# CASE CONCERNING

## APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

VOLUME IV OF THE ANNEXES TO THE MEMORIAL SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE

12 JUNE 2018

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# Annex 52

BBC News, Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia's Crimea Takeover Plot (9 March 2015)

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## Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot

## Media playback is unsupported on your device

In March, Russian TV produced a lavish film on the annexation of Crimea

Vladimir Putin has admitted for the first time that the plan to annex Crimea was ordered weeks before the referendum on self-determination.

Crimea was formally absorbed into Russia on 18 March, to international condemnation, after unidentified gunmen took over the peninsula.

Mr Putin said on TV he had ordered work on "returning Crimea" to begin at an all-night meeting on 22 February.

The meeting was called after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted.

Speaking last year, Mr Putin had said only that he took his final decision about Crimea after secret, undated opinion polls showed 80% of Crimeans favoured joining Russia.

Ukraine crisis

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What is Russia's end game in Crimea? 14 August 2016

Crimea tensions in Russia, Ukraine media

12 August 2016

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15 April 2016

The findings of these polls were borne out by the outcome of the referendum on 16 March, he told Russian state TV last April.



АНВИЗИНИ САПЕРНЫЙ, В41 СВЯЗИ, КРАСНОЗ АМЕННЫЙ РТПО ИЕДИКО - САНИТАРНЫИ БАТАЛЬОНЫ. 47 АК ИЕИ



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Speaking in a forthcoming Russian TV documentary, Mr Putin said a meeting with officials had been held on 22-23 February to plan the rescue of Ukraine's deposed president.

"I invited the leaders of our special services and the defence ministry to the Kremlin and set them the task of saving the life of the president of Ukraine, who would simply have been liquidated," he said.

"We finished about seven in the morning. When we were parting, I told all my colleagues, 'We are forced to begin the work to bring Crimea back into Russia'."

The trailer for The Path To The Motherland was broadcast on Sunday night with no release date announced.

On 27 February, unidentified **armed men seized the local parliament** and local government buildings in Crimea, raising the Russian flag.

Among them appeared to be regular soldiers without military insignia, who were dubbed the "little green men".

Mr Putin subsequently admitted deploying troops on the peninsula to "stand behind Crimea's self-defence forces".

## Timeline: How Crimea was annexed

- 22 February, former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych flees Kiev after violent protests
- 23 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to rescue Mr Yanukovych and annexe Crimea
- 27 February, pro-Russian gunmen seize Crimea's parliament and other key buildings
- 28 February, unidentified soldiers in combat fatigues occupy two airports in Crimea
- 1 March, Russian parliament approves Mr Putin's request to use force in Ukraine
- 16 March, 97% of voters in Crimea agree to join Russia
- 18 March, Mr Putin signs a bill absorbing Crimea into the Russian Federation

#### Ukraine crisis: Timeline

The formal annexation of Crimea sparked unrest in eastern Ukraine on 7 April, when pro-Russian protesters occupied government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv demanding independence.

A month later, pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence from Ukraine after unrecognised referendums.

Ukraine responded by launching an "anti-terrorist operation" against them and the region became engulfed in a conflict which has cost at least 6,000 lives and driven more than a million people from their homes, according to the UN.

The Ukrainian government, Western leaders and Nato say there is clear evidence that Russia is helping the separatists with heavy weapons and soldiers. Independent experts echo that accusation.

Moscow denies it, insisting that any Russians serving with the rebels are "volunteers".

Full details of Mr Yanukovych's escape from Ukraine are unclear although Mr Putin spoke of preparations to evacuate him from Donetsk.

"Heavy machine guns were placed there, so as not to waste time talking," he added, with preparations made by land, sea and air.

The documentary, which Russian TV says will be broadcast soon, was made by Andrei Kondrashov, a journalist with state-run channel Rossiya-1.

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# **Ukraine crisis**

Why are Russia-Ukraine tensions high over Crimea?

12 August 2016

What is Russia's end game in Crimea?

14 August 2016

#### Crimea tensions in Russia, Ukraine media

12 August 2016

Daily reality of Ukraine's 'frozen war'

15 April 2016

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#### Nato's Russia problem 11 August 2016

# Background

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
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
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# Annex 53

Vladimir Putin, Interview Given to the TV Channel "Rossiya" as Part of a Documentary "Crimea: Path to the Homeland" (video)

# Annex 54

Ukraine Report Under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Report (1 January 2014)

# AGREEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE



# Information on Ukrainian conventional armed forces as of January 1, 2014

UKRAINIAN CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF VERIFICATION CONTROL

KIEV

#### Table IIIA: LOCATION, NUMBERS INFORMATION TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED UNDER SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN UKRAINE

Current as of: January 1, 2014

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Center for Storage, Pre-Sale Preparation, and	Vakulenchuk 49°56'30"N 028°17'40"E					5 1 1					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
1631 <sup>st</sup> Artillery Armament Base	Shepetivka 50°10'50"N 027°04'40"E					30 5					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140
Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
1827 <sup>th</sup> Artillery Armament Base	Nizhyn 51°01'40"N 031°52'40"E					16 2					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
3623 <sup>rd</sup> Central Artillery Armament Base	Voznesensk 47°35'30"N 031°19'50"E					24 33					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
8 <sup>th</sup> Army Corps	Zhytomyr 50°15'10"N 028°40'10"E					48 57					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
						36 56 18 2 105 48 57					152 mm 2S19 152 mm 2S3 152 mm 2S5 152 mm D-20 MLRS 122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
1 <sup>st</sup> Separate Tank Brigade	Goncharovskoye 51°18'10"N 030°54'50"E					18 2					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

(c)         (d)         (e)         (f)         (g)         (h)         (i)         (j)         (k)         (l)         (m)         (n)           30 <sup>th</sup> Separate Mechanized Brianda         Novohrad-Volynskyi 50°35'30"N 027°39'10"E         Image: Constraint of the second	Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
30 <sup>m</sup> Separate         Novohrad-Volynskyi         17           Mechanized         50°35'30"N 027°39'10"E         17	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(i)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Digaue							17					122 mm BM-21

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
72 <sup>nd</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade	Bila Tserkva 49°48′50″N 030°05′50″E					12					122 mm BM-21

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(i)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
27 <sup>th</sup> Rocket Artillery Regiment	Sumy 50°52'50"N 034°47'20"E					1 55					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Armed Forces of Ukraine Army Forces Command	Kiev 50°27'40"N 030°28'10"E					148 12 74					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
169 <sup>th</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade	Desna 50°55'40"N 030°45'30"E					8 2 1					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52

Name of formation o unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
					similar						

(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Academy of	Lviv					7					122 mm BM-21
the Army	49°49'30"N 024°01'10"E					1					220 mm 9P140
						1					300 mm 9A52

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(i)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Academy of	Lviv					2					122 mm BM-21
the Army-1	49°49'30"N 024°01'10"E					1					220 mm 9P140

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
International Peacekeeping and Security Center	Starychi 49°58'50"N 023°34'10"E					4					122 mm BM-21

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
184 <sup>th</sup> Educational Center	Starychi 50°00'10"N 023°35'30"E	244	0	1 1 1	0	1 1 1	1	0	0	0	IFV ARV-1 Wheeled MLRS 122 mm BM-21 MTM-20
Military Academy (Odessa)	Odessa 46°26'50"N 030°44'50"E					1					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Military Training,	Zaporizhia					1					122 mm BM-21

Department,	47°51'40"N 035°10'40"E					
Zaporizhia NTU						

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(i)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Operational Command "SOUTH"	Dnipropetrovsk 48°27'50"N 035°00'40"E					72 36					122 mm BM-21 300 mm 9A52

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
17 <sup>th</sup> Separate	Kryvyi Rih					18					122 mm BM-21

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	ВΤ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c) 28 <sup>th</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade	(d) Chornomorske 46°35'10"N 030°56'30"E	(e)	(f)	(9)	(h)	(i) 18	(j)	(k)	(!)	(m)	(n) 122 mm BM-21

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
92 <sup>nd</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade	Chuhuiv 49°50'50"N 036°43'50"E					18					122 mm BM-21

# 

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
93 <sup>rd</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade	Cherkasskoye 48°42'20"N 035°23'10"E					18					122 mm BM-21

									27		
107 <sup>th</sup> Rocket Artillery Regiment	Kremenchuk 49°05'40"N 033°25'50"E	400	0	0	0	36 36 36	-	0	0	0	MLRS 300 mm 9A52

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Operational Command "NORTH"	Rivne 50°37'20"N 026°13'30"E					59 8 36					122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
24 <sup>th</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade	Yavoriv 49°55'30"N 023°23'30"E					18					122 mm BM-21

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)

51 <sup>st</sup> Separate Mechanized	Volodymyr-Volynskyi 50°52'00"N 024°19'50"E			18			122 mm BM-21
Brigade							

									12		
15 <sup>th</sup> Rocket Artillery Regiment	Drohobych 49°20'30"N 023°30'30"E	403	0	0	0	36	0	0	0	0	
, .						36 36					MLRS 300 mm 9A52
	l				1						BTR-60 R-975 M1
233rd Educational Center	Novaya Lyubomirka					2					122 mm BM-21
	50°45'40"N 026°24'30"E										
Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
					similar						
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
1448 Central	Orzhiv					21					122 mm BM-21
Artillery Armament Base	50°46'30"N 026°06'00"E					8					220 mm 9P140

Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(i)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
Armed Forces of Ukraine Naval Forces Command	Sevastopol 44°35'20"N 033°30'30"E					18					122 mm BM-21
Name of formation or unit	Peacetime location	Personnel strength	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	Туре
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(i)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
36 <sup>st</sup> Separate Coastal Defense Brigade	Perevalne 44°50'10"N 034°19'50"E					6					122 mm BM-21

(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)
406 <sup>th</sup> Separate	Simferopol					12					122 mm BM-21
Coastal	44°57'00"N 034°05'20"E										
Artillery											
Group											

	formation or unit	Peacetin	ne location		Personnel strength	вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	P	TS (	٦V	CSP	NFC	Ту	pe			
(c)			(d)		(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(	(i)	(j) (	k)	(I)	(m)	(1	n)			
SE "Shepe Repair Pla	etivka" Int	Shepetiv 50°10'50	'ka )"N 027°04'4	0"E						20 28 6						n BM-21 n 9P140 n 9A52			
								1	I		122 n	nm BM-2	:1						
Shepetivka 50°10'50"N	a N 027°04'40"E																		
													7		122 m	m BM-21			
			Shepetivk 50°10'50"	a N 027°04'40"E															
	K006 Bila Tserkva 49°48'50"N 039	0°05'50"E		PVV 001							1	2							122 mm BM-21
	Declared Site I		ו Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item			BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
	(b)			(c)	(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
					72 <sup>nd</sup> Separate Mechanized Br S173 OK# 2	igade					1	2							122 mm BM-21

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)

K154 Vakulenchuk 49°56'30" N 028°17'40"E	P١	′V 001								5 1 1								122 mm BM 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52
Monitored Item	вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Ту	De					
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p	)					
Center for Storage, Pre-Sale Preparation, and Utilization of WMP S824 OK# 7				5 1 1									n BM-21 n 9P140 n 9A52					
Declared Site Registration Number		int of try/Exit	N	Nonitored	ltem		ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(C)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K026 Volodymyr-Volynskyi 50°52'00"N 024°19'50"E	P١	′V 002								18								122 mm BM-21

Monitored Item	вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
51 <sup>st</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade S365 OK# 12				18								122 mm BM-21

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K029 Voznesensk 47°35'30"N 031°19'50"E	PVV 003					24 33								122 mm BM- 21 220 mm 9P140

Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
			Similar									
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
3623 <sup>rd</sup> Central				24								122 mm BM-21
Artillery				33								220 mm 9P140
Armament Base												
 S575 OK# 13												

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K033 Goncharovskoye 51°18'10"N 030°54'50"E	PVV 001					18 2								122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Declared Site Registration Number	Poin Entry	t of y/Exit	Monito	red Item			вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)			(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
			Brigade	arate Tan e OK# 15	k					18 2								122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140
Declared Site Registration Number	Poin Entry	t of y/Exit	N	onitored I	tem		ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(	(c)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K035 Divychky 50°02'30"N 031°14'50"E	PVV	001								8 2 1								122 mm BM- 21 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52
Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Ту	De					
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p	)					
6 <sup>th</sup> Artillery Division S133 OK# 16				8 2									n BM-21 n 9P140					

## 1 300 mm 9A52

Dr	(038 Drohobych 19°20'30"N 023°30'30"E	PVV 002		0	0	0	36 36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300 mm 9A52
			15 <sup>th</sup> Rocket Artillery Regiment S307 OK# 18	0	0	0	36 36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300 mm 9A52

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K204 Kremenchuk 49°05'40"N 033°25'50"E	PVV 005		0	0	0	36 36	0		0	0	0	0	0	300 mm 9A52
		107 <sup>th</sup> Rocket Artillery Regiment S657 OK# 31	0	0	0	36 36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	300 mm 9A52
Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K063 Kryvyi Rih 47°52'30"N 033°15'10"E	PVV 005					18								122 mm BM-

Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Тур	0e	
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p	)	
17 <sup>th</sup> Separate Tank Brigade S678 OK# 32				18								122 mn	n BM-21	

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV,	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
	Entry/Exit				and									
					similar									

(b)		(c)			(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p)
K210 Lviv 49°49'30"N 024°01'10"E	Ρ	PVV 00	02								2 1 1								122 mm BM 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52
Academy of the Army-1 S194-1 OK# 34	]				2 1 1									n BM-21 n 9P140 n 9A52					
Declared Site Registration Number		Point o Entry/E		М	onitored I	Item		вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(c)			(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p)
K077 Nizhyn 51°01'40"N 031°52'40"E	Ρ	PVV 00	01								16								122 mm BM-21
											2								220 mm 9P140
Monitored Item	вт	,		APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Ту	De					
(d)	(e)		(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p	)					
1827 <sup>th</sup> Artillery Armament Base S081 OK# 40					16 2									n BM-21 n 9P140					
K208 Novaya Lyubomirka 50°45'40"N 026°24'30"E	Ρ	•VV 00	02	233 <sup>rd</sup> E S921 (	ducationa DK# 47	al Center					2 2								122 mm BM-21 122 mm BM-21
Declared Site Registration Number	r P E	Point o Entry/E		М	onitored I	Item		вт	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(c)			(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p)
(b) (c) (d) 84 vohrad-Volynskyi "35'30"N 027"39'10"E			(~)			(-)		(3/	17	. VI			¥7	()		(-)	122 mm BM-21		

Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
30 <sup>th</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade S510 OK# 48				17								122 mm BM-21

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b) K212 Odessa 46°26'50"N 030°44'50"E	(c) PVV 003	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h) 1 1	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p) 122 mm BM -21 220 mm 9P140

Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
Military Academy (Odessa) S741 OK# 50				1								122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K153 Orzhiv 50°46'30"N 026°06'00"E	PVV 002					21 8								122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140

Monitored Item	BT		ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Ту	pe					
(d)	(e)		(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p						
1448 Central Artillery Armament Base S077 OK# 53					21 8									n BM-21 n 9P140					
Declared Site Registration Numbe		Point Entry		Μ	lonitored I	ltem		BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(0	c)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K092 Perevalne 44°50'10"N 034°19'50"E		PVV	004								6								122 mm BM-21
Monitored Item	вт		ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Тур	pe					
(d)	(e)		(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p	)					
36 <sup>th</sup> Separate Coastal Defense Brigade S638 OK# 54					6								122 mr	n BM-21					
Declared Site Registration Numbe		Point Entry		Monito	red Item			BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(0	c)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K144 Simferopol 44°57'00"N 034°05'20"E		PVV		Artillery	406 <sup>th</sup> Separate Coastal Artillery Group S764 OK# 56					12 12								122 mm BM- 21 122 mm BM-21	
Declared Site Registration Numbe	r	Point Entry		Monitored Item t			BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре	
(b)		(0	c)	(d)		(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)		
K206 Starychi 49°58'50"N 023°34'10"E		PVV	002								4								122 mm BM-21

<b>F</b>							1			1			-						
Monitored Item	B	Г	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Ту	pe					
(d)	(e	)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p						
International Peacekeeping and Security Center S809 OK# 57					4								122 mr	n BM-21					
Declared Site Registration Numb	er	Point Entry		Monito	red Item			BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(	c)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p)
K109 Sumy 50°52'50"N 034°47'20"E		PVV	006								1								122 mm BM- 21
				27 <sup>th</sup> Ro Artillery S775	/ Regime	nt					55 1 55								220 mm 9P140 122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140
				3//3	ON# 00														
Declared Site Registration Numb	er	Point Entry		N	lonitored	ltem		BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(	c)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(0)	(p)
K126 Cherkasskoye 48°42'20"N 035°23'10"E		PVV	005								18								122 mm BM-21
Monitored Item	B	Т	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Ту	pe					
(d)	(e	)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p	)					
93 <sup>rd</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade S692 OK# 66					18								122 mr	n BM-21					

Declared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K130 Chornomorske 46°35'10"N 030°56'30"E	PVV 003					18								122 mm BM-21

Monitored Item	BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Тур	be					
(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p						
28 <sup>th</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade S606 OK# 71				18								122 mn	n BM-21					
Declared Site Registration Number		nt of ry/Exit	N	lonitored	ltem		BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(c)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K128 Chuhuiv 49°50'50"N 036°43'50"E	PV\	/ 006								18 18 18	1							122 mm BM -21 122 mm BM-21 152 mm 2S3 MTM-20
Declared Site Registration Number		nt of y/Exit	N	lonitored	ltem		BT	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
(b)		(c)		(d)			(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
K134 Shepetivka 50°10'50"N 027°04'40"E	PV\	/ 002								58 33 6								122 mm BM- 21 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52
			Arman	Artillery nent Base						30 5								122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140
			ANALY EXPO							20 28 6 7 1								122 mm BM-21 220 mm 9P140 300 mm 9A52 122 mm BM-21 122 mm BM-21

D	eclared Site Registration Number	Point of Entry/Exit	Monitored Item	ВТ	ACV	APC, IFV, and similar	Art.	PTS	UV	CSP	NFC	BS	PUBS	UTS	Туре
	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(I)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)

K135 Yavoriv 49°55'30"N 023°23'30"E	PVV 002			18				122 mm BM-
		24 <sup>th</sup> Separate Mechanized Brigade S285 OK# 76		18				122 mm BM-21

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-3823/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 16 May 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



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[Handwriting:] Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-3823/0/6-14 of May 16, 2014

Extremely urgent

Attn: First Deputy Director of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.M. Dorokhin

#### Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],

In response to your letter of May 16, 2014, the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine would like to inform you as follows.

The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine does not possess information about any intentions of unidentified citizens of Ukraine to proceed to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (in the Syvash and Azov directions). At the same time, it should be noted that we are constantly registering attempts by individuals to infiltrate mainland Ukraine to engage in subversive and sabotage activities from the temporarily occupied territory (Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII *On the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Citizens in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine*, which took effect on May 15, 2014). We also record daily attempts to deliver means of terror, weapons, ammunition, and cash intended to fund mercenaries.

The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine would also like to remark that, unfortunately, we did not receive a single response to our letters between March 3 and May 16, 2014.

In light of the foregoing, please be informed that we prepared and forwarded to you a letter of May 15, 2014, which will be handed over to you in person by Major-General O.I. Valkiv in the immediate future.

We are counting on an appropriate evaluation of the information contained in the letter and appropriate measures to be taken under the Protocol between the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation governing the procedure for exchanging information about the situation at the state border of Ukraine and the Russian Federation dated September 26, 2008, and the Protocol between the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation dated September 26, 2008, and the Protocol between the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation on the activity of border guard representatives dated September 26, 2008.

#### Best regards,

First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Colonel-General[Signature]P.A. Shisholin

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.22-3829/0/6 to the Russian First Deputy Head of the Border Service of FSB, dated 17 May 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

> Attn: First Deputy Director of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.M. Dorokhin

### Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],

I would like to use this opportunity to express my respect for you and my confidence in our continued fruitful cooperation.

In response to your letter of May 16, 2014, please be informed that the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine continues to monitor the situation at the administrative border of Kherson Oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The information reported by the Russian side has not been confirmed as of May 17.

Meanwhile, the leadership of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine is extremely concerned about the lack of a response from the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia both at the central and regional levels in connection with the situation unfolding in the Ukrainian-Russian sector of the state border.

In addition to the facts presented in Letter No. 0.42-3763/0/6-14 of May 15, 2014, please be informed that at around 5:00 a.m. on May 17 a border patrol of the Dyakovo border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment detected an illegal crossing of the state border by a convoy of 6 trucks and 1 UAZ vehicle in the direction of Nagorno-Tuzlovka (Russia) - Klunnikovo (Ukraine), which proceeded deep into Ukrainian territory from the Russian Federation.

Meanwhile, the Russian side has thus far failed to take active steps to deter such incidents.

In light of the foregoing, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine hopes the existing agreements and international laws on cross-border issues will be honored in the future.

First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

**Colonel-General** 

[Signature]

P.A. Shisholin

ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE Outgoing Ref. No. 0.22-3829/0/6-14 of May 17, 2014 0.22

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-4004/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 27 May 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

[Handwriting:] May 27, 2014 No. 0.42-4092/0/6-14

Attn: First Deputy Director -Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

#### Dear Colonel-General,

Yesterday the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine informed the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia about a possible attempt by a large number of militants to break through into Ukrainian territory (Letter No. 0.42-4048/0/6-14 of May 26, 2014 addressed to Colonel-General V.M. Dorokhin). Meanwhile, no response or any steps to prevent the illegal crossing of the common state border followed.

Moreover, one gets the impression that Russian border guards are facilitating the illegal crossing of the common Ukrainian-Russian border by armed militants, thereby violating the provisions of the August 3, 1994 Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Interaction in Border-Related Issues, the May 31, 1997 Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and the requirements of the Protocol between the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation governing the procedure for exchanging information about the situation at the state border of Ukraine and the Russian Federation governing border-related issues.

From 10:30 p.m. on May 26 to 3:43 a.m. on May 27, Ukrainian border guards of the Biryukovo border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment observed the movement of vehicle convoys on the adjoining side (in the direction of Novoprokhorovka (Russia) - Novoborovitsy (Ukraine) in the area of information post No. 68), which could not have passed unnoticed by Russian border guards. Moreover, border guard representatives of the Luhansk and Donetsk border guard detachments informed their Russian colleagues about the movement of these vehicles through operative officers of the two sides, which was followed by a telephone conversation between the chiefs of directorates.

The attempt to break through into Ukrainian territory began at 3:43 a.m. The militants open effective fire in response to warning shots fired by Ukrainian border patrols. The armed encounter ended at 4:22 a.m. Three passenger cars accompanying the convoy were detained, six terrorists killed, one more wounded and taken prisoner as a result of the armed encounter. The cars that were detained were found to contain automatic assault rifles, sniper rifles, handheld grenade launchers, explosives and detonators.

Meanwhile, six trucks and three passenger cars managed to break through in the direction of Ukraine under the cover of massive fire and considering the small number of border patrols.

The militants that broke through the border are now preparing to storm the Sverdlovsk and Biryukovo border guard units of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment (as of 12:00 p.m. Kyiv time).

The events of the past ten days, the lack of any response to our petitions, and the omission to act on the part of Russian border guards can be viewed by us as deliberate actions by the Russian side to undermine Ukraine's efforts to deescalate the conflict in the region.

We believe that this position of the Russian side does not befit a partner but is rather a sign of Russia's enmity.

The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine finds it possible to publish our petitions in the mass media, inform the border guard agencies of the CIS member states, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), as well as all international monitoring missions working in Ukraine.

Blame for possible consequences in the Ukrainian and Russia cross-border region rests with the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia.

## Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General

[Signature]

N.M. Lytvyn

O.V. Derkach, 527-63-92

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-4182/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 3 June 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

> Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

### Dear Colonel-General,

Based on information from reliable sources, please be informed that a large group of 800 armed individuals are planning to break through the joint Ukrainian-Russian state border in the direction of Ukraine on or around June 3-4, 2014 within the strip of land between Millerovo (Russia) - Dyakovo (Ukraine), Kuibyshevo (Russia) - Dmitrovka (Ukraine).

It is not to be ruled out that this group of individuals might commit acts of extremism on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and in other directions within Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts on their way to their final destinations – the cities of Donetsk and Mariupol.

I urge you to react to this information and make every possible effort to deter and prevent criminal activity on the Ukrainian-Russian state border.

### Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General [Si

[Signature]

N.M. Lytvyn

O.V. Derkach, 527-63-92

ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-4298/0/6-14 of June 3, 2014 0.42 Olha Volodymyrivna Derkach



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> www.dpsu.gov.ua

> Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

### Dear Colonel-General,

I would like to yet again call your attention to the gross incidents in which armed individuals illegally crossed the state border without any obstruction from the Russian side.

Specifically, at 3:20 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. on May 30, 2014, in two separate incidents border patrols of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment detained two Gazel vehicles and individuals traveling in them after they crossed the state border from the Russian side; they attempted to illegally move a large cache of weapons and ammo across the state border (Kalashnikov machine guns, Kalashnikov assault rifles, Dragunov sniper rifles, handheld grenade launchers).

Also, please be informed that on the night of May 29-30, 2014, the Stanichno-Luganskoe border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment repelled several armed attacks in which militants used both individual and team weapons.

Bearing in mind the lack of any response from the Russian side to information and petitions from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine regarding attempts by armed individuals to break through the state border and preparations to commit crimes the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine places the full extent of responsibility for the events unfolding in this sector of the Ukrainian-Russian state border on the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, and also views this behavior as facilitation of terrorism in the territory of a sovereign country.

## Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General

[Signature]

N.M. Lytvyn

S. Morozov, 527-63-92



Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5220/0/6-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 2 July 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



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#### URGENT

Attn: First Deputy Director of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.M. Dorokhin

Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],

The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine offers condolences in connection with the incidents involving the shelling of the frontier territory of the Russian Federation on June 28, 2014, which you mentioned in Letter No. 3/85. Please be informed, however, that the Border Guard Service of Ukraine has no information to indicate that units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were involved in these incidents.

Moreover, we have repeatedly called your attention to the possibility of provocative acts on the part of the illegal paramilitary groups operating in the eastern regions of Ukraine, whose leadership includes mercenaries and militants as well as representatives of Cossack military units, citizens of the Russian Federation.

In turn, please be informed that 22 incidents involving trespassing of the state border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation were recorded in April-June 2014 in the sector supervised by the Eastern Regional Directorate of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.

1. Fire from the territory of the Russian Federation (4 incidents).

Donetsk Border Guard detachment:

June 5: militants driving a KamAZ truck crossed the state border and stormed the Marinovka border crossing point from the direction of the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by the Dmitrovka Unit of the Border Guard Service;

After the attack of the militants was repelled, a container that used to store an IGLA shoulderfired surface-to-air missile (9M39) and traces of its use were discovered at the scene of combat during a sweep of the area around the Marinovka border crossing point.

The packing list found in the container indicates that that the missiles had been stored since 2001 at Military Unit No. 33859 of the Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces of the Russian Federation (city of Eysk, Krasnodar Krai). The most recent packing list notations were made on April 12, 2014.

June 21: while militants were firing from the territory of Ukraine at the Uspenka border crossing point in the sector supervised by the Amvrosievka Unit of the Border Guard Service, the Ukrainian positions were also fired at from the territory of the Russian Federation.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-5220/0/6-14 of July 2, 2014 0.42 Luhansk Border Guard detachment:

June 20: in the sector supervised by the Krasnodon Unit of the Border Guard Service, the unit came under fire from the territory of the Russian Federation during an armed attack by militants at the Izvarino border crossing point from Ukrainian territory;

June 22: in the sector supervised by the Belovodsk Unit of the Border Guard Service, the border guard detachment came under fire from the Russian territory (three short bursts of automatic rifle fire).

2. Intrusion into the air space of Ukraine (8 incidents).

Donetsk Border Guard detachment:

April 2: a drone flying along the state border above the territory of Ukraine was detected in the sector supervised by the Novoazovsk Unit of the Border Guard Service;

April 22: intrusions into the air space of Ukraine by drones were also detected in the sector supervised by the Amvrosievka Unit of the Border Guard Service;

April 24: intrusions into the air space of Ukraine by a drone were detected in the sector supervised by the Novoazovsk Unit of the Border Guard Service; the drone flew along the state border of Ukraine;

May 23: drones were spotted flying over the territory of Ukraine along sectors supervised by the Amvrosievka and Novoazovsk Units of the Border Guard Service;

May 29: Anti-Aircraft Defense units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine shot down a drone conducting aerial reconnaissance in the territory of Donetsk Oblast.

Luhansk Border Guard detachment:

June 10: intrusions into the air space by a KA-2 helicopter from Ukrainian territory in the direction of the Russian Federation were detected in the sector supervised by the Krasnodon Unit of the Border Guard Service;

June 28: intrusions into the air space by a drone were detected in the sector supervised by the Stanichno-Luganskoe Unit of the Border Guard Service.

Sumy Border Guard detachment:

May 21: intrusions into the air space by a Mi-8 helicopter (it flew up to 1,500 meters into Ukrainian territory and then flew back to Russia in the opposite direction) were detected in the sector supervised by the Yunakovka Unit of the Border Guard Service.

3. Illegal crossing of the state border of Ukraine by illegal paramilitary groups and sabotage and reconnaissance groups (2 incidents).

Luhansk Border Guard detachment:

May 3: a group of individuals (up to 6 people) illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine on foot from the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by the Stanichno-Luganskoe Unit of the Border Guard Service;

June 22: a group of individuals (up to 15 people) illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine, entering Ukraine and then returning back to Russia, in the sector supervised by the Belovodsk Unit of the Border Guard Service.

4. Illegal crossing of the state border of Ukraine by vehicles (4 incidents).

Donetsk Border Guard detachment:

May 24: five KamAZ trucks illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine in the sector supervised by the Dmitrovka Unit of the Border Guard Service (one machine gunner traveled in the back of

each truck, and one large-caliber machine gun was additionally mounted on the main KamAZ truck).

Luhansk Border Guard detachment:

May 3: two trucks illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by the Dyakovo Unit of the Border Guard Service;

May 8: two offroad vehicles illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by the Biryukovo Unit of the Border Guard Service;

May 17: six KamAZ trucks and one UAZ truck illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation in the sector supervised by the Dyakovo Unit of the Border Guard Service.

May 21: three KamAZ trucks accompanied by a Niva offroad vehicle illegally crossed the state border in the sector supervised by the Krasnodon Unit of the Border Guard Service. When the border guard officers opened effective fire, the vehicles abruptly changed their course and returned back toward the Russian Federation.

May 27: a convoy of 6 KamAZ trucks, 4 passenger cars, and 2 minivans illegally crossed the state border in the sector supervised by the Biryukovo Unit of the Border Guard Service. A border patrol fired at, destroyed and captured 3 vehicles, including with weapons, and arrested one wounded militant.

May 30: in the sector supervised by the Dyakovo Unit of the Border Guard Service, 2 minivans were stopped while attempting an illegal crossing of the state border of Ukraine. In these vehicles, 4 citizens of Ukraine in military uniforms and a citizen of the Russian Federation (the so-called "war bride" of I. Girkin) smuggled into Ukrainian territory 43 units of weapons (27 AK automatic rifles, 4 PK machine guns, 5 Dragunov sniper rifles, 5 RPG-26 handheld anti-tank grenade launcher, 2 Makarov pistols), 197 grenades (102 F-1, 95 RGD-5 grenades), 74 boxes of ammo (7.62 mm - 34 boxes, 12.6 mm - 40 boxes), and foreign currency (USD 10,000).

Berdiansk Border Guard detachment:

May 25: in a joint effort with officers of the Federal Security Service of Ukraine, the Border Guard Service thwarted an attempt to illegally smuggle a large cache of weapons across the Sea of Azov in a boat (90 AK-74 automatic rifles, 5 RPK-74 machine guns, 3 PKM machine guns, 24 RPG-22 handheld grenade launchers, 918 RGD grenades, and over 20,000 units of ammo). Three citizens of Ukraine were detained.

In light of the foregoing, I call your attention to an extreme need to implement a set of appropriate measures on the state border to stabilize the situation, prevent illegal crossing of the state border by personnel carriers and militants, and delivery of weapons and ammo to the state border line.

Best regards,

#### First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Colonel-General	[Signature]	P.A. Shisholin
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S.O. Morozov, 527-63-92

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5698/0/6-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 14 July 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

### URGENT

Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

### Dear Colonel-General,

This is to inform you that the Ukrainian government is making every possible effort to restore control over the sector of the Ukrainian-Russian border in Luhansk Oblast and put an end to criminal activity on the part of members of illegal paramilitary groups in the frontier regions of Ukraine, including their potential attacks targeting the state border and the territory of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, we are forced to call the Russian side's attention to the fact that the armed encounter at the border in this case resulted from an attempt by a convoy of about 100 trucks and armored vehicles to illegally cross the border from the Russian Federation, which was accompanied by intense fire targeting the positions of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the state border line, of which you were informed via Letter No. 0.42-5564/0/6-14 of July 13, 2014.

We believe that the events at the Ukrainian-Russian state border could have been avoided if the Russian side had taken appropriate measures to prevent the illegal crossing of the state border by armed individuals and vehicles, including at border crossing points where crossing operations have been temporarily suspended by a decision of the Ukrainian Government, of which you were informed via Letters Nos. 0.42-4495/0/6-14 and 0.42-4496/0/6-14 of June 10, 2014.

We also repeatedly informed you about a tactic used by militants whereby positions of our units are fired at from the state border line or even from the territory of the Russian Federation in order to provoke return fire in the direction of the Russian Federation, which could result in civilian deaths. According to available information, residents in frontier regions of both Ukraine and Russia are also involved in illegal activities at the border. They help armed individuals and military vehicles cross the border.

To prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future, we propose joining our efforts to ensure the security of the common state border and bring to the attention of the public in both countries, including via the mass media, the fact that any attempts to cross the border illegally will be immediately deterred by the relevant authorities of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

### Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General [Signature]

N.M. Lytvyn

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-5980/0/6-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 21 July 2014

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26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

[Handwriting:] No. 0.42-5980/0/6-14 of July 21, 2014

### URGENT

Attn: First Deputy Director of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.M. Dorokhin

## Dear Viacheslav Mikhaylovich [Mr. Dorokhin],

This is to inform you that today, July 21, 2014, between 11:20 a.m. and 12:10 p.m., unidentified individuals launched an artillery attack on units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the vicinity of Marinovka, Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, from Russian territory. Ukrainian military personnel have been wounded in the attack along with considerable material damage.

At 4:30 p.m., we recorded an attack launched from the area of Dmitrovka and Dyakovo, Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine, into Russian territory in the direction of Dyakovo - Kuibyshevo by militants of illegal paramilitary groups in order to provoke return fire at units of the State Border Guard Service and Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine would like to inform you that, in cooperation with units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, we are taking every possible measure to neutralize the militants and deter their illegal activity at the state border, which includes preventing attacks targeting the territory of the Russian Federation.

For our part, we would like to call attention to the increasingly more frequent attacks on units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Russian territory and ask you to make every effort needed to prevent such attacks.

Best regards,

First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine		
Colonel-General	[Signature]	P.A. Shisholin

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6013/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 22 July 2014

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#### URGENT

Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

## Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

This is to inform you that from 11:50 p.m. on July 21, 2014 to 12:30 a.m. on July 22, 2014, unidentified individuals launched a mortar attacks (close to 40 shots) on units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine from Russian territory in the direction of Staraya Ilyinka (Russia) - Parkhomenkovo (Ukraine). Vehicles then retreated deep into Russian territory.

From 3:00 a.m. to 3:40 a.m. on July 22, 2014, our units were yet again fired at in this area from Russian territory using mortar launchers and GRAD multiple rocket launchers, with a total of 7 salvos and 40 shots per salvo.

Ukrainian border guards suffered wounds and shell shock injuries. Material damage is considerable.

Also on the night of July 21-22, 2014, some 14 military vehicles entered Ukrainian territory from Russian territory in the direction of Shevchenkovo (Ukraine) - Malokaterinovka (Russia), which fired a salvo in the direction of units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine stationed near Solntsevo. The vehicles returned to the Russian Federation after firing the shots. Traces of the attack have been found at the site from which the shots were fired. We have documented them and will hand them over in the prescribed manner to border guard representatives of the Russian Federation during the meeting of border guard representatives.

Please note that attacks on units of the State Border Guard Service and Armed Forces of Ukraine from Russian territory have become constant, and the Russian side is not responding to our petitions and has failed to take any steps to prevent them.



These acts constitute a gross violation of bilateral Ukrainian-Russian agreements on border issues, considerably complicate the situation at the common state border, and result in grave consequences, including casualties among our servicemen and civilians.

The Ukrainian side demands that you make every effort needed to prevent the militants from using Russian territory to fire at Ukrainian territory and illegally cross the state border in military vehicles.

Best regards,

Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.28-6080/0/6-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 23 July 2014

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July 23, 2014 No. 0.28-6080/0/6-14

#### URGENT!

Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

### Dear Colonel-General,

This is to inform you that recent days have seen increasingly more frequent artillery attacks on positions of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Border Guard Service of Ukraine coming from Russian territory. In the past 24 hours alone, there have been 4 artillery and mortar attacks in sectors of the Novoazovsk, Amvrosievka units of the Donetsk border guard detachment and the Stanichno-Luganskoe unit of the Luhansk border guard detachment.

In particular, at 11:30 a.m. and 4:25 p.m. on July 23, 2014, massive rocket artillery fire covered the base camp of the unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that is defending the state border near the Marinovka border crossing point of the Donetsk border guard detachment. The attack came from the area of Kuibyshevo, Rostov Oblast.

The attack resulted in casualties and destruction.

Yet again we urge you to take steps to prevent the recurrence of such incidents on the Ukrainian-Russian border.

Best regards,

Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General

[Signature]

N.M. Lytyvn

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6058/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 23 July 2014

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> Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

## Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

In follow-up to Letter No. 0.42-6013/0/6-14 of July 22, 2014 from the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, this is to inform you about new incidents in which frontier territories of Ukraine were fired at from Russian territory.

Specifically, at 10:10 p.m. on July 22, 2014, border patrols of Ukraine witnessed an artillery attack targeting the territory of Ukraine in the direction of Amvrosievka (Ukraine), and at 10:40 p.m. – volleys from GRAD multiple rocket launchers from Russian territory in the direction of Gerasimovka (Ukraine). At 2:15 a.m. on July 23, 2014, an artillery attack on the Uspenka border crossing point came from Russian territory.

In addition, on July 22, 2014, Russian drones intruded into the Ukrainian air space to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the frontier regions of Ukraine, specifically at 2:50 a.m. (in the area of Kuznetsovo-Mikhaylovka) and at 8:15 a.m. (in the area of Peremoga).

Also, on July 22, 2014, four incidents were reported between 10:20 p.m. and 11:35 p.m. in which helicopters flew up to 3 km into Ukrainian territory from Russian territory.

The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine urges the Russian side to take decisive and appropriate measures to prevent acts of provocation designed to further escalate the situation in Ukraine's eastern regions and assist illegal paramilitary groups of bandits operating in frontier regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Best regards,

## Acting Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

**Colonel-General** 

[Signature] **P.A. Shisholin** 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6058/0/6-14 of July 23, 2014 0.42



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> www.dpsu.gov.ua

> Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

## Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

In follow-up to Letter No. 0.42-6013/0/6-14 of July 22, 2014 from the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, this is to inform you about new incidents in which frontier territories of Ukraine were fired at from Russian territory.

Specifically, at 10:10 p.m. on July 22, 2014, border patrols of Ukraine witnessed an artillery attack targeting the territory of Ukraine in the direction of Amvrosievka (Ukraine), and at 10:40 p.m. – volleys from GRAD multiple rocket launchers from Russian territory in the direction of Gerasimovka (Ukraine). At 2:15 a.m. on July 23, 2014, an artillery attack on the Uspenka border crossing point came from Russian territory.

In addition, on July 22, 2014, Russian drones intruded into the Ukrainian air space to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the frontier regions of Ukraine, specifically at 2:50 a.m. (in the area of Kuznetsovo-Mikhaylovka) and at 8:15 a.m. (in the area of Peremoga).

Also, on July 22, 2014, four incidents were reported between 10:20 p.m. and 11:35 p.m. in which helicopters flew up to 3 km into Ukrainian territory from Russian territory.

The Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine urges the Russian side to take decisive and appropriate measures to prevent acts of provocation designed to further escalate the situation in Ukraine's eastern regions and assist illegal paramilitary groups of bandits operating in frontier regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

Best regards,

## Acting Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

### Colonel-General

P.A. Shisholin

ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6058/0/6-14 of July 23, 2014 0.42

Krasnodon Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine Letter No. 63/32/233 (24 July 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

[Handwriting: Potapenko] [Illegible] 62

[Handwriting: V.M. Zamohylnyi For your information, work-related July 25, 2014]

Copy No. 1

Attn: Deputy Chief of the Investigative Department of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V.M. Bondarenko

Re: Your Ref. No. 63/3/800 of July 5, 2014

Following a request from the investigator of Criminal Case No. 2201413000000089 involving an alleged crime falling under Part 2 of Article 201 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Krasnodon Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine ascertained that at around 6:00 a.m. on July 5, 2014 unidentified individuals, having conspired as part of a group, illegally moved a convoy of military vehicles operated by unidentified individuals across the customs border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation in the vicinity of the Severny border crossing checkpoint of the Luhansk Boarder Guard Detachment stationed in Severny, Krasnodon District, Luhansk Oblast. The convoy consisted of: four (4) Kamaz trucks carrying automatic assault rifles and ammo for them, as well as one (1) truck carrying a GRAD multiple rocket launcher. The trucks were without any number plates or insignia. The convoy proceeded deeper into Ukrainian territory, specifically in the direction of Luhansk.

It was also established that these vehicles crossed the border in the immediate vicinity of the Severny border crossing checkpoint of the Luhansk Boarder Guard Detachment, over which the Ukrainian authorities do not have control.

The Krasnodon Municipal District Office of the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine has conducted a number of investigative activities that did not make it possible to determine the whereabouts of the above-mentioned military vehicles. Detective efforts are also currently underway to locate witnesses of this illegal movement of the above-mentioned military vehicles across the customs border of Ukraine.

We will notify you as soon as we receive any further vital information pertaining to the investigation of Criminal Case No. 2201413000000089.

Chief of the Krasnodon Municipal District Officeof the Luhansk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of UkraineLieutenant Colonel[Signature]July 24, 2014

Reg. No. 63/32/*233* Typed by: E.V. Yehorov

[Handwriting: H.V. Potapenko No. 089 [Signature] July 26, 2014]

> Ref. 472 July 25, 2014

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6125/0/6-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 24 July 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

July 24, 2014 No. 0.42-6125/0/6-14

#### URGENT!

Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

### Dear Colonel-General,

This is to inform you that at 5:30 p.m. and 7:40 p.m. on July 24, 2014, a massive attack on the Marinovka border crossing point of the Donetsk border guard detachment continued with the use of mortar launchers (more than 100 shots fired).

The attack wounded one person and damaged vehicles.

Yet again we urge you to take steps to prevent the recurrence of such incidents on the Ukrainian-Russian border.

## Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General

[Signature]

N.M. Lytyvn

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/2894 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 29 July 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

[Handwriting:] July 29, 2014 Copy No. \_\_\_



# STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE

### **Eastern Regional Directorate**

7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82

July 29, 2014

No. 42/2894

Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko, Acting Director of the Border Guard Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in Rostov Oblast

Russia, Rostov-on-Don

#### Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],

This is to respectfully inform you that the Ukrainian side is alarmed by reports of attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation, particularly the Gukovo vehicle border crossing point.

In response to your Letter No. 26/ 832 of July 29, 2014 (received at 5:32 (Kyiv time)), please be informed that the information you have provided has been referred to the relevant authorities of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, I would like to yet again inform the Russian side that, unfortunately, the area from which the terrorists are staging attacks on the territory of the Russian Federation is currently not controlled by units of the State Border Guard Service or the Ukrainian military.

The Ukrainian defenders of homeland perform their military duty until the end. Today alone, 4 Ukrainian servicemen were killed and more than 10 wounded as a result of a series of mortar and artillery attacks in this direction.

I would like to assure you that the Ukrainian side is taking exceptional measures to restore control over sectors of the state border of Ukraine and eliminate the causes of attacks targeting the territory of the Russian Federation (Letter No. 42/2831 of July 25, 2014).

Terrorists who kill peaceful civilians, shoot at border guards and servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and launch artillery attacks on the territories of Ukraine and the Russian Federation will be located and held accountable, and their crimes will be stopped.

In turn, the Ukrainian side urges the Russian side to step up security of the state border in this direction, prevent militants from entering Ukraine, cut off the existing channels for smuggling weapons and military vehicles that the terrorists use to launch attacks on the territories of our countries and kill our citizens.

#### Best regards,

Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate

of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Lieutenant-General

[Signature]

A.A. Kucherenko

FROM: 268

PHONE: 2879793

JULY 29, 2014 18:32 PAGE 2

Fax without follow-up mailing of the original

[Handwriting: illegible]

[Signature] July 29, 2014

### FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

### Attn: Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate of the State Board Guard Service of Ukraine

### BORDER DIRECTORATE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIA IN ROSTOV OBLAST

July 29, 2014, No. 26/832 Rostov-on-Don, 344011 Lieutenant-General A.A. Kucherenko

7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, Ukraine, 61045

Dear Andrey Arkadyevich [Mr. Kucherenko],

This is to inform you that on the night of July 28 - 29, 2014, during the period of armed encounters occurring in Luhansk Oblast, attacks were launched from Ukrainian territory on the Russian Federation and the Gukovo vehicle border crossing point (Russia). In this connection, crossings of individuals and vehicles across the state border of the Russian Federation are temporarily suspended at the Gukovo border crossing point.

The attack by the Ukrainian side damaged buildings and the utility infrastructure of the Russian border crossing point, and shell hole were discovered at the sites of explosions.

The Russian side demands that the Ukrainian side take steps to rule out the possibility of attacks on Russian territory across the state border. The actions of the Ukrainian side constitute a gross violation of Russia's sovereignty.

The Russian side would like to call attention to the fact that the criminal and provocative actions by the Ukrainian side cannot be left without attention and appropriate evaluation.

Best regards,

Acting Chief of Directorate

Colonel

[Signature]

D.N. Nechepuren

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6311/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 30 July 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

> Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

## Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

Yet again please be informed that, despite repeated petitions from the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine calling for the attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine from Russian territory to be stopped and decisive measures to be taken by the Russian side to ensure border security, systemic illegal activity of a provocative nature continues out of Russian territory.

Specifically, from 7:20 p.m. to 7:50 p.m. on July 29, 2014, a border patrol of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine witnessed artillery fire from Grad-P multiple rocket launchers in the direction of Amvrosievka (Ukraine) from the direction of Shramko (Russian Federation).

In addition, from 7:20 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. the Marinovka border crossing point came under mortar fire from Russian territory, and from 7:30 p.m. to 7:40 p.m. artillery fire from Grad-P multiple rocket launchers came from Russian territory in the direction of Stepanovka (Ukraine).

Incidents involving attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine from Russian territory are documented. Photo and video evidence will be presented to the Russian side during the meeting at the level of border guard representatives.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6311/0/6-14 of July 30, 2014 0.42 We would like to call your attention to the urgent need for the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia to take comprehensive measures toward preventing the use of Russian territory to stage attacks targeting Ukrainian territory, which threatens the lives and health of citizens of a sovereign state.

We also request that you expedite the process of releasing information from the Russian Federation following the investigation of incidents involving attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine with the use of Russian territory, information about which we presented earlier on July 21-29, 2014.

Best regards,

#### Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General

[Signature]

N.M. Lytvyn

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6400/0/6-14 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 31 July 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

[Handwriting:] 0.42-6400/0/6-14 of July 31, 2014

Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

#### Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

I am forced to state that omission to act on the part of border guard units of the Russian Federation, systematic violations by the Russian side of the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Interaction in Border-Related Issues, as well as the Protocol between the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation on the activity of border guard representatives, have yet again resulted in casualties among Ukrainian border guards.

Specifically, at 3:20 a.m. on July 31, 2014, a sabotage and reconnaissance group used the latest models of Russian-made handheld grenade launchers to fire at the premises of the Vasilyevka border guard service office of the Amvrosievka border guard service unit of the Donetsk Border Guard detachment. As a result of this criminal act, 2 Ukrainian border guards were killed, 8 were wounded, while 2 more remain buried under rubble.

In addition, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. today, a unit of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the sector supervised by the Stanichno-Luganskoe border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came under fire from BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket launchers (7 volleys) and artillery fire from the territory of the Russian Federation (up to 5,000 m from the state border line) from the area of Voykovo (Russia) in the direction of Kolesnikov (Ukraine).

The Ukrainian side demands that you act immediately to restore the proper regime of the state border of the Russian Federation, honor international laws and bilateral agreements on the assurance of border security of the sovereign state.

#### Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General [S

[Signature]

N.M. Lytvyn



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> www.dpsu.gov.ua

[Handwriting:] 0.42-6400/0/6-14 of July 31, 2014

Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

#### Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

I am forced to state that omission to act on the part of border guard units of the Russian Federation, systematic violations by the Russian side of the Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Interaction in Border-Related Issues, as well as the Protocol between the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation on the activity of border guard representatives, have yet again resulted in casualties among Ukrainian border guards.

Specifically, at 3:20 a.m. on July 31, 2014, a sabotage and reconnaissance group used the latest models of Russian-made handheld grenade launchers to fire at the premises of the Vasilyevka border guard service office of the Amvrosievka border guard service unit of the Donetsk Border Guard detachment. As a result of this criminal act, 2 Ukrainian border guards were killed, 8 were wounded, while 2 more remain buried under rubble.

In addition, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:30 a.m. today, a unit of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the sector supervised by the Stanichno-Luganskoe border guard unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came under fire from BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket launchers (7 volleys) and artillery fire from the territory of the Russian Federation (up to 5,000 m from the state border line) from the area of Voykovo (Russia) in the direction of Kolesnikov (Ukraine).

The Ukrainian side demands that you act immediately to restore the proper regime of the state border of the Russian Federation, honor international laws and bilateral agreements on the assurance of border security of the sovereign state.

#### Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General [Signature] N.M. Lytvyn

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3055 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 6 August 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

[Handwriting:] August 6, 2014 Copy No. \_\_\_



### STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE

#### **Eastern Regional Directorate**

7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82

August 6, 2014

No. 42/3055

[Handwriting:] O.O. Morozov, [illegible] [Signature]

Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko, Acting Director of the Border Guard Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in Rostov Oblast

Russia, Rostov-on-Don

#### Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],

This is to inform you that my communication to you, sent via Letter No. 42/3031 of August 5, 2014, about the nighttime mortar and artillery attack on the Ukrainian border patrol in the vicinity of the population centers of Krasnyi Derkul - Gerasimovka did not find an appropriate response. The situation has not been contained. Instead, it has deteriorated further.

This morning, from 4:25 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. (Kyiv time), another border patrol on duty in the vicinity of Krasnaya Talovka (Ukraine) came under howitzer fire from Russian territory from an area in the vicinity of Novorusskiy (Russia).

Also, between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. in the direction of Voloshino (Russia) - Krasnaya Talovka (Ukraine), the border patrol detected an intrusion into the Ukrainian air space from the Russian Federation by a drone that flew up to 1,000 meters into Ukrainian territory directly above the position of border patrols, which were subsequently targeted by the attack.

I would yet again like to remind the Russian side that on July 14 and 28, 2014, roadside bombs and land mines were planted along routes traveled by Ukrainian border patrols near the state border, and the border patrols came under mortar and assault rifle fire from the Russian side, which wounded our personnel and damaged our vehicles;

On July 5, 14 and 28, Ukrainian border guards serving both in the "green sector" of the border and at the border crossing point came under fire. The border crossing point came under fire from shoulder-fired missile launchers from the Russian side. Some of the border guards were severely wounded. The infrastructure and the watch tower of the border crossing point have been destroyed.

While previously the Russian side would respond to all reports of the Ukrainian side about attacks on Ukrainian border patrols from the Russian side by saying (most recent letter No. 26/929 of August 5, 2014) that the attacks did not come from Russian territory but instead originated from the "opposing warring part" (or, in the words of the Ukrainian side, from terrorists and bandits), in this case the distance between positions of border patrols that came under attack and positions of terrorists is more than 50 km, and any fire could possibly come only from Russian territory.

I would like to emphasize the total omission to act on the part of Russian border guards and their failure to defend the state border on their side.

*Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],* I request that you admit the obvious fact: that Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian border guards are being fired at from Russian territory.

In light of the foregoing, the Ukrainian side insists that the following information be provided: What units are responsible for artillery fire targeting Ukrainian territory? Which grouping of forces and hardware do they belong to? Who commands these units? Who gives orders to fire and launch drones? Who delivers missiles and weapons to the firing emplacements in the frontier region?

Please reply to my letter as soon as practicable.

Best regards, Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Lieutenant-General [Signature]

A.A. Kucherenko

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6741 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 10 August 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

[Handwriting:] 0.42-6741 of August 10, 2014

#### Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

#### Dear Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

This is to inform you that on August 9, 2014, the territory of Ukraine yet again repeatedly came under artillery fire from the Russian side over the course of 24 hours.

In particular, artillery fire from Grad-P multiple rocket launchers came in the direction of Petropavlovka (Ukraine) from the direction of Marfinka (Russian Federation) between 1:00 p.m. and 1:10 p.m. When the attack ended, the Ukrainian border patrol witnessed 4 units of heavy military vehicles retreating back into the Russian Federation.

Also, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers staged a series of attacks from Russian territory between 1:00 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. in the direction of Amvrosievka (Ukraine) from the direction of Selezniovka (Russian Federation) and Marfinka (Russian Federation).

The town of Diakovo (Ukraine) came under artillery fire (presumably from a tank) at 2:00 p.m. from the direction of Dibrovka (Russian Federation).

Subsequently at 5:05 p.m., a border patrol observed two Mi-24 Russian military helicopters fly up to 2 km into Ukrainian territory in the direction of Rogalik (Russia) - Blagoveshchenka (Ukraine).

A massive artillery attack began at 9:17 p.m. from Russian territory, targeting the territory of Ukraine in the direction of Yuganovka (Ukraine) from the direction of Manotskiy (Russian Federation).

Incidents involving attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine from Russian territory and intrusions into the Ukrainian air space are documented. Photo and video evidence will be presented to the Russian side during the meeting at the level of border guard representatives.

Yet again we urge the border guard directorate of the Russian Federation to act immediately to put an end to artillery and mortar attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine and prevent recurring violations of international laws.

Best regards,

#### Acting Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Colonel-General

[Signature]

P.A. Shisholin

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 0.42-6776/0/6 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 11 August 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



26 Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine Phone: (38044) 239-85-75 Fax: (38044) 239-84-80 Email: <u>dkk@pvu.gov.ua</u> <u>www.dpsu.gov.ua</u>

#### URGENT

Attn: First Deputy Director - Chief of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, Colonel-General V.G. Kulishov

#### Vladimir Grigoryevich [Mr. Kulishov],

The manifestations of cynicism by the Russian side as it turns a blind eye to the obvious violations by the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia of international laws governing cross-border security at the Ukrainian-Russian state border are further proof of our assumptions that the Russian border guard service has a direct interest in the destabilization of the situation in Ukraine's eastern regions.

Incredulously, the Russian side continues to turn a blind eye to the massive daily attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine, surgical artillery attacks on Ukrainian units, including border guard patrols, coming from Russian territory remain.

Meanwhile, August 11, 2014 has been declared a day of mourning in Odesa and Kirovohrad Oblasts for the border guard heroes who died in the artillery and mortar attack against the unit of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment in the vicinity of Stanichno-Luganskoe on August 10, 2014, which came from the area of Manotskiy, Rostov Oblast, Russia. The attack that lasted from 8:25 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. killed four and wounded ten servicemen of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.

Also, between 11:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. on August 10, 2014, an artillery attack targeting an area in the vicinity of the Krasnaya Talovka border crossing point of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came from Russian territory from the area of Derkul (Russia) in the direction of Krasnaya Talovka (Ukraine).

From 12:05 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. on August 11, 2014, an attack from a BM-21 GRAD

ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE Outgoing Ref. No. 0.42-6776/0/6-14 of July 11, 2014 multiple rocket launcher targeting a roadblock of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the vicinity of Amvrosievka came from Russian territory from the area of Avilo-Fiodorovka (Russia) in the direction of Uspenka (Ukraine).

I would also like to call your attention to the continuing systematic intrusions by Russian reconnaissance drones that fly up to 4,000 m deep into Ukrainian territory (Krasnaya Talovka and Melovoe border guard service units).

Yet again I urge you to act immediately to prevent the territory of the Russian Federation from being used to stage attacks against Ukrainian territory, and ensure observance of international laws and bilateral agreements aimed at maintaining an appropriate stage border regime and preventing casualties among Ukrainian citizens.

#### Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Ukrainian Army General

[Signature]

N.M. Lytvyn

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3603 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB, dated 31 August 2014

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



## STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE

#### **Eastern Regional Directorate**

7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82

August 31, 2014

No. 42/3603

[Handwriting: illegible] *O.V. Derkach* [Signature]

Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko, Acting Director of the Border Guard Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in Rostov Oblast

Russia, Rostov-on-Don

#### Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],

Peaceful citizens of Ukraine, residents of the Belovodsk District of Luhansk Oblast, have been killed or wounded, property, utilities, and residential buildings have been damaged as a result of blatant aggression coming from Russian territory, specifically regular attacks targeting the territory of Ukraine between 8:05 a.m. and 3:45 p.m. on August 30, 2014 in the direction of Kalmykovka (Russia) - Nizhniaya Baranikovka.

You have ignored the proposal of the Ukrainian border guard representative in the Luhansk Sector to hold a meeting of border guard representatives in connection with the abovementioned cross-border incident, which constitutes a violation of international legal and ethical norms as well as bilateral agreements.

Unfortunately, I am forced to conclude that this position of the Russian side only magnifies the tragic consequences of illegal activities undertaken against the Ukrainian state, as evidenced by another attack on the territory of Ukraine in the direction of Nizhnemityakinskoe (Russia) – Kamyshnoe (Ukraine), which took place between 12:38 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. on August 31, 2014. Preliminary observation results indicate that the attack was launched using missiles from Russian territory, specifically from the direction of Nizhnemityakinskoe (Russia) from a distance of 8-10 kilometers into Russian territory.

Articles 4 and 8, Clause (a) of Article 10 of the 2008 Cross-Agency Protocol on the Activity of Border Guard Representatives, Article 8 of the 1994 Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on Cooperation and Interaction in Border-Related Issues, and agreements reached at the meeting of chiefs of both sides' border guard agencies on August 30, 2014, are currently in effect.

Please inform us about the measures taken and your decision as soon as practicable.

Best regards,

Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate

of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Lieutenant-General

[Ciana turn

[Signature] A.A. Kucherenko

Ukrainian Military Intelligence Summary of Cross-Border Weapons Transfers (September 2014 to December 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Combined data on verified facts of arms, military equipment, materiel, fuel and lubricants supplied from the territory of the Russian Federation to the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions and of border crossing by armed formations in the period from June 1 until December 31, 2015

No	Date	Supply routes, destination	Mode (means) of	Amount of arms, military equipment, materiel, fuel and	Supporting
110	documented	(crossing) points	delivery	lubricants, personnel strength	documents
		2	014	luoneants, personner strengtn	
				10 APC and 10 KAMAZ	
1.	06.07.14	to the territory of Ukraine		trucks	
2.	06.08.14	KUIBYSHEVE-DYAKOVE	road	3 towed artillery systems	
2		through IZVARYNE -	1	20 D-20 type artillery	
3.	06.19.14	LUHANSK	road	systems	
4.	07.26.14	Through KHRUSTALNY-	road	3 tanks, 2 APC and 2	
4.	07.20.14	LUTUGINE	road	KAMAZ trucks	
5.	07.26.14	to NOVOHANNIVKA	road	4 tanks, 2 APC	
6.	07.26.14	to KHRUSTALNY	road	2 tanks, 5 infantry fighting	
			Toud	vehicles and 18 coaches	
7.	08.10.14	to LUHANSK	road	1 APC, 6 cars	
				10 BM-21 Grad multiple	
_			road	rocket launchers, 5 tanks, 4	
8.	08.12.14	through IZVARYNE		KAMAZ trucks and 1	
				Tunguska anti-aircraft	
				weapon	
		DONETSK (Rostov Region, 13-15.14 Russian Federation – Sorokine)		14 tanks, 22 BM-21 Grad	
			road	multiple rocket launchers, 20	
				APCs, 6 self-propelled guns	
9.	08.13-15.14			(mounted on APC-80), 87	
				Ural and Kamaz trucks with	
				personnel and luggage), 15 tractor units 6 ambulance	
				cars and 3 refuelers	
				60 airborne infantry fighting	
10.	08.24.14	BERESTOVE	road	vehicles, 18 tanks	
				12 tanks, 3 BMP-2 infantry	
11.	08.26.14	NOVOAZOVSK	road	fighting vehicles, 3 KAMAZ	
	00.2011		1044	trucks	
10	00.01.11			4 tanks, 2 BM-21 Grad	
12.	09.01.14	YENAKIEVE	road	multiple rocket launchers	
				1 BM-21 Grad multiple	
12	00.01.14	DMVTDIVEV	road	rocket launcher, 1 refueler	
13.	09.01.14	DMYTRIVKY	road	and 2 Ural trucks with	
				personnel	
		through DIBRIVKA-		6 APCs, 9 BM-21 Grad	
14.	09.5.14	DMYTRIVKA	road	multiple rocket launchers, 13	
				Kamaz and 6 Ural trucks	
15.	09.11.14	to SOROKINE	road	13 KAMAZ trucks	
16.	09.12.14	through IZVARYNE	road	40 armored fighting vehicles	

17.	09.14.14	through NOVOAZOVSK- BEZIMENNE	road	15 tanks and 30 other fighting vehicles
18.	09.14.14	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK- SOROKINE	road	15 tanks, 8 APCs and 11 white Kamaz type vehicles
19.	10.9.14	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK	road	9 tanks, 3 APCs and 2 KAMAZ type trucks with personnel and ammunition
20.	10.9.14	Through DOVZHANSKY	road	3 tanks and 10 trucks with ammunition
21.	10.9.14	Through the NOVOAZOVSK checkpoint, in NOVOAZOVSK	road	7 9K58 Smerch multiple rocket launchers, T-90 tanks, 50 armored fighting vehicles and trucks
22.	10.11.14	through IZVARYNE	road	1 APC and 3 D-30 howitzers
23.	10.18.14	through KUZNETSY	road	10 KAMAZ vehicles, 3 refuelers and 3 Tigr armored fighting vehicles
24.	10.19.14	through VOZNESENIVKA- ROVENKI	road	30 tanks
25.	10.25.14	through USPENKA- ILOVAYSK	road	2 APCs, 10 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers
26.	10.25.14	through DYAKOVE	road	6 armored fighting vehicles, 4 KAMAZ trucks
27.	10.26.14	through DYAKOVE	road	20 self-propelled guns and 60 trucks
28.	10.27.14	through DYAKOVE – NIZHNIY NAGOLCHIK	road	10 refuelers
29.	10.28.14	through GUKOVO- DOVZHANSK	road	10 tanks, 6 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 4 TOS-1 Buratino heavy flame-thrower systems and truckloads of ammunition
30.	10.30.14	through the NOVOAZOVSK checkpoint	road	10 trucks with personnel and ammunition
31.	10.30.14	through IZVARYNE	road	15 tanks, 30 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 100 Kamaz trucks
32.	10.30.14	through DIBRIVKY	road	12 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 14 KAMAZ type trucks
33.	10.31.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	2 tanks, 5 BDRM amphibious armored patrol cars, 3 APCs, 6 D-30 howitzers, 50 trucks
34.	11.3.14	through IZVARYNE	road	6 tanks, 5 infantry fighting vehicles, 1APC, 2 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft autocannon, 8 trucks
35.	11.6.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	7 infantry fighting vehicles, 1APC
36.	11.6.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	4 tanks, 6 infantry fighting vehicles, 5 BDRMs, 1 refueler, 1 NONA self- propelled gun, 1 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher, 1 anti- aircraft autocannon, 13 trucks
37.	11.6.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	5 truckloads of ammunition, 1 refueler
38.	11.6.14	Trough SEVERNYI - LUTUGINE	road	40 APCs
39.	11.6.14	Through BIRYUKOVE - DOVZHANSK	road	2 APCs, 3 tanks, 3 Ural trucks

40.	11.7.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	1 APC, 13 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 9 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, 21 trucks (7 KAMAZ type trucks with personnel, 2 with ammunition, 1 Ural-mounted anti-aircraft autocannon)
41.	11.8.14	NOVOAZOVSK	road	6 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 4 Tigr armored fighting vehicles, 8 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns
42.	11.10.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	1 APC BTR-80, 1 Tigr armored fighting vehicle, 3 trucks
43.	11.10.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	2 infantry fighting vehicles, 10 trucks (with personnel and ammunition), one howitzer with trailer, 1 refueler
44.	11.10.14	through DYAKOVE – NIZHNIY NAGOLCHIK	road	17 KAMAZ type trucks (trailers pulling: 3 towed artillery systems and 2 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft autocannon)
45.	11.11.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	4 tanks, 11 infantry fighting vehicles
46.	11.11.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	4 tanks, 5 infantry fighting vehicles and 4 KAMAZ and Ural trucks
47.	11.13.14	through MARYNIVKA- SNIZHNE	road	20 T-72 tanks
48.	11.15.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	10 T-90 tanks, 2 infantry fighting vehicles, 4 APCs, 41 trucks
49.	11.16.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	5 BDRM amphibious armored patrol cars, 5 APCs and 5 KAMAZ and KRAZ trucks
50.	11.21.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	6 tanks, 2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 2 BDRMs and 10 trucks
51.	11.24.11	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	6 armored fighting vehicles and 80 trucks
52.	11.25.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	2 amphibious armored patrol cars and 57 KAMAZ trucks
53.	11.26.14	through IZVARYNE – SOROKINE - LUHANSK	road	46 KAMAZ trucks, 3 tanks, 3 self- propelled guns, 5 civilian cars
54.	11.26.14	To DMYTRIVKA	road	9 tanks, 29 KAMAZ trucks with personnel and ammunition and 2 automatic cranes
55.	11.26.14	through USPENKA- VASYLIVKA	road	6 tanks
56.	11.26.14	through USPENKA - MOKROYELANCHIK	road	10 tanks
57.	11.28.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	16 tanks, 17 Tigr armored fighting vehicles, 87 trucks (including 8 with personnel, the others with ammunition), 6 kitchens, a radar with a power station, 1 APC, 2 UAZ trucks, 1 coach and 2 minivans
58.	11.30.14	Through DYAKOVE – NIZHNIY NAGOLCHIK	road	9 APCs
59.	11.30.14	To STAKHANOV	road	Borisoglebsk-2 electronic warfare station
60.	12.02.14	NOVAYA NADEZHDA (Russian Federation) - DMYTRIVKA	road	18 tanks, 8 APCs, 8 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 4 KAMAZ trucks with ammunition

61.	12.06.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	7 Gvozdika 2S1 self-propelled guns, 1 APC, 11 refuelers, a coach with personnel and 28 KAMAZ and Ural trucks	
62.	12.07.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	5 Gvozdika 2S1 self-propelled guns, 5 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 APC, 9 Bogdan minivans with personnel, 40 KAMAZ and Ural type trucks	
63.	12.8.14	through DMYTRIVKA	road	5 infantry fighting vehicles, 5 KAMAZ and Ural type trucks, 11 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers and 6 white vehicles	
64.	12.9.14	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK	road	6 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers	
65.	12.9.14	through IZVARYNE - SOROKINE	road	1 self-propelled gun, 1 T-72 tank, 1 BREM armored recovery vehicle, 1 BAT-2 armored tracklayer	
66.	12.11.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	15 armored fighting vehicles, 38 KAMAZ trucks and 4 command staff vehicles	
67.	12.13.14	Through BIRYUKOVE - DOVZHANSK	road	26 tanks, 18 self-propelled guns, 24 armored fighting vehicles, 8 OSA anti-aircraft missile systems, 25 trucks	
68.	12.15.14	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	12 infantry fighting vehicles	
69.	12.15.14	Through DOVZHANSKY - DOVZHANSK	road	5 tanks, 3 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 2 trucks with ammunition	
70.	12.18.14	In the direction of DMYTRIVKA	road	8 tanks, 3 Pion self-propelled guns	
71.	12.19.14	VOZNESENIVKA - DOVZHANSK	road	2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 11 tanks and 1 APC	
72.	12.21.14	Through IZVARYNE – KRASNODON - LUHANSK	road	12 armored fighting vehicles, 8 refuelers and 30 trucks with personnel and ammunition	
	T		2015		
73.	01.04.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	28 military refuelers	
74.	01.06.15	CHEVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK - LUHANSK	road	5 tanks and 3 trucks	
75.	01.06.15- 01.07.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	30 trucks with property and ammunition (1 for ZU-23-2), 15 refuelers	
76.	01.07.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	10 tanks, 10 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, 21 artillery systems, 4 Strela-10 anti-aircraft missile systems, 8 Ural trucks	
77.	01.09.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	13 vehicles (with property and ammunition)	
78.	01.09.15- 01.10.15	GUDKOVO (Russian Federation) - SVERDLOVSK	road	5 Ural trucks with towed artillery vehicles mounted on them and one BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher	

79.	01.11.15- 01.12.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	3 tanks, 9 armored fighting vehicles (tracked), 119 trucks (with property and ammunition) 2 refuelers and 1 bus with personnel.
80.	01.13.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	1 APC, 64 trucks with property and ammunition, including one with ZU- 23-2, 5 armored vehicles, 2 refuelers
81.	01.13.15	Through MARKINE	road	16 trucks (with property and ammunition)
82.	01.15.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	20 trucks (with property and ammunition)
83.	01.16.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	19 refuelers, 2 armored fighting vehicles, 42 trucks (with property and ammunition)
84.	01.17.05	Through IZARYNE, DOVZHANSKY CHERVONOPARTYZANSK AND DMYTRIVKA	road	500 pieces of military equipment (including 92 tanks, 65 armored fighting vehicles and 2 TOS-1 Buratino systems
85.	01.19.05	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	29 trucks (with property and ammunition)
86.	01.21.15- 01.22.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	4 Pantsir-S1 missile systems and 2 refueling vehicles for it, 1 Tor missile system, 46 trucks with personnel, property and ammunition (2 with ZU- 23-2)
87.	01.23-24.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	128 trucks (with property and ammunition), 11 refuelers, 4 Pantsir S-1 missile system, 1 ZRK Tor missile system and 2 refueling cars
88.	01.26.15- 01.27.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	11 armored fighting vehicles, 6 BM- 21 Grad multiple rocket launchers and 44 trucks (with property and ammunition)
89.	01.29.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	6 tanks, 4 TOS-1 Buratino, 12 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 4 refuelers and 26 trucks (with property and ammunition)
90.	01.29.15- 01.30.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	7 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 7 self-propelled guns, 1 APC and 76 trucks
91.	01.29.15- 01.30.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	26 tanks and 14 trucks with personnel
92.	02.01.15- 02.02.15	GUKOVO (Russian Federation) - SVERDLOVSK	road	12 KAMAZ type trucks with ammunition
93.	02.01.15- 02.02.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	2 T-72 tanks, 7 infantry fighting vehicles, 96 trucks (with personnel, property and ammunition)

94.	02.01.15- 02.02.15	through DMYTRIVKA- SNIZHNE	road	10 Uragan multiple rocket launchers
95.	02.04.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	3 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 7 trucks (with personnel and ammunition)
96.	02.05.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	10 tanks, 2 infantry fighting vehicles and 58 trucks with property and ammunition
97.	02.05.15	through IZVARYNE- ROVENKI	road	10 tanks and 15 trucks
98.	02.05.15	through DMYTRIVKA- SNIZHNE	road	5 T-72 tanks, 10 refuelers
99.	02.08.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	5 trucks (with property and ammunition)
100.	02.08.15	through DYAKOVE- ROVENKI	road	11 tanks, 10 armored fighting vehicles, 8 KAMAZ type trucks (with property and ammunition)
101.	02.08.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	8 tanks, 6 armored fighting vehicles, 6 cars with ammunition
102.	02.10.15	Through USPENKA- AMVROSIYIVKA	road	30 tanks, 20 infantry fighting vehicles and 50 trucks (with ammunition)
103.	02.10.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	39 trucks (with property and ammunition)
104.	02.10.15- 02.11.15	NOVOAZOVSK- BEZIMENNE	road	3 T-64 tanks, 10 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 20 trucks with personnel, ammunition and towed artillery systems
105.	02.10.15- 02.11.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	7 tanks, 2 APCs, 12 Pion self- propelled guns, 8 Ural trucks with ammunition
106.	02.13.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	61 trucks (1 with ZU-23-2), 3 refuelers
107.	02.13.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	8 tanks, 3 Pantsir-S1 missile systems, 12 trucks (with ammunition)
108.	02.13.15	Through NOVOAZOVSK - TELMANOVE	road	18 tanks (T-64, T-72, T-90), 5 multiple rocket launchers
109.	02.14.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	20 trucks, 10 refuelers, 15 trucks with property and ammunition, a bus and two cars with personnel
110.	02.14.15	MAKSYMIV - NOVOAZOVSK	road	20 tanks
111.	02.14.15	KUZNETSI - BEZIMENNE	road	2 infantry fighting vehicles, 6 tanks, 10 self-propelled guns, 12 trucks
112.	02.14.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	12 tanks, 20 cars with personnel

113.	02.15.15	GUKOVO (Russian Federation) - SVERDLOVSK	road	20 KAMAZ trucks with ammunition
114.	02.16.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	12 armored fighting vehicles, 2 BM- 21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 104 trucks (with property and ammunition)
115.	02.17.15	DIBRIVKA - DMYTRIVKA	road	17 trucks, 1 TOS-1 Buratino, 1 220 mm Uragan multiple rocket launcher
116.	02.17.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	60 122 mm Gvozdika self-propelled guns
117.	02.18.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	8 trucks (with personnel, property and ammunition)
118.	02.18.15	GUKOVO (Russian Federation) - SVERDLOVSK	road	7 tanks, 11 APCs, 4 trucks with ammunition
119.	02.21.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	51 trucks with ammunition and towed artillery systems
120.	02.22.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	7 tanks, 5 armored fighting vehicles, 8 trucks with ammunition
121.	02.24.15- 02.25.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 42 trucks, 7 refuelers
122.	02.24.15- 02.25.15	Through DOVZHANSKY - SVERDLOVSK	road	2 tanks, 4 trucks
123.	02.25.15- 02.26.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	10 152 mm Akatsiya self-propelled guns, 14 trucks (1 with ZU-23-2 anti- aircraft autocannon)
124.	02.25.15- 02.26.15	through DOVZHANSKY - SVERDLOVSK	road	2 tanks, 2 Uragan multiple rocket launchers, 7 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 6 refuelers
125.	02.25.15- 02.26.15	AMVROSIYIVKA	rail	train with firearms and ammunition
126.	02.27.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	12 trucks with ammunition
127.	02.28.15	through DOVZHANSKY - SVERDLOVSK	road	11 tanks and 7 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers
128.	02.28.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	20 trucks and five refuelers
129.	02.28.15- 03.01.15	Through DYAKOVE - ANTRATSYT	road	2 tanks, 25 Ural trucks
130.	02.28.15- 03.01.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	35 KAMAZ trucks (2 with ZU-23-2)
131.	03.01.15- 03.02.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	12 APCs, 9 trucks with personnel and ammunition
132.	03.01.15- 03.02.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	8 trucks with personnel and ammunition

133.	03.03.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	12 BTR-80 APCs, 6 infantry fighting vehicles BMP-2, 6 trucks with ammunition	
134.	03.03.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	13 trucks (1 with ZU-23-2)	
135.	03.04.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	14 T-72 and 10 refuelers	
136.	03.04.15	through IZVARYNE – LUHANSK	road	1 infantry fighting vehicle and 27 trucks with property and ammunition (2 with ZU-23-2)	
137.	03.05.15	through DOVZHANSKY - SVERDLOVSK	road	5 tanks, 2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers	
138.	03.06.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	1 APC, 4 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 59 trucks (with property and ammunition)	
139.	03.08.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	7 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 104 trucks with ammunition and personnel, 10 white trucks	
140.	03.08.15	through IZVARYNE - KRASNODON	road	5 minivans with field medical supplies	
141.	03.09.15	GUKOVO (Russian Federation) - SVERDLOVSK	road	5 tanks, 2 infantry fighting vehicles	
142.	03.09.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	30 trucks (with ammunition)	
143.	03.10.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	2 infantry fighting vehicles and 4 trucks with personnel	
144.	03.09.15- 03.11.15	AMVROSIYIVKA	rail	3 trains with military equipment (armored fighting vehicles, self- propelled guns, artillery systems and ammunition)	
145.	03.11.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	18 trucks with ammunition and property, and 2 refuelers	
146.	03.11.15	GUKOVO (Russian Federation) - SVERDLOVSK	road	2 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers	
147.	03.11.15	TAGANROG - STAROBESHEVE	road	21 refuelers	
148.	03.11.15	SUKHODOLSK	rail	20 cars with ammunition and property	
149.	03.11.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	25 platforms with armored vehicles, 2 tankers with fuel and lubricants and 4 cars with ammunition	
150	03.12.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	53 trucks	
151	03.12.15	through DOVZHANSKY - SVERDLOVSK	road	23 tanks, 5 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers and 8 trucks with ammunition	

152.	03.10.15- 03.13.15	DEBALTSEVE	rail	7 trains with military equipment and ammunition
153.	03.16.15	through DOVZHANSKY - LUHANSK	road	20 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers
154.	03.16.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	2 infantry fighting vehicles, Krasukha-2 electronic warfare system
155.	03.17.15	SUKHODOLSK	rail	train with property and ammunition
156.	03.18.15	through IZVARYNE - KRASNODON	road	6 armored fighting vehicles, 2 refuelers
157.	03.21.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	10 trucks with property and ammunition
158.	03.26.15	GUKOVO (Russian Federation) - SVERDLOVSK	road	2 tankers, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, and 3 Kamaz trucks with two towed artillery systems attached to the trailer
159.	03.29.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	Train with military equipment (4 tanks, 4 infantry fighting vehicles, 2 APCs)
160.	03.29.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	10 tractor units with T-72B tanks
161.	03.30.15	Through DMYTRIVKA - STEPANIVKA	road	3 Uragan multiple launchers, 2 Kamaz trucks with personnel
162	04.02.15	through DOVZHANSKY - SVERDLOVSK	road	9 tanks, 3 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers
163.	04.04.17- 04.05.17	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	7 infantry fighting vehicles, 3 tanks, 2 trucks with personnel and property
164.	04.04.15- 04.05.15	AMVROSIYIVKA	rail	<ul><li>17 cars with ammunition and military equipment (4 command vehicles and 2 mobile radio stations mounted on Kamaz trucks, 2 power stations mounted on Ural trucks)</li></ul>
165.	04.14.15	Through DMYTRIVKA - STEPANIVKA	road	10 tanks, 40 trucks with property and ammunition
166.	04.14.15	through DOVZHANSKY - SVERDLOVSK	road	25 tanks, 7 APCs, 3 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 9 trucks
167.	05.05.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	Buk missile system, 4 trucks
168.	05.05.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	14 tanks, an infantry fighting vehicle, 7 trucks
169.	05.06.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	4 APCs, 7 MTLB auxiliary tracked vehicles, 8 trucks
170.	05.10.15	Through DMYTRIVKA - STEPANIVKA	road	10 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers and 10 refuelers
171.	05.10.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	train with fuel and lubricants

172.	05.17.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK	road	3 tanks, 2 trucks and buses carrying
		- VOLODARSK		personnel
173.	05.21.15	through IZVARYNE	road	5 APCs and 32 trucks
174.	05.22.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	21 trucks with property and ammunition
175.	05.24.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	7 trucks with property and ammunition
176.	05.25.15	Through USPENKA - DONETSK	road	10 self-propelled guns, 23 trucks
177	05.28.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	20 T-72 and 10 tanks, 10 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles and trucks with property and ammunition
178.	06.01.15	DEBALTSEVE	rail	3 Zoopark-1M radar systems
179.	06.03.15	Through DMYTRIVKA SNIZHNE	road	3 TOS-1 Buratino, 11 trucks
180.	06.20.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	3 armored cars KAMAZ-43269 Vystrel
181.	06.22.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	8 cars with ammunition and spare parts for armored vehicles
182.	06.25.15- 06.27.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	13 trucks with ammunition and refuelers
183.	06.29.15- 06.30.15	SUKHODOLSK	rail	Train with ammunition
184.	07.13.15	AMVROSIYIVKA	rail	30 armored vehicles
185.	07.19.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	30 Ural trucks with personnel and 152 mm D20 howitzers attached to the trailer
186.	07.22.15	GUKOVO (Russian Federation) - LUHANSK	road	15 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers
187.	08.12.15	FRUNZE	rail	train with ammunition and parts
188.	08.17.15	DONETSK	rail	50 cars with artillery shells and 17 trucks
189.	08.22.15	DEBALTSEVE	rail	military train with tanks and ammunition
190.	08.26.15	through IZVARYNE TO KRANSNODON	road	6 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 11 tanks (pulled by tractor units), 5 Msta-S 152 mm self- propelled gun, 28 armored fighting vehicles
191.	09.02.15	DEBALTSEVE	rail	19 cars with ammunition
192.	09.14.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	train with ammunition for multiple rocket launchers
193.	09.16.15	through IZVARYNE TO KRANSNODON	road	4 infantry fighting vehicle and 4 trucks with property and ammunition
194.	09.22.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	6 T-72 tanks and 9 cars with property and ammunition
195.	09.23.15	through MARKINE - NOVOAZOVSK	road	50 armored vehicles
196.	09.24.15.	ILOVAYSK	rail	6 T-72 tanks and 9 cars with property and ammunition

197.	10.02.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	3 armored fighting vehicles, 4 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 2 MTLB auxiliary tracked vehicles, 4 trucks
198.	10.03.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	4 armored fighting vehicles, MTLB auxiliary tracked vehicles and 20 trucks with personnel and ammunition
199.	10.07.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	9 cars with ammunition, 6 tanks
200.	10.10.15	through IZVARYNE - SVERDLOVSK	road	11 T-72 tanks
201.	10.30.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	5 APCs, 50 trucks, 8 refuelers
202.	11.06.15	KHARTSYZK	rail	10 cars with fuel and lubricants
203.	11.06.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	4 cars with ammunition
204.	11.12.15	SUKHODOLSK	rail	17 cars with ammunition
205.	11.13.15- 11.14.15	through IZVARYNE - LUHANSK	road	30 tanks
206.	11.16.15	ILOVAYSK	rail	8 cars with ammunition, 4 tankers with fuel and lubricants
207.	11.24.15	Through DMYTRIVKA - STEPANIVKA	road	20 T-72 tanks, 20 trucks, 5 refuelers
208.	11.26.15	through CHERVONOPARTYZANSK - SVERDLOVSK	road	122 mm Grad multiple rocket launcher, two infantry fighting vehicles and ammunition
209.	12.04.15	ROVENKI (oil exploration base)	rail	7 tankers with fuel and lubricants
210.	12.17.15- 12.18.15	ROVENKI	rail	15 tankers with fuel and lubricants
211.	12.21.15- 12.24.15	through IZVARYNE - SVERDLOVSK	road	5 trucks, 2 tanks
212	12.28.15	KHARTSYZK	rail	2 rail cars of ammunition

Expert Opinion No. 116/3, drafted by Research Institution for Special Purpose Equipment and Forensic Examination, Security Service of Ukraine (2 September 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



### SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE

Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic Examinations

#### EXPERT OPINION

September 2, 2014

Kyiv

No. 116/4

Copy No. 1

Experts with the 4<sup>th</sup> Center (Center for Forensic and Special-Purpose Expert Examinations) of the Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine:

- Olha Volodymyrivna Veresenko, who has a higher philological education, is a qualified forensic expert in examination of phonoscopic documents, and has been working as an expert since 1996. She holds a phonoscopic expert's certificate No. 272 of April 29, 2011, with a specialty in "Linguistic Study of Oral Speech" (valid through April 29, 2016);
- Vitaliy Mykolayovych Mahera, who has a higher philological education, is a qualified forensic expert in examination of phonoscopic documents, and has been working as an expert since 1989. He holds a phonoscopic expert's certificate No. 322 of April 16, 2008, with Specialty 7.2 "Study of the Speaker Based on Physical Parameters of Oral Speech, Acoustic Signals, and Ambient Conditions" (valid through March 13, 2018), and No. 323 of April 16, 2018, with Specialty 7.1 "Technical Examinations of Materials and Means of Video and Sound Recording" (valid through March 13, 2018);

have conducted an expert examination of sound and video recordings pursuant to the July 28, 2014 order for a phonoscopic forensic expert examination, issued by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice S.M. Filipov, Senior Investigator with the 1st Operative Unit of the 1st Office of the Pretrial Investigation Department at the Central Investigative Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, in connection with a criminal case registered in the Uniform Register of Pre-trial Investigations under No. 2201400000000232 on July 4, 2014 involving alleged criminal offenses falling under Part 2 of Article 110 and Article 436 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The experts acknowledge having been warned about criminal liability for issuing a knowingly false expert opinion under Article 384 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera [Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine] [Signature] [Illegible seal] [Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine] The following questions have been posted to the experts (quoted from the order):

1. Are sound recordings on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014 suitable for an expert examination (the list of files is provided in the descriptive section of the order)?

2. Is the speech of the person heard speaking in the file "Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step" present between the following DVD player time stamps: from 00:00:56 to 00:03:13, from 00:03:19 to 00:03:45, from 00:03:52 to 00:05:41, from 00:05:45 to 00:06:16, from 00:06:27 to 00:08:30, from 00:08:38 to 00:09:47, from 00:10:16 to 00:12:28, from 00:12:31 to 00:13:14, from 00:13:39 to 00:15:53, from 00:16:21 to 00:19:40, from 00:19:47 to 00:19:58, from 00:20:10 to 00:20:49, and in the following files:

"02 03 2014 15 01 10 18p1 (SBD)102949453 00"; "02 03 2014 15 53 57 18p1 (SBD)10295146 00"; "02 03 2014 15 53 57 18p1 (SBD)102948140 00"; "02\_03\_2014\_15\_53\_57\_18p1\_(SBD)102952125\_00"; "27 02 2014 10 36 50 18p1 (SBD)102710250 00"; "03 03 2014 12 59 51 23p1\_(SBD)1031250\_00"; "03 03 2014 12 59 51 23p1 (SBD)103124453 00"; "03\_03\_2014\_16\_56\_30\_23p1\_(SBD)103125515\_00"; "03 03 2014\_16\_56\_37\_23p1\_(SBD)103123671\_00"; "04 03 2014 15 52 23 26k1 (SBD)10244515 00"; "79859698761-2014.02.27-14.07.11-8"; "79859698761-2014.02.27-14.45.58-2\_1"; "79859698761-2014.02.28-08.31.38-10"; "79859698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-01" "79859698761-2014.03.01-13.54.54-0"; "79859698761-2014.03.01-17.42.1-1"; "79859698761-2014.03.01-17.58.59-2"; "79859698761-2014.03.01-18.38.50-3"; "79859698761-2014.03.02-13.45.50-6"; "79859698761-2014.03.04-20.37.15-7"; "03\_03\_2014\_12\_41\_49\_31p1\_(SBD)103037250\_00"; "03 03 2014 12 41 49 31p1 (SBD)103037781 00"; "28\_02\_2014\_12\_24\_50\_31p1\_(SBD)102757187\_00"; "28 02 2014 12 24 50 31p1 (SBD)102757656 00"; "79857687453-2014.02.27-17.30.43-25 1"; "79857687453-2014.02.27-19.59.9-26\_1"; "79857687453-2014,02.27-23.39.44-27\_1";

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera [Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine] [Signature] [Illegible seal] [Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine] "79857687453-2014.02.28-07.52.47-35 1"; "79857687453-2014.02.28-08.34.48-36 1"; "79857687453-2014.02.28-09.09.59-3 7 1"; "79857687453-2014.02.28-14.10.59-31"; "79857687453-2014.02.28-14.57.19-32 1"; "79857687453-2014.03.02-07.37.6-19"; "79857687453-2014.03.02-12.25.28-15"; "79857687453-2014.03.02-12.29.50-16"; "79857687453-2014.03.02-15.01.5-17"; "79857687453-2014.03.02-20.23.18-18"; "01\_03\_2014\_16\_03\_29\_37k1\_(SBD)102320125\_00"; "01 03 2014 16 31 29 37k1 (SBD)102320906 00"; "01\_03\_2014\_16\_50\_22\_37k1\_(SBD)102321156\_00"; "01\_03\_2014\_16\_5 0\_22\_37k1\_(SBD)102321531\_00"; "01\_03\_2014\_ 17\_23\_29\_37k1\_(SBD)1023 21906\_00"; "06\_03\_2014\_09\_18\_37\_37k1\_(SBD)1023226 87\_00"; "74956064302-2014.03.01-16.03.26-0"; "74956064302-2014.03.01-16.50.19-1"; "74956064302-2014.03.03-11.55.10-3": "74956064302-2014.03.03-17.34.31-4"; "01 03 2014 18 59 08 100p1 (SBD)102848390 00.wav"; "01\_03\_2014\_18\_59\_08 100p1 (SBD)102849218 00.wav"; "74959212145-2014.03.01-18.35.49-4.wav"; "74959212145-2014.03.01-21.02.29-13.wav"; "74959212145-2014.03.01-22.00.56-14.wav"; "74959212145-2014.03.02-13.23.13-15.wav"; "01 03 2014 17 36 26 216k1 (SBD)101940171 00"; "01\_03\_2014\_19\_11 \_54\_216k1\_(SBD)101940625\_00"; "01 \_03\_2014\_21 \_02\_32\_216k1\_(SBD)101941187\_00"; "01\_03\_2014\_21\_02\_32\_216k1\_(SBD)101941484\_00"? If so, which specific words and phrases belong to this person?

The experts are familiar with the circumstances of the proceedings to the extent of the information provided in the order requesting the expert examination.

The pretrial investigation has found that during the period from late February to early March 2014, Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev, advisor to the Russian President, managed unidentified individuals in Ukraine through telephone calls from Moscow. These individuals then committed deliberate offenses in the cities of Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Odesa and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea with the intention of changing the boundaries of Ukrainian territory and violating the law and order established by the Constitution of Ukraine.

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera [Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine] [Signature] [Illegible seal] [Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine] The Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014, arrived from the Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine on June 24, 2014. The disk contains recordings of conversations which S.Yu. Glazyev had during the above-mentioned period with individuals as yet unidentified by the investigation. Transcripts of the conversations are provided in the examination record of July 16-23, 2014.

On July 15, 2014, a survey of the Internet revealed the October 29, 2013 interview of S.Yu. Glazyev with the Russia 24 TV Channel on the YouTube website (file: "Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step").

Considering that specialist phonoscopy knowledge is required to ascertain the truth in this case, and guided by Articles 110, 242, and 243 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, a forensic phonoscopic expert examination has been ordered. It has been entrusted to experts with the Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine.

The following materials were made available to the experts together with the order requesting the expert examination:

- A Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014, with 57 files specified in the descriptive section of this order;
- A Verbatim CD-R optical disk, serial No. 317259RC02336, storing the following file: "Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4";
- The July 16, 2014 record of examination of the files stored on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014, on 108 pages.

### EXAMINATION

### 1. VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR EXAMINATION:

1. A parchment-colored envelope arrived under the cover of Letter No. 6/9574 of July 28, 2014.

The envelope contains:

- A Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014, with 57 files;
- A Verbatim CD-R optical disk, serial No. 317259RC02336, storing the following file: "Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4";
- The July 16, 2014 record of examination of the files stored on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QL16193911, registration number 1528 of March 16, 2014, on 108 pages.

Descriptions of materials made available for examination and their photos are provided in the appendix to the Expert Opinion.

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera [Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]

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### List of devices used in the examination:

- 1. Computer: Intel (R) Core (TM) 2Duo CPU E8400 @ 3400 GHz 3.00 GHz, 2.00 GB RAM, serial number: E818739.
- 2. Sound card STC-H246, serial number: 0306/40053
- 3. AKG K501 headphones.
- 4. SIS 6.1 application, serial number: 40053.
- 5. *Phonograph* application.
- 6. *Phonexi* v.2.02 application (RF Patent No. 2107950, RF Certificate No. 2000611270 of official registration of a computer application).
- 7. Adobe Audition 1.5 application, serial number: 90051608.
- 8. Justiphone 2.8 application.
- 9. WinHex 12.9 SR-13 application.
- 10. Metal ruler, 30 cm long.

### The following methods were used in conducting the expert examination:

- 1. Methods of Forensic Examination of Sound and Video Recording Materials and Equipment, State Forensic Expert Research Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kyiv, 1998, adopted in 2009; code in the Register of Forensic Examination Methods: 7.1.03.
- Methods of Identifying a Person Based on Russian-Language Sound Recordings Using the Dialect Automated System, authors: N.F. Popov et al., edited by A.V. Fisenko, Moscow, Military Unit 34435, 1996. Adopted in 2009; code in the Register of Forensic Examination Methods: 7.0.03.

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera [Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]

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### 2. IDENTIFICATION OF THE OBJECTS OF EXAMINATION

The Verbatim DVD-R and Verbatim CD-R optical disks store sound and video recordings.

The details of the files stored on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014, which are to be examined, are provided in Table 1 of the Opinion.

The details of the file stored on the Verbatim CD-R optical disk No. 317259RC02336 with the recording titled "Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4", which is to be examined, is provided in Table 2 of the Expert Opinion.

For greater convenience of further examination, each separate recording (file) has been assigned a sequential number and name "examined sound recording" (abbreviated to ESR with the corresponding number in Table 1) or the name "examined video and sound recording" (abbreviated to EVSR with the corresponding number in Table 2).

Table 2

EVSR58	
Location: \Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4	
File name: Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step.mp4	
File format: mp4 (MPEG-4)	
File size: 57.91 MB	
Duration: 21 minutes 9 seconds	
Bit rate (all streams): 383 Kbps	
Bit rate type (all streams): Variable	
File created on: UTC 2013-10-31 03:15:56	
Last modified on:	
2014-07-15 17:49:05	
Name: Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the EU Is a Misguided Step	
Stream type: video	
Duration: 00:21:09	
Codec: AVC	
Codec / profile: Baseline@L2.1	
Codec / ID: avcl	
Image size: 480 x 360 (4:3)	
Refresh rate: 25.000 fps	
Refresh rate / mode: Constant	
Stream size: 43.0 MiB (74%)	
Bit rate: 284 Kbps	
Bit rate / max: 1,296 Kbps	
Color space: YUV	
Scan type: Progressive	
Bits / (Pixel*Frame): 0.066	
Pixel depth: 8 bits	
Stream type: Sound #1	
Duration: 00:21:09.342	
Codec: AAC	
Codec / ID: 40	
Sampling rate: 44.1 KHz	
Channels: 2 channels	
Channels / position: Front: L R	
Bit rate: 96.0 Kbps	
Bit rate type: Variable	
Stream size: 14.5 MB (25%)	
Name: IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	
[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera	
[Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]	

[Signature] [Illegible seal]

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According to the questions posed in the order requesting the expert examination, the experts need to study the speech of the speaker recorded in EVSR58 between the time stamps shown in Table 3. Said time stamps were updated using specialist applications (the update was required to account for instances in which the speaker's speech ended sooner or for instances in which the period between time stamps ended with both speakers speaking at the same time).

Table 3

	1 4010
Time stamps between which the experts	Time stamps between which the experts
need to study the speaker's speech	need to study the speaker's speech
recorded in EVSR58 according to the	recorded in EVSR58 after the time stamps
order requesting the expert examination.	were updated by the experts.
00:00:56-00:03:13	00:00:54-00:03:13
00:03:19-00:03:45	00:03:19-00:03:44
00:03:52-00:05:41	00:03:52-00:05:41
00:05:45-00:06:16	00:05:45-00:06:15
00:06:27-00:08:30	00:06:27-00:08:30
00:08:38-00:09:47	00:08:38-00:09:47
00:10:16-00:12:28	00:10:16-00:12:27
00:12:31-00:13:14	00:12:31-00:13:14
00:13:39-00:15:53	00:13:39-00:15:53
00:16:21-00:19:40	00:16:21-00:19:40
00:19:47-00:19:58	00:19:47-00:19:58
00:20:10-00:20:49	00:20:10-00:20:49

In Table 3 mentioned above, the array of recordings is from a televised interview that clearly shows the speaker giving the interview and stating his job title, last name, first name, and patronymic. For this reason, the experts examined this array as a specimen of this speaker's speech and it was used in the examination as a single array. Experts: [Signature] O.V. Veresenko

[Signature]	O.V. Veresen
[Signature]	V.M. Mahera

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## **3. TECHNICAL IDENTIFICATION STUDIES** 3.1. Assessment of the Suitability of Available Materials for Further Identification Studies

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3.2. Technical identification study of the speech of Speaker S1 recorded in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13,14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.

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3.3. Technical identification study of the speech of Speaker S1 recorded in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,12,13,14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, and the speech of Speaker S2 recorded in EVSR 58.

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Therefore, based on the completed integral technical study it is POSSIBLE to CONCLUDE that the speech marked with the index S1 in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 and the speech of Speaker S2 recorded in EVSR58 belongs to the same person.

It is possible to note the high similarity of the formant structure accurate down to the differences in tempo and manner of speaking. Slight deviations are attributable to slight differences in the speaker's emotional state as well as the amplitude and frequency characteristics of the transmission and reception channel. Expert [Signature] V.M. Mahera

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### 4. LINGUISTIC IDENTIFICATION STUDIES 4.1. Assessment of the Suitability of Available Materials for Further Linguistic Studies

[Page 23]

4.2. Linguistic identification of the oral speech of Speaker S1 recorded in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,12,13,14,15, 23, 24, 27,28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, in ESR No. 51 and EVSR No. 58, using linguistic methods

[Pages 31-32]

A separate and comparative study of speech marked with the index S1 in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 and in ESR No. 54, and speech marked with the index S2 in EVSR No. 58 has produced a match of attributes relevant to identification. The identified matching linguistic attributes are stable; in terms of their volume and significance they form an individual aggregate that is considered sufficient to make a decision to the effect that the objects being compared are identical. This information is sufficient to draw a categorically positive conclusion to the effect that speech marked with the index S1 in ESRs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 and in ESR No. 51 and speech marked with the index S2 in EVSR No. 58 belongs to one and the same person.

Expert

[Signature]

O.V. Veresenko

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### 5. LITERAL TRANSCRIPT OF CONVERSATIONS

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### ESR No. 51 (File 79859698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-0\_1.wav)

<b>-</b>	1			
Time	_			
(hours:	Pers	Speech		
minutes:	on	Орееси		
seconds)				
00:00:15 S1 Hello. Hello, I'm listening.		Hello. Hello, I'm listening.		
	S	Hello.		
	S1	Yes, I'm listening.		
	S	Good morning. I apologize for bothering you so early.		
	S1	(Unintelligible)		
	S	Is it safe to speak?		
	S1	Yes, of course.		
	S	I am unable to understand what is going on there. What next? What further steps should		
		we take? What should we do? They already started taking over buildings. All roads are		
		blocked: the entrance to Kyiv, roads going to Kyiv. The military are all over the place		
		What happens next? What should we expect?		
	S1	To the best of my understanding, all power is now in the hands of the Supreme Council		
		of Crimea. You have to act through the council. Am I right in thinking that none of your		
		people joined Aksenov's government?		
	S	People would have probably joined Aksenov's government if it had been legitimate. So		
		far we have been able to keep the people from going to war using our methods. But if		
		the government still obeys the orders of Yanukovych after all the embezzlement, as		
		alleged by Aksenov, nobody will join it now. It's like one hand is doing bad things while		
		the other one is pointing at it to expose them How to make sense of it?		
	S1	(Unintelligible). This is the kind of situation there is. The government does not obey the		
	01	orders of Yanukovych and will not be obeying them, because Yanukovych is already		
		gone.		
	S	But Aksenov keep declaring from the podium and everywhere else that he will be		
	3			
		working with Yanukovych. When we saw all of this How can we send people there?		
		The same man oppressed us here yesterday. Now we (unintelligible) declared		
		Yanukovych. It's been four years since we were made redundant, out of a job. They did		
		not keep anybody and did not say a single word. Our number one priority was to get rid		
		of Yanukovych. And now he says he will work with Yanukovych. How are we going to		
		send people there, would you tell me?		
	S1	Well, no		
	S	Things just do not stick together. I'm telling you: the people who are at the helm today,		
		they embarrass you despite everything that has been done, and done impeccably, no		
		questions asked. Everything that has been done turns to naught. If Crimea is going to be		
		an autonomy with its own powers, such things need to be presented nicely and not the		
		way it is being done now. I don't understand it. There is so much disorder in the political		
		field. Somebody died. Let him come and see what is happening from an outsider's		
		perspective. There is no need to interfere. Let him take an outsider's view.		
	S1	I can say with certainty that this government does not obey the orders of Yanukovych		
		and never will. The legitimate aspect of everything that is happening is based on the fact		
		that the only legitimate public authority is the Supreme Council of Crimea. There are no		
		other authorities. We do not recognize that government in Kyiv and never will. That's		
		why we will be doing everything in our power to get the Turchynov-Yatseniuk		
		government to resign and resume negotiations about forming a government of people's		
		trust, the way it is stated in the memorandum under which Yanukovych surrendered his		
		power.		

This is the most recent document signed by all the parties. It is our understanding that Ukraine does not currently have any legitimate central government. Legitimate government is left only in the regions. In our understanding, the Supreme Council of Crimea and regional councils are the only representatives of legitimate government with whom we will cooperate. That's why, in our understanding, the Supreme Council of Crimea is authorized to make all decisions. To be honest, here everybody was disappointed to learn that none of you joined the government, because we had hopes
But it's important to make the essential constituent documents somewhat more neatly. There has to be an intermediary that would take care of this whole issue You formulated the first task: to avoid bloodshed. We bent over backwards but somehow managed to do so. What next? They voted and got only 49 votes, with the rest inflated artificially. Meanwhile, all those who voted stood next to us. Suppose one of the council members did not show up for the voting, but the tally says that he voted. What do you make of that? People see everything. There are a thousand wrong issues that would not hold up in court. And we are currently panicking on the inside: What is this all about? We can't make sense of it all. Is thick a mockery or not? If this is normal, can't we do say and do things the normal way: what we want, what we get? Things are not happening properly there, let me tell you.
Well, everything is happening in a haphazard manner in Ukraine. I don't know how the voting took place. That is to say, we only received information here to the effect that out of the 100 Supreme Council members, about 60 members participated in the voting. I did not double-check the numbers specifically. This is all I can say on the subject (unintelligible).
People were in Kyiv on business, but their last names still appear among those who voted. They printed out the names of those who voted. They only found after they started getting calls while still in Kyiv. For that matter, there are very many issues like that surrounding this situation. When you see all this you begin to doubt things. Today all of our people read the report and begin sharing their misgivings. It's very difficult to calm them down afterwards. And how do you expect them to join the government together? How does this work? These are the difficult questions we face. Now we need patience. We have to keep quiet and wait to see what happens with the Ukrainian government. They will start coming for negotiations here soon. How will they end? If they can't do anything, then we need to sit down to discuss and decide what we are going to do next. And this takes time. Until then we need to sit down at a table and hold consultations. If we start calling people names, we will not be able to bring them back later. Of course, Russia has a lot of forces: you can shoot and kill everybody. This scenario is also possible, and that's where we are going to end up.
No You need to avoid this. We are doing everything we can to avoid this.
Avoiding or not, it's already beginning: the current Mejlis members did not show up today. They are summoned one a time and told that they will have nothing if they don't show up. They pull them out one at a time and forcibly send them there. Such things are also unacceptable. We need to sit down at a negotiating table quietly, address the conflicting points and slowly polish off these issues. Although we also need such people to work there at the local level. Still, this should not be managed by "ratty" people.

	You should at least delegate intermediaries who would monitor the ethics. The ethics have to be monitored. It would be very difficult to appease different sides with each other inside Crimea. We should avoid the scenario of one ethnicity going against the other. We don't need rank-and-file people fighting with one another. This is where time-proven authority comes into play. Clearly, they respect Putin and Russia. But the things that are happening need to be handled correctly.
S1	(Unintelligible) I agree that negotiations have to be conducted calmly without any force whatsoever, in a professional manner. But how can we delegate an intermediary? Since the Supreme Council of Crimea is the only legitimate public authority, this means that Konstantinov has to be that kind of intermediary. Ideally, he should negotiate the terms with you, your requirements, take cognizance of them, so to speak, and bring you back into the government. We will facilitate this process in every way possible. If you have terms on which you are prepared to work
S	In principle, we need to answer these questions: How will events unfold next? What is the future of Crimean Tatars in this situation? What steps await them? These are the answers we are looking for. Neither Konstantinov nor anybody else can answer them. We need to go into the masses to calm the people down. We need to show a new beautiful leader. Ukraine has not given us anything for twenty years, while today with Russia we can do this and that by following these steps, and that's where we will arrive Our people are not stupid. They lost their homeland once and do not want to lose it now again. That's why everybody is thinking about it: both young and old and so forth. How can we bring a message about what's tomorrow will be like across to them?
S1	Fine. Who could be delegated from Russia? Let's think. Who would you trust? Perhaps somebody from Tatarstan?
S	They came here and we worked with them. But so far we have not exposed ourselves to them. They, too, are ashamed of coming forward and saying it as it is. If this scenario materializes, they need to be here like peace keepers, intermediaries who care
S1	(Unintelligible)
S	You do not need to expose them too much. They are like a commiserating party. We will be very quiet with them every day. They need to reveal one key for us every day and show us: this is how it's going to happen, this is what we'll do. And we should calm our people down gradually. This won't work otherwise in a single bang. I hear people saying we no longer have a homeland and wishing they died fighting here today One says this, the other says that I have spent three days doing nothing but trying to calm people down. Who am I after all, damn it? I could disappear tomorrow and be gone. Others will lead the masses tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. It's just that I have a longer-term vision of where this is going. People don't have a vision of what tomorrow will bring or a future outlook, or want things to happen on slightly mutual terms. It's clear that Russia will never do stupid things in the world. However, we need to break down the steps being taken today to somehow demonstrate and shown what is going to happen ten or twenty years down the road and what we will be arriving at. Surely it won't be the oppression we once experienced? It will be a completely different world seen through completely different eyes. Things will be different. We must bring this
S1	(Unintelligible) In my understanding, nobody knows what will happen in the future in this situation, of course. But this is how I see it: either that Banderovite government leaves and normal elections are held, with Ukraine becoming a federated state with an independent Crimea inside of it.

	So our position is that Ukraine is a divided country in the current situation. They unleashed the war. They effectively divided the country, those Banderovites. Ukraine's southeast will never recognize them. All things considered, Ukraine can be a stable state only as a federation where every region has a sufficient amount of independence. Meanwhile, Crimea will have total independence. It will simply be located inside Ukraine, formally, so to speak. This is one scenario based on which everybody can reach an agreement. Another scenario will materialize when they fail to agree and a conflict erupts. It seems to me that in this situation Crimea will be gravitating toward complete independence. I will reiterate that Russia has no plans to annex Crimea. This will not happen.
S	I have already figured that part out. I understand. Now what happens with Crimean Tatars? When we discuss language, ethnicity, and Crimean Tatar autonomy, will these things crop up somewhere or not? Will things happen the same way they did in Tatarstan? Or what are our further steps? What are the preconditions? How should I calm down the elders, the old people and others if I begin to go into the masses now slowly? What positive message should I bring? Do you understand? I have to begins somewhere. I want
S1	I believe you should formulate the conditions. Obviously, you have been sitting on them for many years
S	Yes.
S1	And you have them. You have to formulate the conditions, the things you want. Perhaps the referendum scheduled for the 25 <sup>th</sup> should include some issues that concern you.
S	There! There! You see. That's why we need to throw such questions around. If we know what's happening today and tomorrow, we have an understanding of the situation. One way or another, Crimea will be separated from the mainland. That is to say, it will stay a single whole with Ukraine in terms of territory, but in terms of the executive authorities, the status of Crimea and its budget, its turnovers
S1	Yes.
S	And its independence will be separate [from Ukraine]. I already understand all that.
S1	Yes, precisely.
S	Yes. What future should Crimean Tatars see for themselves in this situation? Will it happen for them? That's one question. What should we aspire to? What awaits us? We need to embellish this. Against this background we need to promote peace and friendship with everybody living here. Do you understand?
S1	Uh-huh.
S	That's why we want to focus on this aspect. What are we promised? What will happen? What are we heading towards together? What will be our tomorrow's slogan for ourselves, our children and grandchildren? These are the special kind of questions. So far they leave an empty space. That niche has yet to be filled. It would be simple to just run over there like boys and joy that government. We've been through this before. I served in eight governments in a row. What's the use of it? I went there to handle all of the dirty work. Meanwhile, the places where people should govern and formulate positions are empty. You give people heat and water and stay out of everything else. If this keeps on happening every time, why do I need a government like that? I've had enough. Nobody except me cares about people's lives there. Meanwhile, if the government is (unintelligible) fully functional, you know what awaits your people. What are the needs? What projects will we undertake? How will they be positioned? If we are going to secure independence, there will be some major projects, and people will need to join them.

S1	Uh-huh.
S	Meanwhile, those cronies have their roles cut out for them: who will do what, who will steal
_	what. Surely this is not what Russia wants for us today? Russia sees (unintelligible) a
	normal (unintelligible) Crimean autonomy.
S1	Of course (unintelligible).
S	Whoever comes to power, whoever (unintelligible) is sitting there right now, whoever gets
	appointed - all of them are thieves. I've known them from the very bottom, since childhood.
	That's why we need to sit down and (unintelligible) such things.
S1	I understand. I think that those who have come to power are still temporary. They
S	I understand that also. After the election on May 25 <sup>th</sup> all of this can change. I understand this
	applies to me.
S1	Uh-huh.
S	(Unintelligible) not simple.
S1	So tell me. Of course, we are not interested absolutely. First, Yanukovych is not very well,
	he is the president formally, but he does not and will not control anything.
S	I had the same thoughts yesterday. After listening to everything, I thought to myself: no this
	person is temporary; he will make some noise while we things quiet down here.
S1	Yes.
S	That's it. He will leave at this point. A second point
S1	His role is purely on paper.
S	Yes. We should not say anywhere that today all Russia, or Putin himself we should not
	discuss any unclear issues. We must calm our people down to its roots. We need to calm
	our people down so they would not say untoward things against the government and
	leaders in the streets. We need to decide how to begin this conversation. I am looking for
	this, do you understand? That's why I need somebody to talk to from over there, with whom
	we would bring our ideas to the attention of the upper circle, then the second circle before
	moving all the way down. It doesn't happen any other way.
S1	I understand. So let's recap again that, first, Yanukovych will not return. I give you one
	hundred percent. Second
S	That's clear to me.
S1	Nobody will also obey Kyiv as it is now. That's the second point.
S	This is also understandable. This is also (unintelligible).
S1	Third, the Supreme Council of Crimea has all the power. This means that we absolutely do
	not want the new government of Crimea to become a second edition of Yanukovych and the
	Donetsk (unintelligible).
S	That's correct.
S1	We don't need that. The more so that we intend to invest a great deal of money in Crimea.
	Effectively, we are now beginning to fund Crimea, and we absolutely do not need thieves.
S	That's correct.
S1	We need people like you, who enjoy trust and so forth. This leaves us with the following
	question. When it comes to Aksenov, it's all clear. If you don't trust Konstantinov, I can
	suggest I can ask them to send Shamiev as an intermediary there so he could, so to
	speak, influence the situation with his authority.

	S	I think that now I ack have I will tall you about the best cooperio that can work now
	3	I think that now Look here: I will tell you about the best scenario that can work now. Shamiev delegated his people for some mild-mannered talks. Whoever sent him, we need
		this envoy from the Presidential Administration to simply stay here. So when I hold
		negotiations about this very sensitive issue with one group or another in the evenings, we
		simply need to sit down at a table for some drinks in a quiet setting.
	S1	Uh-huh.
	S	The most critical issue that can influence the future course of this situation when it comes
		to people who have formulated a deep-rooted vision of our situation. As far as I understand,
		Russia and Turkey have a very good economic relationship.
	S1	Uh-huh.
	S	The attention and messages from Turkish leadership, the Prime Minister of Turkey, holds
		weight and could possibly win over some of the leaders.
	S1	Uh-huh.
	S	That's a trick.
	S1	I see, I see.
	S	Do you understand me? From where
	S1	A minister is going to visit you soon. I think it's their minister?
	S	Yes. I've been looking for you today for this reason.
	S1	Uh-huh.
	S	The minister is coming. The minister should have a discussion beforehand with the Turkish
		prime minister. We need to announce the agenda in such a way as to prevent the locals from
		rocking the boat. There are no other ways. I already have a vision. I don't have any problems
		with it. I have a crystal clear vision and understanding of what will happen and how
		(unintelligible). We need to awaken them in the right way. This is the kind of agenda I see.
	S1	I understand. I will now try to arrange such negotiations. Fine.
	S	Fine. Stay in touch (unintelligible).
00:20:49	S1	Yes, let's keep in touch. Uh-huh. Thank you. (End of conversation)

Experts:

[Signature]

O.V. Veresenko

[Signature]

V.M. Mahera

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera [Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine]

[Signature] [Illegible seal]

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The speech of Speaker S1 recorded in files on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014 in files listed in Table 7 is suitable for identification studies.

No.	Folders and directories of	on the Files
	optical disk	
ESR1	\37k1\	01_03_2014_16_03_29_37k1_(SBD)102320125_00.wav
ESR2	\37k1\	01_03_2014_16_31_29_37к1_(SBD)102320906_00.wav
ESR3	\37k1\	01_03_2014_16_50_22_37к1_(SBD)102321156_00.wav
ESR4	\37k1\	01_03_2014_16_50_22_37к1_(SBD)102321531_00.wav
ESR5	\37k1\	01_03_2014_17_23_29_37к1_(SBD)102321906_00.wav
ESR12	\18p1\	02_03_2014_15_01_10_18p1_(SBD)102949453_00.wav
ESR13	\18p1\	02_03_2014_15_53_57_18p1_(SBD)10295146_00.wav
ESR14	\18p1\	02_03_2014_15_53_57_18p1_(SBD)102948140_00.wav
ESR15	\18p1\	02_03_2014_15_53_57_18p1_(SBD)102952125_00.wav
ESR23	\37k1\	06_03_2014_09_18_37_37к1(SBD)102322687_00.wav
ESR24	\18p1\	27_02_2014_10_36_50_18p1_(SBD)102710250_00.wav
ESR27	\37m1\	74956064302-2014.03.01-16.03.26-0.wav
ESR28	\37m1\	74956064302-2014.03.01-16.50.19-1.wav
ESR35	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.02.27-17.30.43-25_1.wav
ESR36	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.02.27-19.59.9-26_1.wav
ESR38	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.02.28-07.52.47-35_1.wav
ESR39	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.02.28-08.34.48-36_1.wav
ESR40	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.02.2S-09.09.59-37_1.wav
ESR42	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.02.28-14.57.19-32_1.wav
ESR43	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.03.02-07.37.6-19.wav
ESR45	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.03.02-12.29.50-16.wav
ESR47	\33m1\	79857687453-2014.03.02-20.23.18-18.wav
ESR48	\28m1\	79859698761-2014.02.27-14.07.11-8.wav
ESR50	\28m1\	79859698761-2014.02.28-08.31.38-10.wav
ESR51	\28m1\	79S59698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-0_1.wav
ESR52	\28m1\	79859698761-2014.03.01-13.54.54-0.wav
ESR53	\28m1\	79859698761-2014.03.01-17.42.1-1.wav
ESR54	\28m1\	79859698761-2014.03.01-17.58.59-2.wav
ESR55	\28m1\	79859698761-2014.03.01-18.38.50-3.wav
ESR56	\28m1\	79859698761-2014.03.02-13.45.50-6.way

2. Technical and linguistic identification methods have revealed that speech of the speaker recorded on the Verbatim CD-R optical disk No. 317259RC02336 in the file "Sergey Glazyev: Ukraine's Accession to the US Is a Misguided Step.mp4" within the updated time stamps shown in Table 3 and speech of the speaker recorded on the Verbatim DVD-R optical disk, serial No. MAPA10QI16193911, registration number 1528 of March 12, 2014 in files listed in Table 7 belong to the same person.

The words and phrases spoken by Speaker S1 in the files specified in Table 7 (other than file "79859698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-0\_1.wav" - ESR51) appear in the July 16, 2014 record of examination under the index "M".

The words and phrases spoken by Speaker S1 in the file "79859698761-2014.03.01-06.33.1-0\_1.wav" (ESR51) appear in Section 5 of the Expert Opinion under the index "S1".

Experts:

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko

[Signature] V.M. Mahera

[Signature] O.V. Veresenko [Signature] V.M. Mahera [Seal: For Expert Examinations, No. 1, Security Service of Ukraine] [Signature] [Illegible seal] A True Copy, Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the General Prosecutor's Office

[Stamp: A True Copy. Main Military Prosecutor's Office of the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine]

[Stamp: Ukrainian Research Institute for Special-Purpose Equipment and Forensic Examinations. Outgoing Ref. No. 18/4-6152 of September 2, 2014. Primary sheets: 23.

# Annex 76

Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Letter No. 42/3664 to the Russian Border Directorate of the FSB (4 September 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[Handwriting] September 4, 2014

[Handwriting] N. 299

Сору No. \_\_\_\_



### STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE

**Eastern Regional Directorate** 

7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82

September 4, 2014

No. 42/367

[Handwriting] for O.O. Morozov [Signature]

Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko, Acting Director of the Border Guard Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in Rostov Oblast

Russia, Rostov-on-Don

#### Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],

In follow-up to Fax No. 42/3664 of September 4, 2014, this is to inform you about continued attempts to destroy the border infrastructure and armed attempts to push Ukrainian border guards deep into Ukrainian territory. These attempts originate from the Russian territory.

At 4:15-4:30 p.m. on September 4, 2014, in the direction of Derkul (Russia) - Krasnyi Derkul, three armored personnel carriers in Russian territory fired at personnel of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine performing their duties to guard the state border and territory of their country.

The nature of your answer to the above-mentioned communication and the time it took you to prepare it (No. 42/3664 was transmitted to you at 10:20 a.m., and your response arrived at 10:55 a.m.) are reason for us to call into question its objectivity and presume that you are unwilling to conduct a thorough investigation of the facts reported by the Ukrainian side.

In light of this, the Ukrainian side continues to insist on receiving objective explanations of the above-mentioned events and demands that immediate steps be taken to prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future.

Best regards,

Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate

of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Lieutenant-General

[Signature]

A.A. Kucherenko

[Handwriting] September 4, 2014

[Handwriting]: N. 296

Сору No. \_\_\_\_



### STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE

#### **Eastern Regional Directorate**

7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkiv, 61166, P.O. box 4193, phone: (057) 702-06-22, fax: (057) 702-05-82

September 4, 2014

[Handwriting:] for O.O. Morozov [Signature]

. \_ . . . .

No. 42/366

Attn: Colonel D.N. Nechepurenko, Acting Director of the Border Guard Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation in Rostov Oblast

Russia, Rostov-on-Don

#### Dear Dmitry Nikolaevich [Mr. Nechepurenko],

This is to inform you about new incidents in which the Ukrainian territory has been fired at from the Russian territory, as well as intrusions into the Ukrainian air space by Russian aviation. The Russian side has yet to respond to them appropriately.

At 7:15 p.m., 7:30 p.m., 8:30 p.m., 11:43 p.m. on September 3 and 2:27 a.m. on September 4, border patrols of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine witnessed the shelling of the Ukrainian territory in the direction of the village of Pobeda by rocket-propelled missiles from an area that is up to 10 km away from the state border in the direction of Ushakovka (Russia) - Shirokoe (Ukraine). A total of five salvos of 10 missiles each were fired. The personnel of the border patrols reflected this in the relevant reports.

At 12:55 p.m. on September 3, 2014, a Mi-24 helicopter crossed the state border from the Russian side and flew 300 meters into the Ukrainian territory in the Belovodsk state border sector of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment in the direction of Titovka (Russia) - Alexandrovka (Ukraine).

Between 9:40 p.m. and 9:55 p.m. on September 3, 2014, the Krasnaya Talovka state border crossing point of the Luhansk Border Guard detachment came under artillery fire for a second time after the July 28, 2014 incident (Letter No. 42/2862 of July 28, 2014) from Russian territory. The attack damaged its infrastructure. The attack was accompanied by photo and video surveillance with the use of a drone. At 10:00 p.m. the drone crossed the state border from the Russian side in the vicinity of the Krasnaya Talovka border crossing point and flew 3,000 meters into Ukrainian territory.

The Russian side's explanations that attribute these incidents to the civil conflict in Ukraine are baseless because the nearest positions of illegal paramilitary groups are more than 70 km away from the site of the artillery attack.

In light of this, the Ukrainian side insistently demands objective explanations and requires that immediate steps be taken to prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future.

Best regards,

Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Lieutenant-General [Signature]

[Signature] A.A. Kucherenko

# Annex 77

Russian Border Guard Service of the FSB Letter No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 to the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (11 October 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

[Handwriting:] October 11, 2014



### **Federal Security Service**

of the Russian Federation

[Handwriting:] *Attn: V.O. Subotin, A.M. Zarytskyi. Please continue work* [Signature] *October 13, 2014* 

Attn: Deputy Director

of the International Law Department – Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate

of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Major-General A.M. Zaritskiy

[Handwriting: illegible] [Signature]

Re: No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 of October 7, 2014

Dear Anatoly Mikhaylovich [Mr. Zaritskiy],

The leadership of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia has decided to conduct further legal due diligence at institutions of the Russian Federation of the Ukrainian side's proposals regarding joint border control at specific border crossing points in Russian territory and coordinated (joint) monitoring of the situation along the Russian-Ukrainian sector of the state border outside border crossing points from Russian territory.

In light of this, until this activity has been completed, we believe that the meeting of experts of border guard services of Russian and Ukraine scheduled for October 16, 2014 at the Nekhoteyevka-Goptovka border crossing point is premature.

We will inform you additionally about the new date and venue of the consultations.

First Deputy Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate

Major General[Signature]V.I. UlyanovOctober 11, 2014

No. 3/165

[Handwriting:] *Attn: O.O. Morozov, for your consideration* [Signature]



## Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

Attn: Deputy Director

of the International Law Department – Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate

of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Major-General A.M. Zaritskiy

Re: No. 0.42-8801/0/6-14 of October 7, 2014

Dear Anatoly Mikhaylovich [Mr. Zaritskiy],

The leadership of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia has decided to conduct further legal due diligence at institutions of the Russian Federation of the Ukrainian side's proposals regarding joint border control at specific border crossing points in Russian territory and coordinated (joint) monitoring of the situation along the Russian-Ukrainian sector of the state border outside border crossing points from Russian territory.

In light of this, until this activity has been completed, we believe that the meeting of experts of border guard services of Russian and Ukraine scheduled for October 16, 2014 at the Nekhoteyevka-Goptovka border crossing point is premature.

We will inform you additionally about the new date and venue of the consultations.

First Deputy Chief of the International Cooperation Directorate

Major General	[Signature]	V.I. Ulyanov
October 11, 2014		
		ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD
No. 3/165		SERVICE OF UKRAINE
		Incoming Ref. No. 36588/0/3-14 of October 13, 2014
		0.42

## Annex 78

Russian Border Directorate of the FSB Letter No. 26-1209 to the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (7 November 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Ruslan Koloskov <No subject>

[Handwriting:] November 7, 2014

FROM: Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service of Russian in Rostov Oblast

Phone: 88632679838 JULY 29, 2014 4:08 p.m. PAGE 1

Fax without follow-up original

FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION	Attn: Chief of the Eastern Regional Directorate of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine
BORDER DIRECTORATE OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF RUSSIAN IN ROSTOV OBLAST	Major-General A.A. Binkovskyi
<i>November 7, 2014</i> No. <i>26/1209</i> Rostov-on-Don, 344011	7 Inzhenerny Pereulok, Kharkov, 61045, Ukraine

Re: No. 4765 of November 6, 2014

Dear Alexander Antolyevich [Mr. Binkovskiy],

This is to respectfully inform you that decisions to clear the passage of vehicles transporting cargo for employees of state oversight agencies of Ukraine are outside the scope of authority of the border representative of the Russian Federation and the border directorate.

We propose initiating a resolution of this issue at the level of border agencies of the two states parties.

Head of Directorate Major-General

[Signature] A.P. Ektov

[Scanned image info: Ectov to Binkovskyi-07-11-14.jpg. Download. Upload to cloud. 1 of 4. All attachments]

## Annex 79

Extract from Criminal Proceedings No. 2201722000000060 (22 November 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Extract from criminal proceedings No. 2201722000000060

No. 1

Date of statement or report received or discovery from another source: 11.22.2014

Claimant or victim: independent discovery of a criminal offense by the investigator, such as during pre-trial investigation (code)

Date of entry into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations: 02.21.2017 2:55:28 PM

Outcome of investigation:

Legal qualification: (Criminal Code of Ukraine 2001) Article 28 Pt. 2, Article 263 Pt. 1

Description:

On 11.22.2014, a plastic bag was found and seized during the search of a building (outdoor kitchen) at 11 vul. Ulyanova, Bezruki village, Dergachi District, Kharkiv Region, which is being occupied by citizen Igor Pavlovych Umanets. Inside the bag was an object that looked like an SPM (medium limpet mine) marked SPM 15-6-90 MS OTK-9 with a screwed in fuze marked VZD – 1M, 583-2-85.

Person notified of a suspicion, investigation outcomes as regards this person and information on a special pre-trial investigation as regards this person:

1) Boyko, Igor Vitaliyovych Date of birth: 03.25.1972

Legal entity subject to criminal proceedings and representative of legal entity:

[...]

Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine Letter No. 55/2208 (10 December 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



### ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE BORDER GUARD SERVICE OF UKRAINE

(Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine)

26 Volodarska Street, Kyiv-601, 10601. Phone: (044) 235-11-00, fax: (044) 239-84-80, email: adpsu@dpsu.gov.ua, www.dpsu.gov.ua

December 10, 2014 55/2208

Foreign Ministry of Ukraine

Re: No. 72/36-994-73 DSK

This is to inform you that the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine is constantly making every reasonable effort – within its terms of reference – to document instances of illegal attempts to cross the state border of Ukraine from the direction of the Russian Federation.

Between June 2014 and now, we have submitted to the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine 19 written, photographic and video materials proving the involvement of the Russian Armed Forces in the armed conflict in Ukraine's east and the fact that they provided military vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to illegal paramilitary formations operated within Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.

The most telltale of them are as follows:

1. On May 30, 2014, border patrols of the State Border Guard Service detailed 11 citizens of Ukraine and Russian citizen Olga Ivanovna Kulygina (d.o.b. September 14, 1972, registered address of residence: 43 Leninskiy Prospect, apartment 17, Moscow) while they were attempting an illegal crossing of the state border. These individuals are involved in the contraband of weapons and ammunition to be handed over to terrorist groups operating in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts.

The following items were seized during the arrest: **27** *AK***-72** *assault rifles*, *2 Makarov pistols*, **5** *RPG***-26** *handheld anti-tang grenade launchers*, **5** *Korovin pistols*, **5** *Dragunov sniper rifles*, 36 magazines for AK-74, 9 magazines for Dragunov sniper rifle, 2 anti-aircraft collimator sights, **95** *RGD***-5** *grenades*, **102** *F1 grenades*, 1 stun grenade, 2 bore-sighting tubes for a Kalashnikov machine gun, **40 crates of large-caliber 12.7 mm cartridges**, **22 crates** + 5 boxes of 7.62 cartridges, *12 crates* + 5 *boxes of 5.45 mm cartridges*.

FOREIGN MINISTRY OF UKRAINE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT Incoming Ref. No. 110899 December 10, 2014



A search and screening also revealed mobile phones, a tablet PC, payment documents, personal memos, and paperwork proving that these individuals were implicated in separatist activities and had connections with intelligence services of the Russian Federation. Some of the documents found prove that their owners served in units of the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The fact that a portrait of Stepan Bandera was among the items seized does not rule out the possibility that they intended to stage provocations under the guise of Ukrainian nationalists.





Attachment No. 1 (on a compact disk)

2. On June 6, 2014, after a successfully repelled attack by militants and the subsequent sweep of the territory around the Marynivka border crossing point of the Dmytrivka border guard service unit of the Donetsk Boarder Guard Detachment, a border patrol found a container that used to store a 9M39 IGLA shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile launcher and traces of its use at the site of combat.



The packing list contained in the container indicates that the missile launcher had been stored since 2001 at Military Unit No. 33859 of the Russian Anti-Aircraft Defense Forces (in the town of Eysk, Krasnodar Krai). The most recent packing notations are dated April 12, 2014.



Attachment No. 2 (on a compact disk)

3. At around 11:50 p.m. on July 15, 2014, a convoy of military vehicles comprised of five GRAD multiple rocket launchers and two BTR armored personnel carriers (providing cover) illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine in the direction of ROZHDESTVENSKIY (Russia) – KOSHARNE (Ukraine). Sixty meters into Ukrainian territory, they fired a salvo in the direction of the area where units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were stationed. An inspection of the state border line revealed the location where they crossed the border with clear marks of military vehicle tires. Leftover caps of rocket missiles and scorched earth were found at the position from which the fire came.

Also, on the morning of July 16, 2014, we discovered an attempt to erase traces of an illegal border crossing from the direction of the Russian Federation using agricultural machinery that harrowed the fields.





Attachment No. 3 (on a compact disk)

4. At around 3:00 a.m. on July 22, 2014, a convoy of military vehicles comprised of fourteen GRAD multiple rocket launchers illegally crossed the state border of Ukraine in the vicinity of the population center of Pobeda. After this they fired a salvo in the direction of the population center of Amvrosiyivka.



Attachment No. 4 (on a compact disk)

Also please be informed that informational reference materials on the military and political situation at the state border submitted to the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine in September-October of this year were based on reports by border patrols, reconnaissance information, and reports from local residents. For objective reasons, the facts presented in your letter cannot be confirmed with evidentiary materials.

Attachment: 4 compact disks, for the specified recipient only.

First Deputy Chairman of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine

Major General

[Signature]

V.M. Servatiuk

I.M. Kryzhanivskyi Phone: 527-63-70

Record of Identification of Gennadiy Ruslanovych Shmoryvoz by Photograph (17 December 2014)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

#### RECORD

#### Of person identification from photographs

December 17, 2014

Kharkiv

Started at "15" hr "40" min

Finished at "<u>16</u>"hr "<u>20</u>"min

The special investigator of the investigations department at the Kharkiv Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, Captain of Justice I.O. Yena, in Room 21 of the investigations department, in connection with criminal proceedings No 22014220000000305, in the presence of witnesses:

1. Andriy Volodymyrovych Medintsev, DOB 12.29.1992, residing at Apartment 2/6, 43B vul. Gvardiytsiv-Shirokintsiv, Kharkiv

2. Yaroslav Oleksandrovych Kravchenko, DOB 02.21.1993, residing at Apartment 5/7 43B vul. Gvardiytsiv-Shirokintsiv, Kharkiy

and with the participation of victim Gennadiy Ruslanovych Shmoryvoz, DOB 09.13.1993, registered as living at 50 vul. Plekhanivska, Kharkiv, pursuant to Articles 103-105, 107, 223, 228 and 231 of the Criminal Procedures Code of Ukraine, presented an addendum to this record for identification: a photo spread on 1 side of an A4 showing black-and-white copies of male photographs numbered 1 - 4.

Prior to the start of this procedural action, the above individuals were advised about their right to make statements which are subject to mandatory inclusion in the record, as well as their right to be present at all of the investigator's actions. Pursuant to Article 66 pt 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, these individuals have been warned about their duty not to disclose the details of this procedural action and for the criminal liability incurred by disclosing details of a pre-trial investigation (Article 387 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

Prior to viewing the photographs, the victim was asked whether he would be able to recognize the man who was drinking coffee next to him immediately before the explosion in the building of the Stena rock pub on 11.09.2014, whom he described in more detail in the victim's interrogation record of 12.17.2014, to which G.R. Shmoryvoz replied that he would be able to recognize the said man by his external attributes.

Having viewed the photo spread presented to him, the victim said that he recognized the man on Photo 4 on page 1 as the one who was at the Stena rock pub on 11.09.2014 before the explosion, drinking coffee for about 20 minutes.

The victim recognizes this person by his external attributes, namely: short receding hair and the shape of his ears and eyebrows.

The procedural action took place in daytime in artificial light. The persons listed in this record have read it independently. There have been no comments or additions after the reading.

[signature]	(H.R.	Shmoryvoz,

Witnesses:

[signature] (A.V. Medintsev) [signature] (Y.O. Kravchenko)

Procedural action conducted, Record compiled by:

Special investigator, Investigations department, Kharkiv Regional Directorate, Security Service of Ukraine Captain of Justice

[signature]

I.O. Yena

#### **PHOTOSPREAD** to person identification record

#### <u>Kharkiv</u>









[signature] (H.R. Shmoryvoz)

#### Witnesses:

1) [signature] (A.V. Medintsev) 2)

[signature]

(Y.O. Kravchenko)

#### Identification conducted, photo spread compiled by

<u>Special investigator,</u> <u>Investigations department,</u> <u>Kharkiv Regional Directorate,</u> <u>Security Service of Ukraine</u> <u>Captain of Justice</u> <u>"12" 17 2014</u>



Photo No 2




Photo No 4

2

[signature]

I.O. Yena

## NOTE to person identification record

Photo No 4 of this photo spread shows Dmytro Mykhailovych Loginov, DOB 11.27.1978.

The other individuals whose photographs are shown on the photo spread bear no relation to these criminal proceedings.

This note was printed after the photo spread was shown to the person performing the identification.

Special investigator, Investigations department, Kharkiv Regional Directorate, Security Service of Ukraine Captain of Justice

[signature]

I.O. Yena

Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/09 (2 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for European Integration Affairs O.V. Zerkal

#### MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE

#### MAIN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

33 vul. Elektrykiv, Kyiv, 04176 Unified Register code 22990919

<u>05/17/2018</u> No 222/ <u>4D/535</u>

#### Dear Olena Volodymyrivna,

As part of the Ukrainian Side's preparation for the hearings at the UN International Court, we enclose available information which may be used to strengthen Ukraine's evidential base as the Court considers the case of the Russian Federation violating the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

- Enclosures: 1. Intelligence briefing from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (as of 9:00 a.m., January 2, 2015), on <u>3</u> sheets, one copy, addressee only.
  - 2. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region, Russian Federation) of December 3, 2014, on <u>2</u> sheets, 1 copy, addressee only.
  - 3. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region, Russian Federation) of January 8, 2015, <u>2</u> sheets, 1 copy, addressee only.
  - 4. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region, Russian Federation) of February 17, 2015, <u>2</u> sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
  - 5. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region, Russian Federation) of February 20, 2015, <u>2</u> sheets 1 copy, addressee only.
  - 6. Satellite images of the area 4 km southeast of Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region, Russian Federation) of February 22, 2015, <u>2</u> sheets 1 copy, addressee only.

#### Sincerely,!

Acting Deputy Commander, Military Unit No A0515, Director of Department 4,		
Colonel	[signature]	V.V. SKIBITSKY
Y.V. Yukhno 425 60 26	[stamp:] Ministry of Foreign Affairs DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT	_
[stamp:] 0045053	Red. No. <u>38184</u> 05" <u>18</u> " 20 <u>18</u>	Zam. No 187-14



#### MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE

#### MAIN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

33 vul. Elektrykiv, Kyiv, 04176 Unified Register code 22990919

<u>01/02/2015</u> No 222/ <u>3D/90/09</u>

#### INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (on January 2, 2015, at 9:00 a.m.)

#### **Operational situation.**

1.1. Concentrations of troops, arms and military equipment (A and ME) of the Russian Armed Forces in the temporarily occupied territories and Russian regions adjacent to the Ukrainian border.

According to operational reports and space intelligence data, the following has been confirmed:

[redacted]

concentrations of Russian Armed Forces arms and equipment in the following areas:

Kuibyshevo (Rostov Region) – the number of armored fighting vehicles has increased; six 300-mm Smerch multiple rocket launchers and six mobile charging units are missing; also missing are four 203-mm Pion self-propelled cannons (brought to the territory of Donetsk Region on December 20, 2014);

<u>Assessment:</u> The change in the number of A and ME in Kuibyshevo area, in particular the reduction in the number of artillery systems, is linked to their continued delivery to the Russian Armed Forces and illegal military formations active in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions.

[redacted]

1.2. Reconnaissance by the Russian Armed Forces of sites in the territory of Ukraine. Air reconnaissance involved the following:

Reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR (Marinovka) – in the air space (AS) of Volgograd and Rostov Regions and over the Sea of Azov.

[redacted]

page 3

Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/78 (9 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



## GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

6 Povitroflotsky Prospect, Kyiv-168, Ukraine Phone: (044) 234-01-92. Fax: (044) 226-26-56

Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Foreign Ministry of Ukraine

No. 300/1/C/78 of January 9, 2015

10:47:41 AM Page: 1/6

05237755319942662475

In pursuance of Instruction No. 02-01/2948 of October 15, 2014 issued by the Ukrainian Presidential Chief of Staff, presented herewith are informational reference materials pertaining to the body of evidence for the presence of foreign military groups in Ukrainian territory, to be used in raising the awareness of Ukrainian society and international partners more actively and in the future lawsuits to be filed by Ukraine with the relevant international courts.

Attachment: above-mentioned information on 6 pages, unclassified, for the specified recipient only

Acting First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Lieutenant General	[Sig	nature]	I.M. CHUBENKO
		FOREIGN MINISTR TMENT OF THE GE Incoming Ref. Januarv 14	NERAL SECRETARIAT . No. 2163
V.A. Khomenko, 454-40-78 [Handwriting: Colonel Vitaliy Anatolievych]	E   N   P		

000313\*

Order 233-2014

#### [...]

# II. Regarding the chronology of the crossing of the state border of Ukraine by personnel, weapons, and military vehicles of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

No.	Date	Border crossing point crossed	Point of destination (crossing)	Number of convoys	Number of vehicles (personnel)			
January 1-7, 2015								
	January 7	From the Russian Federation to Ukraine through IZVARYNE	in the direction of KRASNODON - LUHANSK	1 convoy of military vehicles	15 tanker trucks.			
	January 6	from Russian territory to Ukraine through IZVARYNE	in the direction of KRASNODON - LUHANSK	1 convoy of military vehicles	Comprised of: 30 trucks (with cargo), including 1 truck carrying a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft autocannon.			
	January 6	from Russian territory in the area of MARKINE (NOVOAZOVSK border crossing point)	in the direction of NOVOAZOVSK	1 convoy of military vehicles	Comprised of: 4 tanks, 5 trucks (carrying ammunition and replacement parts).			
	January 6	from GUKOVE (CHERVONOPARTYZA NSK border crossing point)	in the direction of LUHANSK	1 convoy of military vehicles	Comprised of: 5 tanks (3 people traveling on top of each tank), 3 URAL trucks, 2 off-road vehicles.			
	January 5	Left Ukraine for Russia from LUHANSK	in the direction of KRASNODON - IZVARYNE - DONETSKIY (RUSSIA)	1 convoy of military vehicles	20 army tanker trucks.			
	January 4	During the course of the day, from the Russian Federation to Ukraine through IZVARYNE	in the direction of KRASNODON, LUHANSK	1 convoy of military vehicles	28 army tanker trucks.			

Acting Chief of the Main Command Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Major General [Signature]

**B.V. BONDAR** 

Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/901073 (12 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



#### MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176 USREOU [Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine] code 22990919

<u>01.12.2015</u> ref No <u>222/3D/901073</u>

#### INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE at 9:00 AM January 12, 2015

#### **1.** Operational situation.

1.1. Increase in the combat power of the Russian Armed Forces group and the illegal armed formations in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

[redacted]

1.2. Concentration of enemy units in the key areas of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

[redacted] has confirmed concentrations of enemy units, arms and equipment in the following areas:

northeastern suburbs of Dokuchayevsk (Donetsk Region) – a **tank company** (11 tanks), **two artillery** (13 self-propelled guns) and one **rocket artillery** (6 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers) **batteries** with a total strength of 200 men;

Yasne (Donetsk Region) – a unit comprising four tanks, two self-propelled guns and two 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers. It is possible to assume that the bulk of forces are from the units of the tactical battalion group of the  $5^{th}$  Detached Tank Brigade (Gusinoozersk) of the  $36^{th}$  Army of the Eastern Military District (MD).

<u>Assessment</u>: The enemy has formed a battle group and strengthened artillery which will be used to strike against the positions of the ATO forces and carry out raids along the Dokuchayevsk-Volnovakha route.

Kirovsk (Luhansk Region) – **a mixed** enemy **artillery group** comprising nine cannons, four 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers and one **TOS-1 Buratino heavy mortar**.

[redacted]

Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

Record of Site Inspection, drafted by A. G. Albot, Investigations Department of the Volnovakha District Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (13 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

#### INCIDENT SITE INSPECTION REPORT

City of Volnovakha

<u>1/13/</u>20<u>15</u>

Inspection commenced at <u>3:25 p.m.</u> Inspection completed at 10:30 pm

Investigator <u>A.G. Albot</u> with the Investigations Department of the <u>Volnovakha</u> <u>District</u> <u>Department</u> of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, on the basis of: <u>notice of</u> <u>dispatch center of the Volnovakha District Department</u>

(indicate the ruling of the investigating judge if inspecting a house or other personal property;

indicate the details of the incident report or statement if inspecting the scene of an incident

before the start of criminal proceedings)

Pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine:

In the presence of witnesses:

1) Ruslan Anatolyevich Kovalenko

(full name, date of birth and place of residence)

city of Volnovakha

2) Nikolai Nikolaevich Riabchenko

(full name, date of birth and place of residence) residing in the city of Mariupol, 62 Shevchenko Street

estaing in the city of Manapol, 62 Shevchenko Sheet

who were advised of their rights and obligations pursuant to Articles 11, 13, 15 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. With the participation of the victim:

(full name, date of birth and place of residence)

who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 56(1) and (2) and Article 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the suspect:

(full name, date of birth and place of residence)

who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 42(3), (5), (6) and (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the defense attorney:

(full name, date of birth and place of residence)

who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Articles 46 and 47 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. With the participation of the representative:

(full name, date of birth and place of residence)

who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 44(5), Article 58(4) and Article 59(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the specialist:

(full name)

who was advised of his or her rights and obligations pursuant to Article 71(4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the owner (user) of the premises or other property:

(full name and address)

Before the inspection commenced, the aforementioned persons were advised of their right to be present for all actions performed in the process of the inspection and to make comments, which shall be entered into the report. The persons involved in carrying the inspection also

[signature]

[signature]

[text cut off] regarding the procedural action performed, as well as [text cut off] terms and procedures for their use: Nikon coolpix camera, Sony video camera

(characteristics of recording devices and data storage media used in this procedural action, signatures of the parties)

The inspection established that:

(indicate address of home or other property) the incident site is a checkpoint situated at a State Traffic Inspectorate post on the Donetsk-Mariupol road for traffic moving in the direction of the city of Donetsk. At the said site there is a yellow I-Van A07A TATA passenger bus with plate number AH 0985 AA, travelling from Zlatoustovka to Donetsk (Yuzhnvi) via the towns of Volnovakha and Khlebodarovka. The said bus is located at the site of the check point for checking passenger documents on the side of the roadway at a distance of 7.40 meters from the left side of the roadway and at a distance of 25 meters from the first electricity tower in the direction of traffic towards the city of Donetsk. At the said checkpoint, at a distance of 10 meters from the back axis of the bus concrete blocks have been placed on the roadway. At a distance from the front axis of the bus along the left lane of traffic heading toward the city of Donetsk concrete blocks have been placed on the roadway. The metal barriers that divide traffic that goes in opposite directions are installed on the right side of the roadway. The width of the roadway in the indicated location is 9 meters. On the right side of the roadway toward the city of Donetsk there is a shoulder of 5 meters. At a distance of 12 meters from the front axle of the bus lies a fallen tree, from the stump of which at a distance in the direction of the village of Blizhnee [illegible] traces of irregular shape from an exploded shell of the diameter of [illegible] 30 cm [illegible] 50 cm, and the depth of 50 cm is observed. There are remnants of the tree and broken branches around the indicated trace. There are remains of burning and black soil on the snow. This trace is located at a distance of 11.45 meters from the rear axle of the bus. The inspection revealed that right near the rear door of the bus [illegible] there is a stain of substance of brown color of irregular shape.

[signature]


[signature]

The outside inspection revealed that the yellow bus has two entry and exit doors. At the time of inspection, the front door is open. The windows on the right side are missing, there are fragments of glass on the entire perimeter of metal windows frames. The body of the bus on the right side has extensive damage from fragments of an exploded shell. The windshield of the bus is damaged in the form of numerous cracks. On the left side of the bus there is no glass in the three windows on the roadway near the bus. The curtains of the bus have mechanical damages that look like holes. An inspection of the passenger section of the bus reveals that there are 6 female corpses and 4 male corpses in the bus, of which 3 corpses are located on the seats and 7 corpses are located in the aisle between the seats. Around the corpses are bags with personal belongings. There are signs of forceful death on the corpses. Photographs were taken. The corpses were examined separately.

Witnesses:

1) [signature] 2) [signature]

Inspection carried out by [signature] A.G. Albot



1

*Layout sketch prepared by* [signature]

A. A[illegible]

#### MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS CENTER

32 vul. Italiyska, Mariupol 87515 tel. 095-429-16-67 eku@pol05.donec.ua, mail@ndekc.dn.ua

## TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS

To the incident site inspection report <u>dated 1/13/2015</u>


































Illustration No. 15








Illustration No. 18















Illustration No. 25

## MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE

#### MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS CENTER 32 vul. Italiyska, Mariupol 87515 tel. 095-429-16-67 eku@pol05.donec.ua, mail@ndekc.dn.ua

## TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS

To the incident site inspection report <u>dated 1/[illegible]/2015</u>







































# Illustration No. 18





Illustration No. 20

#### Ukraine Pension Fund of Ukraine PENSION CARD No. 2080801663

Last name: SHUDYKINA First name: OLHA Patronymic: MYKOLAYIVNA Sex: FEMALE Date of birth: 12/20/1956 Personal account #: [illegible] Type of pension: Old age



Valid until: INDEFINITELY Date of issue: [illegible] Issued by: Pension Fund of Ukraine [signature] [seal:] Pension Fund of Ukraine

Series AAZh No. [illegible]

Illustration No. 21



Shudykina Last name Olga First name Mykolayivna Patronymic December 20, 1956 Date of birth Chasiv Yar Place of birth Donetsk Region

[signature] Passport holder's signature








Illustration No. 23





26

Illustration No. 25

PASSPORT OF A CITIZEN OF UKRAINE	<i>Karpus</i> <i>Karpus</i> Last name <i>Halyna</i> First name <i>Serhiyivna</i> Patronymic <i>October 5, 1939</i> Date of birth <i>Donetsk</i> Place of birth
	[signature] Passport holder's signature

#### Ukraine Pension Fund of Ukraine PENSION CARD No. [illegible]

Last name: MORHASYUK First name: OLEKSANDR Patronymic: OLEKSANDROVYCH Sex: MALE Date of birth: [illegible] Personal account #: [illegible] Type of pension: [illegible]



Valid until: INDEFINITELY Date of issue: [illegible] Issued by: Pension Fund of Ukraine [signature] [seal:] Pension Fund of Ukraine

Series [illegible] No. 282248



Morhasyuk Last name Oleksandr First name Oleksandrovych Patronymic October 15, 1957 Date of birth Volnovakha Place of birth Donetsk Region

[signature] Passport holder's signature

Illustration No. 27




Illustration No. 28

Yu.V. Rishko

Forensic Expert [signature]

# Annex 86

Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/083 (13 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document



### MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176 USREOU [Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine] code 22990919

<u>01.13.2015</u> ref No 222/<u>3D/90/083</u>

## INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE at 09:00 a.m. January 13, 2015

#### 1. Operational situation.

1.1. Regrouping by Russian Armed Forces units in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and Russian districts adjacent to the Ukrainian border.

[redacted]

On January 11-12 this year, **four columns of military equipment** were brought into Ukraine via the town of Izvaryne (Luhansk Region) along the Krasnodon-Luhansk route. They comprise: three tanks, nine armored fighting vehicles (mounted on a tracked base), 119 cargo trucks (with property and ammunition), two refuelers and a bus with personnel.

### [redacted]

1.4 Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory

Ten tactical unmanned aerial vehicles were engaged in airborne reconnaissance in these areas: Donetsk (two UAVs), Avdiyivka, Volnovakha, Kalchik and Novoselivka Druha (two UAVs), Lebedinske-Mariupol (Donetsk Region), Nizhne, Vesela Gora – Shchastya (Luhansk Region).


Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

# Annex 87

Record of Review, drafted by Captain of Justice V. Romanenko, Senior Investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the Investigations Department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk Region (16 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document



## RECORD of review

Volnovakha of Donetsk region

January 16, 2015

Review started at 2:40 PM 6<sup>th</sup> Review ended at 5:05 PM

Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Captain of Justice V.V. Romanenko, having reviewed the materials of criminal proceedings No. 2201505000000021 under article 258, part 3 of the Criminal Code (CC) of Ukraine, in accordance with articles 104, 105, 106, 237, 223 of the Criminal Procedural Code (CPC), involving:

Specialist –

- 1. Consultant-expert 6 of office 4 of the Institute of Special Technology and Judicial Expertise (ICTE) of the Security Service of Ukraine Vitaliy Petrovych Stasiuk, born May 8, 1988, who resides at the address 77 Heorhiyivska St., Donetsk region, Mariupol and who has been in service since 2012, who in accordance with article 71 of the CPC of Ukraine was explained his rights and obligations \_\_\_\_\_\_\_,
- Deputy chief of staff of the rocket launcher artillery battalion of military unit A2167 Serhiy Volodymyrovych Dmitriyev, born September 30, 1981, who resides at the address Konovaltsya St., Bila Tserkva, Kyiv region at military unit A2167, who has served in the military since 1999, who in accordance with article 71 of the CPC of Ukraine was explained his rights and obligations [signature].

conducted a review – sections of land located near a checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, located on the territory of fixed post No. 5 of the Department of the State Automobile Inspection of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (UDAI GUMBS) in the Donetsk region on highway H-20 connection Slov'yansk-Mariupol of the Donetsk region.

Before the start of a review, the individuals cited above were explained the content of article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine on the fact that the individual does not bear responsibility under the requirement to give testimony or explanations about himself, family members or close relatives, the circle of which is determined by law.

1 [signature]	2	[signature]

Before the start of a review, the individuals cited above were explained their right to be present at all actions conducted during the process of the examination, to make comments that must be entered into the record. The individuals who take part in the conduct of the review were also explained the requirements of article 66, part 3 of the CPC of Ukraine on their obligations to do disclose information on the proceedings conducted as well as on the use of technical means of recording – on the digital camera "Olympus SP-510UZ" on an "XD" memory card and the conditions for its use with automatic settings.

1	[signature]	2	sig	gnature]	

#### Conduct of the review established:

The subject of the review is the section of the area located on the area of a checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine located on the territory of fixed post No. 5 of the UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk area on highway N-20 connecting Slov'yansk-Mariupol of the Donetsk region.

The specified section of the area is territorially located on the section of highway N-20 between Buhas and Volnovakha of the Donetsk region.

The highway specified is divided down the middle equipped by metal guardrails.

Located on the side of this highway, on a section in the direction of traffic from Mariupol to Donetsk at a distance of 12 m from the city, according to the record of the review of January 13, 2015, was a "Tata A07A" bus, yellow in color, with license plate AN 0985 AA, with a crater, which is designated in this record under No. 1.

## No. 1

The subject of the review is a crater, designated in this record conditionally under number 1. Using a GPS navigator "GARMIN DAKOTA 10" (serial number 1RK136165) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev established that this crater No. 1 is located at coordinates x=052776445, y=073889600, the distance from fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk area (its proximity in relation to the crater part) is 65 meters in a southwestern direction.

Using GPS navigator "GARMIN DAKOTA 10" (serial number 1RK136165) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev established that this fixed post No. 5 of UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region (its center) is located at x=052776650, y=073889630.

During the review specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No.1, and established that this angle is **6-28** sections of the goniometer  $(37.68^{\circ})$ .

In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil (with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in this crater No. 1, and established that it is equivalent to 55 degrees, which corresponds, according to Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell as 19,000 meters from this crater.

Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50 transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as

a result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 1 was actually fired from the area of the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by square 5291 7401.

### No. 2

The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 2. Using GPS navigator "GARMIN DAKOTA 10" (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776786, y=073889821, the distance from fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 300 meters in a northwestern direction.

During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 2, and established that this angle is **6-32** sections of the goniometer (37.92°).

In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil (with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in this crater No. 2, and established that it is equivalent to 52 degrees, which corresponds, according to Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell as 19,000 meters from this crater.

Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50 transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 2 was actually fired from the area of the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by square 5292 7401.

#### No. 3

The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 2. Using GPS navigator "GARMIN DAKOTA 10" (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776755, y=073889841, the distance from fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 220 meters in a northwestern direction.

During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 3, and established that this angle is **6-39** sections of the goniometer ( $38.34^\circ$ ).

In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil (with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater,

measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in this crater No. 3, and established that it is equivalent to 52 degrees, which corresponds, according to Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell as 19,000 meters from this crater.

Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50 transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 3 was actually fired from the area of the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by square 5292 7402.

### No. 4

The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 4. Using GPS navigator "GARMIN DAKOTA 10" (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776642, y=073889254, the distance from fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 370 meters in a northeastern direction.

During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 4, and established that this angle is **6-55** sections of the goniometer (39.3°).

In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil (with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in this crater No. 4, and established that it is equivalent to 53 degrees, which corresponds, according to Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell as 19,000 meters from this crater.

Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50 transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 4 was actually fired from the area of the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by square 5291 7401.

#### No. 5

The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 5. Using GPS navigator "GARMIN DAKOTA 10" (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776752, y=073889826, the distance from

fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 380 meters in a northwestern direction.

During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 4, and established that this angle is **6-42** sections of the goniometer ( $38.52^{\circ}$ ).

In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil (with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in this crater No. 5, and established that it is equivalent to 52 degrees, which corresponds, according to Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell as 19,000 meters from this crater.

Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50 transferred to the topographical map (scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 5 was actually fired from the area of the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by square 5292 7401.

### No. 6

The subject of the review is the crater designated in this record conditionally under number 5. Using GPS navigator "GARMIN DAKOTA 10" (serial number 1RK1361615) specialist S.V. Dmitriyev established that this crater No. 2 is located at coordinates x=052776518, y=073889914, the distance from fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region is 380 meters in a northwestern direction.

During the review, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using the magnetic needle of a PAB-2M artillery periscope compass (serial number 92A3437) and tape measure measured the directional (horizontal) angle of incidence of trajectory of the shell, which resulted in this crater No. 4, and established that this angle is **6-72** sections of the goniometer ( $40.32^{\circ}$ ).

In addition, specialist S.V. Dmitriyev using KR-1 reference level of the map marking stencil (with protractor) and a rail placed in the crater, measured the angle of incidence of the shell, which results in this crater No. 5, and established that it is equivalent to 55 degrees, which corresponds, according to Tables of firing of M-21OF shells of highly explosive rocket shells of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the range (without consideration of meteorological conditions) of the flight of the explosive shell as 19,000 meters from this crater.

Furthermore, the data specified by specialist S.V. Dmitriyev – directional angle and table of ranges of the flight of a shell using the artillery circle AK-4 and the scale sighting line MPL-50 transferred to the topographical map

(scale of 1:50,000) the respective sites in the area of this crater, as a result of which it was established that the shell that made crater No. 6 was actually fired from the area of the northeastern edge of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, which is designated on the map by square 5291 7402.

Thus, with consideration of the aforementioned indicators received as a result of this investigative action, specialist S.V. Dmitrivev stated that the shells were fired, which resulted in the crater around fixed post No. 4 of the UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk region, including crater No. 1 (which is located at distance of 12 meters from the "Tata A07A" bus, yellow in color, license plate No. AN 0985 AA – according to the record of review of the scene dated January 13, 2015), actually from the area of the northeastern outskirts of Dokuchayevsk of the Donetsk region, namely in boxes 5292 7401, 5292 7402, 5291 7401, 5291 7402 of the topographical map with a scale of 1:50,000.

The specified map of the area on which the specialist marked the trajectory of the flight of the shells is attached to this record as an addendum.

During this investigative action photos were used which all participants of the investigative action were notified of prior to its conduct. After the production of photos the latter will be attached to this record in the form of a photo board.

All participations of the investigative action were notified on how to read the contents of the record, namely – provision of the written record for personal reading.

*1* [signature] *2* [signature]

All participants in the proceedings familiarized themselves with the record by personally reading it, the applications, comments, additions: <u>not [illegible]</u>

# **Participants:**

1 [signature] Stasiuk 2 [signature] S.V. Dmitriyev

Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region **Captain of Justice** 

[signature]

V. Romanenko

# RECORD of review

Donetsk

January 16, 2015

Review started at: 11:25 AM January 16, 2015 Review ended at: 4:55 PM January 17, 2015

Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Lt. Colonel Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Martyniuk, having reviewed the materials of criminal proceedings No. 2201505000000021 entered into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations of January 13, 2015, on the grounds of commission of crimes as stipulated by part 3, article 258 of the CC of Ukraine, in accordance with articles 104, 105, 106, 237, 223 of the CPC of Ukraine, conducted a review of the scene (territory) located around the checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on highway N-20 "Slov'yansk-Mariupol," located at the site of fixed post No. 5 UDAI GUMBS of Ukraine in the Donetsk area at the exit from Volnovakha in the direction of Buhas of the Donetsk area in order to search for craters after an attack on the checkpoint from a multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS) BM-21 "GRAD", which took place on January 13, 2015.

The review was conducted under daytime natural light using photos on a "Sony-Cyber-Shot" camera with a 2 GB "Transcend" memory card with automatic settings.

# The conduct of the review established:

The review started on the territory which is located to the right of the checkpoint (the eastern part with respect to the "Slov'yansk-Mariupol" highway on the checkpoint site). In this case, the crater was not reviewed that had been examined earlier and was closest to the checkpoint, near which on January 13, 2015 the shuttle bus "I-VAN A0718," state license number AN0985AA, was hit by shrapnel on the road from "Zlatoustivka to Donetsk," killing 12 passengers and injuring 19. The crater is conditionally designated as No. 1.

The following craters were also reviewed, (which were respectively numbered according to the review schedule which is attached to the record):

No. 2: at a distance of 265 m from crater No. 1 along the "Slov'yansk-Mariupol" highway, along the center divider (the crater reviewed with the removal of remnants of ammunitions according to the review record of January 14, 2015);

No. 3: at a distance of 17 meters from crater No. 2 along the highway and 35 meters deep crater found perpendicular to the road 25 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 4: at a distance of 29 meters from crater No. 3 in a direction perpendicular to the road a crater was found that is 27 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 5: at a distance of 19 meters from crater No. 4 perpendicular to the road a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 6: No. 4: at a distance of 47 meters from crater No. 5 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately 20° to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards

Volnovakha a crater was found that is 25 x 27 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 7: at a distance of 144 meters from crater No. 6 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 24 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 8: at a distance of 78 meters from crater No. 7 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $40^{\circ}$  to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 32 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 9: at a distance of 108 meters from crater No. 8 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional line of the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 35 x 40 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 10: at a distance of 100 meters from crater No. 9 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 22 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 11: at a distance of 67 meters from crater No. 10 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $60^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 23 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 100 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 12: at a distance of 83 meters from crater No. 11 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $40^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 28 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 13: at a distance of 36 meters from crater No. 12 in a direction along the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is  $30 \times 30$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 14: at a distance of 38 meters from crater No. 13 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is  $32 \times 35$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 15: at a distance of 31 meters from crater No. 14 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately 25° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards

Volnovakha a crater was found that is 25 x 27 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 16: at a distance of 38 meters from crater No. 15 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately 15° to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 17: at a distance of 56 meters from crater No. 16 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $55^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 22 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 18: at a distance of 104 meters from crater No. 17 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $35^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 19: at a distance of 25 meters from crater No. 18 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 23 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 20: at a distance of 125 meters from crater No. 19 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 21: at a distance of 75 meters from crater No. 20 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 23 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 22: at a distance of 82 meters from crater No. 21 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $50^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 24 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 23: at a distance of 115 meters from crater No. 22 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $15^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 55 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 24: at a distance of 145meters from crater No. 23 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $15^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

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No. 25: at a distance of 100 meters from crater No. 25 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $20^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 22 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 26: at a distance of 106 meters from crater No. 25 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $15^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 27 x 28 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 27: at a distance of  $\overline{87}$  meters from crater No. 26 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately 90° to the road, a crater was found that is 29 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 28: at a distance of 45 meters from crater No. 26 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $10^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 23 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 29: at a distance of 103 meters from crater No. 28 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 135 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 30: at a distance of 94 meters from crater No. 29 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $40^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 17 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 31: at a distance of 65 meters from crater No. 30 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $50^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 35 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction; In this case, it was established that the distance from the specified conventional boundary perpendicular to the highway sign "177<sup>th</sup> km" along the highway is 65 meters.

No. 32: at a distance of 90 meters from crater No. 31 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $20^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 32 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part),

with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 33: at a distance of 100 meters from crater No. 32 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 35 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 34: at a distance of 107 meters from crater No. 33 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $35^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 28 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 35: at a distance of 12 meters from crater No. 34 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $40^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Buhas, at a distance of 2.5 m to a tree with a number of green branches, planted along the road, and 12.5 meters from the edge of the roadway part of the road, a crater was found that is 20 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction. Also on the specified tree there are fresh ragged wounds to the bark, at a height of 25 cm from the ground from the northeast side.

No. 36: at a distance of 132 meters from crater No. 34 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $10^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 29 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 35 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction.

No. 37: at a distance of 30 meters from crater No. 34 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 23 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 38: at a distance of 80 meters from crater No. 36 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 112 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 30: at a distance of 43 meters from crater No. 38 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $20^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, perpendicular to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 22 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 40: at a distance of 23 meters from crater No. 40 in a direction towards the road at an angle of approximately  $40^{\circ}$  to the conventional line, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha a crater was found that is 28 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 155 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of

entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 41: at a distance of 15 meters along the conventional perpendicular to the road, an 67 meters for the specified perpendicular in the direction from the checkpoint to the "DAI" "90" speed limit sign, a crater was found that is 30 x 35 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 42: at a distance of 3 meters along the conventional boundary perpendicular to the roadway part of the road, and 7 meters from the specified perpendicular in the direction from the checkpoint to "DAI" "90" speed limit sign, a crater was found that is 30 x 40 cm wide (diameter at the intersection) with a depth of approximately 20 cm.

The review is interrupted at 4:45 PM on January 16, 2016 and continued at 10:35 AM on January 17, 2015.

The review continues from the territory which is located to the left of the checkpoint (western part with respect to the "Slov'yansk-Mariupol" road on the site of the checkpoint). In this case, a crater was found (with continuation of review numbering):

No. 43: at a distance of 630 meters along the road from the checkpoint in a direction from Buhas and 2 meters from the roadside a crater was found that is  $18 \times 20$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 65 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the metal scrap shell, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 44: at a distance of 160 meters from crater No. 43 along the road from the checkpoint in a direction from Buhas and 10 meters from the " $177^{th}$  km" road sign exactly in the center of the roadway from the direction of Buhas-Volnovakha, a crater is found in the asphalt that is 50 x 40 cm (diameter at the intersection) with a depth of approximately 3-5 cm, behind the crater (from the northeast) there are many chips in the asphalt. The narrowed part of the plane of the crater also travels in the same direction.

No. 45: at a distance of 150 meters from crater No. 44 along the road from the checkpoint in a direction from Buhas and 15 meters from the roadside in the forest right of way a crater was found that is 35 x 45 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 35 cm;

No. 46: at a distance of 35 meters from crater No. 44 along the road to the checkpoint from Volnovakha and 124 meters along the perpendicular from the roadside in a deep field a crater was found that is 25 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 75 cm penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction.

No. 47: at a distance of 5 meters from crater No. 43 along the road from the checkpoint in a direction from Buhas and 55 meters along the perpendicular from the roadside in a deep field a crater was found that is  $27 \times 30$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 100 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction.

No. 48: at a distance of 10 meters from crater No. 47 in a direction from the road at an angle of approximately  $40^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 20 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 90 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 49: at a distance of 70 meters from crater No. 43 along the road to the checkpoint in the direction of Volnovakha and 15 meters along the perpendicular from the roadside, in a deep field, 4 meters from a separate strip of forest between the fields, a crater was found that is 45 x 50 cm wide (diameter at the intersection), with a depth of approximately 20 cm;

No. 50: at a distance of 5 meters from crater No. 49 in a western direction (from the road) along a separate strip of forest between the fields and 7 meters from the strip of forest in a deep field along the conventional boundary perpendicular, in the direction of the plane towards Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 27 x 28 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 51: at a distance of 87 meters from crater No. 50 in a western direction (from the road) along a separate strip of forest between the fields and 2 meters from the strip of forest in a deep field along the conventional boundary perpendicular, in the direction of the plan to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 24 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 52: at a distance of 340 meters from crater No. 51 in a western direction (from the road) along a separate strip of forest between the fields and 48 meters from the strip of forest in a deep field along the conventional boundary perpendicular, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is  $27 \times 32$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 53: at a distance of 218 meters from crater No. 52 in the direction of the road from an angle of  $40^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 25 x 26 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 54: at a distance of 21 meters from crater 53 parallel to the road in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is  $25 \times 26$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 55: at a distance of 68 meters from crater No. 54 at an angle of  $15^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 24 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 56: at a distance of 122 meters from crater No. 55 in the direction of the road at an angle of  $25^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 27 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 57: at a distance of 30 meters from crater No. 56 in the direction of the road at an angle of  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 25 x 26 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 58: at a distance of 70 meters from crater No. 57 in the direction of the road at an angle of  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to a separate strip of forest between the fields in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, as well as at a distance of 70 meters closer to the checkpoint of the strip of forest, a was found that is 22 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 59: at a distance of 68 meters from crater No. 58 and 45 meters along the conventional boundary perpendicular from the strip of forest, nearer to the checkpoint, in a deep field in the direction of the plane to Buhas, a crater was found that is  $26 \times 27$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 60: at a distance of 60 meters from crater No. 56 in the direction of the road at an angle of  $25^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, perpendicular to the separate strip of forest, nearer to the checkpoint, in a deep field in the direction of the plane to Buhas, a crater was found that is  $23 \times 25$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 132 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 61: at a distance of 105 meters from crater No. 60 in the direction from the road at an angle of  $10^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Buhas, and at a distance of 39 meters from the strip of forest farthest from the checkpoint, a crater was found that is 23 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 62: at a distance of 135 meters from crater No. 61 in the direction to the road at an angle of  $15^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 20 x 19 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 100 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 63: at a distance of 36 meters from crater 62 in the direction to the road at an angle of  $15^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 22 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 64: at a distance of 25 meters from crater No. 63 in a direction perpendicular to the road, a crater was found that is 25 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 65: at a distance of 46 meters from crater No. 63 in a direction parallel to the road in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is  $21 \times 22$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 66: at a distance of 20 meters from crater No. 65 in a direction perpendicular to the road, a crater was found that is 22 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 55 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 67: at a distance of 94 meters from crater No. 66 in a direction to the road at an angle of  $29^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 23 x 24 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 68: at a distance of 95 meters from crater No. 67 in the direction from the road at an angle of  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 21 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 69: at a distance of 9 meters from crater No. 68 in a direction to the road at an angle of  $30^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, and at a distance of 77 meters along the perpendicular to the strip of forest nearest to the checkpoint, a crater was found that is 20 x 19 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 70: at a distance of 29 meters from crater No. 68 in a direction to the road at an angle of  $50^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, parallel to the road, in the direction of the plane to Buhas, a crater was found that is 20 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 71: at a distance of 25 meters from crater No. 70 in a direction to the road at an angle of  $20^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, perpendicular to the road, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 22 x 23 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 72: at a distance of 80 meters from crater No. 69 in the direction of the road and along a strip of forest nearest to the checkpoint, in the direction of the road, at 2 meters to the specified strip of forest, a crater was found that is  $25 \times 24$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 73: at a distance of 34 meters from the road and 7 meters along the road towards the checkpoint to the "DAI 90" road sign, a crater was found that is 21 x 21 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 74: at a distance of 12 meters from crater No. 73 parallel to the road in a direction from the checkpoint, a crater was found that is 20 x 18 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 75: at a distance of 10 meters from the road and 9 meters along the road in a direction from the checkpoint to the "DAI 90" road sign, a crater was found that is  $19 \times 20$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 76: at a distance of 50 meters from crater No. 75 parallel to the road in the direction of the checkpoint and 8 meters from the road, in a strip of forest along the road, a crater was found that is 24 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 125 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 77: at a distance of 15 meters from crater No. 76 parallel to the road in the direction of the checkpoint and 8 meters from the road, in a strip of forest along the road, a crater was found that is 20 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 78: at a distance of 28 meters from crater No. 76 perpendicularly from the road and 63 meters perpendicularly to a strip of forest nearest to the check point, a crater was found that is  $19 \times 20$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 130 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 79: at a distance of 200 meters along the road from crater No. 1, in a strip of forest along the road, a crater was found that is 20 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 95 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 80: at a distance of 55 meters from crater No. 79 in a direction along the road in the direction of the checkpoint, in a strip of forest along the road, a crater was found that is 22 x 23 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 105 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

Furthermore, the territory was examined which is located to the left of the checkpoint (southwestern part with respect to the "Slov'yansk-Mariupol" road at the site of the checkpoint) behind a strip of forest (in the direction of the review towards the checkpoint), which separates the field from the craters found above, and in this case the craters found:

No. 81: at a distance of 110 meters from the checkpoint and 25 meters from the strip of forest, a crater was found that is 21 x 22 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 82: at a distance of 20 meters from crater No. 81 in the direction from the checkpoint along the strip of forest, under an electric power line, perpendicular to the strip of forest, a crater was found that is 25 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 135 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 83: at a distance of 50 meters from crater No. 82 in a direction from the road at an angle of  $45^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary, perpendicular to the road, in a direction of the plain to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 21 x 20 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail, apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 84: at a distance of 82 meters from crater No. 83 and in a direction along an electric power line, perpendicular to a strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 20 x 18 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, penetrating the center of the crater towards the probable axis of entry of the shell, a wooden rail,

apparent approximate northeast direction;

No. 85: at a distance of 50 meters from crater No. 84 in a direction from the road at an angle of  $60^{\circ}$  to an electric power line, perpendicular to a strip of forest, in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, in a corn field, a crater was found that is 45 x 30 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 40 cm;

No. 86: at a distance of 140 meters from a second electric power line in the direction of an electric power line perpendicular to a strip of forest in a direction to the road, at an angle of  $45^{\circ}$  to an electric power line in the direction of the plane to Volnovakha, a crater was found that is 20 x 19 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm;

No. 87: at a distance of 85 meters from crater No. 86 in the direction of the checkpoint parallel to the road, a crater was found that is  $18 \times 20$  cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 110 cm;

No. 88: at a distance of 46 meters from crater No. 87 in the direction of the checkpoint at an angle of  $15^{\circ}$  to the conventional boundary of the parallel road, a crater was found that is 22 x 25 cm wide (diameter at the intersection along the inner part), with a depth of approximately 115 cm;

During this investigative act a diagram (map) of sites was drawn up where craters were found that were named in the record, which is attached to this record as addendum No. 1.

While conducting this review a "Sony-Cyber Shot" camera was used with a 2 GB "Transcend" memory card with automatic settings, the photos of which will be attached to this record after they are produced in the form of a photo board (addendum No. 2).

Senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Agency of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Lt. Colonel of Justice

[signature] **O.V. Martyniuk** 

# **RECORD** of review

Mariupol

January 16, 2015

Review started at: 11:00 AM Review ended at: 12:40 PM

Senior investigator of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Lieutenant of Justice D.F. Chernenko, in connection with the conduct of pre-trial investigations in criminal proceedings No. 2201505000000021 of January 13, 2015, on the premises of the Mariupol Central Office of the Directorate of the Security Service in the Donetsk region, in accordance with articles 100, 104-107, 223, 237 of the CPC of Ukraine, conducted a review of the disk provided by employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region during implementation of the resolution of the investigator for the performance of investigative (exploratory) actions in the criminal proceedings.

# The review conducted established:

The "X Digital" disk, with the handwritten label "BP," obtained during implementation by the employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Security Service in the Donetsk region of the resolution of the investigator on the conduct of investigative (exploratory) actions in the criminal proceeding, contains a video file with the name "1\_02\_N\_150113140000.avi" with a size of 858,627 bytes. The video recording lasts 1 hour. In the video recording the numbers and letters of the label and the date itself (01-13-2015) time (indicated in hours, minutes and seconds) and number of the video recording method (SAM02) are visible. In the video recording lasting 24 hours and 57 seconds there is a depiction of the site in which the roads are visible in opposite directions along which transportation is travelling. There are strips of forest along the roads and buildings and farm fields are also visible.

At 24 minutes and 58 seconds of the video recording it is evident that in the fields, on the roads and in the strips of forest there are explosions taking place at the same time, after which smoke rises. For the entire hour explosions take place lasting from 24 minutes and 58 seconds through 25 minutes and 15 seconds. During this time there were approximately 25 explosions in different places on the territory being videotaped. Also on the video recording it is evident that at 25 minutes and 10 seconds on the right side smoke is rising. After 25 minutes and 15 seconds the explosions stop and the video recording of the territory on which the explosions occurred continues. After the explosions only spots that are dark colored and a round shape remain on the ground.

At 51 minutes and 56 seconds of the video recording the device which is recording the video turns to the right and visible in the right lower corner of the video recording is a yellow buss on the right of which can be seen a dark colored spot that is characteristics for explosions which was visible earlier during review of the video recording. There are unknown persons near the bus. Also one of these persons with the help of ladder is climbing up to the glass window on the side of the bus.

2

Then the device that is recording the video turns to the right and videotapes the territory. In this territory visible are dark colored spots that are characteristic of the explosions seen earlier when reviewing the video recording.


The device which performed the video recording completed a full rotation which videotaping the territory. During review of the video recording a total number of explosions that occurred during the video recording was counted at 39 explosions.


During review of the disk which contains a video recording using the "prtsc" key, screen shots were made and attached to the review record.


Performed the review and composed the record: Senior investigator of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Senior Lieutenant of Justice


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
**D.F.** Chernenko























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
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	Crityce () () () USB DISK (F.) () DID RW ANCCORDA ( Senior investigator of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Senior Lieutenant of Justice [sig














# **RECORD** of review of things

Mariupol

January 16, 2015

Review started at: 10:00 AM Review ended at: 10:40 AM

Senior investigator of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Senior Lieutenant of Justice D.F. Chernenko, in connection with the conduct of pre-trial investigations in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, on the premises of the Mariupol Central Office of the Directorate of the Security Service in the Donetsk region, in accordance with articles 100, 104-107, 223, 237 of the CPC of Ukraine, conducted a review of the disk provided by employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region on January 14, 2015 during implementation of the resolution of the investigator for the performance of investigative (exploratory) actions in the criminal proceedings.

#### The review conducted established:

The "Axent DVD+R" disk, with the handwritten label "Checkpoint," obtained during implementation by the employees of the Volnovakha Passport Issuing Authority of the Security Service in the Donetsk region of the resolution of the investigator on the conduct of investigative (exploratory) actions in the criminal proceeding, contains a video file with the name "Videorecorder captured attach on the Volnovakha checkpoint" with a size of 2.17 MB (2,277,376 bytes). The video recording lasts 1 minutes and 26 seconds. In the video recording for 1 minute and 12 seconds there is a depiction of the transport vehicles which are located on the right side of the road travelling one after another in the direction of the buildings located on the left side of the road. The last vehicle located on the right side and which is closest of all to the buildings is seen to be yellow. At 1 minute and 9 seconds of the video recording), and at 1 minute and 14 seconds of the video recording it is apparent that at a distance of about 100 meters from the device performing the video recording and opposite the yellow vehicle on the right side of the road by a strip of forest there is a flash of orange-yellow color and at the same time there can be seen flashes and smoke near the building in the form of a tower on the left side of the road.


During review of the disk which contains the video recording screen shots were made using the "prtsc" button and attached to the record of review.


Performed the review and composed the record: Senior investigator of the investigations department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Senior Lieutenant of Justice

[signature]

**D.F.** Chernenko







V.V. Romanenko [illegible] [signature] 01/15/15

To the Chief of the Investigations Department of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk area Lt. Colonel of Justice I.V. Ivanchenko

In the performance of the resolution on the order to conduct investigative (exploratory) actions in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000021 of January 13, 2015, for commission of a crime as stipulated by article 25, part 3 of the CC of Ukraine, we are sending you a video recording of January 13, 2015 from a surveillance camera at the checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine where the crime in the criminal proceedings took place.

Addendum: optic disk X-Digital with label BP

Respectfully, Chief of the Volnovakha Passport Authority of the Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Donetsk region Lt. Colonel

[signature]

I.V. Mykytiuk

<u>56/29-11 nt</u> 01/14/15

SV

<u>Ref. 111 nt</u> 01/14/15

Expert Opinion No. 63, drafted by Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations, Security Service of Ukraine (18 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations EXPERT OPINION

01/18/2015

City of *Mariupol* 

No. <u>63</u>

Copy No. <u>1</u>

I, Vitaly Petrovych Stasyuk, an expert consultant with Section 6 of the 4<sup>th</sup> Center (Center for Forensic and Special Expert Examinations) of the Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute for Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examinations of the Security Service of Ukraine, with an advanced technical degree, special expert training and experience working as an expert since 2012, holding the qualification of a forensic expert with the right to conduct explosives research with specializations in "Researching Explosive Devices and the Traces and Circumstances of Explosions" (registration certificate No. 477 issued by the Expert Qualification Commission of the Security Service of Ukraine on 03/13/2012) and "Forecasting the Possible Effects of the Use of Explosive Devices and the Traces and Circumstances of Explosive Devices and the Expert Qualification certificate No. 478 issued by the Expert Qualification Commission of the Security Service of Ukraine on 03/13/2012), pursuant to an order calling for an expert explosives examination, issued by Colonel of Justice Ye.L. Kosyak, Deputy Head of the Investigations Department of the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, conducted an expert explosives examination based on the files of criminal proceeding No. 2201505000000021.

I am aware of the facts of the case from the investigator's order calling for an expert examination.

Together with cover letter No. 56/13-170 nt of 01/14/2015, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine provided for expert examination 7 packs bound with white thread and sealed with paper glue, containing an explanatory note and the signatures of the investigator and the participants in the investigative action, and two envelopes.

The expert has been warned of potential liability for presenting knowingly false findings and refusing without a valid excuse to perform his duties under Articles 384 and 385 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:

#### [signature]

#### The expert was asked to answer the following questions:

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the submitted video recordings, what was the cause of the explosion(s)?

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the submitted video recordings, is it possible to identify the specific type and sort of munitions that produced the explosion(s) and the type and sort of weaponry (artillery system or other type of weapon) that fired the munitions whose fragments and explosive traces were found during the examination of the incident scene and on

the video recordings submitted for expert examination; if it is possible, then what type and sort of munitions produced the explosion, and what type and sort of weapon fired them?

• Do the objects removed during the examination of the incident site and submitted for expert examination bear any markings that would help identify the type and sort of munitions, or do the munitions that produced the explosion have any other identifying features?

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the submitted video recordings, where was (were) the epicenter(s) of the explosion(s)?

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the submitted video recordings, was the explosion produced by munitions fired from an artillery system or by stationary mines or explosive devices (in the latter case, which type and sort of stationary mines or explosive devices)?

• How many munitions (explosive devices) were detonated, based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the explosive traces described in the incident site examination report, the objects removed during the examination of the incident site, and the submitted video recordings (in general, based on the submitted video recordings, and specifically in relation to the site of the explosion that occurred next to the bus)?

• What was the force of the munitions (explosive device, explosive shell), in explosives equivalent, the detonation (initiation) of which led to the explosion that caused damage to the bus and left traces on the ground and on the tree, which were found during the examination of the incident site?

• Exactly which fragments removed during the examination of the incident site are fragments of munitions (explosive devices), and what is the purpose of each component of the munitions (explosive devices) whose fragments were removed during the examination of the incident site?

• Is it possible, based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the objects removed during the examination of the incident site, and the video recordings submitted for examination, to draw any conclusions as to the direction(s) from which the munitions whose explosion was documented during the incident site examination and captured on the submitted video recordings were fired, as well as the distance from which the said munitions were fired; if it is possible, then from which direction(s) and distance were the munitions fired?

• Is it possible, based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the objects removed during the examination of the incident site, and the video recordings submitted for examination, to draw any conclusions as to the angle of incidence of the munitions whose explosion was documented during the incident site examination; if so, then what was the angle of incidence of the munitions whose explosion was documented during the incident site examination; if so, then what was the angle of incidence of the munitions whose explosion was documented during the incident site examination and captured on the video recordings submitted for expert examinations, and what firing distance of the munitions is consistent with their established angle of incidence?

• Based on the video recordings submitted for expert examination, how many salvos of the shelling were there, is the image on the video recordings submitted for expert examination consistent with one or multiple salvos, and on what criteria is this conclusion based?

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The following information sources were used in conducting the research:

- Methods of Complex Analysis of Explosive Devices, Explosive Substances and Traces of Explosions (H.V. Prokhorov-Lukin, V.I. Pashchenko, V.I. Bykov, et al – Kyiv: Elite Print LLC, 2011. – p 216: il.);

- Mass-Produced Explosive Devices and the Criminalistic Analysis Thereof (Yu.M. Dildin, V.V. Martynov, Expert Criminalistics Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. Moscow. 1991);

- Explosives Expert Book: a Study Guide and Methodological Handbook (Moscow 2001);

- "Tables of Fire from M-21-OF High-Explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells (Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow 1975).

The following were used in conducting the research:

- caliper ShTs-1 GOST 166-89;

- metal ruler GOST 427-75;

- magnifying glass with 4x magnification;

- OLYMPUS x-775 camera;

- map marking stencil;

- protractor;

- SARTORIUS electronic scales.

- bubble level

- WILTON 5m tape measure

The air temperature in the room was  $+20^{\circ}$ C.

#### RESEARCH

The objects submitted for examination were packed in accordance with the criminalistic procedure rules for the storage and transportation of physical evidence. The packing precludes access to the contents and is undamaged.

#### Upon being opened, the packs were found to contain:

#### Pack No. 1, made of green plastic material (Illustration No. 1):

- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring  $605 \times 4 \times 125 \text{ mm}$  (Object No. 1, Illustration No. 2)

#### Pack No. 2, made of black plastic material (Illustration No. 3):

- grey, deformed cylindrical metal object measuring 260 mm in length, 4 mm in thickness and 200 mm in width (Object No. 2, Illustration No. 4)

#### Pack No. 1, made of black plastic material (Illustration No. 7):

- grey, semi-spherical metal object measuring 99 x 4 x 57 mm (Object No. 3, Illustration No. 8);

- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 380 mm in length, 45-115 mm in width and 3-6.6 mm in thickness (Object No. 4, Illustration No. 8).

#### Pack No. 4, made of black plastic material (Illustration No. 9):

- grey, cylindrical metal object measuring 250 mm in length, ~116 mm in diameter and 3 mm in thickness (Object No. 5, Illustrations Nos. 10-11)

### Pack No. 5, made of green plastic material (Illustration No. 12):

- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 220 x 8 x 59 mm (Object No. 6, Illustration No. 13);

- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 185 x 3 x 77 mm (Object No. 7, Illustration No. 13)

- grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 600 x 3.6 x 350 mm (Object No. 8, Illustration No. 13)

### Pack No. 3, made of white plastic material (Illustration No. 14):

- grey, cylindrical metal object measuring 735 mm in length, ~127 mm in diameter and 4 mm in thickness (Object No. 9, Illustration No. 15).

### Pack No. 3, transparent plastic pack (Illustration No. 16):

- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 65 x 4.7 x 19 mm (Object No. 10, Illustration No. 17);

- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 17 x 2.6 x 14 mm (Object No. 11, Illustration No. 17);

- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 19 x 2.5 x 23 mm (Object No. 12, Illustration No. 17);

- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 13 x 2.5 x 15 mm (Object No. 13, Illustration No. 17);

- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 14 x 2.5 x 15 mm (Object No. 14, Illustration No. 17);

- dark grey, irregular-shaped metal object measuring 14 x 2.5 x 14 mm (Object No. 15, Illustration No. 17);

**Envelope** with "xDigital" optical disk labeled "BP", which contains video recording "1\_02\_H\_150113140000.avi".

**Envelope** with **"Axent DVD+R"** optical disk (serial number MOGXPR-801), which contains a video recording labeled **"Video recorder captured shelling of Volnovakha** checkpoint.flv".

### The examination of Objects Nos. 1-9 revealed:

- longitudinal grooves in the form of threads (Objects Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 (on the interior));

markings in the form of letters and figures:
a) T 91 V S I (Object No. 7, Illustration No. 20);
b) 60 V I I, 881 (Object No. 5, Illustrations Nos. 21-22);
c) ..-12-G (Object No. 4, Illustration No. 23);
d) 559-76-6 KZh 1237 (Object No. 2, Illustrations Nos. 5-6), where 599 is the factory lot and assembly number;
76 is the year of manufacture;
6 KZh is the number of the powder factory.

Attached to Object No. 5 are two metal rods measuring 4.2 mm in diameter and  $\sim$ 70 mm in length, around which metal wire measuring 1.7 mm in diameter is coiled in the form of a spring. On one side there is a plate (deformed), which has a hole measuring  $\sim$ 15 mm in diameter, and on the other side can be seen traces of thermal influence in the form of chaotically spaced cavities of irregular shape with fire-damaged edges and black stratification (which appears to be soot).

In order to answer the questions that were posed, a comparative analysis was conducted of Object No. 5, which was submitted for examination, with the same parameters specified in the technical standard documentation. The results of this analysis are shown in Table No. 1

Indicators of main components	Comparable item	Analyzed object
	shell propulsion motor	Objects similar in appearance to a propulsion motor (Object No. 5)
Material of construction	grey metal	grey metal
Number of blades	5	5 apertures for attaching blades
Diameter, mm	122	~116

**Comparative Table No. 1** 

Based on a comparison of the object with the drawing in the reference literature, as well as the dimensions, it is the propulsion motor of a rocket-propelled shell (Illustrations Nos. 18 and 19).

In order to answer the questions that were posed, a comparative analysis was conducted of Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15, which were submitted for examination, with the same parameters specified in the technical standard documentation. The results of this analysis are shown in Table No. 2

#### **Comparative Table No. 2**

Indicators of main	Comparable item	Analyzed object	
components			
	pre-formed fragmentation	Shrapnel-like elements	
	element of unguided M-21	(Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15)	
	OF rocket-propelled high-		
	explosive fragmentation shell		
Material of construction	grey metal	grey metal	
Weight (g)	2.4	2.25-2.48	
Geometric shape	rhombus rhombus		

The comparative analysis established that in terms of outward appearance, material of construction and structural features, the submitted Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15 are standard fragmentation elements of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U).

According to the standard literature, *Explosives Expert Book: a Study Guide and Methodological Handbook* (Moscow 2001), nearly all rocket-propelled shells contain the explosive substance A-IX-2. In this case, according to the technical specifications of the 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), the weight of the explosive substance is 6.6 kg.

The power of a munition is calculated according to the formula  $Q=M_{ex} \times C_{ex}$ , where:  $M_{ex} = mass$  of the explosive substance with which the munition (explosive device) is loaded (in kg)

 $C_{ex}$  = the coefficient, which depends on the heat or energy of the explosion; for the explosive substance A-IX-2 it is 1.55.

#### Q=6.6x1.55=10.23 kg in TNT equivalent.

Based on the video recordings submitted for expert examination, the shelling of the checkpoint began at 2:24:58 PM and ended at 2:25:13. The question of how many munitions were fired falls outside the expert's area of expertise. According to the examination report dated 01/16/15, a total of 88 shells were fired, which corresponds to at least three simultaneous salvos. The total firing time of one round of ammunition (40 shots) is 20 seconds, i.e., it takes one second for two shells to fly out of one unit, so one BM 21 GRAD vehicle could not have produced 88 shots in approximately 15 seconds. This suggests that the shots were fired from at least three BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket launchers simultaneously.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results of the examination of the incident site, the removed objects and the submitted video recordings, the blast was caused by the explosion (or explosions) of a shell (or shells).

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects, and the submitted video recordings, it is possible to identify the specific type and sort of munitions as 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shells (item 9M22U). These shells were fired from BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers.

• Object No. 2, which was removed during the examination of the incident site and submitted for expert examination, bears the marking "559 76 6 KZh" and, below that, "1237", where:

559 is the factory lot and assembly number;

76 is the year of manufacture;

6 KZh is the number of the powder factory. These markings are consistent with the markings of rocket-propelled shells.

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site and the removed objects, the epicenter of the explosion was 12 meters from the bus.

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the removed objects and the submitted video recordings, the explosions were caused by munitions fired from BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket launchers.

• Based on the results of an examination of the incident site, the explosive traces described in the incident site examination report, the objects removed during the examination of the incident site, and the submitted video recordings, there were 88 shots from BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket launchers (as for the blast next to the bus, there was an explosion of one 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U)).

• The power of the 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U) responsible for the blast that caused the damage to the bus and traces on the ground and on the tree found during the examination of the incident site is 10.23 kg in TNT equivalent.

• Objects Nos. 1-4 and 6-9 comprise the standard body of a propulsion motor of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed to hold two sections of the propulsion motor's powder charge and capable of producing fragmentation elements upon the detonation of the main explosive charge.

Objects Nos. 11 and 13-15 are standard fragmentation elements of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed to inflict losses on enemy personnel and unarmored equipment.

Object No. 10 is a fragment of the body of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocketpropelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed to inflict losses on enemy personnel and unarmored equipment.

Object No. 5 is a propulsion motor of a 122-mm unguided M-21 OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shell (item 9M22U), designed to deliver the warhead to its target.

• Based on the results of the examination report dated 01/16/15, the angles of incidence of the shells were 52-55 degrees. According to the firing table for M-21-OF rocket-propelled high-explosive fragmentation shells, the firing distance of the munitions

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[signature]

corresponds to 19,000 meters. According to the information contained in the incident site examination report, the shots were probably fired from a location in the northeastern outskirts of the city of Dokuchaievsk.

• Based on the video recordings submitted for expert examination, the question of how many munitions were fired falls outside the expert's area of expertise. According to the information contained in the examination report dated 01/16/15, a total of 88 shells were fired. This suggests that the shots were fired from at least three BM-21 GRAD multiple rocket launchers simultaneously (see the research section).

Exhibit: illustrations table (6 pages)

**Expert:** 

[signature]

V. Stasyuk

56/21-154 nt 01/19/15



Illustration No. 1, packing of research objects



Illustration No. 3, packing of research objects



Illustration No. 5, markings on research object



Illustration No. 2, research object



Illustration No. 4, research object



Illustration No. 6, markings on research object



Illustration No. 7, packing of research objects



Illustration No. 9, packing of research objects



Illustration No. 8, research objects




Illustration No. 10, research object




Illustration No. 11, research object



Illustration No. 12, packing of research objects




Illustration No. 13, research objects




Illustration No. 14, packing of research objects




Illustration No. 15, research object



Illustration No. 16, packing of research objects



Illustration No. 17, research objects



[signature]



Illustration No. 20, markings on research object



Illustration No. 21, markings on research object



Illustration No. 22, markings on research object




Illustration No. 23, markings on research object

Map showing shell craters around the Buhas roadblock, which were marked by investigators after inspecting the crime scene (dated 20 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.



Record of crime scene inspection conducted by T.A. Belobokova, Lieutenant of the Police and Senior Criminal Investigator with the Ordzhonikidze District Office of the Mariupol City Department of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

# CRIME SCENE

### City of Mariupol

January 24, 2015

Inspection commenced at 11:30 a.m.

Inspection ended at 12:00 p.m.

Police Senior Lieutenant T.A. Belobokova, Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Ordzhonikidze District Office of the Mariupol City Directorate of the Central Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Donetsk Oblast, [conducted a crime scene inspection] in the context of Criminal Case No. 2201505000000047

(Specify the ruling of the investigating judge if the inspection is conducted at the residence or other property of an individual; if the inspection is conducted prior to initiation of criminal proceedings, state the details of the crime or incident report)

pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine:

### In the presence of attesting witnesses:

1) Oleh Hryhorovych Tiplev, born in 1989, 37/42 Kievskaya Street, Mariupol

(First name, patronymic, last name, date of birth, address of residence)

2) Serhiy Oleksandrovych Sayanin, born in 1981, Mariupol

(First name, patronymic, last name, date of birth, address of residence)

who had their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine explained to them.

[...]

*Findings of the inspection:* (state the address of residence or other property of the individual)

The site of inspection is the area in front of building No. 45/2 at Kievskaya Street. It is a nine-story building with three entrances. It is linked with another section of the building by an arch with a balcony above it. The area in front of this building is located right behind the "Destkiy Mir" [Toy Store] store and the "Virus" computer club. There are many glass fragments on the ground. Virtually every window of this building shows visible damage to window panes: glazing is either missing or cracked or half-broken. Entrance doors are made of metal and do no show visible signs of damage. The roof of the building is intact and shows no visible signs of damage. The building shows some damage caused by fragments (with pockmarks dotting virtually the entire surface of the building in the front and in the back). Upper stories of the building beginning with the 5<sup>th</sup> story are more damaged. Balconies above the arch of the building in question also show visible signs of damage.

No corpses were found in the area in front of this building.

The inspection then proceeded to the second part of the nine-story building at 45/1 Kievskaya Street. This building shows visible signs of damage: window panes are missing in many apartments and the building surface is damaged by shell fragments. The building roof shows no visible signs of damage. Other than glass fragments, no extraneous objects were found in the area in front of this building.

The inspection then proceeded to the area behind building No. 45/2 and building No. 45/1. There is a kindergarten behind these buildings. The kindergarten is ringed with a metal fence. Glass fragments were found on the grounds of the kindergarten. No other signs of damage were found.

No corpses were found in the area inspected.

[...]

**The inspection detected:** [blank] (Specify evidence, items detected during the inspection).

**The items detected during the inspection were seized:** [blank] (Specify what items were detected in what order and how they were sealed)

**The following equipment was used during the inspection:** Canon camera (Specify the use of photo or video equipment, other devices and special-purpose equipment and their specifications)

*The inspection was conducted:* In the daytime, not at dusk, without precipitation, under natural lighting.

The record has been read, written down [blank] (comments from inspection participants)

# Participants:

[Signature]
(Signature)
[Signature]
(Signature)
[Signature]
(Signature)

# Inspection conducted by:

Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Ordzhonikidze District Office

[Signature]

T.A. Belobokova

Donetsk Region Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, All Necessary Measures Being Taken to Deal with the Consequences of Militants' Shelling of Mariupol (25 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

[state emblem of Ukraine	]	
NATIONAL	DONESTK	Back to main page
POLICE	REGION	www.npu.gov.ua
86 Prospekt Nakhimova, Mariupo Tel +380 62 951 98 01, fax +380 e-mail: <u>gupolice@dn.npu.gov.ua</u> press enquiries: <u>press@dn.npu.go</u> freedom of information requests: <u>public enquiries</u> : <u>gupolice@dn.np</u>	52 947 48 15 <u>v.ua</u> gupolice@dn.npu.gov.ua	
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About the main directorate o	of the Ministry of Internal A	ffairs  Key agency sites   Citizens advice   Your
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site menu, calendar, adverts: recruitment to police, hiring trainers]

Main/News archive

[...]

#### ALL NECESSARY MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF MILITANTS' SHELLING OF MARIUPOL 01.25.2015 | 14:15 | Mariupol

Mariupol is slowly recovering after the city's brutal shelling by the militants. The lawenforcement agencies, municipal services, urban development companies and medical institutions are devoting all their efforts to dealing with the horrific consequences and providing assistance to those affected. It is already known that the shelling came from the occupied territory of Sakhanka and the Lebedinsky Novoazovsky district.

Thirty people died in the shelling: 17 women, 12 men and one child: the 4-5 years old Stanislav Kashin. The boy was found dead in a destroyed building.

Ninety-five people were wounded: 49 women, 37 men and 9 children. Doctors amputated 3-year-old Milana's leg.

Seventy-nine sites were damaged: 37 detached houses, 22 apartment blocks, 2 markets, 8 stores, a post office, 2 bank branches, a pharmacy, a cafe and a service station.

Last night already, power supply was restored in Vostochny neighbourhood. Repair works continue.

According to the head of the **Ministry of Internal affairs main regional directorate**, **Vyacheslav Ambroskin**, the affected area is being patrolled by 300 policemen, 6 motor patrol teams of the Sokil special unit and 2 patrols from the Azov regiment. This is done to avoid adverse escalation and to provide security for the public.

The general also praised the work of the hundreds of rescue workers from the Ministry of Emergencies, who had put out 10 fires.

The Security Service of Ukraine Donetsk Regional directorate is conducting a pre-trial investigation into the shelling. Criminal proceedings have been launched under Article 258 Pt 3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (a terrorist act causing the loss of human life).

Public relations department, Donetsk Region main directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine

When citing this article a hyperlink to npu.gov.ua is mandatory

Inspection Report, drafted by Mykhaylo Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine (25 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

#### **INSPECTION REPORT**

City of Donetsk

	January 25, 2015
Inspection started:	11:10 А.М.
Inspection completed	d: 04:55 P.M.

Major of Justice Mykhaylo Mykhaylovych Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having reviewed the evidence in criminal proceedings No. 2201505000000047, entered in the Unified Registry of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, based on the elements of crime under part 3 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, acting in compliance with Articles 104, 105, 106, 237, and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine, performed an on-site inspection of the area (territory) located in Skhidnyi Mikroraion of the City of Mariupol, marked as Sector No. 4 (delimited by Marshala Zhukova Street on the east, 9 Travnya Street on the north, Olimpiyska Street on the west, and Nova Street on the south), for the purpose of identifying shell impact points (craters) following the artillery shelling of Skhidnyi Mikroraion on January 24, 2015.

The inspection was conducted in natural daylight conditions with photography performed using an Olympus SP–510 UZ camera with automatic settings and a 1 GB Fujifilm memory card.

### The inspection has produced the following findings:

The inspection began in the southern portion of Kyivska Street in Ordzhonikidzevskyi *Raion* of the City of Mariupol. The inspection has produced the following findings (craters are discussed below in relation to specific addresses):

Number 32 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the middle of the roadway on (1)Kyivska Street at a distance of 12 meters from number 32 and at a distance of 20 meters from the right side of number 3 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of  $15 \times 45$  cm. Mangled metal fragments with ragged edges are situated in the center of the crater. One of the fragments is cylindrical and shows the remains of an external thread. The surface of the object is marked with the letters "KV" in black paint and with a stamped number "1091." The asphalt paving near the crater has suffered damage in the shape of furrows sized at 130 cm  $\times$  120 cm  $\times$  150 cm and running in the eastern direction. After the shell fragments were recovered, the depth was measured at approximately 50 cm; when a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about  $45^{\circ}$  to  $50^{\circ}$ . The metal objects were recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No." and the signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.

- Number 44 Kvivska Street: A crater is located in the middle of an asphalt road, in the (2)vicinity of the intersection of Kyivska Street and Stanislavska Street at a distance of 23 meters from the left side of number 5 Kvivska Street and at a distance of 13 meters from number 44 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of  $39 \times 50$  cm. In the center of the crater, cylindrical metal fragments were found, appearing deformed and coated with soot both on the surface and inside. The tail piece of the cylindrical object is pointed toward the side of the building at number 5 Kyivska Street, facing east. The maximum diameter of the cylindrical portion of the object is 140 cm. The asphalt paving near the crater has suffered damage in the shape of furrows sized at approximately 120 cm  $\times$  115 cm  $\times$  160 cm and running in the eastern direction. After the shell fragments were recovered, the depth was measured at approximately 60 cm; when a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 45°. The metal objects were recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No. \_\_ " and the signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.
- (3) Number 34 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the asphalt pavement in the middle of the roadway in Kyivska Street at a distance of 13 meters from number 34 Kyivska Street, at a distance of 22 meters from number 44 Kyivska Street, and at a distance of 9 meters from crater No. 1. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 45 cm × 45 cm. Four (4) broken metal pieces with a maximum size of 12 cm × 4 cm and a minimum size of 107 cm × 5 cm [sic] were found in the center of the crater. The asphalt paving near the crater has suffered damage in the shape of furrows sized at 125 cm × 115 cm × 160 cm and running in the eastern direction. The crater is partially filled with asphalt debris and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure the depth. The metal objects were recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No. \_\_\_" and the signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.
- (4) Number 30 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in a dirt road at a distance of 7 meters from number 30 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 27 meters from number 3 Kyivska Street, and at a distance of 4.5 meters from high-voltage transmission tower No. 17. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 23 cm × 18 cm; when a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at approximately 40° and the crater depth at approximately 120 cm. The dirt paving near the crater has damage in the shape of furrows sized at 137 cm × 124 cm × 143 cm.

- (5) Number 3 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in an asphalt pedestrian footpath at a distance of 7 meters from number 3 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 22 meters from number 32 Kyivska Street, and at a distance of 9 meters from crater No.1. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 53x54 cm. The asphalt paving near the crater has damage in the shape of furrows sized at 155 cm × 150 cm × 180 cm and running in the eastern direction. The crater is partially filled with asphalt debris and dirt and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure the depth.
- (6) Number 1a Kyivska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 35 meters from the service station located at number 1a Kyivska Street and at a distance of 120 meters from number 3 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 33 cm × 27 cm. The dirt paving near the crater has suffered damage in the shape of furrows sized at 155 cm × 150 cm × 180 cm. When a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 40°. The approximate depth of the crater is 120 cm.
- (7) Number 44 Kyivska Street: A crater is located near the intersection of Kyivska Street and Stanislavska Street at a distance of 6 meters from number 44 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 16 meters from number 45 Stanislavska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 65 cm  $\times$  60 cm. The sidewalk pavement near the crater is damaged, with both the sidewalk slabs and the ground appearing broken. When a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 40°. The approximate depth of the crater is 50 cm.
- (8) Number 5 Kyivska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 15 meters from the first entrance door of the building at number 7 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 17 meters from the 4<sup>th</sup> entrance door of the building at number 5 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 35 cm × 19 cm. When a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 40°. The approximate depth of the crater is 150 cm. The ground around the crater is damaged within an area of approximately 150 cm × 146 cm × 170 cm.
- (9) Number 46 Kyivska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 10 meters from the rear of the building at number 46 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 24 meters from the rear of the building at number 7 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 75 cm × 100 cm. The curbstones near the crater are damaged and partially shattered within the crater. The crater is partially filled with dirt and curbstone debris and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure its depth.

- (10) Number 33a Kyivska Street: A cone-shaped metal object was found on a lawn at a distance of 10 meters from Tyhrenya toy store located in the building at number 33a Kyivska Street and 43 meters from number 66 Kyivska Street. The object has a truncated top and is about 10.8 cm long. The maximum diameter is 5 cm; the minimum diameter is 1.8 cm. There is a hole with a diameter of 22 mm on the inside. The surface of the lower portion is clearly marked with the stamped lettering "MRV–U; 42–M; 46–83." The metal object was recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No. \_\_\_\_" and the signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.
- (11) Number 7 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the ground at a distance of 32 meters from the right side of the building at number 7 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 27 meters from the right side of the building at number 11 Kyivska Street near the building occupied by Pryvatbank. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 90 cm  $\times$  140 cm. The crater is partially filled with dirt and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure its depth.
- (12) Number 7a Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the ground and partially on a walkway paved with slabs at a distance of 5 meters from the central entrance to Nakhodka toy store located in the building at number 7a Kyivska Street and at a distance of 60 meters from number 50 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 43 cm  $\times$  90 cm and about 70 cm deep. When a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 35° to 40°.
- (13) Kyivska Street in the vicinity of the Church of St. Volodymyr the Great: A crater is located in the ground at a distance of 15 meters from the central entrance to Nakhodka toy store located in the building at number 7a Kyivska Street and at a distance of 30 meters from number 48b Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 43 cm  $\times$  51 cm. The curbstone near the crater was found to be damaged and partially shattered within the crater. The crater is partially filled with dirt and curbstone debris and, for that reason, it was impossible to measure its depth.
- (14) **Number 240 Stanyslavska Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it is damaged, namely, the hallway roof is completely wrecked and the walls of the rooms situated on the first and second floors are damaged. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building.
- (15) Number 127 Olimpiyska Street: A crater is located at a distance of 7 meters from number 127 Olimpiyska Street and at a distance of 23 meters from number 238 Olimpiyska Street, near a public transit stop shelter hit by an electric line bar. The crater has an irregular oval shape with a maximum size of 80 cm × 100 cm and is about

20 cm deep. The curbstone at the location is partially damaged and shifted from its original position approximately along the shell's trajectory.

- (16) **Number 137/2 Olimpiyska Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof of the building was completely destroyed and the building's interior room burned down. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building.
- (17) Number 3 Rivnynna Street: A crater is located at a distance of 3 meters from number 3 Rivnynna Street and at a distance of 8 meters from number 4 Rivnynna Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 33 cm  $\times$  23 cm and is approximately 80 cm deep. When a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 35°.
- (18) **Number 25 Rivnynna Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, one of the walls was partially damaged with bricks loosened and fallen out and windows broken. A crater caused by shell impact was found in the ground immediately in front of the foundation under the damaged wall; the crater was almost completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
- (19) **Number 31 Rivnynna Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was partially wrecked with open gaps in the wall and the floor in one of the rooms. A crater caused by an artillery shell was located under the floor in the room; the crater was completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
- (20) Number 32 Landshaftna Street: A crater is located in the area surrounding the building, paved with sidewalk slabs, at a distance of 6 meters from number 32 Landshaftna Street and at a distance of 17 meters from the rear of the building at number 48/2 Kyivska Street. The crater has an irregular conical shape with the maximum size of 180 cm × 175 cm and the depth of about 130 cm. When a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 35°. The curbstone and the sidewalk slabs near the crater were damaged and partially wrecked within the crater.
- (21) **Number 32 Landshaftna Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the wall near the entrance to the building was damaged and partially collapsed. A crater caused by an artillery shell was located at a distance of 1 meter from the building's wall facing Landshaftna Street; the crater was completely filled with wall bricks at the time of inspection.
- (22) **Number 48/2 Kyivska Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that a two-room apartment, number 39, was located on the 9<sup>th</sup> floor; one of the apartment rooms,

designated as bedroom for purposes of this document, had a damaged ceiling that was partially wrecked; the building's roof was also damaged. The ceiling in the room had an irregularly shaped gap, sized approximately at 35 cm  $\times$  44 cm. There was no glass pane in the window frame; a piece of polyethylene film was covering the window. The floor in the room was covered with construction debris; on the floor, at a distance of 80 cm from the window wall and 110 cm from the wall on the left of the entrance to the room, three metal fragments were found, sized from 10.5 cm  $\times$  2.5 cm to 18.8 cm  $\times$  7.5 cm. The largest fragment was marked with a stamp, "96 VNK 3." The metal objects were recovered and packaged in a plastic bag that was sewn together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No. \_\_\_" and the signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.

- (23) Number 48/2 Kyivska Street: A crater is located in the ground at a distance of 6 meters from the rear of the building at number 48/2 Kyivska Street and at a distance of 17 meters from number 32 Landshaftna Street. The crater has an irregular conical shape with the maximum size of 24 cm × 38 cm; the crater was partially filled with dirt at the time of inspection. When drawing a thrust line, it was found that the crater was most likely caused by an artillery shell that damaged the roof and a portion of apartment number 39 at 48/2 Kyivska Street.
- (24) Number 216 Stanislavskoho Street: A crater is located in the ground at a distance of 13 meters from number 216 Stanislavskoho Street and at a distance of 6 meters from number 214 Stanislavskoho Street. The crater has an irregular conical shape, with a maximum size of 20 cm  $\times$  27 cm and a crater depth of approximately 110 cm; when a wooden bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern, with an angle of entry at about 40°.
- (25) **Number 1 Provulok Yasnyi Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and partially wrecked and the chimney was ruined. It was impossible to find the crater or any shell parts at the time of inspection.
- (26) **Number 48 Landshaftna Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and partially wrecked and a wall and a window were damaged (at the side of the entrance to the courtyard where the building is located) and partially wrecked. It was also found that a portion of the fence was ruined within the area of the damaged building wall. In addition, a portion of the right side of the garage, located immediately under the roof on the left of the building, was found to be wrecked too. It was impossible to find the crater or any shell parts at the time of inspection.

- (27) Number 48/3 Kyivska Street (48b on the map), at a distance of 16 meters from the building located at number 48/3 Kyivska Street, 38 meters from the building located at number 46 Kyivska Street, and 1.5 meters from the garage, there was a crater in the ground, sized approximately at 18 cm  $\times$  20 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and about 50 cm deep; when a white plastic bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (28) Number 48/3 Kyivska Street (48b on the map), at a distance of 41 meters from the building located at number 48/3 Kyivska Street and 43 meters from the building located at number 46 Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the soccer field, filled with dirt, with the maximum size of 57 cm × 73 cm. The percussive force of the explosive resulted in black traces, about 2 meters long, on the synthetic covering of the soccer field, from the eastern direction. At a distance of 15 meters to the north-east of the crater, 8 metal objects were found, each about 2 cm in size. The metal objects were recovered and packaged in a plastic bag with an opening sewn together with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No. \_\_\_\_" and the signature and an explanatory note of the investigating officer.
- (29) Number 241 Stanislavskoho Street: At a distance of 6 meters from the building located at number 241 Stanislavskoho Street and 56 meters from the Kyivska Street roadway, a crater approximately 40 cm  $\times$  36 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and about 30 cm deep was found in the ground.
- (30) **Number 237 Stanislavskoho Street:** A visual inspection of said building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and broken through. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around said building.
- (31) Number 239 Stanislavskoho Street: At a distance of 12 meters from the building located at number 239 Stanislavskoho Street and 87 meters from the Kyivska Street roadway, there was a crater in the roadway between numbers 239 and 237, approximately 20 cm  $\times$  25 cm in size (crosswise diameter measurements). The percussive force of the explosive resulted in damage to the asphalt road pavement, toward the east, about 1 meter long. When a white plastic bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (32) **Number 28 Landshaftna Street** (number 231 Stanislavskoho Street): A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and broken through; a wall collapsed; and the windows were shattered. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building.

- (33) **Number 22 Landshaftna Street:** A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was damaged and broken through; a wall collapsed; and the windows were shattered. At a distance of 1 meter from the building wall facing Landshaftna Street, there was a crater caused by an artillery shell; the crater was completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
- (34) Number 43 Landshaftna Street: At a distance of 6 meters from the building located at number 43 Landshaftna Street, 9 meters from the Landshaftna Street roadway, and 9.5 meters from the building located at number 37 Landshaftna Street, there was a crater about 26 cm  $\times$  25 cm (crosswise diameter measurements). When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (35) **Number 43 Landshaftna Street:** At a distance of 3.5 meters from the right corner of the building located at number 43 Landshaftna Street, farthermost from the roadway, there was a crater that was completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
- (36) **Number 43 Landshaftna Street:** At a distance of 6 meters from the rear wall of the building located at number 43 Landshaftna Street, there was a crater that was completely filled with construction debris at the time of inspection.
- (37) Number Landshaftna 21 Street: At a distance of 6.5 meters from the building located at number Landshaftna Street 21 and 7 meters from the building located at number 12 Landshaftna Street, there was a crater in the roadway, sized at approximately 26 cm × 25 cm (crosswise diameter measurements). When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (38) Number 13 Landshaftna Street: At a distance of 29 meters from the Landshaftna Street roadway, near the left wall of the building at number 13, there was a crater in the ground, sized at approximately 14 cm × 22 cm (crosswise diameter measurements). When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (39) **Number 11 Landshaftna Street:** At a distance of 6 meters from the building located at number 11 Landshaftna Street, there was a crater in the roadway that appeared as crushed asphalt paving at the time of inspection.
- (40) **Number 1a Kyivska Street:** A visual inspection of the building established that the building was damaged, namely, a wall was damaged and broken through. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building.
- (41) Number 1a Kyivska Street: At a distance of 24 meters from the building located at number 1a Kyivska Street and 20 meters from the Peyzazhna Street roadway, there was a crater in the ground sized at approximately 38 cm  $\times$  28 cm (crosswise diameter measurements).

- (42) **Number 1a Kyivska Street:** At a distance of 10 meters from the building located at number 1a Kyivska Street and 47 meters from the Peyzazhna Street roadway, there was a crater in the ground, its shape was irregular and no measurements could be taken during the inspection.
- (43) Number 17 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street: At a distance of 1.5 meters from the building located at number 17 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street and 14 meters from the roadway, there was a crater sized at approximately  $22 \text{ cm} \times 28 \text{ cm}$  (crosswise diameter measurements). When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (44) **Number 15 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street:** At a distance of 3 meters from the rear wall of the building, there was a crater in the ground, caused by an artillery shell, that was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements.
- (45) **Number 44 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street:** At a distance of 5 meters from number 44, there was a crater, caused by an artillery shell, that was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements.
- (46) **Number 21 Provulok Landshaftnyi Street:** A visual inspection of the building established that the building was damaged, namely, a wall and the roof were damaged and broken through and the window panes were shattered. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building,
- (47) **Number 32 Peyzazhna Street:** A visual inspection of the building established that the building was damaged, namely, the bricks in the side wall of the building collapsed. At the time of inspection, no crater caused by a shell impact was found in the area around the building.
- (48) **Number 32 Kyivska Street:** At a distance of 11 meters from the building located at number 32 Kyivska Street and 3 meters from the roadway, there was a crater that was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements.
- (49) **Number 32 Kyivska Street:** At a distance of 17 meters from the building located at number 32 Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the roadway that was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements. The percussive force of the explosive resulted in black traces in the asphalt road pavement, about 1 meter to 1.5 meters long, toward the east.
- (50) **Number 32 Kyivska Street:** At a distance of 14 meters north of an earlier crater, there was a crater in the roadway that was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements. The percussive force of the explosive resulted in black traces in the asphalt road pavement, about 1 meter to 1.5 meters long, toward the east.

- (51) **Number 19v 9 Travnya Street:** A visual inspection of the building established that the building was damaged, namely, the side wall of the attic located above the 9<sup>th</sup> floor destroyed.
- (52) **Number 5 9 Travnya Street:** A visual inspection of the building established that the building was damaged, namely, the side wall next to the window located on the 9<sup>th</sup> floor destroyed after being hit by an artillery shell.
- (53) **Number 17 9 Travnya Street:** A visual inspection of the building established that the building was damaged, namely, the attic destroyed after being hit by an artillery shell.
- (54) Number 3a Kyivska Street: At a distance of 20 meters from the building located at number 3a Kyivska Street and 10 meters from the roadway, there was a crater in the sidewalk sized at approximately 28 cm × 30 cm (crosswise diameter measurements). When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (55) Number 3a Kyivska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the side wall of the first entrance lobby was wrecked next to the window of the 2<sup>nd</sup> floor flight of stairs as a result of a hit by an artillery shell.
- (56) **Number 3b Kyivska Street:** At a distance of 1 meter from the building, on the courtyard side, there was a crater in the ground that was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements.
- (57) Number 40b Peyzazhna Street: At a distance of 30 meters from the building located at number 40b Peyzazhna Street and 35 meters from the building located at number 3a Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the sports playground sized at approximately 23 cm  $\times$  18 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and 75 cm deep. When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (58) Number 40b Peyzazhna Street: At a distance of 38 meters from the building located eastward of number Peyzazhna Street 40b, there was a crater in the ground, sized at approximately 15 cm  $\times$  16 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and 75 cm deep. When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.
- (59) **Number 3v Kyivska Street:** At a distance of 20 meters from the building located eastward of number 3v Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the ground that was completely filled with dirt at the time of inspection, which made it impossible to take measurements.
- (60) Number 7a Kyivska Street: At a distance of 20 meters from "Nakhodka" store located eastward of number 7a Kyivska Street, there was a crater in the ground sized at approximately 23 cm × 20 cm (crosswise diameter measurements) and 80 cm deep.

When a bar was inserted in the center of the crater in the direction of the probable axis of shell penetration, the approximate direction was established as eastern.

- (61) Number 147 Olimpiyska Street: In the building courtyard, at a distance of 4 meters from the left side of the building and 3 meters from the fence separating the courtyard from the premises of number 3 Provulok Yasnyi Street, there is a crater in the ground that has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of  $23 \text{ cm} \times 35 \text{ cm}$ . At the time of inspection the crater was partially filled with construction debris, which made it impossible to measure its depth.
- (62) Number 145 Olimpiyska Street: At a distance of 4 meters from the entrance to the building located at number 147 Olimpiyska Street and 1 meter from the rear of the building located at number 145 Olimpiyska Street, there is a crater in the ground that has an irregular oval shape and is sized at approximately 65 cm  $\times$  70 cm. At the time of inspection the crater was partially filled with construction debris, which made it impossible to measure its depth.
- (63) Number 25 Rivnynna Street: A crater is located at a distance of 4.5 meters from number 25 Rivnynna Street and at a distance of 12 meters from number 23 Rivnynna Street. The crater has an irregular oval shape with the maximum size of 40 cm × 60 cm and is approximately 30 cm deep. The crater was partially filled with dirt.

A diagram (map) showing the locations of the craters referred to in this Report was plotted during the investigative operation, which is attached to this Record as Appendix 1.

The inspection was conducted with photography performed using an Olympus SP–510 UZ camera with automatic settings and a 1 GB Fujifilm memory card; the resulting photos will be attached to this Record, when ready, in the form of a photo table (Appendix 2).

(Inspection of craters located on privately-owned premises was performed subject to consent by owners.)

Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine Major of Justice [signature] M.M. Onyshchenko

# Annex 93

Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/9010203 (25 January 2015 09:00 a.m.).

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document



## MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176 USREOU [Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine] code 22990919

<u>01.25.2015</u> ref No 222/<u>3D/9010203</u>

# INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE at 09:00 a.m. January 25, 2015

## 1. Operational situation.

[redacted]

1.2. Strengthening and comprehensive support of the Russian Armed Forces group and illegal armed formations (IAF) in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

On January 23-24 of this year, the following was brought in from the territory of the Russian Federation:

through the **town of Izvaryne in the direction of Krasnodon-Luhansk** – **five columns of military equipment,** comprising: 128 tented trucks (with property and ammunition), 11 refuelers, four Pantsir-S1 surface–to-air and anti-aircraft artillery missile systems, one Tor missile system and two charge loaders. A column of 40 empty cargo trucks has set off from Ukraine for the Russian Federation via Izvaryne;

through the **town of Dmytrivka in the direction of Snizhne – two columns** comprising: 15 assault fighting vehicles, 48 cargo trucks, 40 cars and 26 traction units;

through the **town of Kuznetsi in the direction of Novoazovsk** (partly moving towards Telmanove through Guselshchikovo) – a **column of military equipment** comprising 35 tanks, 35 armored fighting vehicles, 40 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers and 40 Ural trucks.

[redacted]

1.3 Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory

The following have been engaged in air surveillance and airborne control in the eastern regions of Ukraine:

**two tactical unmanned aerial vehicles** – in the vicinity of Shchastya (Luhansk Region) and Mariupol (Donetsk Region)

**Su-24MR reconnaissance plane** (Marinovka) in the air space of Volgograd and Rostov Regions and over the Sea of Azov;

**two A-50U long-range target detection and guidance aircraft** (Taganrog) – in the air space of Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory. On completion of their missions, the planes landed at Yeysk airfield.

Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

# Annex 94

Record of area inspection conducted by V.V. Romanenko, Captain of Justice and Senior Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

#### **INSPECTION REPORT**

City of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast

January 25, 2015

Inspection started:10:30 AMInspection completed:07:05 PM

Captain of Justice V. V. Romanenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having reviewed the evidence in criminal proceedings No. 22015050000000047 under part 3 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and acting in compliance with Articles 104, 105, 106, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, with the participation of the following specialist:

1. Serhiy Volodymyrovych Dmitriyev, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rocket Artillery Battalion, Military Unit A2167, date of birth: September 30, 1981, residing in Military Unit A2167 at Konovaltsya Street, Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast and serving in the armed forces since 1999, who has been advised of his rights and duties under Article 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ukraine,

[signature]

performed an area inspection in Skhidnyi Mikroraion, Ordzhonikidzevskyi *Raion* [administrative district] of the City of Mariupol, which was subjected to artillery shelling on January 24, 2015.

Before launching the inspection, the aforesaid individuals were advised of the content of Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which provides that a person may not be held liable for refusing to give testimony or explanations concerning himself, members of his family or close relatives, as identified by law.

[signature]

Before launching the inspection, the aforesaid individuals were advised of their right to be present at all events performed in the process of inspection and to make comments that must be entered in the report. The individuals participating in the inspection were also advised of the requirements of part 3 of Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine as to their duty to refrain from disclosure of any information related to the procedural action and notified of the use of recording equipment, i.e., Canon A480 digital camera with an XD memory card and of the terms of its application using automatic settings.

[signature]

#### The inspection has produced the following findings:

The object of the inspection is an area situated in Skhidnyi Mikroraion, Ordzhonikidzevskyi *Raion* of the City of Mariupol that was subjected to artillery shelling on January 24, 2015, in particular, individual craters located within that area and possibly resulting from impacts of artillery shells.

#### No. 1

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 1 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by O. V. Martynyuk, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 2). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 1 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221718, y = 7399958. On the ground, the crater is located on a separate traffic lane on Olimpiyska Street at a distance of 13 meters eastward of the building located at number 324 Olimpiyska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 1 and determined that the angle was **14–20** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 1 and found that it equaled 44 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense Table of Firing M-210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 17,400 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a 1979 topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 1 was most likely fired from the area **marked on the map as grid square 5223 7417.** 

#### No. 2

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 2 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, Directorate of the Donetsk Regional Security Service of Ukraine, under number 2). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 2 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221169, y = 740315. On the ground, the crater is located on the Kyivska Street roadway at a distance of 20 meters westward of the building located at number 5 Kyivska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB-2M periscopic

aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 2 and determined that the angle was **14–30** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit the aforesaid crater No. 2 and found that it equaled 46 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense Table of Firing M-210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 17,800 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 2 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5222 7418.

#### No. 3

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 3 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by D. O. Naumov, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 8). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 3 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221719, y = 7400299. On the ground, the crater is located in the area of a children's playground in front of a multi-storey building located at number 68 Kyivska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, at a distance of 20 meters westward of the building.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 3 and determined that the angle was **13–17** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit the aforesaid crater No. 3 and found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry

of Defense Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 3 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5224 7417.

#### **No. 4**

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 4 (referred to in the inspection record executed on January 25, 2015 by D. O. Naumov, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 18). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 4 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221842, y = 7400143. On the ground, the crater is located in the area of a children's playground of Dzhereltse [Little Spring] Preschool No. 160 located at number 171 Olimpiyska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast at a distance of 20 meters eastward of the building.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 4 and determined that the angle was **13–00** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 4 and found that it equaled 46 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense Table of Firing M-210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 17,800 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 4 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5224 7418.

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this record, number 5 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 6). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 5 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5220891, y = 7400285. On the ground, the crater is located at a distance of 6 meters south of the intersection of Kyivska Street and Peyzazhna Street in Ordzhonikidzevskyi *Raion* of the City of Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 5 and determined that the angle was **13–98** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 5 and found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense Table of Firing M-210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 5 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5222 7417.

#### No. 6

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 6 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 12). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 6 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221362, y = 7400332. On the ground, the crater is located on the shoulder of the Kyivska Street roadway at a distance of 6 meters westward of Znakhidka [Discovery] store.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB-2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a

measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 6 and determined that the angle was 13–35 mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 6 and found that it equaled 40 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense Table of Firing M-210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,400 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 6 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5224 7416.

#### No. 7

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 7 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by O. V. Martynyuk, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 10). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 7 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221925, y = 7399668. On the ground, the crater is located at a distance of 1.5 meters eastward of the residential building located at number 3 1<sup>st</sup> Nizhynskyi Proyizd, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 7 and determined that the angle was **13–83** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 7 and found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense

Table of Firing M–210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 7 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5224 7416.

#### No. 8

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 8 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko, Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 17). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 8 is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221332, y = 7399977. On the ground, the crater is located on the Rivnynna Street roadway at a distance of 6 meters north of the building located at number 3 Rivnynna Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 8 and determined that the angle was **14–26** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 8 and found that it equaled 42 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense Table of Firing M-210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,800 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 8 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5222 7416.

#### No. 9

The object of the inspection is a crater assigned, for purposes of this report, number 9 (referred to in the inspection report executed on January 25, 2015 by M. M. Onyshchenko,

Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, under number 27). Using a GARMIN DAKOTA 10 GPS navigator (serial number 1PK136165), specialist S. V. Dmitriyev has found that crater number 9, is located at the following coordinates: x = 5221349, y = 7400451. On the ground, the crater is located at a distance of 42 meters north of the building located at number 13 Kyivska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

In the course of the inspection, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev, using a PAB–2M periscopic aiming circle oriented with the help of a magnetic needle (serial number 02V4110) and a measuring cord, measured the directional (horizontal) angle of fall for the trajectory of the shell that hit crater No. 9 and determined that the angle was **14–33** mils.

In addition, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used, in a similar manner, a KR-1 level gage, a bar inserted in the crater (hereinafter referred to as the "basic bar"), and two other bars positioned horizontally and vertically in relation to the basic bar, thus forming a reference triangle, and applied the following formula:  $\alpha = \arccos \times ((b^2 + c^2 - a^2) / 2bc)$ , where  $\alpha$  is the shell's angle of fall; *b* is the hypotenuse; *c* is the horizontal cathetus, and *a* is the vertical cathetus of the reference triangle so formed, to measure the angle of fall of the shell that hit crater No. 9 and found that it equaled 41 degrees, which corresponds, according to the USSR Ministry of Defense Table of Firing M-210F High-explosive Fragmentation Rocket-Propelled Shells, to a rocket-propelled shell trajectory length (without adjustment for weather conditions) of 16,600 meters from the crater.

Further, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev used an AK–4 aiming circle and an MPL–50 graduated aiming ruler to plot the data so obtained, i.e., the shell's directional angle and tabular trajectory length, on a topographic map (with a scale of 1:50000) of the area in the vicinity of the crater and found as a result that the shell that hit crater No. 9 was most likely fired from the area **marked** on the map as grid square 5222 7417.

Thus, given the aforesaid data obtained as a result of the investigative operation in question, specialist S. V. Dmitriyev stated that the artillery shells that caused the craters in the area of **Skhidnyi Mikroraion, Ordzhonikidzevskyi** *Raion* of the City of Mariupol, were most likely fired from the following two areas:

- Area 1 (according to the data obtained from craters Nos. 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9): a field located 3 km to the north-east of the village of Sakhanka, Novoazovskyi *Raion*, Donetsk Oblast, [grid squares] 5222 7416, 5222 7417, 5223 7417, and 5222 7418 on the topographic map with a scale of 1:50000.
- Area 2 (according to the data obtained from craters Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7): a field located 3 km to the north-east of the village of Leninske, Novoazovskyi *Raion*, Donetsk Oblast, namely, in grid squares 5224 7416, 5224 7417, and 5224 7418 on the topographic map with a scale of 1:50000.

The above area map with a scale of 1:50000 (dated 1979 and showing the city of Mariupol, Ukraine as the city of Zhdanov, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), on which the specialist

plotted the flight trajectory of the shells, is attached to the Report as an appendix.

This investigative operation used photography and all participants of the investigative operation were notified to this effect before the operation commenced. When the photos are ready, they will be attached to this Report as a photo table.

All participants of the investigative operation have been advised of the method of familiarizing themselves with the contents of the records, i.e., by providing a written report for personal review.

[signature]

All participants in the action in proceedings have familiarized themselves with this report by way of personal review. Statements, notes, or additions: *None* 

### **Participants:**

[signature:] S. V. Dmitriyev

[signature]

Captain of Justice V. Romanenko Senior Special Investigator at the Investigations Department The Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine

# Annex 95

Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/90/0373 (11 February 2015 09:00 a.m.).

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document



## MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176 USREOU [Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine] code 22990919

<u>02.11.2015</u> ref No 222/<u>3D/90/0373</u>

# INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE at 09:00 a.m. February 11, 2015

## **1.** Operational situation.

1.1. Concentrations of troops, arms and military equipment in the Russian regions adjacent to the Ukrainian border

[redacted]

The following concentrations have been confirmed:

[redacted]

In the field camp near the village of **Dolotynka**, 5 km west of Millerovo – arms and equipment (including four 300 m Smerch multiple rocket launchers not previously registered). Numbers decreased: armored fighting vehicles – by 2; 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers – by 18, trucks – by 23 units.

<u>Assessment</u>: Changes in the number of arms and equipment concentrated near Millerovo are caused by their concentration and further movement to the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine to strengthen the military capability of the Russian armed forces group and illegal armed formations.

[redacted]

1.2. Confirmation of artillery reconnaissance resources present in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

[redacted] in the vicinity of **Krasnyi Luch** (Luhansk Region) there are concentrations of **artillery reconnaissance units** operating ground surveillance radars **SNAR-10** "Leopard" and **SNAR-10M** "Pantera."

<u>Assessment:</u> Using means of artillery reconnaissance provides the enemy with greater efficiency in detecting ATO forces and correcting artillery fire. We can expect this technology to be moved to active combat locations in Debaltseve area.

1.3. Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory

The following have been engaged in air surveillance and airborne control in the eastern regions of Ukraine:

**Nine tactical unmanned aerial vehicles,** in the following areas: Horlivka (two), Horlivka-Debaltseve (two), Amvrosiyivka – Debaltseve, Komsomolske – Novoazovsk, Artemivsk – Kramatorsk, Sartana – Kominternove, Pavlopil – Sakhanka (Donetsk Region);

**Two long-range target detection and guidance aircraft**, **A-50** (Krymsk) and **A-50U** (Armavir, two missions per plane) – in the air space of Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory. On completion of their missions, the aircraft landed at Yeysk (A-50) and Taganrog (A-50U).

**II-20 reconnaissance aircraft** (Kursk) – in the air space of Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk Regions;

**Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft** (Buturlinovka) in the air space of Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk Regions;

<u>Assessment:</u> The flying missions of Su-24MR and Il-20 are part of the Russian command's measures to monitor the air waves in the northeastern areas of Ukraine so as to get a more accurate idea of changes in the operational structure

of the Ukrainian security forces involved in the anti-terrorist operation.

[redacted]

Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

## Annex 96

Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Martyniuk, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice and Senior Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

#### **INSPECTION REPORT**

City of Donetsk

January 25, 2015

Inspection commenced: 11:10 AM Inspection ended: 4:55 PM

Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Martynyuk, a special senior investigator with the Investigations Department at the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having examined the files of Criminal Proceeding No. 22015050000000047, entered into the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations on 01/24/2015, based on elements of the crime provided for by Article 258(3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, conducted an inspection of the locality (area) located in the Skhidnyy microdistrict of Mariupol, provisionally designated as Sector No. 2 (bound by vul. Olimpiyska (to the east), vul. Tahanrozka (to the north), vul. Ternova and vul. 130-y Tahanrohskoy Dyvyziyi (to the west), and vul. Nezhynska and provulok Zvenihorodskyy (to the south), in order to identify shell craters following the artillery shelling of the Skhidnyy microdistrict that took place on 01/24/15.

The inspection was carried out in natural daylight with the use of photography on a Sony-Cyber Shot camera with a Transcend 2 GB memory card and automatic settings.

#### The inspection found the following:

The inspection began on the southern part of vul. Olimpiyska and established the following (shell craters were examined in relation to specific property addresses):

- 1) **316 vul. Olimpiyska:** at a distance of 5 m from the building and 8 meters from the roadway, on the sidewalk alongside the building there is a shell crater measuring approximately 35x35 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 60 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately  $40^{\circ}$ .
- 2. **324 vul. Olimpiyska:** at a distance of 15 m from the building, to the left of the direction of road traffic near the median on vul. Olimpiyska, there is a shell crater measuring approximately 50x35 cm (damage to the asphalt) with a cylindrical metal object (probably a shell fragment), the visible section of which is 20 cm long, protruding at an angle of 45°-50°. Around the shell there are also metal elements of the shell casing. Upon removing these object from the shell crater, it was determined that the cylindrical
- *I* object (probably the tail of the shell) has a length of 24 cm, while the casing element, also cylindrical in shape with jagged edges, has an approximate length of 70 cm.
- 3) 326 vul. Olimpiyska: on the grounds of the property to the right of the building (standing with one's back to vul. Olimpiyska), at a distance of

2.5 meters from the building and 21 m from the roadway of vul. Olimpiyska at a height of approximately 30-40 cm there is damage to the foundation (chipping) measuring 50x60 cm, under which, to the right, in an approximately east-to-west direction, there is damage to the concrete in the form of a crater measuring approximately 50x50 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 5 cm. Two metal objects (fragments were found and removed from this crater: one measuring 45x10 cm and

- 2
- bearing the numbers "18T-86-179-SV" and "V-49", and other measuring 20x10 and bearing the number "4 18 V I N".
- 4) **19 prov. Nizhynskyy:** in the far right corner from the entrance from the lane to the property at a distance of 1.5 m from the fence of the property located at 91 vul. Kuzbaska there is a crater in the earth measuring approximately 15x25 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 90 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the shell's probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 35-40°.
- 5) **21 prov. Nizhynskyy**: to the left of the building (standing with one's back to vul. Olimpiyska) there are traces of the impact of a shell on the shed, which was completely destroyed by the blast. At the time of inspection, it was not possible to identify a crater or remnants of the shell.
- 6. **404 vul. Olimpiyska:** at a distance of 4 m from the iron gate and 5 meters from the southern corner of the building, on the sidewalk alongside the gate between the building and the roadway of vul. Olimpiyska, and at a distance of 9 m from the roadway, there is a shell crater measuring approximately 40 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 40°.
- 7. **404 vul. Olimpiyska:** at a distance of 2.5 m from the roadway of vul. Olimpiyska, opposite the right edge of the building (standing with one's back to vul. Olimpiyska), there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25-22 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 100 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 45°.
- 8. **131a and 125a Kuzbaska** (a lane between properties): at a distance of 16 m from the roadway of vul. Kuzbaska, in the center of the lane between the property fences, there is a shell crater in the earth and the asphalt measuring approximately 35x35 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 35-45°.

- 9. **137 Kuzbaska:** in the center of the garden behind the main building opposite vul. Kuzbaska, at a distance of 3 m from an outbuilding that was half-destroyed by the blast, there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 35x25 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 170 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 45°.
- 10. **3 Proyizd 1-y Nizhynskyy:** at a distance of 5 m from the entrance gate and 1.5 m from the building in the leveling concrete there is a shell crater in the earth and asphalt measuring approximately 20x30 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 35-45°.
- 11) **4 per. Nizhynskyy**: in the garden of the property at a distance of 3 m from the fence to the left and 10 m from the fence on the far side of the entrance to the property there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x25 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 110 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 45-50°.
- 12) **75 vul. Zoryana:** opposite the entrance to the property behind the building at a distance of 7 m from house No. 73 and 5 meters from house No. 75, as well as 3 m from the root cellar in the garden, there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x35 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 120 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately  $45-50^{\circ}$ .
- 13) 68 vul. Zoryana: at a distance of 4 m to the east of the building and 7 meters to the left side of the building (standing with one's bank vul. Olimpiyska) there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x35 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 40 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 50°. To the east of the crater there is a hollow in the earth in the shape of an ellipsis with an area of approximately 1.5 m<sup>2</sup>. A metal fragment measuring 18x7 cm with the inscription "Sh 47 V N I \* 4" in the metal was found at the crater site and removed according to the report on the scene
- metal was found at the crater site and removed according to the report on the scene inspection conducted at the specified address on 01/25/15 by an investigative agency
  - of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
    14) 73 vul. Zoryana: opposite the gate to the property at a distance of 3 m from the gate leading in from the street and 4 m from the roadway there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 20x25 cm (cross section diameter).

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with a depth of approximately 120 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately  $50^{\circ}$ .

- 15) **50 Kuzbaska:** there are traces of the impact of a shell (or shells) on the building, which was destroyed by the blast and fire. At the time of inspection, it was not possible to identify a crater or remnants of the shells. Two metal fragments were found at the site of the destroyed building and were removed according to the report on the scene
- inspection conducted at the specified address on 01/25/15 by an investigative agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- 16) **97 Kuzbaska:** at a distance of 10 m from the entrance to the property under the wall of the adjacent building to the right of the building at the specified address (if one stand on the street facing the building) there is a shell crater in the concrete with a depth of 10 cm and a perimeter measuring 50x50, as well as hollow spots in the wall of the adjacent building at a height of approximately 40 cm from the shell crater.
- 17) **75 Kuzbaska:** on the grounds of the property, at a distance of 5 meters from the garage gate and 5 meters from the building, there is damage to the concrete surface with features of shell crater in the concrete with a depth of approximately 25 cm, the probable direction of which could not be determined.
- 18) **109 per. Poletayeva:** on the roadway near the building, at a distance of 1 m from the curb and 8 m from the building, a buried crater was found in the asphalt with a damage area of approximately 1.5 x 2 meters. An inspection of the crater revealed a metal piece
- 5 (fragment) of irregular shape measuring 20x10 cm with the number "F 79 V I N", which was removed from the inspection site;
  - 19) **104 vul. Zvenyhorodska:** behind the building at this address, in the lower left part of the fence, at a distance of 15 meters from the building and 120 cm from a tree that was felled (probably by the shell), there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 30x40 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 40 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 45°. A metal fragment measuring 15x5 cm with the
- 6 inscription "GpI-56d" in the metal was found at the crater site and removed according to the report on the scene inspection conducted at the specified address on 01/25/15 by an investigative agency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;
  - 20) **124 vul. Zvenyhorodska:** at a distance of 5 meters from the gate leading in from the street and 6 meters from the building there is damage to the concrete surface, measuring around 1 meter in length. Around 1 m from said damage, a metal cylindrical object was found completely embedded in the earth at an angle of approximately 90°, around which there is a shell crater

4

measuring approximately 35x40 cm (cross section diameter). At time of inspection, this object could not be identified.

- 21) **120 vul. Zvenyhorodska:** behind the building at this address, at a distance of 5 meters from the building, there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x30 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 100 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 50°.
- 22) **86 vul. Lyutneva:** the H-shaped building of High School No. 57 was inspected. Below the eastern right wing of the school (standing with one's back to vul. Lyutneva), at the location of the foundation, in the center of the external (side) wall of the wing, there is damage measuring approximately 15 cm in depth, probably from a shall with an epicenter at a height of approximately 45 cm, with an area of 50x30 cm and extensive fragmentation damage to the wall around the epicenter, as well as on the asphalt underneath. The total perimeter length of the damage on the wall is around 3.5 m.
- 23) **86 vul. Lyutneva:** at a distance of 13 meters to the east and 24 meters to the south of the eastern left wing of School No. 57 (standing with one's back to vul. Lyutneva), and at a distance of 10 meters from the school's concrete perimeter fence, there is a shell crater in the earth measuring approximately 25x25 cm (cross section diameter), with a depth of approximately 80 cm, with a white plastic rod thrust into the center of the shell crater in the direction of the probable axis of entry; the approximate direction appears to be easterly, and the angle of entry is approximately 45-50°.
- 24) **49 vul. Kuzbaska:** in the eastern wall of the building at this address there is a round hole (size of aperture in the wall: 1.5x1.9 m), behind which, on the floor in the middle of the building, there is a through hole to the basement, probably from a shell, measuring approximately 40x35 cm.
- 25) **24 vul. Nizhynska:** at a distance of 4 meters from the property fence, deep into the grounds, and 2 meters from the right side of the building (if one stands facing the building from the street) there are traces of a buried shell crater in the earth, the size of which could not be determined, nor could the approximate angle of entry of the shell.
- 26) **intersection of vul. Olimpiyska and vul. Marshrutna:** at a distance of 20 meters to the north along vul. Olimpiyska on the median and at a distance of 1 m from the inner curb there are traces of a buried shell crater, the size of which could not be determined, nor could the approximate angle of entry of the shell.

In the course of this investigative action, a diagram (map) was drawn up to show the location of the discovered shell craters mentioned in the report, which is attached to this report as Exhibit No. 1.

Photographs were taken during the inspection using a Sony-Cyber Shot camera with a 2 GB Transcend memory card with

automatic settings. The photographs will be attached to this report after they are prepared in the form of a table of photographs (Exhibit No. 2).

(The inspection of shell craters on the grounds of properties was conducted on the condition that consent for such an inspection was obtained from the owners).

Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Martynyuk[signature]Special Senior Investigator with the Investigations Departmentat the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine

Exhibit No. 2 to the Inspection Report dated 01/25/15 (Sector No. 2)

### **TABLE OF PHOTOGRAPHS**to the inspection report



Photos 1, 2: Shell crated discovered near the building at 316 vul. Olimpiyska (No. 1)





Photos 3, 4: Shell crater discovered on the roadway on vul. Olimpiyska (No. 2)





Photo 5: Metal fragments of a shell casing removed from a shall crater on the roadway of vul. Olimpiyska (No. 2)



Photo 6: Shell crater discovered on the grounds of the property located at 3 Proyizd 1-y Nizhynskyy (No. 10)



Photo 7: Shell crater discovered on the grounds of the property located at 3 Proyizd 1-y Nizhynskyy (No. 10)



Photo 8. Shell crater discovered on the grounds of the property located at 68 vul. Zoryanka (No. 13)



Photo 9. Shell crater discovered on the territory of the property located at 68 vul. Zoryana (No. 13)



Φοτο 10. p. Photo 10. Shell crater discovered on the territory of the property located at 109 vul. Poletayeva (No. 18)



Photo 11: Metal piece (fragment) removed from the shell crater on the grounds near the property located at 109 vul. Poletayeva (No. 18)




Photo 12: Shell crater discovered on the grounds of School No. 57 located at 86 vul. Lyutneva (No. 22)

Photographs prepared by:

Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Volodymyrovych Martynyuk Special Senior Investigator with the Investigations Department at the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine [signature]

## Annex 97

Record of crime scene inspection conducted by O.V. Starostenko, Senior Lieutenant of Justice and Senior Criminal Investigator with the Investigative Office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the SSU (25 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

#### **INSPECTION REPORT**

City of Donetsk

January 25, 2015

Inspection started:12:10 PMInspection completed:04:30 PM

Senior Lieutenant of Justice O. V. Starostenko, Senior Criminal Investigator at the Investigations Department, Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, having reviewed the evidence in criminal proceedings No. 2201505000000047, entered in the Unified Registry of Pretrial Investigations on January 24, 2015, based on the elements of crime under part 3 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and acting in compliance with Articles 104, 105, 106, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, with the participation of:

1. Dmytro Volodymyrovych Velychko, Investigator for the Investigations Department, the Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine, date of birth: February 28, 1992, residing at the following address: 77 Heorhiyevska Street, Mariupol,

and the following specialist:

2. Vitaliy Petrovych Stasyuk, Consultant/Expert for Department 6, Center 4, Ukrainian Scientific Research Institute of Special Equipment and Forensic Expert Examination of the Security Service of Ukraine, date of birth May 08, 1977, residing at the following address: 77 Heorhiyevska Street, Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, with practical work experience in the field since 2012, who has been advised of his rights and duties under Article 71 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine,

[signature]

performed an area (territory) inspection in Eastern Residential Complex [*Skhidnyi Mikroraion*] of the City of Mariupol designated, for purposes of this report, as Sector No. 3 (delimited by Olimpiyska Street on the east, Nezhynska Street and Zvenyhorodskyi Provulok Street on the north, 130<sup>th</sup> Tahanrohskoyi Dyvyzii Street on the west, and Lyutnevyi Provulok Street on the south), in order to locate shell craters caused by the artillery shelling of Skhidnyi Mikroraion on January 24, 2015.

The inspection was conducted in natural daylight conditions with photography performed using a Canon digital camera with automatic settings and a 2 GB Transcend memory card.

#### The inspection has produced the following findings:

The inspection began to the south of the eastern side of Nezhynska Street. The inspection has produced the following findings (craters are discussed below in relation to specific addresses):

- (1) Number 17 Nezhynska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed it was damaged, namely, there was no roof; the walls were charred; and the window panes were shattered. At the time of the inspection, no shell crater was found in the area around the building.
- (2) Number 252a Olimpiyska Street: A visual inspection of the building showed that it was damaged, namely, the roof was crashed through. At the time of the inspection, no shell

crater was found in the area around the building.

(3) Number 35 Zorvana Street: At a distance of 5.5 meters from the building located at number 35 Zoryana Street, 7 meters from the building located at number 34 Zoryana Street, and 10 meters from the building located at number 41 Zoryana Street, there was a crater on the Zoryana Street roadway, flanked by the aforesaid buildings, with a size of surface damage of approximately 35 cm  $\times$  45 cm and about 30 cm deep (it was impossible to take measurements of the initial crater dimensions due to the fact that at the time of the inspection the crater had collapsed as a result of vehicle traffic in the area of the street roadway). At a distance of 2 meters from the crater, toward the building located at number 35, a metal object, 22 cm wide by 19 cm long, was found on the ground. The metal object was recovered and packaged in a plastic bag, with its opening sewn with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No. 1" and the signature and an explanatory note by the investigating officer. In addition, another metal object, 9 cm long and a maximum of 1 cm wide, was found on the ground at a distance of 8 meters from the crater toward the building located at number 41. The metal object was retrieved and packaged in a plastic bag, with its opening sewn with thread and sealed with a paper label carrying the legend "Package No. 2" and the signature and an explanatory note by the investigating officer.

In the course of this investigative operation, a map of the area subject to inspection was drawn and the shell impact points were subsequently plotted on the map. The map is attached to the Record as Appendix 1.

This inspection used photography performed using a Canon digital camera with automatic settings and a 2 GB Transcend memory card. When the photos are ready, they will be attached to this Record as a photo table (Appendix 2).

#### **Participants:**

1. [signature] ([handwritten:] D. V. Velychko)

**2.** [signature] ([handwritten:] V. P. Stasyuk)

[signature]

Senior Lieutenant of Justice O. V. Starostenko Senior Criminal Investigator at the Investigations Department The Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine






Photo No. 1: Damaged building located at number **17 Nezhynska Street:** no roof, charred walls, shattered window panes




Photo No. 2: Damaged building located at number **252a Olimpiyska Street:** roof crashed through


Photo Table: Attachment to the January 25, 2015 Inspection Report (continued)



Photo No. 3: Crater, with a size of surface damage of approximately  $35 \text{ cm} \times 45 \text{ cm}$  and about 30 cm deep, located at a distance of 5.5 meters from the building located at number 35 Zoryana Street, 7 meters from the building located at number 34 Zoryana Street, and 10 meters from the building located at number 41 Zoryana Street, on the Zoryana Street roadway, flanked by the aforesaid buildings



Photo No. 4: Crater, with a size of surface damage of approximately  $35 \text{ cm} \times 45 \text{ cm}$  and about 30 cm deep, located at a distance of 5.5 meters from the building located at number 35 Zoryana Street, 7 meters from the building located at number 34 Zoryana Street, and 10 meters from the building located at number 41 Zoryana Street, on the Zoryana Street roadway, flanked by the aforesaid buildings






Photo No. 5: metal object, 9 cm long and a maximum of 1 cm wide, found on the ground at a distance of 8 meters from the crater toward the building located at number 41




Photo No. : Metal object, 22 cm wide by 19 cm long, found on the ground at a distance of 2 meters from the crater in question, toward the building located at number 35

[signature]

Senior Lieutenant of Justice O. V. Starostenko Senior Criminal Investigator at the Investigations Department The Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine

## Annex 98

Intelligence Briefing from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense No. 222/3D/9010203 (25 January 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

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#### MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Vul. Elektrykiv 33, Kyiv, 04176 USREOU [Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organizations of Ukraine] code 22990919

<u>01.25.2015</u> ref No 222/<u>3D/9010203</u>

#### INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FROM THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE at 09:00 a.m. January 25, 2015

#### 1. Operational situation.

[redacted]

1.2. Strengthening and comprehensive support of the Russian Armed Forces group and illegal armed formations (IAF) in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

On January 23-24 of this year, the following was brought in from the territory of the Russian Federation:

through the **town of Izvaryne in the direction of Krasnodon-Luhansk** – **five columns of military equipment,** comprising: 128 tented trucks (with property and ammunition), 11 refuelers, four Pantsir-S1 surface–to-air and anti-aircraft artillery missile systems, one Tor missile system and two charge loaders. A column of 40 empty cargo trucks has set off from Ukraine for the Russian Federation via Izvaryne;

through the **town of Dmytrivka in the direction of Snizhne – two columns** comprising: 15 assault fighting vehicles, 48 cargo trucks, 40 cars and 26 traction units;

through the **town of Kuznetsi in the direction of Novoazovsk** (partly moving towards Telmanove through Guselshchikovo) – a **column of military equipment** comprising 35 tanks, 35 armored fighting vehicles, 40 122 mm Grad multiple rocket launchers and 40 Ural trucks.

[redacted]

1.3 Russian Armed Forces reconnaissance activities in Ukrainian territory

The following have been engaged in air surveillance and airborne control in the eastern regions of Ukraine:

**two tactical unmanned aerial vehicles** – in the vicinity of Shchastya (Luhansk Region) and Mariupol (Donetsk Region)

**Su-24MR reconnaissance plane** (Marinovka) in the air space of Volgograd and Rostov Regions and over the Sea of Azov;

**two A-50U long-range target detection and guidance aircraft** (Taganrog) – in the air space of Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory. On completion of their missions, the planes landed at Yeysk airfield.

Main Directorate for Intelligence, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine

## Annex 99

Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Letter No. 300/1/C/576 (6 February 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

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### **GENERAL STAFF**

### OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

6 Povitroflotsky Prospect, Kyiv-168, Ukraine

Phone: (044) 234-01-92. Fax: (044) 226-26-56

Administrative Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Foreign Ministry of Ukraine

No. 300/1/C/576 of February 6, 2015

2:47:01 PM Page: 1/3

In pursuance of Instruction No. 02-01/2948 of October 15, 2014 issued by the Ukrainian Presidential Chief of Staff, presented herewith are informational reference materials pertaining to the body of evidence for the presence of foreign military groups in Ukrainian territory, to be used in raising the awareness of Ukrainian society and international partners more actively and in the future lawsuits to be filed by Ukraine with the relevant international courts.

Attachment: above-mentioned information on 3 pages, unclassified, for the specified recipient only

Acting First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Major General

[Signature]

V.M. NAZAROV

D.S. Pasko, 454-40-78

FOREIGN MINISTRY OF UKRAINE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT Incoming Ref. No. 12021 February 13, 2015

000460\*

Order 210-2014

#### INFORMATIONAL REFERENCE MATERIALS

pertaining to the body of evidence for the direct invasion by foreign military groups into Ukrainian territory

### I. Regarding the involvement of Russian citizens in illegal paramilitary groups operating in Eastern Ukraine

No documented facts of the involvement of Russian citizens in illegal paramilitary groups operating in Eastern Ukraine were recorded last week.

# II. Regarding the chronology of the crossing of the state border of Ukraine by personnel, weapons, and military vehicles of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

-					
No.	Date	Border crossing point crossed	Point of destination (crossing)	Number of convoys	Number of vehicles (personnel)
1	Februar y 04	CHERVONOPARTYZ ANSK (Luhansk Oblast)	SVERDLOVSK	1	5 tanks, 2 armored fighting vehicles, and two Ural trucks (with personnel – 40 persons);
2	Februar y 04	LYSYCHE, Amvrosiyivka District, Donetsk Oblast	in the direction of TELMANOVE (Donetsk Oblast)	2	21 T-72 tanks, 30 KamAZ trucks, and 10 tanker trucks.
3	Februar y 04	NOVOAZOVSK	Donetsk	1	50 trucks (carrying personnel, munitions, and ammo).
4	Februar y 3	DMYTRIVKA (Donetsk Oblast)	STEPANIVKA (Shakhtarsk District)	1	20 KamAZ military trucks and 10 tanker trucks
5	Februar y 3	DMYTRIVKA (Donetsk Oblast)	SNIZHNE	1	10 KamAZ military trucks and 10 tanker trucks (40 tons)
6	Februar y 3	IZVARYNE (Luhansk Oblast)	KRASNODON, LUHANSK	1	21 military trucks with munitions and ammo
7	Februar y 2		railway station of PANTELEYMONIVKA (15 km south of Horlivka)	1	over 20 rail tank cars with fuel
8	Februar y 2	DONETSK border crossing point		1	15 buses and 5 tarpaulin trucks with personnel in military uniforms, some of them wearing characteristic headgear of the Cossacks;
9	Februar y 2	GUKOVO	SVERDLOVSK	1	12 KamAZ trucks with ammunition. It is possible that they will be transported further in the direction of LUHANSK;

10	Februar y 2	DMYTRIVKA	STEPANIVKA	1	Ten T-72 tanks, 20 KamAZ tarpaulin trucks;
11	Februar y 2	DMYTRIVKA	SNIZHNE (Donetsk Oblast)	1	10 220-mm Uragan multiple rocket launchers
12	Februar y 2	CHERVONOPARTYZ ANSK	SVERDLOVSK	1	29 tanks, 18 trucks with ammunition
13	Februar y 2	IZVARYNE	KRASNODON- LUHANSK	1	Two T-72 tanks, seven BMP infantry fighting vehicles, one armored vehicle (armored fighting vehicle, possibly the TOS-1 Buratino heavy rocket launcher), 49 trucks (7 with personnel, the remaining trucks with munitions and ammo);
14	Februar y 01	IZVARYNE	KRASNODON- LUHANSK		36 trucks (with munitions and ammo) and 11 tanker trucks.
15	January 31	DONETSK (Russia) – IZVARYNE (Ukraine)	LUHANSK	"Humanita rian Convoy"	175 trucks (including 119 trucks, 40 tanker trucks (20 with gasoline and 20 with diesel), and 16 escort vehicles, as well as 336 personnel).
16	January 31	MATVEYEV KURHAN (Russia) - USPENKA (Ukraine)	DONETSK	"Humanita rian Convoy"	
17	January 31	through DMYTRIVKA	in the direction of SNIZHNE	1	10 BMD tracked infantry fighting vehicles, 10 motor vehicles;
18	January 31	through DOVZHANSKY	in the direction of ROVENKY	1	4 units, 3 motor vehicles with ammunition;
19	January 31	through DOVZHANSKY	SVERDLOVSK	1	5 BTR armored personnel carriers, 8 motor vehicles.
20	January 30	through DMYTRIVKA	SNIZHNE	1	Ten T-80 tanks, 10 BMD tracked infantry fighting vehicles, 40 122-mm GRAD multiple rocket launchers, 10 KamAZ trucks, and 10 buses with personnel.
21	January 29	Through DYAKOVE	DEBALTSEVE	1	5 self-propelled guns, 20 Ural trucks carrying personnel, and a tanker truck

22	January 29	IZVARYNE	KRASNODON- LUHANSK	1	6 tanks, 4 armored fighting vehicles (presumably TOS-1 Buratino heavy rocket launchers), twelve 12-mm Grad multiple rocket launchers, 4 tanker trucks and 26 trucks (with munitions and ammo).
23	January 28	DMYTRIVKA	SNIZHNE	1	69 (including 14 tanks, 15 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, 30 motor vehicles, 10 tanker trucks)
24	January 28	IZVARYNE	KRASNODON- LUHANSK	1	a convoy of motor vehicles (number to be updated), presumably carrying ammunition;
25					A convoy of Ural-4320 trucks carrying military casualties left Ukraine for the Russian Federation through IZVARYNE.
26	January 28	CHERVONOPARTYZ ANSK	in the direction of LUHANSK		numbering 46 units (including: 14 tanks, 20 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, 7 self- propelled guns, 4 BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 1 Uragan multiple rocket launcher);
27	January 2728	from Russian territory	to the railway station of Luhansk-Vantazhny	3 Trains	with armored vehicles, ammo, and fuel (some 20 rail tank cars)
28	January 27	DMYTRIVKA	SNIZHNE	1	20 trucks and 5 tanker trucks
29	January 27	DMYTRIVKA	STEPANIVKA (Shakhtarsk District)	1	15 BMD tracked infantry fighting vehicles, 20 trucks and 5 tanker trucks.
30	January 26	IZVARYNE	KRASNODON- LUHANSK	3	11 armored fighting vehicles, six 122-mm GRAD multiple rocket launchers, and 44 trucks (with munitions and ammo).

Acting Chief of the Main Command Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Major General

[Signature] B.V. BONDAR

# Annex 100

Scene Inspection Report, drafted by A. Sorokina, Police Captain, Kramatorsk City Department (10 February 2015)

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### SCENE INSPECTION REPORT

City of Kramatorsk

Inspection commenced at 3:00 PM

<u>02/10/</u>2015 Inspection ended at <u>3:45 PM</u>

Police Captain A.S. Sorokina, an investigator with the Investigations Section of the Kramatorsk City Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, on the basis of <u>an order issued by the on-duty operations officer</u>, pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:

In the presence of the following witnesses:

1. [illegible name] 18/05/1969

37/12 vul. [illegible]

2. <u>Oleksandr Hryhorovych [illegible]</u>

22/56 vul. [illegible]

who were advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of a representative of \_\_\_\_\_\_, who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 44(5), 58(4), and 59(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of specialist \_\_\_\_\_\_, who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 71(4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. With the participation of the owner (user) of the promises or other personal property.

With the participation of the <u>owner</u> (user) of the premises or other personal property.

Before the inspection began, the aforementioned individuals were advised of their right to be present for all actions carried out in the process of the inspection, and to make objections that must be entered into the record. The persons taking part in the inspection were also explained the requirements of Article 66(3) regarding their duty not to disclose information about the procedural action and were notified about the use of any technical recording devices and the procedures for using them:

LG camera

The inspection established the following: <u>Inspected the scene at the intersection of vul.</u> <u>Parkova and bul. Kramatorsky. [illegible] on bul. Kramatorsky located [illegible] along which</u> <u>there is a sidewalk. [illegible]</u> The following objects discovered during the inspection were removed: <u>nothing was</u> [illegible]

The following technical devices were used during the inspection: <u>camera, [text cut off]</u>

The inspection was conducted: [illegible]

The record was read, recorded \_\_\_\_\_

Participants:

1.\_\_\_\_\_

2.\_\_\_\_\_

/\_\_\_\_\_/

Witnesses:

<u>[illegible name]</u>
 [illegible name]

/ <u>[signature]</u> / / <u>[signature]</u> /

Inspection conducted by:

Police Captain A.S. Sorokina

[signature]

Investigator with the Investigations Section of the Kramatorsk City Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine

## **Table of Photographs**

to the scene inspection report dated 01/10/2015 for 21 bul. Kramatorsky

[identical seals throughout: Kramatorsk City Department of the Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, For packs, No. 1]

Photo 1. General view of the site and surface of bul. Kramatorsky and vul. Parkova from vul. Parkova




Photo 2. General view of discovered metal section of shell




Photo 3. General view of the site at bul. Kramatorsk near house No. 21



Photo 4. General view of the site at vul. Parkova



## 02/10/2015

Table of Photographs prepared by: A.S. Sorokina, Investigator with the Investigations Section ofthe Kramatorsk City Department[signature]

### MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS CENTER 25 vul. Shkadionova, Kramatorsk 84333

tel. (06264) 7-02-87 eku@pol05.donec.ua, mail@ndekc.dn.ua

## TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS

to the scene inspection report dated 02/10/2015 for the address 21 bul. Kramatorsky, Kramatorsk



Illustration No. 1. General view of the site



Illustration No. 2. General view of the site



Illustration No. 3. General view of the site



Illustration No. 4. General view of the site






Illustration No. 6. Munitions impact site



Illustration No. 7. Munitions impact site

Investigator with the Investigations Section<br/>of the Kramatorsk City Department[signature] S.Yu. [illegible]

# Annex 101

Scene Inspection Report, drafted by E. Abushov, Police Lieutenant, Kramatorsk City Department (10 February 2015)

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#### SCENE INSPECTION REPORT

City of Kramatorsk

Inspection commenced at  $\underline{6:15 PM}$ Inspection ended at  $\underline{6:55 PM}$ 

Police Lieutenant E.E. Abushov, an investigator with the Investigative Unit of the Kramatorsk City Department, Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, on the basis of

an order issued by the duty officer

(indicate the ruling of the investigating judge if the inspection is being carried out on a residential building or other personal property; if the scene inspection at <u>vul. [illegible], Kramatorsk</u> is being conducted prior to the start of criminal proceedings, provide information about the statement or incident report), **pursuant to** Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:

In the presence of the following witnesses:

1. Oleksandr Vitaliyovych Baturbayev, b. 06/24/1987

(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)

7/161 vul. Gv. [illegible], Kramatorsk [signature]

2. Pavlo Mykolayovych Bogush, b. 07/12/1985 [signature]

(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)

15/1 vul. Mayakovskoho, Kramatorsk

who were advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the victim

(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 56(1) and (2) and Article 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the suspect

(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 42(3), (5), (6), and (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the defense counsel:

(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 46 and 47 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the representative:

(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 44(5), 58(4), and 59(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of specialist <u>S.V. Nesterov</u>, who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 71(4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

With the participation of the owner (user) of the premises or other personal property.

(full name, date of birth, and place of residence)

Before the inspection began, the aforementioned individuals were advised of their right to be present for all actions carried out in the process of the inspection, and to make objections that

<u>02/10</u>2015

must be entered into the record. The persons taking part in the inspection were also explained the requirements of Article 66(3) regarding their duty not to disclose information about the procedural action and were notified about the use of any technical recording devices and the procedures for using them:

*Canon A850 in auto mode* (features of technical recording devices and data media that were used)

The inspection established the following: <u>The focus of the scene inspection</u> (indicate the address of the home or other personal property)

is an area measuring 2x2 meters. This area is located in the city of Kramatorsk, vul. Mayakovskoho, in Pushkin Park. The area is located behind the [illegible] Wheel ride at a distance of 11 meters. In this area there is a metal object embedded in the earth in the form of a pipe with a white [illegible]. This object appears to be a fragment of a Smerch [illegible]. Next to [illegible] there is a white [illegible] at a distance of 50 meters.

Another focus of the scene inspection is an area measuring 1x1 meter, which is located at vul. Mayakovskoho, Kramatorsk, in Pushkin Park. This area is located 170 meters from the first focus of the scene inspection [illegible]. Next to this area at a distance of 1.5 meters [illegible] there is [illegible] in the ground, from which protrudes a metal object with a white [illegible]. In terms of outward appearance, this object appears to be a fragment of a Smerch [illegible] [illegible] white building at a distance of 30 meters. [illegible] was removed from this [illegible] and packed in a [illegible] bag No. 0373430

[signatures]

The following was discovered during the inspection
(indicate traces and items found during the inspection)

The following objects discovered during the inspection were removed: [illegible] (indicate what was removed and it what order and how it was sealed)

The following technical devices were used during the inspection: <u>Canon A850 in auto mode</u>

(indicate the use of photo, video or other technical and special devices and their technical parameters)

The inspection was conducted: <u>*at [illegible]* +  $-5^{\circ}C$ </u> (specify the weather conditions, lighting, air temperature and other data as necessary)

The record was read, recorded \_\_\_\_\_\_ and no objections were received \_\_\_\_\_\_

Participants: 1. <u>S.V. Nesterov</u> (full name) 2. \_\_\_\_\_ (full name)

/ <u>[signature]</u> /

Witnesses:

1. [O.V. Baturbayev]	/ [signature] /
2. [P.M. Bogush]	/ [signature] /

Inspection conducted by:

Police Lieutenant E.E. Abushov

Investigator with the Investigative Unit of the Kramatorsk City Department, Main Donetsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine

Table of Photographs to the scene inspection report dated 02/10/2015 vul. Mayakovskoho, Kramatorsk



General photo of discovered object



General photo of metal object

Investigator with the Investigative Unit of the Kramatorsk City Dept [signature] E.E. Abushov

### **MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE** MAIN DONETSK REGIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE **MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE** SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND EXPERT CRIMINALISTICS CENTER 25 vul. Shkadionova, Kramatorsk 84333

tel. (06264) 7-02-87 eku@pol05.donec.ua, mail@ndekc.dn.ua

## TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS

to the scene inspection report dated 02/10/2015 for the address: Pushkin Park, vul. Lenina, Kramatorsk



Illustration No. 1. General view of the site



Illustration No. 2. Munitions impact site



Illustration No. 3. General view of the munitions



Illustration No. 4. General view of the munitions



Illustration No. 5. General view of the munitions




Illustration No. 6. General view of the munitions



Illustration No. 7. General view of the munitions



Illustration No. 8. General view of the munitions



Illustration No. 9. General view of the munitions



Illustration No. 10. General view of the site



Illustration No. 11. General view of the munitions



Illustration No. 12. General view of the munitions




Illustration No. 13. View of the munitions



Illustration No. 14. View of the munitions

Investigator with the Investigative Section of [text cut off]

[signature] S.Yu. [illegible]

# Annex 102

Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation Letter No. 1696 og (12 February 2015)

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Mr. O.A. Pohorelov: [illegible] 02/14/15 [signature]

Antiterrorist Center of the Security Service of Ukraine

Headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation on the Territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions

### No. <u>1696 og</u> February 12, 2015

Kramatorsk, Donetsk Region

Copy No.

Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V. Panchenko Head of the Office of Procedural Management of Criminal Proceedings, Investigations Section, Department for the Supervision of Compliance with Laws on the Unified Forces of the Antiterrorist Operation, Main Military Prosecutor's Office

[illegible]

The headquarters of the Antiterrorist Operation on the Territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (hereinafter ATO) has reviewed your letter regarding the provision of information concerning the military servicemen who were killed as a result of the terrorist act at the ATO headquarters on 02/10/2015.

Having examined the question posed in your letter, I hereby provide you with the following information:

No.	Full name	Date of birth	Military rank	Military unit	Notes
1	Viktor Viktorovych DEVYATKIN	05/03/1988	private	A1604	Kherson
2	Ihor Stanislavovych SHEVCHENKO	08/04/1981	mayor	A1225	Kyiv
3	Volodymyr Leonidovych DOVHANYUK	01/17/1967	colonel	A1225	Kyiv
4	Serhiy Olehovych KHAUSTOVYCH	04/08/1980	private 1 <sup>st</sup> class	A3258	
5	Serhiy Vasylyovych SHMERETSKYI	02/16/1974	sergeant	A3808	
6	Volodymyr Petrovych HLUBOKOV	07/23/1978	captain	A3808	
7	Mykhaylo Mykolayovych ILLYASHUK	07/10/1979	private 1 <sup>st</sup> class	A2099	Lutsk
8	Yevhen Valeriyovych BUSHNIN	07/19/1976	private	V4252	

Acting Chief of Staff /First Deputy Chief of Staff for the Antiterrorist Operation on the Territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions Colonel [signature]

V.I. TERTICHNYY Incoming Ref. No. 335

# Annex 103

Incident Site Inspection Report of O.V. Kupriyanov, Police Lieutenant and Investigator with the Investigations Department of the Kramatorsk Police Department (12 February 2015)

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#### **Incident Site Inspection Report**

Kramatorsk

*02/12/* 20<u>15</u>

Inspection started at <u>12:34 PM</u> Inspection ended at <u>1:00 PM</u>

Police Lieutenant O.V. Kupriyanov, Investigator with the Investigations Department of the Kramatorsk Police Department

pursuant to Articles 104, 105, 106, 234, 237 and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine [CrPCU]: In the presence of the following witnesses:

1) [illegilible, possibly Maksym Olegovych Karamushka], 12/18/1953

46/26 vul. IXI Partzyizdu, Kramatorsk [signature]

2) <u>Stanislav Andrivovych [illegible, possiblyBelinenko]</u>, <u>12/14/1995</u> [illegible, possibly 69/27] *vul. Sotsialistychna, Kramatorsk* [signature]

who were advised of their rights and obligations under Articles 11, 13, 15 and 223 of the CrPCU. With the participation of the victim:

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Articles 56(1) and (2) and Article 57 of the CrPCU. With the participation of the suspect:

 $\checkmark$ 

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 42(3), (5), (6) and (7) of the CrPCU. With the participation of the defense attorney:

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 46 and 47 of the CrPCU.

With the participation of the representative:  $\checkmark$ 

(full name, data of birth, place of residence)

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 44(5), Article 58(4), and Article 59(2) of the CrPCU. *V.P. Korablin, explosives expert, NDEKU* [signature]

(full name)

✓

who was advised of his rights and obligations under Article 71(4) and (5) of the CrPCU.

With the participation of the owner (or user) of the premises or other personal property  $\checkmark$ 

(full name, address)

Before the inspection began, the aforementioned persons were advised of their right to be present for all actions carried out in the process of the inspection, and to raise objections, which shall be entered into the record. The persons taking part in the inspection were also advised of the requirements of Article 66(3) of the CrPCU concerning their obligations not to disclose information about the procedural action, and of the use of technical recording devices and the terms and procedures for their use:

The inspection site is a parcel of land located near 12 vul. Dvirtseva, Kramatorsk, specifically external side of Bldg #42, the windows of which open out onto vul. Yuvileyna, Kramatorsk, near the first entrance. Under the windows there is a heap of broken glass, wooden window frames, pieces of soil, remnants of concrete floor slabs [illegible] Among the aforesaid debris [illegible] was recovered and placed in a special package of the Expert Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine with [illegible] marking 2586583 a grey metal fragment measuring 13x5 cm. The metal fragment has a layer of black substance [illegible, possibly soot deposit]. On the 5<sup>th</sup>-floor balcony in the first entrance there is damage to the balcony's floor slab between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> floors, as well as the façade and the glazing of the 5<sup>th</sup>-floor balcony. On the 4<sup>th</sup> floor there is [similar] damage, there is also damage on the 3<sup>rd</sup> floor. On the 2<sup>nd</sup>-floor balcony there is damaged glass [illegible] wooden window frames and there is also [illegible] debris from the higher floors. The inspection was completed [illegible].

[illegible]

During the inspection, the following was found:

[illegible] grey metal fragment with soot deposit (list any traces or items found during the inspection) The following was recovered during the inspection: grey metal fragment with soot deposit, (list what was found, in what order, and how it was sealed)

[illegible] packed in pack No. 2586583

During the inspection, the following technical devices were used: *Photographs were taken with a Cannon camera* 

The inspection was conducted:

in clear weather, under natural light, at a temperature of  $-1^{\circ}C$ 

I have read the report, and it is written

accurately, no objections raised

Participants:
---------------

1	icipunto.	
1. <u>V.</u>	P. Korablin	/ [signature] /
	(full name)	(signature)
1		/ /
	(full name)	(signature)
Witı	nesses:	
1	M.O. Karamushka	/ [signature] /
	(full name)	(signature)
2.	S. A. Belinenko	/ [signature] /
	(full name)	(signature)

Inspection carried out by:

Police Lieutenant O.V. Kupriyanov Investigator with the Investigations Department of the Kramatorsk Police Department Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Main Directorate for the Donetsk Region [signature]

[signature]

Photo 1. General view of damaged balconies




Photo 2. Close-up of 5<sup>th</sup>-floor balcony

[illegible]




Photo 3. Close-up of 3<sup>rd</sup>-floor balcony




Photo 4. Close-up of 2<sup>nd</sup>-floor balcony




Photo 5. Photograph of damaged façade




Photo 6. General view of all damaged balconies



Photo 7. General view of corner section of building




Photo 8. Shattered glass under damaged balconies




Photo 9. Shattered glass and wooden parts of damaged balconies

Table of photographs compiled by: Police Lieutenant O.V. Kupriyanov, Investigator with the Investigations Department [signature]

# Annex 104

Letter from the Mariupol City Council Healthcare Directorate of Donetsk Region No. 01/133-08-0 to the Deputy Head of the SBU Directorate in Donetsk Region (12 February 2015)

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### Ukraine Donetsk Region MARIUPOL CITY COUNCIL HEALTHCARE DIRECTORATE

70 Lenin Ave., Mariupol, 87500. Tel.: (0629) 54-17-42. Fax: (0629) 33-24-94

EDRPOU Code 02012591

Email: <u>uzomar@mail.ru</u> Website: <u>www.marsovet.org.ua</u>

Ref. No. 01/133-08-0 dated 02.12.2015

To: Deputy Head of the SBU Directorate in Donetsk Region – Deputy Head of the Main Department in Mariupol

A.V. Usenko

Dear Anatoliy Volodymyrovych,

With reference to your enquiry No. 56/34-93n/t of 02.06.2015, the Healthcare Directorate of the Mariupol City Council hereby provides information on persons who applied to medical institutions for medical aid due to injuries sustained during the shelling of the Skhidnyi Microdistrict, Ordzhonikidzevskyi District, Mariupol since 01.24.2015 (attached). Please also find attached a list of persons who died due to said shelling (attached).

Yours truly,

Deputy Head of Directorate

[signature]

T.V. Yeliseyeva

[stamp:] SBU Directorate in Donetsk Region, Main Department in Mariupol, filing No. <u>126</u> [text cut off]

#### 152 List updated as of 02.12.2015

### Information about deceased persons in medical institutions of the city

Item No.	Full name	Year of birth	Residential address	
1.	POLISHCHUK Olga Dmitriyevna	04.29.1979	-	Shrapnel wound of the ribcage on the right with damage to internal organs due to blast injury.
2.	KONSTANTINOVA Tamara Konstantinovna	05.26.1945	Mariupol, 183-124 Olimpiyskaya St.	A/Shock BU/ Blast injury: multiple shrapnel wounds of both lower limbs.
3.	BUDNIK Valeriy Valentinovich	11.16.1969	Mariupol, 45 Kievskaya St., bldg. 3,51	Blunt shrapnel wound of the chest with damage to the left lung.
4.	DEMCHENKO Aleksandr Nikolayevich	08.25.1956	Mariupol, 92-57 Kievskaya St.	Blunt shrapnel wound of upper and lower [sic]
5.	POPOVA Larisa Aleksandrovna	11.18.1948	Mariupol, 42 Kievskaya St., bldg. 2-141	Blast trauma: injury of the left hip with damage to blood vessels.
6.	BOBYLEV Nikolay Anatolyevich	10.18.1960	Mariupol, 48-103 Fevralskaya St.	Blunt shrapnel wound of the head with damage to the temporal bone and brain matter.
7.	BOBYLEVA Lyubov Petrovna	07.31.1963	Mariupol, 48-103 Fevralskaya St.	Blast trauma: open craniocerebral trauma: fracture of the calvarial and basilar bones, and crushing of the brain matter.
8.	KASHINA Marina Nikolayevna	04.01.1986	Mariupol, 48-103 Fevralskaya St.	Blast trauma: fracture-amputation of both lower limbs.
9.	KASHIN Stanislav Aleksandrovich	02.16.2011	Mariupol, 48-103 Fevralskaya St.	Multiple shrapnel wounds of the body and limbs with blast injury.
10.	BORISOV Leonid Mikhaylovich	06.24.1954	Mariupol, 97-15 Kuzbasskaya St.	Multiple blunt shrapnel wounds of the face and head with damage to the left eyeball and brain matter.
11.	SIROTENKO Vitaliy Nikolayevich	05.13.1965	Mariupol, 17-2 130-y Taganrogskoy Diviziii St.	Blast trauma: shrapnel wounds of the head and neck with damage to major vessels.
12.	AKATYEVA Yelena Grigoryevna	02.16.1987	Mariupol, 185 Fevralskaya St.	Blunt shrapnel wound of the head with damage to the brain matter.
13.	SHURKHAYEVA Valeriya Sergeyevna	06.18.1987	Mariupol, 62-a Marshala Zhukova St.	Blast trauma: open craniocerebral injury – fracture of the calvarial and basilar bones with damage to the brain matter.

14.	YEFIMOV	07.11.1950	Mariupol,	Blast trauma: shrapnel wounds of the head and
	Yuriy Sergeyevich		48-3 Kievskaya St.	neck with damage to major vessels and cervical
				spine.
15.	ABDURASHITOVA	10.27.1987	Mariupol,	Shrapnel wounds of the head with fracture of the
	Olga Viktorovna		161-106 Olimpiyskaya St.	calvarial and basilar bones and damage to the
				brain matter.
16.	VERBITSKAYA	12.27.1944	Mariupol,	Blunt shrapnel wounds of both lower limbs with
	Lyubov Naumovna		48- Kievskaya St.	damage to major vessels.
17.	CHUMAK	03.28.1989	Mariupol,	Perforating shrapnel wounds of the ribcage and
	Liliya Georgiyevna		48- Kievskaya St.	abdomen with damage to internal organs.
18.	PAVLYUK	05.03.1979	-	Cause of death undetermined (incineration).
	Yelena Aleksandrovna			
19.	ANIKIYENKO	11.18.1965	Mariupol,	A/ Shock B/ Traumatic amputation of lower
	Galina Vladimirovna		187-114 Olimpiyskaya St.	limbs.
20.	LUTSENKO	12.22.1998	Mariupol,	Blunt shrapnel wounds of the head with rough
	Yelena Petrovna		48/2-65 Kievskaya St.	destruction of skull bones and brain matter.
21.	MAKAROV	12.07.1965	Displaced from Novoazovsk	Perforating shrapnel wound of the right hip with
	Andrey Andreyevich			damage to the femoral bone and femoral artery.
22.	YEFREMOV	05.19.1976	Mariupol,	Multiple blunt shrapnel wounds of the ribcage,
	Stanislav Olegovich		17 Sycheva St.	body, abdomen with rough destruction of internal
				organs.
23.	YEVGLEVSKAYA	09.07.1967	Mariupol,	Blunt shrapnel wounds of the head with rough
	Valentina Konstantinovna		80-38 Mashynostroitelnaya St.	destruction of the brain matter.
24.	BONDARENKO	12.25.1994	Mariupol,	Blunt shrapnel wounds of the chest on the right
	Marina Stanislavovna		34 Vysokovoltnaya St.	side with damage to the right lung.
25.	NIMENKO	09.20.1953	Mariupol,	A/ Tamponade of the pericardium. B/ Rupture
	Liliya Nikolayevna		33-69 Kievskaya St.	of the ascending aorta.
				Sudden death at the shelling site.
26.	LOBOV	09.23.1977	Mariupol,	Shrapnel wounds of the head and body with
	Sergey Vladimirovich		170-72 Azovstalskaya St.	damage to the brain matter.
27.	LITVINENKO	03.24.1947	Mariupol,	Anemic infarction of the brain during CA.
	Nadezhda Ivanovna		51-33 Kievskaya St.	Sudden death at the shelling site.
28.	NAYDENOV	10.24.1945	Mariupol,	A/ Acute cardiovascular insufficiency B/ ABS.
	[text cut off]		61-95 Kievskaya St.	[text cut off]

29.	KIRICHEK	1961	Mariupol,	Acute transmural myocardial infarction of the
	Yuriy Gennadiyevich		28-6 Vladimirskaya St.	anterior lateral wall of the left ventricle and the
				left interatrial septum.
30.	BUSHNEVA	12.26.1922	(registered) 22-a Semashko St.,	A/ Tamponade of the pericardium B/ Acute
	Lyubov Stepanovna		Mariupol	transmural myocardial infarction.
			(resided) 68-53 Kievskaya St.	Sudden death at the shelling site.

Information about persons with grievous wounds treated in medical institutions of the city

Item No.	Date admitted	Full name	Year of birth	Residential address	Place of employment	Diagnosis				
	City Hospital No. 1									
1.	01.24.2015	Baklagova, Svetlana Ivanovna	11.27.1966	102 Kasatkina Lane	Unemployed	Traumatic amputation of the lower third of both shins. Shrapnel wound of the right shoulder, right half of the pelvis.				
2.	01.24.2015	Nikolayenko, Yelizaveta Aleksandrovna	07.27.1999	3 Kievskaya St., bldg. 2 apt. 38	Mariupol technical mining college	Open firearm multiple shrapnel displaced fracture of the upper third of the left shoulder. Gunshot wounds of the upper third of the left hip with metal fragments. Blunt shrapnel wound of the neck.				
3.	01.24.2015	Ignatenko, Natalya Viktorovna	1966	63/80 Kievskaya St.	Delta-Bank, cashier	Extensive gunshot wound of the right scapular region of the shoulder. Open firearm fracture of the right blade bone upper third of the right shoulder with displacement and metal fragments. Gunshot wounds of the right hip with skin and left shin defect. Traumatic hemorrhagic shock.				
4.	01.24.2015	Demyanenko, Andrey Yevgenyevich	1966	68/99 M. Zhukova St.	Employed	Penetrating shrapnel wound of the abdominal cavity with multiple wounds of the small intestine. Intra-abdominal hemorrhage. Hemorrhagic shock, 3 <sup>rd</sup> degree. Shrapnel wound of the upper third of the left hip and right foot. Contusion of the chest on the left side. Contusion of the left lung.				
5.	01.24.2015	Nikitina, Raisa Grigoryevna	1940	27/112 Rizhskiy Lane	Retired	Penetrating wound of the abdominal region with damage to the descending section of the middle intestine. Intra-abdominal hemorrhage.				
6.	01.24.2015	Antonenko, Yelena Alekseyevna	12.02.1955	11/2 Kievskaya St.	Retired	Open fracture of the lower third of the shin. External hemorrhage.				
	1		1	City Hospital No						
7.	01.24.2015	Lelekina, Raisa Antonovna	04.17.1941	15-53 9 Maya St.	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the right hip. Open fracture of the right brachium.				
8.	01.24.2015	Ivashchenko, [text cut off]	02.18.1942	47-[text cut off] Kievskaya St.	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the right and left hip.				

				Territorial Medical As	sociation	
9.	01.24.2015	Abdurashitova, Milana Denisovna	01.13.2012	161-106 Olimpiyskaya St.	Pre-school	Gunshot wound of the lower third of the left shin. Traumatic amputation.
10.	01.24.2015	Demchenko, Mariya Dmitriyevna	04.03.2011	19/1-11 9 Maya St.	Pre-school No. 47	Gunshot wound of left wrist joint. Foreign object (fragment).
				City Hospital No	. 4	
11.	01.24.2015	Kovalchuk, Vitaliy Vladimirovich	11.18.1969	48/2-101 Kievskaya St.	Azovstal BOF, crane operator	Shrapnel wound of the left lung.
12.	01.24.2015	Kalinkin, Stepan Leonidovich	05.03.1985	56 Mezhevaya St.	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the abdominal cavity.
13.	01.24.2015	Kapustina, Lyudmila Alekseyevna	10.30.1958	80-8 Kievskaya St.	School No. 69, cleaner	Shrapnel wound of the abdominal cavity.
14.	01.24.2015	Vidyushchenko, Vitaliy Mikhaylovich	06.20.1983	34 Zvezdnaya St.	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the spleen and intestinal tract.
15.	01.24.2015	Kosyy, Sergey Anatolyevich	08.22.1977	183-11 Olimpiyskaya St.	Azovstal, Press Shop, Sort Loader	Ribcage wound.
16.	01.24.2015	Rashevskiy, Viktor Mikhaylovich	06.23.1952	255-41 Taganrogskaya St.	-	Shrapnel wound of the ribcage on the left side, wound of the right common carotid.
	-			City Hospital No		
17.	01.24.2015	Reznik, Marina Olegovna	09.29.2002	253-77 Taganrogskaya St.	School No. 48, Grade 6	Shrapnel wound of the spinal column.
18.	01.24.2015	Tishchenko, Yelena Alekseyevna	01.01.1961	55-37 Kievskaya St.	Unemployed	Open craniocerebral trauma.

Item No.	Date admitted	Full name	Year of birth	Residential address	Place of employment	Diagnosis
				City Hospital No.	1	
1.	01.24.2015	Baklagov, Vasiliy Andreyevich	03.23.1989	102 Kasatkina Lane	Azovstal BOF, mixer operator	Open fracture of the lower third of the left shinbone, wound of the left shin. Open fracture of the left calcaneal tuber.
2.	01.24.2015	Golinko, Natalya Vladimirovna	09.18.1977	46/48 Kievskaya St.	Vostochniy Management Company, Yard Keeper	Shrapnel wound of the right shoulder girdle.
3.	01.24.2015	Gabatel, Lyudmila Vladimirovna	12.31.1963	60/81 M. Zhukova St.	K/I ITA, operator	Perforating wound of the right shoulder, contused wound of the right lacteal gland.
4.	01.24.2015	Chetyrkina, Valentina Nikolayevna	08.25.1927	235 Stanislavskogo St.	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the right shoulder, anterior surface of the ribcage, side abdomen wall on the left.
5.	01.24.2015	Kulbaka, Valentina Ivanovna	06.20.1960	48/2-89 Kievskaya St.	Maternity Center No. 2, junior nurse	Shrapnel wound of the left hip. Foreign object in the left hip.
6.	01.24.2015	Maksimtseva, Tatyana Ivanovna	08.27.1988	255 Taganrogskaya St.	Maternity leave	Shrapnel wound of the right buttock.
7.	01.24.2015	Poltorak, Antonina Viktorovna	06.13.1958	191/111 Olimpiyskaya St.	Retired	Contused wound of the left hip, right supraorbital ridge.
8.	01.24.2015	Baranyuk, Nikolay Valeryevich	04.02.1988	44/64 Kievskaya St.	Intelcom LLC, Service Engineer	Shrapnel wound of the upper external quarter of the right buttock. Foreign object in the right hip.
9.	01.24.2015	Skurenok, Aleksey Anatolyevich	1984	47/18 Kievskaya St.	Unemployed	Avulsive wound of the head, right hip.
10.	01.24.2015	Kotik, Olga Nikolayevna	02.24.1975	17/71 Rovenskiy Lane	Unemployed	Gunshot wound of the right hip joint and hip with metal fragments. Blunt shrapnel wound of the neck. Closed displaced comminuted fracture of the upper third of the left hip. First-degree traumatic shock.

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12.	01.24.2015	Leonov,	01.20.1936	162/89	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the left hip, right
		Vasiliy Pavlovich		Olimpiyskaya St.		shoulder. Degloving wound of the genitals.
13.	01.24.2015	Litvin,	01.10.1986	78/4 M. Zhukova	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the left infraclavicular
		Andrey Valeryevich		St.		region.
14.	01.24.2015	Smoroda,	02.10.1961	84/134	Unemployed	Contusion of the right eye. Degloving
		Sergey Ivanovich		M. Zhukova St.		wound of the upper eyelid.
15.	01.24.2015	Vasilenko,	1947	39 Landshaftnaya	Retired	Blunt shrapnel wound of the left gluteal
		Valentina Semenovna		St.		region with fragments.
	-		·	City Hospital No.	2	
16.	01.24.2015	Karyuta,	11.30.1947	19 Marshrutnaya	Retired	Open fracture of the left brachium.
		Vladimir		Sychova St.		-
		Grigoryevich				
			Te	rritorial Medical Ass	ociation	·
17.	01.24.2015	Grishko,	10.25.2000	78/138 Kievskaya	OVK No. 14,	Avulsive wound of the left hip. Left
		Aleksey Olegovich		St.	Grade 8	shoulder (fragments)
18.	01.24.2015	Bazyleva,	09.17.2003	60-144	School No. 5,	Soft tissue bruise of the back, abrasion of
		Darya Igorevna		M. Zhukova St.	Grade 5	the head and limbs
19.	01.24.2015	Levochkina,	04.18.2005	43-36 Kievskaya	School No. 57,	Avulsive wound of the left foot.
		Polina Anatolyevna		St.	Grade 3	
20.	01.24.2015	Mishchenko,	07.25.2004	50-77 M. Zhukova	School No. 5,	Gunshot wounds, foreign object
		Kirill Vadimovich		St.	Grade 5	(fragment) in the right shoulder blade.
				City Hospital No.	4	
21.	01.24.2015	Bogdanova,	03.04.1993	13-85 9 Maya St.	Magneto	Shrapnel wound of the right side of the
		Albina Sergeyevna			Sportclub,	ribcage. Penetrating shrapnel wound of the
					administrator	otic and parotid region, shrapnel wound of
						the right hip, right shin.
22.	01.24.2015	Shchurenko,	12.20.1984	10-48 9 Maya St.	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the right gluteal region,
		Irina Valeryevna		-		upper third of the right shin.
23.	01.24.2015	Ternovaya,	02.15.1958	53-112 Kievskaya	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the upper third left
		Tatyana [illegible]		St.		shin, left foot, multiple shrapnel firearm
						fractures.

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24.	01.24.2015	Atorvin, Aleksandr Fedorovich	10.30.1956	163-135 Olimpiyskaya St.	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the right foot. Open fracture of the calcaneal tuber, right calcaneus without displacement.
25.	01.24.2015	Goncharov, Vladimir Georgiyevich	08.04.1960	5/1-28 9 Maya St.	Unemployed	Shrapnel wounds of the mid third of the right shin with displacement, shrapnel wound of the right shinbone with displacement, blunt shrapnel wound of the right pelvis joint, blunt shrapnel wound of mid third of the left hip.
26.	01.24.2015	Gabriyelyan, Karen Leonidovich	03.20.1980	52 Oktyabrskaya St.	Unemployed	Firearm shrapnel wound of the lumbar region and right buttock.
27.	01.24.2015	Gargayeva, Natalya Petrovna	02.16.1954	39/1 Stalevarnaya St.	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the upper lip, upper third of the right hip, lower third of the left brachium, mid third of the left hip, multiple comminuted fractures of 1-5 instep bones of the left foot.
28.	01.24.2015	Ivanova, Oksana Aleksandrovna	12.03.1983	84-53 Zhukova Ave.	Unemployed	Gunshot wound, avulsive wounds of the left shin, left wrist joint, left hip, right buttock region
29.	01.24.2015	Ustimenko, Lyudmila Nikolayevna	10.20.1956	22-49 9 Maya St.	Garant, Quality Controller	Shrapnel wound of the right side of the ribcage, anterior abdomen surface, brachium, wrist joint.
30.	01.24.2015	Kuprikov, Aleksey Sergeyevich	02.16.1966	120-13 Poletayeva Lane	Ilyicha, Driver	Shrapnel wound of the left buttock and right hip.
31.	01.24.2015	Chizhikova, Svetlana Anatolyevna	03.18.1978	100-38 Lenina Ave.	Nadezhda Store, Saleswoman	Multiple shrapnel wounds of the face and forehead.
32.	01.24.2015	Barylo, Eduard Nikolayevich	09.15.1965	5-32 Kievskaya St.	Ilyicha UA, Driver	Blunt gunshot wound of the right hip.
33.	01.24.2015	Shiman, Dmitriy Alekseyevich	02.18.1953	66-1 Kievskaya St.	Retired	Shrapnel wounds of the lumbar region.
34.	01.24.2015	Vakulenko, Yelena Pavlovna	09.20.1976	120/32 Poletayeva St.	Margas, metalworker	Shrapnel wounds of the left hand, left half of the buttock.
35.	01.24.2015	Stepchenko, Igor Alekseyevich	04.29.1970	36-106 M. Sibiryaka St.	Kievskiy Market, Salesman	Shrapnel wound of chest on the right side, tight hip, left shoulder, and left cheek.
36.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

01.24.2015	Pyshkin,	08.30.1949	18-98 9 Maya St.	DK No. 42,	Shrapnel wounds of the lumbar region,
	Viktor Sergeyevich			watchman	buttocks, and hips.
01.24.2015	Mikhankov,	06.23.1988	2A-1 Peyzazhnaya	Unemployed	Firearm shrapnel wound of the mid third
	Sergey		St.		of the right shin with fracture. Shrapnel
	Aleksandrovich				wound of the left shin.
01.24.2015	Yudenkova,	01.23.1972	3-24 Poltavskaya	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the buttocks region.
	Katerina		St.		
	Grigoryevna				
01.24.2015	Poyda,	03.15.1983	170-14	Unemployed	Firearm shrapnel wound of the mid third
	Katerina Sergeyevna		Azovstalskaya St.		of the left hip, upper third of the right shin.
01.24.2015	Matyash,	07.16.1956	396 Olimpiyskaya	Solnyshko Orphan	Shrapnel wound of the porous bone of the
	Yevgeniya		St.	Home	right hip.
	Viktorovna				
01.26.2015	Kilin,	10.20.1939	11/3-48 Kievskaya	Retired	Right-sided pneumonia, right-sided
	Yevgeniy		St.		pleuritis, Compression fracture of D4 and
	Demyanovich				D5 body.
01.24.2015	-	07.04.1990	60-3-38 Zhukova	Maternity leave	Contused wound of the head. Wounded
	5		Ave.		foot.
01.24.2015	,	01.09.1951	•		Contused wound of the head. Splintered
	Viktor Anatolyevich				head wound.
01.24.2015	Yevseyeva,	03.02.1954	183-10	Retired	Contused wound of the head. Splintered
			Olimpiyskaya St.		wound of the left frontal region.
01.26.2015	Denisenko,	01.14.1999	94-4 Kievskaya St.		Cerebral contusion.
	•			training center, 1 <sup>st</sup>	
	Viktorovna			year	
01.26.2015	Klimovich,	05.19.1954	169-18	Retired	Closed craniocerebral injury. Cerebral
	Nadezhda Vasilyevna		Olimpiyskaya St.		contusion.
01.28.2015	Osicheva,	11.15.1946	41-126 Kievskaya	Retired	Cerebral contusion.
	Galina Yakovlevna		St.		
01.28.2015	Tokar,	04.20.1985	16 Leningradskiy	Maternity leave	Cerebral contusion.
	Yelena [illegible]		[illegible]		
	01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.24.2015 01.26.2015 01.26.2015 01.28.2015	Viktor Sergeyevich01.24.2015Mikhankov, Sergey Aleksandrovich01.24.2015Yudenkova, Katerina Grigoryevna01.24.2015Poyda, Katerina Sergeyevna01.24.2015Matyash, Yevgeniya Viktorovna01.26.2015Kilin, Yevgeniy Demyanovich01.24.2015Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna01.24.2015Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna01.24.2015Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna01.24.2015Sichev, Viktor Anatolyevich01.24.2015Denisenko, Anastasiya Viktorovna01.26.2015Denisenko, Anastasiya Viktorovna01.26.2015Klimovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna01.28.2015Osicheva, Galina Yakovlevna01.28.2015Tokar,	Viktor Sergeyevich           01.24.2015         Mikhankov, Sergey Aleksandrovich         06.23.1988           01.24.2015         Yudenkova, Katerina Grigoryevna         01.23.1972           01.24.2015         Yudenkova, Katerina Sergeyevna         01.23.1972           01.24.2015         Poyda, Grigoryevna         03.15.1983           01.24.2015         Poyda, Katerina Sergeyevna         07.16.1956           9veygeniya Viktorovna         07.16.1956           901.24.2015         Kilin, Yevgeniya Demyanovich         10.20.1939           91.24.2015         Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna         07.04.1990           01.24.2015         Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna         01.09.1951           01.24.2015         Sciekev, Viktor Anatolyevich         01.09.1951           01.24.2015         Yevseyeva, Tamara Pavlovna         01.09.1951           01.24.2015         Denisenko, Anastasiya Viktorovna         01.14.1999           01.26.2015         Denisenko, Anastasiya Viktorovna         01.14.1999           01.26.2015         Klimovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna         01.14.1999           01.28.2015         Osicheva, Galina Yakovlevna         11.15.1946	Viktor SergeyvichO01.24.2015Mikhankov, Sergey Aleksandrovich06.23.1988 St.2A-1 Peyzazhnaya St.01.24.2015Yudenkova, Katerina Grigoryevna01.23.1972 St.3-24 Poltavskaya St.01.24.2015Yudenkova, Katerina Sergeyevna03.15.1983 Azovstalskaya St.01.24.2015Poyda, Katerina Sergeyevna03.15.1983 Azovstalskaya St.01.24.2015Matyash, Yevgeniya Viktorovna07.16.1956 St.01.26.2015Kilin, Kilin, Demyanovich10.20.1939 St.01.24.2015Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna07.04.1990 St.01.24.2015Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna07.04.1990 St.01.24.2015Sichev, Viktor Anatolyevich01.09.1951 St.01.24.2015Yevseyeva, Tamara Pavlovna01.09.1951 St.01.26.2015Denisenko, Anastasiya Viktorovna01.14.1999 St.01.26.2015Klimovich, Natalya Aleksandrovna01.14.1999 St.01.26.2015Denisenko, Anastasiya Viktorovna01.14.1999 St.01.26.2015Klimovich, Anastasiya Viktorovna05.19.1954 St.01.26.2015Klimovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna05.19.1954 St.01.26.2015Klimovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna01.14.1999 St.01.26.2015Klimovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna01.14.1946 St.01.26.2015Klimovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna01.14.1946 St.01.26.2015Klimovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna01.14.1946 St.<	Viktor Sergeyevichwatchman01.24.2015Mikhankov, Sergey Aleksandrovich06.23.1988 St.2A-1 Peyzazhnaya St.Unemployed01.24.2015Yudenkova, Katerina Grigoryevna01.23.1972 St.3-24 Poltavskaya St.Unemployed01.24.2015Poyda, Katerina Sergeyevna03.15.1983 Aleksandrovich170-14 Azovstalskaya St.Unemployed01.24.2015Poyda, Katerina Sergeyevna07.16.1956 Yevgeniya Viktorovna396 Olimpiyskaya St.Solnyshko Orphan Home01.26.2015Kilin, Yevgeniy Demyanovich10.20.1939 St.11/3-48 Kievskaya St.Retired01.24.2015Kuzmenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna07.04.1990 St.60-3-38 Zhukova Ave.Maternity leave metalworker01.24.2015Osichev, Viktor Anatolyevich01.09.1951 St.41-126 Kievskaya St.Matiupolteploset, metalworker01.24.2015Denisenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna01.14.1999 St.94-4 Kievskaya St.Maternity leave Matiupolteploset, metalworker01.24.2015Denisenko, Natalya Aleksandrovna01.14.199994-4 Kievskaya St.Vocational training center, 1st year01.26.2015Denisenko, Nadezhda Vasilyevna05.19.1954169-18 St.Retired01.26.2015Denisenko, Nadezhda Vasilyevna05.19.1954169-18 St.Retired01.26.2015Sicheva, Galina Yakovlevna01.14.1995161-106 Kievskaya St.Retired01.26.2015Kilmovich, Nadezhda Vasilyevna0

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50.	01.24.2015	Balayev,	1988	70 Kievskaya Str,	Ordzhonikidze	Extensive avulsive wound of the left pelvis
		Oleg Yevgenyevich		apt. 41	Interior Affairs	joint, left gluteal region with traumatic
					Dept.	rhabdomyolysis.
			En	nergency Medical Ser	vice Team	
51.	01.24.2015	Kopysova,	1938	11 Kievskaya St.,	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the ribcage on the right
		Nina Mikhaylovna		bldg. 3 apt. 66		side.
52.		Pavlova,	1940	17 9 Maya St., apt.	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the ribcage, right
		Lidiya Antonovna		36		shoulder.
53.	01.24.2015	Ivanova,	1954	163 Olimpiyskaya	School No. 5,	Shrapnel wound of the right hip, right shin.
		Yelizaveta		St., apt. 13	counselor	
		Nikolayevna				
54.	01.24.2015	Zova,	1958	7 Kievskaya St.,	Azovstal, Coke	Shrapnel Gunshot wound of the face.
		Lidiya Vasilyevna		apt. 13	and By-Product	_
				-	Production,	
					engineer	
55.	01.24.2015	Gavrilchenko,	1960	194 Shevchenko	Disabled person of	Avulsive wound of the neck on the left side.
		Tatyana Viktorovna		St.	Group III, not	Shrapnel wound of the left shoulder girdle.
					employed	
56.	01.24.2015	Kuptsova,	1954	163 Ordzhonikidze	Retired	Closed fracture of the left patella (fell down
		Olga Aleksandrovna		St., apt. 128		during an explosion).
57.	01.24.2015	Vidolevich,	1952	35-45 Kievskaya	Retired	Acute Q(+) posterior myocardial
		Mikhail		St.		infarction.
		Mikhaylovich				

### Information about persons with light wounds treated in medical institutions of the city

Ite m No.	Date admitted	Full name	Year of birth	Residential address	Place of employment	Diagnosis
				City Hospital N	lo. 1	
1.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Dovgalets, Rostislav Sergeyevich	1940	165/17 Olimpiyskaya St.	Retired	Contused wound of the right brachium. Contused wound of the back, face.
2.	01.24.2015	Dovgalets, Tatyana Grigoryevna	06.24.1967	165/17 Olimpiyskaya St.	Retired	Abrasion of the face and neck.
3.	01.24.2015	Zhuravel, Yekaterina Mitrofanovna	08.17.1943	3/2-71 Kievskaya St.	Retired	Blunt shrapnel wound of the right knee-joint with fragments of soft tissues. Perforating gunshot wound of the left knee-joint.
4.	01.24.2015	Sarzhay, Aleksandr Rodionovich	1942	46/12 Kievskaya St.	Retired	Open comminuted fracture of the mid third of the right ulnar bone. Avulsive wound of the axillary region.
5.	01.24.2015	Matynga, Zinaida Yegorovna	1933	91/111 Poletayeva St.	Retired	Closed comminuted fracture of the bones of the left brachium. Mid and lower thirds with displacement.
				City Hospital N	lo. 2	
6.	01.24.2015	Nikolayeva, Natalya Mikhaylovna	09.12.1961	56-70 Zhukova Ave.	City Hospital No. 2	Shrapnel wound of the left buttock.
7.	01.24.2015	Dontsov, Sergey Pavlovich	09.18.1970	88 Rizhskiy Lane	Satelit LLC, machine operator	Shrapnel wound of the left brachium.
8.	01.24.2015	Miski-Oglu, Oleg Federovich	01.19.1962	168-54 Azovstalskaya St.	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the left brachium.
9.	01.24.2015	Kochegarova, Tatyana Vasilyevna	11.12.1948	145-4 Olimpiyskaya St.	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the neck.
10.	01.26.2015	Laktionov, Viktor Ivanovich	10.07.1954	11/3-55 Kievskaya St.	SU-112 PJSC Stalkonstruktsia, assembly foreman	Shrapnel wound of the lower third of the right hip
11.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Platonova, Lidiya Aleksandrovna	09.20.1991	252 Olimpiyskaya St.	City Council	Shrapnel wound of the right and left brachia.
			ſ	<b>Ferritorial Medical A</b>	ssociation	

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
	City Hospital No. 4							
13.	01.24.2015	Buzlyak,	05.30.1990	19 Landshaftnaya	Eva Beauty	Shrapnel wound of the upper third of the right		
		Sofiya Sergeyevna		St.	Parlor, hairdresser	shin.		
14.	01.24.2015	Dremukha,	1969	68-8 Zhukova St.	-	Shrapnel wound of the right hand.		
	(outpatient	Natalya						
1 -	treatment)	Mikhaylovna	1000	<b>-</b>				
15.	01.24.2015	Kozlova,	1980	76-5 Kievskaya St.	-	Shrapnel wound of the left shin.		
	(outpatient	Svetlana Yeliferovna						
10	treatment)	De als et anna la	1072	245 Constalation C4				
16.	01.24.2015	Reshetnyak,	1972	245 Sovetskaya St.,	-	Chopped wound of the parietal region of the		
	(outpatient treatment)	Vitaliy Vsevolodovich		Vinogradnoye		head.		
17.	01.24.2015	Golovacheva,	1953	68-81 Kievskaya	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the right hand fingers.		
	(outpatient	Lyubov Pavlovna		St.		······································		
	treatment)							
18.	01.24.2015	Kundys,	1939	4-34	Retired	Shrapnel wound of the right brachium.		
	(outpatient	Valentina		Komsomolskiy				
	treatment)	Yakovlevna		Blvd.				
19.	01.24.2015	Malakutskiy,	1980	169-136	SU 112 PJSC,	Chopped wound of the right brachium.		
	(outpatient	Aleksandr		Olimpiyskaya St.	Head of the Metal			
	treatment)	Aleksandrovich			Structures Shop			
20.	01.24.2015	Zhuravlev,	1968	45 Poletayeva St.	Ilyicha, Shop No.	Shrapnel wound of the upper third of the hip.		
	(outpatient	Nikolay Leonidovich			307, Electrician			
- 21	treatment)	Developing	1059	45/7 01				
21.	01.24.2015	Ryzhykova, Valentina Kirillovna	1958	45/7-21	-	Shrapnel wound of the right hip.		
	(outpatient treatment)	valentina Kirinovna		Azovstalskaya St.				
22.	01.28.2015	Makhnevich,	04.06.1982	48/3-29 Kievskaya	Ilyicha, Cold	Diminished hearing.		
22.	01.20.2015	Nadezhda	04.00.1702	St.	Reduction	Diministrea nearing.		
		Vladimirovna			Department, sorter			
23.	01.29.2015	Tolkachev,	03.17.1956	16 Volkova St.,	Private Company	Shrapnel wound of the right brachium.		
		Sergey Anatolyevich		Sartana	1 5			
		· · · · ·		City Hospital N	lo. 5			
24.	01.24.2015	Borisov,	86 years old	97 Kuzbasskaya St.	Retired	Abrasion of the soft tissues of the face.		
	(outpatient	Mikhail						
	treatment)	Afanasyevich						

164						
25.	[illegible]	[illegible] Yefimovna	[illegible]	36-106 M. Sibiryaka St.	[illegible]	[illegible]
26.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Burlachenko, Tatyana Grigoryevna	02.18.1957	40-1-45 Peyzazhnaya St.	Retired	Subcutaneous hemorrhage. Abrasion of the frontal right part.
27.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Ovcharenko, Anna Nikolayevna	2011	183-46 Olimpiyskaya St.	-	Contused wound of the forehead, chin.
28.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Kuzmenko, Sofiya Mikhalovna	05.07.2013	60/13-38 Marshala Zhukova St.	Unorganized	Face abrasion.
29.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Kuznetsova, Marina Nikolayevna	06.28.1979	60/54 Kievskaya St.	-	Face abrasion. Situation neurosis.
	•			City Hospital N	lo. 9	
30.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Florinskiy, Nikolay Aleksandrovich	1960	166-127 Azovstalskaya St.	Florinskiy Private Company	Comminuted wound of the acromioclavicular joint.
31.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Baluyeva, Antonina Ivanovna	1961	48/1 Kievskaya St., apt. 8	Ilyich Iron and Steel Works, Charging Material Preparation Shop	Stab and slash wound of the left shin.
			E	mergency Medical Se	ervice Team	
32.	01.24.2015	Ivanov, Maksim Vyacheslavovich	1982	163 Olimpiyskaya St., apt. 13	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the soft tissues of the right hip.
33.	01.24.2015	Sergeyev, Sergey Aleksandrovich	1969	33 Ravninnaya St.	Azovstal, Oxygen Converter Shop, metalworker	Gunshot wound of the right shin.
34.	01.24.2015	Olekberov, Asif Romanovich	1984	117 Goncharova Sttr.	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the right cubital fossa.
				<b>First-Aid Stat</b>	ion	
35.	01.24.2015 (outpatient treatment)	Karpalov, Oleg Viktorovich	1972	74 Karpinskogo St., apt. 44	Unemployed	Shrapnel wound of the left shin, left iliac region.

36.	01.24.2015	Boldyshor,	1986	96 Rizhskiy Lane	Unemployed	Contused wound of the right lumbar region
	(outpatient	Vyacheslav				(during the explosion).
	treatment)	Sergeyevich				

166										
38.	01.28.2015	Коор,	05.15.1985	Resides: 8-144	-	Situation neurosis.				
		Yelena Yevgenyevna		Kievskaya St.						
				Registered: 8-9						
				Kominterna St.						
	Primary Care Health Center No. 2									
39.	01.26.2015	Kulbaka,	09.15.1979	28-52 50 Let SSSR	-	Shrapnel wound of the posterial ribcage wall,				
	09:15	Oksana Valeryevna		St.		fingers on both hands.				
	Primary Care Health Center No. 5									
40.	01.26.2015	Shalaginova,	08.11.1981	112b Zvezdnaya	Security Holding	Contused wound of the left hip. Foreign object				
		Tatyana		St.	LLC, controller	in the soft tissues of the left hip.				
		Aleksandrovna								
41.	01.29.2015	Shchukina,	1934	185-44	Retired	Infected body wounds of the lower blade				
		Lina Garifulovna		Olimpiyskaya St.		region (7 wounds). Foreign object in the soft				
						tissues of the suprascapular region. Brain				
						contusion.				
42.	02.02.2015	Mytsyk,	08.29.1941	15-38 Mezhevaya	City Hospital No.	Thermal burn of both feet and both hands, 2 <sup>nd</sup>				
		Nikolay		St.	7, Department	$-3^{rd}$ degree, burn area $-1\%$				
		Aleksandrovich			No. 7, Head of	LN AGU No. 954013 from 02.02.2015 to				
					Department	present				
			Pr	imary Care Health (	Center No. 6					
43.	01.30.2015	Borisova,	03.08.1971	13-41	Private Company	Shrapnel wound of the left leg.				
		Tatyana		Azovstalskaya St.						
		Aleksandrovna								
~ _	1 20									

Deceased: 30

Applied for medical aid: Total of 118 people including:

- with grievous wounds: 18

- with moderate wounds: 57

- with light wounds: 43

# Annex 105

Record of Site Inspection Conducted by A.A. Kholin, Major of Justice and Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast (12 February 2015)

This document has been translated from its original language into English, an official language of the Court, pursuant to Rules of the Court, Article 51.

Pursuant to Rules of the Court Article 51(3), Ukraine has translated only an extract of the original document constituting this Annex. In further compliance with this Rule, Ukraine has provided two certified copies of the full original-language document

Town of Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

Inspection commenced at 6:10 p.m. on February 10, 2015 Inspection ended at 8:05 p.m. on February 11, 2015

This record was drawn up on February 12, 2015 between 10:40 a.m. and 6:50 p.m.

Major of Justice A.A. Kholin, Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast, having reviewed the files of criminal case No. 2201505000000092 of February 10, 2015 into an alleged crime falling under Article 258 (Part 3) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, as required by Articles 104, 105, 106, 237, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code,

in the presence of attesting witnesses:

1) Ruslan Yuriyovych Smenov, born in 1976, residing at 28 Katerynycha Street, apartment 30, Kramatorsk;

2) Oleksiy Valeriyovych Pechenyi, born in 1987, residing at 20 Uralska Street, Kramatorsk,

who had their rights and obligations explained to them pursuant to Articles 11, 13, 15, and 223 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine;

with the participation of the following experts:

3) rocket artillery battery commander Captain H.O. Panchenko, d.o.b. February 5, 1984, residing at 164 Truskavetska Street, Drohobych, Lviv Oblast on the premises of Military Unit A1108, who has been serving in the military since 2001;

4) A.V. Lytvynenko, acting chief of the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the Forensic Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast;

5) V.E. Holovko, deputy chief of the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the Forensic Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast;

6) S.M. Tomnyuk, senior expert with the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the Forensic Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast;

7) V.P. Korablin, explosives expert with the Bomb and Arson Expert Department at the Forensic Expert Research Center of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast,

who had their rights and obligations explained to them pursuant to Parts 4 and 5 of Article 71 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine;

3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature] 7) [signature]

With the participation of other individuals:

8) Lieutenant S.S. Kovalov, investigator with the Investigative Department of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;

9) Lieutenant L.Yu. Zhurko, investigator with the Investigative Department of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;

10) Major of Justice P.O. Nykytenko, investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;

11) Colonel of Justice V.V. Kharakhorin, senior investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine;

inspected the territory of the town of Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, to locate the shell impact sites (shell holes) after the artillery shelling of the town of Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, on February 10, 2015.

The inspection was conducted under natural daylight conditions.

Before the inspection commenced, the above-mentioned individuals had the meaning of Article 63 of the Constitution of Ukraine explained to them to the effect that a person shall not be held accountable for refusing to offer testimony or explanations regarding themselves, their family members or next of kin as defined by law.

Before the inspection commenced, it was explained to the above-mentioned persons that they had the right to be present during all inspection formalities and make comments that must be reflected in the record. The persons involved in the inspection also had the requirements of Article 66, Part 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine explained to them, under which they are obligated not to disclose information about any procedural formalities completed, and also warned about the use of photographic equipment (a Canon digital camera) with automatic settings.

1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature] 7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]

#### **Inspection Findings**

1. The inspection focused directly on an area located at the intersection of Dvirtseva Street and Devyatnadstiatoho Partzyizdu Street in Kramatorsk. Block of flats No. 26 and block of flats No. 34 are located on the right-hand side of Dvirtseva Street in the direction from the center of Kramatorsk. The facades of these buildings face the roadway of Dvirtseva Street. Building No. 34 faces the roadway of Devyatnadstiatoho Partzyizdu Street in Kramatorsk. A visual inspection did not reveal these buildings to be damaged. A sidewalk runs along the roadway of Dvirtseva Street. There are trees planted between the sidewalk and the blocks of flats. An inspection of the area near these buildings revealed a shell hole approximately 1 meter in diameter and 90 cm deep with uneven edges on the ground surface. There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located approximately 3 meters from the edge of the sidewalk and 8 meters from the corner of building No. 34 in Parkova Street, Kramatorsk. Fragments of a concrete slab are scattered on the ground next to the shell hole. There is a metal notice board next to the shell hole. At the time of this inspection, there was no projectile in this shell hole. The projectile had been removed prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 8 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bag No. 2266425 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

**2.** The inspection focused directly on an area located at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street in Kramatorsk.

Block of flats No. 17 in Marata Street is located on the left-hand side of Voznesenskoho Street in the direction from the center of Kramatorsk. Its facade faces the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street and adjoins Marata Street. A small park is located along the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street. A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 17 in Marata Street revealed pockmark damage to the facade. The ground floor of this block of flats houses Hair Salon No. 2, Trust Bank, Zdravytsya Pharmacy, and Zateynik Toy Store. At the time of the inspection, their windows were boarded up. The finishing material of the walls shows multiple pockmarks up to 5 cm in size. The signs of the commercial properties are damaged. A sidewalk runs along the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street. An inspection of the area near this building revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses): Shell hole No. 1 approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep, located directly next to the stairs leading to the entrance to the Zdravytsva Pharmacy, approximately 1 m from the building facade; Shell hole No. 2 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 5 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 4 m from the building facade and 8 m from the corner of building No. 17 in Marata Street; Shell hole No. 3 approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located in bushes, approximately 40 cm from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 4 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 5 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 7 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 13 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zatevnik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 6 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 7 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 5 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zatevnik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 7 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 20 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store; Shell hole No. 8 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 10 m from the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street, in front of the Zateynik Toy Store. No projectiles were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bag No. 2586569 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said shell holes and placed them into security bag No. 2266424 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

3. The inspection focused directly on an area located at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street in Kramatorsk. Block of flats No. 24 in Lenin Street is located on the left-hand side of Voznesenskoho Street in the direction from the center of Kramatorsk. The building is L-shaped and its facade faces the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street and adjoins Lenin Street. A small park is located along the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street. A sidewalk runs along the roadway of Lenin Street. Trees are planted between the sidewalk and the roadway of Lenin Street. A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street revealed pockmark damage to the facade. The ground floor of this block of flats houses the Glamor store and the Zdravytsya pharmacy. At the time of the inspection, their windows were boarded up with roller blinds lowered. The finishing material of the walls shows multiple pockmarks up to 5 cm in size. The signs and windows of the commercial properties are damaged. A sidewalk runs along the roadway of Voznesenskoho Street. There are numerous fragments of broken glass on the sidewalks on the side of Voznesenskoho Street and Lenin Street. The building facade on the side of the backyard shows multiple pockmark damage spots. Some of the flats have broken window panes. An inspection of the area near this building revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses): Shell hole No. 1 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up to 5 cm deep, located directly next to the stairs leading to the entrance to the Zdravytsya Pharmacy, approximately 1 m from the building facade; Shell hole No. 2 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 20 m from the building facade and 5 m from the corner of building No. 24 in Lenin Street; Shell hole No. 3 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 30 m from the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street on the side of the backyard; Shell hole No. 4 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 30 m from the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street on the side of the backyard; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 15 m from the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street on the side of the backyard; Shell hole No. 6 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 4 m from the facade of building No. 24 in Lenin Street on the side of the backyard. The roof of this building also sustained extensive damage. However, repairs were already underway at the time of this inspection, making it impossible to determine the extent of original damage.

No projectiles were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bag No. 2586571 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said shell holes and placed them into security bag No. 2586570 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

4. The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 49 in Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, which is a two-story edifice. The facade of this building faces the roadway of Lenin Street. Building No. 45 is located 10 m away from building No. 49. Building No. 45 is located at the right angle to the roadway of Lenin Street and is also a two-story edifice. Asphalt-paved roadways run past the buildings. Trees are planted next to the buildings. A visual inspection did not reveal these buildings to be damaged. An inspection of the area near building No. 45 in Lenin Street revealed a shell hole measuring 1 m x 3 m and 3 m deep with uneven edges on the ground surface. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site, making it impossible to determine the original shell entry angle and shell hole size. There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. At the time of the inspection, tail fragments of the missile are lying next to the shell hole. The shell hole contains a missile fragment 3 to 3.5 m long, which is partly embedded in the ground. The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located approximately 5 meters from the facade of building No. 43 in Lenin Street and 11 m from the building corner. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards.

**5.** The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 16 in Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, which is a two-story edifice. The facade of this building faces the roadway of Sotsialistychna Street in Kramatorsk. An asphalt-paved sidewalk runs along the building. Trees are planted next to the building. A visual inspection of said building revealed the following damage to the second section of the building: the roof deck was damaged – specifically there is a 50 cm hole with uneven edges in the roof deck; the flight of stairs between the first and second stories was destroyed; there is a hole up to 1 m in diameter in the floor deck of the first story. At the time of this inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. The second story of the building was also damaged by the falling missile. However, repairs were already underway at the time of this inspection, making it impossible to determine the extent of original damage. No shell holes were discovered on the ground surface during an inspection of the area next to building No. 6 in Sako Ivantseti Street.

6. The inspection focused directly on an area located near the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk. The facade of this building faces building No. 50 in Sotsialistychna Street in Kramatorsk. An asphalt-paved sidewalk runs along the building. Trees and bushes are planted next to the building. A visual inspection of the Culture and Technology Palace did not reveal any damage to the building. An inspection of the area near the Culture and Technology Palace revealed a shell hole approximately 0.5 m in diameter and 90 cm deep with uneven edges on the asphalt-paved surface. There are differently sized fragments of soil and asphalt next to the shell hole. The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located approximately 4 meters from the right facade of the Culture and Technology Palace and 11 meters from the rear right corner of the building and 32 m from building No. 50 in Sotsialistychna Street. At the time of this inspection, there was no projectile in this shell hole. The projectile had been removed prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. The projectile was still lying next to the shell hole at the time of the inspection and was removed by the investigator to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 10 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bags Nos. 2586599, 2266426 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said shell hole and placed them into security bag No. 2586582 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

**7.** The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, which is a multi-story edifice with 6 entrances (sections). The facade of this building faces the roadway of Dvirtseva Street. The L-shaped building No. 11 in Kramatorsky Boulevard is located 20 meters from building No. 56. Block of flats No. 58 in Dvirtseva Street is located next to the 6<sup>th</sup> entrance to building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street. There are asphalt-paved sidewalks along the buildings on the side of Dvirtseva Street and on the side of the backyard. Trees are planted next to the building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street revealed pockmark damage on the side of the backyard next to the 6<sup>th</sup> entrance. There are broken windows on the first, second, and third stories on the shorter side of the building No. 56, shows extensive pockmark damage spots up to 5 cm in size on the facade. There are broken windows on the first, second, and third stories. There are many broken glass fragments under said windows. An inspection of the area near these buildings revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses):

Shell hole No. 2 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 5 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt radiating from it, located on the asphalt-paved sidewalk of the building's backyard approximately 10 m from the facade of building No. 11 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, which faces the roadway of Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 1 m from the corner of said building; there are broken glass fragments next to the shell hole; Shell hole No. 2 approximately 30 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 20 m from the facade of building No. 11 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, which faces the roadway of Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 10 m from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 3 approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 10 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 15 m from the facade of building No. 11 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, which faces the roadway of Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 10 m from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 4 approximately 40 cm in diameter and up to 3 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 10 m from the facade of the 6<sup>th</sup> section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 2 m from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 50 cm in diameter and up to 15 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 8 m from the facade of the 6<sup>th</sup> section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the side of the backyard, and 2 m from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 6 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up to 2 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 25 m from the facade of the 6<sup>th</sup> section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the shorter side of the building. and 2 m from the corner of said building; Shell hole No. 7 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up to 2 cm deep with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 25 m from the facade of the 6<sup>th</sup> section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, on the shorter side of the building, and 1 m from the corner of said building. The roof of the 6<sup>th</sup> section of building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street also sustained damage. However, repairs were already underway at the time of this inspection, making it impossible to determine the extent of original damage. No projectiles were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bags Nos. 2586579, 0636364 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said shell holes and placed them into security bag No. 2586580 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

**8.** The inspection focused directly on the premises of a four-story residential building located at 28 Lenin Street. The facade of this building faces the roadway of Lenin Street.

A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 28 in Lenin Street revealed no damage. However, the roof of the first section shows damage from falling shell fragments. Specifically, the roof deck is damaged. The owners of the damaged apartments (No. 14 on the fourth story and No. 10 on the third story), who were at home at the time of the inspection, verbally agreed to allow entry into their housing for purposes of the inspection. A fragment of the projectile that damaged the building had been removed prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards and was missing at the time of the inspection. The inspection revealed that a fragment of the projectile made contact with the building roof and penetrated the roof decks and reinforced concrete decks between the fourth and third stories in the first section of said building. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a circular missile fragment 30 cm in diameter, which was placed by the expert into a polyethylene packet in the presence of all inspection participants and sealed with a paper seal bearing the signatures of all inspection participants.

**9.** The inspection focused directly on an area located at 22-a Kramatorsky Boulevard. The private firm Vladis is situated at this address. The administrative offices of the private firm Vladis are located on one side. The premises of garage compartments of the private firm Vladis are located in front of the building facade at a distance of approximately 15 m. A block of flats at 89 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, is located 45 m from the shorter side of the building housing the administrative offices of the private firm Vladis. A visual inspection did not reveal these premises to be damaged. A shell hole approximately 1 m in diameter and 10 cm deep with uneven edges was discovered during an inspection of the area at a distance of approximately 15 m from the shorter side of the administrative premises of the private firm Vladis, some 30 m from the block of flats at 89 Parkova Street, and 15 m from the premises of the garage compartments. There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

**10.** The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 21 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, which is a nine-story residential building. A 9-story residential building at 97 Parkova Street is located at the right angle to the roadway of Kramatorsky Boulevard some 170 m from building No. 21 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk. A visual inspection did not reveal these buildings to be damaged. An inspection of the area between building No. 21 in Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, revealed a shell hole approximately 50 cm in diameter on the ground surface, which contained a missile fragment. The shell hole depth could not be determined at the time of the inspection because the shell hole contained the missile fragment that had not been removed from the ground and examined for explosion hazards.

The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located approximately 100 meters from the facade of building No. 27 in Kramatorsky Boulevard and 70 m from the facade of the building at 97 Parkova Street. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

**11.** The inspection focused directly on an area near building No. 13 in Karpynskoho Street, Kramatorsk, which is a two-story edifice. Building No. 9 is located 25 m away from building No. 13. Building No. 9 is also a two-story edifice. An asphalt-paved roadway runs past the buildings. Trees are planted next to the buildings. A visual inspection did not reveal these buildings to be damaged. An inspection of the area near building No. 13 in Karpynskoho Street revealed a shell hole measuring 3 m x 2 m and 2 m deep with uneven edges on the ground surface. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site. There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. At the time of the inspection, tail fragments of the missile are lying next to the shell hole. The shell hole (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses) is located approximately 15 meters from building No. 19 in Karpynskoho Street and 10 m from building No. 13 in Karpynskoho Street. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards.

12. The inspection focused directly on a cemetery in Lenin Street, Kramatorsk. A main alley runs along the length of the cemetery, with graves located on either side of it. The grave of F.V. Chyzhykov (1907-1977) is located approximately 200 m from the central entrance to the cemetery, on the left-hand side, some 20 m from the main alley. An inspection of said grave revealed partial damage to the burial chamber, with a missile fragment still embedded in it. The shell hole depth could not be determined at the time of the inspection because the shell hole contained the missile fragment that had not been removed from the ground and examined for explosion hazards. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards.

**13.** The inspection focused directly on the grounds of Boarding School No. 2 located at 15 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk. The building of a 9-story block of flats at 16 Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, is located approximately 140 meters from the facade of Boarding School No. 2. The building of a 9-story block of flats at 1 Karpynskoho Street, Kramatorsk, is located approximately 200 meters from the shorter side of the building of Boarding School No. 2.

Missile fragments extracted from the ground by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management are located on the boarding school grounds. Missile fragments (all impact sites were inspected relative to specific street addresses) are located approximately 150 m from the building at 1 Karpynskoho Street, some 70 m from the building of the boarding school at 15 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, and some 70 m from the building at 16 Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. The inspection also discovered the impact site of the missile in question, specifically 70 m from the building at 1 Karpynskoho Street, some 200 m from the building of the boarding school at 15 Sotsialistychna Street, and some 50 m from the building at 16 Voznesenskoho Street. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site, making it impossible to determine the original shell entry angle and shell hole size.

14. The inspection focused directly on the area located in the backyard of block of flats No. 99 in Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, which is L-shaped and has a facade facing the roadway of Parkova Street. There are trees and a playground in this backyard. A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 99 in Parkova Street revealed pockmark damage on the wall. Windows on the ground floors were broken at the time of the inspection. Numerous broken glass fragments are under the walls of building No. 99 in Parkova Street. An inspection of the area near this building revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses): Shell hole No. 1 measures 25 x 23 cm and is located 39 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 165 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 0636365; Shell hole No. 2 measures 25 x 25 cm and is located 7 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 119 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street.

During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586605, and soil samples that were placed and sealed in security bag No. 0636366; Shell hole No. 3 measures 24 x 26 cm and is located 4.5 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 101 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586606; Shell hole No. 4 measures 23 x 25 cm and is located 11 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 78 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586607; Shell hole No. 5 measures 25 x 25 cm and is located 38.5 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 87 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586608; Shell hole No. 6 measures 27 x 24 cm and is located 46 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 64 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586609; Shell hole No. 7 measures 27 x 25 cm and is located 51.5 m from the building section located at the right angle to Parkova Street and 60 m from the building section that runs parallel to Parkova Street. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586610. No projectiles were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection.

**15.** The inspection focused directly on the area located in the backyard of block of flats No. 47 in Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, which is L-shaped and has a facade facing the roadway of Dvirtseva Street. There are trees and a playground in this backyard. A visual inspection did not reveal the building to be damaged. The inspection revealed a shell fragment impact site 25 m from the section of building No. 47 located at the right angle to Dvirtseva Street and 20 m from the section of building No. 47 that runs parallel to Dvirtseva Street. The impact site contained a metal object embedded in the ground, which consisted of a cylindrical body 300 mm in diameter with an apparent length of 160 cm. A cylindrical insert 270 m in diameter and 55 cm long is attached to the body of the object. Six metal bent plates (fins) are attached to this cylindrical insert.

The object is hollow. There are partly erased markings made in a black ink on its lateral surface. The fins also bear mechanically applied (indented) markings: "CT 10490961; CT 10490071; CT 10610861; CT 10610561; CT 10090571; CT 10610231". A projectile fragment was removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards.

**16.** The inspection focused directly on the area of a parking lot at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv, Kramatorsk. A visual inspection of the parking lot grounds did not reveal any damage. The inspection of the area revealed shell a fragment impact site in the backyard. A metal object with an apparent length of 110 cm was discovered 30 m from the front concrete wall and 8 m from the left wall. The object was embedded in the ground and was 270 mm in diameter at its thickest. The object consists of a cylindrical pipe approximately 70 cm in diameter, to which a circular plate 270 mm in diameter and 30 mm thick is attached by welding. Four same-sized metal plates with multiple round holes 16 mm in diameter are attached to the cylindrical pipe by welding. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

**17.** The inspection focused directly on the area of the Venera Garage Cooperative that adjoins Rybalko Street, specifically the 5<sup>th</sup> row of garages. A visual inspection of the 5<sup>th</sup> row of garages at the Venera Garage Cooperative did not reveal any damage. A shell fragment impact site was discovered in the middle of the 5<sup>th</sup> row of garages at the Venera Garage Cooperative during the inspection of the area. A metal object embedded in the ground was discovered 3 m from Garage No. 47 of the 5<sup>th</sup> row of the Venera Garage Cooperative. The object consists of a cylindrical body 300 mm in diameter at its thickest, with an apparent length of 15 cm. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

**18.** The inspection focused directly on the area next to a private residence at 10 Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, and the Veteran Garage Cooperative. A visual inspection of this area revealed pockmark damage to the garages and the metal fence of the private residence at 10 Rybalko Street. An inspection of this area revealed shell fragment impact sites, specifically a shell hole measuring 24 x 26 cm and located 5 m from Garage No. 40 of the Veteran Garage Cooperative, and 15 m from the corner of the fence of the private residence at 10 Rybalko Street.

During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 0636368.

19. The inspection focused directly on the area of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative that adjoins Rybalko Street, specifically the 2<sup>nd</sup> row of garages. A visual inspection of the 2<sup>nd</sup> row of garages at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative revealed damage to garages. A shell fragment impact site was discovered in the middle of the 2<sup>nd</sup> row of garages at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative during the inspection of the area. A shell hole measuring 25 x 24 m was discovered 4.5 m from Garage No. 18 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 4 m from Garage No. 2 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative. A metal object embedded in the ground 210 mm long and 300 mm in diameter at its thickest was discovered 12 m from the administrative offices of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 23 m from the 1<sup>st</sup> row of garages of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative. The object consists of a cylindrical pipe approximately 70 cm in diameter, to which a circular plate 270 mm in diameter and 30 mm thick is attached by welding. Four same-sized metal plates with multiple round holes 16 mm in diameter are attached to the cylindrical pipe by welding. The main part of the object contains a cylindrical metal part 300 mm in diameter and 42 cm long. Multi-strand wires with connectors stick out on the shorter side of this part. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bags Nos. 2266428 and 0636367. A cylindrical metal object 70 mm in diameter and 180 cm long was also discovered 12 m from the administrative offices of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 23 m from the first row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative. This object has multiple round holes 16 mm in diameter. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

**20.** The inspection focused directly on the area of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative that adjoins Rybalko Street, specifically the  $1^{nd}$  row of garages. A visual inspection of the  $1^{nd}$  row of garages at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative revealed damage to garages. A shell fragment impact site was discovered during the inspection of the area. A shell hole measuring 24 x 23 cm was discovered 3.5 m from Garage No. 101 of the first row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 30 m from the fence of a gas filling station that was closed at the time of the inspection.

During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2266431. A shell hole measuring 24 x 23 cm was discovered 8 m from Garage No. 103 of the first row of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative and 26 m from the fence of a gas filling station that was closed at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted metal fragments of the projectile, placed and sealed them in security bag No. 2586567.

**21.** The inspection focused directly on an area located on the grounds of Novokramatorsky Mechanical Engineering Plant (NKMZ). The premises of Shop No. 12 are located on one side. The premises of the neutralization station of Shop No. 12 are located opposite said shop. There is a roadway between them. A pipeline mounted on metal supports runs along the roadway some 5 meters above ground. An electrical substation is located to the right of Shop No. 12. A visual inspection did not reveal these premises to be damaged. Trees are planted in this area of the plant along the roadway. An inspection of the area near these buildings revealed shell fragment impact sites. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site, making it impossible to determine the original shell entry angle and shell hole size. The missile fragment itself was broken in half. The shell hole is located 74 m from Shop No. 12 of the NKMZ Plant and 47 m from the electrical substation of the NKMZ Plant. The largest part of the missile is marked with the lettering "Bandage" in white paint. The smaller part of the missile is marked with the lettering "14-99-A 22 9D\* two illegible symbols \*.00.010" in blank paint. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

**22.** The inspection focused directly on the premises of the nine-story residential building at 42 Dvirtseva Street, whose facade faces the roadway of Yubileyna Street. A visual inspection of the facade of building No. 42 in Dvirtseva Street revealed considerable damage to apartments between the second story and the fifth story in the first section of said building. The owners of the damaged apartments (on the second and third stories), who were at home at the time of the inspection, verbally agreed to allow entry into their housing for purposes of the inspection. A fragment of the projectile that damaged the building had been removed prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. The inspection revealed that a part of the missile made contact with the building between balconies on the fifth and fourth stories and got embedded in the floor of the third-story balcony.

23. The inspection focused directly on the area in the backyard between buildings at 107 and 105 Parkova Street, the roof, and the 6<sup>th</sup> section of said building No. 107 in Parkova Street, which were also hit by missile fragments. Missile fragments broke windows in many apartments in said buildings. A KIA Cerato with the number plate AH0756HO and a Geely with the number plate BB5203CH parked in the backyard sustained considerable damage to the body and windows. An inspection of the area near this building revealed shell fragment impact sites. The shell holes are located as follows (all shell holes were inspected relative to specific street addresses): Shell hole No. 1 approximately 20 cm in diameter and up to 3 cm deep with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 11 m from the shorter side of building No. 105; Shell hole No. 2 approximately 26 cm in diameter and up to 5 cm deep is located on an asphalt-paved sidewalk with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 4 m from the facade of building No. 105 and 11 m from the shell hole No. 1; Shell hole No. 3 approximately 24 cm in diameter and up to 1 cm deep is located on an asphalt-paved sidewalk with pockmark damage to the asphalt pavement radiating from it, located approximately 6 m from the facade of building No. 105 and 7 m from the shell hole No. 2; Shell hole No. 4 approximately 24 cm in diameter and up to 3 cm deep in the ground with pockmark damage to the ground radiating from it, located approximately 14 m from the facade of building No. 107 and 23 m from the left facade of building No. 105; Shell hole No. 5 approximately 17 cm in diameter is located in the wall of building No. 107 near the window in the area of the flight of stairs between the second and third stories of the 6<sup>th</sup> section. To allow said shell hole to be inspected, a representative of the housing management company opened a stowaway space located on this flight of stairs, and the damage to the premises was inspected. Damage to the ceiling and walls of the stowaway space as well as the window frame was discovered; shell hole No. 6 approximately 33 cm in diameter with pockmark damage to the roofing bitumen felt radiating from it, located on the roof in the area of the 7<sup>th</sup> section of building No. 107. No projectiles were present in said shell holes at the time of the inspection. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bags Nos. 2586598, 2586604 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted soil samples from said shell holes and placed them into security bag No. 2586581 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

**24.** The inspection focused directly on the track and field grounds of Secondary School No. 9 at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard. The building facade faces the roadway. A visual inspection of the track and field grounds revealed a shell hole approximately 50 cm in diameter. The shell hole is located approximately 62 from the school building and 14 m from the rear wall of privately owned garages. A fragment of the projectile that landed in the track and field grounds had been removed prior to the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards.

During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a soil sample from said shell hole and placed it into security bag No. 2586597 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

25. The inspection focused directly on the area near building No. 67 in Lenin Street, which is a single-story building bearing an advertisement for the LeaderStroy company that is housed in this building. Building No. 65 is located 10 m away from building No. 67-a. Building No. 65 is located at the right angle to the roadway of Lenin Street and is also a single-story edifice. A road with trees planted alongside it runs past the buildings. A visual inspection did not reveal these buildings to be damaged. The inspection of the area revealed a shell hole in the ground measuring 47 x 73 cm and approximately 120 cm deep with uneven edges at a distance of 6 m from building No. 67-a in Lenin Street and 3 m away from the roadway. At the time of the inspection, the shell hole contained an element of the 300 mm cluster of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system. There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a soil sample from said shell hole and placed it into security bag No. 2586596 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

**26.** The inspection focused directly on an area at the soccer field of the Blooming Stadium at the intersection of Mayakovskoho Street and Shkadinova Street. A shell hole measuring 29x86 cm by 3 m was discovered on the surface of the ground on the soccer field. At the time of the inspection, the shell hole contained an element of the 300 mm cluster of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system, was approximately 3 m deep and had uneven edges. There are differently sized fragments of soil next to the shell hole. Fragments of the tail end of the missile were lying next to the shell hole at the time of the inspection. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management to be inspected for any explosion hazards. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted differently shaped metal fragments of the shell approximately 4 cm in size. The fragments were then placed by the expert into security bag No. 2586595 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants. During the inspection, a bomb expert extracted a soil sample from said shell hole and placed it into security bag No. 2586594 and sealed it in the presence of all inspection participants.

**27.** The inspection focused directly on an area near a residential building at 1 Kramatorsky Boulevard.

An inspection of the area 50 m from the building revealed a shell fragment impact site in the ground under the fence of a car parking lot. By the time of the inspection, representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management used construction machinery to dig up and deepen the shell fragment impact site, making it impossible to determine the original shell entry angle and shell hole size.

**28.** The inspection focused directly on the area located in a gully between the residential neighborhoods of Kramatorsk: Lazurne and Damansky. A shell fragment impact site in the ground was located during the inspection of this area 100 m from the road between said residential neighborhoods. A cylindrical metal pipe approximately 170 cm long and 20 cm in diameter was extracted from the shell hole. Ten equidistant end-to-end holes are located along the entire length of the pipe. Projectile fragments were removed after the inspection by representatives of the State Service for Emergency Management and transported to the Kramatorsk office of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine.

During the inspection, expert H.O. Panchenko used the TOPO application and a GPS navigator installed on a Samsung tablet (Model SM-T110) determined the coordinates of "cluster" explosion sites and missile fragment impact sites following the shelling of the territory of Kramatorsk on February 10, 2015, specifically:

1. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 5 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5402433, Y=7396822;

2. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 4 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5401860, Y=7397223;

3. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 16 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5400538, Y=7397150;

4. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 9 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5400381, Y=7397436;

5. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 10 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5400079, Y=7397584;

6. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 21 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5403999, Y=7395326;

7. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 11 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5402249, Y=7397141;

8. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 13 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5402242, Y=7396884;

9. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 7 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5401266, Y=7396647;

10. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 6 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5401648, Y=7396169;

11. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 15 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5401094, Y=7397113;

12. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 22 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5400910, Y=7397069;

1) [signature] 2) [signature] 3) [signature] 4) [signature] 5) [signature] 6) [signature]

7) [signature] 8) [signature] 9) [signature] 10) [signature] 11) [signature]

13. The missile fragment impact site that appears under number 26 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5402640, Y=7396372;

14. The "cluster" explosion site that appears under number 7 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5400472, Y=7397892;

15. The "cluster" explosion site that appears under number 2 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5401938, Y=7396595;

16. The "cluster" explosion site that appears under number 8 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5401905, Y=7396748;

17. The "cluster" explosion site that appears under number 25 in this record is located at the following coordinates: X=5401270, Y=7397743;

The expert notes that 300 mm missiles of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system, which are fitted with projectiles contained in "clusters", are characterized by the fact that "clusters" fall at the coordinates of the target site. After the cluster part separates from the missile engine, the clusters continue flying to the target site; the remaining missile elements continue to fly chaotically by inertia until they land entirely outside the cluster impact site. Any remaining elements of the missile engine up to 4 m long rotate while flying. Upon making contact with the ground, they become twisted and deformed. It is therefore impossible to determine the missile angle simply by looking at the remaining elements of the missile engine.

Expert H.O. Panchenko also notes that "clusters", which are elements of 300 mm missiles of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system, carry small-sized projectiles. A "cluster" detonates upon making contact with a hard surface. While inspecting the "cluster" explosion sites (shell holes), the expert used an artillery compass to perform measurements and determined that when the "clusters" exploded their projectiles exited them at an angle equivalent to 23-26 notches of the angle meter, or at 138-156 degrees.

During the inspection, expert H.O. Panchenko drew missile fragment impact sites on the map of Kramatorsk. The expert notes that "cluster" scatter pattern makes it safe to conclude that the missiles were fired from different distances, and since the shelling happened during the same period of time it is likely that more than one system was used in the shelling of the town.

Expert H.O. Panchenko went on to plot the coordinates of the missile fragment impact sites and "cluster" explosion sites on the topographic map. The expert then drew an ellipsoid along the outermost coordinates of missile fragments and located the center point. The expert then drew an ellipsoid along the outermost coordinates of "cluster" explosion sites and located the center point. He then positioned an AK-4 artillery aiming circle at the center point of the area where missile fragments fell and used an MPL-50 scale aiming rule positioned at the center of the "cluster" explosion area to determine the directional angle of 23-00, or 138 degrees. The line drawn at this angle over the possible reach distance of missiles fired by the Smerch multiple launch rocket system made it possible to determine that the missiles in question were most likely fired from the area of the northeastern outskirts of the town of Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast.

The inspection revealed:

1. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 8 cm in size, which were extracted at the intersection of Dvirtseva Street and Devyatnadstiatoho Partzyizdu Street, Kramatorsk, and placed in security bag No. 2266425.

2. Soil samples recovered at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, and placed in security bag No. 2266424.

3. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 4 cm in size, which were extracted at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, and placed in security bag No. 2586571.

4. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 10 cm in size, which were extracted near the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk and placed in security bags Nos. 2586599, 2266426.

5. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole near the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk and placed in security bag No. 2586582.

6. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments up to 4 cm in size, which were extracted in an area near building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, and placed in security bags Nos. 2586579, 0636364.

7. Soil samples recovered in an area near building No. 56 in Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, and placed by the expert in security bag No. 2586580.

8. Circular metal part of a missile 30 cm in diameter extracted at 28 Lenin Street and placed into polyethylene bag No. 1.

9. Missile fragment extracted at 22-a Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 2.

10. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 3.

11. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 4.

12. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 5.

13. Missile fragment extracted at 21 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 6.

14. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 0636365.

15. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586605.

16. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 0636366.

17. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586606.

18. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No.2586607.

19. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586608.

20. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586609.

21. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586610.

22. Missile fragment extracted at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 7.

23. Missile fragment extracted at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 8.

24. Missile fragment extracted at the Venera Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 9.

25. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at 10 Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 0636368.

26. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2266428.

27. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 0636367.

28. Missile fragment extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 10.

29. Missile fragment extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 11.

30. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed into expert security bag No. 2266431.

31. Metal fragments of projectiles extracted at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative, Kramatorsk, and placed into expert security bag No. 2586567.

32. Missile fragment extracted on the grounds of Novokramatorsky Mechanical Engineering Plant (NKMZ) and placed into bag No. 12.

33. Differently-shaped metal parts of missile fragments extracted in the backyard area between buildings Nos. 107 and 105 in Parkova Street and placed into security bag No. 2586598.

34. Differently-shaped metal parts of missile fragments extracted in the backyard area between buildings Nos. 107 and 105 in Parkova Street and placed into security bag No. 2586604.

35. Soil samples recovered from shell holes in the backyard area between buildings Nos. 107 and 105 in Parkova Street and placed into security bag No. 2586598.

36. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586597.

37. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole at 67-a Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586596.

38. Missile fragment extracted at 67-a Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 13.

39. Metal parts of differently-shaped missile fragments extracted on the Blooming soccer field in Kramatorsk and placed into security bag No. 2586595.

40. Soil samples recovered from a shell hole at the Blooming soccer stadium, Kramatorsk, and placed into security bag No. 2586594.

41. Missile fragment extracted at Blooming soccer field, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 14.

42. Missile fragment extracted at Blooming soccer field, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 15.

43. Missile fragment extracted the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk and placed into bag No. 16.

44. Missile fragment extracted the Culture and Technology Palace of the NKMZ Plant in Kramatorsk and placed into bag No. 17.

45. Missile fragment extracted from a gully between the residential neighborhoods of Lazurne and Damansky, Kramatorsk, and placed into bag No. 18.

The objects detected were presented to attesting witnesses and other inspection participant present during the inspection.

Diagrams showing the shell fragment impact sites were drawn in the course of this inspection (Attachment No. 1).

Attached to this record is a map showing the missile and shell fragment impact sites (Attachment No. 2) as well as maps filled out by the artillery expert to determine the missile trajectory and the likely launch site (Attachment No. 3). The following equipment was used during the inspection: Canon digital camera with a 1 GB memory card, with automatic settings. The photos will be attached to this record after the tables of photos have been prepared (Attachment No. 4).

The inspection was conducted in clear weather, at -4 degrees Celsius, under natural daylight and artificial lighting conditions. This record was read by all participants of the inspection. The participants offered no additional suggestions or critical comments.

Attesting witnesses:

1) [signature] R.Yu. Smenov

2) [signature] O.V. Pechenyi

Inspection participants:
3) [signature] H.O. Panchenko
4) [signature] A.V. Lytvynenko
5) [signature] V.E. Holovko
6) [signature] S.M. Tomnyuk
7) [signature] V.E. Korablin
8) [signature] S.S. Kovaliov
9) [signature] L.Yu. Zhurko
10) [signature] P.O. Nykytenko
11) [signature] V.V. Kharakhorin

Inspection conducted by: Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit


of the Investigative Department

of the Donetsk Oblast Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine Major of Justice [signature]

A.A.

## Kholin

**DIAGRAM** Attachment to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015




of the Investigative Department


of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast Major of Justice

[signature]

## A.A. Kholin



**DIAGRAM** Attachment to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015




Attesting witnesses: 1. [signature] 2. [signature] Participants: [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]

Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast Major of Justice

[signature]

A.A. Kholin

**DIAGRAM** Attachment to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015



Attesting witnesses: 1. [signature] 2. [signature] Participants: [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature] [signature]

Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast Major of Justice

[signature]

A.A. Kholin

## ATTACHMENT to the Record of Site Inspection Dated February 11, 2015

## TABLE OF PHOTOS



PHOTO No. 1: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 34 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 2: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 34 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=2= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 3: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 34 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 4: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=3= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 5: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 6: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)

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


PHOTO No. 7: Detailed view of damage to the building facade caused by falling shell fragments near Zateynik Toy Store at 17 Marata Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 8: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)

=5= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 9: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)




PHOTO No. 10: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)



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PHOTO No. 11: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)




PHOTO No. 12: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)

=7= Continuation of the Table of Photos

PHOTO No. 13: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)




PHOTO No. 14: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)

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


PHOTO No. 15: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street)



PHOTO No. 16: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=9= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 17: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Marata Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 17 Marata Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)



PHOTO No. 18: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, Glamor Store)

=10= Continuation of the Table of Photos

PHOTO No. 19: General view of damage to the building facade at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street)




PHOTO No. 20: General view of damage to the building facade at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)

=11= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 21: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)





PHOTO No. 22: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)



=12=

PHOTO No. 23: General view of damage to the building facade at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, Zdravytsya Pharmacy)




PHOTO No. 24: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, in the backyard)




PHOTO No. 25: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, in the backyard)




PHOTO No. 26: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, in the backyard)

=14= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 27: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, in the backyard)



PHOTO No. 28: General view of damage to the building facade caused by falling shell fragments at the intersection of Lenin Street and Voznesenskoho Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (near 24 Lenin Street, in the backyard)

=15= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 29: General view of damage to the building facade caused by falling shell fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 30: General view of damage to the building caused by falling shell fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=16= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 31: General view of damage to the building caused by falling shell fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 32: General view of damage to the building caused by falling shell fragments at 16 Sako Ivantseti Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=17= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 33: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 34: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=18= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 35: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 36: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=19= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 37: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 38: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=20= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 39: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 40: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=21= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 41: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 42: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=22= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 43: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 56 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=23= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 44: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 50 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 45: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 50 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=24= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 46: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the NKMZ Plant, Kramatorsk



PHOTO No. 47: Missile fragment found on the premises of the NKMZ Plant, Kramatorsk



=25= Continuation of the Table of Photos

PHOTO No. 48: General view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 49: Detailed view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=26= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 50: Detailed view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 51: General view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments at 42 Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=27= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 52: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 53: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=28= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 54: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 55: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 105-107 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=29= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 56: General view of damage caused to a building by falling shell fragments at the level of the 3<sup>rd</sup> story near the 6<sup>th</sup> entrance at 107 Parkova Street



PHOTO No. 57: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the track and field grounds of Secondary School No. 9 at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=30= Continuation of the Table of Photos



PHOTO No. 58: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the track and field grounds of Secondary School No. 9 at 17 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 59: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 67-a Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=31= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 60: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 67-a Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 61: View of a missile fragment that fell at 45 Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=32= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 62: View of a missile fragment that fell at 45 Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 63: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the soccer field of the Blooming Stadium at the intersection of Mayakovskoho Street and Shkadinova Street, Kramatorsk

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


PHOTO No. 64: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the soccer field of the Blooming Stadium at the intersection of Mayakovskoho Street and Shkadinova Street, Kramatorsk

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PHOTO No. 65: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 66: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 67: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 68: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 4 Hvardiytsiv Kontemyrivtsiv Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 69: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Yuvileyna Street and Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (in the backyard of the building at 47 Dvirtseva Street)



PHOTO No. 70: General view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Yuvileyna Street and Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (in the backyard of the building at 47 Dvirtseva Street)

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


PHOTO No. 71: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at the intersection of Yuvileyna Street and Dvirtseva Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast (in the backyard of the building at 47 Dvirtseva Street)




PHOTO No. 72: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 73: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 74: General view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 75: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 76: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 77: General view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 78: Detailed view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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


PHOTO No. 79: Detailed view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 80: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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


PHOTO No. 81: General view of damage to the building facade at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 82: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 83: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 84: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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


PHOTO No. 85: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 86: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 87: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 88: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in the backyard of the building at 99 Parkova Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 89: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative




PHOTO No. 90: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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


PHOTO No. 91: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative




PHOTO No. 92: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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


PHOTO No. 93: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative



PHOTO No. 94: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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


PHOTO No. 95: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative



PHOTO No. 96: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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PHOTO No. 97: General view of damage to garages of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative




PHOTO No. 98: Detailed view of damage to garages of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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


PHOTO No. 99: Detailed view of damage to garages of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative



PHOTO No. 100: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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PHOTO No. 101: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Venera Garage Cooperative




PHOTO No. 102: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Venera Garage Cooperative

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


PHOTO No. 103: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Venera Garage Cooperative




PHOTO No. 104: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Venera Garage Cooperative

=55= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 105: General view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10 Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 106: General view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10 Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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


PHOTO No. 107: General view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10 Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 107: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site near the building at 10 Rybalko Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 108: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative



PHOTO No. 109: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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


PHOTO No. 110: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative




PHOTO No. 111: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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


PHOTO No. 112: Detailed view of damage to garages at the Sputnik Garage Cooperative

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PHOTO No. 113: General view of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of Boarding School No. 2 at 15 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 114: View of a shell fragment impact site on the premises of Boarding School No. 2 at 15 Sotsialistychna Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 115: General view of a shell fragment impact site in a cemetery at Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 115: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site in a cemetery at Lenin Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 116: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 22-a Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 117: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 22-a Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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PHOTO No. 118: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 27 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast




PHOTO No. 119: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 27 Kramatorsky Boulevard, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

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


PHOTO No. 120: General view of a shell fragment impact site at 13 Karpenka Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast



PHOTO No. 121: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 13 Karpenka Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

=65= Continuation of the Table of Photos




PHOTO No. 122: Detailed view of a shell fragment impact site at 13 Karpenka Street, Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast

Table of photos prepared by:

Senior Investigator with the Operative Unit of the Investigative Department of the Security Service of Ukraine in Donetsk Oblast Major of Justice

[signature]

A.A. Kholin