter is resolved. This will be communicated officially by the Agency to Iran through a letter.

### **B. Issue of P1-P2:**

Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran and the Agency agreed the following procedural steps to resolve the P1-P2 issue. The proposed timeline assumes that the Agency announces the closure of the Pu-experiments outstanding issue by 31 August 2007, and its subsequent reporting in the Director General's report to the September 2007 Board of Governors.

The Agency will provide all remaining questions on this issue by 31 August 2007. Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran on 24-25 September 2007 to clarify the questions provided. This will be followed up by a further meeting in mid-October 2007 to further clarify the written answers provided. The Agency's target date for the closure of this issue is November 2007.

### **C. Source of Contamination**

Based on the agreed modalities on 12 July 2007 and given the Agency's findings which tend, on balance, to support Iran's statement about the foreign origin of the observed HEU contamination, the

only remaining outstanding issue on contamination is the contamination found at a Technical University in Tehran.

Iran and the Agency agreed on the following procedural steps to address this issue, starting once the P1-P2 issue is concluded and the file is closed. The Agency will again provide Iran with the remaining questions regarding the contamination found at a Technical University in Tehran by 15 September 2007. After 2 weeks of the closure of the P1-P2 issue Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran on this issue.

#### **D. U Metal Document**

Upon the request of the Agency, Iran agreed to cooperate with the Agency in facilitating the comparison of the relevant sections of the document. Iran is presently reviewing the proposals already made during the first meeting on 12 July 2007. After taking this step by Iran, the Agency undertakes to close this issue.

### **II. Modalities of Resolution of other Outstanding Issues**

#### **A. Po210**

Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to deal with this issue, once all the above mentioned issues are concluded and their files are closed. Iran and the Agency agreed upon the following procedural steps: regarding this issue, the Agency will provide Iran in writing with all its remaining questions by 15 September 2007.

After 2 weeks from conclusion and closure of the issues of the source of contamination and U-metal, reflected in the Director General's report to the Board of Governors, Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran where Iran will provide explanations on the Po210.

#### **B. Ghachine Mine**

Based on agreed modalities of 12 July 2007, Iran agreed to deal with this issue, once the issue of Po210 is concluded and its file is closed. Iran and the Agency agreed upon the following procedural steps: regarding this issue, the Agency will provide Iran in writing with all its remaining questions by 15 September 2007.

After 2 weeks from conclusion and closure of the issue of Po210, reflected in the Director General's report to the Board of Governors, Iran and the Agency will have discussions in Iran where Iran will provide explanations to the Agency about Ghachine Mine.

### **III. Alleged Studies**

Iran reiterated that it considers the following alleged studies as politically motivated and baseless allegations. The Agency will however provide Iran with access to the documentation it has in its

possession regarding: the Green Salt Project, the high explosive testing and the missile re-entry vehicle.

As a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment.

#### **IV. General Understandings**

1. These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities.
2. The Agency agreed to provide Iran with all remaining questions according to the above work plan. This means that after receiving the questions, no other questions are left. Iran will provide the Agency with the required clarifications and information.
3. The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities.
4. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use.
5. The Agency and Iran agreed that after the implementation of the above work plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of safeguards in Iran will be conducted in a routine manner.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2007/58**

Date: 15 November 2007

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# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 30 August 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/48 and Corr.1). This report covers the relevant developments since that date.

## **A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues**

2. On 21 August 2007, the Secretariat and Iran reached understandings on a work plan for resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment). Since the previous report, the following progress has been made in the implementation of the work plan.

### **A.1. P-1 and P-2 Centrifuges**

3. The chronology of activities since the previous report is as follows:

- On 31 August 2007, the Agency provided to Iran in writing the outstanding questions relating to the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme;
- On 24 and 25 September 2007, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials to clarify the questions provided to Iran;
- From 9 to 11 October 2007, another meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and the Iranian authorities, at which Iran provided oral answers to the questions and the Agency requested additional clarifications and amplifications;



- On 15 October 2007, the Agency received preliminary written answers to the questions;
- From 20 to 24 October 2007, an Agency technical team visited Tehran to review in detail the answers and supporting documentation, and to interview officials involved in the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme;
- From 29 October to 1 November 2007, the Agency continued discussions with the Iranian authorities on the centrifuge enrichment programme. Iran provided additional supporting documentation and written amplifications and the Agency held discussions and interviews with Iranian officials involved in nuclear activities in the 1980s and 1990s;
- On 5 and 12 November 2007, Iran provided in writing its response to the Agency's questions about the P-1 and P-2 uranium enrichment programme.

### **A.1.1. Acquisition of Fuel Cycle Facilities and Technology 1972–1995**

4. According to Iran, in its early years, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) concluded a number of contracts with entities from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to enable it to acquire nuclear power and a wide range of related nuclear fuel cycle services, but after the 1979 revolution, these contracts with a total value of around \$10 billion were not fulfilled. Iran noted that one of the contracts, signed in 1976, was for the development of a pilot plant for laser enrichment<sup>1</sup>. Senior Iranian officials said that, in the mid-1980s, Iran started working with many countries to revitalize its nuclear programme to meet the State's growing energy needs. Taking advantage of investments already made, Iran said it focused its efforts initially on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, working with entities from, inter alia, Argentina, France, Germany and Spain, but without success. At that time, Iran also initiated efforts to acquire research reactors from Argentina, China, India and the former Soviet Union, but also without success.

5. Parallel to the activities related to nuclear power plants, Iran started to build supporting infrastructure by establishing nuclear technology centres in Esfahan and Karaj. However, apart from uranium conversion technology acquired from an entity in China, Iran was not able to acquire other nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad. As a result, according to Iran, a decision was made in the mid-1980s to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market.

6. To assess the detailed information provided by Iran, the Agency held discussions with senior current and former Iranian officials. The Agency also examined supporting documentation, including Iranian legislation, contracts with foreign companies, agreements with other States and nuclear site surveys.

7. Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the programme and the dual nature of enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based on the information currently available to it, to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the programme. Further light may be shed on this question when other aspects of the work plan have been addressed and when the Agency has been able to verify the completeness of Iran's declarations.

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to the 1976 contract for the laser enrichment pilot plant, concluded with a US company, Iran has reported the conclusion of the following contracts related to laser enrichment (GOV/2004/60, Annex, para. 30):

- 1975 – for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic behaviour of uranium metal (Germany);
- 1991 – for the establishment of a Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory and a Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (China);
- 1998 – to obtain information related to laser enrichment, and the supply of relevant equipment (Russian Federation).

## **A.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 Centrifuge Technology**

### ***The 1987 Offer***

8. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2005/67, paras 14–15), the Agency was shown by Iran in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer for certain components and equipment said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. Iran stated in 2005 that this was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and content of the 1987 offer. On 9 October 2007, the Agency was provided with a copy of the document. Certain aspects of the document indicate that it dates from 1987. However, the originator of the document has still not been identified.

9. On 5 November 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of meetings between Iran and the supply network covering the period 1986 to 1987. Iran maintains that only some components of two disassembled centrifuges, plus supporting drawings and specifications, were delivered in 1987 by the network. Iran reiterated that it did not acquire uranium casting and re-conversion technology or equipment from the network, nor did it ask for the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal, and its casting into hemispheres (GOV/2005/87, para. 6). These points are addressed in A.3 below.

10. According to Iran, the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible additional documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007 with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister, dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister's endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities "should be treated fully confidentially." In response to the Agency's enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.

11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency's independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements are consistent with other information available to the Agency concerning Iran's acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987.

### ***Early Research and Development***

12. Iran has stated that, during the first phase of P-1 research and development (R&D) in 1987–1993, it devoted only limited financial and human resources (three researchers) to the project. According to Iran, emphasis was put on understanding the behaviour of centrifuges and their assembly and on domestic production of components. Iran has also stated that during this period, the R&D work was conducted only by the AEOI, without the support of universities or the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). According to Iran, no contacts were made during this period with the supply network to seek support in solving technical problems which Iran had encountered.

13. Iran's statements about this phase of R&D are not inconsistent with the Agency's findings, which are based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, supporting documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected during the Agency's investigations. However, the role of the technical university at which uranium particle contamination was found still needs to be examined (see A.2 below).

### ***The 1993 Offer and Subsequent R&D***

14. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2006/15, para. 15), statements made by Iran and key members of the supply network about the events leading up to the mid-1990s offer have been at variance with each other. Over the course of meetings held in October 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of events from 1993 to 1999 which clarified certain details concerning meetings, participants and deliveries of P-1 centrifuge equipment by the network during this period.

15. Iran stated again that in 1993 the supply network, on its own initiative, had approached an Iranian company with an offer to sell enrichment technology. This offer was brought to the attention of the Head of Iran's Budget and Planning Organization, who was also a member of the country's Atomic Energy Council. The offer was then further pursued by the AEOI (GOV/2005/67, para. 16).

16. The Agency has so far not been able to confirm Iran's statement that the supply network initiated the 1993 offer. Information provided by Iran on the deliveries and technical meetings after 1993 is consistent with that given to the Agency in interviews with some of the network members. Based on interviews with Libyan officials and supply network members and information from other sources, the Agency has concluded that most of the items related to the 1993 offer had originally been ordered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya but were in fact delivered to Iran in the period 1994–1996.

17. Iran stated that, during the period 1993 to 1999, it was still experiencing difficulty in producing components for P-1 centrifuges and manufacturing reliable P-1 centrifuges. It said that only limited human resources were devoted to the project until 1997 and that, around 1998, additional theoretical and experimental studies were initiated at the Amir Khabir University. Its statements in this regard are supported by the technical questions raised by AEOI staff with the network and procurement information available to the Agency.

18. Iran stated that it successfully tested P-1 centrifuges at the end of the 1990s and that a decision was made to go ahead with larger-scale R&D and eventually with an enrichment plant. To that end, Iran stated that it considered locations at Hashtgerd Karaj, Natanz and Esfahan before deciding to build the enrichment plant at Natanz. During this period, procurement activities were intensified and vacuum equipment, as well as special raw materials such as maraging steel and high strength aluminium, were acquired from abroad. Iran has provided names, locations and activities of the workshops involved in the domestic production of centrifuge components, most of which are owned by military industrial organizations (GOV/2004/11, para. 37). Information provided by Iran on the timing of these purchases and the quantities involved is consistent with the Agency's findings.

### **A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 Centrifuge Technology**

19. Iran has stated that, in order to compensate it for the poor quality of the P-1 centrifuge components provided by the supply network, the network provided Iran at a meeting in Dubai in 1996 with a full set of general P-2 centrifuge drawings. This statement was confirmed to the Agency in interviews with key members of the network.

20. Iran has reiterated that, although the drawings were acquired in 1996, no work on P-2 centrifuges was begun until 2002. According to the former and current senior management of the AEOI, Iran did not yet have the technical and scientific capabilities to master centrifuge manufacturing during this period. The Agency does not have credible procurement related information pointing to the actual acquisition by Iran of P-2 centrifuges or components during this period (an earlier indication which appeared to support this (GOV/2006/15, para. 18) could not be substantiated).

21. In 2002, the AEOI concluded a contract with a private company to manufacture a modified P-2 centrifuge (GOV/2004/11, para. 45). On 5 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the contract, the content of which is consistent with earlier interviews with the company owner, who was not available for interview on this occasion. The contract was terminated in March 2003, but the company owner has stated that he continued to work “on his own initiative” until June 2003.

22. The owner of the company stated in earlier interviews that he was able to obtain all raw materials and minor items, with the exception of bearings, oils and magnets, from domestic sources, which is consistent with the procurement information currently available to the Agency. The owner stated that he acquired 150 magnets with P-2 specifications and attempted to buy tens of thousands more, but these orders were cancelled by the suppliers. The AEOI stated that, after termination of his contract with the AEOI, the company owner sought to secure the supply of additional magnets for the AEOI but that his attempts to do so failed, which is consistent with the information available to the Agency through its investigations. Iran acknowledged that composite rotors for P-2 centrifuges had been manufactured in a workshop situated on a Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) site (GOV/2004/34, para. 22).

23. Based on visits made by Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshop in 2004, examination of the company owner’s contract, progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement enquiries, the Agency has concluded that Iran’s statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D activities are consistent with the Agency’s findings. Environmental samples taken at declared R&D locations and from equipment did not indicate that nuclear material was used in these experiments.

## **A.2. Source of Contamination**

24. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions in writing in connection with the source of uranium particle contamination at the technical university and requested access to relevant documentation and to individuals, as well as to relevant equipment and locations for sample-taking. The questions were, inter alia, about the origin of the uranium particle contamination of equipment (GOV/2006/53, para. 24), the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved (including PHRC). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

## **A.3. Uranium Metal Document**

25. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has reiterated that this document was received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987. The Agency has shared this document with Pakistan, the purported country of origin, and is seeking more information. Iran stated that the reconversion unit with casting equipment mentioned in the one-page 1987 offer was not pursued with the supply network. Apart from the conversion experiments of UF<sub>4</sub> to uranium metal at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (GOV/2004/60 Annex, para. 2), the Agency has seen no indication of any UF<sub>6</sub> reconversion and casting activity in Iran. It should be noted, however, that a small UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal conversion line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was declared by Iran in the design information questionnaire for the UCF (GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, para. 3). This line has not been built, as verified by the Agency’s inspectors.

## **A.4. Polonium-210**

26. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning Iran’s activities involving polonium and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and



equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the scope and objectives of the polonium-210 studies (GOV/2004/11, para. 28), whether any bismuth acquisitions from abroad had been made or attempted and whether any related theoretical or R&D studies had been carried out in Iran. In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

### **A.5. Gchine Mine**

27. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning the Gchine Mine and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the ownership of the mining area and mill, why activities took place at this location when suitable infrastructure was available elsewhere and why AEOI activities at the mine ceased around 1993 (GOV/2005/67, para. 26). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

### **A.6. Alleged Studies**

28. The Agency has urged Iran to address at an early date the alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF<sub>4</sub> (the green salt project), high explosive testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/15, paras 38–39). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should address this topic in the next few weeks. In the meantime, the Agency is working on arrangements for sharing with Iran documents provided by third parties related to the alleged studies.

### **A.7. Facility Attachment for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant**

29. On 17 and 18 September 2007, an Agency technical team discussed with the Iranian authorities details of a draft Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. Further discussions from 20 to 24 September led to the entry into force of the Facility Attachment on 30 September 2007.

## **B. Current Enrichment Related Activities**

30. On 3 November 2007, the Agency verified that Iran had finished installing eighteen 164-machine cascades at FEP and that UF<sub>6</sub> had been fed into all 18 cascades. There has been no installation of centrifuges or centrifuge pipework outside the original 18-cascade area. Work to install feed and withdrawal infrastructure and auxiliary systems is continuing.

31. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 1240 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> into the cascades at FEP. The feed rate has remained below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest U-235 enrichment measured so far from the environmental samples taken by the Agency from cascade components and related equipment is 4.0%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy will be carried out during the annual physical inventory taking which is scheduled from 16 to 19 December 2007. Since March 2007, a total of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.

32. Since August 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10- and 20-machine cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between 23 July and 22 October 2007, Iran fed 5 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> into the single machines; no nuclear material was

fed into the cascades. From 15 to 18 September 2007, the Agency performed a physical inventory verification at PFEP. Although some of the sample results are not yet available, the Agency's provisional evaluation tends to confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran.

33. There have been several press reports about statements by high level Iranian officials concerning R&D and testing of P-2 centrifuges by Iran (GOV/2006/27, para. 14). In a communication to the Agency received on 8 November 2007, Iran wrote: "Iran voluntarily has informed the IAEA on the status of mechanical test (without UF<sub>6</sub> feeding) of new generation of centrifuge design." In the communication, Iran added that it "agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation information" would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007.

## **C. Reprocessing Activities**

34. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.

## **D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects**

35. On 11 November 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the IR-40 and noted that construction of the facility was proceeding. Satellite imagery appears to indicate that the Heavy Water Production Plant is operating. The Agency must rely on satellite imagery of this plant as it does not have routine access to it while the Additional Protocol remains unimplemented.

## **E. Other Implementation Issues**

### **E.1. Uranium Conversion**

36. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007, approximately 78 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced as of 5 November 2007. This brings the total amount of UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 266 tonnes, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

## **E.2. Design Information**

37. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1. (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14)<sup>2</sup>, but there has been no progress on this issue.

## **E.3. Other Matters**

38. The Agency has made arrangements to verify and seal the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr nuclear power plant on 26 November 2007, before shipment of the fuel from the Russian Federation to Iran.

## **F. Summary**

39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear programme is diminishing.

40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme: Iran's past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran's declarations. The Agency intends in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other activities that could have military applications.

42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran's active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.

43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally

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<sup>2</sup> Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part as agreed to in 1976 provides for the submission of design information for new facilities "normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time", in contrast to the modified text agreed to in 2003, which provides for the submission of such information as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction, of such a facility has been taken, whichever is earlier.

importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran's undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the suspension of all enrichment related activities.

44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.



## Board of Governors

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Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2008/6)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 15 November 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/58). This report covers the relevant developments since that date.
2. On 11 and 12 January 2008, the Director General met in Tehran with H.E. Ayatollah A. Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran; H.E. Mr. M. Ahmadinejad, President of Iran; H.E. Mr. G. Aghazadeh, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI); H.E. Mr. M. Mottaki, Foreign Minister; and H.E. Mr. S. Jalili, Secretary, Supreme National Security Council of Iran. The purpose of the visit was to discuss ways and means of implementing all relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council as well as accelerating implementation of the work plan agreed between Iran and the Secretariat on 21 August 2007 aimed at the clarification of outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment).
3. During the discussions, the Iranian leadership stated that the country's nuclear programme had always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons development programme. The Iranian authorities agreed to accelerate implementation of the work plan.

## **A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues**

### **A.1. Source of Contamination**

4. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions relating to the source of the uranium particle contamination found on some equipment at a technical university, the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved, including the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) (GOV/2007/58, para. 24). This equipment was procured by the former head of PHRC, who had also been a professor at the university. He had also procured, or attempted to procure, other equipment, such as balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment, which could be useful in uranium enrichment activities (GOV/2006/27, para. 25).

5. On 10–12 December 2007 and on 15–16 December 2007, meetings took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions and the Agency requested additional clarifications regarding the intended purpose of the equipment, the persons and entities who had requested the items, the recipients, and the use and locations, both past and present, of the equipment. In a follow-up letter dated 18 December 2007, the Agency provided Iran with further details regarding the equipment.

6. In a letter dated 3 January 2008, the Agency reminded Iran that Iran needed to provide additional clarifications to allow a full assessment of the issue of the source of contamination and procurement efforts.

7. In a letter dated 8 January 2008, Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter of 3 January 2008.

#### **A.1.1. Use of Equipment and Source of Contamination**

8. According to Iran, vacuum equipment was procured in 1990 on behalf of the technical university by the former Head of PHRC because of his expertise in procurement and PHRC's business connections. The equipment was intended to be used at the Physics Department of the technical university for the coating of items such as optical mirrors, optical lasers, laser mirrors, resistive layers for solar cells and mirrors for use in medical operating theatres.

9. Iran stated that, upon receipt of the equipment in 1991, it was noticed that the delivery was incomplete and that some incorrect parts had been supplied. The equipment was therefore put into storage at the university. Iran further stated that a number of letters of complaint were written to the supplier company at intervals until 1994, but to no avail.

10. According to Iran, some individual pieces of equipment were used both inside and outside the university during the period 1994–2003 in research, operation and maintenance activities involving vacuum conditions, but other parts of the consignment were never used. As its explanation of how the contamination had come about, Iran said that, in 1998, an individual who was testing used centrifuge components from Pakistan at the laboratory at Vanak Square for the AEOI (GOV/2004/34, para. 31) had asked the vacuum service of the university to come and repair a pump. Iran stated that some items of the vacuum equipment mentioned above were used for this repair activity and that, when these items were eventually brought back to the university, they spread uranium particle contamination.

11. To assess the information provided by Iran, the Agency spoke with the individual from the Vanak Square laboratory and the vacuum technician from the university who had carried out the repairs. The Agency was also shown the pump that had been repaired using the equipment concerned. The Agency made a detailed analysis of the signatures of the contamination of the equipment and

compared them with those of the swipe samples taken from the centrifuge components in Iran which had originated in Pakistan. The Agency concluded that the explanation and supporting documentation provided by Iran regarding the possible source of contamination by uranium particles at the university were not inconsistent with the data currently available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran's declarations.

#### **A.1.2. Procurement activities by the former Head of PHRC**

12. According to Iran, none of the equipment purchased or enquired about by the former Head of PHRC (see para. 4 above) was intended for use in uranium enrichment or conversion related activities, whether for research and development (R&D) or for educational activities in these fields. Procurements and procurement attempts by the former Head of PHRC were said by Iran to have also been made on behalf of other entities of Iran, as described below.

13. Iran stated that the vacuum equipment purchased by the Head of PHRC had been intended for educational purposes in the Vacuum Technique Laboratory of the university, specifically for use in experiments by students on thin layer production using evaporation and vacuum techniques, coating using vacuum systems and leak detection in vacuum systems. To support its statements, Iran presented instruction manuals related to the various experiments, internal communications on the procurement of the equipment and shipping documents. Agency inspectors visited the Vacuum Technique Laboratory and confirmed the presence of the equipment there.

14. Iran stated that some magnets had also been purchased by the Head of the PHRC on behalf of the Physics Department of the university for educational purposes in "Lenz-Faraday experiments". To support this statement, Iran presented a number of documents: instruction manuals related to the experiments; requests for funding which indicated that a decision had been made to approach the Head of PHRC to order and purchase the parts; and an invoice for cash sales from the supplier. Iran stated that the magnets were discarded after being used.

15. According to Iran, the Head of PHRC attempted twice — once successfully — to buy a balancing machine for the Mechanical Engineering Department of the university for educational purposes, such as in the measurement of vibrations and forces in rotating components due to unbalancing. To support Iran's statement, the Agency was shown laboratory experiment procedures, requests about procurement and a letter confirming the completion of the purchase. Agency inspectors visited the Mechanical Engineering Department and confirmed the presence of the balancing machine there.

16. According to Iran, the Head of PHRC also attempted to purchase 45 gas cylinders, each containing 2.2 kg of fluorine, on behalf of the Office of Industrial Interrelations of the university. Iran stated that the intended purpose of the fluorine had been to enhance the chemical stability of polymeric vessels. To support its statements, Iran presented a request to buy fluorine and a communication between the Head of PHRC and the President of the university about the proposed supplier's refusal to deliver the goods.

17. Iran stated that the AEOI had encountered difficulties with procurement because of international sanctions imposed on the country, and that that was why the AEOI had requested the Dean of the university to assist in the procurement of a UF<sub>6</sub> mass spectrometer. According to Iran, in 1988, the Dean of the university approached the Head of the Mechanics Workshop of the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which belonged to the Ministry of Sepah, and asked him to handle the procurement. According to Iran, the mass spectrometer was never delivered. The Head of the Mechanics Workshop, who was later appointed Head of PHRC when it was established in 1989, is the same person involved in the other procurement attempts mentioned above.

18. The Agency took note of the information and supporting documents provided by Iran as well as the statements made by the former Head of PHRC to the Agency and concluded that the replies were not inconsistent with the stated use of the equipment. The role and activities of PHRC will be further addressed in connection with the alleged studies as discussed below.

## **A.2. Uranium Metal Document**

19. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy from Iran of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF<sub>6</sub> to uranium metal and the machining of enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons. Iran reiterated that this document had been received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987 and that it had not been requested by Iran. The Agency is still waiting for a response from Pakistan on the circumstances of the delivery of this document in order to understand the full scope and content of the offer made by the network in 1987 (GOV/2006/15, paras 20–22).

## **A.3. Polonium-210**

20. Polonium-210 is of interest to the Agency because it can be used not only for civilian applications (such as radioisotope batteries), but also — in conjunction with beryllium — for military purposes, such as neutron initiators in some designs of nuclear weapons. On 20–21 January 2008, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated 15 September 2007 regarding polonium-210 research (GOV/2007/58, para. 26). The Agency's questions included a request to see the original project documentation.

21. According to Iran, in the 1980s, scientists from the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) were asked to propose new research activities. A project called "Production of <sup>210</sup>Po by the irradiation of <sup>209</sup>Bi in the TNRC reactor" was proposed and eventually approved by the Scientific Advisory Committee of TNRC in 1988. The project consisted of fundamental research aimed at enhancing knowledge about this process. According to Iran, it was not aimed at a specific immediate application. However, a potential use in radioisotope batteries, if the chemical extraction of polonium-210 proved successful, was mentioned in the initial proposal.

22. Iran reiterated that the project was not part of any larger R&D project, but had been a personal initiative of the project leader. According to Iran, the chemist working on the project left the country before full chemical processing had been performed, the project was aborted and the decayed samples were discarded as waste (GOV/2004/11, para. 30).

23. To support its statements, Iran presented additional copies of papers and literature searches that had formed the basis for the request for approval of the project. Iran also provided copies of the project proposal, the meeting minutes and the approval document from the Scientific Advisory Committee of TNRC, as well as a complete copy of the reactor logbook for the entire period that the samples were present in the reactor.

24. Based on an examination of all information provided by Iran, the Agency concluded that the explanations concerning the content and magnitude of the polonium-210 experiments were consistent with the Agency's findings and with other information available to it. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran's declarations.



#### **A.4. Gchine Mine**

25. On 22 and 23 January 2008, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated 15 September 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 27) with a view to achieving a better understanding of the complex arrangements governing the past and current administration of the Gchine uranium mine and mill (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31).

26. According to Iran, the exploitation of uranium at the Gchine mine, as well as the ore processing activities at the Gchine uranium ore concentration (UOC) plant, have always been and remain the responsibility of the AEOI.

27. Iran stated that, by 1989, the extent of uranium reserves at Saghand in central Iran had been established in cooperation with Chinese experts. Considering the promising output of this region, a contract for equipping the Saghand mine and designing a uranium ore processing plant was concluded with Russian companies in 1995. Insufficient funding was allocated in the Government's 1994–1998 five-year plan for the AEOI to pursue activities at both Gchine and Saghand. Since there was more uranium (estimated 1000 tonnes) at Saghand than at Gchine (estimated 40 tonnes), it was decided to spend the available funds on Saghand.

28. According to Iran, in the period 1993–1998, tasks such as the preparation of technical reports and studies, and some chemical testing of ores, were performed at the AEOI Ore Processing Center (OPC) at TNRC. The focus of some of the documentation work had been to justify funding of Gchine in the 1999–2003 five-year plan. These efforts were successful and funding for further exploration and exploitation at Gchine was approved in the plan. A decision to construct a UOC plant at Gchine, known as "Project 5/15", was made on 25 August 1999.

29. During the 22–23 January 2008 meetings, Iran also provided the Agency with supporting documentation regarding the budget, the five-year plans, contracts with foreign entities and the preparation of studies and reports. The Agency concluded that the documentation was sufficient to confirm the AEOI's continuing interest in and activity at Gchine in the 1993–1999 period.

30. Regarding the origin and role of the Kimia Maadan (KM) Company, Iran stated that the OPC, in addition to its own staff, had hired consultants and experts for various projects, including for work relating to Gchine. When budget approval was given in 1999 for exploration and exploitation at Gchine, some experts and consultants had formed a company (KM) to take on a contract from the AEOI for the Gchine plant. Supporting documentation was provided to the Agency showing that KM was registered as a company on 4 May 2000. Iran stated that KM's core staff of about half a dozen people consisted of experts who had previously worked for the OPC. At the peak of activity, the company employed over 100 people. In addition to its own staff, KM made use of experts from universities and subcontractors to work on the project.

31. According to Iran, KM was given conceptual design information by the AEOI consisting of drawings and technical reports. KM's task was to do the detailed design, to procure and install equipment and to put the Gchine UOC plant into operation. The contract imposed time constraints and the time pressure led to some mistakes being made. After the detailed design was completed, changes had to be made which led to financial problems for KM.

32. Iran stated that KM had had only one project — the one with the AEOI for construction of the Gchine UOC plant on a turnkey basis. However, the company had also helped with procurement for the AEOI because of the AEOI's procurement constraints due to sanctions (GOV/2006/15, para. 39). A document listing items procured for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was provided by Iran. According to Iran, because of KM's financial problems, the company ceased work on the Gchine project in June 2003, when the three-year contract with the AEOI came to an end. Iran stated that KM

was officially deregistered on 8 June 2003 and provided a document supporting this statement. After KM stopped work, the OPC again took over work on the Gchine UOC plant.

33. Iran stated that KM had been able to progress quickly from its creation in May 2000 and to install foundations for the UOC plant by late December 2000 because the conceptual design for the plant had been done by the OPC. This conceptual design and other “know-how” had been supplied to KM, which used the information for the detailed design of processing equipment. KM was therefore quickly able to prepare drawings and issue purchase orders. Documents supporting the conceptual work done by the AEOI were presented to the Agency by Iran.

34. Much of the supporting information provided by Iran had not been presented to the Agency during past discussions about Gchine. The Agency concluded that the information and explanations provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and continues to verify this issue as part of verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.

### **A.5. Alleged Studies**

35. The Agency has continued to urge Iran, as demanded by the Security Council, to address the alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide (UO<sub>2</sub>) into uranium tetrafluoride (UF<sub>4</sub>) (the green salt project), high explosives testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections, and in view of their possible link to nuclear material (GOV/2007/58, para. 28). As part of the work plan, Iran agreed to address these alleged studies.

36. On 27 and 28 January 2008 and from 3 to 5 February 2008, the Agency and Iran discussed the alleged studies at meetings in Tehran. During these discussions, the Agency provided detailed information about the allegations and asked for clarification concerning other issues that had arisen during the implementation of the work plan, including the roles of PHRC, KM, the Education Research Institute (ERI) and the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) (GOV/2004/83, paras 100–101).

37. The Agency showed Iran certain documentation which the Agency had been given by other Member States, purportedly originating from Iran, including a flowsheet of bench scale conversion of UO<sub>2</sub> to UF<sub>4</sub>. The documents show a capacity of the process of about 1 tonne per year of UF<sub>4</sub>. The flowsheet has KM markings on it and refers to “Project 5/13.” The documentation includes communications between the project staff and another private company on the acquisition of process instrumentation. These communications also make reference to the leadership of the project concerning the missile re-entry vehicle. The Agency also presented a sketch of a process to produce 50 tonnes of UF<sub>4</sub> per year.

38. Iran stated that the allegations were baseless and that the information which the Agency had shown to Iran was fabricated. However, Iran agreed to clarify its statement in detail. On 8 February and 12 February 2008, the Agency reiterated in writing its request for additional clarifications. On 14 February 2008, Iran responded, reiterating its earlier statements and declaring that this was its final assessment on this point. Iran stated that the only organization that had been, and was, involved in fuel cycle activities was the AEOI and that the AEOI had had a contract with KM to develop a UOC plant in Gchine, which was the only project in which KM was ever involved. In Iran’s view, the flowsheet was a fabrication and the accusation baseless.

39. During the meetings on 3–5 February 2008, the Agency made available documents for examination by Iran and provided additional technical information related to: the testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment; the development of an exploding bridgewire detonator (EBW); the

simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators; and the identification of an explosive testing arrangement that involved the use of a 400 m shaft and a firing capability remote from the shaft by a distance of 10 km, all of which the Agency believes would be relevant to nuclear weapon R&D. Iran stated that the documents were fabricated and that the information contained in those documents could easily be found in open sources. During the meetings mentioned above, the Agency also described parameters and development work related to the Shahab 3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a re-entry vehicle, and made available to Iran for examination a computer image provided by other Member States showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a re-entry vehicle. This layout has been assessed by the Agency as quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device. Iran stated that its missile programme involved the use of conventional warheads only and was also part of the country's space programme, and that the schematic layout shown by the Agency was baseless and fabricated.

40. During the meetings of 27–28 January and 3–5 February 2008, the Agency asked Iran to clarify a number of procurement actions by the ERI, PHRC and IAP which could relate to the above-mentioned alleged studies. These included training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles. Efforts to procure spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts (GOV/2006/15, para. 37) and radiation measurement equipment, including borehole gamma spectrometers, were also made. In its written response on 5 February 2008, Iran stated that 'PAM shock' software was enquired about "in order to study aircraft, collision of cars, airbags and for the design of safety belts." Iran also stated that the radiation monitors it had enquired about were meant to be used for radiation protection purposes. Iran's response regarding the efforts to procure training courses on neutron calculations, and enrichment/isotope separation, spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources and radiation measurement equipment for borehole gamma spectrometers is still awaited.

41. During the same meetings, the Agency requested clarification of the roles of certain officials and institutes and their relation to nuclear activities. Iran was also asked to clarify projects such as the so-called "Project 4" (possibly uranium enrichment) and laser related R&D activities. Iran denied the existence of some of the organizations and project offices referred to in the documentation and denied that other organizations named were involved in nuclear related activities. Iran also denied the existence of some of the people named in the documentation and said allegations about the roles of other people named were baseless. Iran's response to the Agency's request regarding "Project 4" and laser related R&D activities is still awaited

42. On 15 February 2008, the Agency proposed a further meeting to show additional documentation on the alleged studies to Iran, after being authorized to do so by the countries which had provided it. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency's proposal.

## **B. Current Enrichment Related Activities**

43. On 12 December 2007, the first physical inventory taking was carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz and verified by the Agency. Since the beginning of operations in February 2007, a total of 1670 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> had been fed into the cascades. The operator presented, inter alia, about 75 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> as the product, with a stated enrichment of 3.8% U-235. The throughput of the facility has been well below its declared design capacity. There has been no installation of centrifuges outside the original 18-cascade area. Installation work, including equipment and sub-header pipes, is continuing for other cascade areas. Since March 2007, a total of nine unannounced inspections have

been carried out at FEP. All nuclear material at FEP remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

44. On 8 November 2007, Iran stated that it “agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation information” would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 33). On 13 January 2008, the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards visited an AEOI R&D laboratory at Kalaye Electric, where they were given information on R&D activities being carried out there. These included work on four different centrifuge designs: two subcritical rotor designs, a rotor with bellows and a more advanced centrifuge. Iran informed the Agency that the R&D laboratory was developing centrifuge components, measuring equipment and vacuum pumps with the aim of having entirely indigenous production capabilities in Iran.

45. On 15 January 2008, Iran informed the Agency about the planned installation of the first new generation subcritical centrifuge (IR-2) at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and provided relevant design information. On 29 January 2008, the Agency confirmed that a single IR-2 test machine and a 10-machine IR-2 test cascade had been installed at PFEP. Iran reported that about 0.8 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> had been fed to the single machine between 22 and 27 January 2008. Iran has continued to test P-1 centrifuges in one single machine, one 10-, one 20- and one 164-machine cascade at PFEP. Between 23 October 2007 and 21 January 2008, Iran fed a total of about 8 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> into the single P-1 and the 10-machine P-1 cascade; no nuclear material was fed into the 20- and 164-machine cascades. At the end of January 2008, the single P-1 machine and the 10- and 20-machine P-1 cascades were dismantled and the space was used for the new IR-2 machines. All activities took place under Agency containment and surveillance.

46. On 5 February 2008, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the Director of Safeguards Operations B visited laboratories at Lashkar Abad, where laser enrichment activities had taken place in 2003 and earlier. The laboratories are now run by a private company, which is producing and developing laser equipment for industrial purposes. All the former laser equipment has been dismantled and some of it is stored at the site. The management of the company provided detailed information on current and planned activities, including plans for extensive new construction work, and stated that they are not carrying out, and are not planning, any uranium enrichment activities.

## **C. Reprocessing Activities**

47. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. In addition, Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, which the Agency can confirm only with respect to these facilities.

## **D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects**

48. On 5 February 2008, the Agency carried out design information verification at the IR-40 and noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued to monitor the



construction of the Heavy Water Production Plant using satellite imagery. The imagery appears to indicate that the plant is operating.

## **E. Other Implementation Issues**

### **E.1. Uranium Conversion**

49. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007, approximately 120 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced as of 2 February 2008. This brings the total amount of UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF since March 2004 to 309 tonnes, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Iran has stated that it is carrying out no uranium conversion related R&D activities other than those at Esfahan.

### **E.2. Design Information**

50. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1. (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), but there has been no progress on this issue. However, Iran has provided updated design information for PFEP.

### **E.3. Other Matters**

51. On 26 November 2007, the Agency verified and sealed in the Russian Federation the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), before its shipment to Iran. As of February 2008, all fuel assemblies had been received, verified and re-sealed at BNPP.

## **F. Summary**

52. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran has also responded to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on the issues raised in the context of the work plan, with the exception of the alleged studies. Iran has provided access to individuals in response to the Agency's requests. Although direct access has not been provided to individuals said to be associated with the alleged studies, responses have been provided in writing to some of the Agency's questions.

53. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings — in the case of the polonium-210 experiments and the Gchine mine — or are not inconsistent with its findings — in the case of the contamination at the technical university and the procurement activities of the former Head of PHRC. Therefore, the Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify these issues as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran's declarations.

54. The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran's nuclear programme is the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a

matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme. The Agency was able to show some relevant documentation to Iran on 3–5 February 2008 and is still examining the allegations made and the statements provided by Iran in response. Iran has maintained that these allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated. The Agency's overall assessment requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications concerning the procurement activities of some military related institutions still not provided by Iran. The Agency only received authorization to show some further material to Iran on 15 February 2008. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency's request of that same date for Iran to view this additional documentation on the alleged studies. In light of the above, the Agency is not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran's nuclear programme. However, it should be noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard. The Director General has urged Iran to engage actively with the Agency in a more detailed examination of the documents available about the alleged studies which the Agency has been authorized to show to Iran.

55. The Agency has recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran had previously provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol, as well as updated design information. As a result, the Agency's knowledge about Iran's current declared nuclear programme has become clearer. However, this information has been provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner. The Director General has continued to urge Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date and as an important confidence building measure requested by the Board of Governors and affirmed by the Security Council. The Director General has also urged Iran to implement the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information. Iran has expressed its readiness to implement the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, "if the nuclear file is returned from the Security Council to the IAEA".

56. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. In addition, Iran started the development of new generation centrifuges. Iran has also continued construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

57. With regard to its current programme, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about its scope and nature. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. With the exception of the issue of the alleged studies, which remains outstanding, the Agency has no concrete information about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although Iran has provided some additional detailed information about its current activities on an ad hoc basis, the Agency will not be in a position to make progress towards providing credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran before reaching some clarity about the nature of the alleged studies, and without implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the confidence deficit created as a result. The Director General therefore urges Iran to implement all necessary measures called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

58. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

## Iran vows not to 'retreat one iota' in nuclear pursuit

POSTED 1 56 a.m. EST, February 22, 2007



Chief negotiator Ari Larijani says the Islamic republic would be willing to give assurances that its nuclear program will never deviate toward weapons.

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- The U.N. Security Council is scheduled to receive a report on Iran on Thursday
- Iran says it's willing to assure the West it will never move toward nuclear weapons
- President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran won't halt enrichment
- Security Council won't take action before March 9, leaving time for more dialogue

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TEHRAN, Iran (CNN) — The Iranian president scoffed Wednesday at a U.N. Security Council demand that the Islamic republic halt its uranium-enrichment program.

"Iran will not retreat one iota in its path to nuclear victory," President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said in a speech Wednesday, according to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency.

He added, "Today, there are those who are against Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology and are trying to put obstacles in our nuclear path in order to prevent us from exercising our rights with the grace of the God," RNA reported.

Ahmadinejad's remarks come the day before a report on Iran's nuclear activities is scheduled to be circulated to the Security Council in New York.

Tehran has insisted that its nuclear program is for civilian energy purposes only, but Western powers have said Iran has its eye on nuclear weaponry.

Iran's position on the matter has remained static since well before July, when the United Nations gave Iran an August 31 deadline to halt its nuclear program.

Ahmadinejad told reporters as that deadline passed, "Access to peaceful nuclear energy and power is the right of the Iranian people. We've chosen our right and under international law we want to use our right. Nobody can prevent us from it."

On December 23, the 15-member Security Council unanimously approved a resolution imposing sanctions on Iran. Russia and China, two veto-wielding members of the Security Council, voted in favor of the resolution despite previously expressing their aversion to imposing sanctions.

Under Resolution 1737, the council requested that International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei report within 60 days on whether Iran has suspended its nuclear activities.

It was initially reported that the deadline expired Wednesday — 60 days after the December 23 resolution passed — but an IAEA official told CNN the deadline is Friday. ElBaradei is scheduled to deliver his report Thursday, the official said.

ElBaradei said in Monday's Financial Times that he expected to report that Iran had not complied with the resolution. However, ElBaradei noted, the Security Council will not take any action until he reports to the IAEA board of governors next month.

"Even if my report is coming out this week, I can still add and reverse judgments there until the sixth of March," ElBaradei told the London-based newspaper. The board of governors is scheduled to meet in Vienna, Austria, March 5-9.

After the December 23 vote, Iran defiantly vowed to continue with its nuclear program, which included the production of 3,000 centrifuges at its nuclear complex in Natanz. Iran said the work would be done under IAEA supervision.

ElBaradei told The Financial Times that Iran was still months from having those centrifuges running smoothly. Presently, the IAEA chief said, Iran is operating at least one 164-centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium.

Experts say thousands of centrifuges are needed to produce weapons-grade uranium, and ElBaradei told the newspaper Monday that Iran's operation "is still small scale, so whatever they have, what we have seen today, is not the kind of capacity that would enable them to make bomb."

### Assurances offered

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ari Larijani, who met with ElBaradei in Vienna, Austria, on Wednesday, told IRNA that Iran was willing to offer assurances that its nuclear program was aimed at energy production, not bombmaking.

One of the proffered assurances, according to Reuters, is an Iranian pledge to refine uranium no higher than the 4-5 percent level, well below the 80 percent threshold

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needed for nuclear bombs.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the final say in Iran's nuclear matters. According to Reuters, Ali Akbar Velayati, a Khamenei aide, told a French newspaper that Iran was flexible on negotiating a deal, "but one cannot dictate the solution in advance."

The Iranian nuclear issue will be discussed over a breakfast meeting among U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, European Union Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

Israel also has a stake in the negotiations as Ahmadinejad has questioned the United States' "blind support for the Zionists" and called for Israel to be "wiped off the map."

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called on the international community Wednesday to step up its pressure on the Islamic republic. He also questioned Iranian assertions regarding the progress of the nation's nuclear program.

"A lot more has to be done, but I think that the Iranians are not as close to the technological threshold as they claim to be, and unfortunately they are not as far [away] as we would love them to be," he said. "So there is a lot that still can be done and ought to be done. And the sooner it will be done the better it will be."

He continued with remarks addressing Ahmadinejad, "It is incumbent upon the international community not only to take practical measures to stop these threats but also to take practical measures that will indicate the extent of the disapproval of his language, of his attitude and of his approaches."

CNN's Liz Neisloss and Michal Zippori contributed to this report.

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## Board of Governors

**GOV/2009/74**

Date: 16 November 2009

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# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 28 August 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2009/35). This report covers relevant developments since that date.

## **A. Current Enrichment Related Activities**

### **A.1. Natanz: FEP and PFEP**

2. On 2 November 2009, Iran was feeding UF<sub>6</sub> into the 18 cascades of Unit A24, and 6 cascades of Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.<sup>1</sup> On that day, the other 12 cascades of Unit A26 were under vacuum. Iran has continued with the installation of cascades at Unit A28; as of 2 November 2009, 17 cascades had been installed and the installation of another cascade was continuing.<sup>2</sup> All machines installed to date are IR-1 centrifuges with 164 machines per cascade. Installation work at Units A25 and A27 is also continuing.

<sup>1</sup> There are two cascade halls planned at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units (Units A21 to A28) are planned for Production Hall A (GOV/2008/38, para. 2).

<sup>2</sup> On 2 November 2009, 3936 centrifuges were being fed with UF<sub>6</sub> and an additional 4756 centrifuges had been installed.

3. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 30 October 2009, 10395 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into the cascades and a total of 924 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> was produced<sup>3</sup>, which would result in a total production of 1763 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> since the start-up of FEP. The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.<sup>4</sup>

4. The next physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP is scheduled for 22 to 30 November 2009. As previously indicated to the Board, at that time, the Agency will verify the inventory of nuclear material at the facility and evaluate the nuclear material balance.<sup>5</sup>

5. Between 14 August and 27 October 2009, a total of approximately 53 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into a 10-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). The nuclear material at the PFEP, as well as the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal stations, remain subject to Agency containment and surveillance.<sup>4</sup> The Agency is currently evaluating the results of the PIV it conducted at PFEP between 14 and 16 September 2009.

6. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that the declared maximum enrichment level (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at either plant.<sup>6</sup> Since the last report, the Agency has conducted two unannounced inspections at FEP, for a total of 31 since March 2007.

## **A.2. Qom: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant**

7. In a letter to the Director General dated 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that “Based on [its] sovereign right of safeguarding ... sensitive nuclear facilities through various means such as utilization of passive defense systems ... [Iran] has decided to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment plant (up to 5% enrichment)”. Iran stated that the required infrastructure for the plant had been established and that the plant was under construction. In a letter dated 25 September 2009, the Agency requested Iran to provide further information on the current status of its construction and Iran’s plans for the introduction of nuclear material into the facility. The Agency also requested that Iran submit a detailed Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and provide access to the facility as soon as possible.

8. During a meeting with the Director General in Tehran on 4 October 2009, Iran agreed to provide the Agency with access to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). Under cover of a letter to the Agency dated 18 October 2009, Iran also submitted a preliminary DIQ for FFEP.

9. On 26 and 27 October 2009, the Agency carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP, which is located about 20 km north of the city of Qom. The Agency also held two meetings in

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<sup>3</sup> The Agency has verified that, as of 17 November 2008, 9956 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> had been fed into the cascades and 839 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced since the beginning of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2009/8, para. 3). The Agency has confirmed, through independently calibrated operator load cell readings, that, between 18 November 2008 and 30 October 2009, 10412 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into the cascades, and a total of 814 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> product and 9080 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> tails and dump material was off-loaded into UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. The difference of 518 kg between the input and output figures comprises natural, depleted and low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> arising mainly from hold-up in the various cold traps and is not inconsistent with the design information provided by Iran.

<sup>4</sup> In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not under containment and surveillance.

<sup>5</sup> GOV/2009/55, para. 4.

<sup>6</sup> Results are available for samples taken up to 12 August 2009 for FEP and up to 15 August 2009 for PFEP. These results have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.4% U-235 enrichment), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to 0.37% U-235 enrichment).

Tehran, on 25 and 28 October 2009, to review the DIQ and to discuss the chronology of the design and construction of FFEP as well as its status and purpose. The Agency verified that FFEP was being built to contain sixteen cascades with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. Iran indicated that it currently planned to install only IR-1 centrifuges at FFEP, but that the facility could be reconfigured to contain centrifuges of more advanced types should Iran take a decision to use such centrifuges in the future. Iran stated that some of the equipment located at FFEP had come from the Natanz site, and that the Natanz site would provide functional support to FFEP, such as centrifuge assembly and decontamination of equipment. Iran also stated that no nuclear material had been introduced into FFEP.

10. The DIV included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of photographs of cascade piping and other process equipment, the taking of environmental samples and a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components and systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Centrifuge mounting pads, header and sub-header pipes, water piping, electrical cables and cabinets had been put in place but were not yet connected; the passivation tanks, chemical traps, cold traps and cool boxes were also in place but had not been connected. In addition, a utilities building containing electricity transformers and water chillers had also been erected.

11. During the meeting in Tehran on 25 October 2009, the Agency provided comments on the preliminary DIQ submitted by Iran, and requested that a revised preliminary DIQ be submitted with additional information, which Iran did in the course of the later meeting on 28 October. Iran informed the Agency that it would provide further information required in the DIQ as the facility is developed. The Agency informed Iran that, in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement, FFEP will henceforth be subject to regular DIV by the Agency. The next DIV is scheduled for the end of November 2009.

12. Iran explained that the Fordow site had been allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007, and that that was when the construction of FFEP had started. Iran subsequently confirmed that explanation in a letter dated 28 October 2009. In that letter, Iran stated that:

“As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers for various organizations and activities ...

“The Natanz Enrichment Plant was among the targets threatened with military attacks. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Organization requested the Passive Defence Organization to allocate one of those aforementioned centers for the purpose of [a] contingency enrichment plant, so that the enrichment activities shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack. In this respect, the Fordow site, being one of those constructed and prepared centers, [was] allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007. The construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant then started. The construction is still ongoing. Thus the plant is not yet ready for operation and it is planned to be operational in 2011.”

13. During the meetings, the Agency informed Iran that it had acquired commercially available satellite imagery of the site indicating that there had been construction at the site between 2002 and 2004, and that construction activities were resumed in 2006 and had continued to date. The Agency also referred to the extensive information given to the Agency by a number of Member States detailing

the design of the facility, which was consistent with the design as verified by the Agency during the DIV. The Agency also informed Iran that these Member States alleged that design work on the facility had started in 2006.

14. The Agency further indicated that it still had questions about the purpose for which the facility had been intended and how it fit into Iran's nuclear programme. The Agency also indicated that Iran's declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.

15. In light of the above, the Agency requested access to the FFEP project manager and those responsible for the design of FFEP, along with access to original design documentation, such as engineering drawings, with a view to confirming Iran's statements regarding the chronology and purpose of the facility.

16. Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction or in operation that had not yet been declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future facilities would "be reported to the Agency according to Iran's obligations to the Agency". In a letter dated 6 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.

17. For reasons set out in previous reports to the Board of Governors, Iran remains bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it had agreed in 2003,<sup>7</sup> which requires that the Agency be provided with preliminary design information about a new nuclear facility as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facility is taken. The revised Code 3.1 also requires that Iran provide the Agency with further design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.<sup>8</sup> Even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran's failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

## **B. Reprocessing Activities**

18. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. The Agency carried out a DIV at TRR on 19 August 2009 and on 9 November 2009 at the MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not currently available to it for Iran.

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<sup>7</sup> GOV/2009/55, para. 14; GOV/2008/59, para. 9; GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14.

<sup>8</sup> GOV/2003/40, paras 6, 15.



## **C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects**

19. The Agency has reviewed the updated DIQ for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan provided by Iran on 21 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 9). Contrary to what was requested in the Agency's letter of 19 June 2009, the updated DIQ did not contain information on the design features of the IR-40 fuel assembly. The Agency provided comments on the DIQ to Iran on 5 November 2009, reiterating its request that Iran include the fuel assembly information.

20. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out at FMP in August 2009 (GOV/2009/55, para. 10), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at FMP as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with fabrication plants of similar throughput. On 24 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at FMP. It confirmed that the status of the facility had remained unchanged and that no further assemblies, rods or pellets have been produced.

21. On 7 November 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued using satellite imagery to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which seems not to have been operating since the last report.

22. On 25 October 2009, during the DIV at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan, the Agency observed 600 50-litre drums said by Iran to contain heavy water. In a letter dated 10 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm the number of drums and their contents, and to provide information on the origin of the heavy water.

## **D. Other Implementation Issues**

### **D.1. Uranium Conversion**

23. In a letter dated 16 October 2009, the Agency requested Iran to provide information regarding the layout, equipment and installation schedule for an analytical laboratory which, in the updated DIQ for UCF submitted in August 2009, Iran had indicated would be installed in an underground location in one of the UCF storage areas.

24. On 25 October 2009, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF. At that time, the plant was undergoing maintenance. No UF<sub>6</sub> has been produced since 10 August 2009. The total amount of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF since March 2004 therefore remains 366 tonnes, some of which was transferred to the FEP and PFEP, and which remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance (GOV/2009/55, para. 12). Between 11 August 2009 and 25 October 2009, 92 samples of ammonium diuranate (ADU) containing about a kilogram of uranium were received at UCF from the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.

### **D.2. Design Information**

25. Iran has not yet resumed the implementation of the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information, and remains the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards

arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction, as indicated above.

26. In December 2007, the Agency requested preliminary design information for the nuclear power plant to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11). In a letter dated 22 September 2009, Iran provided the Agency with preliminary design information for the plant, citing, as it had in its letter of 21 September 2009 concerning FFEP, its desire to cooperate rather than a legal obligation. In the preliminary design information, the Darkhovin plant is described as a 360 MWe pressurized water reactor, the construction of which is scheduled to start in 2011, with commissioning to take place in 2015. The Agency has examined the design information and has requested Iran to provide additional clarifications regarding, inter alia, the design of the fuel assemblies and the facility layout.

27. For reasons set out in previous Board reports,<sup>9</sup> the Agency is of the view that the revised Code 3.1 remains in force for Iran. Thus, as indicated above concerning the late submission of design information for FFEP, Iran's failure to submit design information for the Darkhovin facility until September of this year was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

### **D.3. Other Matters**

28. A PIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is planned for 17 November 2009.

29. On 23 September 2009, the Agency performed a DIV at the Uranium Chemical Laboratory at Esfahan, and was able to confirm the decommissioned status of the facility (GOV/2009/55, para. 17).

30. Based on satellite imagery and supporting documentation relevant to the ADU samples received at UCF (see para. 23 above), the Agency assesses that uranium recovery activities are continuing in the area of the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.

## **E. Possible Military Dimensions**

31. As detailed in the Director General's previous reports to the Board (most recently in GOV/2009/55, para. 18), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, implement the Additional Protocol and provide the information and access necessary to: resolve questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.

32. The Agency is still awaiting a reply from Iran to its request to meet relevant Iranian authorities in connection with these issues.<sup>10</sup> The Agency is also still awaiting Iran's response to the Agency's repeated requests for access to persons, information and locations identified in the alleged studies

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<sup>9</sup> GOV/2009/55, para. 14; GOV/2008/59, para. 9; GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14.

<sup>10</sup> GOV/2009/55, paras 24, 28.

documents in order to verify Iran's assertion that these documents are false and fabricated. Further analysis of the information available to the Agency underscores the importance of Iran engaging with the Agency in a substantive and comprehensive manner, and providing the requested access, so that the remaining outstanding issues may be resolved. In this context, it would be helpful if Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency would agree to share more of that documentation with Iran, as appropriate.

## **F. Summary**

33. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. While Iran recently submitted preliminary design information on the Darkhovin reactor, it continues to assert that it is not bound by the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to which it agreed in 2003, and which it ceased to implement in March 2007.

34. Iran has informed the Agency about the construction of a new pilot enrichment plant at Qom, FFEP. Iran's failure to inform the Agency, in accordance with the provisions of the revised Code 3.1, of the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility as soon as such a decision is taken, and to submit information as the design is developed, is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. Moreover, Iran's delay in submitting such information to the Agency does not contribute to the building of confidence. While the Agency has confirmed that the plant corresponds to the design information provided by Iran, Iran's explanation about the purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction requires further clarification.

35. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.

36. Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the requirements of the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. It is now well over a year since the Agency was last able to engage Iran in discussions about these outstanding issues. Unless Iran implements the Additional Protocol and, through substantive dialogue, clarifies the outstanding issues to the satisfaction of the Agency, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

37. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2010/10**

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Item 6(c) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2010/1)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. On 16 November 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2009/74). The Director General issued two additional reports on 8 and 10 February 2010 (GOV/INF/2010/1 and GOV/INF/2010/2, respectively).

## **A. Current Enrichment Related Activities**

### **A.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant**

2. In November 2003, Iran informed the Agency that it would suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities in Iran. Specifically, Iran announced that it would suspend all activities on the site of Natanz, not produce feed material for enrichment processes and not import enrichment related items. In February 2004, Iran expanded the scope of that suspension to include the assembly and testing of centrifuges, and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components. In June 2004, Iran stopped implementing the expanded voluntary measures in connection with the manufacturing of centrifuge components and the assembling and testing of centrifuges. In November 2004, Iran notified the Agency that it had decided, “on a voluntary basis and as [a] further confidence building measure, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities”. In January 2006, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to resume “R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy programme which ha[d] been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and



non-legally binding suspension”, which included the activities carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) located at Natanz. Iran restarted enrichment tests at PFEP in February 2006; FEP was put into operation in February 2007.

3. There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units (Units A21 to A28) are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades planned for each unit. No detailed design information has been provided for Production Hall B.

4. On 31 January 2010, Iran was feeding natural UF<sub>6</sub> into the 17 cascades of Unit A24, and 6 cascades of Unit A26, at FEP. One cascade of Unit A24 and one cascade of Unit A26 were under vacuum on that date. A number of centrifuges from the remaining 11 cascades of Unit A26 had been disconnected. Sixteen cascades of Unit A28 had been installed. Of the remaining 2 cascades of Unit A28, all centrifuges had been removed from one cascade and removal of the centrifuges from the other cascade was ongoing.<sup>1</sup> Installation work in Units A25 and A27 was ongoing. All centrifuges installed to date are IR-1 machines with 164 machines per cascade. There has been no installation work on centrifuges in Production Hall B.

5. Between 21 November 2009 and 2 December 2009, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP and verified that, as of 22 November 2009, 21 140 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> had been fed into the cascades since February 2007, and a total of 1808 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced. The enrichment level of the low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> product, as measured by the Agency, was 3.47% U-235. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the PIV and is discussing the results with Iran. Iran has estimated that, between 23 November 2009 and 29 January 2010, it produced an additional 257 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub>,<sup>2</sup> which would result in a total production of 2065 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> since the startup of FEP. The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.<sup>3</sup>

6. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP as of 21 November 2009 indicate that the maximum enrichment level as declared by Iran in the relevant Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at that plant.<sup>4</sup> Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35 such inspections since March 2007.

7. Between 14 and 16 September 2009, the Agency conducted a PIV at the PFEP, the results of which confirmed the inventory as declared by Iran, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. Between 28 October 2009 and 2 February 2010, a total of approximately 113 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into a 10-machine IR-2m cascade, a 10-machine IR-4 cascade, a 20-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at PFEP.

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<sup>1</sup> On 29 January 2010, of the 8610 centrifuges which had been installed at FEP, 3772 centrifuges were being fed with UF<sub>6</sub>.

<sup>2</sup> The Agency has confirmed, through independently calibrated operator load cell readings, that, between 23 November 2009 and 29 January 2010, 2516 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into the cascades, and a total of 159 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> product and 2098 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> tails and dump material was off-loaded into UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. The difference of 259 kg between the input and output figures comprises natural, depleted and low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> arising mainly from hold-up in the various cold traps and is not inconsistent with the design information provided by Iran.

<sup>3</sup> In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not under containment and surveillance.

<sup>4</sup> These results have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.4% U-235 enrichment), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to 0.19% U-235 enrichment).

8. On 8 February 2010, the Agency received a letter from Iran dated 7 February 2010 referring to “the announcement made by H.E. the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the production of the required fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor”, and in that regard, submitting a revised version of the DIQ for PFEP. Iran informed the Agency that the “provision of production of less than 20% enriched uranium is being foreseen in this revised version of the DIQ”. The DIQ provides for the “production of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> up to 20%”.<sup>5</sup>

9. On 8 February 2010 the Agency received a separate letter from Iran, dated 8 February 2010, informing the Agency that the operator of FEP intended to transfer low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> produced at FEP to the feed station of PFEP, and that these activities would be performed on 9 February 2010.<sup>6</sup> Iran requested that the Agency be present on the site on that date.

10. On 9 February 2010, the Agency wrote to Iran seeking clarification regarding the starting date of the process for the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 and other technical details, and requesting that, in light of Article 45 of the Safeguards Agreement, no low enriched uranium be fed into the process at PFEP for enriching the material up to 20% U-235 before the necessary additional safeguards procedures were in place.

11. On 10 February 2010, when the Agency inspectors arrived at PFEP, they were informed that Iran had already begun to feed the low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> into one cascade at PFEP the previous evening. They were also told that it was expected that the facility would begin to produce up to 20% enriched UF<sub>6</sub> within a few days. As the Board was previously informed,<sup>7</sup> there is currently only one cascade installed in PFEP that is capable of enriching the UF<sub>6</sub> up to 20%.

12. On 14 February 2010, Iran, in the presence of Agency inspectors, moved approximately 1950 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> from FEP to the PFEP feed station. The Agency inspectors sealed the cylinder containing the material to the feed station. Iran provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results which indicate that enrichment levels of up to 19.8% U-235 were obtained at PFEP between 9 and 11 February 2010.<sup>8</sup>

13. While the nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal stations, remain subject to Agency containment and surveillance,<sup>3</sup> additional measures need to be put in place to ensure the Agency’s continuing ability to verify the non-diversion of the nuclear material at PFEP. In a letter to Iran dated 9 February 2010, the Agency requested a meeting to discuss a revised safeguards approach for PFEP.

## **A.2. Qom: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant**

14. On 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided “to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment plant”, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. The Agency met with Iran between 25 and 28 October 2009, at which time it carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP, and held discussions with Iran on the chronology of the design and construction of FFEP, as well as its status and original purpose. The Agency verified that FFEP is being built to contain sixteen cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. Iran

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<sup>5</sup> GOV/INF/2010/1.

<sup>6</sup> On 9 February 2010, Iran transferred approximately 10 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> to PFEP.

<sup>7</sup> GOV/INF/2010/2.

<sup>8</sup> The results of the environmental samples taken at PFEP from the restart of enrichment testing in February 2006 until 15 August 2009 have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.4% U-235 enrichment), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to 0.27% U-235 enrichment).

indicated that it currently planned to install only IR-1 centrifuges at FFEP, but that the facility could be reconfigured to contain centrifuges of more advanced types should Iran take a decision to use such centrifuges in the future. On 28 October 2009, Iran provided the Agency with an updated DIQ for FFEP.

15. In a letter dated 2 December 2009 responding to the Agency's questions in its letter dated 6 November 2009 regarding the timing of the decision to build a third enrichment plant in Iran, other than PFEP and FEP, Iran stated that "The location [near Qom] originally was considered as a general area for passive defence contingency shelters for various utilizations. Then this location was selected for the construction of [the] Fuel Enrichment Plant in the second half of 2007". On 16 December 2009, the Agency wrote to Iran, pointing out that some of its answers had not fully addressed the Agency's requests for clarifications regarding FFEP. In the letter, the Agency referred specifically to the Agency's request that Iran confirm when the decision to construct a third enrichment plant (other than PFEP and FEP) had been taken and reiterated the need for access to companies involved in the design and construction of FFEP to confirm Iran's statement regarding the chronology and purpose of the facility. The Agency informed Iran that it had received extensive information from a number of sources detailing the design of the facility, which was consistent with the design as verified by the Agency during the DIV, and that these sources alleged that design work on the facility started in 2006, i.e. at a time when Iran itself accepts that it was bound by the modified Code 3.1 to have informed the Agency.

16. In a letter dated 22 January 2010, the Agency asked Iran for a complete DIQ for FFEP, and again reiterated its request made in October 2009 for access to relevant design documents and to companies involved in the design of the third enrichment plant in Iran. Iran has not yet responded to these requests.

17. Since 26 October 2009, the Agency has conducted five DIVs at FFEP. During three of these, the Agency took environmental samples. The results of the analyses of the samples taken on 27 October 2009 from two passivation tanks at FFEP showed the presence of a small number of depleted uranium particles that were similar to particles found at Natanz. According to Iran, the tanks had been brought to FFEP from the Natanz site. The results of the analyses of the later environmental samples are pending. The Agency has verified that the construction of the facility is ongoing, but that no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility as of 16 February 2010.

## **B. Reprocessing Activities**

18. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. The Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR on 11 November 2009, and on 23 January 2010 at the MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not currently available to it for Iran.

## C. Heavy Water Related Projects

19. In resolution 1737 (2006), the Security Council decided in operative paragraph 2 thereof that Iran was to suspend certain activities, including “work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA”. In that resolution, the Council also decided, inter alia, that Iran “shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requires to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports”.

20. As indicated in GOV/2009/74, during a DIV carried out at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan on 25 October 2009, the Agency observed a large number of drums said by Iran to contain heavy water. In a letter dated 10 November 2009, the Agency asked Iran to confirm the number of drums and their contents, and to provide information on the origin of the heavy water. In its letter dated 18 November 2009 responding to the Agency, Iran stated that “the origin of the heavy water is the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

21. In light of the request of the Security Council that the Agency verify the suspension by Iran, inter alia, of all heavy water related projects, and to report on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension thereof, the Agency needs to be able to confirm the contents of the drums, and the origin of the heavy water said to be contained in the drums. To that end, in a letter dated 7 January 2010, the Agency informed Iran that, during the DIV at UCF scheduled for 17 January 2010, it planned to take samples of the heavy water for destructive analysis. In a letter dated 14 January 2010, Iran objected to the taking of such samples, stating that there was no provision in the Safeguards Agreement for the sampling of non-nuclear material for destructive analysis. During the 17 January 2010 DIV, the Agency counted 756 50-litre drums said by Iran to contain heavy water, and weighed a small number of randomly selected drums, but was not permitted to take samples of the heavy water to confirm the contents of the drums.

22. On 13 January 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). It confirmed that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been produced since May 2009. On 18 January 2010, the Agency received a revised DIQ for FMP which included information originally requested by the Agency in June 2009 on the design features of the fuel assembly verified by the Agency during its May 2009 inspection at FMP.

23. On 8 February 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. However, as previously indicated to the Board, in light of Iran’s refusal to permit the Agency access to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP), the Agency has had to rely on satellite imagery to monitor the status of that plant. Based on recent images, the HWPP seems to be in operation again. However, it has to be noted that these images can only provide information on what was happening at the time the images were taken. In accordance with the Security Council’s request that the Agency verify the suspension of heavy water related projects in Iran, and particularly in light of the presence at UCF of what Iran has described as Iranian origin heavy water, the Agency needs direct access to the HWPP.

24. In a letter dated 15 February 2010, the Agency reiterated its requests that Iran make the necessary arrangements to provide the Agency, at the earliest possible date, with access to: the HWPP; the heavy water stored at UCF for the purpose of taking samples for destructive analysis; and any other location in Iran where heavy water related projects are being carried out.



## **D. Other Implementation Issues**

### **D.1. Uranium Conversion**

25. According to the design information provided by Iran and revised as of 12 November 2009, UCF will eventually include the following process lines:

- production of natural UF<sub>6</sub> from uranium ore concentrate for further enrichment (completed and operational);
- production of natural UO<sub>2</sub> from uranium ore concentrate for the IR-40 reactor fuel (expected to be completed by March 2010);
- production of natural uranium metal ingots from UF<sub>4</sub> for research and development (R&D) purposes (completed but not yet in operation);
- production of low enriched UO<sub>2</sub> (maximum 5% U-235 enrichment) from UF<sub>6</sub> for light water reactor fuel (building under construction);
- production of low enriched uranium metal (maximum 19.7% U-235 enrichment) from UF<sub>6</sub> for R&D purposes (no equipment installed yet);
- production of depleted UF<sub>4</sub> powder from UF<sub>6</sub> for further conversion process to uranium metal (building under construction);
- and production of depleted uranium metal from UF<sub>4</sub> for storage and shielding purposes (construction not yet started).

Under cover of a letter dated 11 February 2010, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF which included a reference to an additional R&D activity on the conversion of depleted UF<sub>6</sub> to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>.

26. In October 2009, the Agency requested Iran to provide information regarding the layout, equipment and installation schedule for an analytical laboratory which Iran had indicated would be installed in an underground location in one of the storage areas of UCF. Under cover of a letter dated 13 December 2009, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF which included, inter alia, the layout of the laboratory. On 9 February 2010, the Agency provided comments on the DIQ to Iran, reiterating its request that Iran include information related to the equipment and installation schedule for the laboratory.

27. On 17 January 2010, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at UCF. At that time, the plant was undergoing maintenance. No UF<sub>6</sub> has been produced since 10 August 2009; however, since that date, five tonnes of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> which had been previously produced but were held up in the process were discharged from the process on 15 November 2009. The total amount of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF since March 2004 therefore is 371 tonnes (some of which has been transferred to FEP and PFEP), which remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance. Currently, there are 42 tonnes of uranium in the form of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) stored at UCF.

### **D.2. Design Information**

28. In a letter dated 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to suspend the implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, which Iran

had accepted in 2003. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision.<sup>9</sup> The Agency reiterated that request in a letter dated 16 October 2008.

29. The modified Code 3.1, to which Iran agreed in 2003, provides for submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of further design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.

30. In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement,<sup>10</sup> agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of a provision agreed to in Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force for Iran.

31. Both in the case of the Darkhovin facility<sup>11</sup> and FFEP, Iran did not notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facilities, as required in the modified Code 3.1, and has provided only limited design information. Iran's actions in this regard are inconsistent with its obligation under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, and raise concerns about the completeness of its declarations.

32. In a letter to Iran dated 6 November 2009 referring to Iran's decision to build FFEP, the Agency asked Iran, *inter alia*, to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct or to authorize construction of any other nuclear facilities, and that there were currently no such facilities in Iran which have not been declared to the Agency. In its reply dated 2 December 2009, Iran stated that, "The Islamic Republic of Iran will inform the Agency, as it has been done before, on the existence of any other nuclear facility in Iran in accordance to the Safeguards Agreement with the Agency (INFCIRC/214)".

33. In a letter dated 2 December 2009, the Agency referred to Iran's public announcement of its intention to build ten new uranium enrichment facilities and to statements reportedly made by Iran that the location of five sites had already been decided and that five other plants would be built throughout the country, and asked Iran whether the information contained in these reports was correct. The Agency further requested that, if a decision to construct new enrichment facilities has been taken by Iran, Iran provide the Agency with further information regarding the design and scheduling of the construction of such facilities. In its reply dated 17 December 2009, in which Iran referred to its letter of 29 March 2007 suspending the implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and reverting to the implementation of the version reflected in the Subsidiary Arrangements dated 12 February 1976, Iran stated that it would "provide the Agency with the required information if necessary".

34. Article 45 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement requires that the Agency be provided with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary. An increase in the maximum declared enrichment level from 5% U-235 to up to 20% U-235 is clearly relevant for safeguards purposes, and, accordingly, should have been notified to the Agency with sufficient time for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures at PFEP.

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<sup>9</sup> GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14.

<sup>10</sup> Article 39 of the Safeguards Agreement provides, *inter alia*, that the Subsidiary Arrangements "may be extended or changed by agreement between the Government of Iran and the Agency ...".

<sup>11</sup> GOV/2009/74, para. 26.

35. Iran has not yet resumed implementation of the modified Code 3.1. It remains the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities.

### **D.3. Other Matters**

36. On 8 December 2009, at the request of Iran, seals were detached from 31 containers at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) so that a technical examination of the fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use at the BNPP could be carried out. Upon completion of the technical examination, the fuel assemblies will be re-verified by the Agency, and placed again under seal.

37. On 9 January 2010, the Agency conducted a DIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran, during which the Agency was informed that pyroprocessing R&D activities had been initiated at JHL to study the electrochemical production of uranium metal. In a letter dated 3 February 2010, the Agency requested Iran to provide more information regarding these activities.

38. Based on satellite imagery, the Agency assesses that uranium recovery activities are continuing in the area of the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.

39. Since early 2008, the Agency has requested that Iran provide access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment and uranium mining and milling (GOV/2008/15, para. 13). Particularly in light of recent developments in, and statements by, Iran regarding the planned construction of new nuclear facilities, the Agency requests Iran to grant the Agency access to these locations as soon as possible.

## **E. Possible Military Dimensions**

40. In order to confirm, as required by the Safeguards Agreement, that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities, the Agency needs to have confidence in the absence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran,<sup>12</sup> including, inter alia, that Iran implement the Additional Protocol and provide the Agency with the information and access necessary to: resolve questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to the defence industries.

41. The information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It is also broadly consistent and credible in terms of the technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and

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<sup>12</sup> A summary of the issues was provided to the Board in Section E of GOV/2008/15, and most recently in GOV/2009/74, para. 31.

organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. These alleged activities consist of a number of projects and sub-projects, covering nuclear and missile related aspects, run by military related organizations.

42. Among the activities which the Agency has attempted to discuss with Iran are: activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of  $UO_2$  to  $UF_4$ , known as “the green salt project”; and various procurement related activities. Specifically, the Agency has, inter alia, sought clarification of the following: whether Iran was engaged in undeclared activities for the production of  $UF_4$  (green salt) involving the Kimia Maadan company; whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes; whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; whether the engineering design and computer modelling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment.

43. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran: the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons. Addressing these issues is important for clarifying the Agency’s concerns about these activities and those described above, which seem to have continued beyond 2004.

44. Since August 2008, Iran has declined to discuss the above issues with the Agency or to provide any further information and access (to locations and/or people) to address these concerns, asserting that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and that the information to which the Agency is referring is based on forgeries.

45. With the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of information, it is important that Iran engage with the Agency on these issues, and that the Agency be permitted to visit all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to interview relevant persons, without further delay. Iran’s substantive engagement would enable the Agency to make progress in its work. Through Iran’s active cooperation, progress has been made in the past in certain other areas where questions have been raised; this should also be possible in connection with questions about military related dimensions.

## **F. Summary**

46. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

47. Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in clarifying outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, and to



implement the modified text of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information.

48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has continued with the operation of PFEP and FEP at Natanz, and the construction of a new enrichment plant at Fordow. Iran has also announced the intention to build ten new enrichment plants. Iran recently began feeding low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> produced at FEP into one cascade of PFEP with the aim of enriching it up to 20% in U-235. The period of notice provided by Iran regarding related changes made to PFEP was insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran started to feed the material into PFEP. The Agency's work to verify FFEP and to understand the original purpose of the facility and the chronology of its design and construction remain ongoing. Iran is not providing access to information such as the original design documentation for FFEP or access to companies involved in the design and construction of the plant.

49. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and related heavy water activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.

50. The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Additional Protocol.

51. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.




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**Resolution 1929 (2010)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 6335th meeting, on  
9 June 2010**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1887 (2009) and *reaffirming* their provisions,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and *recalling* the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Recalling* the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15), 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53), 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), 22 February 2007 (GOV/2007/8), 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), 26 May 2008 (GOV/2008/15), 15 September 2008 (GOV/2008/38), 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59), 19 February 2009 (GOV/2009/8), 5 June 2009 (GOV/2009/35), 28 August 2009 (GOV/2009/55), 16 November 2009 (GOV/2009/74), 18 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10) and 31 May 2010 (GOV/2010/28) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor cooperated with the IAEA in connection with the remaining issues of concern, which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council

\* Reissued for technical reasons.

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resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

*Reaffirming* that outstanding issues can be best resolved and confidence built in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme by Iran responding positively to all the calls which the Council and the IAEA Board of Governors have made on Iran,

*Noting* with serious concern the role of elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as "Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution"), including those specified in Annex D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007) and Annex II of this resolution, in Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

*Noting* with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and that Iran failed to notify it to the IAEA until September 2009, which is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,

*Also noting* the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2009/82), which urges Iran to suspend immediately construction at Qom, and to clarify the facility's purpose, chronology of design and construction, and calls upon Iran to confirm, as requested by the IAEA, that it has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the IAEA,

*Noting* with serious concern that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,

*Noting* with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA's right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, and *emphasizing* that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the IAEA's right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

*Reiterating* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, and *commending* the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme,

*Expressing* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and *noting* in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,

*Emphasizing also*, however, in the context of these efforts, the importance of Iran addressing the core issues related to its nuclear programme,

*Stressing* that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521) and their June 2008 proposals (INFCIRC/730), and *noting* the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Welcoming* the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1803 (2008), and *recalling* in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,

*Recognizing* that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran's revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and *further noting* that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities,

*Having regard* to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,

*Recalling* that the law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), sets out the legal framework applicable to ocean activities,

*Calling* for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by Iran at an early date,

*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Stressing* that nothing in this resolution compels States to take measures or actions exceeding the scope of this resolution, including the use of force or the threat of force,

*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Affirms* that Iran has so far failed to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008);



2. *Affirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, to resolve outstanding questions and to address the serious concerns raised by the construction of an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and, in this context, *further affirms* its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

3. *Reaffirms* that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the IAEA, and *stresses* the importance of ensuring that the IAEA have all necessary resources and authority for the fulfilment of its work in Iran;

4. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in Iran;

5. *Decides* that Iran shall without delay comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, *calls upon* Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, *calls upon* Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol, and *reaffirms* that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, Iran's Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and *notes* that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement;

6. *Reaffirms* that, in accordance with Iran's obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility;

7. *Decides* that Iran shall not acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials and technology as listed in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1, in particular uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities, all heavy-water activities or technology-related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and *further decides* that all States shall prohibit such investment in territories under their jurisdiction by Iran, its nationals, and entities incorporated in Iran or subject to its jurisdiction, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them;

8. *Decides* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or

missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), *decides* further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel;

9. *Decides* that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities;

10. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex C, D and E of resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I of resolution 1747 (2007), Annex I of resolution 1803 (2008) and Annexes I and II of this resolution, or by the Security Council or the Committee pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the provision to Iran of items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), *underlines* that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and *decides* that the measures imposed in this paragraph shall not apply when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

11. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

12. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, also known as “Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution”) individuals and entities specified in Annex II, and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance over those transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

13. *Decides* that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items in S/2006/814 shall be superseded by the list of items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1 and

INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, and any further items if the State determines that they could contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and further *decides* that for the purposes of the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), the list of items contained in S/2006/815 shall be superseded by the list of items contained in S/2010/263;

14. *Calls upon* all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from Iran, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

15. *Notes* that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and *calls upon* all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

16. *Decides* to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and *decides* further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts;

17. *Requires* any State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 above to submit to the Committee within five working days an initial written report containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if items prohibited for transfer are found, *further requires* such States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

18. *Decides* that all States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to Iranian-owned or -contracted vessels, including chartered vessels, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of

resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and *underlines* that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities;

19. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the entities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as specified in Annex III and to any person or entity acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, or determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted them in evading the sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

20. *Requests* all Member States to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers or activity by Iran Air's cargo division or vessels owned or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions of, or in violation of the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution, including renaming or re-registering of aircraft, vessels or ships, and requests the Committee to make that information widely available;

21. *Calls upon* all States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are related to such programmes or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;

22. *Decides* that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran's jurisdiction, including those of the IRGC and IRISL, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution;

23. *Calls upon* States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision



of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

24. *Calls upon* States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

25. *Deplores* the violations of the prohibitions of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007) that have been reported to the Committee since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), and *commends* States that have taken action to respond to these violations and report them to the Committee;

26. *Directs* the Committee to respond effectively to violations of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, and *recalls* that the Committee may designate individuals and entities who have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, these resolutions;

27. *Decides* that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, including through a work programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted to the Council within forty-five days of the adoption of this resolution;

28. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006), as amended by paragraph 14 of resolution 1803 (2008), shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution, including to receive reports from States submitted pursuant to paragraph 17 above;

29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee, to carry out the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) and paragraph 28 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures; and (d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

30. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

31. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24;

32. *Stresses* the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue and consultations, including to resume dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue without preconditions, most recently in their meeting with Iran in Geneva on 1 October 2009, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue on the basis of the proposal made by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States on 14 June 2008, which would allow for the development of relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme and, inter alia, starting formal negotiations with Iran on the basis of the June 2008 proposal, and *acknowledges with appreciation* that the June 2008 proposal, as attached in Annex IV to this resolution, remains on the table;

33. *Encourages* the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution, including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks, and *encourages* Iran to respond positively to such proposals;

34. *Commends* the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, *regrets* that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and *encourages* the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council's resolutions;

35. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution;

36. *Requests* within 90 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and with other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

37. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 36 above, to be submitted within 90 days, and: (a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome; (b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of resolution 1803 (2008), and in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board of Governors; (c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and *underlines* that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

38. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## Annex I

### Individuals and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

#### Entities

1. **Amin Industrial Complex:** Amin Industrial Complex sought temperature controllers which may be used in nuclear research and operational/production facilities. Amin Industrial Complex is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006).

Location: P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Amin Industrial Estate, Khalage Rd., Seyedi District, Mashad, Iran; Kaveh Complex, Khalaj Rd., Seyedi St., Mashad, Iran

A.K.A.: Amin Industrial Compound and Amin Industrial Company

2. **Armament Industries Group:** Armament Industries Group (AIG) manufactures and services a variety of small arms and light weapons, including large- and medium-calibre guns and related technology. AIG conducts the majority of its procurement activity through Hadid Industries Complex.

Location: Sepah Islam Road, Karaj Special Road Km 10, Iran; Pasdaran Ave., P.O. Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

3. **Defense Technology and Science Research Center:** Defense Technology and Science Research Center (DTSRC) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees Iran's defence R&D, production, maintenance, exports, and procurement.

Location: Pasdaran Ave, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

4. **Doostan International Company:** Doostan International Company (DICO) supplies elements to Iran's ballistic missile program.

5. **Farasakht Industries:** Farasakht Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which in turn is owned or controlled by MODAFL.

Location: P.O. Box 83145-311, Kilometer 28, Esfahan-Tehran Freeway, Shahin Shahr, Esfahan, Iran

6. **First East Export Bank, P.L.C.:** First East Export Bank, PLC is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, Bank Mellat. Over the last seven years, Bank Mellat has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions for Iranian nuclear, missile, and defense entities.

Location: Unit Level 10 (B1), Main Office Tower, Financial Park Labuan, Jalan Merdeka, 87000 WP Labuan, Malaysia; Business Registration Number LL06889 (Malaysia)

7. **Kaveh Cutting Tools Company:** Kaveh Cutting Tools Company is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.



Location: 3rd Km of Khalaj Road, Seyyedi Street, Mashad 91638, Iran; Km 4 of Khalaj Road, End of Seyedi Street, Mashad, Iran; P.O. Box 91735-549, Mashad, Iran; Khalaj Rd., End of Seyyedi Alley, Mashad, Iran; Moqan St., Pasdaran St., Pasdaran Cross Rd., Tehran, Iran

8. **M. Babaie Industries**: M. Babaie Industries is subordinate to Shahid Ahmad Kazemi Industries Group (formally the Air Defense Missile Industries Group) of Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). AIO controls the missile organizations Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated in resolution 1737 (2006).

Location: P.O. Box 16535-76, Tehran, 16548, Iran

9. **Malek Ashtar University**: A subordinate of the DTRSC within MODAFL. This includes research groups previously falling under the Physics Research Center (PHRC). IAEA inspectors have not been allowed to interview staff or see documents under the control of this organization to resolve the outstanding issue of the possible military dimension to Iran's nuclear program.

Location: Corner of Imam Ali Highway and Babaei Highway, Tehran, Iran

10. **Ministry of Defense Logistics Export**: Ministry of Defense Logistics Export (MODLEX) sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world in contravention of resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits Iran from selling arms or related materiel.

Location: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran; located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran

11. **Mizan Machinery Manufacturing**: Mizan Machinery Manufacturing (3M) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SHIG.

Location: P.O. Box 16595-365, Tehran, Iran

A.K.A.: 3MG

12. **Modern Industries Technique Company**: Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) is responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak. MITEC has spearheaded procurement for the construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor.

Location: Arak, Iran

A.K.A.: Rahkar Company, Rahkar Industries, Rahkar Sanaye Company, Rahkar Sanaye Novin

13. **Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine**: The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (NFRPC) is a large research component of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which was designated in resolution 1737 (2006). The NFRPC is AEOI's center for the development of nuclear fuel and is involved in enrichment-related activities.

Location: P.O. Box 31585-4395, Karaj, Iran

A.K.A.: Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine; Karaji Agricultural and Medical Research Center

14. **Pejman Industrial Services Corporation:** Pejman Industrial Services Corporation is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: P.O. Box 16785-195, Tehran, Iran

15. **Sabalan Company:** Sabalan is a cover name for SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

16. **Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO):** SAPICO is a cover name for SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

17. **Shahid Karrazi Industries:** Shahid Karrazi Industries is owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Tehran, Iran

18. **Shahid Satarri Industries:** Shahid Sattari Industries is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, SBIG.

Location: Southeast Tehran, Iran

A.K.A.: Shahid Sattari Group Equipment Industries

19. **Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries:** Shahid Sayyade Shirazi Industries (SSSI) is owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, the DIO.

Location: Next To Nirou Battery Mfg. Co, Shahid Babaii Expressway, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran; Pasdaran St., P.O. Box 16765, Tehran 1835, Iran; Babaei Highway — Next to Niru M.F.G, Tehran, Iran

20. **Special Industries Group:** Special Industries Group (SIG) is a subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

21. **Tiz Pars:** Tiz Pars is a cover name for SHIG. Between April and July 2007, Tiz Pars attempted to procure a five axis laser welding and cutting machine, which could make a material contribution to Iran's missile program, on behalf of SHIG.

Location: Damavand Tehran Highway, Tehran, Iran

22. **Yazd Metallurgy Industries:** Yazd Metallurgy Industries (YMI) is a subordinate of DIO.

Location: Pasdaran Avenue, Next To Telecommunication Industry, Tehran 16588, Iran; Postal Box 89195/878, Yazd, Iran; P.O. Box 89195-678, Yazd, Iran; Km 5 of Taft Road, Yazd, Iran

A.K.A.: Yazd Ammunition Manufacturing and Metallurgy Industries, Directorate of Yazd Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries

### Individuals

**Javad Rahiqi:** Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (additional information: DOB: 24 April 1954; POB: Marshad).

## Annex II

### Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

1. **Fater (or Faater) Institute:** Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) subsidiary. Fater has worked with foreign suppliers, likely on behalf of other KAA companies on IRGC projects in Iran.
2. **Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem:** Gharagahe Sazandegi Ghaem is owned or controlled by KAA.
3. **Ghorb Karbala:** Ghorb Karbala is owned or controlled by KAA.
4. **Ghorb Nooh:** Ghorb Nooh is owned or controlled by KAA.
5. **Hara Company:** Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
6. **Imensazan Consultant Engineers Institute:** Owned or controlled by, or acts on behalf of, KAA.
7. **Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters:** Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA) is an IRGC-owned company involved in large scale civil and military construction projects and other engineering activities. It undertakes a significant amount of work on Passive Defense Organization projects. In particular, KAA subsidiaries were heavily involved in the construction of the uranium enrichment site at Qom/Fordow.
8. **Makin:** Makin is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
9. **Omran Sahel:** Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
10. **Oriental Oil Kish:** Oriental Oil Kish is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
11. **Rah Sahel:** Rah Sahel is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
12. **Rahab Engineering Institute:** Rahab is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA, and is a subsidiary of KAA.
13. **Sahel Consultant Engineers:** Owned or controlled by Ghorb Nooh.
14. **Sepanir:** Sepanir is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.
15. **Sepasad Engineering Company:** Sepasad Engineering Company is owned or controlled by or acting on behalf of KAA.

## **Annex III**

### **Entities owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)**

1. **Irano Hind Shipping Company**

Location: 18 Mehrshad Street, Sadaghat Street, Opposite of Park Mellat, Vali-e-Asr Ave., Tehran, Iran; 265, Next to Mehrshad, Sedaghat St., Opposite of Mellat Park, Vali Asr Ave., Tehran 1A001, Iran

2. **IRISL Benelux NV**

Location: Noorderlaan 139, B-2030, Antwerp, Belgium; V.A.T. Number BE480224531 (Belgium)

3. **South Shipping Line Iran (SSL)**

Location: Apt. No. 7, 3rd Floor, No. 2, 4th Alley, Gandi Ave., Tehran, Iran; Qaem Magham Farahani St., Tehran, Iran



## Annex IV

### **Proposal to the Islamic Republic of Iran by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union**

*Presented to the Iranian authorities on 14 June 2008 Teheran*

#### **Possible Areas of Cooperation with Iran**

In order to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and building further upon the proposal presented to Iran in June 2006, which remains on the table, the elements below are proposed as topics for negotiations between China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, joined by the High Representative of the European Union, as long as Iran verifiably suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, pursuant to OP 15 and OP 19(a) of UNSCR 1803. In the perspective of such negotiations, we also expect Iran to heed the requirements of the UNSC and the IAEA. For their part, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative state their readiness:

to recognize Iran's right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations;

to treat Iran's nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored.

#### **Nuclear Energy**

- Reaffirmation of Iran's right to nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT.
- Provision of technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy, support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
- Support for construction of LWR based on state-of-the-art technology.
- Support for R&D in nuclear energy as international confidence is gradually restored.
- Provision of legally binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
- Cooperation with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

#### **Political**

- Improving the six countries' and the EU's relations with Iran and building up mutual trust.
- Encouragement of direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
- Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.

- Promotion of dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues.
- Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security.
- Establishment of appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
- Support for a conference on regional security issues.
- Reaffirmation that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.
- Reaffirmation of the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
- Cooperation on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programmes on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.

#### **Economic**

Steps towards the normalization of trade and economic relations, such as improving Iran's access to the international economy, markets and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization, and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.

#### **Energy Partnership**

Steps towards the normalization of cooperation with Iran in the area of energy: establishment of a long-term and wide-ranging strategic energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications/measures.

#### **Agriculture**

- Support for agricultural development in Iran.

Facilitation of Iran's complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.

#### **Environment, Infrastructure**

- Civilian Projects in the field of environmental protection, infrastructure, science and technology, and high-tech:
  - Development of transport infrastructure, including international transport corridors.
  - Support for modernization of Iran's telecommunication infrastructure, including by possible removal of relevant export restrictions.

### **Civil Aviation**

- Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran:
  - Enabling Iran to renew its civil aviation fleet;
  - Assisting Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety standards.

### **Economic, social and human development/humanitarian issues**

- Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran’s economic and social development and humanitarian need.
- Cooperation/technical support in education in areas of benefit to Iran:
  - Supporting Iranians to take courses, placements or degrees in areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies;
  - Supporting partnerships between Higher Education Institutions e.g. public health, rural livelihoods, joint scientific projects, public administration, history and philosophy.
- Cooperation in the field of development of effective emergency response capabilities (e.g. seismology, earthquake research, disaster control etc.).
- Cooperation within the framework of a “dialogue among civilizations”.

### **Implementation mechanism**

- Constitution of joint monitoring groups for the implementation of a future agreement.
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## Board of Governors

**GOV/2010/46**

Date: 6 September 2010

Original: English

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**For official use only**

Item 7(d) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2010/38)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

1. This is the report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran);<sup>1</sup> it includes developments since the last report was issued in May 2010.<sup>2</sup>

2. On 9 June 2010, the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010), in which the Council, inter alia:

- Affirmed that Iran has failed to meet the requirements of the Board of Governors and to comply with Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008);
- Affirmed that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82;
- Further affirmed that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) (i.e. to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as well as work on all heavy water related activities);
- Reaffirmed that Iran shall cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including by providing access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency;

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<sup>1</sup> The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010).

<sup>2</sup> GOV/2010/28 (31 May 2010).



- Decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of, and to ratify promptly, the Additional Protocol; and reaffirmed that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, Iran's Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangements, including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and noted that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangements;
- Reaffirmed that, in accordance with Iran's obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water related and enrichment related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any such facility;
- Requested the Director General to communicate to the Security Council all reports from the Director General on the application of safeguards in Iran; and
- Requested a report from the Director General, within 90 days, on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the Board and with other provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010).

## A. Enrichment Related Activities

### A.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

3. **Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP):** There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units (Units A21 to A28) are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has been provided for Production Hall B.

4. On 28 August 2010, Iran was feeding natural UF<sub>6</sub> into 17 cascades of Unit A24, and 6 cascades of Unit A26, at FEP. All 18 cascades of Unit A28, the remaining cascade of Unit A24 and the remaining 12 cascades of Unit A26 (6 cascades of which were under vacuum) were also installed, but were not being fed with UF<sub>6</sub>.<sup>3</sup> To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines, of which there are 164 in each cascade. Installation work in Units A21, A22, A23, A25 and A27 was ongoing but no centrifuges had been installed. As of 28 August 2010, there had been no installation work in Production Hall B.

5. On 22 November 2009, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP.<sup>4</sup> The Agency is continuing its evaluation of the material balance for the period 18 November 2008 to 22 November 2009, taking into account new information provided by Iran. In letters dated 9 August 2010 and 17 August 2010, Iran informed the Agency that it had underestimated the hold-up of nuclear material in the facility and provided a revised estimation. Iran also informed the Agency

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<sup>3</sup> On 28 August 2010, of the 8856 centrifuges which had been installed at FEP, 3772 centrifuges were being fed with UF<sub>6</sub>.

<sup>4</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 4.

how it intended to improve the nuclear material accountancy system of the facility. Until its evaluation has been completed, the Agency cannot confirm the nuclear material balance.<sup>5</sup>

6. Iran has estimated that, between 23 November 2009 and 6 August 2010, it produced an additional 995 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub>,<sup>6</sup> which would result in a total production of 2803 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> since the start of operations in February 2007.<sup>7</sup> The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.<sup>8</sup> The Agency reminded Iran, in a letter dated 19 July 2010, of a number of incidents involving the breaking of seals by the operator at FEP. In a letter dated 9 August 2010, Iran provided more information about these incidents and stated that the breakages were accidental and that “all necessary advice and instructions have been given to the operator to exercise more vigilance and control in this respect”. The consequences for safeguards of these seal breakages will be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of the next PIV, which is currently planned for October 2010.

7. Since February 2007, the Agency has taken a large number of environmental samples at FEP, the results of which have indicated a level of enrichment of uranium of less than 5.0% U-235. In one recent result, a small number of particles from samples taken in the cascade area were found with enrichment levels of between 5.0% and 7.1% U-235, i.e. higher than that stated in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ). The Agency, in a letter dated 13 August 2010, informed Iran of this matter and requested clarification. In letters dated 17 August 2010 and 1 September 2010, Iran provided a possible explanation for the presence of such particles, along with supporting information. Iran’s explanation is not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings.<sup>9</sup>

8. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP):** PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades. Cascades 1 and 6, each of which can comprise up to 164 machines, are designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235. The other part of the cascade hall is designated as an “R&D area”.

9. In the R&D area, between 22 May 2010 and 20 August 2010, a total of approximately 84 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into a 20-machine IR-4 cascade, a 20-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges. In this area, no LEU is withdrawn because the product and the tails of this R&D activity are recombined at the end of the process.

10. On 9 February 2010, Iran began feeding low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> into Cascade 1 for the stated purpose of producing UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 as fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Iran subsequently informed the Agency that it intended to install a second 164-machine IR-1 cascade (Cascade 6) at PFEP and connect it to Cascade 1 with the aim of reducing the enrichment of tails

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<sup>5</sup> See GOV/2009/55, para. 4.

<sup>6</sup> The Agency has verified, through independently calibrated operator load cell readings, that, between 23 November 2009 and 7 August 2010, 10636 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into the cascades, and a total of 980 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> product and 9554 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> tails and dump material was off-loaded into UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. The difference of 102 kg between the input figure (10636 kg) and the sum of the output figures (980 kg + 9554 kg) comprises natural, depleted and low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> arising mainly from hold-up in the various cold traps and is not inconsistent with the design information provided by Iran.

<sup>7</sup> The Agency has verified that, as of 22 November 2009, a total of 1808 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced.

<sup>8</sup> In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not under containment and surveillance.

<sup>9</sup> In this regard, it should be noted that Iran’s explanation refers to a known technical phenomenon associated with the start-up of centrifuge cascades.

“from ~2% to ~0.7% U-235”.<sup>10</sup> The increase in the enrichment level and the interconnection of the two cascades necessitated a new safeguards approach, which has been implemented since 15 May 2010.<sup>11</sup>

11. In a letter dated 30 June 2010, Iran informed the Agency that it intended to start feeding LEU into the interconnected Cascades 1 and 6 and requested the Agency to rearrange the seals to allow Iran to operate the two cascades as planned. The Agency did so on 3 July 2010. On 17 July 2010, Iran informed the Agency that the feeding of Cascade 6 with the tails from Cascade 1 had started on 13 July 2010.

12. Iran has estimated that, between 9 February 2010 and 20 August 2010, a total of approximately 310 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched at FEP was fed into Cascade 1 and that 22 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 was produced. The UF<sub>6</sub> produced is being periodically withdrawn by Iran from Cascade 1 and loaded into a cylinder with a capacity of about 25 kg of UF<sub>6</sub>. This material is under containment and surveillance. Iran has stated that, once the cylinder is full, it will homogenize the UF<sub>6</sub> contained within, after which the Agency will sample the material for destructive analysis.

13. As of 7 April 2010, the results of the environmental samples taken at PFEP indicate that the maximum enrichment level in the DIQ (i.e. less than 20% U-235 enrichment) had not been exceeded at that plant.<sup>12</sup>

## **A.2. Qom: Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant**

14. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. The Agency verified that FFEP was being built to contain sixteen cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.<sup>13</sup>

15. The Agency has asked Iran on a number of occasions to provide additional information regarding the chronology of the design and construction of FFEP, as well as its original purpose.<sup>14</sup> In response to these requests, Iran has stated that, “The location [near Qom] originally was considered as a general area for passive defence contingency shelters for various utilizations. Then this location was selected for the construction of [the] Fuel Enrichment Plant in the second half of 2007”. The Agency has also reiterated the need for access to companies involved in the design and construction of FFEP. The Agency informed Iran that it had received extensive information from a number of sources alleging that design work on the facility had started in 2006.<sup>15</sup> In a letter to the Director General, dated 4 June 2010, Iran stated that there were “no legal bases” upon which the Agency could request information on the chronology and purpose of FFEP, and that the Agency was “not mandated to raise any question beyond the Safeguards Agreement”.<sup>16</sup> The Agency considers that the questions it has raised are within the terms of the Safeguards Agreement, and that the information requested is

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<sup>10</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

<sup>11</sup> A description of this new approach is set out in GOV/2010/28, para. 11.

<sup>12</sup> These results have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.0% U-235), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to 0.27% U-235).

<sup>13</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 14.

<sup>14</sup> GOV/2010/10, paras 14–16.

<sup>15</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 15.

<sup>16</sup> INFCIRC/797, para. 4.

essential for the Agency to verify the chronology and original purpose of FFEP to ensure that the declarations of Iran are correct and complete.<sup>17</sup>

16. In its response to the Agency's request that Iran submit a complete DIQ for FFEP,<sup>18</sup> Iran said, in a letter to the Director General dated 4 June 2010, that it had "fulfilled its obligation in providing the DIQ of FFEP" according to its Safeguards Agreement.<sup>19</sup> The Agency has informed Iran on a number of occasions that it considers that, based on the current construction status of the facility, additional information must be available to Iran and that this information should be included in the DIQ.

17. Since October 2009, the Agency has been conducting, on average, one design information verification (DIV) at FFEP per month. The Agency has verified that the construction of the facility is ongoing. As of 18 August 2010, no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. The results of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 16 February 2010 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.<sup>20</sup>

### **A.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities**

18. In light of the announcement made by Iran on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser uranium enrichment technology,<sup>21</sup> and its announcement on 9 April 2010 regarding the development of 'third generation' centrifuges,<sup>22</sup> the Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 18 August 2010, reiterated its previous request that Iran provide access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment (including laser enrichment), and uranium mining and milling activities.<sup>23</sup> In its reply dated 21 August 2010, Iran did not provide the Agency with the requested information but reiterated that it was "continuing to cooperate with the Agency in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement".

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<sup>17</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 14.

<sup>18</sup> Referred to in GOV/2010/28, para. 16.

<sup>19</sup> INFCIRC/797, para. 3.

<sup>20</sup> The results did show a small number of particles of depleted uranium (see GOV/2010/10, para. 17).

<sup>21</sup> Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at <http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255>

<sup>22</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 18.

<sup>23</sup> GOV/2008/15, para. 13.



## **B. Reprocessing Activities**

19. The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR<sup>24</sup> and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.<sup>25</sup> The Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR on 1 August 2010 and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 31 July 2010. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as Iran's Additional Protocol is not being implemented.

## **C. Heavy Water Related Projects**

20. As indicated in the Director General's previous reports, the Agency, as mandated by the Security Council, has requested that Iran make the necessary arrangements to provide the Agency, at the earliest possible date, with access to: the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP); the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for the taking of samples;<sup>26</sup> and any other location in Iran where projects related to heavy water are being carried out. In a letter to the Agency dated 10 June 2010, Iran stated that the Agency's requests had "no legal basis since they are not falling within Iran's Safeguards Agreement" and that the requests also went beyond the relevant Security Council resolutions that "request only verification of suspension".<sup>27</sup> Iran also stated that it had not suspended work on heavy water related projects.<sup>28</sup> To date, Iran has not provided the requested access.

21. On 2 August 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that construction of the facility was ongoing, with the civil construction of the buildings almost complete and some major equipment having been installed. This equipment includes the main crane in the reactor building and the pressurizer for the reactor cooling system. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 reactor is currently planned to commence in 2013. In the radiochemistry building, the concrete structure for the hot cells was ready, but no hot cell windows or manipulators were present.

22. Based on satellite imagery, the HWPP appears to be in operation.<sup>29</sup> However, without access to the HWPP, the Agency is unable to verify Iran's statement that it has not suspended work on heavy water related projects and therefore cannot report fully on this matter.

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<sup>24</sup> TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

<sup>25</sup> The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

<sup>26</sup> GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.

<sup>27</sup> INFCIRC/804, paras 12 and 13.

<sup>28</sup> INFCIRC/804, para. 13.

<sup>29</sup> As previously indicated to the Board, in light of Iran's refusal to permit the Agency access to the HWPP, the Agency has had to rely solely on satellite imagery.

## D. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

23. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the PIV carried out at UCF in March 2010,<sup>30</sup> and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at UCF as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with conversion plants of similar throughput.

24. On 4 August 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF. At that time, the plant was still undergoing maintenance. Iran informed the Agency, in a letter dated 4 July 2010, that UCF would resume full operations on 23 September 2010. As no UF<sub>6</sub> has been produced at UCF since 10 August 2009, the total amount of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> produced at UCF since March 2004 remains 371 tonnes (some of which has been transferred to FEP and PFEP), which remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance.

25. During the DIV on 4 August 2010, Iran informed the Agency that the installation of equipment at UCF for the conversion of the UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, required for the fabrication of fuel for TRR, would start in November 2010. In a letter dated 17 August 2010, Iran informed the Agency that experiments on the conversion of UF<sub>6</sub> to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> using depleted UF<sub>6</sub> would start at UCF in September 2011.

26. In a letter dated 28 June 2010, Iran provided an updated DIQ for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP), in which it stated that fuel fabrication for TRR will take place in part of a building at UCF. In a letter to the Agency dated 17 August 2010, Iran stated that it planned to install equipment for TRR fuel fabrication in November 2010. On 3 August 2010, the Agency carried out a PIV and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that no new fuel assemblies, rods or pellets for the IR-40 reactor had been produced.

## E. Other Activities

27. In a letter dated 9 August 2010, Iran informed the Agency that it would commence the transfer of fresh fuel to the reactor containment building at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP). As stated in the Director General's previous report, Iran has informed the Agency that it would perform a technical examination of fuel assemblies prior to loading them into the core of the reactor.<sup>31</sup> On 21 August 2010, the Agency confirmed that the transfer of fresh fuel into the reactor building had begun and commenced its re-verification activities.

28. The Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) is located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre and is a nuclear and non-nuclear chemistry research laboratory. On 31 July 2010, the Agency conducted a DIV and a PIV at JHL, during which Iran reiterated what it had stated during the DIV on 14 April 2010, specifically that the activities at JHL were related to "a research project aiming purely [at] studying the electrochemical behaviour of uranyl ion in ionic liquid", using a uranyl nitrate

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<sup>30</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 25.

<sup>31</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 27.

solution.<sup>32</sup> Iran also stated that these experimental activities had not yet begun. The Agency continues to monitor Iran's electrochemical R&D activities at this facility.

29. Based on satellite imagery, the Agency assesses that activities involving the mining and concentration of uranium are continuing in the area of the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant, and that construction activities are continuing at the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant and at the Saghand Uranium Mine.

## **F. Design Information**

30. As explained in previous reports of the Director General, the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force, notwithstanding Iran's decision in 2007 to suspend its implementation.<sup>33</sup> Although the Agency has, on numerous occasions, reminded Iran that it is obliged to provide design information in accordance with the modified Code 3.1, Iran has not resumed implementation of the modified Code 3.1, which is inconsistent with its obligation under the Subsidiary Arrangements. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.

31. In the case of both the Darkhovin facility and FFEP, Iran did not notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, the facilities, as required in the modified Code 3.1, and has provided only limited design information with respect to those facilities.<sup>34</sup> Iran has also not provided updated design information for the IR-40 reactor.

32. The Agency requested Iran, in a letter dated 18 June 2010, to confirm a statement made by the Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, H.E. Ali Akbar Salehi, to an Iranian news agency to the effect that Iran was designing a reactor similar to TRR, for the production of radioisotopes. In the same letter, the Agency also requested that, if a decision to construct new nuclear facilities had been taken by Iran, Iran provide further information regarding the design and scheduling of the construction of the facilities. In its reply, dated 23 June 2010, Iran reiterated that it was continuing to cooperate with the Agency "in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement".

33. On 16 August 2010, H.E. Ali Akbar Salehi announced that "studies for the location of 10 other uranium enrichment facilities" had ended, and that "the construction of one of these facilities will begin by the end of the (current Iranian) year (March 2011) or start of the next year".<sup>35</sup> In a letter dated 19 August 2010, the Agency requested Iran to provide preliminary design information for the facility. In its reply dated 21 August 2010, Iran did not provide the requested information and stated only that it would provide the Agency with the required information "in due time". These latest communications between Iran and the Agency follow similar exchanges relating to public statements

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<sup>32</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 28.

<sup>33</sup> GOV/2010/10, paras 28–30.

<sup>34</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 31.

<sup>35</sup> 'Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites', Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.

made by Iranian officials in relation to the possible construction of new nuclear facilities.<sup>36</sup> Iran has also said that the statements on design information as set out in paragraphs 30 to 33 of the Director General's previous report (GOV/2010/28) have "no legal base".<sup>37</sup>

34. The modification of PFEP to produce uranium enriched up to 20% in U-235,<sup>38</sup> which is clearly relevant for safeguards purposes, was not notified to the Agency by Iran with sufficient time for the Agency to adjust its safeguards procedures, as required under Article 45 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement.<sup>39</sup>

## G. Designation of Inspectors

35. In a letter to the Director General dated 3 June 2010, Iran stated that, henceforth, if confidential information acquired by the Agency as a result of implementing its Safeguards Agreement "leaks, in any way, and/or [is] conveyed to the media; for the first reaction, the designation of the relevant inspector(s) will be withdrawn".<sup>40</sup> In a letter to the Director General dated 10 June 2010, referring to the "false and wrong statements in paragraph 28" of the Director General's previous report (GOV/2010/28), Iran informed the Agency that it objected to the designation of two inspectors who had recently conducted inspections in Iran.

36. While Iran's Safeguards Agreement does permit it to object to the designation of Agency inspectors, the Agency rejects the basis upon which Iran has sought to justify its objection in this case. The Agency has full confidence in the professionalism and impartiality of the inspectors concerned, as it has in all of its inspectors, and confirms that the Director General's previous report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran (GOV/2010/28) is fully accurate.

37. In a meeting with the Resident Representative of Iran to the Agency on 20 July 2010, the Agency informed the Resident Representative that the repeated objection by Iran to the designation of inspectors with experience in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and facilities hampers the inspection process and thereby detracts from the Agency's capability to implement effective and efficient safeguards in Iran. In this regard, at the same meeting, the Agency again requested that Iran reconsider its decision of 16 January 2007 to request the Agency to withdraw the designation of 38 Agency inspectors and its requests (dating back to 2006) to withdraw the designations of four other inspectors with experience in conducting inspections in Iran. While acknowledging Iran's recent acceptance of the designation of five new inspectors (in letters from Iran to the Agency dated 14 April 2010 and 16 August 2010), the Agency will continue to request Iran to withdraw its objection to the designation of inspectors with experience in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and facilities.

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<sup>36</sup> See GOV/2010/28, para. 32.

<sup>37</sup> INFCIRC/804, para. 18.

<sup>38</sup> This refers to the original modification that enabled the commencement of enrichment up to 20% in U-235 on 9 February 2010 (GOV/2010/10, para. 9), rather than to the subsequent additional modification involving the interconnection of two cascades.

<sup>39</sup> The period of notice provided by Iran regarding the related changes made to PFEP was insufficient for the Agency to adjust the existing safeguards procedures before Iran started to feed the material into PFEP (GOV/2010/10, para. 48).

<sup>40</sup> See INFCIRC/796, 10 June 2010, para. 10.



## H. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and the actions required of Iran necessary to resolve those issues.<sup>41</sup> In the Director General's February 2010 report (GOV/2010/10), the Agency described a number of technical matters it needed to address with Iran.<sup>42</sup> Since August 2008, however, Iran has declined to discuss the outstanding issues with the Agency or to provide any further information or access to locations and people necessary to address the Agency's concerns, asserting that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and that the information to which the Agency is referring is based on forged documents.

39. Based on an overall analysis undertaken by the Agency of all the information available to it,<sup>43</sup> the Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. There are indications that certain of these activities may have continued beyond 2004.

40. It is essential that Iran engage with the Agency on these issues, and that the Agency be permitted to visit all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to interview all relevant persons, without further delay. The passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of some relevant information increase the urgency of this matter. Iran's substantive and proactive engagement is essential to enable the Agency to make progress in its verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations.

## I. Summary

41. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.<sup>44</sup>

42. More specifically, Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of Iran's nuclear programme and to resolving outstanding questions. In particular, Iran needs to cooperate in clarifying outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme, including by providing access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents

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<sup>41</sup> A summary of the issues was provided to the Board in Section E of GOV/2008/15, and most recently in GOV/2010/10, para. 40.

<sup>42</sup> GOV/2010/10, paras 42–43.

<sup>43</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 41.

<sup>44</sup> The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49). Paragraph 41 reflects the past and current implementation by Iran of its Safeguards Agreement and other obligations.

requested by the Agency. Iran also needs to implement the modified Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

43. In addition, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation of FEP and PFEP at Natanz, and has started the enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 at PFEP, now in two interconnected cascades. Iran has continued the construction of FFEP. In order to verify the chronology and original purpose of FFEP, Iran still needs to provide the Agency with access to relevant design documents and to companies involved in the design and construction of the plant. Iran also needs to submit a complete DIQ for the facility. Iran has also announced that it has selected the venues for new enrichment facilities and that construction of one of these facilities will start around March 2011, but has not provided the Agency with the necessary design information and access in accordance with Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Subsidiary Arrangements.

44. Similarly, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and with heavy water related activities. The Agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the HWPP. While the Agency can report that Iran has made statements to the effect that it has not suspended those activities, without full access to the heavy water at UCF, the HWPP and the other facilities which Iran has announced it has decided to construct, the Agency is unable to verify such statements and therefore to report fully on this matter.

45. Iran objected to the designation of two inspectors who had recently conducted inspections in Iran. The Agency rejects the basis upon which Iran has sought to justify its objection; it is also concerned that the repeated objection to the designation of experienced inspectors hampers the inspection process and detracts from the Agency's ability to implement safeguards in Iran.

46. The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including implementation of its Additional Protocol.

47. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

## Board of Governors

**GOV/2012/55**

Date: 16 November 2012

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Item 5(d) of the provisional agenda  
(GOV/2012/54)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

## **A. Introduction**

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement<sup>1</sup> and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions<sup>2</sup> are binding on Iran.<sup>3</sup> The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council

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<sup>1</sup> The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

<sup>2</sup> The Board of Governors has adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009); GOV/2011/69 (18 November 2011); and GOV/2012/50 (13 September 2012).

<sup>3</sup> In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran's obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (paras 1–6).

resolutions<sup>4</sup> were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.<sup>5</sup>

3. In line with the request of the Board of Governors in resolution GOV/2012/50 (13 September 2012),<sup>6</sup> this document provides a comprehensive report on substantive implementation of that resolution and of resolution GOV/2011/69 (18 November 2011), especially with respect to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme. It also addresses developments since the Director General's previous report (GOV/2012/37, 30 August 2012), as well as issues of longer standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

## **B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues**

4. As previously reported, in resolution GOV/2011/69, the Board, inter alia, stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In that resolution, the Board also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In light of this, from January 2012 onwards, Agency and Iranian officials held several rounds of talks in Vienna and Tehran, including during a visit by the Director General to Tehran in May 2012. However, no concrete results were achieved.<sup>7</sup> In particular, there was no agreement on a structured approach to resolving outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and no agreement by Iran to the Agency's request for access to the Parchin site.

5. In resolution GOV/2012/50, the Board, inter alia, stressed that it was essential for Iran to immediately conclude and implement a structured approach, including, as a first step, providing the Agency with the access it had requested to relevant sites.<sup>8</sup> In that resolution, the Board also decided that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.<sup>9</sup>

6. In light of resolution GOV/2012/50, and immediately following the September 2012 Board meeting, the Agency took steps to engage Iran in further talks, including at a meeting on 17 September 2012 between the Director General and H.E. Mr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of

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<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

<sup>5</sup> By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11, Part I.A), the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council's responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Member States of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

<sup>6</sup> GOV/2012/50, para. 6.

<sup>7</sup> GOV/2012/37, para. 8.

<sup>8</sup> GOV/2012/50, para. 4.

<sup>9</sup> GOV/2012/50, para. 4.



Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. On 24 October 2012, the Agency wrote to Iran reaffirming the Agency's commitment to dialogue, and suggesting that a senior level meeting be held on 13 and 14 November 2012 aimed at finalising the structured approach document, agreement on which would allow the Agency and Iran to start substantive work on the outstanding issues. In a letter dated 1 November 2012, Iran reaffirmed its commitment to dialogue with the Agency and invited an Agency delegation to Tehran in mid-December 2012 in order to "discuss the modality for the resolution of the allegations, based on principles elaborated in the meeting between H.E. Dr. Jalili, the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council and the Director General on 30 May 2012". It was subsequently agreed that the Agency and Iran would meet in Tehran on 13 December 2012.

## C. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

7. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 16 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).<sup>10</sup> Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared material at these facilities and LOFs.

## D. Enrichment Related Activities

8. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below. All of these activities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.<sup>11</sup>

9. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF<sub>6</sub> up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its nuclear facilities<sup>12</sup> and that the purpose of enriching UF<sub>6</sub> up to 20% U-235 is the manufacture of fuel for research reactors.<sup>13</sup>

10. Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities approximately:

- 7611 kg (+735 kg since the Director General's previous report) of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235, of which: 5303 kg is presently in storage; 1226 kg has been fed into the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and 1029 kg has been fed into the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

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<sup>10</sup> All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

<sup>11</sup> In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be subject to containment and surveillance.

<sup>12</sup> As declared in Iran's Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.

<sup>13</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 8; H.E. Mr Fereydoun Abbasi reportedly made a statement to the effect that Iran plans to build four to five new reactors in the next few years in order to produce radioisotopes and carry out research ('Iran will not stop producing 20% enriched uranium', Tehran Times, 12 April 2011). He was also quoted by the Iranian Student's News Agency as saying "To provide fuel for these (new) reactors, we need to continue with the 20 per cent enrichment of uranium" ('Iran to build new nuclear research reactors – report', Reuters, 11 April 2011).

(FFEP) for enrichment up to 20% U-235; and 53 kg has been fed into the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for conversion to  $UO_2$ ,<sup>14</sup> and

- 232.8 kg (+43.4 kg since the Director General's previous report) of  $UF_6$  enriched up to 20% U-235, of which: 134.9 kg is presently in storage; 1.6 kg has been downblended; and 96.3 kg has been fed into the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) for conversion to  $U_3O_8$ .<sup>15</sup>

## D.1. Natanz

11. **Fuel Enrichment Plant:** FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit and a total of about 25 000 centrifuges. Iran has yet to provide the corresponding design information for Production Hall B.

12. As of 10 November 2012, Iran had fully installed 61 cascades in Production Hall A, 54 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with natural  $UF_6$ . Iran had also partially installed one other cascade. Preparatory installation work had been completed for another 28 cascades, and was ongoing in relation to 54 others. All of the centrifuges installed in Production Hall A are IR-1 machines.<sup>16</sup>

13. Between 20 October 2012 and 11 November 2012, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP and verified that, as of 21 October 2012, 85 644 kg of natural  $UF_6$  had been fed into the cascades since production began in February 2007, and a total of 7451 kg of  $UF_6$  enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 22 October 2012 and 9 November 2012, a total of 1576 kg of natural  $UF_6$  was fed into the cascades and a total of approximately 160 kg of  $UF_6$  enriched up to 5% U-235 was produced, which would result in a total production of 7611 kg of  $UF_6$  enriched up to 5% U-235 since production began.

14. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007,<sup>17</sup> and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant design information questionnaire (DIQ).

15. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant:** PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot LEU production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

16. As a result of the PIV carried out by the Agency at PFEP between 15 September 2012 and 1 October 2012, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory as declared by Iran on 15 September 2012.

17. **Production area:** As of 6 November 2012, Iran was feeding low enriched  $UF_6$  into two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6) containing a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges.

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<sup>14</sup> The figures referring to the  $UF_6$  fed into the enrichment and/or conversion processes include  $UF_6$  contained in the cylinders attached to the processes, as well as nuclear material held up in the process and present in waste.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 14.

<sup>16</sup> As of 10 November 2012, 10 414 centrifuges were installed at FEP (+991 since the Director General's previous report).

<sup>17</sup> Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 24 June 2012.

18. The Agency has verified that, as of 15 September 2012, 1119.6 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP had been fed into the cascades in the production area since production began in February 2010, and that a total of 129.1 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 16 September 2012 and 11 November 2012, a total of 57.4 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 produced at FEP was fed into the cascades in the production area and that approximately 8.2 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This would result in a total production of 137.3 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP since production began.

19. **R&D area:** Since the Director General's previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF<sub>6</sub> into IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into small or larger cascades.<sup>18</sup> Iran has yet to install three new types of centrifuge (IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s) as it had indicated it intends to do.<sup>19,20</sup>

20. Between 22 August 2012 and 11 November 2012, a total of approximately 198.6 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.

21. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP,<sup>21</sup> and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

## D.2. Fordow

22. **Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant:** FFEP is, according to the DIQ of 18 January 2012,<sup>22</sup> a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235. Additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility, particularly in light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used.<sup>23</sup> The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, contains 16 cascades, equally divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2, with a total of 2784 centrifuges. To date, all of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran has yet to inform the Agency which of the cascades are to be used for enrichment up to 5% U-235 and/or for enrichment up to 20% U-235.<sup>24</sup>

23. Since the Director General's previous report, Iran has installed 644 centrifuges at FFEP, thereby completing the installation of centrifuges in all eight cascades in Unit 1, none of which it was feeding with UF<sub>6</sub>. Iran had installed all eight cascades in Unit 2, four of which (configured in two sets of two

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<sup>18</sup> On 6 November 2012, there were 32 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 2, 14 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 3, 144 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 4, and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.

<sup>19</sup> GOV/2012/9, para. 20.

<sup>20</sup> On 6 November 2012, the Agency observed the presence of two empty casings for IR-6 centrifuges at PFEP. According to Iran, when originally received at PFEP, these centrifuges had been complete, but the rotors had subsequently been removed for testing somewhere other than PFEP.

<sup>21</sup> Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 10 June 2012.

<sup>22</sup> To date, Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs (GOV/2012/9, para. 24).

<sup>23</sup> GOV/2009/74, paras 7 and 14.

<sup>24</sup> In a letter to the Agency dated 23 May 2012, Iran stated that the Agency would be notified about the production level of the cascades prior to their operation (GOV/2012/23, para. 25).

interconnected cascades) it was feeding with UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235<sup>25</sup> and four of which, having been subjected to vacuum testing, were ready for feeding with UF<sub>6</sub>.

24. Iran has estimated that, between 14 December 2011, when feeding of the first set of two interconnected cascades began, and 10 November 2012, a total of 693 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 was fed into cascades at FFEP, and that approximately 95.5 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced, 73.7 kg of which has been withdrawn from the process and verified by the Agency.

25. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,<sup>26, 27</sup> and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in its most recent relevant DIQ.

### **D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities**

26. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided.<sup>28</sup> Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.<sup>29</sup> As a result of Iran's lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.

## **E. Reprocessing Activities**

27. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.<sup>30</sup> Iran has stated that it "does not have reprocessing activities".<sup>31</sup> The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)<sup>32</sup> and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.<sup>33</sup> The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 11 November 2012, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 12 November 2012. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.

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<sup>25</sup> The number of centrifuges being fed (696) remains unchanged from that reflected in the Director General's previous report (GOV/2012/37, Figure 7).

<sup>26</sup> Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 11 June 2012.

<sup>27</sup> GOV/2012/37, para. 26.

<sup>28</sup> 'Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites', Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at <http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255>.

<sup>30</sup> S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008.

<sup>32</sup> TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

<sup>33</sup> The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.



## F. Heavy Water Related Projects

28. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the ongoing construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor at Arak, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is under Agency safeguards.<sup>34</sup>

29. On 10 November 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that the installation of cooling and moderator circuit piping was continuing. During the DIV, Iran stated that the operation of the IR-40 Reactor was now expected to commence in the first quarter of 2014.<sup>35</sup>

30. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency has not been provided with further access to the plant. As a result, the Agency is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the plant appears to continue to be in operation. To date, Iran has not permitted the Agency to take samples from the heavy water stored at UCF.<sup>36</sup>

## G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

31. Although Iran is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, it is conducting a number of activities at UCF, the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and FPPF at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of those obligations, notwithstanding that the facilities are under Agency safeguards. Iran has stated that it is conducting these activities in order to make fuel for research reactors.<sup>37</sup>

32. According to the latest information available to the Agency:

- Iran has produced at UCF: 550 tonnes of natural UF<sub>6</sub>, 99 tonnes of which has been sent to FEP; and
- Iran has transferred to TRR the following fuel items produced at FMP and FPPF: ten containing uranium enriched up to 20% U-235, four containing uranium enriched to 3.34% U-235 and five containing natural uranium.

33. **Uranium Conversion Facility:** As previously reported, the Agency carried out a PIV at UCF in March 2012. In order to finalise its evaluation of the PIV results, the Agency has requested that Iran provide further information.

34. In the DIQ for UCF dated 13 October 2012, Iran informed the Agency of an increase in its capacity to produce natural UO<sub>2</sub> at UCF from 10 tonnes per year to 14 tonnes per year.

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<sup>34</sup> S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

<sup>35</sup> GOV/2012/23, para. 32.

<sup>36</sup> GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.

<sup>37</sup> As declared in Iran's DIQs for FPPF.

35. The Agency has verified that, as of 5 November 2012, Iran had produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$  during R&D activities involving the conversion of  $\text{UF}_6$  enriched up to 3.34% U-235. Iran subsequently transferred 13.6 kg of uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$  to FMP.<sup>38</sup> As of 6 November 2012, Iran had resumed these R&D activities, but had not produced additional uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$  from the conversion of  $\text{UF}_6$  enriched to 3.34% U-235. As of the same date, Iran, through the conversion of uranium ore concentrate, had produced about 6231 kg of natural uranium in the form of  $\text{UO}_2$ , of which the Agency has verified that Iran transferred 3100 kg to FMP.

36. During a DIV carried out at UCF on 6 November 2012, Iran informed the Agency that, due to the rupture of a storage tank, a large quantity of liquid containing natural uranium scrap material had spilled onto the floor of the facility. Agency inspectors confirmed that the spillage had taken place. The Agency is discussing with Iran the accountancy of the nuclear material that has spilled from the tank.

37. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant:** Between 4 and 6 September 2012, the Agency carried out a PIV at FMP, the results of which it is still evaluating. On 7 November 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV and an inspection at FMP and confirmed that the manufacture of pellets for the IR-40 Reactor using natural  $\text{UO}_2$  was ongoing. Iran informed the Agency that it had completed the manufacture of dummy fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor.<sup>39</sup> As of 7 November 2012, Iran had not commenced the manufacture of fuel assemblies containing nuclear material. On the same date, the Agency also verified two prototype fuel rods made of  $\text{UO}_2$  enriched to 3.34% U-235 prior to their transfer to TRR.

38. **Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant:** The Agency carried out a PIV at FPPF on 29 September 2012 and verified that, between the start of conversion activities on 17 December 2011 and 26 September 2012, 82.7 kg of  $\text{UF}_6$  enriched up to 20% U-235 had been fed into the conversion process and 38 kg of uranium had been produced in the form of  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$  powder<sup>40</sup> and fuel items. Iran has declared that, between 27 September 2012 and 10 November 2012, it did not convert any more of the  $\text{UF}_6$  enriched up to 20% U-235 contained in the cylinder attached to the process. On 11 November 2012, the Agency verified a new fuel assembly prior to its transfer to TRR and verified the presence of 46 fuel plates. On 12 November 2012, the Agency and Iran agreed to an updated safeguards approach for FPPF.

## H. Possible Military Dimensions

39. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.<sup>41</sup> Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.

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<sup>38</sup> GOV/2012/23, para. 35.

<sup>39</sup> A dummy assembly is similar to a fuel assembly except that it contains non-nuclear material.

<sup>40</sup> A small quantity of  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$  enriched to 20% U-235 was converted into  $\text{UO}_2$  and downblended with natural  $\text{UO}_2$  to produce standard pellets at three different levels of enrichment (1.6%, 2.6% and 3.9%).

<sup>41</sup> See, for example: GOV/2011/65, paras 38-45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40-45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18-25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14-21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14-25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35-42.

40. The Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency, indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency's own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that, prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing. Since November 2011, the Agency has obtained more information which further corroborates the analysis contained in the aforementioned Annex.

41. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran's obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.<sup>42</sup> In its resolution GOV/2011/69, the Board of Governors, inter alia, expressed its deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions. As indicated above, in its resolution GOV/2012/50, the Board of Governors decided, inter alia, that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and urgent to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

42. As indicated in Section B above, since the November 2011 Board, the Agency, through several rounds of formal talks and numerous informal contacts with Iran, has made intensive efforts to seek to resolve all of the outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear programme, especially with respect to possible military dimensions, but without concrete results. Specifically, the Agency has:

- Sought agreement with Iran on a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues (referred to in paragraph 4 above), focusing on the issues outlined in the Annex to GOV/2011/65. Agreement has yet to be reached;
- Requested that Iran provide the Agency with an initial declaration in connection with the issues identified in Section C of the Annex to GOV/2011/65. Iran's subsequent declaration dismissed the Agency's concerns in relation to these issues, largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations;
- Identified, as part of the structured approach, thirteen topics, consistent with those identified in the Annex to GOV/2011/65, which need to be addressed;
- Provided Iran with clarification of the nature of the Agency's concerns, and the information available to it, about Parchin and the foreign expert,<sup>43</sup> and presented Iran with initial questions in this regard, to which Iran has not responded; and
- Requested on several occasions, from January 2012 onwards, access to the Parchin site. Contrary to Board resolution GOV/2012/50, Iran has still not provided the Agency with access to the site.

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<sup>42</sup> S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.

<sup>43</sup> GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 44.

43. **Parchin:** As stated in the Annex to the Director General's November 2011 report,<sup>44</sup> information provided to the Agency by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments;<sup>45</sup> such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development. The information also indicates that the containment vessel was installed at the Parchin site in 2000. As previously reported, the location at the Parchin site of the vessel was only identified in March 2011, and the Agency notified Iran of that location in January 2012. Iran has stated that "the allegation of nuclear activities in Parchin site is baseless".<sup>46</sup>

44. As previously reported, satellite imagery available to the Agency for the period from February 2005 to January 2012 shows virtually no activity at or near the building housing the containment vessel. Since the Agency's first request for access to this location, however, satellite imagery shows that extensive activities and resultant changes have taken place at this location. Among the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location since February 2012 are:

- Frequent presence of, and activities involving, equipment, trucks and personnel;
- Run off of large amounts of liquid from the containment building over a prolonged period;
- Removal of external pipework from the containment vessel building;
- Razing and removal of five other buildings or structures and the site perimeter fence;
- Reconfiguration of electrical and water supply infrastructure;
- Shrouding of the containment vessel building and another building; and
- Initial scraping and removal of considerable quantities of earth at the location and its surrounding area, covering over 25 hectares, followed by further removal of earth to a greater depth at the location and the depositing of new earth in its place.

45. In light of the extensive activities that have been, and continue to be, undertaken by Iran at the aforementioned location on the Parchin site, when the Agency gains access to the location, its ability to conduct effective verification will have been seriously undermined. While the Agency continues to assess that it is necessary to have access to this location without further delay, it is essential that Iran also provide without further delay substantive answers to the Agency's detailed questions regarding the Parchin site and the foreign expert, as requested by the Agency in February 2012.<sup>47</sup>

## I. Design Information

46. Contrary to its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary

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<sup>44</sup> GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 49.

<sup>45</sup> GOV/2011/65, Annex, para. 47.

<sup>46</sup> GOV/2012/37, para. 43.

<sup>47</sup> GOV/2012/9, para. 8.



Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement,<sup>48</sup> which provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1. It is important to note that the absence of such early information reduces the time available for the Agency to plan the necessary safeguards arrangements, especially for new facilities, and reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities.<sup>49</sup>

47. Contrary to Iran's obligations under the modified Code 3.1, Iran has not provided the Agency with an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor since 2006. The lack of up-to-date information is having an adverse impact on the Agency's ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach.<sup>50</sup>

48. Iran's response to Agency requests that Iran confirm or provide further information regarding its stated intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in "due time" rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.<sup>51</sup>

## **J. Additional Protocol**

49. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General's reports (see, for example, GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to "comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1".

<sup>49</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 35.

<sup>50</sup> GOV/2012/37, para. 46.

<sup>51</sup> GOV/2011/29, para. 37; GOV/2012/23, para. 29.

<sup>52</sup> Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

## K. Other Matters

50. The Agency and Iran have continued to discuss the discrepancy between the amount of nuclear material declared by the operator and that measured by the Agency in connection with conversion experiments carried out by Iran at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) between 1995 and 2002.<sup>53</sup>

51. As previously reported, Iran is now using in the core of TRR a number of fuel assemblies that were produced in Iran and which contain nuclear material that was enriched in Iran up to 3.5% and up to 20% U-235.<sup>54</sup>

52. As indicated in the Director General's previous report,<sup>55</sup> on 29 and 30 July 2012, the Agency conducted an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) while the reactor was operating at 75% of its nominal power. In a letter dated 15 October 2012, Iran informed the Agency that "fuel assemblies will be transferred from the core to spent fuel pond" from 22 to 29 October 2012. On 6 and 7 November 2012, the Agency conducted an inspection at BNPP and verified that the fuel assemblies were in the spent fuel pond.

## L. Summary

53. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.<sup>56</sup>

54. Contrary to the Board resolutions of November 2011 and September 2012, and despite the intensified dialogue between the Agency and Iran since January 2012, no concrete results have been achieved in resolving the outstanding issues, including Iran having not concluded and implemented the structured approach. The Director General is, therefore, unable to report any progress on clarifying the issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

55. It is a matter of concern that the extensive and significant activities which have taken place since February 2012 at the location within the Parchin site to which the Agency has requested access will have seriously undermined the Agency's ability to undertake effective verification. The Agency reiterates its request that Iran, without further delay, provide both access to that location and substantive answers to the Agency's detailed questions regarding the Parchin site and the foreign expert.

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<sup>53</sup> This material had been under Agency seal since 2003; GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, and Annex, paras 1–7; GOV/2011/65, para. 49.

<sup>54</sup> GOV/2012/37, para. 50.

<sup>55</sup> GOV/2012/37, para. 51.

<sup>56</sup> The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).

56. Given the nature and extent of credible information available, the Agency continues to consider it essential for Iran to engage with the Agency without further delay on the substance of the Agency's concerns. In the absence of such engagement, the Agency will not be able to resolve concerns about issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

57. The Director General continues to urge Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, and to urge Iran to engage with the Agency to achieve concrete results on all outstanding substantive issues.

58. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

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Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda  
 (GOV/2011/63)

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

*Report by the Director General*

## A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement<sup>1</sup> and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).
2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions<sup>2</sup> are binding on Iran.<sup>3</sup> The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

<sup>2</sup> The Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); and GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

<sup>3</sup> In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran's obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras 1–6).

<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).



3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,<sup>5</sup> the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council's responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,<sup>6</sup> and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

4. In a letter dated 26 May 2011, H.E. Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), informed the Director General that Iran would be prepared to receive relevant questions from the Agency on its nuclear activities after a declaration by the Agency that the work plan (INFCIRC/711) had been fully implemented and that the Agency would thereafter implement safeguards in Iran in a routine manner. In his reply of 3 June 2011, the Director General informed Dr Abbasi that the Agency was neither in a position to make such a declaration, nor to conduct safeguards in Iran in a routine manner, in light of concerns about the existence in Iran of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. On 19 September 2011, the Director General met Dr Abbasi in Vienna, and discussed issues related to the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and other relevant obligations. In a letter dated 30 September 2011, the Agency reiterated its invitation to Iran to re-engage with the Agency on the outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and the actions required of Iran to resolve those issues. In a letter dated 30 October 2011, Dr Abbasi referred to his previous discussions with the Director General and expressed the will of Iran "to remove ambiguities, if any", suggesting that the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG), should visit Iran for discussions. In his reply, dated 2 November 2011, the Director General indicated his preparedness to send the DDG-SG to "discuss the issues identified" in his forthcoming report to the Board of Governors.

5. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011), as well as issues of longer standing, and, in line with the Director General's opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, contains an Annex setting out in more detail the basis for the Agency's concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. The report focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

## **B. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement**

6. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).<sup>7</sup> Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to implement safeguards at these facilities and LOFs.

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<sup>5</sup> The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957, following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.

<sup>6</sup> The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.

<sup>7</sup> All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

## C. Enrichment Related Activities

7. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the following declared facilities, all of which are nevertheless under Agency safeguards.

### C.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

8. **Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP):** There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B.

9. As of 2 November 2011, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A, 37 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF<sub>6</sub>.<sup>8</sup> Whereas initially each installed cascade comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 15 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 2 November 2011, installation work in the remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been no installation work in Production Hall B.

10. Between 15 October and 8 November 2011, the Agency conducted a physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP, the results of which the Agency is currently evaluating.

11. Iran has estimated that, between 18 October 2010 and 1 November 2011, it produced 1787 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub>, which would result in a total production of 4922 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> since production began in February 2007.<sup>9</sup> The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.<sup>10</sup> The consequences for safeguards of the seal breakage in the feed and withdrawal area<sup>11</sup> will be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of its assessment of the PIV.

12. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007<sup>12</sup> and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).

13. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP):** PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

14. In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010, for the stated purpose of producing UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for

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<sup>8</sup> The 54 installed cascades contained approximately 8000 centrifuges; the 37 cascades declared by Iran as being fed with UF<sub>6</sub> on that date contained 6208 centrifuges. Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF<sub>6</sub> may have been working.

<sup>9</sup> The Agency previously verified that, as of 17 October 2010, a total of 3135 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> had been produced since the start of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2011/29, para. 9).

<sup>10</sup> In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not subject to containment and surveillance.

<sup>11</sup> GOV/2011/29, para. 10.

<sup>12</sup> Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 6 March 2011.

the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).<sup>13,14</sup> Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> into two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.<sup>15</sup>

15. Between 13 and 29 September 2011, the Agency conducted a PIV at PFEP and verified that, as of 13 September 2011, 720.8 kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> had been fed into the cascade(s) in the production area since the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the results of the PIV. Iran has estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of 44.7 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched at FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 6 kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced.

16. The preliminary results of the PIV show an improvement to the operator's weighing system. Once the assessment of the PIV has been completed, the Agency will be able to determine whether the operator's better sampling procedures have resulted in a more accurate determination of the level of U-235 enrichment.<sup>16</sup>

17. In the R&D area, as of 22 October 2011, Iran had installed 164 IR-2m centrifuges in Cascade 5,<sup>17</sup> all of which were under vacuum, and 66 IR-4 centrifuges in Cascade 4, none of which had been fed with UF<sub>6</sub>. In Cascades 2 and 3, Iran has been feeding natural UF<sub>6</sub> into single machines, 10-machine cascades and 20-machine cascades of IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges.

18. Between 21 August 2011 and 28 October 2011, a total of approximately 59.8 kg of natural UF<sub>6</sub> was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails are recombined at the end of the process.

19. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP<sup>18</sup> and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the DIQ.

## **C.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant**

20. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. In its DIQ of 10 October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of the facility was the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built to contain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.<sup>19</sup>

21. In September 2010, Iran provided the Agency with a revised DIQ in which it stated that the purpose of FFEP was to include R&D as well as the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235.

22. As previously reported, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in June 2011 in which the stated purpose of FFEP was the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235, as well as R&D. Iran informed the Agency that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnected cascades, and that each of these cascades would consist of 174 centrifuges. Iran was reported to have

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<sup>13</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

<sup>14</sup> TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

<sup>15</sup> GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

<sup>16</sup> GOV/2011/29, para. 14; GOV/2011/54, para. 15.

<sup>17</sup> Iran had previously indicated its intention to install two 164-centrifuge cascades (Cascades 4 and 5) in the R&D area (GOV/2011/7, para. 17).

<sup>18</sup> Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 5 March 2011.

<sup>19</sup> GOV/2009/74, para. 9.

decided to “triple its (production) capacity”, after which Iran would stop the “20% fuel production” at Natanz.<sup>20</sup>

23. On 17 October 2011, as anticipated in its letter to the Agency dated 11 October 2011, Iran transferred from FEP to FFEP one large cylinder containing LEU in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> and one small cylinder containing depleted uranium (DU) in the form of UF<sub>6</sub>. According to Iran, the LEU will be used for feeding and the DU will be used for line passivation. On 24 October 2011, the Agency detached the seal on the cylinder containing the DU, and the cylinder was immobilized at the feeding station. At the request of Iran, the Agency will detach the seal on the cylinder containing the LEU on 8 November 2011, and the cylinder will be immobilized at the feeding station.

24. During an inspection on 23 and 24 October 2011, the Agency verified that Iran had installed all 174 centrifuges in each of two cascades, neither of which had been connected to the cooling and electrical lines, and had installed 64 centrifuges in a third cascade. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran informed the Agency that the main power supply had been connected to the facility. No centrifuges had been installed in the area designated for R&D purposes.

25. The Agency continues to verify that FFEP is being constructed according to the latest DIQ provided by Iran. As previously reported, although Iran has provided some clarification regarding the initial timing of, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FFEP at an existing defence establishment, additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility.<sup>21</sup>

26. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FFEP up to 27 April 2011 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.<sup>22</sup>

### **C.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities**

27. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this Iranian year.<sup>23,24</sup> In August 2011, Dr Abbasi was reported as having said that Iran did not need to build new enrichment facilities during the next two years.<sup>25</sup> Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.<sup>26</sup> As a result of Iran’s lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters.

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<sup>20</sup> Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, ‘Iran to Triple Production of 20%-Enriched Uranium’, Fars News Agency, 8 June 2011.

<sup>21</sup> GOV/2011/29, para. 20.

<sup>22</sup> The results did show a small number of particles of depleted uranium (GOV/2010/10, para. 17).

<sup>23</sup> ‘Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites’, Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.

<sup>24</sup> GOV/2010/46, para. 33.

<sup>25</sup> ‘Iran atomic chief says fuel swap talks over: IRNA’, Agence France Press article of 31 August 2011, citing remarks made by Dr Abbasi during an interview with the Islamic Republic News Agency.

<sup>26</sup> Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at <http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255>.



## D. Reprocessing Activities

28. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.<sup>27</sup> In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it “does not have reprocessing activities”. In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.<sup>28</sup> The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 15 October 2011, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 16 October 2011. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.

## E. Heavy Water Related Projects

29. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is subject to Agency safeguards.<sup>29</sup>

30. On 17 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that construction of the facility was ongoing and the coolant heat exchangers had been installed. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.

31. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in a letter to Iran dated 20 October 2011, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive a reply to that letter, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access to the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.<sup>30</sup>

## F. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

32. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan which, as described below, are in contravention of those obligations, although both facilities are under Agency safeguards.

33. **Uranium Conversion Facility:** On 18 October 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at UCF during which the Agency observed the ongoing installation of the process equipment for the conversion of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 into U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. During the DIV, Iran informed the Agency that the initial tests of

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<sup>27</sup> S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

<sup>28</sup> The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

<sup>29</sup> S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

<sup>30</sup> GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and 21.

this conversion line, originally scheduled to start on 6 September 2011, had been postponed and would not involve the use of nuclear material.

34. As previously reported, Iran informed the Agency in July 2011 that it would start R&D activities at UCF for the conversion of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO<sub>2</sub>. During the aforementioned DIV, Iran informed the Agency that 6.8 kg of DU in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> had been processed and that Iran had produced 113 g of uranium in the form of UO<sub>2</sub> that met its specifications. According to Iran, this UO<sub>2</sub> has been sent to FMP to produce test pellets. Iran has also started using UF<sub>6</sub> enriched to 3.34% U-235 to produce UO<sub>2</sub>. During the DIV, Iran further informed the Agency that this UO<sub>2</sub> would also be sent to FMP to produce fuel pellets, which would then be sent to TRR for “performance test studies”.

35. In a letter dated 4 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency of the postponement of the production of natural UF<sub>6</sub>, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant, originally scheduled to restart on 23 October 2011. In a letter dated 11 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that, from 11 November 2011, it intended to use UOC produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant for the production of natural uranium in the form of UO<sub>2</sub>. During the DIV on 18 October 2011, the Agency took a sample of this UOC. During the same DIV, Iran informed the Agency that, since 23 July 2011, it had fed into the process 958.7 kg of uranium in the form of UOC<sup>31</sup> and produced about 185.6 kg of natural uranium in the form of UO<sub>2</sub>, and further indicated that some of the product had been fed back into the process. In a letter dated 8 October 2011, Iran informed the Agency that it had transferred about 1 kg of this UO<sub>2</sub> to the R&D section of FMP in order to “conduct research activities and pellet fabrication”.

36. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant:** As previously reported, in a DIQ for FMP dated 31 May 2011, Iran informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO<sub>2</sub> manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis. On 15 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR and confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a prototype fuel rod containing natural UO<sub>2</sub> that had been manufactured at FMP. In a letter dated 30 August 2011, Iran informed the Agency that “for the time being” it had no plans to conduct any destructive testing on the rod and that only non-destructive testing would be conducted at TRR.

37. On 22 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran had started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.<sup>32</sup> During the inspection, the Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at FMP for testing purposes.

## G. Possible Military Dimensions

38. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.<sup>33</sup> Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information.

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<sup>31</sup> This was taken from Iran’s stockpile of imported UOC (GOV/2003/75, Annex I, para. 8).

<sup>32</sup> GOV/2010/46, para. 26.

<sup>33</sup> GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.

39. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.<sup>34</sup> In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran's obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.<sup>35</sup> Since August 2008, Iran has not engaged with the Agency in any substantive way on this matter.

40. The Director General, in his opening remarks to the Board of Governors on 12 September 2011, stated that in the near future he hoped to set out in greater detail the basis for the Agency's concerns so that all Member States would be kept fully informed. In line with that statement, the Annex to this report provides a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency to date which has given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

41. The analysis itself is based on a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation in all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. This approach involves, inter alia, the identification of indicators of the existence or development of the processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

42. The information which serves as the basis for the Agency's analysis and concerns, as identified in the Annex, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency's own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved, and time frames.

43. The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

- Efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities (Annex, Sections C.1 and C.2);
- Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material (Annex, Section C.3);
- The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network (Annex, Section C.4); and
- Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components (Annex, Sections C.5–C.12).

44. While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.

45. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

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<sup>34</sup> Most recently in GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

<sup>35</sup> S/RES/1929, paras 2 and 3.

## H. Design Information

46. The modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement but which is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.<sup>36</sup> The Agency is still awaiting receipt from Iran of updated design information for the IR-40 Reactor, and further information pursuant to statements it has made concerning the planned construction of new uranium enrichment facilities and the design of a reactor similar to TRR.<sup>37</sup>

47. As reported previously, Iran's response to Agency requests for Iran to confirm or provide further information regarding its statements concerning its intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in "due time" rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.<sup>38</sup>

## I. Additional Protocol

48. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.<sup>39</sup>

## J. Other Matters

49. In August 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) to verify, inter alia, nuclear material, in the form of natural uranium metal and process waste, related to the conversion experiments carried out by Iran between 1995 and 2002.<sup>40,41</sup> The Agency's measurement of this material was 19.8 kg less than the operator's declaration of 270.7 kg. In a letter dated

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<sup>36</sup> In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General's reports (see e.g. GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to "comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1".

<sup>37</sup> GOV/2010/46, para. 32.

<sup>38</sup> See para. 27 of this report and GOV/2011/29, para. 37.

<sup>39</sup> Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

<sup>40</sup> This material had been under Agency seal since 2003.

<sup>41</sup> GOV/2003/75, paras 20–25 and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras 10–12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, and Annex, paras 1–7.



2 November 2011, Iran provided additional information on this matter. The Agency is working with Iran to try to resolve this discrepancy.

50. As previously reported, in a letter dated 19 June 2011, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to “transfer some of spent fuel assemblies (HEU [high enriched uranium] Control Fuel Element (CFE) and Standard Fuel Element (SFE)) from spent fuel pool (KMPE) to reactor core (KMPB) in order to conduct a research project”. As of 15 October 2011, this activity had yet to begin.

51. On 2 and 3 October 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, during which the Agency noted that the reactor was in operation. Iran subsequently informed the Agency that the reactor has since been shut down for routine maintenance.

## **K. Summary**

52. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.<sup>42</sup>

53. The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.

54. Given the concerns identified above, Iran is requested to engage substantively with the Agency without delay for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme as identified in the Annex to this report.

55. The Agency is working with Iran with a view to resolving the discrepancy identified during the recent PIV at JHL.

56. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related activities; and, as referred to above, addressing the Agency’s serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

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<sup>42</sup> The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).

## ANNEX

### **Possible Military Dimensions to Iran's Nuclear Programme**

1. This Annex consists of three Sections: Section A, which provides an historical overview of the Agency's efforts to resolve questions about the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme, in particular regarding concerns about possible military dimensions; Section B, which provides a general description of the sources of information available to the Agency and its assessment of the credibility of that information; and Section C, which reflects the Agency's analysis of the information available to it in the context of relevant indicators of the existence or development of processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.

#### **A. Historical Overview**

2. Since late 2002, the Director General has reported to the Board of Governors on the Agency's concerns about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Such concerns coincided with the appearance in open sources of information which indicated that Iran was building a large underground nuclear related facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.<sup>1</sup>

3. Between 2003 and 2004, the Agency confirmed a number of significant failures on the part of Iran to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the processing and use of undeclared nuclear material and the failure to declare facilities where the nuclear material had been received, stored and processed.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, it was discovered that, as early as the late 1970s and early 1980s, and continuing into the 1990s and 2000s, Iran had used undeclared nuclear material for testing and experimentation in several uranium conversion, enrichment, fabrication and irradiation activities, including the separation of plutonium, at undeclared locations and facilities.<sup>3</sup>

4. In October 2003, Iran informed the Director General that it had adopted a policy of full disclosure and had decided to provide the Agency with a full picture of its nuclear activities.<sup>4</sup> Following that announcement, Iran granted the Agency access to locations the Agency requested to visit, provided information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components and made individuals available for interviews. It also continued to implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, to which it agreed in February 2003, which provides for the submission of design information on new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of such a facility is taken.<sup>5</sup> In November 2003, Iran announced its intention to sign an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement (which it did in December 2003 following Board approval of the text), and that, prior to its entry into force, Iran would act in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol.<sup>6</sup>

5. Between 2003 and early 2006, Iran submitted inventory change reports, provided design information with respect to facilities where the undeclared activities had taken place and made nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> GOV/2003/40, para. 3.

<sup>2</sup> GOV/2003/40, para. 32; GOV/2003/75, para. 48; GOV/2004/83, paras 85–86; GOV/2005/67, para. 4.

<sup>3</sup> GOV/2003/75, Annex 1; GOV/2004/83, paras 85–86.

<sup>4</sup> GOV/2003/75, paras 13 and 15.

<sup>5</sup> GOV/2003/40, para. 6. Iran stopped implementing the modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 (GOV/2007/22, para. 12).

<sup>6</sup> GOV/2003/75, para. 18. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003, and signed on behalf of Iran and the Agency on 18 December 2003 (GOV/2004/11, para. 5). In February 2006, Iran notified the Agency that it would no longer implement the provisions of the Additional Protocol (GOV/2006/15, para. 31).

material available for Agency verification. Iran also acknowledged that it had utilized entities with links to the Ministry of Defence in some of its previously undeclared activities.<sup>7</sup> Iran acknowledged that it had had contacts with intermediaries of a clandestine nuclear supply network in 1987 and the early 1990s, and that, in 1987, it had received a handwritten one page document offering assistance with the development of uranium centrifuge enrichment technology, in which reference was also made to a reconversion unit with casting equipment.<sup>8</sup> Iran further acknowledged that it had received a package of information related to centrifuge enrichment technology that also included a 15 page document (hereafter referred to as the “uranium metal document”) which Iran said it did not ask for and which describes, inter alia, processes for the conversion of uranium fluoride compounds into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components.<sup>9</sup>

6. The Agency continued to seek clarification of issues with respect to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly in light of Iran’s admissions concerning its contacts with the clandestine nuclear supply network, information provided by participants in that network and information which had been provided to the Agency by a Member State. This last information, collectively referred to as the “alleged studies documentation”, which was made known to the Agency in 2005, indicated that Iran had been engaged in activities involving studies on a so-called green salt project, high explosives testing and the re-engineering of a missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a new payload.<sup>10</sup> All of this information, taken together, gave rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

7. In August 2007, Iran and the Agency agreed on “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues” (generally referred to as the “work plan”) (INFCIRC/711). By February 2008, the four items identified in the work plan as “past outstanding issues”, and the two items identified as “other outstanding issues”, had been determined by the Agency to be either closed, completed or no longer outstanding<sup>11</sup>. The remaining issues which needed to be clarified by Iran related to the alleged studies, together with other matters which had arisen in the course of resolving the six other issues and which needed to be addressed in connection with the alleged studies, specifically: the circumstances of Iran’s acquisition of the uranium metal document, procurement and research and development (R&D) activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.<sup>12</sup>

8. Between February and May 2008, pursuant to the work plan, the Agency shared with Iran information (including documentation) on the alleged studies, and sought clarifications from Iran.<sup>13</sup> In May 2008, Iran submitted to the Agency a 117 page assessment of that information. While Iran confirmed the veracity of some of the information which the Agency had shared with it (such as acknowledgement of names of people, places and organizations), Iran’s assessment was focused on deficiencies in form and format, and dismissed the allegations as having been based on “forged” documents and “fabricated” data.<sup>14</sup>

9. The Agency continued to receive additional information from Member States and acquired new information as a result of its own efforts. The Agency tried without success to engage Iran in discussions

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<sup>7</sup> GOV/2004/11, para. 37.

<sup>8</sup> Iran has stated that the intermediaries offered the reconversion unit with casting equipment on their own initiative, not at the request of the AEOL. Iran also stated that it did not receive the reconversion unit (GOV/2005/67, para. 14).

<sup>9</sup> GOV/2005/87, para. 6; GOV/2007/58, para. 25. Pakistan confirmed, in response to an Agency inquiry, that an identical document existed in Pakistan (GOV/2008/15, para. 24).

<sup>10</sup> GOV/2006/15, para. 38.

<sup>11</sup> GOV/2007/58, paras 18, 23, 25; GOV/2008/4, paras 11, 18, 24, 34.

<sup>12</sup> GOV/2008/15, paras 14–15, 25.

<sup>13</sup> GOV/2008/15, para. 16.

<sup>14</sup> GOV/2008/38, para. 15.

about the information, and finally wrote to Iran in October 2010 to inform it about this additional information.<sup>15</sup>

10. Between 2007 and 2010, Iran continued to conceal nuclear activities, by not informing the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of a new nuclear power plant at Darkhovin<sup>16</sup> and a third enrichment facility near Qom (the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant).<sup>17,18</sup> The Agency is still awaiting substantive responses from Iran to Agency requests for further information about its announcements, in 2009 and 2010 respectively, that it had decided to construct ten additional enrichment facilities (the locations for five of which had already been identified)<sup>19</sup> and that it possessed laser enrichment technology.<sup>20</sup>

11. The Agency has continued to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. As additional information has become available to the Agency, the Agency has been able, notwithstanding Iran's lack of engagement, to refine its analysis of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.<sup>21</sup>

## **B. Credibility of Information**

12. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, among the information available to the Agency is the alleged studies documentation: a large volume of documentation (including correspondence, reports, view graphs from presentations, videos and engineering drawings), amounting to over a thousand pages. The information reflected in that documentation is of a technically complex and interconnected nature, showing research, development and testing activities over time. It also contains working level correspondence consistent with the day to day implementation of a formal programme. Consistent with the Agency's practice, that information has been carefully and critically examined. The Agency has also had several meetings with the Member State to clarify the information it had provided, to question the Member State about the forensics it had carried out on the documentation and the information reflected in it, and to obtain more information on the underlying sources.

13. In addition to the alleged studies documentation, the Agency has received information from more than ten Member States. This has included procurement information, information on international travel by individuals said to have been involved in the alleged activities, financial records, documents reflecting health and safety arrangements, and other documents demonstrating manufacturing techniques for certain high explosive components. This information reinforces and tends to corroborate the information reflected in the alleged studies documentation, and relates to activities substantially beyond those identified in that documentation.

14. In addition to the information referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 above, the Agency has acquired information as a result of its own efforts, including publications and articles acquired through open source research, satellite imagery, the results of Agency verification activities and information provided by Iran in the context of those verification activities.<sup>22</sup> Importantly, the Agency has also had direct discussions with a number of individuals who were involved in relevant activities in Iran, including, for example, an interview with a leading figure in the clandestine nuclear supply network (see paragraph 35 below). The information obtained by the Agency from the discussions with these individuals is consistent with the

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<sup>15</sup> GOV/2010/62, paras 34–35.

<sup>16</sup> GOV/2008/38, para. 11.

<sup>17</sup> GOV/2009/74, paras 7–17.

<sup>18</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 31; GOV/2010/28, para. 31; GOV/2010/46, para. 31.

<sup>19</sup> GOV/2010/10, para. 33. In August 2010, Iran informed the Agency that the construction of one of these facilities was to start at the end of the current Iranian year (March 2011) or the beginning of the next year (GOV/2010/46, para. 33).

<sup>20</sup> GOV/2010/46, para. 18.

<sup>21</sup> GOV/2011/54, para. 43.

<sup>22</sup> Further specific examples are described below in Section C of this Annex.



information provided by Member States, and that acquired through its own efforts, in terms of time frames and technical content.

15. As indicated in paragraph 8 above, Iran has acknowledged certain information reflected in the alleged studies documentation. However, many of the answers given by Iran to questions posed by the Agency in connection with efforts to resolve the Agency's concerns have been imprecise and/or incomplete, and the information has been slow in coming and sometimes contradictory. This, combined with events such as the dismantling of the Lavisan-Shian site in late 2003/early 2004 (see paragraph 19 below), and a pattern of late or after the fact acknowledgement of the existence of previously undeclared parts of Iran's nuclear programme, have tended to increase the Agency's concerns, rather than dispel them.

16. As indicated above, the information consolidated and presented in this Annex comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency's own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself. It is overall consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved and time frames. Based on these considerations, and in light of the Agency's general knowledge of the Iranian nuclear programme and its historical evolution, the Agency finds the information upon which Part C of this Annex is based to be, overall, credible.

## **C. Nuclear Explosive Development Indicators**


17. Within its nuclear programme, Iran has developed the capability to enrich uranium to a level of up to 20% U-235, declared to be for use as fuel in research reactors. In the absence of any indicators that Iran is currently considering reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel to extract plutonium,<sup>23</sup> the Agency has, to date, focused its analysis of Iran's nuclear programme on an acquisition path involving high enriched uranium (HEU). Based on indicators observed by the Agency in connection with Iran's nuclear activities, the Agency's work has concentrated on an analysis pertinent to the development of an HEU implosion device.

### **C.1. Programme management structure**

18. The Agency has been provided with information by Member States which indicates that the activities referred to in Sections C.2 to C.12 were, at least for some significant period of time, managed through a programme structure, assisted by advisory bodies, and that, owing to the importance of these efforts, senior Iranian figures featured within this command structure. From analysis of this information and information provided by Iran, and through its own endeavours, the Agency has been able to construct what it believes to be a good understanding of activities undertaken by Iran prior to the end of 2003. The Agency's ability to construct an equally good understanding of activities in Iran after the end of 2003 is reduced, due to the more limited information available to the Agency. For ease of reference, the figure below depicts, in summary form, what the Agency understands of the programme structure, and administrative changes in that structure over the years. Attachment 1 to this Annex provides further details, derived from that information, about the organizational arrangements and projects within that programme structure.

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<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, there are, and have been in the past, activities in Iran relevant to the production of plutonium.



19. The Agency received information from Member States which indicates that, sometime after the commencement by Iran in the late 1980s of covert procurement activities,<sup>24</sup> organizational structures and administrative arrangements for an undeclared nuclear programme were established and managed through the Physics Research Centre (PHRC), and were overseen, through a Scientific Committee, by the Defence Industries Education Research Institute (ERI), established to coordinate defence R&D for the Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Iran has confirmed that the PHRC was established in 1989 at Lavisian-Shian, in Tehran. Iran has stated that the PHRC was created with the purpose of “preparedness to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents (nuclear defence) and also support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence”. Iran has stated further that those activities were stopped in 1998.<sup>25</sup> In late 2003/early 2004, Iran completely cleared the site.<sup>26</sup>

20. According to information provided by Member States, by the late 1990s or early 2000s, the PHRC activities were consolidated under the “AMAD Plan”. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (Mahabadi) was the Executive Officer of the AMAD Plan, the executive affairs of which were performed by the “Orchid Office”.<sup>27</sup> Most of the activities carried out under the AMAD Plan appear to have been conducted during 2002 and 2003.

21. The majority of the details of the work said to have been conducted under the AMAD Plan come from the alleged studies documentation which, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, refer to studies conducted in three technical areas: the green salt project; high explosives (including the development of exploding bridgewire detonators); and re-engineering of the payload chamber of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle.

<sup>24</sup> GOV/2004/83; GOV/2003/75, Annex 1.

<sup>25</sup> At which time, according to Iran, the centre was changed to the Biological Studies Centre. Iran also stated that, in 2002, the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) was also located at that site, and that, although some of the biological activities continued there, the main objective was to use the capabilities of universities in Iran (in particular at the Malek Ashtar University near Esfahan) for the education and R&D needs of the Ministry of Defence (GOV/2004/83, paras 100–101).

<sup>26</sup> According to Iran, the site was cleared in 2003/2004 in order to return the land to the local municipality (GOV/2004/60, paras 42–46; GOV/2004/83, paras 96–105).

<sup>27</sup> Possibly so named because one of the locations used by the AMAD Plan was on Orchid Street in Tehran.

22. According to the Agency's assessment of the information contained in that documentation, the green salt project (identified as Project 5.13) was part of a larger project (identified as Project 5) to provide a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme. The product of this programme would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies (identified as Project 111). As of May 2008, the Agency was not in a position to demonstrate to Iran the connection between Project 5 and Project 111. However, subsequently, the Agency was shown documents which established a connection between Project 5 and Project 111, and hence a link between nuclear material and a new payload development programme.

23. Information the Agency has received from Member States indicates that, owing to growing concerns about the international security situation in Iraq and neighbouring countries at that time, work on the AMAD Plan was stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a "halt order" instruction issued in late 2003 by senior Iranian officials. According to that information, however, staff remained in place to record and document the achievements of their respective projects. Subsequently, equipment and work places were either cleaned or disposed of so that there would be little to identify the sensitive nature of the work which had been undertaken.

24. The Agency has other information from Member States which indicates that some activities previously carried out under the AMAD Plan were resumed later, and that Mr Fakhrizadeh retained the principal organizational role, first under a new organization known as the Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies (SADAT)<sup>28</sup>, which continued to report to MODAFL, and later, in mid-2008, as the head of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT) in Tehran.<sup>29</sup> The Agency has been advised by a Member State that, in February 2011, Mr Fakhrizadeh moved his seat of operations from MUT to an adjacent location known as the Modjeh Site, and that he now leads the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research.<sup>30</sup> The Agency is concerned because some of the activities undertaken after 2003 would be highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.

## **C.2. Procurement activities**

25. Under the AMAD Plan, Iran's efforts to procure goods and services allegedly involved a number of ostensibly private companies which were able to provide cover for the real purpose of the procurements. The Agency has been informed by several Member States that, for instance, Kimia Maadan was a cover company for chemical engineering operations under the AMAD Plan while also being used to help with procurement for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).<sup>31</sup>

26. In addition, throughout the entire timeline, instances of procurement and attempted procurement by individuals associated with the AMAD Plan of equipment, materials and services which, although having other civilian applications, would be useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device, have either been uncovered by the Agency itself or been made known to it.<sup>32</sup> Among such equipment, materials and services are: high speed electronic switches and spark gaps (useful for triggering and firing detonators); high speed cameras (useful in experimental diagnostics); neutron sources (useful for calibrating neutron measuring equipment); radiation detection and measuring equipment (useful in a nuclear material production environment); and training courses on topics relevant to nuclear explosives development (such as neutron cross section calculations and shock wave interactions/hydrodynamics).

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<sup>28</sup> The information indicates that SADAT consisted of at least seven centres, each responsible for carrying out specific R&D work. The activities were established as overt work applicable to conventional military activities, some with possible nuclear applications. The work in the SADAT Centres drew on resources at Iranian universities which had laboratories available to them and students to do the research.

<sup>29</sup> The information indicates that, in his new role, Mr Fakhrizadeh merged the SADAT Centres into complexes within MUT, known as "Pardis Tehran".

<sup>30</sup> Known from its Farsi initials as "SPND".

<sup>31</sup> GOV/2008/4, para. 32; GOV/2006/15, para. 39.

<sup>32</sup> GOV/2008/4, para. 40.

### **C.3. Nuclear material acquisition**

27. In 2008, the Director General informed the Board that: the Agency had no information at that time — apart from the uranium metal document — on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies,<sup>33</sup> and that it had not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.<sup>34</sup>

28. However, as indicated in paragraph 22 above, information contained in the alleged studies documentation suggests that Iran was working on a project to secure a source of uranium suitable for use in an undisclosed enrichment programme, the product of which would be converted into metal for use in the new warhead which was the subject of the missile re-entry vehicle studies. Additional information provided by Member States indicates that, although uranium was not used, kilogram quantities of natural uranium metal were available to the AMAD Plan.

29. Information made available to the Agency by a Member State, which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran made progress with experimentation aimed at the recovery of uranium from fluoride compounds (using lead oxide as a surrogate material to avoid the possibility of uncontrolled contamination occurring in the workplace).

30. In addition, although now declared and currently under safeguards, a number of facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment (the Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom) were covertly built by Iran and only declared once the Agency was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran. This, taken together with the past efforts by Iran to conceal activities involving nuclear material, create more concern about the possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran.

### **C.4. Nuclear components for an explosive device**

31. For use in a nuclear device, HEU retrieved from the enrichment process is first converted to metal. The metal is then cast and machined into suitable components for a nuclear core.

32. As indicated in paragraph 5 above, Iran has acknowledged that, along with the handwritten one page document offering assistance with the development of uranium centrifuge enrichment technology, in which reference is also made to a reconversion unit with casting equipment, Iran also received the uranium metal document which describes, inter alia, processes for the conversion of uranium compounds into uranium metal and the production of hemispherical enriched uranium metallic components.

33. The uranium metal document is known to have been available to the clandestine nuclear supply network that provided Iran with assistance in developing its centrifuge enrichment capability, and is also known to be part of a larger package of information which includes elements of a nuclear explosive design. A similar package of information, which surfaced in 2003, was provided by the same network to Libya.<sup>35</sup> The information in the Libyan package, which was first reviewed by Agency experts in January 2004, included details on the design and construction of, and the manufacture of components for, a nuclear explosive device.<sup>36</sup>

34. In addition, a Member State provided the Agency experts with access to a collection of electronic files from seized computers belonging to key members of the network at different locations. That collection included documents seen in Libya, along with more recent versions of those documents, including an up-dated electronic version of the uranium metal document.

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<sup>33</sup> GOV/2008/15, para. 24.

<sup>34</sup> GOV/2008/38, para. 21.

<sup>35</sup> The same network was also the source of an unsolicited offer to Iraq in 1990 for the provision of information dealing with centrifuge enrichment and nuclear weapon manufacturing (GOV/INF/1998/6, Section B.3).

<sup>36</sup> GOV/2004/11, para. 77; GOV/2004/12, paras 30–32.



35. In an interview in 2007 with a member of the clandestine nuclear supply network, the Agency was told that Iran had been provided with nuclear explosive design information. From information provided to the Agency during that interview, the Agency is concerned that Iran may have obtained more advanced design information than the information identified in 2004 as having been provided to Libya by the nuclear supply network.

36. Additionally, a Member State provided information indicating that, during the AMAD Plan, preparatory work, not involving nuclear material, for the fabrication of natural and high enriched uranium metal components for a nuclear explosive device was carried out.

37. As the conversion of HEU compounds into metal and the fabrication of HEU metal components suitable in size and quality are steps in the development of an HEU nuclear explosive device, clarification by Iran is needed in connection with the above.

### **C.5. Detonator development**

38. The development of safe, fast-acting detonators, and equipment suitable for firing the detonators, is an integral part of a programme to develop an implosion type nuclear device. Included among the alleged studies documentation are a number of documents relating to the development by Iran, during the period 2002–2003, of fast functioning detonators, known as “exploding bridgewire detonators” or “EBWs” as safe alternatives to the type of detonator described for use in the nuclear device design referred to in paragraph 33 above.

39. In 2008, Iran told the Agency that it had developed EBWs for civil and conventional military applications and had achieved a simultaneity of about one microsecond when firing two to three detonators together,<sup>37</sup> and provided the Agency with a copy of a paper relating to EBW development work presented by two Iranian researchers at a conference held in Iran in 2005. A similar paper was published by the two researchers at an international conference later in 2005.<sup>38</sup> Both papers indicate that suitable high voltage firing equipment had been acquired or developed by Iran. Also in 2008, Iran told the Agency that, before the period 2002–2004, it had already achieved EBW technology. Iran also provided the Agency with a short undated document in Farsi, understood to be the specifications for a detonator development programme, and a document from a foreign source showing an example of a civilian application in which detonators are fired simultaneously. However, Iran has not explained to the Agency its own need or application for such detonators.

40. The Agency recognizes that there exist non-nuclear applications, albeit few, for detonators like EBWs, and of equipment suitable for firing multiple detonators with a high level of simultaneity. Notwithstanding, given their possible application in a nuclear explosive device, and the fact that there are limited civilian and conventional military applications for such technology, Iran’s development of such detonators and equipment is a matter of concern, particularly in connection with the possible use of the multipoint initiation system referred to below.

### **C.6. Initiation of high explosives and associated experiments**

41. Detonators provide point source initiation of explosives, generating a naturally diverging detonation wave. In an implosion type nuclear explosive device, an additional component, known as a multipoint initiation system, can be used to reshape the detonation wave into a converging smooth implosion to ensure uniform compression of the core fissile material to supercritical density.<sup>39</sup>

42. The Agency has shared with Iran information provided by a Member State which indicates that Iran has had access to information on the design concept of a multipoint initiation system that can be used to

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<sup>37</sup> GOV/2008/15, para. 20.

<sup>38</sup> The authors of the papers have affiliations to Malek Ashtar University and the Air Defence Industries Group of Tehran.

<sup>39</sup> “Supercritical” density is one at which fissionable material is able to sustain a chain reaction in such a manner that the rate of reaction increases.

initiate effectively and simultaneously a high explosive charge over its surface.<sup>40</sup> The Agency has been able to confirm independently that such a design concept exists and the country of origin of that design concept. Furthermore, the Agency has been informed by nuclear-weapon States that the specific multipoint initiation concept is used in some known nuclear explosive devices. In its 117 page submission to the Agency in May 2008, Iran stated that the subject was not understandable to Iran and that Iran had not conducted any activities of the type referred to in the document.

43. Information provided to the Agency by the same Member State referred to in the previous paragraph describes the multipoint initiation concept referred to above as being used by Iran in at least one large scale experiment in 2003 to initiate a high explosive charge in the form of a hemispherical shell. According to that information, during that experiment, the internal hemispherical curved surface of the high explosive charge was monitored using a large number of optical fibre cables, and the light output of the explosive upon detonation was recorded with a high speed streak camera. It should be noted that the dimensions of the initiation system and the explosives used with it were consistent with the dimensions for the new payload which, according to the alleged studies documentation, were given to the engineers who were studying how to integrate the new payload into the chamber of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle (Project 111) (see Section C.11 below). Further information provided to the Agency by the same Member State indicates that the large scale high explosive experiments were conducted by Iran in the region of Marivan.

44. The Agency has strong indications that the development by Iran of the high explosives initiation system, and its development of the high speed diagnostic configuration used to monitor related experiments, were assisted by the work of a foreign expert who was not only knowledgeable in these technologies, but who, a Member State has informed the Agency, worked for much of his career with this technology in the nuclear weapon programme of the country of his origin. The Agency has reviewed publications by this foreign expert and has met with him. The Agency has been able to verify through three separate routes, including the expert himself, that this person was in Iran from about 1996 to about 2002, ostensibly to assist Iran in the development of a facility and techniques for making ultra-dispersed diamonds (“UDDs” or “nanodiamonds”), where he also lectured on explosion physics and its applications.

45. Furthermore, the Agency has received information from two Member States that, after 2003, Iran engaged in experimental research involving a scaled down version of the hemispherical initiation system and high explosive charge referred to in paragraph 43 above, albeit in connection with non-nuclear applications. This work, together with other studies made known to the Agency in which the same initiation system is used in cylindrical geometry, could also be relevant to improving and optimizing the multipoint initiation design concept relevant to nuclear applications.

46. The Agency’s concern about the activities described in this Section derives from the fact that a multipoint initiation system, such as that described above, can be used in a nuclear explosive device. However, Iran has not been willing to engage in discussion of this topic with the Agency.

## **C.7. Hydrodynamic experiments**

47. One necessary step in a nuclear weapon development programme is determining whether a theoretical design of an implosion device, the behaviour of which can be studied through computer simulations, will work in practice. To that end, high explosive tests referred to as “hydrodynamic experiments” are conducted in which fissile and nuclear components may be replaced with surrogate materials.<sup>41</sup>

48. Information which the Agency has been provided by Member States, some of which the Agency has been able to examine directly, indicates that Iran has manufactured simulated nuclear explosive components using high density materials such as tungsten. These components were said to have

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<sup>40</sup> GOV/2008/15, Annex, Section A.2, Document 3.

<sup>41</sup> Hydrodynamic experiments can be designed to simulate the first stages of a nuclear explosion. In such experiments, conventional high explosives are detonated to study the effects of the explosion on specific materials. The term “hydrodynamic” is used because material is compressed and heated with such intensity that it begins to flow and mix like a fluid, and “hydrodynamic equations” are used to describe the behaviour of fluids.

incorporated small central cavities suitable for the insertion of capsules such as those described in Section C.9 below. The end use of such components remains unclear, although they can be linked to other information received by the Agency concerning experiments involving the use of high speed diagnostic equipment, including flash X ray, to monitor the symmetry of the compressive shock of the simulated core of a nuclear device.

49. Other information which the Agency has been provided by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The explosives vessel, or chamber, is said to have been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was constructed at that time around a large cylindrical object at a location at the Parchin military complex. A large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighbouring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The Agency has obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information. From independent evidence, including a publication by the foreign expert referred to in paragraph 44 above, the Agency has been able to confirm the date of construction of the cylinder and some of its design features (such as its dimensions), and that it was designed to contain the detonation of up to 70 kilograms of high explosives, which would be suitable for carrying out the type of experiments described in paragraph 43 above.

50. As a result of information the Agency obtained from a Member State in the early 2000s alleging that Iran was conducting high explosive testing, possibly in association with nuclear materials, at the Parchin military complex, the Agency was permitted by Iran to visit the site twice in 2005. From satellite imagery available at that time, the Agency identified a number of areas of interest, none of which, however, included the location now believed to contain the building which houses the explosives chamber mentioned above; consequently, the Agency's visits did not uncover anything of relevance.

51. Hydrodynamic experiments such as those described above, which involve high explosives in conjunction with nuclear material or nuclear material surrogates, are strong indicators of possible weapon development. In addition, the use of surrogate material, and/or confinement provided by a chamber of the type indicated above, could be used to prevent contamination of the site with nuclear material. It remains for Iran to explain the rationale behind these activities.

## **C.8. Modelling and calculations**

52. Information provided to the Agency by two Member States relating to modelling studies alleged to have been conducted in 2008 and 2009 by Iran is of particular concern to the Agency. According to that information, the studies involved the modelling of spherical geometries, consisting of components of the core of an HEU nuclear device subjected to shock compression, for their neutronic behaviour at high density, and a determination of the subsequent nuclear explosive yield. The information also identifies models said to have been used in those studies and the results of these calculations, which the Agency has seen. The application of such studies to anything other than a nuclear explosive is unclear to the Agency. It is therefore essential that Iran engage with the Agency and provide an explanation.

53. The Agency obtained information in 2005 from a Member State indicating that, in 1997, representatives from Iran had met with officials from an institute in a nuclear-weapon State to request training courses in the fields of neutron cross section calculations using computer codes employing Monte Carlo methodology, and shock wave interactions with metals. In a letter dated 14 May 2008, Iran advised the Agency that there was nothing to support this information. The Agency has also been provided with information by a Member State indicating that, in 2005, arrangements were made in Iran for setting up projects within SADAT centres (see Section C.1 and Attachment 1), inter alia, to establish a databank for "equation of state" information<sup>42</sup> and a hydrodynamics calculation centre. The Agency has also been provided with information from a different Member State that, in 2005, a senior official in SADAT solicited assistance from Shahid Behesti University in connection with complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.

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<sup>42</sup> An "equation of state" is a thermodynamic equation describing the state of matter under a given set of physical conditions (such as temperature, pressure, volume or internal energy).

54. Research by the Agency into scientific literature published over the past decade has revealed that Iranian workers, in particular groups of researchers at Shahid Behesti University and Amir Kabir University, have published papers relating to the generation, measurement and modelling of neutron transport.<sup>43</sup> The Agency has also found, through open source research, other Iranian publications which relate to the application of detonation shock dynamics to the modelling of detonation in high explosives, and the use of hydrodynamic codes in the modelling of jet formation with shaped (hollow) charges. Such studies are commonly used in reactor physics or conventional ordnance research<sup>44</sup>, but also have applications in the development of nuclear explosives.

### **C.9. Neutron initiator**

55. The Agency has information from a Member State that Iran has undertaken work to manufacture small capsules suitable for use as containers of a component containing nuclear material. The Agency was also informed by a different Member State that Iran may also have experimented with such components in order to assess their performance in generating neutrons. Such components, if placed in the centre of a nuclear core of an implosion type nuclear device and compressed, could produce a burst of neutrons suitable for initiating a fission chain reaction. The location where the experiments were conducted was said to have been cleaned of contamination after the experiments had taken place. The design of the capsule, and the material associated with it, are consistent with the device design information which the clandestine nuclear supply network allegedly provided to Iran.

56. The Agency also has information from a Member State that work in this technical area may have continued in Iran after 2004, and that Iran embarked on a four year programme, from around 2006 onwards, on the further validation of the design of this neutron source, including through the use of a non-nuclear material to avoid contamination.

57. Given the importance of neutron generation and transport, and their effect on geometries containing fissile materials in the context of an implosion device, Iran needs to explain to the Agency its objectives and capabilities in this field.

### **C.10. Conducting a test**

58. The Agency has information provided by a Member State that Iran may have planned and undertaken preparatory experimentation which would be useful were Iran to carry out a test of a nuclear explosive device. In particular, the Agency has information that Iran has conducted a number of practical tests to see whether its EBW firing equipment would function satisfactorily over long distances between a firing point and a test device located down a deep shaft. Additionally, among the alleged studies documentation provided by that Member State, is a document, in Farsi, which relates directly to the logistics and safety arrangements that would be necessary for conducting a nuclear test. The Agency has been informed by a different Member State that these arrangements directly reflect those which have been used in nuclear tests conducted by nuclear-weapon States.

### **C.11. Integration into a missile delivery vehicle**

59. The alleged studies documentation contains extensive information regarding work which is alleged to have been conducted by Iran during the period 2002 to 2003 under what was known as Project 111. From that information, the project appears to have consisted of a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile.

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<sup>43</sup> The modelling of neutron transport refers to the study of the motions and interactions of neutrons with materials which are used to see where they are and in what direction and at what speed they are going.

<sup>44</sup> For example, the shaped (hollow) charge studies said by Member States to have been carried out by the Centre for Research and Development of Explosion and Shock Technology, also known as "METFAZ", have conventional military applications (such as for developing armour piercing projectiles), but can also be used to develop computer codes which can then be adapted to model nuclear explosives.



60. According to that documentation, using a number of commercially available computer codes, Iran conducted computer modelling studies of at least 14 progressive design iterations of the payload chamber and its contents to examine how they would stand up to the various stresses that would be encountered on being launched and travelling on a ballistic trajectory to a target. It should be noted that the masses and dimensions of components identified in information provided to the Agency by Member States that Iran is alleged to have been developing (see paragraphs 43 and 48 above) correspond to those assessed to have been used in Project 111 engineering studies on the new payload chamber.

61. During these studies, prototype components were allegedly manufactured at workshops known to exist in Iran but which Iran refused the Agency permission to visit. The six engineering groups said to have worked under Project 111 produced many technical reports, which comprise a substantial part of the alleged studies documentation. The Agency has studied these reports extensively and finds that they are both internally consistent and consistent with other supporting information related to Project 111.

62. The alleged studies documentation also shows that, as part of the activities undertaken within Project 111, consideration was being given to subjecting the prototype payload and its chamber to engineering stress tests to see how well they would stand up in practice to simulated launch and flight stresses (so-called “environmental testing”). This work would have complemented the engineering modelling simulation studies referred to in paragraph 60 above. According to the information reflected in the alleged studies documentation, within Project 111, some, albeit limited, preparations were also being undertaken to enable the assembly of manufactured components.

63. Iran has denied conducting the engineering studies, claiming that the documentation which the Agency has is in electronic format and so could have been manipulated, and that it would have been easy to fabricate.<sup>45</sup> However, the quantity of the documentation, and the scope and contents of the work covered in the documentation, are sufficiently comprehensive and complex that, in the Agency’s view, it is not likely to have been the result of forgery or fabrication. While the activities described as those of Project 111 may be relevant to the development of a non-nuclear payload, they are highly relevant to a nuclear weapon programme.

## **C.12. Fuzing, arming and firing system**

64. The alleged studies documentation indicates that, as part of the studies carried out by the engineering groups under Project 111 to integrate the new payload into the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab 3 missile, additional work was conducted on the development of a prototype firing system that would enable the payload to explode both in the air above a target, or upon impact of the re-entry vehicle with the ground. Iran was shown this information, which, in its 117 page submission (referred to above in paragraph 8), it dismissed as being “an animation game”.

65. The Agency, in conjunction with experts from Member States other than those which had provided the information in question, carried out an assessment of the possible nature of the new payload. As a result of that assessment, it was concluded that any payload option other than nuclear which could also be expected to have an airburst option (such as chemical weapons) could be ruled out. Iran was asked to comment on this assessment and agreed in the course of a meeting with the Agency which took place in Tehran in May 2008 that, if the information upon which it was based were true, it would constitute a programme for the development of a nuclear weapon. Attachment 2 to this Annex reproduces the results of the Agency’s assessment as it was presented by the Secretariat to the Member States in the technical briefing which took place in February 2008.

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<sup>45</sup> GOV/2008/15, para. 22.

### Attachment 1: List of Departments, Projects and Centres

#### PHRC Departments

Department 01 Nuclear Physics  
Department 02 Centrifuge  
Enrichment  
Department 03 Laser Enrichment  
Department 04 Uranium Conversion  
Department 05 Geology  
Department 06 Health Physics  
Department 07 Workshop  
Department 08 Heavy Water  
Department 09 Analytical  
Laboratory  
Department 10 Computing  
Department 20 Analysis

#### AMAD Plan Projects

Project 110 Payload Design  
Project 111 Payload Integration  
Project 3 Manufacture of Components  
3.12 Explosives and EBW detonator  
3.14 Uranium metallurgy  
Project 4 Uranium Enrichment  
Project 5 Uranium Mining, Concentration & Conversion  
5.13 Green Salt Project  
5.15 Gchine Mine Project  
Projects 8, 9 and 10  
Project Health and Safety  
Project 19 Involvement of IAP  
Project/Group 117 Procurement and Supply

#### SADAT Centres

Centre for Readiness & New Defence  
Technologies  
Centre for R&D (1) of Explosion & Shock  
Technology  
Centre for Industrial Research & Construction  
Centre for R&T (2) of Advanced Materials –  
Chemistry  
Centre for R&T of Advanced Materials –  
Metallurgy  
Centre for R&D of New Aerospace Technology  
Centre for Laser & Photonics Applications

(1) R&D = Research & Development

(2) R&T = Research & Technology



**Attachment 2: Analysis of Payload**

	BIOLOGICAL	CHEMICAL	HIGH EXPLOSIVE	E M P	SATELLITE	NUCLEAR
Applicable Mass and Dimensions	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	POSSIBLE	UNLIKELY	IMPOSSIBLE	LIKELY
Contains a HV generator box	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	POSSIBLE	LIKELY	UNLIKELY	LIKELY
Airburst <3000'	LIKELY	LIKELY	POSSIBLE	LIKELY	IMPOSSIBLE	LIKELY
Multiple Detonators Present	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	POSSIBLE	POSSIBLE	IMPOSSIBLE	LIKELY
No Capability for Release of Chamber from Capsule or Load from Chamber and no Antenna(s)	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	LIKELY	IMPOSSIBLE	UNLIKELY	LIKELY
Presence of 400m Shaft in Test Sketch	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	POSSIBLE	IMPOSSIBLE	LIKELY
Total Package Taken as a Whole	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	UNLIKELY	IMPOSSIBLE	IMPOSSIBLE	LIKELY

LIKELY	POSSIBLE	UNLIKELY	IMPOSSIBLE
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## Security Council

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### Note by the President of the Security Council

In paragraph 2 of resolution 1984 (2011), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.

Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report dated 4 June 2012 received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).

12-37171 (E) 270612



**Annex**

**Letter dated 4 June 2012 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) addressed to the President of the Security Council**

On behalf of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1929 (2010), I have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 1984 (2011), the final report on its work.

(Signed) Salomé **Zourabichvili**  
Coordinator  
Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010)

(Signed) Jonathan **Brewer**  
Expert

(Signed) Kenichiro **Matsubayashi**  
Expert

(Signed) Thomas **Mazet**  
Expert

(Signed) Jacqueline **Shire**  
Expert

(Signed) Elena **Vodopolova**  
Expert

(Signed) Olasehinde Ishola **Williams**  
Expert

(Signed) Wenlei **Xu**  
Expert

## Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010)

### *Summary*

The present final report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1984 (2011) and in accordance with the mandate set forth in paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010). It contains the analysis, conclusions and recommendations of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) regarding compliance by the Islamic Republic of Iran with the provisions of that and related resolutions, in addition to information provided by Member States regarding their implementation. The Panel draws on consultations with Member States and experts, inspections of reported incidents of non-compliance and assessments of implementation reports submitted by Member States under resolution 1929 (2010). The report also contains a discussion of other work undertaken by the Panel relevant to its mandate, including outreach activities to Member States, regional groups and the private sector and, where appropriate, the provision of technical advice.

The sanctions measures specified in resolution 1929 (2010) and previous resolutions are part of a coordinated and intensive effort by the international community to persuade the Islamic Republic of Iran to resolve outstanding questions about the nature of its nuclear programme and demonstrate that it is for purely peaceful purposes. Sanctions remain one element of a dual-track approach to the country, which includes diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. These sanctions are targeted at specific activities, institutions, entities and individuals related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's prohibited proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of a nuclear weapon delivery system, in addition to transfers of conventional weapons.

Sanctions are slowing the procurement by the Islamic Republic of Iran of some critical items required for its prohibited nuclear programme. At the same time, prohibited activities, including uranium enrichment, are continuing. The Islamic Republic of Iran has still not complied with the requests of the International Atomic Energy Agency for information to clarify the possible military dimensions of its programme. In the present report, the Panel identifies the acquisition of high-grade carbon fibre as one of a number of critical items that the Islamic Republic of Iran requires for the development of more advanced centrifuges. The report also contains an analysis of the country's requirements for uranium ore in the context of its current and future planned activities, while noting that no procurement attempts have been reported to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006).

The Iranian ballistic missile programme continues to develop, as demonstrated by additional launches, their prohibition under resolution 1929 (2010) notwithstanding. In the present report, the Panel provides the conclusions of its investigation into the June 2011 launch of the Rasad satellite, which was reported to the Committee.

The Panel takes note of the recent designations by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of two Democratic People's Republic of Korea entities and their links to the Iranian ballistic missile programme.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to defy the international community through illegal arms shipments. Three interdictions of conventional arms or related materiel are identified in the present report. Two of these involve the Syrian Arab Republic, as did most of the cases inspected by the Panel during its previous mandate, underscoring that the Syrian Arab Republic continues to be the central party to illicit Iranian arms transfers. The Panel recommends the designation of two entities related to these interdictions.

The Panel also takes note of information received concerning arms shipments by the Islamic Republic of Iran to other destinations.

The Panel highlights the challenges in identifying specific transactions or businesses involving Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps entities that could contribute to the country's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It also describes the involvement of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps entity in a transfer of conventional arms reported to the Committee.

The transportation sector offers unique challenges for sanctions implementation. The report details the complex structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, with its frequent changes in ownership, names or national flags of vessels, and whose activities are subject to vigilance under paragraph 22 of resolution 1929 (2010). This is illustrated in the case of the Irano Hind Shipping Company, an Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines entity, which was designated under resolution 1929 (2010) and whose vessels continue to operate.

The Panel concludes that financial sanctions have been implemented by many Member States with rigour and welcomes the new Financial Action Task Force standard on financing of proliferation.

The Panel underscores the growing level of awareness among Member States of the importance of strong export controls in the implementation of sanctions. The Panel identified small and medium-sized enterprises as an attractive target of Iranian illicit procurement attempts, and highlighted the importance of outreach to such enterprises for effective implementation of export controls.

Interdictions of prohibited shipments are vital for slowing the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile activities and preventing arms transfers from the country. The Panel recognizes the value of sharing intelligence and cooperation among Member States in successful interdictions.

The Panel is aware of interdictions, of which only a few have been reported to the Committee. The Panel wishes to underline that this reporting is central to its ability to analyse patterns of procurement and illicit activity and develop recommendations. Information regarding denials of export licences for sensitive items, or attempted transfers identified by vigilant Customs authorities, is equally important.

During consultations with Member States, those that were not members of the Security Council raised the issue of the availability of the Panel's 2011 final report, which they suggested would be useful in having a better understanding of sanctions implementation and improving national measures.

Although there remain examples of Member States who have yet to implement United Nations sanctions fully, the Panel is encouraged by the high level of commitment among most of its interlocutors to the effective implementation of the sanctions contained in Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

(SWIFT), the International Group of P&I Clubs, the International Air Transport Association and Maersk.

### **C. Assessment of implementation reports**

27. As requested by the Committee in its programme of work, the Panel submitted four quarterly assessments of implementation reports: on 29 July 2011, 31 October 2011, 31 January 2012 and 30 April 2012. These assessments showed that approximately 60 per cent of Member States had not reported under resolution 1929 (2010). The Panel concluded that the reports would be more informative and relevant to its work if they contained details regarding implementation in practice, albeit on a voluntary basis.

28. The Panel stands ready to assist the Committee to hold a planned open briefing to inform Member States of the activities of the Panel and the Committee, as agreed by the Committee on 4 March 2011 and 7 December 2011.

### **D. Inspections of reported incidents**

29. The Panel investigated four reported incidents of non-compliance during its current mandate, two of which were reported to the Committee during the Panel's previous mandate. The Panel completed three physical inspections and one investigation.<sup>4</sup> Three of four reported cases concerned violations of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), pertaining to arms and related materiel exports from the Islamic Republic of Iran, and one of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010). The following provides background to and summarizes the Panel's key findings in each case.

30. The Panel wishes to highlight the strong cooperation that it has received from all reporting Member States, in particular Turkey, which has reported several violations. The Panel wishes to emphasize the positive example set by reporting Member States.

#### **1. International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)**

31. The seizure of a shipment of rockets, fuses and ammunition in southern Afghanistan on 5 February 2011 was reported to the Committee by the United Kingdom on 21 April 2011. Following the seizure, the bulk of the shipment was destroyed. Samples of the rockets and fuses were shipped to the United Kingdom for forensic examination and, on 26 September 2011, made available to the Panel for inspection.

32. This inspection was unusual because the Panel was unable to visit the site of the seizure, only a small part of the original shipment was available for inspection and no documents were available. The Panel concluded, on the basis of its investigation and the information provided by the United Kingdom, that there was a

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<sup>4</sup> Inspection teams generally consist of from two to four Panel experts. In the present report, references are to "the Panel" and not "members of the Panel", as all inspections and the subsequent reports engage the Panel as a whole. References are made to "members of the Panel" only in cases of dissenting views.



high probability that the shipment of the 122-mm rockets constituted a violation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007). To substantiate this conclusion, the Panel continues to investigate this incident and invites Member States to supply further relevant information.

## **2. Yas Air (Turkey)**

33. On 19 March 2011, the Turkish authorities seized 19 crates containing assault rifles, machine guns, ammunition and mortar shells from an Ilyushin-76 cargo aircraft operated by an Iranian cargo airline, Yas Air. The flight originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran and was bound for the Syrian Arab Republic. This interdiction was reported by Turkey to the Committee on 28 March 2011 and was supplemented by a detailed inventory of the cargo transmitted to the Committee on 7 July 2011.

34. The Panel travelled to Diyarbakir on 19 November 2011 to inspect the shipment. It concluded that the items seized constituted a violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007).

## **3. Safir/Rasad launch**

35. Following a communication by four Member States on 15 July 2011, the Panel investigated a launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the Rasad satellite on 15 June 2011 to determine whether the launch constituted a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010).

36. The Panel noted that the Safir space launch vehicle itself was not designed to carry a nuclear weapon. The majority of the Panel concluded that the satellite launch was related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, based on the space launch vehicle's derivation from two nuclear-capable missiles (the Shahab-3 and the R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile in its second stage). Three members of the Panel concluded that the launch was not an activity related to a ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The majority of the Panel also concluded that the Safir space launch vehicle made use of ballistic missile technology, and therefore constituted a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010). Two members of the Panel believed that it was difficult to reach such a firm conclusion.

## **4. Kilis (Turkey)**

37. On 15 February 2011, the Turkish authorities seized a truck carrying explosives originating in the Islamic Republic of Iran and bound for the Syrian Arab Republic. The seizure was reported to the Committee on 12 January 2012. From 4 to 7 March 2012, the Panel physically inspected the seized materials and accompanying documents at an ammunition depot in Osmaniye Province, southern Turkey.

38. The Panel concluded that the shipment constituted a violation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007).

## **E. Challenges**

39. The Panel recalls the need to report promptly to the Committee incidents of non-compliance. Some Member States have reported that domestic legal proceedings

## **B. Ballistic missiles**

### **1. Introduction**

73. In paragraph 9 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council decided that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that Member States were to take all measures necessary to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran related to such activities. In paragraph 7 of that resolution, the Council decided that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not to acquire an interest in any commercial activity in another State involving, among other things, technology related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

74. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1737 (2006), Member States are obliged to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, referred to in document S/2006/815 that could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran's development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. In paragraph 13 of resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council decided that the list of items contained in document S/2006/815 was to be superseded by the list of items contained in document S/2010/263.

75. In the present section, the Panel provides a brief summary of recent developments related to ballistic missile activity over the past year. These include information reported by IAEA regarding the potential military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme, including a nuclear payload for a missile, a series of test launches of ballistic missiles, the introduction of the Qiam missile, the disclosure of missile silos and the launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran of two satellites using the Safir space launch vehicle. The Panel also addresses information provided by Member States concerning continuing procurement efforts related to ballistic missiles.

### **2. Background**

76. The Iranian arsenal of ballistic missiles is widely recognized as one of the largest in the region. The table in annex VIII to the present report provides an overview of the number and type of ballistic missiles. Two in particular are judged to be potentially nuclear capable: the liquid propelled Shahab-3 and the solid-fuel-propelled Sejil (also referred to as the Sajjil or the Ashura). The Islamic Republic of Iran is not judged to have an operational intercontinental ballistic missile.

77. While the Islamic Republic of Iran is actively producing its own missiles, it remains reliant on foreign suppliers for components, materials and equipment. According to some experts, there is no evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran possesses the technology necessary to manufacture the large-diameter, flow-formed pressure tanks and large, composite pressure vessels necessary to construct larger, long-range missiles. It also appears that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to import whole engines, or at least critical engine components, for its liquid-fuelled missiles, and requires components for guidance systems.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Miles A. Pomper and Cole J. Harvey, "Beyond missile defense: alternative means to address Iran's ballistic missile threat", *Arms Control Today*, October 2010, citing "Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment", *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 7 May 2010.

78. In November 2011, IAEA stated that, since 2002, it had become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in the Islamic Republic of Iran of undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which it had regularly received new information (see GOV/2011/65, para. 38, and previous reports).

79. IAEA describes work that took place before 2004 as a structured and comprehensive programme of engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab-3 missile. In addition, according to documentation provided by a Member State, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted computer modelling studies of at least 14 progressive design iterations of the payload chamber and its contents to examine how they would stand up to the various stresses that would be encountered on being launched and travelling on a ballistic trajectory to a target (GOV/2011/65, annex, paras. 59 and 60).

80. IAEA has described the information on which its assessments are based as coming from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from its own efforts and from information provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran itself (GOV/2011/65, para. 42).

### 3. Recent developments

81. **Missile launches.** In late June 2011, the Islamic Republic of Iran held a military exercise known as “Great Prophet Six”. On 28 June 2011, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Aerospace Force, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, announced on Iranian State television that, on the second day of the exercise, the country had fired Zelzal rockets, the Shahab-1 and -2 and the Ghadr (a modified version of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile).<sup>12</sup>

82. **Qiam missile.** The only test of this missile reported in the media took place in August 2010. The Iranian Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, highlighted the missile’s lack of stabilizer fins, which he claimed would increase the missile’s speed and allow it to be launched from a silo.<sup>13</sup> He also claimed that the liquid-fuelled ballistic missile was entirely indigenously produced. In May 2011, he announced the delivery of the missile to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (see figure II). One Member State assessed the Qiam to be based on the Shahab-2, with a range of between 500 and 1,000 km. Some experts have raised questions about the missile’s lack of apparent testing. Missiles are known to require extensive flight-test programmes before they can be fully operational.

<sup>12</sup> Farhad Pouladi, “Iran fires medium range missile in war game”, Agence France Presse, 28 June 2011. Jonathan’s Space Report No. 643, 5 July 2011, SpaceRef International Group. Available from [www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=37608](http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=37608).

<sup>13</sup> “New ballistic missile delivered to IRGC”, *Day.AZ*, 23 May 2011.

**(c) International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)**

107. The United Kingdom authorities reported on 21 April 2011 a seizure by the International Security Assistance Force on 5 February 2011 of a shipment of rockets and ammunition near Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. The shipment was reported to include 48 122-mm rockets, 49 fuses and 1,000 7.62-mm ammunition rounds.

108. Following the seizure, much of the shipment was destroyed in situ and the rest transferred to the United Kingdom for forensic analysis to provide additional evidence of its origin. Tests included X-ray examination, metallurgy sampling, and chemical and comparative analysis. The United Kingdom also possessed intelligence suggesting that the shipment of rockets originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many of the characteristics of the rockets matched Iranian rockets found elsewhere.

109. The Panel inspected some of the remains of the rockets in the United Kingdom on 26 September 2011. The Panel carried out its investigation on the basis of evidence provided by the United Kingdom authorities, independent research and consultations with experts.

110. The Panel concluded that there was a high probability that the rockets had originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Panel invited relevant Member States to provide further evidence that would enable confirmation of that finding, and consulted experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels in search of relevant evidence. The Panel continues its investigation and seeks further information.

**3. Analysis***Nature of the transfers*

111. Whereas in previous inspections the Panel had found only ammunition and no arms, the current cases include a greater diversity of items. In the Yas Air case, arms and ammunitions were both present; in the Kilis case, detonators and explosives were identified. The Panel also observed that, previously, systematic attempts had been made to conceal shipments physically through erased markings or packaging, but the current cases reflected no such attempts. This may reflect confidence on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran that the transfers might proceed undetected, a greater time pressure for the shipments or operational errors on the part of the Iranian authorities.

*Transportation*

112. Although the current cases inspected by the Panel include examples of arms transfers using ground and air transport, it cannot be excluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to use maritime avenues to transport shipments of arms and related materiel. This issue is discussed further in paragraphs 150 to 181. One Member State alerted the Panel that the Islamic Republic of Iran might be using mixed passenger-cargo flights to transfer arms illicitly. The Panel has not further corroborated this information.

*Iranian origin of items*

113. The Panel found documentary evidence in two of the three cases linking the shipments to the Islamic Republic of Iran as the sender. Documents found with the