

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION**

(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

REJOINDER

SUBMITTED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

VOLUME V

(ANNEXES 16 - 20)

10 MARCH 2023

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Witness Statement of Tatyana Anatolyevna Manezhina, 7 March 2023

(translation)

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**WITNESS STATEMENT
OF TATYANA ANATOLYEVNA MANEZHINA**

7 MARCH 2023

1. I, Tatyana Anatolyevna Manezhina, present this witness statement in connection with the dispute “Ukraine v. Russian Federation” before the International Court of Justice.
2. As part of my witness statement, I provide information on the measures taken by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea (hereinafter the “Ministry of Culture”) to support the culture of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian peoples on the Peninsula.
3. My statement is based on the information known to me due to my current position of the Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, professional experience of many years of work in the field of culture. All my practical activities since 1989 have been related to the development of culture and social life in Crimea. In 2011, I was appointed Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, and before that I had held the job of First Deputy Minister of Youth Affairs. After Crimea's reunification with the Russian Federation, I was First Deputy Minister from 2017 and Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea since 16 December 2021.
4. I am aware that the Ministry of Culture has already provided extensive information reports on mass-scale literary, artistic and musical events held since 2014, broadcasts of films and other programmes in the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages, museums and exhibitions dedicated to the history, culture and art of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian peoples.¹ I would like to offer some additional information to what is already known to the Court.

A. ORGANISATION OF EVENTS POPULARISING CRIMEAN TATAR AND UKRAINIAN CULTURE

5. One of the tasks of the Ministry of Culture is to support and promote the culture of all the peoples living on the Peninsula and to educate the public about the unique aspects of their life and history.
6. Before 2014, it was not possible to carry out those functions in full, as in most cases the Ukrainian authorities did not provide funds for activities and restoration of cultural

¹ Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No. 268 of the President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar peoples, Annex 498 to the Counter-Memorial.

heritage sites, or provided them at the lowest priority in an catastrophically limited amount.

7. After 2014, the situation as I see it has changed tremendously due to the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of culture. The Ministry of Culture has provided assistance in organising hundreds of contests, exhibitions and festivals in support of the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian culture on the Peninsula, which has already been reported by the Ministry of Culture for this international dispute.² I will mention but a few of the events organised in Crimea in the last six months what is illustrative of the common practice of implementation of state policy in the field of culture:

- (a) Dozens of events in museums across Crimea to mark National Unity Day.³ One of such events organised by the Republican Crimean Tatar Library n.a. Ismail Gasprinsky featured a display of national costumes and a performance by the Yildizlar Crimean Tatar children's dance studio; at the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage visitors took part in a master class in traditional Crimean Tatar goldwork embroidery. An artist of the Qirim Crimean Tatar folklore ensemble performed for the museum guests, playing various folk instruments.
- (b) The celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery named after Vera Roik, organised jointly with the RPO (regional public organization) “Ukrainian Community of Crimea”, where songs in Ukrainian were performed;⁴ and a memorial night in honour of the 111th anniversary of Vera Roik’s birth held on the basis of the Centralised Library System of Simferopol.

² Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Information note on measures taken to implement the Decree No. 268 of the President of the Russian Federation and other activities aimed at promoting cultures of the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar peoples, Annex 498 to the Counter-Memorial, pp. 3-12.

³ Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, *Republican Cultural and Art Institutions Held Over 120 Events Dedicated to National Unity Day (7 November 2022)*, available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10312> (Exhibit A).

⁴ Crimean Newswire, *Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its 10th Anniversary (26 December 2022)*, available at: <https://crimea-news.com/culture/2022/12/26/1005338.html> (Exhibit B).

- (c) Celebration of the anniversary of the Crimean Tatar poet Bekir Choban-zade;⁵ celebration of events in honour of the 110th anniversary of the Crimean Tatar classic of national literature, writer, publicist, and public figure Shamil Alyadin;⁶ organization of historical and literary event “Strolls in the Rose Garden of Khans” dedicated to the 250th birth anniversary of a Crimean Khan, poet and classic of Crimean Tatar literature Halim Geray Sultan;⁷ events of the Inspiration literary association promoting creative heritage of outstanding Crimean Tatar writers and public figures;⁸
- (d) Readers’ folk fairytale marathons, including Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian, held on the basis of the Centralised Library System of the Bakhchisaray District;
- (e) Concert by the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble;⁹ hosting of a concert “Prosperity in Unity”, which comprised songs and poems about love for the homeland in the Crimean Tatar language;¹⁰ organization of presentation of the documentary drama “Sabriye” dedicated to the life and work of the great master of the Crimean Tatar singing art Sabriye Eredzhepova;¹¹ presentation of the inclusion of the Crimean Tatar Zinadinov family ensemble from Michurinskoye Village of the Belogorsk

⁵ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade’s Birthday Anniversary Opened* (26 January 2023), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10633> (Exhibit C).

⁶ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held* (14 July 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9837> (Exhibit D); Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Shamil Aladin’s Benefit Performance Held as Part of Interregional Cooperation* (1 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596> (Exhibit E). Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin’s 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed* (24 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10386> (Exhibit F).

⁷ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan* (13 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10045> (Exhibit G).

⁸ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library Continues Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association* (1 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10420> (Exhibit H).

⁹ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *“Krym” Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert Programme Presented* (16 January 2023), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10583> (Exhibit I).

¹⁰ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki* (14 October 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10203> (Exhibit J).

¹¹ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its 34th Season* (30 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10133> (Exhibit K).

District and the Feodosia Karaites holiday Aga-Dumpa in the federal project “Anthology of Folk Culture ”;¹²

- (f) Organisation of a visit by the Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre troupe to the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchisaray to prepare for the performance of the drama “The Fountain of Bakhchisarai”;¹³
- (g) Hosting of All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars;¹⁴
- (h) Celebration of the anniversary of the scholar Emirasan Kurtmollayev, where students of one of the schools made acquaintance with literature in the Crimean Tatar language;¹⁵ organization of the “10th Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky” conference dedicated to the Crimean Tatar historian;¹⁶
- (i) Organisation of the exhibition “From the Origins to Perfection” at the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage displaying old Crimean Tatar handicrafts of the late 19th to early 20th centuries;¹⁷
- (j) Exhibition “Khan's Palace as Open-Air Museum” at the Museum of History and Culture of the Crimean Tatars of the Bakhchisaray Museum-Reserve;¹⁸

¹² Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian Karaites Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project* (18 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10365> (Exhibit L).

¹³ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *“The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre* (23 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10524> (Exhibit M).

¹⁴ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held* (16 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10492> (Exhibit N).

¹⁵ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev’s 120th Birthday Anniversary* (9 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10453> (Exhibit O).

¹⁶ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky* (13 October 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10201> (Exhibit P).

¹⁷ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage Presents New Exhibition* (30 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10413> (Exhibit Q).

¹⁸ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *“Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in Bakhchisaray* (1 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10416> (Exhibit R).

organisation of student excursions to the Bakhchisaray Museum to get acquainted with the history, traditions and customs of the Crimean Tatars;¹⁹

- (k) Organisation of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Day “Rich Palette of National Heritage”;²⁰
- (l) Exhibition on the material and spiritual culture of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples “At Native Sources” at the Sudak Fortress Museum-Reserve;²¹
- (m) Exhibition of traditional Crimean Tatar costumes, where Afize Kasara, soloist of the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble of the Crimean State Philharmonic, performed folk songs of Crimean Tatars;²²
- (n) Preparation of the exhibition of Crimean Tatar culture and art in the framework of the XII Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s Peoples;²³
- (o) Presentation about the origins and celebration of Derviza (a traditional harvest festivity) by Crimean Tatars to students of the Crimean boarding school for gifted children as part of a folk crafts fair;²⁴
- (p) A conference on the ethnography of the peoples of Crimea;²⁵

¹⁹ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near”* (30 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9760> (Exhibit S).

²⁰ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage”* (10 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10323> (Exhibit T).

²¹ Preserve Museum “Sudak fortress”, *At Native Roots* (22 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596> (Exhibit U).

²² Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *“Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples* (30 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10134> (Exhibit V).

²³ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s Peoples* (26 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10105> (Exhibit W).

²⁴ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *“Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural Heritage Year* (23 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10103> (Exhibit X).

²⁵ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be Held* (20 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10075> (Exhibit Y).

- (q) Hosting of a library forum in Kerch and the Crimean Tatar Book Forum in Sevastopol, at which Crimean Tatar Great Patriotic War warriors were remembered, information from Elmira Osmanova's book "Yolshashirma: the Crimean Tatar Traditional Embroidery Technique" presented, Crimean Tatar songs played and interaction between national autonomies discussed;²⁶
- (r) Organisation of "Obzhinki" festival of Ukrainian culture with songs and poems in the Ukrainian language;²⁷
- (s) Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival "Derviza";²⁸ and other activities.

8. Consequently, the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian cultures in the Crimea are currently receiving unprecedented help and support.

B. SUPPORT FOR THE UKRAINIAN CULTURE IN CRIMEA


- 9. The Ministry of Culture is monitoring the situation with restoration of the Lesya Ukrainka house-museum in Yalta.
- 10. The museum building is at least a hundred years old, and it needed repair and restoration as early as in the nineties. Nevertheless, in 1991-2014 no systematic protection, repair or restoration works were made to the Museum's building, and only minor ongoing repairs were carried out in order to maintain the Museum's availability for excursions. Those were solely superficial repairs aimed at maintaining the external looks of the building but failing to care for load-bearing structures, structural elements, roof, walls, etc. No comprehensive restoration was undertaken.

²⁶ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, "Crimean Tatar Book" Forum Organised for Kerch Library Professionals (7 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10018> (Exhibit Z); Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds "Crimean Tatar Book" Forum in Sevastopol* (26 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9754> (Exhibit AA).

²⁷ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Crimean Central Library Hosted "Obzhinki" Ukrainian Cultural Festival* (30 August 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9984> (Exhibit AB). Government of the Republic of Crimea, *State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea: Crimea Celebrates Popular Fest Called "Obzhinki"* (29 August 2022), available at: <https://rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/16927> (Exhibit AC).

²⁸ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, "Derviza" Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners Announced (31 May 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9585> (Exhibit AD).

11. Now a number of steps aimed at preparing for reconstruction have been implemented. Specifically, in 2016 the museum was included on the list of Russia's cultural heritage. In that same year over 9 million roubles from the municipal budget allotted by the Administration of the City of Yalta were spent on research and development resulting in elaboration of a complete plan of the museum building's restoration with the total cost of 130.95 million roubles. At the moment the Ministry of Culture is searching for funding sources for that restoration, both within the framework of national project "Culture", and within the city program "Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol".
12. Alas, the Lesya Ukrainka Museum is just one of the many examples of the disastrous consequences of the Ukrainian authorities' unwillingness to finance maintenance of cultural institutions in Crimea before 2014. After Crimea's reunification with the Russian Federation, one of the tasks of the Ministry of Culture was to prioritise objects that had to be restored or renovated. Therefore after careful deliberations it was decided to give priority to the restoration of cultural facilities in the hinterland of the Peninsula, i.e. rural clubs, which in many small settlements are the only centre of attraction for residents. A Herculean effort has been made in this area which has borne its fruits. In rural areas, major repairs have been carried out on 94 cultural institutions, at a total cost of 2.3 billion roubles (around 31.5 million dollars at current exchange rate).
13. Below are photos of the village club in Novokrymskoye (Dzhankoy District), clearly showing the results of the restoration:



Stairs to the second floor of the building – before and after



Events hall – before and after



Hall – before and after



Façade of the building – before and after

14. I am also attaching photos with the results of restoration works in the clubhouse in the village of Maryino, Chernomorsky District:



Façade of the building – before and after



Condition of the interior decoration – before and after



Events hall – before and after

15. Therefore, the first priority was given to the full-scale restoration of cultural life in the countryside, where, *inter alia*, many Crimean Tatars live, and now the efforts have switched to cultural sites in major cities, including Yalta.
16. Nevertheless, the Lesya Ukrainka Museum is still within the attention of the Ministry of Culture. It further significantly hindered its restoration that it used to have a tenant that had been unrelated to the Museum.
17. Only in 2018, after a series of trials in courts of different instances initiated after reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation, and the termination of the lease agreement, the tenant who had occupied part of the premises for more than 10 years was evicted from the right wing of the Museum building. Thanks to the actions of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum administration and local self-government bodies of the city of Yalta, the historical and cultural integrity of the memorial building has been restored, and the area of the renovated Museum will now cover 771.2 sq. m.
18. The museum exhibits have been transferred to the Yalta History and Literature Museum for preservation, and are periodically displayed at the exhibition “Yalta. The 19th Century” and at temporary exhibitions during cultural and educational events dedicated to anniversaries and commemorations of Ukrainian cultural figures.
19. Various events in memory of Lesya Ukrainka continue to be held in Crimea. A series of events throughout Crimea marked the 150th anniversary of the poetess’s birth:
 - (a) A temporary exhibition dedicated to Lesya Ukrainka was opened at the Lesya Ukrainka Museum on her birthday;
 - (b) In 2021, a literary night in memory of Taras Shevchenko and Lesya Ukrainka was held at the Kerch Central Library System (CBS);
 - (c) In 2021, the exhibition “Strings of Lesya's Soul” was opened in the Soviet District CBS;
 - (d) In 2021, the Sudak CBS held an exhibition called (in Ukrainian) “Kvitka na Dolonivichnosti” in honour of the 150th anniversary of Lesya Ukrainka’ birth;

- (e) In 2021 an exhibition dedicated to the poetess was opened in the Yevpatoriya CBS, with a virtual quiz “The Sun of Crimea Shines in Her Verse”;
 - (f) An exhibition “In Memory of Lesya Ukrainka” was opened in the Dzhankoy Central District Library; the Dzhankoy CBS held an exhibition and a talk about Lesya Ukrainka on the topic “I have something in my heart that doesn’t die”.
 - (g) The Ismail Gasprinsky Crimean Tatar Republican Library also delighted visitors with a thematic exhibition.
20. The Museum’s staff continues working and organizing exhibitions and events devoted to distinguished Ukrainian individuals, such as Lesya Ukrainka, ethnographer Kliment Kvitka, Stepan Rudanskiy, Taras Shevchenko, Mikhail Kotsyubinsky and others.²⁹
21. Besides, exhibitions dedicated to various aspects of Ukrainian culture continue to operate throughout Crimea:

²⁹ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023 (Exhibit AE).



Vera Roik Ukrainian Embroidery Museum exposition room



Ukrainian culture corner in the Bakhchisarai District, Crimea



Ukrainian culture corner in the village of Zavetnoye, Sovetsky District

22. Thus, national traditions of the Ukrainian people, are cherished and preserved in Crimea.

C. ON THE UKRAINIAN CULTURE CENTRE

23. The “Ukrainian Culture Centre” has not been active in promoting Ukrainian culture and has not been in contact with the Ministry of Culture officials regarding the organisation of any cultural events.

24. I have heard that that activists of the “Ukrainian Culture Centre” were involved in the publication of the Krymskiy Teren “newspaper”. However, as far as I know, there were only 2 or 3 printed issues of the “newspaper”, it was printed on an amateur basis with the circulation so small that there are no copies left now even in the archives of the largest Crimean library, i.e. Library n.a. Ivan Franko.

25. As mentioned above, with regard to initiatives to promote Ukrainian culture, the Ministry of Culture cooperates with and takes into account the opinion of the RPO “Ukrainian Community of Crimea”, which, in particular, organises the annual festival of Ukrainian culture “Obzhinki”.³⁰

³⁰ See above, ¶7(r). See also ¶7(b).



Obzhinki Festival

D. KHAN’S PALACE

26. The Ministry of Culture attaches great importance to the restoration of the Khan’s Palace. Unfortunately, before 2014 that unique monument of Crimean Tatar heritage received little attention and little funding for repairs.
27. The currently ongoing restoration of the Khan’s Palace is a project that involves not only restoration works but also an archaeological survey of the areas adjacent to the palace complex. Specialists conduct a thorough archaeological reconnaissance to make sure that the planned repair work will not damage the buildings of the complex and also investigate the objects never previously investigated:
 - (a) Thus, by the Order of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea dated 16.02.2022 No.32-okn a land plot on the palace grounds where ruins of a graveyard of German soldiers dating back to the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 were located was included on the list of objects of historical heritage. As of now, in course of renovation of the Khan’s Palace territory, representatives of the Association of International Military Memorial Cooperation “Military Memorials” which under the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 24.09.2010 No.1615-r is authorized to search and exhumated graveyards of foreign servicemen, have exhumated and re-buried around 100 remains of German soldiers.

- (b) Besides, archaeological excavations near one of the buildings of the complex revealed the ruins of another ancient structure, presumably also belonging to the palace ensemble. To be sure, such historical discoveries slow down the works to a certain extent, but at the same time they give confidence that quality work is being done and that foundation is being laid for the study of new aspects of the Crimean Tatar culture.
28. To date, the federal and regional authorities have allocated 3.6 billion roubles for the restoration works³¹. In this regard, the arguments that a “campaign of destruction” is being carried out in relation to the Khan’s Palace are unfounded.
29. Employees of the Ministry of Culture and I personally visit the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchisaray on a monthly basis to monitor the repair and restoration works at the site.³² Moreover, the Head of the Republic of Crimea, at the initiative of the Crimean Muftiyat, has established a Public Expert Council for the restoration of the Khan’s Palace, whose purpose is to conduct independent monitoring and to inform the population about the progress of the restoration works. The Public Expert Council consists of specialists in architecture, restoration, and public representatives; it also includes ethnic Crimean Tatars.
30. I hereby confirm that, to the best of my knowledge and understanding, the information provided in this witness statement is true.

Witness

³¹ Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023 (Exhibit AE).

³² Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Tatiana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace* (18 January 2023), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10597> (Exhibit AF); Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Tatiana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Work in Khan’s Palace* (23 August 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9964> (Exhibit AG); Ministry of Culture of the Crimea, *Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace Inspected* (22 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10086> (Exhibit AH)

[Signature]_____

Tatyana Anatolyevna Manezhina

Simferopol, 7 March 2023

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Number:	Name of exhibit:
Exhibit A	Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, <i>Republican Cultural and Art Institutions Held Over 120 Events Dedicated to National Unity Day</i> (7 November 2022).
Exhibit B	Crimean Newswire, <i>Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its 10th Anniversary</i> (26 December 2022).
Exhibit C	Ministry of Culture of Crimea, <i>Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade's Birthday Anniversary Opened</i> (26 January 2023).
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Exhibit F	Ministry of Culture of Crimea, <i>Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin's 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed</i> (24 November 2022).
Exhibit G	Ministry of Culture of Crimea, <i>Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan</i> (13 September 2022).
Exhibit H	Ministry of Culture of Crimea, <i>Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library Continues Cycle of Events by "Inspiration" Literary Association</i> (1 December 2022).
Exhibit I	Ministry of Culture of Crimea, <i>"Krym" Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble's Concert Programme Presented</i> (16 January 2023).
Exhibit J	Ministry of Culture of Crimea, <i>All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest "Stages of Mastery" Held in Saki</i> (14 October 2022).

- Exhibit K Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its 34th Season* (30 September 2022).
- Exhibit L Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Agadumpa Feodosian Karaites Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project* (18 November 2022).
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- Exhibit O Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev’s 120th Birthday Anniversary* (9 December 2022).
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- Exhibit S Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near”* (30 June 2022).
- Exhibit T Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage”* (10 November 2022).
- Exhibit U Preserve Museum “Sudak fortress”, *At Native Roots* (22 June 2022).

- Exhibit V Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples* (30 September 2022).
- Exhibit W Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia’s Peoples* (26 September 2022).
- Exhibit X Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural Heritage Year* (23 September 2022).
- Exhibit Y Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be Held* (20 September 2022).
- Exhibit Z Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Crimean Tatar Book” Forum Organised for Kerch Library Professionals* (7 September 2022).
- Exhibit AA Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum in Sevastopol* (26 June 2022).
- Exhibit AB Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian Cultural Festival* (30 August 2022).
- Exhibit AC Government of the Republic of Crimea, *State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea: Crimea Celebrates Popular Fest Called “Obzhinki”* (29 August 2022).
- Exhibit AD Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners Announced* (31 May 2022).
- Exhibit AE Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023.
- Exhibit AF Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Tatiana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Works in Khan’s Palace* (18 January 2023).

- Exhibit AG Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Tatiana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Work in Khan's Palace* (23 August 2022).
- Exhibit AH Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during Restoration Works in Khan's Palace Inspected* (22 September 2022).

Exhibit A

Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, *Republican Cultural and Art Institutions Held
Over 120 Events Dedicated to National Unity Day (7 November 2022)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, *Republican Cultural and Art Institutions Held Over 120 Events Dedicated to National Unity Day (7 November 2022)*, available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10312>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

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**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

31 January, Tuesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Republican Cultural and Art Institutions Held Over 120 Events Dedicated to National Unity Day



The programme of events was arranged with the assistance of the Ministry of Culture of Crimea

Republican institutions of culture and arts held over 120 events dedicated to the Day of National Unity, including as part of the All-Russian “Night of Arts”. The programme of events was arranged with the assistance of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea.

In the Year of Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia, the programme of events was aimed at popularising folk arts and preserving cultural traditions, historical and cultural monuments, ethno-cultural diversity and the cultural identity of the peoples and ethnic communities of the Russian Federation. It was intended to inspire everyone to search for their creative niche in a variety of opportunities opened up by arts.

For example, the Ivan Franko Crimean Republican Universal Scientific Library offered a historical hour called “We Are Strong with One Spirit”, an exhibition of books and periodicals, a roundtable discussion on “Unity in Harmony” with participation of the regional national and cultural autonomy Ukrainian Community of Crimea and students of the Crimean University of Culture, Arts and Tourism, an event called “The Future of Russia is in the Unity of the People”, a biblio-interactive event, a bibliographic review titled “Where There Is Unity, There Is Victory”, various illustrated book and virtual exhibitions, a concert, a literary and folklore performance featuring artists of the art studio *Modus Operandi* of the Crimean State Philharmonic, an opening day of the Alexander Mikhalyants anniversary exhibition, and a variety of master classes, virtual games, ethnic trips and contests.

The Crimean Republican Library for Youth presented a historical sketch “We Are Strong with One Spirit”, exhibitions of works of art by the Guild of Artists and Masters of the Cimmerian Land and the creativity studio “Wise Workshop”, performances by young Crimean poets and musicians, and various master classes.

The Vladimir Orlov Crimean Republican Children’s Library held a series of various events, including performances, a creative workshop, and a biblio-journey.

The Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library presented a living room named “All Peoples Visit Us...” presenting its project developed in conjunction with Millet TV to digitise the collection of records of its department of rare books, archival materials and manuscripts. The guests attended a show of stylised national costumes featuring teachers and students of the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University, took part a toy-making master class and enjoyed the poems, songs and choreographic compositions performed by pupils of the Crimean Tatar Children’s Dance Studio “Yildizlar”.

The Simferopol Art Museum offered sightseeing tours, master classes, performances by soloists of the Crimean State Philharmonic, the performance of a play titled “The Importance of Being Earnest”, and various exhibitions.

The Crimean Movie and Media Centre offered a video lecture “Cinema as Life” and various master classes, and the Yalta Movie Studio screened the domestic films “From Sorrow to Joy” and “Once Upon a Time”.

The Crimean Tatar State Academic Music and Drama Theatre invited schoolchildren, pupils of theatrical studios and students to take part in an interactive performance, learn to create masks

for the Theatre's productions, make excursions around the Theatre's backstage, and attend a ballet performance. The Theatre's foyer accommodated an exposition of objects of national colour and a photo area. On the Theatre's main stage, directors, artists and guests staged an excerpt from a play titled "Those Who Do Not Appreciate Time Are Close to Oblivion".

On its cultural and educational evening, the Crimean Academic Puppet Theatre presented the exhibitions "Theatrical Posters" and "Theatrical Dolls" accommodated in a small area. An introductory conversation about the history of the Theatre by public relations specialist Natalia Vasilieva was full of interesting facts from the life of the Theatre's company and its achievements of recent years. Students of the Vladimir Vernadsky Crimean Federal University held a master class on how to make advertising products. At the end of the event, all those present watched a farce performance "What Happened to the Crocodile?" based on the play by Marina Moskvina and Sergei Sedov.

The State Academic Musical Theatre of the Republic of Crimea presented a photo area imitating theatrical stages, an exhibition of theatrical costumes, master classes by decorators, hairdressers and make-up artists, various quizzes and video lectures, and an exhibition of children's drawings named "Dance of the Soul".

The Ismail Gasprinsky Memorial Museum hosted a thematic event called "Art Unites", complemented by performances by students of the Bakhchisaray Children's Music School.

The Sudak Fortress Museum Reserve offered a rich programme of events, including talks, exhibitions, assemblies, musical and literary living rooms, and theatrical performances.

The East Crimean Historical and Cultural Museum Reserve presented an exhibition titled "The Science of Victory", a theatrical excursion, and a concert of students and teachers of the local children's music school.

Students and teachers of the Crimean University of Culture, Arts and Tourism prepared various creative projects. The exhibitions of decorative paintings and clay dolls, and the premiere performance of a play titled "An Opera for Three Roubles" based on Bertolt Brecht's "The Threepenny Opera" aroused a keen interest among the visitors.

The Maximilian Voloshin House Museum offered a guided tour of the exhibition "The Worlds and Miracles of Voloshin's September", presented a play titled "Your Love Is Like the Milky Way...", and screened a feature movie "At the Beginning of Glorious Days".

The Museum of Marina and Anastasia Tsvetaeva met the guests with a literary and musical performance. Feodosia schoolchildren took part in a master class on how to make traditional knot dolls and enjoyed a presentation of a collection of coiled dolls in costumes of the peoples of Russia. A thematic excursion "The Earthly Journey of the Star Ariadne" aroused great interest among the visitors.

The Literary and Art Museum of the Town of Saryi Krym held an hour called "This Country Is Famous for Its Unity", telling the guests about the wedding traditions of the peoples of the Crimea, and the Konstantin Paustovsky House Museum offered a literary quest called "You Need to Live a Life of Wandering" and an evening meeting titled "The Art of Seeing the World".

The Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage held a number of events, including temporary and permanent exhibitions. An artist of the Crimea Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble played musical compositions on various folk instruments. Embroidery enthusiasts took part in master classes on “Traditional Crimean Tatar Gold Embroidery” and “Urban Landscapes on Graphic Drawings”.

The Museum of the Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan Sultan in Alupka hosted a literary evening.

The Museum of History and Archaeology (in Staryi Krym) told the visitors about the history of the medieval town of Solkhat and its culture, demonstrating unique exhibits. As part of the creative meeting with masters of decorative and applied arts, master classes on “myklama” gold sewing, beading and clay modelling were held.

The Andrey Beketov Estate Museum invited the guests to visit free excursions “Life and Work of Andrey Beketov” and “Museum Exhibits Tell”. On the veranda of the old house, the visitors were introduced to a poster exhibition “35 years of the Museum: History, Traditions, and Projects”. They were told about the history of the architectural monument of the late 19th century, which is no less interesting than the Museum’s collection. The Museum’s exhibition halls presented a personal exhibition of paintings by Nikolai Dudchenko, “Inspiration and Forms. Painting and Graphics”. The Museum’s music lounge pleased all those present with the sounds of classical music performed by a teacher of the Alushta Children’s Music School.

The Centre for Folk Arts of the Republic of Crimea located in the building of the I.Y. Franko Crimean Republican Universal Scientific Library housed an exhibition of dolls titled “Tales of Crimean Masters”, and the department of culture and folk crafts presented an exhibition of works by Remeslo Crimean Creative Association, a master class on decorative and applied arts named “Khokhloma Paintings”, and a master class by Nikolai Barsky on “Production of Wooden Painted Souvenirs Based on Ornaments and Patterns of the Peoples of Russia”. In addition, a festival marathon was held on the Centre’s official website and on *Vkontakte*.

The guests of the Livadiya Palace Museum visited a thematic tour of “Yalta-45. A New World Was Created Here” presenting some interesting facts about the Crimean Conference of the leaders of the three allied powers of the Anti-Hitler Coalition – the USSR, the United States, and the UK. In conjunction with the members of the Yalta Historical Reconstruction Club, the Museum’s scientific staff managed to recreate the atmosphere of the historical events. The cultural programme continued with a theatrical excursion “An Italian Palazzo for the Russian Empress”. Together with a traveller in time – a lady of the Renaissance, the visitors could plunge into the atmosphere of Tsar’s Livadiya of 1911 by visiting a ball in the White Hall, meeting people from the close circle of the imperial family and learning more about the architectural features of the Livadiya Palace. The evening ended with a multimedia project “Diplomacy at the Dining Table”, which introduced the audience to the culinary preferences of the parties to the Crimean Conference and was broadcast on the Museum’s official pages on social networks.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit B

Crimean Newswire, *Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its 10th Anniversary* (26 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Crimean Newswire, *Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its 10th Anniversary* (26 December 2022), available at: <https://crimea-news.com/culture/2022/12/26/1005338.html>.

Crimean Newswire

Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery Celebrated Its Tenth Anniversary

26 December 2022 at 05:50 PM

Culture



The Crimean Ethnographic Museum hosted the “Pattern on Canvas” event dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery. The event was held jointly with the Ukrainian Community of Crimea regional civil society organisation.

Lyudmila Naumenko, the host of the event and Deputy Director of the

Crimean Ethnographic Museum, welcomed the audience pointing out how important it had been to establish the Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery.

The event began with a musical greeting from the *Poyuschie Serdtsa* [Singing Hearts] vocal band (led by Alexander Dudorov) who performed songs in Russian and Ukrainian.

Sergey Patrushev, Head of the Department of Museums, Libraries and Cultural Education, spoke on behalf of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea stressing the significant role of the Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery in preserving the history and culture of Ukrainians in Crimea.

Ruslan Yakubov, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, made a welcoming speech and congratulated the museum and the Ukrainian community, noting the community’s active efforts in preserving and popularising Ukrainian culture in the region.

The event was continued by Natalia Filippova, Head of the Museum’s Research Department, who told how the collection of Ukrainian culture objects was put together in 2018-2022.

Anastasia Gridchina, Chairwoman of the Ukrainian Community of Crimea regional civil society organisation, made a welcoming speech, thanked the museum staff for their fruitful cooperation, and awarded certificates of honour to the Crimean Ethnographic Museum and members of the local and regional Ukrainian community of Crimea. The museum was donated some interesting exhibits that would make a great addition to the museum’s permanent and

temporary exhibitions: a bandura, a spinning wheel, and textile items.

Nadezhda Ryndych, Deputy Chairwoman of the Ukrainian community of Crimea, read some of her own poetry.

At the end of the event, the *Kumushki* vocal band (led by Galina Navrotskaya) performed traditional Ukrainian and Russian folk songs.

FOR REFERENCE: The Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery was established in 2012 as part of the Crimean Ethnographic Museum on the basis of a collection of Ukrainian culture objects held at the Ethnographic Museum and a collection of embroidery items by Vera Roik.

The Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery currently has three exhibition areas: the hall titled “The History of Ukrainian Embroidery – from the Creation of a Canvas to the Finished Product”, the celebrated embroiderer’s memorial room, and an exhibition of works by modern Crimean embroiderers.

The Vera Roik Museum of Ukrainian Embroidery has become the spot where events related to the popularization of decorative and applied arts of the Eastern Slavs are held, such as: the Vera Roik Republican Biennale of East Slavic Folk Embroidery “Patterns on Canvas”, the “Towel for T. Shevchenko’s 200th birthday anniversary” project, and various thematic events dedicated to the life of and work of Vera Roik.

Press office of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit C

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Chobanzade's Birthday Anniversary Opened* (26 January 2023)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade's Birthday Anniversary Opened* (26 January 2023), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10633>.

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


**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Annual Cycle of Thematic Events Dedicated to Bekir Choban-zade's Birthday Anniversary Opened



2023 will mark the 130th anniversary of the birthday of Bekir Choban-zade, a classic of Crimean Tatar literature and an outstanding Turkologist, teacher and public figure.

2023 will mark the 130th anniversary of Bekir Choban-zade, a classic of Crimean Tatar literature and an outstanding Turkologist, teacher and public figure. To mark the anniversary of the great poet and as part of the Year of Teachers and Mentors, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library, with support from the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, plans to hold a library panorama “Bekir Choban-zade’s Word” throughout the year.

It should be noted that two libraries in the Crimea bear the name of the famous scientist and writer: the Bekir Choban-zade Crimean Tatar Library Branch No. 32 of the Belogorsk Centralised Library System, and the Bekir Choban-zade Library Branch No. 16 of the Simferopol Centralised Adult Library System.

The grand opening of the thematic cycle was attended by employees of the republican libraries and centralised library systems of the Crimea, creative intellectuals, public figures, admirers of the writer’s work, and the laureates of the Bekir Choban-zade International Prize.

Welcoming the guests, Gulnara Yagyaeva, Director of the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library, noted that the opening of the library panorama is the beginning of the events initiated by her institution in the year of Bekir Choban-zade’s birthdate anniversary.

Various writers, artists and librarians spoke about the life and talents of Bekir Choban-zade and the need to popularise his creative heritage. A review of the exhibition-portrait titled “The Heritage of Bekir Choban-zade” was held, and an exposition of paintings by Crimean honoured artists Zarema Trasinova and Irfan Nafiyev called “The Poet’s World” was presented. Some of the poetic and prosaic works by the classic as well works as created in his honour were read aloud at the event.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION. A classic of Crimean Tatar literature, a Turkologist, a teacher and a public figure, Bekir Sydkiy Choban-zade was born on the 15th of May (27th of May according to New Style) 1893 in Karasubazar (currently known as Belogorsk) and died on the 13th of October 1937 in Baku).

From 1909 to 1914, he studied at the Galatasaray Lyceum in Istanbul. In 1914, he graduated from the university courses of Arabic and French languages. He has also graduated from the Faculty of History and Philology of the University of Budapest. In 1919, he defended his thesis on “Apparent Synharmonic Inconsistencies in Codex Cumanicus and the Issue of the Articulatory Basis in Turkic Languages”.

Bekir Choban-zade has written about 200 publications, including over 120 scientific ones. His literary heritage includes about 80 pieces of poetry, two poems, and eight stories. He was a Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, a full member of the Azerbaijani Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and a member of the Paris Linguistic Society. In addition to Crimean Tatar, he also spoke Azerbaijani, Arabic, Hungarian, Kazakh, Karachay-Balkar, Kumyk, German, Persian, Russian, Turkish, Turkmen, Uzbek, and French. In 2006, the Bekir Choban-zade International Prize was established.

From 2012 to 2018, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library held literary soirees named “The World of Bekir Choban-zade”.

Exhibit D

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Shamil Aladin's 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held*
(14 July 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Shamil Aladin's 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held* (14 July 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9837>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

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**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> [Shamil Aladin's 110th Birthday Anniversary Evening Held](#)



The Republican Crimean Tatar Library continues familiarising its visitors with the various facets of the classical writer's heritage

With support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library continues its series of events in the memory of outstanding figures of culture and arts. More specifically, it held an evening called “High Service” dedicated to the 110th birthday anniversary of Shamil Aladin, a classic of Crimean Tatar national literature, a writer, a publicist, a public figure, and a participant of the Great Patriotic War.

The event was attended by Shamil Aladin’s colleagues, students, and relatives as well as scientists and readers who shared their memories of the writer and told the audience about the specific features of his works.

The Library conducted a review of a portrait exhibition named “YukseK Khyzmet” based on its collections. The guests were presented with a movie named “Nefaset” (“Elegance”) filmed for Shamil Aladin’s anniversary. They listened to archival audio recordings of some pieces of his poetry, including “Adzhizlik Ile Chatyshuv” (“Struggle against Helplessness”) featuring his live voice and “Ana” (“Mother”) recited by playwright Gani Murad, and a song titled “Kel, Guzelim” (“Come, the Beauty”) based on his lyrics (with the music written by Ilyas Bakhshish).

The Library will continue familiarising its users with the various facets of the classic’s works as part of its creative gallery.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION. Shamil Seitovich Alyadinov (who wrote under the pen name “Shamil Aladin”) was born on the 12th of July 1912 in the village of Makhuldur in the Kuibyshev District (currently known as Nagornoye in the Bakhchysarai District). He received his primary education at the local school and then continued his studies at a Bakhchisaray seven-year school. From 1928 till 1931, he studied at the Simferopol Pedagogical College and later graduated from the correspondence department of the Moscow Literary Institute. Shamil Aladin has authored dozens of literature collections.

Şamil was a member of the USSR Union of Writers (1939) and Board Chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers of Crimea (1939-1941). Following his people, he was deported from Crimea. In Uzbekistan, he was a member and Head of the Section of Crimean Tatar Writers under the Uzbekistani Union of Writers. He was awarded the titles of “Honoured Cultural Worker of the Uzbek SSR” (1973) and “Honoured Artist of the Uzbek SSR” (1982). He returned to Crimea in 1994 to stay in Simferopol. Shamil Aladin passed away on the 21st of May 1996.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit E

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Shamil Aladin's Benefit Performance Held as Part of Interregional Cooperation* (1 June 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Shamil Aladin's Benefit Performance Held as Part of Interregional Cooperation* (1 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

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**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

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The project is dedicated to the 110th birthday anniversary of the Crimean Tatar classical writer

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of interregional cooperation, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library hosted a benefit performance of Shamil Aladin.

The “High Service” event was held in a hybrid format with about 60 libraries from the Southern and North Caucasus Federal Districts and the Krasnodar Territory taking part.



Dedicated to the 110th birthday anniversary of Shamil Aladin, a classic of the Crimean Tatar literature, a publicist, a public figure and a participant of the Great Patriotic War, the event was arranged as the information and literary online dialogue “The Literary Caucasus: Hear the Fiery Words of Wisdom...”.

The Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library presented a virtual exhibition named “Excerpts from the Writer’s Front-Line Diary”. Teachers and students of the Institute of Philology of the Vladimir Vernadsky Crimean Federal University spoke at the event. Shamil Aladin’s poetic works “Pre-Dawn Nightingale” and “In the Trench” were performed in the Crimean Tatar and Russian languages as recorded by the author and read aloud by students of the Crimean Boarding School for Gifted Children. The song “I Fell in Love with You” based on Shamil Aladin’s lyrics was also presented to the audience.



During the benefit performance, the Ismail Gasprinsky Crimean Tatar Library presented its creative gallery that will continue to acquaint its users with various facets of Shamil Aladin's talent throughout the current year.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit F

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin's 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed* (24 November 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin's 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed* (24 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10386>.

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
**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Series of Events Dedicated to Shamil Aladin's 110th Birthday Anniversary Were Completed



During the thematic cycle, the users of the Republican Crimean Tatar Library familiarised themselves with various facets of the classical writer's heritage

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of the cultural and local history project called "The Crimea Where We Live", the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library completed its series of anniversary events as part of its single-writer creative gallery named "High Service" dedicated to the 110th birthday anniversary of Shamil Aladin, a classical writer of Crimean Tatar national literature, an essayist, a public figure and a participant of the Great Patriotic War.

During the thematic cycle, the users familiarised themselves with various facets of the classical writer's heritage.

The Library presented a literary view on "The Writer's Spiritual World" with participation of teachers and students of the Institute of Philology of the Vladimir Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. The event focused on the writer's special role in the Crimean Tatar literature. Specialists of the Library conducted a review of the virtual exhibition dedicated to certain stages of Shamil Aladin's life and work.

The guests of the anniversary cycle's final event – a literary review called "The Prose Writer's Talented Pen" – included writers, philologists, and journalists.

The participants shared their personal memories of Shamil Aladin and spoke about the artistic, linguistic, cultural and historical features of his works forming part of the golden fund of Crimean Tatar literature.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION. Shamil Seitovich Alyadinov (who wrote under the pen name "Shamil Aladin") was born on the 12th of July 1912 in the village of Makhuldur in the Kuibyshev District (currently known as Nagornoye in the Bakhchysaray District). From 1928 through 1931, he studied at the Simferopol Pedagogical College and later graduated from the correspondence department of the Moscow Literary Institute.

He is the author of poetic and prose collections titled "The Earth Smiled, the Sky Smiled" (1932), "Songs of the Chervony Cossack" (1935), "Life" (1940), "If You Love" (1961, 1962, and 1964), "Girl in Green" (1969), "Lanterns Burn until Dawn" (1969, 1970, and 1982), "Elmaz" (1972), "Iblisnin Ziyafitetine Davet" (1979), "Teselli" (1985), "Springs" (1987), and "I am Your King and God" (2004), as well as books "High Service" (1983), "Drillers" (1991), etc. His works have been translated into many languages.

Shamil Aladin was a member of the USSR Union of Writers (1939) and Board Chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers of Crimea (1939-1941). On 26 June 1941, he volunteered to go to the front. After being wounded, he participated in the guerrilla movement. Later, he was deported from Crimea.

In Uzbekistan, he was a member and the head of the Section of Crimean Tatar Writers under the Uzbekistani Union of Writers. He was directly involved in the establishment of the newspaper Leninskoye Znamya, the magazine Yildiz, the ensemble Haytarma, and a radio editorial office.

Shamil Aladin has been awarded the titles of "Honoured Cultural Worker of the Uzbek SSR" (1973) and "Honoured Artist of the Uzbek SSR" (1982).

He returned to Crimea in 1994 to stay in Simferopol. Shamil Aladin passed away on the 21st of May 1996.

Exhibit G

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan* (13 September 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan* (13 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10045>.

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**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

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> Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan



Republican Crimean Tatar Library Holds Historical and Literary Event Dedicated to Halim Geray Sultan

The event was arranged by the *Inspiration* Association

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library hosted a historical and literary event called “Walks in the Khans’ Rose Garden”, which was arranged by the *Inspiration* Literary Association and dedicated to the 250th birthday anniversary of Halim Geray Sultan, a Crimean Khan, a poet, and a Crimean Tatar classical writer.

The Library’s user service section conducted a review of a book titled “Gulbyun-i Khanan” (“The Khans’ Pink Flower Garden, or the History of Crimea”), which describes the biographies of the 44 Crimean Khans. The review was supplemented by excerpts from the book and pieces of poetry written by Halim Geray in the 18th century.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit H

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library*
Continues Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association (1 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library Continues Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association (1 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10420>.*

Government of the Republic of Crimea

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**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

31 January, Tuesday

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> [Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library Continues Cycle of Events by “Inspiration” Literary Association](#)



The meetings with readers are aimed at popularising the creative heritage of the outstanding Crimean Tatar writers and public figures

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library continues its series of events prepared by the “Inspiration” Literary Association.

The meetings with readers are aimed at popularising the creative heritage of the outstanding Crimean Tatar writers and public figures.



During the loud readings called “Humorous Stories”, dedicated to the 105th anniversary of Yakub Zekka, the guests got acquainted with the writer’s biography and works, items of the Library’s collections, and the stories titled “Knock off a Bottle between Three”, “Magic Deception” and others.



The readings were attended by Seyyare Medzhitova, a poetess and journalist, Alie Seitumerova, one of the first members of the literary club, and readers. To make Yakub Zekka's works more readily available to a wider audience, the Library's official website presented "Cheat Sheet" and "Football as a Passion", which were read aloud out by Elvira Kapnist, a poetess, and Seville Gafarova, a regular reader.



The Library held an event named "Sorrowful Memories of the Poet" dedicated to the 95th anniversary of Idris Asanin, a poet, a writer, a public figure and a participant in the Crimean Tatar national movement.

The writer's archive stored in the Library's department of rare books, manuscripts and archival materials contains documents about the history, literature and culture of the Crimean Tatars as well as rich illustrative materials.

The guests and participants of the meeting shared their memories of the poet and recited his works. The speakers included students of the Crimean Boarding School for Gifted Children as well as Crimean poets. The event was complemented by presentations and an exhibition revealing all facets of the activities of the outstanding writer and public figure.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit I

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Krym” Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert
Programme Presented (16 January 2023)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Krym” Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert Programme Presented (16 January 2023), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10583>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble’s Concert Programme Presented



The Ensemble performed traditional dances that make up the classics of folk choreography.

On the stage of the Simferopol Cultural and Leisure Centre, the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble of the Crimean State Philharmonic presented its concert programme called “Sound, My Crimea”, which has absorbed all the best created by the Crimean Tatar national culture and brightly and emotionally reflected its past and present.

The programme was written by Server Kakura, Artistic Director of the Ensemble and Honoured Artist of Ukraine, the Republic of Tatarstan and the Republic of Crimea. Nazire Emir, Honoured Artist of the Republic of Crimea, was the programme’s choreographer.

Both young and venerable performers and masters of folk song, including Yunus Kakura, Afeze Kasara, Asie Saale, Mamet Kharhara, and Arsen Bekirov, Honoured Artist of the Republic of Crimea and the Republic of Tatarstan, took part in the concert.

The Ensemble performed traditional dances that make up the classics of folk choreography: *Tym-tym*, *Agyr ava ve haytarma*, *Choban oyuny*, *Yavluk avasy*, *Yigitler*, and *Khoran*. A colourful musical and choreographic action recreating the “Bride Colouring Evening” from the traditional Wedding Rite, the performance was filled with warmth and tenderness.

Maye Anafiyeva, Honoured Artist of the Republic of Crimea, presented a solo choreographic composition in the folk style “If I Was a Bird” made in the best traditions of Selima Chelebiyeva, a legendary folk dancer.

A piece called “Tunes of the Motherland”, which was masterfully performed by an instrumental ensemble, left a vivid impression.

Elmar Ablayev, Honoured Artist of the Republic of Crimea, an actor, a theatre and film director, and a screenwriter, acted as the host of the concert programme and an elocutionist.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit J

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki* (14 October 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki* (14 October 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10203>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery” Held in Saki



Creative collectives presented their concert programme named “Prosperity in Unity”

As part of the All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Stages of Mastery”, local creative collectives presented their concert programme named “Prosperity in Unity” at the Yuri Bogatikov Children’s Music School in Saki.

Nadezhda Latysheva, Director of the Museum of Local Lore and the History of Mud Therapy, conducted for the guests and the jury of the project a tour of an exhibition of products of decorative and applied arts and artistic creativity made by Saki masters.

The concert programme included songs and poems about love for the Motherland in the Russian and Crimean Tatar languages. The folk Cossack ensemble of songs and dances “Free Wind” united all those present with its dance “Friendship of Peoples”. A cheerful hytarma was also performed.

The All-Crimean Amateur Art Contest “Steps of Mastery” will last until the end of this year. Alushta will become the next region to present its concert programme. Performances of vocal and choreographic collectives and individual performers will take place on the 8th of November.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit K

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its
34th Season* (30 September 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre* Opens Its 34th Season (30 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10133>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre Opens Its 34th Season



The Theatre premiered a drama named “Sabriye” dedicated to the life and work of Sabriye Eredzhepova, a great master of the Crimean Tatar art of singing

The Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre opened its 34th season.

As part of the start of the new theatrical season, the Theatre premiered a drama named “Sabriye”. The play is dedicated to the life and work of Sabriye Eredzhepova, a great master of the Crimean Tatar art of singing. The touching performance stroke a chord of every spectator. The following friends who lived next door to Sabriye Eredzhepova in Tashkent actively assisted in writing and producing the play: Lilya Dzhemileva and her daughter Gulnara Murtaayeva; Sabriye Apte, a friend of Sabriye Eredzhepova’s family; Rustema Memetova, Gulizar Bekirova and Zarema Khanum, colleagues of Sabriye Eredzhepova; Zarema Trasinova (who helped clarify the biographical details of Sabriye Eredzhepova); and Prof. Ibrahim Kerimov (who provided consultations on her creative work).

In addition, in this October, the Crimean Tatar Academic Music and Drama Theatre will present its performances “Sunny Friend” based on the play by Renat Bektashev, “Amet Khan, the Heavenly Sultan” describing the life and exploits of Amet-Khan Sultan, a native Crimean, a legendary ace and twice Hero of the Soviet Union, and “Eki Asyr Arasynda” depicting the main milestones of the biography, creativity and journalism of Ismail Gasprinsky, a famous enlightener, and its concert programme named “By the Road of Good”.

The Theatre plans to give those performances in Simferopol, its home city, and as field shows in a variety of other Crimean cities, towns and villages. Spectators will be able to visit those performances by presenting their Pushkin Cards.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit L

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian
Karaites Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project*
(18 November 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian Karaite Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project (18 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10365>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#) > Zinadinov Family Ensemble and Aga-Dumpa Feodosian Karaite Fest to Represent Crimea in “Anthology of Folk Culture” Federal Project



The presentation of the federal project “Anthology of Folk Culture” became the key event of the international forum of the CIS and Baltic countries “Folk Cultures in the 21st Century: Traditions and Innovations”

The presentation of the federal project “Anthology of Folk Culture” became the key event of the international forum of the CIS and Baltic countries “Folk Cultures in the 21st Century: Traditions and Innovations” in St. Petersburg. The project includes 100 objects of the intangible cultural heritage of the Russian peoples. The Crimea is represented by the Zinadinov Family Ensemble from the village of Michurinskoye in the Belogorsk District and the Aga-Dumpa Feodosian Karaites.

The forum was founded by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and organised by the Vasily Polenov State Russian House of Folk Art.

The international forum is intended to form a uniform cultural space, disseminate knowledge about national cultures, and draw the attention of both governmental authorities and the general public to the issues of intangible cultural heritage.

Professionals and specialists from 40 regions of Russia as well as Kazakhstan and Belarus took part in the forum. During the plenary session, discussion platforms and round tables, the participants discussed how to study and popularise Russia’s ethno-cultural heritage. Experts from the houses of folk arts and centres of traditional culture unveiled their scientific, methodological and educational releases.

Olga Chernikova, Director of the Centre of Folk Arts, took part in the forum on behalf of the Republic of Crimea.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit M

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre (23 December 2022)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre (23 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10524>.

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
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> “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” Premiere Took Place at Crimean Tatar Academic Theatre



The play was based on the famous poem by Alexander Pushkin.

The Crimean Tatar State Academic Music and Drama Theatre premiered a drama titled “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray”.

For almost three months, the Theatre’s artists, directors, props, painters, and composers have worked hard to stage Oedipus Emir’s script based on the famous poem by Alexander Pushkin. The play has been directed by Yuri Khadzhinov.

While working on the stage performance, the company visited the Khan’s Palace in Bakhchisaray to immerse themselves more deeply into the roles and atmosphere of the epoch of the Crimean Khanate. The bellicose scenes performed by the ballet dancers and the gentle voices of the vocalists in the episodes showing the harem’s life undoubtedly added depth and dynamism to the play. Khan Giray’s tragedy, Maria’s thoughts of retribution, and Zarema’s unconditional love for her homeland and the Khan have all convolved together in the Crimean Tatar Theatre’s new drama named “The Fountain of Bakhchisaray” (*Bağçasaray Çeşmesi*).

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit N

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held*
(16 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held (16 December 2022)*, available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10492>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> All-Russian Scientific Conference on Topical Issues and Prospects of Development of Cultural and Historical Heritage of Crimean Tatars Held



The scientific forum was dedicated to the memory of Noman Chelebijhan, Mufti of the Crimean Muslims and a famous socio-political figure.

With support from the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage hosted an All-Russian Scientific Conference with International Participation on Topical Issues and Prospects of the Development of the Cultural and Historical Heritage of the Crimean Tatars dedicated to the memory of Noman Chelebijhan, Mufti of the Crimean Muslims and a famous socio-political and literary figure, and to the 105th anniversary of the First Kurultai of the Crimean Tatar People.

The conference was arranged for by the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage in conjunction with the editorial board of the newspaper “Crimea’s Voice New” and the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to discuss topical issues related to the preservation, study and popularisation of the Crimean historical and cultural heritage.


Safiye Eminova, Director of the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage, opened the event by expressing gratitude to those present for their participation in the conference.



Raim Gafarov, Deputy Mufti of the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, made a welcoming speech.



The conference included speeches by representatives of the scientific community, public organisations and educational institutions as well as museum experts.



The final plenary session summed up the results of the scientific forum. At the end of the event, exhibitions prepared by the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage were presented to the audience.



Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit O

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev's 120th
Birthday Anniversary* (9 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev's 120th Birthday Anniversary* (9 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10453>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> [Events Held to Celebrate Emirasan Kurtmollayev's 120th Birthday Anniversary](#)



The events were arranged for as part of the project “Enlightenment” by the Ismail Gasprinsky Crimean Tatar Library

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of the cultural and educational project “Enlightenment”, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library arranged for a series of events dedicated to the 120th birthday anniversary of Emirasan Kurtmollayev, an outstanding linguist and teacher.

For example, a biblio-lesson named “Philological Scientist Emirasan Kurtmollayev” was held on the premises of Secondary School 22 in Simferopol. Library experts told the students about Mr. Kurtmollayev’s scientific works and presented some pieces of literature in the Crimean Tatar language.

The Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library hosted an hour of science named “A Scientist Deeply Worried about His Native Language”. The event was attended by employees and students of the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University, creative intellectuals, journalists, and relatives of the scientist. The participants noted the contribution made by Emirasan Kurtmollayev to the development of Crimean Tatar linguistics and national language studies and shared memories of his life.

As part of the event, a thematic exhibition of books and documents from the library collections was presented.

HISTORICAL INFORMATION. Emirasan Kurtmollayev was born on 7 December 1902 in the village of Buyuk-Ozenbash (currently known as Schastlivoye) in the Bakhchisaray District. He graduated from the Totaikoy Pedagogical College (1926) and the Faculty of the Crimean Tatar Language and Literature of the Mikhail Frunze Crimean Pedagogical Institute (1930). After completing his postgraduate studies at this University in 1933-1941, he taught at an institute and worked as a senior researcher at the Pushkin Research Institute of Tatar Language and Literature. He participated in the Second and Third All-Crimean Scientific Conferences on the Crimean Tatar Language (in 1929 and 1934). He has authored/co-authored and edited many textbooks for schools. “Spelling Dictionary of the Crimean Tatar Language” prepared by a team of scientists including Mr. Kurtmollayev was reprinted four times from 1936 through 1941.

During the Great Patriotic War, he served in the rank of lieutenant and participated in the partisan movement in Crimea. During the deportation years, he taught in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and had his articles published in Leninskoye Znamya.

He passed away on the 11th of April 1973 in the city of Alma-Ata.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit P

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky* (13 October 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky* (13 October 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10201>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#) > [Historians, Archaeologists, Ethnologists, Art Historians and Language Experts Participated in Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky](#)



The reports presented found a very receptive audience

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, a conference named “X Bakhchisaray Academic Readings in Memory of Usein Bodaninsky” was held in the Bakhchisaray Historical, Cultural and Archaeological Museum Reserve.

More than 40 professionals and researchers in the fields of history, archaeology, ethnology, art history, and linguistics from Crimea and other regions of Russia took part in the event dedicated to the 145th birthday anniversary of historian, artist, art historian and ethnographer Usein Bodaninsky. The reports presented found a very receptive audience.

The conference made it possible to achieve the key goals set by its organiser – to create an intellectual discussion platform and enable a free exchange of information and practical experience, and establish direct contacts between scientists, museum researchers and other interested parties.

The participants familiarised themselves with the exhibitions of the Ismail Gasprinsky Memorial Museum.

Summing up, the importance of holding such scientific events both for society in general and for science and culture, in particular, was noted.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit Q

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage*
Presents New Exhibition (30 November 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage Presents New Exhibition* (30 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10413>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage Presents New Exhibition



The exhibition named “From the Origins to Perfection” describes the history, traditions and culture of the Crimean Tatars

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage presented an exhibition named “From the Origins to Perfection”.

The exhibition showcases ancient handmade items dated back from the late 19th century to the early 20th century from the Museum’s collections as well as works by modern masters, including embroideries, weavings, clothes, ceramic vessels and dishes, felt products, copper dishes, etc., introducing the visitors to the history, traditions and culture of the Crimean Tatars.

The works by jeweller Eldar Islamov, coppersmiths Rustem and Nuri Dervish, ceramists Eldar Gusenov, Abdyulya Seit-Ametov, Edem Ganiyev, Aziz and Anifa Velillyaev, and Bekir Musa, felt masters Niyara Memetova and Elmas Appazova, master of artistic and gold embroidery Khalide Kipchakova and costume designer Venera Kurmaeva, who are also the founders and teachers of Steps School, and their students, as well as embroiderers Venera Bekirova, Zore Ziyadinova and Emine Mustafaeva demonstrate original and diverse arts and crafts, traditions being guarded and preserved, and the continuity of generations being secured.

During the presentation of the exhibition, Safiye Eminova, Director of the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage, as well as a master of artistic and gold embroidery Khalide Kipchakova and embroiderers Zore Ziyadinova and Venera Bekirova delivered their speeches.

The event was accompanied by folk songs performed by Yunus Kakura, a vocalist of the Crimean Tatar folklore ensemble “Crimea” of the Crimean State Philharmonic.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit R

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in Bakhchisaray* (1 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in Bakhchisaray (1 December 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10416>.

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> “Khan’s Palace as Open-Air Museum” Exhibition Presented in Bakhchisaray



The exhibition showcases stylised interiors of workshops, a student class and private rooms as well as the finds discovered during archaeological research and restoration works.

The Museum of History and Culture of the Crimean Tatars of the Bakhchisaray Museum Reserve presented an exhibition named “The Khan’s Palace as an Open-Air Museum”.

The exhibition introduces the visitors to the history of Bakhchisaray, the Khan’s Palace and its inhabitants.

The exhibition showcases stylised interiors of craft workshops, a student class and private rooms of the Palace. The finds discovered during the archaeological research and restoration works in the territory of the Khan’s Palace are also demonstrated, including decorative sheathing elements, tiles, fragments of pottery pipes and ceramic floor tiles, a fragment of a marble slab, forged nails, fragments of plaster with paintings, and a copy of a stained-glass window.

The Palace’s buildings, the large Khan’s mosque, the family cemetery of the rulers of the Crimean Khanate, archaeological sites, numerous fountains, parks, and gardens – a survey of the entire complex of the Khan’s Palace combined with a display of items in show windows will help the visitors to immerse themselves in the historical past.

The exhibition will be open until the 20th of December.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit S

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near”* (30 June 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near”* (30 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9760>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Crimean Tatar History and Culture Museum Hosted Thematic Event Called “Bakhchisaray: The History Is Near”



The Bakhchisaray Museum Reserve presented the participants with commemorative gifts – self-published catalogues of the items from the Museum’s collection

The Museum of the Crimean Tatar History and Culture hosted a thematic event called “Bakhchisaray: The History is Near”. During the event, students of the School Academy of Bakhchisaray visited the Museum’s historical exposition describing the traditions and customs of the Crimean Tatars.



An employee of the Museum's excursion section told the young visitors about the history of Bakhchisaray, the construction phases of the Khan's Palace, and the monuments located in the Museum's territory.

At the end of the event, the Museum presented the participants with commemorative gifts – self-published catalogues of the items from the Museum's collection.



Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit T

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage”* (10 November 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage”* (10 November 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10323>.

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[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#) > Republican Library Holds Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture Called “Rich Palette of National Heritage”



The event was held as part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia and dedicated to 145th birthday anniversary of Usein Bodaninsky

With the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library arranged for the Day of Crimean Tatar Writing and Culture called “The Rich Palette of National Heritage”.

The event was held as part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia and dedicated to 145th birthday anniversary of Usein Bodaninsky, an outstanding Crimean ethnographer, archaeologist, artist and museology enthusiast.

Facsimile publications based on books from the rare collection of the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library were presented as part of its joint project with the Mediacentre n.a. I. Gasprinsky. During the event, research fellows of the Bakhchisaray Historical, Cultural and Archaeological Museum Reserve and the House of Peoples’ Friendship delivered their speeches. Specialists of the Library conducted a review at the portrait exhibition named “Usein Bodaninsky: a Local Lore Researcher, Historian, Ethnographer, Archaeologist, and Historian”.

Students of the Pyotr Tchaikovsky Simferopol Musical College and Crimean creative collectives also performed.

The events were attended by representatives of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, the Mediacentre n.a. I. Gasprinsky, the House of Peoples’ Friendship, library and museum professionals, young people, and library readers.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit U

Preserve Museum “Sudak fortress”, *At Native Roots* (22 June 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Preserve Museum "Sudak fortress", *At Native Roots* (22 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9596>.

NEWS

July 22, 2022

AT NATIVE ROOTS

On July 22, through the joint efforts of the SBI RC "Preserve Museum "Sudak fortress" and the SBI RC "Historical and Archaeological Preserve Museum "Kalos Limen" with the support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, a new inter-museum project "At Native Roots" was opened.

The life of the Slavic people encompasses customs, traditions and rituals that have evolved over the centuries. The Slavs have always been known for their industriousness and taste for beauty. Carved and woven things combined practicality and elegance of forms. Girls and women decorated their clothes and towels with wonderful embroidery. The potters' skills were handed down from parents to children and became a family craft.

The exhibition features museum items from the collection of the preserve museums "Sudak Fortress" and "Kalos Limen", telling about the material and spiritual culture of the Slavic peoples.

In keeping with folk tradition, guests were welcomed with folk tales and cool kvass.

Opening the exhibition, the director of the preserve museum "Sudak Fortress" Svetlana Emets noted the relevance of the exhibition against the background of the culture of rejection of everything Russian reigning in hostile countries. The museum objects on display help to better understand the deeper meaning of Slavic identity. Svetlana Grigoryevna gave the example of outstanding sons of Russia: Pushkin, Lermontov, Mendeleev, Suvorov. They were all proud of their Russianness.

Olga Panasevich, a chief curator of the historical and archaeological preserve museum "Kalos Limen", thanked her Sudak colleagues for the new joint project and expressed hope for further fruitful cooperation.

Svetlana Neklyasa, a researcher at the "Kalos Limen" preserve museum, took a creative approach to guide visitors through the new exhibition. The museum worker, dressed in folk costume, spoke about the exhibits with inspiration and using metaphors, and concluded the tour with a performance of a Ukrainian folk song.

The first visitors walked around the exhibition hall and looked with interest at unique hand embroidery on women's clothes, towels, tablecloths, pillowcases and curtains; curious everyday objects of the late XIX - early XX centuries: cast iron and coal irons, wooden fluted flat ironing boards, coal samovars, stoves, true works of art - spinners and spindles, traditional Slavic utensils, earthenware and wooden dishes. The reconstruction of a part of a Russian or Ukrainian hut (which did not differ from each other in Crimea) with its essential attribute - Russian stove and old exhibits has created an idea about the peculiarities of Slavic dwelling space organization.

The opening of the new inter-museum project was broadcasted online at the official page of the preserve museum "Sudak Fortress" in the social network "Odnoklassniki" (<https://ok.ru/live/4202150174612>).

The exhibition will be on display until September 22, 2022 in the Historical Museum (former Funk Mansion) at 11 Naberezhnaya Street, Sudak city.

Exhibit V

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples* (30 September 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples (30 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10134>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#) > “Return to the Origins” Exhibition Displays over 20 Old Traditional Costumes, Including New Ones Sewn by Modern Crimean Designers Pattern-Shaped to 19th Century Samples



The exhibition is part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia

The Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage, with support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea and as part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia, presents an exhibition named “Return to the Origins”. The items displayed include both works enriched with artistic ornaments dated back to the period from the late 19th century to the early 20th century and works by today’s masters who have preserved the continuity of traditions. The exhibition displays more than 20 traditional costumes, including both old and new ones, the latter having been sewn by modern Crimean designers pattern-shaped to the samples of the 19th century.

Nurie Gemedzhi, Deputy Director of the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage, opened the event by expressing her gratitude to the organisers and participants of the exhibition as well as noting the high professionalism of the modern masters and their creative approach to their work.

Lera Asanova, head of the student fashion laboratory “SeLyaM” of the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University representing the Simferopol city administration, delivered a welcoming speech. Zure Pinka, a methodologist of the Crimean Tatar Museum of Cultural and Historical Heritage, told the audience about the features of ancient and modern samples of clothing.

Afiza Kasara, an Honoured Artist of Crimea and a soloist of the Krym Crimean Tatar Folklore Ensemble of the Crimean State Philharmonic, performed Crimean Tatar folk songs.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit W

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia's Peoples* (26 September 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia's Peoples* (26 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10105>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> [Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia's Peoples](#)



Crimea Presents Its Unique Historical and Cultural Heritage at Festival of Culture and Sports of Southern Russia's Peoples

108 просмотров

26.09.2022

A Crimean creative delegation led by Andrey Tereshchenko, Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, took part in the events

Crimea's unique historical and cultural heritage was presented at the XII Festival of Culture and Sports of the Peoples of Southern Russia in the city of Grozny, Chechen Republic.

A Crimean creative delegation led by Andrey Tereshchenko, Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, took part in the Festival's events.

The XII Festival of Culture and Sports of the Peoples of Southern Russia was held by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Sports of the Russian Federation. The cultural programme was arranged by *Rosconcert*. Part of the Demography National Project, the Festival is intended to facilitate the preservation of traditional cultures and national sports, strengthen friendship, and further develop interethnic relations among the peoples of Russia.

The Crimea presented its thematic platform: the national crafts of the local peoples reflect Crimea's centuries-old history, ancient traditions, and craftsmanship passed down from generation to generation. For example, an exposition of the Crimean Tatar culture and arts displayed traditional crafts: ceramics, felting, caracul dressing, copper articles, and traditional embroidery (by Khatidzhe Yunusova). Master classes were held in the area of blacksmithing (by Raim Minayev), a traditional metal processing or metalware making craft that uses forging or stamping. An exhibition of historical ceramics (by Alexander Cheremisov) revealed the relationship between drawings, symbols, forms and techniques of ceramics making, on the one hand, and the peoples and nationalities inhabiting the Crimean Peninsula, on the other hand. An exposition of Slavic culture and arts (by Svetlana Sergeyeva) presented traditional crafts, including embroidery, weaving from natural materials, ceramics, folk dolls, belt weaving, lace weaving, and painting.

In addition, national costumes of the local peoples and models of some of Crimea's famous sightseeing places such as the Juma-Jami Mosque in Yevpatoria, the Swallow's Nest palace and castle on the rock of Cape of Ai-Todor, the Armenian Church in Yalta, the Stamboli Dacha in Feodosia, and the Bridge of Lovers in Sevastopol were demonstrated.

Andrey Tereshchenko, Deputy Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, acquainted Lyudmila Sirotkina, Head of the Section of Musical and Folk Arts of the Department of State Support of Arts and Folk Arts of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, Musa Dadayev, Minister of Physical Culture and Sports of the Chechen Republic, Rustam Milkiyev, Deputy Minister of Culture of the Chechen Republic, and the heads of state authorities in the fields of culture and sports of the regions of the Southern Federal District and the North Caucasus Federal District of Russia with the work of the "courtyard", a Crimean creative platform.

The Crimean delegation took part in the all-Russian forum of national creative collectives called "Multinational Russia", a significant event of the Festival.

Also, the Festival's concert programme featured Elmira Nalbantova, a People's Artist of the Republic of Crimea and an Honoured Artist of Ukraine, and the Crimean Tatar dance ensemble "Atesh" (led by Midat Khalilov), a laureate of numerous festivals.

We may recall that the Festival of Culture and Sports of the Peoples of Southern Russia has been held annually since 2010. Over those years, it has become an authoritative and representative platform for wide discussions and demonstrations of outstanding achievements in culture and sports. In 2021, the Festival was held in Alushta, Republic of Crimea.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit X

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural Heritage Year (23 September 2022)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “*Sketches from Derviza*” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural Heritage Year (23 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10103>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> “Sketches from Derviza” Folk Crafts Fair Held as Part of Cultural Heritage Year



The event took place in the Republican Crimean Tatar Library

As part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of Russia, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library held a fair of folk crafts named “Sketches from *Derviza*”.

Gulnara Yagyaeva, Director of the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library, addressed the guests with a welcoming speech and congratulated all those present at the harvest festival *Derviza*.

At the fair, students of the Crimean Boarding School for Gifted Children were introduced to the origin and celebration of *Derviza* among the Crimean Tatars. In addition, they took part in interactive games and received valuable gifts.

The Library prepared an exhibition named “We Invite You to *Derviza!*” including stock books and other materials. A musical performance by the Crimean Tatar ensemble “Dzhemile” was in the limelight of everyone’s attention.

The “Rodnichok” Centre for Crimean Tatar Children’s Readings prepared and held a festive programme for the kids.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit Y

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be Held* (20 September 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be Held* (20 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10075>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> Fifth International Scientific and Practical Conference on Crimean Ethnography of 19th -21st
Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes Will Be Held



An exhibition from the Vologda State Museum Reserve's collections will also be presented on the 21st of September.

On the 21st of September, Simferopol will host the V International Scientific and Practical Conference on the Crimean Ethnography of the 19th through 21st Centuries and Modern Ethno-Cultural Processes, which is dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Crimean Ethnographic Museum.

The Conference will cover the following key topics:

- Ethnography of the Crimean Peoples: Sources and Study History;
- Issues of the Ethnic History of the Crimea and Adjacent Territories;
- Traditional Occupations, Crafts, and Decorative and Applied Arts of the Peoples of the Black Sea Region;
- Spiritual Traditions, Rituals and Folklore of the Crimean Peoples;
- Ethno-Confessional Processes in the Crimea: History and Modernity;
- Today's Theories and Practices of Ethnological Research: Domestic and Foreign Experience;
- Ethnographic Museums: The History of Concepts and Collections; and
- Crimea's Ethno-Cultural Heritage and Its Use in Tourism.

Speeches will be made at the Conference by 43 scientists, local lore specialists, historians and museologists from Simferopol, Yevpatoria, Bakhchysarai, Feodosia, Sevastopol, St. Petersburg, Kazan, Moscow and Omsk.

The Conference will begin at 10:00 AM in the Crimean Ethnographic Museum.

As part of the event, an exhibition named "Islands of Traditions" from the Vologda State Museum Reserve's collections will be presented at 6:30 PM on the same day.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit Z

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “*Crimean Tatar Book*” Forum Organised for Kerch Library
Professionals (7 September 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum Organised for Kerch Library Professionals (7 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10018>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum Organised for Kerch Library Professionals



The cultural and educational project has been implemented for five years

With support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library arranged for and held a library forum named “Crimean Tatar Book” for professionals of the Kerch Library System. The Library has been implementing this cultural and educational project over the past five years.

Opening the event, Elmira Kurtmemetova, Head of the Department of Culture of the Kerch Administration, noted the importance of events intended to study and popularise the local lore knowledge as well as the literary and cultural heritage. Leilya Kadyrova, Deputy Director of the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library, and Lyudmila Popova, Director of the Kerch Centralised Library System, addressed the audience with greetings.

Vladimir Polyakov, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Professor at the Department of History of the Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University, shared the results of his research and publishing projects about the Crimean Tatars who took part in the Great Patriotic War, including those born in Kerch.

As part of the creative platform named “Literature Space: Opinions, Representations, and Expectations”, the Ismail Gasprinsky Media Centre presented an overview of the “portfolio” of national periodicals.

An autograph session was held in a bright and emotional way where Venera Ryabchikova (writing under the pen name of “Yulduz”), a member of the Union of Writers of the Republic of Crimea, a poet, a translator, and a theatre critic, presented her new collection of poems and translations titled “The Cool Light of the Autumn Moon”, and Valery Basyrov, an Honoured Arts Worker of the Republic of Crimea, a poet, a prose writer, a translator, and a book publisher, presented his book “I Was Not a Guest on Earth...”.

During the Librarian’s Open Workshop, professionals of the Republican Library presented a video chronicle of the forum, a slide review titled “Kerch: People and Destinies”, and a creative review named “Point of Growth – People’s Culture” based on Elmira Osmanova’s book titled “Yol Shashyrma: the Crimean Tatar Traditional Embroidery Technique”. A methodologist of the Vissarion Belinsky Central City Library shared information on best librarian practices to promote national books and cultures of the peoples living in Crimea. The project was musically illustrated by an ethnic composition performed by the dance collective “Varirach” and the performances by the vocal ensemble “Lyale” and the vocal and instrumental ensemble “Khydyrlez” of the Yuri Bogatikov Kerch Culture and Leisure Centre.

The participants were pleased with the useful and constructive atmosphere of the event and noted that it created new opportunities for working with readers in the areas mentioned above.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AA

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum in Sevastopol (26 June 2022)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library* Holds “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum in Sevastopol (26 June 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9754>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> [Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Library Holds “Crimean Tatar Book” Forum in Sevastopol](#)



The project is intended to increase the prestige of the national literature and actualise the municipal libraries' local lore research efforts

Since 2018, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library has been arranging for the Crimean Tatar Book Library Forum in the Crimean regions, which is intended to increase the prestige of the national literature and actualise the municipal libraries' local lore research efforts.

The event was held for library professionals of the Regional Information and Library System (a state budgetary cultural institution of Sevastopol). Elena Volkova, Director of the System, stressed the importance of libraries for promoting the national books in the multicultural space of the region.

As part of the Year of the Cultural Heritage of Russia, the Ismail Gasprinsky Republican Crimean Tatar Library presented a review named "Sevastopol: People and Destinies" and a cultural research project called "The Song: The Folk Identity Code" (the history of the folk song "Aqyar", which is the Crimean Tatar name for Sevastopol). Cooperation with national autonomies and prospects for providing libraries with books in native languages were also discussed.

The Ismail Gasprinsky Media Centre traditionally participated in the event. It presented periodicals (the newspapers *Meraba* and *Yany Dyunya*, and the first youth magazine *My!*). Venera Kurmayeva, President of the Prof. Sabri Izidinov Sevastopol Foundation for the Revival of the Crimean Tatar Culture, spoke on the Foundation's project activities in response to social needs.

The performance of the Crimean Tatar folk dance "Tym-Tym" by the girls of the kids' choreographic ensemble "Kyrym Yildyzlary" became a musical illustration for the event.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AB

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian Cultural Festival* (30 August 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian Cultural Festival (30 August 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9984>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#) > Crimean Central Library Hosted “Obzhinki” Ukrainian Cultural Festival



Traditionally dedicated to the end of the harvest period, the festive event is held as part of the Days of the Ukrainian Culture in Crimea.

The Ivan Franko Crimean Republican Universal Scientific Library hosted a regional festival of Ukrainian culture called “Obzhinki”. Traditionally dedicated to the end of the harvest period, this festive event is held as part of the Days of the Ukrainian Culture in Crimea.

The annual event involved various creative collectives. In accordance with ancestral traditions, the festival featured a ceremony where the hostess was given the last sheaf cut on a field as a symbol of prosperity.



The performances by the vocal and instrumental ensemble “Singing Hearts” and the vocal group “Kumushki” became a musical gift for the guests. During the event, pieces of poetry in Russian and Ukrainian associated with the festival were also read aloud.



Obzhinki has become one of the favourite festive events for the residents and guests of the Crimean Peninsula. The fun contests, Ukrainian flavour, pleasant souvenirs as well as cheerful songs and dances appealed to every guest.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AC

Government of the Republic of Crimea, *State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea: Crimea Celebrates Popular Fest Called “Obzhinki”* (29 August 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Government of the Republic of Crimea, State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea: Crimea Celebrates Popular Fest Called “Obzhinki” (29 August 2022), available at: <https://rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/16927>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

OFFICIAL PORTAL

3 February, Friday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#) > State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea: Crimea Celebrates Popular Fest Called “Obzhinki”



The event was supported by the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the

Republic of Crimea.

In the Republic of Crimea, a popular fest called “Obzhinki” was celebrated. The event held in the town of Saki was arranged for by the public organisation “Ukrainian Community of Crimea”, House of Peoples’ Friendship (a state budgetary institution of the Republic of Crimea) and the Saki town administration with support from the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea.



Ruslan Yakubov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of

the Republic of Crimea, noted that this holiday in the Crimea serves as a clear example of the efforts to preserve the national traditions, customs and culture of the Ukrainian people while creating a friendly atmosphere and uniting people of different nationalities and religions.

The event was attended by Elizaveta Glushchenko, Deputy Minister for Internal Policy, Information and Communications of the Republic of Crimea and Head of the Ministry's Domestic Policy Department, and Ivan Shonus, Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Public Diplomacy and Interethnic Relations of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea and Chairman of the public organisation "Regional National and Cultural Autonomy of the Greeks in the Republic of Crimea 'Taurida'". Mr. Shonus extended his congratulations and presented gratitude by the State Council to a member of the Ukrainian community of Crimea for his significant contribution to the strengthening of the Ukrainian culture in the Republic of Crimea as well as his activity, conscientious work, and professionalism.

As part of the festival, a festive concert was held, including folk sports, contests, and a theatrical performance with elements of the traditions and customs of the peoples of Crimea.

Press Service of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AD

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *“Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners
Announced (31 May 2022)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, “Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners Announced (31 May 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9585>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

[Government of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea](#) > [News](#)
> “Derviza” Crimean Tatar Art Contest Festival Winners Announced



Over 250 creative collectives and soloists took part in the qualifying rounds

The winners of the Fifth *Derviza* Crimean Tatar Art Competition Festival were announced. The key goal of the creative project is to preserve and promote the performing arts and traditions of the Crimean Tatar people. The Competition Festival was organised by the Centre of Folk Arts of the Republic of Crimea with support of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea.

The Crimean Tatar State Academic Music and Drama Theatre hosted the final of the Competition Festival. The competent jury selected up to five professional and amateur participants of the final round in the areas of “Vocal Art”, “Choreographic Art”, “Musical and Instrumental Art” and “Conversational Genre”.

The jury (chaired by Nikolay Antyufriyev, an Honoured Artist of Ukraine, an Honoured Cultural Worker of the Republic of Crimea, and Deputy Director of the Centre for Folk Arts of the Republic of Crimea) decided the grand prix winners, the winners in nominations, and the winners in age categories (whose names were published on the organiser’s website). This year, over 250 creative collectives and soloists took part in the qualifying rounds.

The award ceremony with a gala concert will take place in September 2022.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea



Exhibit AE

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Letter No. 3096/10-11/4, 3 February 2023.

**Republic of Crimea
Council of Ministers
Ministry of Culture**

Tel/fax <...>

e-mail: <...>

web: [http:// mkult.rk.gov.ru](http://mkult.rk.gov.ru)

03.02.2023 No. 3096/10-11/4

To No.1637/dp dated 31.01.2023

**To: M.Y. Galuzin,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation**

Dear Mikhail Yurievich!

The Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea considered your request for information about the identified archaeological heritage site "The urban development site of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (the possible location of the palace of Kalga Sultan)" and the progress of repair and restoration works on the cultural heritage site of federal importance "Khan's Palace" in Bakhchisaray, Republic of Crimea.

With regard to the identified archaeological heritage site "Site of urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII cc." please be informed of the following:

According to Articles 16.1, 45.1 of the Federal Law of 25.06.2002 No. 73-FZ "On Objects of Cultural Heritage (Monuments of History and Culture) of the Peoples of the Russian Federation", FGBUN "RAS Institute of Archaeology of Crimea " provided to the State Committee for the Protection of Cultural Heritage of the Republic of Crimea (hereinafter - the 'State Committee') information about the identified archaeological heritage site " Site of urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (the location of the Palace of Kalga Sultan)" (hereinafter – the 'Site').

Archaeological fieldwork to identify the Site were carried out in accordance with permit (open list) No. 2355 of 30.10.2017 issued by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation in the name of E.I. Seidaliev.

By Order No. 41 of 27.03.2018, the State Committee included the Site in the list of identified archaeological heritage sites located in the territory of the Republic of Crimea. The same order approved the boundaries of the Site area of 1.369 hectares.

According to the results of additional examination of a part of the territory of the identified object of archaeological heritage "Site of the urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (place of possible location of the palace of Kalga Sultan)" conducted in 2019, FGBUN "RAS Institute of Archaeology of Crimea" developed research and design documentation (reports on the conducted research). According to the conclusions contained in the reports, there is no archaeological cultural layer on the land plots with cadastral numbers 90:22:010223:118 and 90:22:010223:590.

In this regard, on the basis of paragraphs 18, 20 of the Procedure for approving the boundaries of the territories of objects of cultural heritage located in the Republic of Crimea, approved by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea No. 398 dated 18.07.2019, the State Committee prepared and issued orders No. 196 dated 21.08.2019 and No. 426 dated 09.12.2019 in amendment of Order of the State Committee No. 41 dated 27.03.2018 "On inclusion of the identified object of archaeological heritage in the list of identified objects of cultural heritage of the Republic of Crimea and on approval of borders and regimes of its territory use" and excluded the aforesaid land plots from the territory of the identified object of archaeology.

According to clause 12 of Article 45.1 of the Federal law No. 73-FZ dated 25.06.2002 "On objects of cultural heritage (monuments of history and culture) of the peoples of the Russian Federation", if as a result of carrying out archeological field works registration data of object of archeological heritage (object area, protected items and other data) have changed, the physical person who has received the permit (open sheet) is obliged, within thirty working days from the date of completion of archeological field works, to inform in writing the executive body of the Russian Federation authorised in the sphere of cultural heritage protection of such changes. The boundaries of the territory of the identified object of archeology "Site of urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (place of probable location of palace of Kalga Sultan)" have been changed by the exclusion of the land plots owned by citizens, in connection with the receipt of the mentioned reports on archeological research on the land plots.

The archaeological fieldwork was carried out by Vyacheslav Vadimovich Masyakin, an employee of the Federal State Budgetary Scientific Institution " Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Archaeology of Crimea " on the basis of permit (open list) No. 0600-2019 dated 31.05.2019, issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Culture for the right to conduct archaeological fieldwork on the territory of the identified object of archaeological heritage "Site of the urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (probable location of the palace of Kalga-sultan)" (specifically, the right to conduct archaeological exploration with the implementation of local excavations in the specified territory in order to identify archaeological heritage sites, clarify information about them and plan activities to ensure their preservation).

In 2022, on the basis of documentation about the identified object of archaeological heritage on the territory of Simferopol, Republic of Crimea, received from the General Director of LLC "Crimean Regional Centre for Archaeological Research" A.V. Sharapa (permit (open list) No. 0198-2022 of 28.03.2022 issued by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation in the name of V.Yu. Kononov), order of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea No. 525-OCN dated 08.09.2022 "On approval of the boundaries of the territory, modes of land use within the boundaries of the identified object of archaeological heritage 'Site of the urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries. (site of the Palace of Kalga Sultan), XVII-XVIII centuries' located at the address: Republic of Crimea, Simferopol" approved the boundaries of the territory and the regime of land use within the boundaries of the site, namely in connection with the discovery of new sites containing the archaeological cultural layer, the area of the said object was increased.

Thus, the identified archaeological heritage site "Site of the urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (possible location of the palace of Kalga Sultan)" is under state protection.

We also hereby inform that there are no immovable property within the boundaries of the territory of the identified object of archaeological heritage "**Site of the urban development of Ak-Mosque, XVII-XVIII centuries (the place of possible location of the palace of Kalga-sultan)**", including any orthodox church buildings.

According to Art. 5.1(1)(1) of Federal Law No. 73-FZ of 25.06.2002 "On Objects of Cultural Heritage (Monuments of History and Culture) of the Peoples of the Russian Federation", capital construction and enlargement of existing objects of capital construction on the territory of a monument or an ensemble are prohibited, including **land, building, reclamation or any other works, except works for the conservation of the cultural heritage object** or its individual components.

According to Article 5.1(5) of Federal Law No. 73-FZ of 25.06.2002 "On Objects of Cultural Heritage (Monuments of History and Culture) of the Peoples of the Russian Federation", the special regime for the use of the land plot **within whose boundaries the archaeological heritage object is situated, provides for the possibility of carrying out archaeological fieldwork in the manner prescribed by this Federal Law, excavation, construction, reclamation, economic and other works, subject to ensuring the conservation of the archaeological heritage site** included in the Unified State Register of Cultural Heritage Sites (historical and cultural monuments) of the peoples of the Russian Federation, or the identified archaeological heritage site, as well as ensuring public access to the aforesaid sites.

We also hereby inform that no violations of the mandatory requirements of current legislation in the field of protection of cultural heritage sites have been recorded.

We also report that a draft order by the Head of the Republic of Crimea is under development to carry out historical and bibliographic research and archaeological work at the site "Spiritual, cultural and historical complex 'Kalga Sultan Palace' at the address: Republic of Crimea, Simferopol by 31.12.2028 in order to prevent damage, destruction or demolition and to preserve Muslim places of worship, subject to the allocation of funding for this purpose.

Regarding the repair and restoration works on the cultural heritage object of federal importance "Khan's Palace" in the city of Bakhchisaray of the Republic of Crimea (hereinafter - the "Khan's Palace"), we report that these works are carried out under the State Program of the Russian Federation "Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol" (hereinafter - the State Program). Previously, the total cost of the facility was 1.98 billion rubles.

In the light of the research and design documents approved by Rosgosexpertiza, an increase in the cost of the restoration from the amount originally set in 2018 is required. The necessary additional funds have now been agreed and are provided for in the Federal Budget for 2023-2025 in the amount of 1.6 RUB bn.

Thus, the total cost of the project implementation will be RUB **3.6 bn**.

With the confirmed possibility of additional funding only being available in 2024, work on the entire Khan's Palace complex is scheduled to be completed in 2024.

The customer is the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea's subordinate organization. i.e. the Directorate for Centralised Servicing and Development of Cultural Institutions.

As of today, a full-scale repair and restoration process has been launched for the entire Khan's Palace ensemble, involving 225 people, and this number is getting bigger by the day. During the peak period, more than 250 people are involved in the restoration work.

Repair and restoration works are being carried out both in the Khan's Palace ensemble area and on specially equipped production sites outside the museum complex, where restoration work is being carried out on some of the architectural elements.

The Khan's Palace ensemble is the only example of palace and garden architecture of the Crimean Tatar people.

Funding limits for the Facility:

2018 г. – RUB 113.38 mln

2019 - RUB 158.00 mln

2020 г. – RUB 129.92 mln

2021 - RUB 288.06 mln

2022 – RUB 808.09 mln (*including RUB 26.9 mln released to the customer in December*)

2023 - **RUB 452.95 mln** (*RUB 427.4 mln contracted*)

2024 - RUB 1,642.60 mln.

The Khan's Palace cultural heritage site complex comprises **16 sites**.

For the current period, the work has been completed in full at **7 sites**, namely:

- North Dürbe Tomb;
- South Dürbe Tomb;
- Dürbe Dilyarı Bıkeç Tomb;
- "Sary-Guzel Bath";
- "Tombstone Rotunda";
- "Embankment with three bridges" (refusal to accept the completed work);
- "*Catherine's Mile*" (acceptance of the completed work is in progress).

At this stage, renovation and restoration works are underway **at 9 sites**, namely:

Contractor: **RSC Gefest Ltd.**

Earl's (secular) Building

Stable Building

Library Building

Khan's Kitchen

Falcon Tower

Contract terms: 25.12.2019 - 30.12.2023.

Contract amount: RUB 291,832,920.

Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 270,279,780 (93%)

Technical readiness (customer data): 75%

Contractor **FAU RosCapStroy:**

Khan Mosque (Phase II)

Contract terms: 29.04.2022 - 30.11.2023.

Contract amount: RUB 90,631,900.

Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 63,870,800 (70%)

Technical readiness (customer data): 51%

Harem

Contract terms: 18.04.2022 - 01.11.2023.

Contract amount: RUB 74,687,610.

Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 36,179,700. (48%)

Technical readiness (customer data): 31%

Main Building

Contract terms: 18.04.2022 - 01.11.2023.

Contract amount: RUB 588,406,470.

Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 242,711,420 (41%)

Technical readiness (customer data): 31%

Gardens and park facilities

Contract terms: 29.04.2022 - 01.11.2023.

Contract amount: RUB 382,795,410.

Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 146,416,930 (38%)

Technical readiness (customer data): 31%

Contractor **NST Ltd:**

Embankment with three bridges

Contract terms: 24.12.2020 - 31.05.2022.

Contract amount: RUB 183,983,960.

Disbursed under the contract (EIS data): RUB 160,161,990 (87%)

Technical readiness (customer data): 100%

Regarding Lesya Ukrainka Museum (hereinafter - the 'Museum'), we inform you that at present it is a structural unit of the Municipal Budget Institution of Culture "Yalta Historical and Literary Museum" and the only museum of the Ukrainian writer Lesya Ukrainka in the Russian Federation. The founder and owner of the Museum is the Yalta City Administration.

The idea to create the museum was born in 1971, when the centenary of the famous novelist and playwright Lesya Ukrainka (real name - Larysa Petrovna Kosach, 1871-1913) was commemorated worldwide according to the Resolution of UNESCO. In connection with that, a decision was made to create a museum of Lesya Ukrainka in Yalta as a branch of the Crimean Local History Museum. The first floor of the building No. 8 Litkensa Street (now Ekaterininskaya Street) was allocated for the future literary-memorial museum of Lesya Ukrainka. The same year a memorial plaque was installed on the building, in memory of Lesya Ukrainka, a Ukrainian writer, who stayed there in 1897. In 1972 a monument to Lesya Ukrainka was erected in front of the building.

The general exposition of the new department was opened to the visitors on December 24, 1977, on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet power establishment in Ukraine, including the section devoted to Lesya Ukrainka. The room where Ukrainian poetess Lesya Ukrainka (Larysa Petrovna Kosach) lived in 1897 was recreated here.

The exhibition lasted a little more than a year and was closed for repairs on 01.01.1979 due to the poor condition of the building. By 1990, the main repair work was completed, and on 6 March 1990 the section "The Progressive Russian and Ukrainian literature and culture of Yalta pre-revolutionary period" was renamed "The Culture of Yalta XIX - early XX century", and there

was also prepared a draft design of anniversary exhibition "Lesya Ukrainka and Crimea", opened 25 February 1991 for the 120th anniversary of the birth of the poetess within the section of "The Culture of Yalta XIX - early XX century".

On 10 September 1993, Yalta City Council of People's Deputies of the Republic of Crimea adopted Resolution No.639 "On the creation of Lesya Ukrainka Museum as a section of the Yalta United Historical and Literary Museum" on the basis of the aforesaid exposition.

The century-old mansion located at 8A Ekaterininskaya Street has survived wars; it was built in 1886 by architect P.K. Terebenev in the style Tavrida Romanticism then popular on the southern coast of Crimea.

Despite repairs between 1979 and 1991, the roof of the building was leaking in several places, and reports were systematically written about it.

Attempts to repair the roof locally were unsuccessful. As a result of years of leaks, the wooden ceiling beams became rotten and needed repair.

During the period from 1991 to 2014, no comprehensive repair and restoration works were carried out in the Museum building; minor current repairs aimed at maintaining the Museum building in a condition suitable for excursions were carried out. It was of an external nature, aimed at maintaining the exterior appearance and did not affect the load-bearing structures and structural elements, roof, walls, etc. No deep and complex restoration was carried out. At the same time, a part of the building (right wing) was leased to Technoprom Ltd. in 2001 (since 2011 - Travel Planet Ltd.) and was used as a mini-hotel.

On 01 November 2011, in the exhibition hall of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum at the cracks that went spider-like on the ceiling, tell-tales were installed. Acts were also drawn up for a crack in the ceiling above the front staircase to the first floor to the Lesya Ukrainka Museum section where plaster later collapsed from the ceiling with the collapsed area of 1m² by 0.8m² at a height of approximately 6m.

On 15 January 2016, the OHSE engineer drew up a prescription stating that due to an emergency situation in the exhibition hall No. 2 of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum section, which arose due to peeling plaster on the ceiling and cracks that tore the tell-tales and reached the chandelier, which threatened to collapse of plaster over a large area. On this basis, exhibit hall No. 2 was closed to museum staff and visitors (Order No. 9 of 15 January 2016 "Termination of visitor access"). Later on 08 February 2016, the staff, on coming to work, discovered a 2.0-2.5 m² dump in Exhibit Hall No. 2. In this regard, an order was issued to close the Lomikamen exhibition of the Lesya Ukrainka Museum section (Order No. 12 of 08 February 2016) to ensure the safety of visitors, and all the exhibits of the exhibition were moved to the funds of the head museum (Yalta Historical and Literary Museum MБУK) to ensure normal storage conditions.

In 2016, the Yalta City Administration carried out research and survey work using funds allocated from the municipal budget (more than RUB 9 mln), which led to the development of a complete restoration project for the museum building.

Based on the conclusion of the state construction expertise to verify the reliability of the estimated cost, the total cost of the repair and restoration work is RUB 130,953,540.

A number of renovation and restoration measures are planned as part of the project:

- Reinforce the foundations by injection of concrete into masonry joints.
- Clean the façades of cement plaster.
- Repair masonry walls in areas of weathering and deterioration.
- Carry out grouting and capping of cracks in masonry walls using indirect reinforcement with basalt-plastic rebar.

- Treat the masonry walls with a hydrophobic agent or varnish.
- Carry out repair and restoration work to reinforce the ceilings above the basement and ground floor.
- Replace emergency ceilings above the first floor.
- Reinforce the rafters to prevent the transmission of tension to the masonry walls, by installing overlays, tightening the rafters, and repairing damaged elements.
- Perform replacement of purlins and roofing with plastic sheeting the roof is covered with eaves and ridge venting.
- Re-establish an organised outdoor drainage system with gutters, downspouts and inlets.
- Replace the wooden staircase.
- Carry out repair and restoration work to eliminate chips and cracks in the steps and landing of the stairs.

At the end of 2018, after a series of court proceedings in courts of different instances initiated after 18 March 2014, and termination of the lease agreement, a tenant, who had occupied part of the premises (mini-hotel) for more than 10 years, was evicted from the right wing of the Museum building. Thanks to the actions of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum MBUK administration and local authorities of Yalta, the historical and cultural integrity of the memorial building was restored, thanks to which the area of the Museum has now increased to 771.2 sq. m. The design and estimate documentation created in 2016 was prepared taking into account the additional space, and after the restoration activities, the exposition of the Museum and the "Culture of Yalta of the XIX - first quarter of the XX centuries" section will be expanded.

At present, the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea is searching for possible sources of funding for the restoration work, both as part of the national project "Culture", and as part of the state programme of the Russian Federation "Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol". After approval of the necessary funding, the developed scientific and design documentation for the project "Restoration of the building of the branch of the Historical and Literary Museum at 8, Ekaterininskaya Street, Yalta" will be additionally updated.

After the Museum's exhibition halls were closed, its staff continued their work as usual. In 2016 a preliminary concept for a new exhibition of the Museum "In the Land of Eternal Sunshine / In the Land of Eternal Flux" was written and approved. Every year, on February 25 (Lesya Ukrainka's birthday), a traditional event "Seven Strings", in which Yalta schoolchildren, students and public organisations take part, is held by the staff at the "Culture of Yalta in the 19th and early 20th centuries" exhibition, which is located in the same building on the ground floor.

In 2017, the main exhibition "The Culture of Yalta in the 19th - First Quarter of the 20th Century", a department of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum, housed in the same building on the ground floor, was supplemented with exhibits telling about the life and stay on the South Coast of Crimea of poetess Lesya Ukrainka, poet and first Yalta city doctor Stepan Rudansky, writer and agronomist Mikhail Kotsyubinsky.

In 2018, the Museum's staff prepared and held events dedicated to the anniversaries and commemorations of Ukrainian cultural figures M.M. Kotsyubinsky and S.V. Rudansky.

In 2019 the staff held events for the 185th anniversary of the poet, city doctor of Yalta S.V. Rudansky (January 6); holiday "We feel you, Kobzar, through the century..." (March 9); art meeting "Such Days Only Happen in Crimea" to the 155th anniversary of M.Kotsyubinsky together with the M.M.Kotsyubinsky Museum in Simeiz (September 17).

On 25 February 2020, the museum staff held a traditional event "The Seven Strings" to mark the 149th anniversary of the birth of the Ukrainian writer Lesya Ukrainka and the 140th anniversary of the birth of ethnographer Klyment Kvitka.

The staff of the Museum prepares and organizes temporary exhibitions which are exhibited in the main exhibition "Culture of Yalta of the XIX - the first quarter of the XX cc." section of Yalta Historical and Literary Museum; hold lectures in educational institutions and public organizations of Yalta; write information and popular science articles on anniversaries and memorable dates of figures of Ukrainian culture; study and select items related to life and everyday life of Yalta residents, with Ukrainian culture and ethnography, to further replenish the funds of Yalta Historical and Literary Museum in accordance with the law.

Before the closure of the rooms in critical condition in 2016, the Museum had more than 300 museum objects in its main exhibition. These included:

- lifetime editions of Lesya Ukrainka's works;
- belongings, pictures belonging to the Kosach family;
- Photos from the personal archive of the winemaker N.S. Okhremenko, who was taught by Lesya Ukrainka as a child;
- pre-revolutionary photographs and postcards with views of Yalta and other Crimean towns visited by Lesya Ukrainka;
- lifetime editions of works by Ukrainian writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries associated with the works of Lesya Ukrainka;
- pre-revolutionary periodicals in which Lesya Ukrainka's works were published;
- Anniversary editions of works, gramophone records with Lesya Ukrainka's voice (records of 1908-1909);
- Ukrainian national costumes and embroidery from the 19th and early 20th centuries;
- Typical items and furniture of a Yalta mansion from the early 20th century;
- copies of manuscripts of Lesya Ukrainka's works and letters.

All these items after closure of the emergency premises of the Museum are fully moved to the funds of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum and are preserved taking into account all normative requirements according to the current legislation. The access to this collection is provided by organizing temporary exhibitions on the basis of the main exposition of the "The culture of Yalta in the 19th - first quarter of the 20th centuries" section and cultural and educational events dedicated to anniversaries and commemorations of the Ukrainian cultural figures.

The most part of the mentioned museum items belongs to the main collection of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum and is a non-state part of the Museum Fund of the Russian Federation, the rest are scientific and auxiliary funds of the institution. Inclusion of items belonging to the main collection of the Yalta Historical and Literary Museum MBUK, in the State Catalogue of the Museum Fund of the Russian Federation is carried out at the present time and in accordance with Federal Law dated No. 357-FZ 3 July 2016 "On Amendments to the Federal Law "On Museum Fund of the Russian Federation and Museums in the Russian Federation" will be completed by 31 December 2025.

Please also note that the list of experts certified by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation is available on the official website of the Ministry of Culture Russian Federation at https://opendata.mkrf.ru/opendata/7705851331-certified_experts.

Regarding the preservation of memorial items of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian culture, history and architecture, we report the following.

As part of the federal target programme "Social and economic development of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until 2025" in 2015-2017, priority anti-damage measures were carried out at the objects of cultural heritage of federal importance "Dervish monastery, XIV-XV centuries" at the address: Republic of Crimea, Evpatoria, Karaeva street, 18, letters A, B, B, C and "Mosque and madrasah" 1314 at the address: Republic of Crimea, Stary Krym, 5. 5 Chapaeva Lane, Stary Krym, Republic of Crimea.

In addition, a draft regulation by the Head of the Republic of Crimea is being drawn up to prevent damage, destruction or demolition and to preserve Muslim places of worship, namely

- The Dervish monastery, XIV - XV centuries, located at: Republic of Crimea, Evpatoria, Karaeva street, 18, lit. A, B, B, C;

- Mosque (ruins), XIV - XV centuries, located at: Republic of Crimea, Simferopol district, rural settlement Dobrovskoye, s. Pionerskoye, 2, Eski-Dzhami str;

- Beibars Mosque (ruins), late XIII century, located at the address: Republic of Crimea, Kirovsky district, Stary Krym, Krasnoarmeiskaya str. 59;

- The spiritual, cultural and historical Kalga Sultan Palace complex at the address: Republic of Crimea, Simferopol. Simferopol.

In addition, we inform you that in 2022 a draft concept for the development of the historical and archaeological complex Salachik in the city of Bakhchisaray, Republic of Crimea has been developed.

Annex in electronic form.

Respectfully, T. Manezhina

Minister

T . MANEZHINA

Ex. by <...> tel: <...>

Exhibit AF

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Tatyana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Works in Khan's Palace* (18 January 2023)

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, Tatyana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Works in Khan's Palace (18 January 2023), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10597>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

VERSION FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED

ONLINE RECEPTION

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> Tatyana Manezhina Visited Conference to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Works
in Khan's Palace



The works are being carried out in the territory of the Bakhchisaray Museum Reserve and on special remote sites where individual architectural elements are being restored

Tatyana Manezhina, Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, held a visiting conference to review the progress of the repair and restoration works being carried out on federally significant cultural heritage sites of the Khan's Palace.

The conference was attended by representatives of the Bakhchisaray administration, the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, including its Department for State Protection of Cultural Heritage Sites, the Directorate for the Centralised Service and Development of Cultural Institutions (an autonomous state institution) (who is the customer for the works), the Bakhchisaray Historical, Cultural and Archaeological Museum Reserve (a state budgetary institution of the Republic of Crimea) (who is the asset holder), and the contractors involved in the project. The participants discussed problematic issues and ways to solve them.

The Minister strictly pointed out the need to comply with the current laws applicable to works on cultural heritage sites.

As of today, full-scale repair and restoration works have been launched on the entire compound of the Khan's Palace, involving more than 200 people. During the peak period, about 250 people are engaged in the restoration works.

The repair and restoration works are being carried out in the territory of the Bakhchisaray Museum Reserve and on specially equipped remote sites where individual architectural elements are being restored.

On some sites where the works lag behind the schedule, contractors have taken steps to attract more workers and increase their performance capabilities in order to reduce the backlog as soon as practicable.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AG

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Tatyana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Work in Khan's Palace (23 August 2022)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Tatyana Manezhina Visited Bakhchisaray to Review Progress of Repair and Restoration Work in Khan's Palace (23 August 2022)*, available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/9964>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

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THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

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in Khan's Palace



The works are being carried out as part of the State Programme for the Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol

Tatyana Manezhina, Minister of Culture of the Republic of Crimea, visited Bakhchisaray to review the progress of repair and restoration works to preserve the federally significant cultural heritage sites of the Khan's Palace.

The works are being carried out as part of the Russian Federation State Programme for the Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.

During her meetings with the contractor's representatives, she focused her attention on checking if the completion deadlines are met for the works in the Stable Building, the Library Building and the Falcon Tower and measures to preserve the Count (Secular) Building.

When inspecting the premises of the Harem and the Khan's Mosque where restoration works are being carried out, she told the contractor's and customer's representatives that they should make additional efforts to detect and preserve those paintings not previously mentioned in the design documentation.

Anna Kileva and Andrey Rostenko, Deputy Ministers of Culture of the Republic of Crimea; representatives of the Ministry's Department for State Protection of Cultural Heritage Sites; Ilya Alymchev, Head of the Directorate for the Centralised Service and Development of Cultural Institutions; and contractors' representatives also took part in the working conference.

Press Service of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AH

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during Restoration Works in Khan's Palace Inspected (22 September 2022)*

(translation)

Translation

Ministry of Culture of Crimea, *Previously Unknown Painting Fragments Discovered during Restoration Works in Khan's Palace Inspected* (22 September 2022), available at: <https://mkult.rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/10086>.

Government of the Republic of Crimea

Head of the Republic of Crimea

Government of the Russian Federation

Official Resources



**MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA**

1 February, Wednesday

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Instructions were given to develop measures to restore the unique paintings and submit them for review by a scientific and methodological council under the Ministry of Culture of Crimea.

Representatives of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Crimea in conjunction with members of its scientific and methodological and expert councils, as well as representatives of the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of Crimea and the public, visited Bakhchisaray to review the progress of the repair and restoration works to preserve the federally significant cultural heritage sites of the Khan's Palace. They inspected the previously unknown fragments of paintings dated back to the late 17th century and the early 18th century that were discovered on the walls of the Khan's Mosque, a federally significant cultural heritage site, during the restoration works.



The repair and restoration works are being carried out as part of the Russian Federation State Programme for the Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.

The design supervision and contractor's teams were instructed to develop additional measures to restore the monument's unique paintings and submit them for review by the scientific and methodological council under the Ministry of Culture of the Crimea.

In the course of the inspection, Ayder Ismailov, Deputy Mufti of the Crimean Muslims, said the Spiritual Direction of Muslims of Crimea would fully support efforts to discover and preserve the Mosque's religious interior design.

Annex 17

Witness Statement of [REDACTED], 6 March 2023

(translation)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**

(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

WITNESS STATEMENT
OF 

6 MARCH 2023

1. I, [REDACTED], provide this witness statement in relation to the issues raised in the Reply of Ukraine to the Counter-Memorial of the Russian Federation in the dispute before the International Court of Justice. I would like to tell about activities of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People (“Qurultay”), the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (“Mejlis”) and the State Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations in Crimea.
2. From 1999 to 2013, I worked as head of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Having extensive experience of work in state government bodies, I joined [REDACTED] in 2013 to establish relations between it, the head of the Crimean government Anatoly Mogilev, and representatives of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich. Later I became a deputy to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], participated in the work of [REDACTED]. After the reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].
3. This witness statement is based on my memories regarding the described events as well as the documents referred to below.

A. QURULTAY

4. In 1944, Crimean Tatars were deported from Crimea to Uzbekistan and several other republics of the USSR. Later, the Soviet authorities rehabilitated Crimean Tatars and their gradual return to the peninsula began, which acquired a mass character in the 1990s.
5. Having returned to the peninsula, Crimean Tatars were not able to obtain land for development as well as could not return territories, lands and houses, which had belonged to them and their families prior to deportation and were occupied by new owners; this was partly due to the fact that some deported Crimean Tatars had problems with documents (many did not have deportation certificates, birth certificates, passports etc.) as well as due to the absence of a program of allotment of land to Crimean Tatars that returned in Ukraine. Therefore, Crimean Tatars began to seize vacant and undeveloped wastelots and plots of land and by themselves build houses and buildings there, which

were subsequently occupied by their families. In that manner, entire ethnic settlements were formed.¹

6. To discuss the land issue and other problems, which were not resolved by Ukrainian authorities the Crimean Tatars have revived the Qurultay — a congress of delegates of the Crimean Tatar people.
7. The Qurultay consists of 250 delegates. The delegates are elected for five years. The delegates are usually nominated by Crimean Tatars and members of their families through Crimean Tatar public and political organisations and their blocs, or they participate by self-nomination.
8. The Qurultay established bodies responsible for conducting its sessions and implementing its decisions: the Presidium, Secretary, Drafting Committee of the session; Mandate, Counting, Audit and Central Electoral Commissions, Chairman of the Mejlis and the Mejlis itself.
9. All of the above bodies are rotation-based, accountable to the Qurultay and operate under the regulations approved by it. According to the Regulation of the Qurultay, all its decisions are obligatory for the delegates, bodies formed by it and the whole system of national representation and self-government of the Crimean Tatar people: the Mejlis, regional and local Mejlises, committees for the assistance in repatriation, their subdivisions and bodies created by them, as well as representatives of the Mejlis in other countries.² Therefore, actions that contradict Qurultay's decisions are prohibited.

B. MEJLIS

10. Mejlis, as executive body of the Qurultay, was supposed to ensure the implementation of Qurultay's decisions and be accountable to it.

¹ Government of the Republic of Crimea, *Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in Crimea* (2 October 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160812144422/http://rk.gov.ru/ru/s/index.html/news/286834.htm> (Exhibit A).

² Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, *Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People*, 12 September 2004, available at: http://web.archive.org/web/20140726221726/http://qtm.org/public/images/ckeditor/file/quick-folder/01_reglament_kurultaya.doc (Exhibit B), Article 2.2.

11. Mustafa Dzhemilev, former leader of the Organisation of Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCTNM) had served as the Chairman of the Mejlis for many years. In 2013, Refat Chubarov was elected Chairman of the Mejlis.³
12. The political leadership of the Mejlis (in particular Mustafa Dzhemilev) did not seek legal status for the Mejlis (its official registration as an organisation). For this reason, internal discussions and agreements on concrete measures of assistance to the Crimean Tatars were not subordinated to a strict procedure and often turned into political “squabbles”. As a result of such wrangles, those who were louder and tougher, and not those who were more constructive, were often found to be right, while unwanted members of the Mejlis, as far as I know, were squeezed out of its membership. Thus, for example, media gave a wide publicity to the situation, when in 1996 Dzhemilev managed to expel his critics from the Mejlis following internal conflict. The critics had earlier indicated that Dzhemilev’s fund misappropriated state money allocated to improve housing conditions of Crimean Tatars.⁴ Yury Bekirovich Osmanov, the founder of the movement for protection of the rights of rehabilitated Crimean Tatars, publicly opposed the position of Dzhemilev and the Mejlis itself. Yury Bekirovich did not accept the position of Mustafa Dzhemilev on the preparation for squatting land in the Crimea and opposition to the governmental and law enforcement authorities. In November 1993, Osmanov was severely beaten and died in hospital. Many believe that his death was not the result of a hooligan attack, but a political “order”, since he actively opposed the Mejlis as such, however, the investigation was not carried out properly.
13. The “informality” of the Mejlis often manifested itself in the way it interacted with the Crimean and Ukrainian authorities to achieve its goals. The top leadership of the Mejlis, which was supposed to primarily address the problems of Crimeans, was not shy about issuing political ultimatums to the authorities and sometimes directly announcing riots in the streets if the demands put forward by the Mejlis were not met.⁵

³ Interfax, *Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars* (27 October 2013), available at: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/337277> (Exhibit C).

⁴ ZN.UA, *Authoritarian Democracy* (26 December 1997), available at: https://zn.ua/politics_archive/avtoritarnaya_demokratiya.html (Exhibit D).

⁵ In 2013, Mustafa Dzhemilev threatened to “block [...] roads”, “paralyse [...] traffic”, “at least in Simferopol, and perhaps ... in other regions of the autonomy” if events on 18 May were obstructed. At the same time, Dzhemilev openly announced plans to hold actions demanding “the resignation of the government” and stated that Crimean Tatars are “angered” by the policies pursued against them and their mood “is obviously not going to be very

14. Such actions could not but arouse apprehension among the Tatars themselves, which on the one hand intimidated Crimean Tatars, and on the other, caused a negative attitude towards our people among Crimean residents of other nationalities.
15. Local authorities, apparently out of fear that protests could actually turn into clashes and cause victims, sometimes made formal concessions to the demands of the Mejlis's leadership. However, while there may have been some concessions on paper, these were isolated cases of solutions in respect of individual appeals. In respect of the global issues facing Crimean Tatars, the Mejlis has never been able to establish an effective dialogue with the Crimean and Ukrainian authorities (not least, I believe, because of the provocative behaviour of Mustafa Dzhemilev and his associates).
16. As previously mentioned, the main problem of the Crimean Tatar people was the lack of proper living conditions. To address this problem, members of the Mejlis repeatedly collected money from the Crimean Tatars, in particular through Dzhemilev's charitable foundation. However, the Mejlis did not achieve any significant results in this area.
17. As of 2013, many Crimean Tatars, more than 20 years after their return to their homeland, did not receive any land from Ukraine, had no housing or lived in self-made structures that in reality were barely livable. In squatter settlements, people could not obtain documents to legalise their houses and continued to live without light, gas, water, sewerage and other proper conditions.⁶ Objectively, since 1991, neither the Mejlis nor Ukrainian government has not solved housing problems of the Crimean Tatars, and it is therefore unclear how the funds collected from the people were spent.
18. Besides, public activists and journalists repeatedly accused Mustafa Dzhemilev of misappropriation of humanitarian aid received from abroad (in particular, from Turkey and the United States). Every month, several million hryvnias worth of aid were sent to organizations controlled by Mustafa Dzhemilev's family. However, instead of using that

peaceful". See RISU, *Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the Commemoration of the Deportation Victims* (28 February 2013), available at: https://risu.ua/ru/krymskie-tatary-ugrozhayut-vlasti-buntom-v-sluchae-prepyatstvovaniya-chestvovaniyu-pamyati-zhertv-deportacii_n61760 (Exhibit E).

⁶ Livejournal, Respublika News, *Enver Abduraimov: "The Mejlis is driving our people into opposition. People don't benefit from it"* (27 February 2013), available at: <https://respublika-news.livejournal.com/186618.html> (Exhibit F).

aid for the benefit of the Crimean Tatars, he re-sold the goods. The money received thus remained in possession of Mustafa Dzhemilev and his associates from the Mejlis.⁷

19. I am aware that members of the Mejlis, in particular, Mustafa Dzhemilev, have also been accused of inefficient and arbitrary use and spending of budgetary funds allocated under the programme for the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people, in particular for addressing housing issues.
20. For a long time, budgetary funds in support of Crimean Tatars were transferred to a current account at Imdat-Bank, whose main founder was Dzhemilev through the Crimea Foundation.
21. Three times members of the Mejlis decided to open a current account in another bank, but Dzhemilev refused to comply, as he was withdrawing large sums of money through Imdat-Bank.⁸ In 1996, the Audit Commission of the Qurultay confirmed the facts of embezzlement and misuse of budgetary funds. As of the end of 1997, the debt for embezzled funds exceeded 2 million hryvnias⁹ (which at that moment amounted to 1 million US dollars).
22. The Imdat-Bank incident was not the only one in which Mustafa Dzhemilev refused to implement the decisions of the Mejlis and the Qurultay. For example, it was reported that he opposed the appointment of Ziya Khalikov to the post of Chairman of the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Deported Citizens, in whose favour members of the Mejlis voted at a meeting on 8 June 1997.¹⁰ Also, Mustafa Dzhemilev led negotiations with opposition factions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Crimea behind the back of the Qurultay faction, of which he was a member.¹¹

⁷ Milli Firka, *How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans* (12 October 2013), available at: <http://milli-firka.org/как-джемилев-трех-сирот-обокрал/> (Exhibit G).

⁸ FLB, *Dzhemilev's Profitable Struggle* (3 April 2014), available at: <https://flb.ru/infoprint/57704.html> (Exhibit H).

⁹ Milli Firka, *"Imdat Bank" and the Crisis in the Mejlis* (25 March 2011), available at: <http://milli-firka.org/«имдат-банк»-и-кризис-в-меджлисе/> (Exhibit I).

¹⁰ L. Arifov's co-report to the semi-annual report of Mejlis chairman M.A. Dzhemilev for the period from July 1996 to December 1997, *see ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

23. These incidents show that, as I indicated above, when the Mejlis took decisions that were unfavourable to him, Mustafa Dzhemilev would sabotage its work, refusing to sign off its decisions, even those taken by the majority, threatened to disrupt the work of the Mejlis.¹² This approach to governance created a deep crisis within the Mejlis, beginning as early as from the II convocation of the Qurultay.
24. The events described above characterise the significance of the conflict within the Mejlis itself, as Mustafa Dzhemilev acted to pursue personal benefit and in opposition to the opinion of the Mejlis, causing great damage to the interests of the Crimean Tatars. Already in the late 1990-s, there emerged certain individual supporters of Dzhemilev who approved his initiatives, which over time acquired more and more radical forms.

C. EVENTS SURROUNDING CRIMEA'S ACCESSION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

25. The events of February-March 2014 required certain legal and political actions from the Crimean Tatar community. An extraordinary second session of the Qurultay of the VI Convocation was convened to discuss them and form a unified agenda for further representation of the interests of the Crimean Tatar people after Crimea's reunification with the Russian Federation. It was held on 29 March 2014.¹³ I participated in the session and was a member of its Presidium.
26. In his speech, Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov declared that the Mejlis was ready to solve the problems of the Crimean Tatar people under the actual circumstances in which they found themselves, with the participation the Russian authorities.¹⁴ Thus, the Mejlis studied Russian laws in order to form a position regarding the protection of the interests of the Crimean Tatars, proposals of the Mejlis and the Qurultay were conveyed

¹² E. Muedinov, Report of the Chairman of the Audit Commission of the III Qurultay (Avdet newspaper, No. 23(186) 31 December 1997, see Milli Firka, *Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis* (25 March 2011), available at: <http://milli-firka.org/кто-и-как-в-меджлисе-обворовывал-народ/> (Exhibit J).

¹³ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Extraordinary 2nd session of the 6th convocation of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people opened in Bakhchisaray* (29 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728221035/http://qtmn.org/новости/4401-в-бахчисарае-открыла-работу-внеочередная-2-ая-сессия-курултая-крымскотатарского-народа-vi-созыва> (Exhibit K).

¹⁴ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for our place in the relationship between the two countries* (30 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728201656/http://qtmn.org/новости/4412-замглавы-меджлиса-нариман-джелиалов-мы-устали-искать-свое-место-в-отношениях-между-двумя-странами> (Exhibit L).

to the legislative bodies of the Russian Federation for discussion.¹⁵ Besides, meetings were held between Refat Chubarov and other representatives of the Mejlis with the President of Tatarstan, where Kazan Tatars reside, the Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Ravil Ismagilovich Gaynutdinov, and the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation Ella Alexandrovna Panfilova.¹⁶ Refat Chubarov by himself initiated a meeting with the President of the Russian Federation, explaining it by the need to solve the problems of the Crimean Tatar people in Crimea, where the Russian Federation had established a legal framework.¹⁷

27. At the same session, Qurultay's delegates voted for the Mejlis to appoint candidates to work in the republican bodies of the Republic in Crimea,¹⁸ having decided to cooperate with Russian authorities in order to protect the rights and interests of Crimean Tatars.¹⁹ On 1 April 2014, pursuant to that decision of the Qurultay, the Mejlis held a meeting, where its members voted for the admission of Lenur Islyamov to the Council of Ministers of Crimea as its first deputy chairman, and for [REDACTED].
28. Before the Mejlis formally took [REDACTED] at the request of Refat Chubarov and members of the Mejlis, [REDACTED] the Mejlis from 1 April 2014.

¹⁵ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum* (29 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728205431/http://qtmn.org/новости/4403-глава-меджлиса-в-том-случае-когда-мы-увидим-что-потребуется-демонстрация-четкой-ясной-воли-крымскотатарского-народа-мы-будем-проводить-референдум> (Exhibit M).

¹⁶ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman* (17 May 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728214824/http://qtmn.org/новости/4484-председатель-меджлиса-встретился-с-омбудсменом-рф> (Exhibit N).

¹⁷ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum* (29 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728205431/http://qtmn.org/новости/4403-глава-меджлиса-в-том-случае-когда-мы-увидим-что-потребуется-демонстрация-четкой-ясной-воли-крымскотатарского-народа-мы-будем-проводить-референдум> (Exhibit M).

¹⁸ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis the right to identify candidates for republican authorities* (29 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728204613/http://qtmn.org/новости/4406-курултай-крымскотатарского-народа-делегировал-меджлису-право-определить-кандидатов-для-работы-в-республиканских-органах-власти> (Exhibit O).

¹⁹ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for our place in the relationship between the two countries* (30 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728201656/http://qtmn.org/новости/4412-замглавы-меджлиса-нариман-джелилов-мы-устали-искать-свое-место-в-отношениях-между-двумя-странами> (Exhibit L).

D. RADICALISATION OF THE POLICY OF THE MEJLIS

29. I cannot say what was the main reason for the radicalisation of Refat Chubarov, Mustafa Dzhemilev and their supporters. Perhaps they were hoping to give themselves more political weight and were afraid that with an effective state policy of the Russian authorities people would realise how ineffective the actions of the Mejlis had been for more than 20 years. Perhaps they were afraid of losing control over the financial flows for the improvement of the life of Crimean Tatars and discovery of their unlawful use of monetary funds, or probably they were acting with the aim of building a political career in Ukraine. One way or another, some time after the reunification of Crimea with Russia, Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev returned to the tactics of blackmail and political ultimatums with obviously unenforceable demands to the Russian authorities. In doing so, Refat Chubarov called for a boycott of the decisions of the Russian authorities, which directly contradicted the earlier Qurultay's decision.
30. Thus, on 3 May 2014, Refat Chubarov organised a rally in support of Mustafa Dzhemilev and blocked the Kherson-Kerch highway, which Dzhemilev used to illegally cross the border in violation of the ban on his entry into the Russian Federation. During the rally, the participants used physical force against police officers and border guards of the Russian Federation, seized the checkpoint and held it for about five hours.
31. In addition, at Chubarov's instigation, rallies were organised on behalf of the Mejlis on other highways, e.g., near Belogorsk, Bakhchisaray, and Sudak, as well as in Leninsky, Sovetsky and other districts of Crimea.
32. As I have already indicated, such methods had caused resentment and apprehension on the part of the Ukrainian authorities in the past. The Russian authorities also became aware that the actions of the Mejlis were radical and dangerous for the residents of the peninsula. For this reason, Crimean prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaya served Refat Chubarov with a warning about the inadmissibility of performing extremist activities.²⁰

²⁰ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on inadmissibility of extremist activities* (4 May 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140729102618/http://qtmn.org/новости/4474-прокурор-крыма-зачитала-предупреждение-председателю-меджлиса-о-недопустимости-осуществления-экстремистской-деятельности> (Exhibit P).

33. Seeing actions undertaken by Refat Chubarov and his supporters, I tried to warn them against the consequences they could lead to, particularly for Crimean Tatars. Such radical actions clearly could not benefit the Crimean Tatar community. They only harmed it and discredited the Crimean Tatars in the eyes of Russian citizens and the authorities.
34. I continued to follow the decision of the extraordinary second session of the Qurultay and hoped that only constructive and diplomatic interaction between Crimean Tatars and the Russian authorities could bring results. However, I was expelled from the Mejlis on 23 August 2014 for such interaction. Refat Chubarov single-handedly decided that my actions had a detrimental effect on the Tatars and allegedly exacerbated their disempowerment. However, in my opinion, it was obvious that it was exactly Refat Chubarov's actions that cast a shadow over Crimean Tatars.
35. Radical supporters of the Mejlis also pointed out at the time of my expulsion that I allegedly did not follow the rules and norms of the Regulation of the Qurultay and the Mejlis By-Laws. However, it was Refat Chubarov himself and his supporters who violated these internal documents, as they did not follow the decision of the extraordinary second session of the VI convocation of the Qurultay and expelled a member of the Mejlis while only Qurultay delegates could do so.
36. Despite the fact that the Mejlis was only an executive body of the Qurultay and was obliged to implement all its decisions, Refat Chubarov once again neglected his duties. All this resulted in an even greater rift in the Mejlis. It became obvious that the Mejlis was no longer representing the interests of the Crimean Tatars.

E. UKRAINE'S SUPPORT FOR CRIMEAN TATARS

37. In all the time the Mejlis has been active, not even the most acute problems of the Crimean Tatars have been resolved. It was only after Crimea reunified with the Russian Federation that the Ukrainian authorities started to actively support Dzhemilev and Chubarov. It was obvious that the motivation for this was not to help Crimean Tatars, but to use radical members of the Mejlis and Crimean Tatars for Ukraine's purposes to aggravate the situation in Crimea.
38. A rather illustrative example of such dual Ukrainian policy is the consideration of the drafts of the Law "On Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds"

by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Over the course of 10 years, numerous drafts of such a law initiated by the Mejlis were considered. For example, Mustafa Dzhemilev submitted one such draft laws to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in March 2004²¹ and a majority voted in its favour, but it was never adopted due to a veto by the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma.²² Its reconsideration was unsuccessful, and as a result it was withdrawn by the Cabinet of Ministers in late 2009.²³ A similar bill was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 24 February 2010.²⁴ However, this draft law was not adopted either. It was only after the reunification of Crimea with Russia that the bill introduced on 12 December 2012 was approved by a majority in the Ukrainian parliament. It came into force on 13 August 2014.

39. Thus, the Ukrainian authorities were initially reluctant to address issues related to the restoration of Crimean Tatars' rights, providing them with land and livelihood, until Crimea reunified with the Russian Federation, in spite of the fact that many organisations advised them to do so. Such a rapid adoption of this law in early 2014 was merely a PR stunt by the Ukrainian authorities.

F. ORGANISING BLOCKADES OF CRIMEA

40. For the Crimean Tatars themselves, it became apparent that the Mejlis had ceased to care about their interests after the blockades of Crimea: (a) water blockade, by blocking the North Crimean canal,²⁵ (b) food blockade, by impeding the passage of goods-loaded

²¹ Maida.org.ua, *The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in the Rada* (2 March 2004), available at: <https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1075827192.html> (Exhibit Q).

²² Maida.org.ua, *Kuchma Imposes Veto on Law on the Deported* (23 July 2004), available at: <https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1090559805.html> (Exhibit R).

²³ OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, *Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine*, August 2013, p. 4, available at: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/104309.pdf>.

²⁴ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *Draft Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds*, 24 February 2010, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220306151430/https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_2?pf3516=5515&skl=7 (Exhibit S).

²⁵ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history* (28 February 2019), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20190228/1116152860.html> (Exhibit T).

lorries to Crimea²⁶, (c) transport blockade, by impeding the passage of trains and cars,²⁷ (d) energy blockade, by destructing transmission towers,²⁸ which left Crimean residents without light, water, stable supply of food and heat for about four months.

41. The masterminds and sometimes direct organizers of these blockades were Dzhemilev and Chubarov, who repeatedly stated in the press that such actions were necessary to breach the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.²⁹ It is clear that by blockades, the Mejlis leaders were in fact trying to fuel inter-ethnic conflict.
42. Although the blockades described above were labelled private initiatives of Dzhemilev and Chubarov, it was clear to everyone that in real fact they were initiated and supported by Ukraine and its organisations. For example, the “Right Sector” extremist organisation and members of the “Azov” battalion joined the food blockade.³⁰ The actions of the blockade organisers were coordinated directly by the President of Ukraine Petr Poroshenko, which he himself admitted.³¹ At the time of the blockade Chubarov was a formal chairman of the Mejlis, discrediting the Mejlis by such actions.
43. Crimean Tatars publicly stated that they were against the blockades.³² They were outraged by the behaviour of the former Crimean Tatar representatives in Crimea, as the

²⁶ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimea is ready for a possible food blockade — Aksyonov* (8 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150908/1100924823.html> (Exhibit U); RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Chubarov: Crimea blockade will begin on 20 September at noon* (16 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150916/1100997459.html> (Exhibit V).

²⁷ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history* (28 February 2019), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20190228/1116152860.html> (Exhibit T).

²⁸ RBC, *Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to the Republic* (22 November 2015), available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/society/22/11/2015/5651b8cf9a79474f3a9e0f59> (Exhibit W).

²⁹ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history* (28 February 2019), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20190228/1116152860.html> (Exhibit T).

³⁰ Vgorode, *“Right Sector” Joins Crimean Blockade* (23 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.vgorode.ua/news/sobytyia/269908-k-blokade-kryma-prysoedynilsya-pravyi-sektor> (Exhibit X); Voicesevas.ru, *“Right Sector” announces that “Azov” has joined Crimean blockade* (1 October 2015), available at: <https://voicesevas.ru/news/17124-pravyi-sektor-soobschil-cto-azov-prisoedinilsya-k-blokade-kryma.html> (Exhibit Y).

³¹ Moskovskiy Komsomolets, *Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea* (14 January 2016), available at: <https://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/01/14/poroshenko-priznalsya-cto-koordiniruet-blokadu-kryma.html> (Exhibit Z).

³² RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in Ukraine* (17 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150917/1101007412.html> (Exhibit AA).

blockades were harmful to all the people in Crimea, including Crimean Tatars themselves.³³

44. I also condemned the use of Crimean Tatar national symbols during the blockades: the flag, the coat of arms and the anthem. Putting a Crimean Tatar flag on a blown-up transmission tower put innocent people, which was not involved in that act, in bad light. In my opinion, Dzhemilev and Chubarov had no right to use the symbols representing the united and peace-loving Crimean Tatar people at their own discretion and for personal objectives.
45. Dzhemilev and Chubarov subsequently moved forces, with the help of which they had organised the blockades, to the Kherson oblast. They also hired Turkish military instructors, natives of the Caucasus and militants who had fought during the Syria conflict on the side of ISIS,³⁴ and encouraged Crimean Tatars to join them.
46. All those actions by Dzhemilev and Chubarov were aimed at discrediting Crimean Tatars in Crimea. It finally became obvious that Dzhemilev and Chubarov's actions had long been dictated by no concern for the Crimean Tatars; these personalities have their own goals, which run counter to the interests of their people.
47. Crimean Tatar mothers also complained about that and organised a forum of Crimean Tatar women in Simferopol on 5 March 2016 entitled "Take Care of Mothers' Hearts". About 500 Crimean Tatar women attended the forum. They called on international organizations to condemn the activities of Refat Chubarov, Mustafa Dzhemilev, Lenur Islyamov, as well as members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, stating that they discredit the entire Crimean Tatar people:

"Our people worked painstakingly to create institutions of national self-government, and now they have been discredited by the extremist and destructive activities of pseudo-leaders. Once again, they are trying to use us as a bargaining chip [...]."³⁵

³³ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border* (17 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150917/1101007975.html> (Exhibit AB).

³⁴ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish Military Instructors in Ukraine* (5 March 2016), available at: <https://ria.ru/20160305/1385199067.html> (Exhibit AC).

³⁵ RG.ru, *Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders* (5 March 2016), available at: <https://rg.ru/2016/03/05/reg-kfo/krymskotatarskie-materi-prizvali-nakazat-medzhlis.html> (Exhibit AD).

48. Thus, Chubarov and Dzhemilev's efforts turned the Mejlis into a criminal community which often acted as told by Ukrainian authorities, hiding behind the interests of Crimean Tatars to justify its activities and form a negative attitude of Crimean Tatars towards the Russian authorities.

G. RECOGNITION OF THE MEJLIS AS AN EXTREMIST ORGANISATION

49. All of the aforementioned activities of the Mejlis were bound to lead to a reaction from the authorities in Crimea. The Crimean Prosecutor was repeatedly requested to respond to the illegal acts of the Mejlis, in particular by Crimean Tatar civil society organisations.

50. The requests were caused by months spent under the blockade of the peninsula. I also shared the view of the Crimean Tatars, seeing all the damage that the Mejlis was inflicting on the peninsula and, above all, on the interests of the Crimean Tatars. I was convinced that the Mejlis had lost the right to be called "Crimean Tatar", because the blockades it had organised were crimes against people living in Crimea.

51. For this reason, I advocated putting an end to activities of the Mejlis and believed that its recognition as extremist was an adequate response to the blatantly criminal activities of Dzhemilev and Chubarov and their associates from the Mejlis. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]³⁶ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED],³⁷ since we could not allow extremist acts, which actually crossed the line of terrorist activity, to continue to take place in Crimea.

52. Upon considering the case, on 26 April 2016 the Supreme Court of Crimea recognised the Mejlis as an extremist organisation. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation checked validity and legality of this decision in September 2016.

H. POSITIVE CHANGES IN CRIMEA AFTER 2014

53. Since Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation, I have seen great progress in resolution of Crimean Tatars' problems. Besides, I was also involved in their resolution

³⁶ [REDACTED]

³⁷ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the Mejlis* (31 March 2016), available at: <https://ria.ru/20160331/1400577129.html> (Exhibit AE); RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis "a Deliverance from Disgrace"* (29 September 2016), available at: <https://ria.ru/20160929/1478161775.html> (Exhibit AF).

during my tenure as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

54. Already since the spring of 2014, the conditions of Crimean Tatars significantly changed for the best. On 21 April 2014, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Decree “On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support for their revival and development”,³⁸ and on 11 March 2014, the Crimean parliament signed the Resolution “On guarantees of the restoration of rights of the Crimean Tatar people and their integration into the Crimean community”,³⁹ on 22 December 2016, amendments to the Law of Crimea “On measures of social support for rehabilitated persons and persons who have suffered from political repression” were adopted,⁴⁰ as well as other acts granting Crimean Tatar the status of the state language, guaranteeing its study, as well as providing for other benefits and allocations to support Crimean Tatars, their culture and, above all, decent living conditions.
55. In spite of the fact that a certain number of Crimean Tatar NGOs representing Crimean Tatar interests has acted (and continues to act) in Crimea,⁴¹ their interests are also protected at the Republican level, as evidenced, in particular, by the establishment in 2018 of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Several meetings took place between the President of the Russian Federation and representatives of the Crimean Tatars; constant contact was established with the Crimean authorities, in particular with the Head of the Republic of Crimea Sergey Aksyonov; certain Crimean Tatars joined the Council under the President of the

³⁸ Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 268 “On measures aimed at rehabilitation of Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Italian, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support of their revival and development”, 21 April 2014. *See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 63.*

³⁹ Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Resolution “On Guarantees of the Restoration of the Rights of the Crimean Tatar People and Their Integration into the Crimean Community” No. 1728-6/14, 11 March 2014. *See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 789.*

⁴⁰ Law of the Republic of Crimea No. 218-ZRK “On measures of social support for rehabilitated persons and persons who have suffered from political repression”, 18 February 2016. *See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 101.*

⁴¹ For example, “Crimea”, the “Inkishaf” Crimean Tatar Society, the Committee of Crimean Tatar Mothers, a number of youth organisations, etc.

⁴² Decree of the Head of the Republic of Crimea No. 93-U “On establishing the Council of Crimean Tatars under the Head of the Republic of Crimea”, 29 March 2018. *See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 112.*

Russian Federation, and a number of advisory councils have been established, such as, for example, the Council for inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations.

56. As regards the implementation of social support measures for Crimean Tatars, to mention just those [REDACTED], a seventy-flat residence was built in Bakhchisaray,⁴³ a ninety-flat building - in Simferopol,⁴⁴ similar houses were built in other districts of Crimea; land plots were allocated to the ownership of the participants of the “Protest Glades” (Crimean Tatars who squatted the lands);⁴⁵ two major roads were built in the location of compact residence of Crimean Tatars; schools, kindergartens, mosques, and a memorial complex have been built, gas, electricity and water supply facilities were constructed.⁴⁶ Thus, we implemented and planned projects that primarily addressed the most painful problems of the Crimean Tatar people with regard to housing, land and infrastructure.
57. Thus, beginning from 2014, the interests of Crimean Tatars began to be protected by the state authorities of the Russian Federation at both the regional and federal levels. Moreover, Crimean Tatars themselves became their members. This situation was fundamentally different from that existing under Ukraine for 20 years, where state authorities were not substantially involved in supporting the Crimean Tatar population and did not allow their participation in political decision-making.
58. Since Crimea’s reunification with the Russian Federation, state bodies have taken on a major role in supporting Crimean Tatar interests and have achieved considerable success in doing so, while some remaining civil society organisations have dealt exclusively with profiled issues. Taking into account my personal experience, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I became strongly convinced that the establishment of quasi-

⁴³ SK Consol-Stroy, *Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New Residential Building for Repatriates* (21 April 2015), available at: consolstroy.ru/news/news_post/noviy-dom-dlay-repatriantov (Exhibit AG).

⁴⁴ RIA Novosti (Realty), *90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to New Flats* (12 December 2016), available at: <https://realty.ria.ru/20161212/408195455.html> (Exhibit AH).

⁴⁵ RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants of “Protest Glades” in Crimea Is Going* (23 January 2020), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20200123/Kak-idet-protsess-vydeleniya-zemli-uchastnikam-polyan-protesta-v-Krymu-1117887486.html> (Exhibit AD); Government of the Republic of Crimea, *The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the allocation of land plots free of charge for ownership* (24 August 2021), available at: <https://rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/13015> (Exhibit AJ).

⁴⁶ TASS, *In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously Deported Citizens Have Been Built in Five Years* (18 May 2020), available at: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/8496051> (Exhibit AK).

representative bodies of ethnic groups (as it was in Ukraine) is a sign of an unhealthy system, in which ethnic groups are sometimes forced to seek protection from structures with no clear legal status due to a total denial of their rights. The rights of ethnic groups (Crimean Tatars being such) in a normal country can and should be protected by state authorities, in accordance with the democratic principle of equal treatment of all citizens.

59. In general, as a Crimean Tatar living in Crimea, I have not experienced any measures that could be considered discriminatory. [REDACTED] of the State Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, I can say that Russia's policy in Crimea is aimed at supporting the Crimean Tatars and other peoples.

Witness

[Signature]

[REDACTED]

Simferopol, 6 March 2023

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Number:	Name of exhibit:
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Exhibit B	Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, 12 September 2004.
Exhibit C	Interfax, <i>Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars</i> (27 October 2013).
Exhibit D	ZN.UA, <i>Authoritarian Democracy</i> (26 December 1997).
Exhibit E	RISU, <i>Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the Commemoration of the Deportation Victims</i> (28 February 2013).
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- Exhibit M Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum* (29 March 2014).
- Exhibit N Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman* (17 May 2014).
- Exhibit O Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis the right to identify candidates for republican authorities* (29 March 2014).
- Exhibit P Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on inadmissibility of extremist activities* (4 May 2014).
- Exhibit Q Maidan.org.ua, *The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in the Rada* (2 March 2004).
- Exhibit R Maidan.org.ua, *Kuchma Imposes Veto on Law on the Deported* (23 July 2004).
- Exhibit S Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, *Draft Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds*, 24 February 2010.
- Exhibit T RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history* (28 February 2019).
- Exhibit U RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimea is ready for a possible food blockade — Aksyonov* (8 September 2015).
- Exhibit V RIA Novosti (Crimea), RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Chubarov: Crimea blockade will begin on 20 September at noon* (16 September 2015).
- Exhibit W RBC, *Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to the Republic* (22 November 2015).
- Exhibit X Vgorode, *"Right Sector" Joins Crimean Blockade* (23 September 2015).
- Exhibit Y Voicesevas.ru, *"Right Sector" announces that "Azov" has joined Crimean blockade* (1 October 2015).

- Exhibit Z Moskovski Komsomolets, *Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea* (14 January 2016).
- Exhibit AA RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in Ukraine* (17 September 2015).
- Exhibit AB RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border* (17 September 2015).
- Exhibit AC RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish Military Instructors in Ukraine* (5 March 2016).
- Exhibit AD RG.ru, *Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders* (5 March 2016).
- Exhibit AE RIA Novosti (Crimea), *The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the Mejlis* (31 March 2016).
- Exhibit AF RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance from Disgrace”* (29 September 2016).
- Exhibit AG SK Consol-Stroy, *Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New Residential Building for Repatriates* (21 April 2015).
- Exhibit AH RIA Novosti (Realty), *90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to New Flats* (12 December 2016).
- Exhibit AI RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants of “Protest Glades” in Crimea Is Going* (23 January 2020).
- Exhibit AJ Government of the Republic of Crimea, *The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the allocation of land plots free of charge for ownership* (24 August 2021).
- Exhibit AK TASS, *In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously Deported Citizens Have Been Built in Five Years* (18 May 2020).

Exhibit A

Government of the Republic of Crimea, *Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in
Crimea (2 October 2014)*

(translation)

Translation

Government of the Republic of Crimea, *Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in Crimea* (2 October 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160812144422/http://rk.gov.ru/rus/index.html/news/286834.htm>.

Sergey Aksyonov Held a Meeting on Squatting in Crimea - Government Portal of the Republic of Crimea

Sergei Aksyonov held a meeting on squatting in Crimea



2 October 2014

Acting Head of the Republic of Crimea - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea Sergey Aksyonov held a meeting on the unauthorised seizure of land plots in the territory of the Republic of Crimea.

“Today’s meeting is dedicated to one of the problems that characterised Crimea during its membership of Ukraine. It is the presence on the territory of our Republic of mass squatting of land for various purposes. This phenomenon is not contributing to the development of our investment climate. We understand that we must solve this issue in the interests of all Crimean people, regardless of nationality. I believe that after Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation, we must resolve this issue legally and prevent similar phenomena in the future,” Aksyonov said.



The deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, Nikolay Yanaki, has made a report on the issue of squatting in Crimea.

“We conducted an inventory of land where the so-called squatters are located. As a result, 59 squatters were identified on the area of 1452 hectares. There are 2545 different structures and constructions on this area. These squatters are located in Sudak district, Alushta, Yalta, City of Simferopol and Simferopol district. In connection with this situation, we have developed a draft law “On Regulation of Issues Related to the Unauthorised Occupation of Land in the Territory of the Republic of Crimea”. The Council of Ministers will initiate consideration of this law at the next session of the State Council,” Nikolay Yanaki informed those present.



The Crimean head said that this law had already been considered and required amendments. “This law has already been considered at the session of the State Council on 30 July, but the law should be considered by the new composition of the deputy corps. The law needs to be amended accordingly,” Aksyonov stressed.



The meeting was also attended by Ruslan Balbek, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea; Alexander Gordetsky, Minister of Property and Land Relations; Gennadiy Naraev, Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources; Zaur Smirnov, Chairman of the State Committee for Interethnic Relations and Deported Citizens; Ivan Magda, Acting Chairman of the State Committee for Forestry and Hunting; Chairman of the State Council Committee on Property and Land Relations Evgeniya Dobrynya, Adviser to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the Crimean Federal District Eskender Bilyalov, and Head of the Legal Policy Department of the Crimean Council of Ministers Andrei Yurkovsky.

Exhibit B

Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, 12
September 2004

(translation)

**Excerpt
Translation**

**Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People, 12 September 2004, available at:
http://web.archive.org/web/20140726221726/http://qtmm.org/public/images/ckeditor/file/quick-folder/01_reglament_kurultaya.doc.**

**RULES
of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People**

Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people, the national congress, is the highest representative competent body of the Crimean Tatar people (hereinafter - Qurultay).

At the Qurultay the Crimean Tatar people are represented by delegates, elected by the Crimean Tatars and members of their families, regardless of nationality, permanently residing in Ukraine, and Crimean Tatars and members of their families - citizens of Ukraine, regardless of place of residence.

The term of powers of the Qurultay is 5 years.

I. General provisions

1.1. The Rules of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people (hereinafter - the Rules of Qurultay) determines the powers and procedure of activity of Qurultay and its bodies.

1.2. The Rules of Qurultay shall be approved by 2/3 of the votes of the delegates present. Amendments and supplements to the Rules of the Qurultay shall be made at the sessions of the Qurultay and shall be adopted by not less than 2/3 of the votes of the delegates registered at the session.

1.3. The official language of Qurultay shall be the Crimean Tatar language.

II. Powers of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people

2.1. Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people takes decisions on all significant issues of socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and other aspects of the life of the people;
approves the Qurultay Rules and the Provisions:
on the status of the Qurultay delegates;
on the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (Qyrym Tatar Milli Mejlisi);
on the Review Committee of Qurultay;
on the election of the delegates to Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people;
determines the main directions and forms of activities of the Mejlis and other bodies of Qurultay, makes decisions on their formation and dissolution;
elects the Working Bodies of the Qurultay session: Presidium, Secretariat, Drafting Commission, Counting Commission; Chairman of Mejlis and the permanent bodies of Qurultay: Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the Review Committee of Qurultay, Mandate Commission and Central Electoral Commission;
makes changes in the composition of: the Mejlis, the Review Committee of Qurultay, the Central Electoral Commission for the election of the Qurultay delegates and other bodies formed by it;
confirms the powers of the Chairman of the Mejlis, the Chairman of the Review Committee of Qurultay;
hears reports of its elected bodies and evaluates their activities and, if necessary, takes decisions on them;
approves the authority of newly elected delegates and decides on the termination of the delegate's powers.

2.2. Decisions of Qurultay are binding upon its delegates, the bodies formed by it and the whole system of national representation and self-government of the Crimean Tatar people: Mejlis of the

Crimean Tatar people (hereinafter - Mejlis), regional and local Mejlises, committees for the return of Crimean Tatars, their subdivisions and bodies created by them, representatives of Mejlis in other states.

2.3. Only the Qurultay itself or the persons and bodies authorised by the Qurultay may make statements and perform any actions on behalf of the Qurultay.

III. Rules of procedure of Qurultay sessions

3.1. Sessions of Qurultay are called by Mejlis at least once every 2.5 years.

3.2. Sessions of Qurultay are also called upon written request of not less than 1/3 of the list of delegates, and the Mejlis shall call this session of Qurultay not later than 2 months from the date of the request.

3.3. The decision on the time of calling the session shall be announced one month before its opening. The delegates of the Qurultay shall be notified in writing, and the draft agenda and order of work of the announced session of the Qurultay approved by the Mejlis shall be brought to their attention not later than 15 days in advance.

3.4. For the preparation of the session of Qurultay the Mejlis forms an organisational entity, which after the election of the Presidium of the session of Qurultay is subordinated to it until the completion of its work. The organisational entity shall ensure the conduct of the session of the Qurultay and carry out the instructions of the Presidium of the session of the Qurultay.

3.5. Qurultay is recognised as competent if not less than 2/3 of the list of delegates have registered by the beginning of the session.

3.6. The Crimean Tatar national anthem and the national anthem of Ukraine shall be played at the opening and closing sessions of the Qurultay.

3.7. The work of the first session of the new convocation of the Qurultay until the election of the Presidium of the session of the Qurultay shall be led by the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission.

3.8. Meetings of the session of the Qurultay shall be open and public.

3.9. Representatives of state bodies, political parties and public organisations, foreign guests may be invited to the session meetings of the Qurultay by the Mejlis. Representatives of the media are accredited for the session meetings in accordance with the procedure established by the Mejlis.

3.10. A closed session meeting may be held by the decision of the Qurultay.

3.11. Qurultay establishes a time limit for speakers and debaters, which shall be observed by the Presidium of the session of Qurultay. Persons who do not comply with the time regulations or allow unethical expressions in relation to the attendees, may be deprived of the floor by the presiding officer. A participant of the Qurultay, who offends the Qurultay and its delegates with misbehaviour, may be removed from the session meeting only by a majority decision of the delegates of the Qurultay present.

3.12. The session of Qurultay finishes its work when the agenda is exhausted or earlier by the decision of the delegates of Qurultay.

3.13. At the closing session of Qurultay the working bodies of the session are dissolved.

[...]

Exhibit C

Interfax, *Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars*
(27 October 2013)

(translation)

Translation

Interfax, *Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars (27 October 2013)*, available at: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/337277>.

Chubarov Was Elected Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars

Simferopol. October 27. INTERFAX.RU - Refat Chubarov, who previously held the post of first deputy head of the Mejlis, has been elected the new chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.

On Sunday, at the 1st session of the VI Qurultay (congress) of the Crimean Tatars taking place in Simferopol, 126 Qurultay delegates voted in favor of R. Chubarov, while his rival - deputy chairman of Mejlis Remzy Ilyasov - received 112 delegates' votes during a secret ballot. Two ballots were declared invalid.

Currently, the Qurultay is holding a nomination of candidates who can be elected members of the Mejlis.

R. Chubarov is the first deputy head of Mejlis since 1991, since 2009 he is also the president of the World Congress of Crimean Tatars. Since November 2010 - the deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea, Head of deputy fraction "Qurultay-Rukh". The deputy of Supreme Soviet of the Autonomy in 1994-1998. The People's Deputy of Ukraine from 1998-2002, 2002-2006, and from 2006-2007 convocations of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine.

Exhibit D

ZN.UA, *Authoritarian Democracy* (26 December 1997)

(translation)

Translation

ZN.UA, *Authoritarian Democracy* (26 December 1997), available at: https://zn.ua/politics_archive/avtoritarnaya_demokratiya.html.

AUTHORITARIAN DEMOCRACY

Nikolai Semena

The split in the Crimean Tatar national movement at the Qurultay has not been overcome, but has only worsened, its veterans believe...

Last week in Simferopol an extraordinary session of the third Qurultay of the Crimean Tatars considered the crisis in the Mejlis. Addressing the Qurultay sixteen of its delegates raised the issue that "a group of unscrupulous businessmen is trying to turn the Mejlis into a "political cover" for their illegal operations related to the embezzlement of budgetary funds allocated for the Program for the Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People". Even after the Qurultay, Lenur Arifov stated that "reaction and authoritarianism have settled in the Mejlis" and that the Mejlis and the Qurultay "have turned into bodies serving the interests of one person and persons close to him." "Now what young Mustafa once fought against, he is implementing in the body he heads," L. Arifov concluded.

People sympathetic to the Crimean Tatars took the news of the split with pain. After all, the Crimean Tatar national movement has been fighting for the ideals of democracy for the last several decades of its history. So what happened? Aisha Seitmuratova, a veteran of the movement, described the incident as "Stalinism," telling a correspondent of "Zerkalo Nedeli" and other journalists the following: "Mustafa is our national hero. He stood up to the pressure of the authorities and KGB, this terrible machine. Not everyone stood up to it. But Mustafa - alas! - is not a leader, with all my respect to him. Not every hero can be a leader and not every leader can be a hero...". According to her, in her New York office (Ayshe Hanum is an American citizen) there's a letter written in 1989 by Izzet Hairrov, a member of the movement who was expelled from the Mejlis during this Qurultay: "Mustafa is no longer the one for whom we fought. I do not understand what happened to him. Mustafa will lead the people to a precipice, from which we all the people will not get out...". Naturally, not everything in this story is as straightforward as it seems at first glance. All the more so because we are talking about quite influential people in Crimea. According to the poll, conducted by the Crimean independent center of political researchers and journalists, Mustafa Dzhemilev was the tenth most influential person in the past year, Lilya Budzhurova - the 18th and Lenur Arifov - the 22nd. However, Refat Chubarov shared 3-4th place, and Nadir Bekirov - 19th-20th. To understand the problem, let's listen to both sides of the argument...

Crisis, Split or Revolt?

Sixteen delegates, ideologically led by the Deputy Prime Minister of the autonomy, one of the leaders of the national faction in the Crimean parliament Lenur Arifov and journalist Lilya Budzhurova, stated that "the Mejlis chairman with all his authority and direct actions created the conditions in which these embezzlements were possible. The economic and financial instruments of embezzlement of budgetary funds were Imdat Bank and the "Crimea" Public Fund... the president of which is the chairman of the Mejlis...". Sixteen delegates of the Qurultay stated that "the Fund "Crimea",

having received 800 thousand grivnas from the state budget to help individual developers - our compatriots, has been keeping this money in its "pockets" for more than two years, condemning many hundreds of people to live in dugouts or unfinished houses. And this is just one example..."

In the report, which Lenur Arifov was not allowed to read to the end, he stated that having discovered the embezzlement, members of the Mejlis demanded that the account of the Capital development administration of State Committee on Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, where the money was transferred by Kiev, be transferred to another bank. But contrary to their expectations, Mustafa Dzhemilev not only did not agree to this, but refused to sign and hindered the implementation of the decisions made by the majority of the Mejlis. And the shortage of funds in the Imdat Bank account at the beginning of the outgoing year was already about 2 million grivnas and continued to grow. Lenur Arifov drew a clear scheme according to which the bank, the State Committee on Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea and commercial structures acted - the budget funds from the accounts of the Capital development administration were transferred to the accounts of the "Crimea" Fund, the "Torshe" Private Entrepreneurship, the "RED" Private Enterprise, the "Sinan" Private Enterprise and the "Oasis" Cooperative, which, according to Arifov, are "the property of private firms, behind which stand several specific individuals, Crimean Tatars by nationality". Arifov states that the image of Imdat-Bank as a national Crimean Tatar financial institution is a myth, because it has never been under the control of the Mejlis, it has always been managed by only one person - Mustafa Dzhemilev.

The opposition called such a state of the Mejlis a crisis, outside observers called it a split, while Mustafa Dzhemilev himself and his colleagues tried to present the opposition's actions at the Qurultay as a revolt in the Mejlis itself. Let's listen to the arguments of the second side for full objectivity. In his report, Mustafa Dzhemilev categorically denied the "information" about his personal accounts and involvement in the ownership of commercial structures. He claimed that the money received by the firms were not embezzled, but used as loans and had to be returned. According to Mustafa Dzhemilev, one cannot "classify all debtors as thieves and embezzlers," even if "it is unlikely that these firms will be able to repay debts in the near future. He also recalled that it was the "Crimea" Fund that invested a lot of money donated by the Tatar diaspora in the Imdat Bank. He rejected accusations of authoritarianism, saying that "if even in such situations the chairman of the Mejlis cannot make volitional decisions, then why does the Mejlis need a chairman at all?" He accused journalist Lilya Budzhurova of "using standard methods of exposure," in which on television they compared the "good" houses of some Crimean Tatars with the unfinished houses of others.

In short, the Qurultay created a situation where, as it were, "two rights" collided. It would have been correct, however, under one condition - if the opposition was given a decent and normal voice. But Arifov was booed and the microphone was taken away from Budzhurova. Democracy can not be limited; it either exists or it doesn't exist. It's good and easy to be a democrat when you have nothing. It turned out that if a manager gets to manage at least one bank and a fairly significant amount of money in it, it is almost impossible to dispose of them so that everyone was happy.

Naturally, for Mustafa Dzhemilev to let the question "about the crisis" go on its own, meant, perhaps, to be removed from politics today, when, in his opinion, this should not be allowed at all - he is included tenth in the election list of Rukh, which almost guarantees the former dissident and the leader of long-suffering people election to

Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Of course Mustafa Bey could not take the risk, but he was afraid to trust the people (more precisely, the Qurultay delegates) and to hold, as it should be, closed voting about prolongation of his powers. As a result, voting was conducted in a usual and primitive way from the point of view of democracy - each delegate had to stand up and say - "for", "against" or "abstained", under the gaze of tough "guards".

As a result, the events have not gone at all according to the scheme expected by the opposition. The Qurultay took tough measures, but not to the "commercial and banking structures" that the rebellious delegates accused of machinations, but to themselves - all sixteen were expelled from the Mejlis, three - Lenur Arifov, Lilya Budzhurova and Nariman Abdureshitov - were recalled from the deputy fraction in the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, the decision "About the Crimean Tatar mass media" was made, which replaced the entire editorial board of the "rebellious" newspaper "Avdet"; the national editorial board on the Crimean television is ordered to have "a public council from the representatives of the Mejlis, as well as the Crimean Tatar culture, science and education"; a "concept of development of the Crimean Tatar journalism for the implementation of a common information policy" will be developed (?). Its former chairman Enver Muedinov was recalled from the revision commission. The Qurultay confirmed the authority of Mustafa Dzhemilev, the chairman of the Mejlis, and gave him additional rights - to withdraw without discussion one third of the nominated candidates (although he asked for only one tenth of them) when electing the members of the Mejlis, to veto its decisions and others. If we take into account that the veto can be overridden by only two-thirds of votes, and the chairman has the right to withdraw one third of votes even without discussion, Mustafa Dzhemilev can be congratulated - practically he has received the right of absolute veto, which actually gives him the rights of khan. If Kirsan Ilyumzhinov can be, as they write, a "democratic khan," why can't Mustafa Dzhemilev be one?

The delegates also confirmed the decision of the Mejlis on the participation of the Crimean Tatars in the elections to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine in the bloc with Rukh and adopted several other documents - an appeal to the OSCE, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, President of Ukraine and the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine "On the continuation of discrimination of the Crimean Tatar people and the need for urgent measures to protect their rights" and the appeal to the leadership of the country "On consideration of the interests of the Crimean Tatar people in the privatization process in Ukraine", which, however, in connection with the issue of the Mejlis crisis are kind of in the shadow.

What Is the Result?

Mustafa Dzhemilev, in terms of overcoming the crisis, considers the Qurultay to have "achieved its goals." The opposition, hoping that the Qurultay would calmly listen to them and delve into the problem, left the congress.

And yet the losses from the Qurultay were probably greater than the gains. First of all, the movement practically lost its image as a democratic movement, and accusations of authoritarianism poured in against the head of the Mejlis. Secondly, the movement has now completely lost its unity, which even before was questioned by the presence of the Crimean Tatar National Movement and the disagreement with the official line of the Mejlis of some representatives of the movement in Moscow, Krasnodar, and

other regions. Such "fragmentation" in the near future will take away a lot of power for internal discord, which could have been spent with greater benefit.

Thirdly, Mustafa Dzhemilev must clearly realize that a significant part of the veterans of the movement are against him, and in time their archives, scattered today all over the world, will be opened, where you'll probably find even more sudden letters than quoted by Aisha Seytmuratova. As a politician, he apparently understands that it is time that will paint his final image for history, and he doesn't care what that portrait will be. This Qurultay added a lot of unflattering material for him...

Exhibit E

RISU, *Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the Commemoration of the Deportation Victims* (28 February 2013)

(translation)

Translation

RISU, *Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the Commemoration of the Deportation Victims* (28 February 2013), available at: https://risu.ua/ru/krymskie-tatary-ugrozhayut-vlasti-buntom-v-sluchae-prepyatstvovaniya-chestvovaniyu-pamyati-zhertv-deportacii_n61760.

Crimean Tatars Threaten the Authorities with Revolt If They Prevent the Commemoration of the Deportation Victims

Religious Information Service of Ukraine

The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people is ready to take thousands of Crimean Tatars to the streets if the authorities prevent the traditional commemoration of the victims of the deportation, which takes place on May 18.



The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people is ready to take thousands of Crimean Tatars to the streets if the authorities prevent the traditional commemoration of the victims of the deportation, which takes place on May 18. This was stated to the Radio “Svoboda” by the chairman of the Mejlis, People's Deputy of Ukraine Mustafa Dzhemilev in connection with the fact that the day before the Simferopol city authorities rejected his request for assistance to the Mejlis to hold appropriate events in the central square of the city. This is reported by Ukrainian Independent Information Agency of News (UNIAN)

M. Dzhemilev called the “provocation of the authorities” the refusal of officials of the Simferopol City Executive Committee to agree upon the traditional events proposed by the Mejlis on the Day of Mourning. According to him, the Mejlis regarded this as an attempt to remove the representative body of the Crimean Tatars from the organisation of mourning events and provoke unrest. “We will do what we have been doing for the last 23 years in a row. And they, if they want something different, they will see the result,” M. Dzhemilev noted.

According to his data, the authorities plan to involve members of the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar people under the President of Ukraine, who are hostile to the Mejlis and its leaders in these events, and to demonstrate the support of this structure by the population they are going to bring in state employees from the regions. “But the Crimean Tatars will not be silent either. They will come in columns

from five sides and fill the square. And if they are not allowed - the roads will be blocked, the traffic will be paralysed, at least in Simferopol, and perhaps this will spread to other regions of the autonomy. A very dangerous game. It can lead to bad consequences. And that's why we will draw the attention of international organisations to this provocation,” stressed the Chairman of the Mejlis.

According to M. Dzhemilev, the current government of the autonomy has recently pursued a tough anti-Crimean Tatar policy, and this greatly irritates Crimean Tatars and stimulates protest moods. “Now the situation has become so aggravated that a lot of people are angered because of the policy that is being pursued against the Crimean Tatars. So the mood of people is obviously not going to be very peaceful. We will, of course, try to keep it all peaceful. But we should not rule out some kind of opposition to the mourning events, some actions, peaceful actions, of course, but with demands for the resignation of the government,” he said.

Dzhemilev put the responsibility for a possible escalation of the ethno-political situation in Crimea on the central authorities of Ukraine and personally on the Prime Minister of the autonomy Anatoliy Mogilev. He said that ‘people like Mogilev, with such caveman views, who claim that Stalin did the right thing in his time by deporting the Crimean Tatars, and not only the Crimean Tatars, but other peoples as well - such people cannot be in power, occupy any government positions’.

At the same time, Radio ‘Svoboda’ refers to the government press service, which distributed the comment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea A. Mogilev where he said that the provocations on the eve of the Day of Deportation of the Crimean Tatars, about which the Mejlis claims, are “far-fetched,” the informational situation around is “artificially inflated,” and accusations by “individual Crimean Tatar politicians” against the leadership of the country and Crimea of “insufficient attention to the restoration of the rights of deported peoples and non-compliance with the rights and freedoms of citizens are unfounded”.

The statement also says that such accusations from “individual figures” are “purposeful” in order to “divert the attention of the Crimean Tatars from the solution of urgent problems that have arisen in the Crimean Tatar national movement on a wave of negativity”.

A. Mogilev also noted that the leadership of the country and the authorities of the autonomy “are always open to cooperation and constructive coordination to solve the problems of the deported peoples, and they expect the same approach from politicians who represent the society of Crimea”.

Exhibit F

Livejournal, Respublika News, *Enver Abduraimov: "The Mejlis is driving our people into opposition. People don't benefit from it"* (27 February 2013)

(translation)

Translation

Livejournal, Respublika News, *Enver Abduraimov: "The Mejlis is driving our people into opposition. People don't benefit from it"* (27 February 2013), available at: <https://respublika-news.livejournal.com/186618.html>.

Enver Abduraimov: "The Mejlis is driving our people into opposition. People don't benefit from it"



Interview by Vadim Nikiforov

photos: Yuri Lashov

Enver Abduraimov is a Crimean Tatar politician who is gaining his popularity and one of the main opponents of the Mejlis leadership. A week ago, the Supreme Council of Crimea appointed him head of the commission on interethnic relations. Abduraimov was appointed despite the protests of the Crimean Tatar deputies, who demanded that Remzi Ilyasov, loyal to the leadership of the Mejlis, continue to lead the commission. Abduraimov met with "Respublika" in his new, not yet furnished office and told us about the reasons for his disagreement with the Mejlis, his hobbies and his family.

"The Mejlis has not solved a single problem of the Crimean Tatars."

- You knew that Remzi Ilyasov, your colleague from the Qurultay-Rukh political group in the parliament, was already working as head of the commission. Didn't that confuse you?

- I was offered this post back in 2010, when the current convocation of Parliament was just getting to work. I told the leadership of the Mejlis about this offer, but faced with their misunderstanding. Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov were indignant: how is it that the leaders of the autonomy contacted me directly and did not address them on this personnel issue? As a result, they (the leadership of the Mejlis - "R") said that if Remzy Ilyasov is not appointed to this position - then let any other deputy head this commission, but not me. Then

I decided not to argue and agreed with their decision, since those were my first steps in politics at this level. But regarded their position as wrong.

- What was wrong?

- The fact is that by then the relationship between the leadership of the Mejlis and representatives of the ruling party had reached the highest level of confrontation. And I was a new person in politics and could become an intermediary in a dialogue with the authorities. But as I understood, the Mejlis does not seek to conduct a dialogue with the authorities at all. It is headed by people who have always been in opposition. They are just used to it - getting into the parliament from opposition parties. It is easier for them to solve their personal issues this way. But for the Crimean Tatar people such a policy is unacceptable. How can you demand that the government solve the problems of the people if you are constantly staying in conflict with it?

- So you suggested supporting Yanukovich in the presidential election?

- Yes, or at least not to support anyone in the first round, not to make loud statements. Then everyone would take thought that the Crimean Tatar people are about 100 thousand voters who have not yet decided on their political preferences. The people could have benefited from this situation. And what we have is that one or two seats in the Verkhovna Rada - for Dzhemilev and Chubarov - are put above the interests of the whole people.

- At the session of the Supreme Soviet, protesting against your appointment, your fellow political group members talked a lot about your lack of experience...

- How many enterprises have the leaders of the Mejlis created? How many jobs have they created, how many taxes have they paid to the budget? I've worked as a manager all my life, I've set up several companies. Hundreds of people work there - they earn money, feed their families.

It will be possible to criticise me for my actions when it will be seen whether there is a result or not. But the Mejlis has been working for more than 20 years, and it hasn't achieved any of its goals. Many Crimean Tatars, 24 years after their return to their homeland, still haven't received any land plots here and don't have any housing. People live in compact settlements without light, gas, water or sewerage. There is no law on the status of the deported. The presidents and governments of Ukraine and Crimea change, but the problems stay the same. Maybe the cause is not in the government?

"I know how to pilot small planes"

- You have little experience in the civil service. You are better known in Crimea as a successful businessman. Who will handle your business now?

- I do have a few businesses. I am their founder and receive dividends, but I haven't been working for them for a long time. In 2002 I became a deputy of Simferopol City Council. Since then, all of my companies are run by managers - I trained them myself and completely trust them. As for me, I made a choice in favour of socially useful work.

- You have won several major poker tournaments. Are you really good at playing cards?

- I got into poker relatively recently: in 2010 a friend suggested that I play in a tournament. By the way, my political opponents are now trying to portray this hobby in a negative light. I answer to Mr. Chubarov and others: I do not play in casinos and I do not play in some "katrans" (in poker parlance "katran" is a place where professional poker players gather - "katalas" - "E"). I participate in tournaments. Yes, there's a prize pool, which is drawn between the participants. Just like in other sports. I don't see anything wrong with it.

- Do you have any other hobbies?

- I used to go in for light aviation, I can fly small planes, for example, Yak-52. I used to jump with parachute for several years. But I'm not stuck on one hobby. I try to take as much from life as possible. I want to learn more and more new things.

- Do you have time for your family?

- I try to spend every free minute with my family. My wife Sevil and I have been together for 20 years, and we have been married for 18 years. We have four children: a daughter and three sons. The elder one, Emil, is graduating from high school this year. He studies in the physics and mathematics class. Recently he won the Olympiad run by Tavrida National V.I. Vernadsky University (TNU), and he was enrolled in the mathematics department without exams. I am proud of my family, and I try to live my life in such a way that my children will be proud of their father.

Profile

Enver Elimdarovich Abduraimov

39 years old.

Has three degrees. In 1999, he graduated from Tavrida Institute of Business and Law, in 2007, from the National Academy for Public Administration under the President of Ukraine, and in 2010, from the International Management Institute in Kiev.

He ranks among the most successful Crimean Tatar businessmen. He founded several companies, including Elim, a plant producing metal-plastic products.

Exhibit G

Milli Firka, *How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans* (12 October 2013)

(translation)

Translation

Milli Firka, *How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans* (12 October 2013), available at: <http://milli-firka.org/как-джемилев-трех-сирот-обокрал/>.

How Dzhemilev Ripped Off Three Orphans

Information about Mustafa Dzhemilev's financial fraud has been appearing in the media since the 1990s. However, all these years, Dzhemilev's supporters were quick to dismiss all the "insinuations", demanding documentary confirmation of the accusations.



This has always been more difficult as the process of moving money or material assets in circumvention of existing laws and regulations bypassing existing laws and regulations from one owner to another usually takes place without witnesses and without signing any papers.

But even the with the documented facts of Mustafa Dzhemilev's financial scams he has time and again gotten away with it. The Mejlis leader is protected by his popularity "behind the scenes" and parliamentary immunity.

For example, in 1997 the chairman of Audit commission of the II Qurultay Enver Muedinov prepared a report in which he highlighted the results of the audit of financial activities of the "Crimea" Fund, the accounting department of Mejlis and the commercial "Imdat-Bank" supervised by M. Dzhemilev, through the accounts of which the budgetary funds allocated by Ukraine for the accommodation of the Crimean Tatars passed.

E. Muedinov's report uncovered the facts of colossal financial abuses, indicated the machination schemes and named the counterparties to whom the budgetary funds were transferred in circumvention of the law.

However, M. Dzhemilev's specially organised team of "loudmouths and whistleblowers" did not allow the speaker to make a report at the Qurultay.

But the report of the head of Qurultay Auditing commission was published in the newspaper "Avdet" №23(186) of 31.12.1997 and after all became known to public, supervisory and law enforcement agencies - but there was no reaction from Finance Ministry, Treasury or Economic Crimes Unit.

On the other hand, there was an immediate reaction from Dzhemilev: Chairman of the Revision Commission Enver Muedinov was immediately removed from the Qurultay.

After such a frank carte blanche of the authorities to embezzle people's funds, the number of those wishing to catch M. Dzhemilev by the hand has sharply decreased...

And this is only with regard to budgetary funds. As to the humanitarian aid, which fall into the hands of Mustafa Dzhemilev, the head of Mejlis never reported to anyone, neither to the people, nor to Qurultay.

According to various foreign data, the total amount of material assistance of the international community to the Crimean Tatar people for two decades is from one to one and a half billion US dollars!

Thus, for example, the former ambassador of Turkey in Ukraine Ahmed Byulent Merich in one of his speeches confirmed that Turkey alone transferred for the needs of the Crimean Tatar people more than 20 million dollars.

The way M. Dzhemilev distributes the money that fall into his hands is evidenced by the recent financial scandal related to the charitable assistance to Crimean Tatars by a well-known businessman from Turkey, chairman of the Federation of Crimean Societies and Society of Culture and Mutual Aid of the Crimean Tatars of the city of Kocaeli Ibraim Araci.

The essence of the scandal is as follows.

Twice, in November and December 2011, Ibraim Araci transferred 50,000 US dollars each to the account of the "Crimea" Fund, whose founder is Mustafa Dzhemilev. This was his contribution for organising the II World Congress of Crimean Tatars in Turkey, in Eskisehir.

(32A) VALUE DATE/CURR./INTERBANK SETTLED AMOUNT	
DATE	23.11.2011
CURRENCY CODE	USD
AMOUNT	50'000.00
(33B) CURR./INSTRUCTED AMOUNT	
CURRENCY CODE	USD
AMOUNT	50'000.00
(50R) ORDERING CUSTOMER - NAME & ADDRESS	
	VEFA İBRAHİM ARACI
	İZMİT - TURKEY
(52A) ORDERING INSTITUTION	
(53A) SENDER'S CORRESPONDANT	
(54A) RECEIVER'S CORRESPONDANT	
(55A) THIRD REIMBURSEMENT INSTITUTION	
(56A) INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTION	
(57A) ACCOUNT WITH INSTITUTION	
(59) BENEFICIARY CUSTOMER	
	CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION
	FOND CRINEA
(70) REMITTANCE INFORMATION	
(71A) DETAILS OF CHARGES	IRRETRIEVABLE FINANCIAL HELP
	01R

(32A) VALUE DATE/CURR./INTERBANK SETTLED AMOUNT	08.12.2011
DATE	USD
CURRENCY CODE	50'000.00
AMOUNT	
(33B) CURR./INSTRUCTED AMOUNT	USD
CURRENCY CODE	50'000.00
AMOUNT	
(50K) ORDERING CUSTOMER - NAME & ADDRESS	MEJLIS DZHEMILEV VEFA IBRAHIM ARACI CIVILIAN - ORGANIZATION IZMIR - TURKEY
(52A) ORDERING INSTITUTION	
(53A) SENDER'S CORRESPONDANT	
(54A) RECEIVER'S CORRESPONDANT	
(55A) THIRD REIMBURSEMENT INSTITUTION	
(56A) INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTION	
(57A) ACCOUNT WITH INSTITUTION	
(59) BENEFICIARY CUSTOMER	CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION FOND CRIMEA IRRETRIEVABLE FINANCIAL HELP
(70) REMITTANCE INFORMATION	
(71A) DETAILS OF CHARGES	CUR

However, the Mejlis flatly refused to hold the congress in Turkey.

Later, on 4 May 2013, a meeting of representatives of the Crimean Tatar diaspora abroad was organised in Crimea to discuss where and when to hold the Second World Congress of the Crimean Tatars.

It was decided to hold it only in Crimea.

Ibrahim Araci was also present at this meeting. He did not agree with the decision and left the meeting without waiting for the end of the event.

And suddenly, in violation of all the agreements, in the autumn of 2013 the head of the Mejlis' Foreign Relations Department Ali Khamzin spread information that the II Congress would be held not in Crimea and not even in Turkey, but in Romania (?!), which caused a sharp negative reaction from the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, which invested a lot of effort and money into the preparation of the II Congress.

One of the manifestations of this reaction was the quite reasonable question of the fate of the \$100,000 transferred to the accounts of the Dzhemilev's "Crimea" Fund.

Mustafa Dzhemilev habitually decided to remain silent...

Here are the texts of two letters addressed to Mustafa Dzhemilev by Ibrahim Araci regarding the fate of the 100,000 dollars he sent to the head of the Mejlis.

Letter 1:

Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013

Dear Mustafa Dzhemilev.

As you know, on May 4, 2013 we took part in a meeting at the restaurant "Ayshe" in Simferopol at your invitation.

After that meeting, you wanted the Ankara General Centre and especially dear Mukremin Şahin, the chairmen of the societies belonging to our federation (e.g. dear Ergin Batur) to confirm that the money I sent you, you allegedly returned to me.

However, the people mentioned could not have been informed in any way concerning this subject.

I personally have never spread the word about the money given to charity. I have never demanded or wanted the return of cash and non-cash funds invested in Crimea. I sent that money to support my compatriots, to help the people. I would like to remind you that I did not demand the return of funds. But if you did send the funds, I DID NOT RECEIVE them and they WERE NOT RETURNED.

Please provide details of where you said you returned the funds you received in the amount of 100,000 (one hundred thousand) dollars. Details of the \$100,000 income are given in the annex below.

Out of the funds which you are very well aware of, I ask you to allocate to the Rector of KIPU (Crimean State Engineering and Pedagogical University), Fevzi Yakubov the sum of \$20,000 (twenty thousand) dollars on my behalf. If you do not need the remaining amount, please let me know and we will distribute this money to the people.

All the best.

V. İbrahim Aracı

Chairman of the Federation of Crimean Societies and Society of Culture and Mutual Assistance of the Crimean Tatars of Kocaeli.

Letter 2:

V. İbrahim ARACI

Sent: 30 September 2013

Dear Mr. Mustafa Dzhemilev.

I want to inform you that I have not received a response to the email dated 23 September 2013.

As you know, there are three orphans of our tribesmen living in Saki. I ask you to allocate \$20,000 from this amount for their purchase of a house.

I would like to ask you to provide information about the amount of these funds allocated for charity on the holiday of Oraza Bayram from the Kocaeli Society of Crimean Tatars.

All the best.

According to a Turkish source, İbrahim Aracı has not yet received a response from Mustafa Dzhemilev.

Also, neither the three orphans from the city of Saki nor the rector of the KIPU, Fevzi Yakubov, have received financial assistance.

* * *

The above case is just one small episode of Mustafa Dzhemilev's more than 20 years of "haymaking" in the fat field of foreign charitable aid to the Crimean Tatar people.

What conclusions can be drawn from the described situation?

Firstly, it's time for the Crimean Tatar public, and first of all the Qurultay delegates, to demand from the Mejlis head and heads of the organisations accountable to him - "Crimea" Fund, "Crimea Development Fund", "League of Crimean Tatar women", "Maarifchi" Association and others, participating in receiving and distributing humanitarian and charitable aid - a full and public report about the amount of humanitarian aid received in recent years, as well as about its distribution and final recipients.

Second, the Crimean Tatar community needs to establish an effective system for receiving and distributing charitable aid, with mandatory monthly public reports by the recipients and distributors of humanitarian and charitable aid on the amount of aid received and its distribution to those in need, as well as on the principles and criteria for selecting candidates and projects to receive such aid.

Thirdly, the Crimean Tatar public should publicly call on the international community, charitable foundations and the Crimean Tatar diaspora to ensure transparency and openness in sending humanitarian and charitable aid to the Crimean Tatar people and its distribution in Crimea. And to ensure that these principles are strictly adhered to.

Without this, embezzlement and abuse will continue in the future, no matter who is at the helm of the Mejlis, inevitably leading the people to further impoverishment and degradation...

Milli Firka Press Service

Exhibit H

FLB, *Dzhemilev's Profitable Struggle* (3 April 2014)

(translation)

Translation

FLB, *Dzhemilev's Profitable Struggle* (3 April 2014), available at: <https://flb.ru/infoprint/57704.html>.



Federal Research Agency (www.FLB.ru)

Dzhemilev's profitable struggle

FLB: Why the interests of "Imdat-Bank" for the head of the Mejlis happened to be above the common interests of the Crimean Tatars. The episode for 100 thousand dollars.

"There is such an amazing category of public figures, around which there is always some kind of a little-understood fuss. At the same time, the pathos of the public figure's statements is sometimes off the charts. For example, Mustafa Dzhemilev, an authoritative representative of the Crimean Tatar for the United States, has made yet another fuss about his own person. We are talking about the scandal that arose at the border of Crimea with Ukraine, where Dzhemilev was handed a certain "Act of notification of non-admission to the Russian Federation". The noise and scandal was sky-high.

Dzhemilev, the "victim of the regime," burst out with a series of anti-Russian remarks, especially when it became clear that no one prohibited Dzhemilev to enter Russia, and "Federal Migration Service has nothing to do with this incident and did not take any part in it," the office stressed. However, there is nothing surprising - Dzhemilev, who is a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine from the party "Batkivshchyna" - an ardent opponent of the reunification of Crimea with Russia - began to rapidly lose the remnants of influence, which for many years was cultivated by the West. It is no coincidence that the Crimean Tatars themselves came out in street action in order to distance themselves from such a "representative of the people".

Agents and enemies are everywhere

The fact is that Dzhemilev's relations with the Crimean Tatar organisations have always been far from the radiance, which is attributed to him. Well, everyone who disagreed with the leader, according to the old human rights tradition, were declared agents of the intelligence services. **A telling story happened** to Dzhemilev with activists from the local branch of the Islamic party Hizb ut-Tahrir (which, incidentally, is on Russia's "black list" of radical organisations). So, the leader of the Mejlis, people's deputy Mustafa Dzhemilev, accused the Crimean representatives of the party of cooperation with the Ukrainian and Russian intelligence agencies, which, according to Dzhemilev, was "the main political force that prevents the implementation of Russia's strategic interests in Crimea". "Therefore, the said intelligence agencies support any organisations that can be used to discredit and divide the Crimean Tatars. Including Hizb ut-Tahrir," Mustafa Dzhemilev said. "Judging by Dzhemilev's words, he has no idea about the real situation in the Muslim community of Crimea. And shows incompetence and inadequacy in matters of our organization. But we are not going to sue him. After all, he's a Muslim too, so let Allah judge," the head of the

Hizb ut-Tahrir information office in Ukraine, Fazil Amzaev, objected to Dzhemilev. By the way, the Crimean "Hizb ut-Tahrir" - the journalists noted, - have repeatedly stated that they will not build a caliphate in the Crimea and Ukraine, because Muslims are not a majority in the country. They are only engaged in popularizing the Muslim way of life. (This is probably why, even during the referendum, it was noted that it is likely that the Crimean branch of this party will be able to stay, because it works in the legal right field).

Dzhemilev's Individual Right

Well, to understand why Dzhemilev has such difficulties in communication and negativity among co-religionists, it is enough to look at the archives. One story **dates back to 2010**, and it has to do with property. Here is how it is described on the portal of the human rights group "Peninsula Crimea". The case was in the summer of 2010. "A month ago I sent an application asking to check the legality of the privatisation of the Mejlis building in Simferopol personally by Mustafa Dzhemilev," said human rights activist Mark Ben-Naim.

"On the instructions of the Prime Minister of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Vasily Dzharty, the issue was referred to the staff of the Property Fund of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for study. According to the Property Fund, the building on Shmidta Street, 2 in Simferopol, was indeed the property of the Autonomy and was rented by the Public Organisation "Crimea Fund", the head of which, according to the register of the Ministry of Justice, was Mustafa Dzhemilev" - reminded the human rights activist.

"In order to obtain the sole right to privatise the building, Mustafa Dzhemilev reorganised the Public Organisation into a private charitable fund, in which he himself is the ONLY founder" - stated Ben-Naim.

According to him, "The most interesting thing in this story is that the Law of Ukraine "On Associations of Citizens" directly prohibits reorganisation of a public organisation into anything other than another public organisation. In other words, a private charitable fund cannot become the legal successor of a public organisation. Thus, the human rights defender believed that Mustafa Dzhemilev had committed a criminal offence. He - believes the applicant - by fraud and entering false information in the documents, misappropriated the state property, which had previously been the property of the Autonomy.

Dzhemilev's schemes. Archives and eyewitnesses

But the more distinctive episodes of Dzhemilev's activity are rooted in the 90's, when passions were running high over on the ruins of the Soviet Union. The portal of the public organisation "SEBAT" found the materials of the newspaper "Avdet" No 23 (186) of 31.12.1997 in the Crimean archives. And **acquainted contemporaries with the document** entitled "The Report of the Chairman of the Review Committee of the III Qurultay Enver Muedinov".

[...] Audits of the financial and economic activities of the "Crimea" Fund for 1996, and of the accounting department of the Mejlis for 1996 and 10 months of 1997 were carried out. I will describe the results of these audits below. [...]

[...] I bring to your attention the report compiled without embellishing the facts, but also without glossing over the painful problems, the attempt to solve which led to the crisis in Mejlis.

So far, the desire not to wash dirty linen in public has worked for us while discussing these or those questions. But in order to understand the reasons of the created crisis it is necessary to wash this dirty linen as long as without telling the truth we won't achieve unity and solidarity of

the national movement, without this it will be difficult to gain trust of the people, which has been noticeably shaken lately.

Some members of the Mejlis and the Review Committee are trying to blame for the crisis situation on those members of the Mejlis who sought to bring order to the Mejlis and in the distribution of funds allocated under the Program for Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People. All the "guilt" of these members of the Mejlis is that they made public the negative phenomena that were happening with the funds allocated under the program. And the Chairman of Mejlis M.Dzhemilev and his supporters are against publicising these facts.

Disclosure of which facts are the Chairman of Mejlis and his supporters afraid of?

At the Mejlis meetings from August 1996 to March 1997 the questions about the efficiency of the use of budgetary funds allocated under the Program for the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people and the principles of the relationship between the Mejlis and "Imdat-bank" were considered 6 times.

During this time, we witnessed how an Mejlis commission was established to make recommendations on the activities of "Imdat-Bank", how extraordinary meetings of the Mejlis were initiated at the request of 13 members of the Mejlis and at the decision of the Review Committee in order to cancel the decisions made. We also faced such a fact as the refusal of the Mejlis chairman to sign and execute adopted decisions without taking into account the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members.

Even then, the first signs of the impending crisis appeared, but the Chairman of Mejlis M.Dzhemilev did nothing to eliminate the crisis phenomena, but on the contrary, did everything possible to deepen it.

The opinion of the majority of Mejlis members was categorical: to transfer the budget account of the capital development administration from "Imdat-bank" to one of those authorised by the national bank of Ukraine to service budget funds, thereby expressing distrust in the activities of "Imdat-bank" and its management.

The Mejlis Chairman, realising that he could not change the mind of the majority of the Mejlis members, went to an extreme step: it was stated that the Mejlis Chairman would resign if the budget account of the capital development administration was withdrawn from the "Imdat-bank". With this step, M.Dzhemilev went to the political blackmail of the Mejlis. He made it clear to everyone that he would reject any decision to withdraw the capital development administration account from the "Imdat-Bank".

What does the Chairman of the Mejlis and his supporters actually stand for, and what do most members of the Mejlis oppose so strongly?

Why does the Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev persistently continue to defend his pet project - "Imdat-bank" without taking into account the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members?

And everything turns out to be in the control, or rather, in the uncontrolled spending of budgetary funds allocated under the Program for the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people, in order to keep "Imdat-bank" afloat.

At one time, when "Imdat-Bank" was organised, it was entrusted with the functions of control over the efficient spending of funds allocated under the Program through the Public Fund "Crimea", which is one of the founders of the bank.

Much in the activities of "Imdat-bank" is hidden behind the term "commercial secret". No one can learn anything about the activities of the bank without the consent of all the founders of the bank.

In October 1995, by order of the Chairman of the Mejlis, a commission of the Mejlis conducted the first and so far the only partial inspection of "Imdat-Bank".

In parallel with this inspection by the commission, an audit of the "Imdat-Bank" activity was carried out by the specialists of an independent financial expertise from Kharkov, at the invitation of the Chairman of the Mejlis. The main purpose of the audit was to make a clear picture of the bank's activities.

Much about the activity of "Imdat-bank" became known due to the results of these inspections. Inspection reports were presented to the Chairman of Mejlis M.Dzhemilev. But the results of the inspections were so unexpected and overwhelming even for M.Dzhemilev that he decided to hide the acts of inspection under the carpet and, rolling up his sleeves, takes decisive measures to save the bank.

So what did the inspections on the activity of "Imdat-Bank" reveal, and what results of the inspections did the Chairman of the Mejlis decide to hide?

Here are a few excerpts from the act of inspections:

The bank's insolvency was caused by the fact that the bank's management... in violation of the requirements of the National Bank of Ukraine, regulating lending activities, in January-September 1994, issued loans totaling 72.303 billion krb. (karbovanets), which have not been repaid even at the time of the inspection. The issuance of unprofitable loans was made without analysing their recoverability and security.

The most serious mistake of the bank officials mentioned above is that credit resources were provided to a number of companies that already had outstanding loans and fees for using credit resources in this bank.

As a result of the inactive credit policy of the Council and the Board of the Bank, "Imdat-Bank" incurred losses amounting to 178.703 billion krb. (non-repayment of issued and guaranteed loans, lost income, as well as losses from interbank credit operations).

Despite the created situation, when the bank incurred losses, the Council of the Bank set the salary for the employees of the bank - 15% of the income received by the bank.

Incompetence of the management of "Imdat-bank" led to the fact that the bank was on the verge of bankruptcy. Changing the chairmen of the Board of "Imdat-bank", one after another, they tried to save the situation. Only in 1994, 5 chairmen of the bank's Board changed.

In an interview with a correspondent of the "All-Ukrainian News", R. Kenje, a former chairman of the bank's Board, stated that he had not worked at the bank when it was suffering losses. This is an impertinent lie. What can you expect from a man who does his best to justify these actions?

R. Kenje was forced to write a notice of resignation from the post of Chairman of the Bank during the inspection of "Imdat-bank" by the Commission of the Mejlis, i.e. in October 1995.

The 53rd meeting of the Mejlis adopted a decision in relation to R. Kenje as well, but no one executes this decision because of the disagreement of the Chairman of the Mejlis with it.

The tape recording of the 53rd meeting of the Mejlis and the minutes of the meeting of 24 August 1996, where the decisions on the account of the capital development administration in the "Imdat-Bank", on the bank officials were taken away and are kept personally by M.Dzhemilev.

The leadership of the Mejlis, the Imdat-Bank and the State Committee on National Security were busy with one problem - how to find funds to replenish the hole that had formed due to non-repayment of loans. They found both ways and means.

These were the budgetary funds of the Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea under the Program for the Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People. They used persuasion and, if necessary, threats of physical violence in order to use the budget funds to the benefit of the bank founders and the managers of some companies. Through these companies and small businesses the budget funds intended for the arrangement of the Crimean Tatar people, flowed into the pockets of managers of various ranks, and the people began to be openly deceived, hiding behind the assurances that official Kiev is gradually phasing out funding for the Program of Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People.

Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, its budget account in the "Imdat-bank" was the very cash cow, from the funds of which the bank still existed.

How else can be explained such a fact that the allocation of 80 billion krb. by the Capital development administration of the "Crimea" Fund in August 1995, which, according to the order of the State Committee of National Security, were intended for the payment of financial aid to individual developers for the completion of houses, were used by the President of the "Crimea" Fund M.Dzhemilev for strengthening the financial position of the "Imdat-bank", for the repayment of debts on loans previously taken by a number of small enterprises and companies.

In order to give the appearance of legitimacy of use of 80 billion krb. received from the Capital development administration, the contracts were concluded between the "Crimea" Fund and the "Geos" and "Arsen-bey" enterprises for the supply of building materials, and the money was transferred to these enterprises in the amount of 63,0 billion krb. and 10 billion krb. respectively, leaving 7,0 billion krb. on the current account of the "Crimea" Fund. But in those two years not a single karbovanets worth of building materials has been delivered.

Where was the money spent? With this money "Geos" and "Arsen-bey" enterprises bought their promissory notes in the "Imdat-bank".

Moreover, at the expense of the above mentioned 63.0 billion krb. "Geos"enterprise repaid the debts of the following enterprises:

1. "Zodiac" enterprise 9.9 billion krb.
2. "Turk-Krym" LLC 10.0 billion krb.
3. "RED" enterprise 12.7 billion krb.
4. "Sparta" LLC 4.62 billion krb.
5. "Ecotech" LLC 4.0 billion krb.
6. "Cruz" enterprise 4.7 billion krb.

7. "Avesta" enterprise 4.6 billion krb.
8. "Krymzemstroj" enterprise 4.6 billion krb.

And the "Arsen-bey" enterprise, at the expense of the public fund "Crimea" received 10 billion krb, has repaid debts of the enterprise "Marat-94" in the amount of 2,0 billion krb.

The way in which after some time the appearance of payment of a part of debts between "Geos" enterprise and Fund "Crimea" was created refers to the category of puzzles and when solving them one starts to wonder: who took credits after all and why one enterprises pay debts of other enterprises and what source was chosen for repayment of debts?

From March 12, 1996 to July 15, 1996 "RED" enterprise transferred to the Fund "Crimea" 25 219 565 000 krb., drawing up payment orders as a repayment of accounts payable. But in the accounting documents in the Fund "Crimea" there is no confirmation of the document on the presence of such debt, but there is a letter from the "RED" enterprise that the transferred amount of 25 219 565 000 Krb is the payment of the debt of "Geos" enterprise.

S. Tokhtarov was the Director of the "RED" enterprise and the Chairman of the Board of "Imdat-bank" at that time, and he probably chose budgetary funds as the source for paying the debt.

The events that happened after that belong to those that are called incredible. The leadership of the "Crimea" Fund decided to use part of the funds coming from compatriots living abroad to replenish the Fund's current account in the "Imdat-Bank". For this purpose, \$31,497 was allocated and handed over to S. Tokhtarov for currency exchange and crediting to the current account of the "Crimea" Fund.

For the execution of this operation S. Tochtarov chose the "Geos" enterprise. The "Geos" enterprise transfers 58107 grivnas to the "Crimea" Fund by issuing a payment order, as a return of accounts payable. Is this not absurd? The funds of the "Crimea" Fund are used to pay off debts to the "Crimea" Fund.

How can one think of choosing a partner to credit funds to a company that has been indebted to the "Crimea" Fund for more than one year? According to the accounting documents, "Geos" enterprise reduced its debt to the "Crimea" Fund at the expense of the funds received by SME "RED" and for the currency received. According to accounting documents, "Geos" enterprise reduced its debt to the "Crimea" Fund through funds received by "RED" enterprise and for the currency received.

All the funds received from "RED" enterprise and "Geos" enterprise the management of the Fund "Crimea" decided to direct for payment of material aid to individual developers for the completion of houses. In 1996, 347.776 grivnas 50 kopecks was allocated for payment of financial assistance to the developers, and to date the indebtedness of the "Crimea" Fund to the developers in the amount of 4,522,234 grivnas 50 kopecks remains.

But what happened with 80 billion grivnas is not the only thing that happened with the budget funds. In the same way, 45 billion grivnas was used to repay the debts of some enterprises through the "Poisk" enterprise and the "RED" enterprise. A total of 8.9 billion krb. was misappropriated through the "Toria" enterprise on August 7, 1996. And there are dozens and dozens of such facts.

From the outside it seemed that official Kiev did not notice, to put it mildly, "these tricks" of the "Imdat-bank" management. But, to its credit, the Ukrainian government has taken steps to streamline the budget. In accordance with Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No 401 of 03.04.96, enterprises and organisations financed from the state budget were obliged to transfer accounts to authorised banks determined by this resolution before 15.05.96. However, this decree, as well as the decisions of the Mejlis taken in accordance with this decree, have not been implemented to date.

The most vigorous opposition to the withdrawal of the Capital development administration account from "Imdat-Bank", following the decision taken at the Mejlis meeting, came from M. Dzhemilev and R. Kenje, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and former chairman of the bank's Council.

At a time when one part of the Mejlis members were trying to bring order to the use of budgetary funds, another part was actively working to keep the budgetary account of the Capital development administration in the "Imdat-Bank".

Without discussing it at meetings of the Mejlis, they held secret negotiations with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, A. Demidenko, and the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, V. Kiselev. As a result of these negotiations, a letter was initiated to the Prime Minister of Ukraine P.I. Lazarenko. I will read an excerpt from this letter:

"The incompetence of the former management, which manifested itself in misconduct, seriously complicated and worsened the financial situation of the bank, the new composition of the Council and the Board of the bank are taking measures to resolve the crisis situation. In these conditions, the control and audit department and the state treasury department of Simferopol charged the amount of 2,772,218 grivnas 85 kopecks on the balance of budgetary funds with penalties, while the authorised capital of the bank is 1,200,074 grivnas.

Taking into account the role of "Imdat-bank" which activity is under constant control of the Supervisory Board and the "Qurultay" faction of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, I ask to consider it appropriate to withdraw the collection orders and give it the status of an authorized bank for servicing the funds sent from the State Budget of Ukraine, to finance the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people.»

How they controlled, and how they wanted to control the use of budgetary funds, we have shown above.

How can we hope that the leadership of "Imdat-bank" will finally begin to show a sense of compassion for their people if they continue to steal from the Capital development administration, but now in a different way.

Imdat-bank's management takes inter-bank loans and lends them to the Capital development administration at a higher interest rate. During the first five months of 1996, the Capital development administration paid "Imdat-bank" interest of 205,278 grivnas and 27 kopecks, while "Imdat-bank" transferred 54,610 grivnas 66 kopecks for interbank credits to "Krym-credit" bank. The difference in the amount of 150,667 grivnas 61 kopecks is the profit of "Imdat-bank" received at the expense of the Capital development administration.

The "Crimea" Fund, being the founder of the bank, has more than 362 thousand grivnas in the "Imdat-bank" statutory fund, but has not received a single penny of dividends for these years.

So who do the resources of the fund work for and who gets dividends from it?

The answer to this question can only be given by the management of the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-bank".

The funds invested in the "Imdat-Bank" statutory fund by the management of the "Crimea" Fund are the funds collected on the donations of compatriots abroad, for the improvement of the entire nation, and not for the profits of a number of high-ranking leaders.

The funds for the operation of the "Crimea" Fund are allocated by the President of the Fund M. Dzhemilev. Only M. Dzhemilev knows the true sources and quantity of the incoming funds. The EB can not say anything about it. Therefore, the verification covers that part of the documents which were provided to us.

Having failed to eliminate the contradictions that led to the confrontation in the Mejlis when addressing the issue of the effectiveness of the use of budgetary funds, the Mejlis Chairman continued to rely on the support of the majority of the Mejlis members when addressing other issues. This was particularly evident in the discussion of candidates for nomination to the new Crimean government.

A majority of Mejlis members did not support the candidates for the Crimean government proposed by the Mejlis chairman. But M. Dzhemilev, without a decision of Mejlis, considered that Ennanov's candidacy for the post of Minister of Social Protection was the best one, and disregarding the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members, who rejected this candidacy, supported Ennanov and achieved his approval in this post.

The Mejlis chairman understood that decisions in Mejlis meetings are made by a majority vote of the Mejlis members, but he also understood that he could not persuade the majority of the Mejlis members to support his ideas.

And so, in this difficult situation, the Chairman of the Mejlis decided to go on leave, until the Qurultay session.

He was well aware that the Mejlis Rules do not foresee a situation where the Mejlis chairman goes on long-term leave on his own initiative before the Qurultay session.

The Mejlis meeting offered M. Dzhemilev to go on leave for 2-3 months, but he refused and insisted on taking leave until the Qurultay session.

And then the Mejlis meeting was forced to assign the duties of Mejlis chairman to the First Mejlis Deputy Chairman R. Chubarov until an extraordinary session of the Qurultay.

Having gone on leave, M. Dzhemilev became more active and began to meet more often with his compatriots in different regions of Crimea, which he did not do so often before.

Two weeks later, at a meeting of the Mejlis, R.Chubarov made a statement that he was physically unable to combine his duties as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and acting deputy chairman of the Mejlis, and asked to be relieved of his duties as chairman of the Mejlis.

But the real reason of R.Chubarov's unwillingness to act as Mejlis Chairman is that though Mejlis Chairman M. Dzhemilev went on holiday, he continued active work and all questions were agreed

with him without taking into consideration Acting Mejlis Chairman, and that he is not willing to work in such circumstances.

The members of the Mejlis faced a dilemma: how to break the deadlock, how to untangle the tangle of painful problems in a situation when the Mejlis leadership withdrew from solving them, aggravating the crisis in the Mejlis.

All members of the Mejlis understood that any decision taken by the Mejlis would go against the rules of procedure of the Mejlis.

At such a critical moment when the issue was put forward: should the Mejlis be the representative body of the people, the majority of Mejlis members accepted Mr Chubarov's statement that he would step down as Mejlis chairman and hand his duties over to Reshat Ablaev on a temporary basis until an extraordinary session of the Qurultay.

Concluding my report I would like to hope that the delegates of the Qurultay will have the courage to assess in a balanced and objective manner the activity of the Mejlis and its President and moreover, to assess the causes of the crisis. I hope that Qurultay will find the ways of getting out of the crisis and create opportunities for strengthening the positions of the system of representative bodies of Qurultay and Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.

It will depend on you, the Qurultay delegates, what composition of the Mejlis you will choose.

But we must not allow the authority of the Mejlis to be used for mercenary purposes, by people with impure intentions - whoever these people are, whatever merits they have before the people.

You have a difficult decision to make, on which the unity of the people will depend.

I think Qurultay decisions will be realistic and their realisation will contribute to the restoration of rights of our people, their return and settlement on their native land.

Enver MUEDINOV, chairman of Review Committee of the III Qurultay (Source: "Avdet" newspaper, No 23(186) 31.12.1997).

And **one more document** - Lenur Arifov's supplementary report to the summary report of Mejlis chairman M.Dzhemilev for the period from July 1996 to December 1997.

"For a year and a half, Mustafa Dzhemilev persistently and persistently, contrary to the decision adopted and subsequently confirmed three times by the majority of the Mejlis, continued to take specific actions to keep the current account of the Capital development administration in "Imdat-Bank". Why? Why did the Chairman risk plunging the Mejlis into a deep crisis over a not-so-principled issue and provoke the convening of an extraordinary session of the Qurultay for the sole purpose of obtaining a new obedient membership of the Mejlis.

The answer lies in the chairman's personal interest in two economic and financial structures - the public organisation "Crimea" Fund and the Crimean commercial bank "Imdat-Bank" (now "Krym-Yurt"). In the first, "Crimea" Fund, he is the President. (Riza Shevkiev is the Director General of the Foundation). He actually controls the second structure, being the main founder of "Imdat-bank". It is through these two structures that large sums of money are withdrawn from the budget, which are aimed at settling Crimean Tatars, but end up stuck in someone else's pockets.

Concerned by the available information about the illegal diversion of part of the budgetary funds to service the financial problems of "Imdat-Bank", members of Mejlis raised the question for the first time at the closed meeting of Presidium of Mejlis on July 26 of last 1996.

It was initiated by Ilmi Umerov, then Deputy Prime Minister. Two circumstances should be pointed out, both from the outset and thereafter, that have characterised the discussion on everything concerning the "Imdat-Bank". The first one. Being aware of their responsibility, members of the Mejlis tended to keep the discussion and decision-making on this issue in private. It was only later that the logic of events took it outside the walls of the Mejlis. First and foremost, those who put forward absurd arguments about the influence of the intelligence services or the desire of some members of the Mejlis to "wash their dirty linen in public" should remember this circumstance.

The second circumstance. The Chairman immediately took the position of seeking to remove the issue of "Imdat-Bank" or the "Crimea" Fund from the control of the Mejlis. In reality, they were never under the control of the Mejlis. But through the efforts of a few members of the Mejlis and some parties in interest, a public perception has gradually emerged in recent years that these economic and financial structures are under the control of the Mejlis, are subordinate to it or even are structures of the Mejlis. This myth has become widespread both among Crimean Tatars and in the external environment.

Paradoxically, many members of the Mejlis have also been caught up in this myth and, under the influence of leaked rumours of financial fraud, have attempted to implement their alleged control over "Imdat-Bank". But they faced a fierce reaction from the chairman, who used every excuse and pretext to delay the discussion of the "Imdat-Bank" issue and, when a decision was finally taken, sabotaged it in every way possible.

For three meetings of the Presidium of the Mejlis during the month, the question of the "Imdat-Bank" was invariably raised, but the decision to convene the Mejlis was never taken. Then 15 members of Mejlis applied for calling an extraordinary closed meeting of Mejlis on 17 August 1996. According to the Rules, the President is obliged to convene the Mejlis if at least a third (i.e. eleven) of the members of the Mejlis demand it. A closed meeting of the Mejlis was held on 24 August 1996. M. Dzhemilev refused to preside over this meeting and to sign the Mejlis resolution adopted by the majority of members. The following is an extract from the said resolution:

1. To recommend the Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to transfer the current account of the Capital development administration from the "Imdat-bank" to one of the banks entitled to conduct operations with budgetary funds within 10 days.
2.to take measures on return of the funds unreasonably withdrawn in 1995-1996 and used not for their target purpose to the current account of the Capital development administration.
3. For the damage caused to the interests of the Crimean Tatar people to propose the former member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea Kenzhe Reshat, in accordance with the commitments he made, to resign his deputy powers.

At the next meeting of Mejlis (September 7-8, 1996) the Chairman of Mejlis initiated the revision of the Decision of Mejlis of August 24. As a result of a long and heated discussion, a working group of Mejlis members was set up and tasked with preparing a draft decision for the Mejlis.

The working group familiarised itself with the state of affairs at I "Imdat-Bank" (including the use of an official statement on "Imdat-Bank", its founders and the statutory fund, provided by the

chairman of the bank's board); with the documented facts of the diversion of large sums of money from the Capital development administration account to cover the financial "holes" of the "Imdat-Bank" (a term used by the bankers themselves); and the group also interviewed the chairmen of the bank's board and the bank's council and the general director of the "Crimea" Fund, analyzed the data they had collected and came to conclusions that were signed by all members of the working group and the chairman of the Review Committee of the Qurultay. (It should be noted that the Chairman of the Review Committee of the Qurultay took part in all activities undertaken by the working group).

The facts of embezzlement and misuse of budget funds through the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-Bank" were confirmed. In three episodes alone, the debt to the Capital development administration on January 1, 1997 was 1 million 770.063 grivnas 50 kopecks. Currently, that debt has exceeded 2 million grivnas due to inflation indexation. And this is only one part of it. There are other episodes.

Especially outrageous and vividly demonstrating the cynicism and immorality of the Crimean Fund leaders is an episode connected with the allocation of funds from the budget for giving out financial assistance to individual developers in dire need. In August 1995 the Capital development administration transferred 800 thousand grivnas to the "Imdat-bank" account of the "Crimea" Fund, which according to the contract between the Capital development administration and the "Crimea" Fund should have been distributed by the "Crimea" Fund to the individual developers according to the special lists drawn up for all districts and towns of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The financial security of the contract was guaranteed by the "Imdat-bank".

However, most of the "Crimea" Fund's money was used for completely different purposes of its own. More than five hundred Crimean Tatar families have still, more than two years later, not received this money. The "Crimea" Fund's debt for this episode amounted to 866719 grivnas as of 1 January 1997. Today it exceeds one million grivnas.

Answering the question of how such large budgetary sums of money could have been diverted from their intended purpose, and analysing the available data, the Mejlis working group concluded that a special instrument had been created, two components of which were the "Imdat-bank", on the one hand, and the staff in the Capital development administration and Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, on the other.

Current accounts are opened at the bank for individuals and various companies, including the companies of the bank's founders, or those controlled by the bank's founders. If necessary, accounts are opened even in violation of the rules on opening current and budgetary accounts in banks (Resolution of the National Bank of Ukraine No117 of 31.10.93). The current account of Capital development administration is in "Imdat-bank".

The scheme of financial transactions in most cases is simple enough: Exerting pressure on officials of Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea achieve the conclusion of a contract with a controlled company for the performance of any work or provision of services and transfer of money from the account of Capital development administration on the account of this company under the contract. From then on, the money, in violation of the contract, is diverted to various accounts at the same bank on internal bank orders or on the orders of companies controlled by the bank.

The essence of the mechanism is that the same persons (not Mejlis, namely one or several persons) control the economic and financial structures of the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-bank"

and influence the personnel in the Capital development administration and the Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. A nodal point is the current account of the Capital development administration placed in "Imdat-bank". All the above mentioned created favourable conditions for embezzlement and financial fraud with the budget funds allocated for the Program for Return and Settlement of Crimean Tatars.

Here is a quote from the interview of M. Dzhemilev to "Golos Krima" (No47, 28.11.97): "Another point of view on the issue of the bank, which I also hold, is that it's not about the bank itself, but about the people who work there and the officials who sign the orders on the distribution of funds".

Here M. Dzhemilev precisely formulates this particular instrument with two elements - the bank and the "Crimea" Fund on the one hand and the officials in the Capital development administration on the other - by which the money was taken from the budget. If M. Dzhemilev was an outsider, drawing conclusions from his observations, but he is directly related to this instrument.

It was him - the President of the "Crimea" Fund and the main co-founder of "Imdat-bank", he himself and on his behalf, under cover of the Mejlis, pushed through the government's decision to open a current account of the Capital development administration in "Imdat-bank". And his influence on officials is yet to be discussed. It was M. Dzhemilev, as the President of the "Crimea" Fund, who delayed the payment of aid to the Crimean Tatar individual developers for two years and four months, and it is unclear when this money will be returned to them.

So what is the "Imdat-bank"? From the outset, some individuals, including the Chairman of the Mejlis, have insisted that it is a people's bank, or the national bank of the Crimean Tatars. Again, through someone else's efforts, this idea has become public. The widespread circulation of the myth about the Crimean Tatar national "Imdat-bank" is beneficial and convenient for those who have created favourable conditions for the manipulation of budgetary funds. Even the official letters of high-ranking officials use this myth and claim that the "Imdat-bank" is under the control of the Mejlis and the Qurultay faction of the Supreme Council of Crimea. The "Qurultay" faction has never controlled and could never control the "Imdat-bank". At no meeting of the faction, not a single decision on the "Imdat-Bank" was taken by the "Qurultay" faction and could not have been taken during the entire existence of the faction.

Assertions that the "Imdat-bank" is a national or people's bank of the Crimean Tatars are false. "Imdat-bank" is a private commercial bank. There are dozens of such banks in Crimea and Ukraine. It is the property of its founders, i.e., the property of several private companies, behind which are several specific individuals, Crimean Tatars by nationality. One of its founders is the "Crimea" Fund (30% of the bank's statutory fund). The fact that the founders are a group of Crimean Tatar entrepreneurs in no way makes it a national bank, just as the Jewish nationality of the owner of any other commercial bank does not make that bank a national Jewish bank. And like any private commercial bank "Imdat-bank" carries out and will continue to carry out financial operations in the interests of its owners, and primarily in the interests of its owners.

Here is a vivid illustration. In January-May 1996, "Imdat-bank" granted loans to Capital development administration, arranging them through inter-bank loans between "Krym-credit" and "Imdat-bank". "Imdat-bank" transferred to "Krym-credit" the amount of 54,610 grivnas 66 kopecks for interest on the loans. Capital development administration also transferred to "Imdat-Bank" the amount of 205,278 grivnas 27 kopecks for interest on loans. Thus, the difference in the amount of 150,667 grivnas 61 kopecks made a profit of the "Imdat-bank" and the budget accordingly lost this

amount. The profit of "Imdat-bank" exceeded almost three times the profit of "Krym-credit". From the legal point of view, the operation is perfectly valid, but in fact it is a robbery. Moreover, it is "Imdat-bank", not "Krym-credit", that is robbing the Crimean Tatars in this operation.

The myth about the national "Imdat-bank" was needed in order to turn the Mejlis and the interests of the Crimean Tatars into a "political roof", in the shadow of which it is more convenient to make those "deals" that have already been made and will still try to be made by unscrupulous businessmen.

Commercial Bank "Imdat-bank" was registered by the National Bank of Ukraine on January 20, 1994. On November 14, 1996 its main founders were: the "Crimea" Fund (30.69%), a small private enterprise "Torshe" (22.48%), a small cooperative enterprise "RED" (28.05%), a private company "Sinan" (9.32%) and the "Oasis" enterprise (7,70%). Hiding behind the interests of Crimean Tatars, in the middle of 1994, the founders succeeded in obtaining an order from the Acting Prime Minister of Ukraine E. Zvyagilskiy to channel budgetary funds for the Programme for the Return and Settlement of Crimean Tatars through the "Imdat-bank".

The instrument was created and elaborate operations were launched to divert money from the budget in the interests of the bank's founders. The last operation of diverting money that was launched on August 7th of 1996 ended on November 5 of 1997 with a withdrawal of 89 thousand grivnas from the the account of Capital development administration.

By the way, about 89 thousand grivnas. M. Dzhemilev found it possible to answer only on this episode in the same interview to the "Golos Krima". Quote: "...I specifically dealt with this incident, as we were talking about the alleged violation by the new management of the bank. It turned out that the write-off was quite legal..." M. Dzhemilev's understanding of this incident was not good, because the bank failed to fulfil its obligation to the account holders. On August 7, 1996 "Imdat-bank" gave a credit to the Capital development administration in the amount of 89 thousand grivnas, on the next day, August 8, Capital development administration ordered the bank to transfer this amount to the account of "Torshe" enterprise, stating the purpose - advance payment for cable supply, according to the contract No2 of August 7, 1996. The Bank was obliged to ensure that "Torshe" would use the money for the designated purpose. Instead, thirty-two thousand grivnas of this amount were withdrawn by order of the Chairman of the Bank's Board A.Galagan to pay off debts of this company for loans dated 15.12.95 and 18.12.95.

7,496 grivnas were transferred to the account of the bank itself as interest on the loans from December 1995 to June 1996, and 49,500 grivnas were transferred to the account of the "RED" enterprise by the order of "Torshe" as a temporary financial assistance.

The Mejlis returned to the discussion on the transfer of the Capital development administration account on 8 February 1997. After a long and heated discussion on the materials submitted by the Mejlis working group it was decided: "To transfer the current account of the Capital development administration from "Imdat-bank" to one of the banks authorised by the National Bank of Ukraine. Eighteen members of the Mejlis voted for this decision and 11 voted against. Thus, on February 8, 1997, the Mejlis confirmed its previous decision of February 24, 1996.

After only ten days the Mejlis Chairman at the Presidium again initiated the revision of Mejlis and at the same time announced his intention to actually resign, formalizing it as a long holiday until the next session of Qurultay. A few days later, on February 22, 1997 a new meeting of Mejlis was held, on which the majority of Mejlis again confirmed the decision on transfer of the settlement account of Capital development administration. At the same time the Mejlis took note of the Chairman's statement about the so-called leave of absence and set the next meeting for March 1,

1997. At this meeting, the Chairman actually delivered an ultimatum to the Mejlis: either the Chairman resigns or the Mejlis cancels its decision on "Imdat-bank".

This meeting is quite revealing. It shows that none of the members of the Mejlis wanted, at least at that time, either his resignation or his going on extended leave. And most members of the Mejlis did not understand the real motives behind the Chairman's stubborn opposition to the majority of the Mejlis over the "Imdat-bank" account.

The Mejlis therefore took a "Solomon's" decision:

"3. To recommend to the Capital development administration of Republican Committee of Crimea not to take any action within a month (from 1 to 31 March 1997) regarding the closure of current account at the "Imdat-bank", provided that no financial abuses are committed by the "Imdat-bank" during this period.

4. Recommend to Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev to postpone consideration of his application dated 18.02.97".

The moratorium imposed by the Mejlis on its decision dragged on for three months until June 1997, when changes in the Crimean government were taking place. All this time the Mejlis did not return to the issue of the "Imdat-bank". But the Chairman did not stand idly by. It was in March that he organised letters from the leaders of Crimea to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Minister of Finance of Ukraine and the Chairman of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine in support of keeping the current account of Capital development administration at "Imdat-bank". In response, a letter was received in May 1997 from the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine stating that the Ministry had no objection to the "Imdat-bank" continuing to service the financing of the Programme for the Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatars. This letter gave "Imdat-bank" the reason for later failing to execute the instructions of the head of the Capital development administration to close its current account. [...]

[...] M.Dzhemilev was directly involved in the complicated negotiation process between the factions of the Supreme Council of Crimea on the issue of formation of a new government in February-May 1997. And not only through the faction. Although the faction informed in detail about the situation in the Supreme Council at each meeting of the Presidium of the Mejlis and meetings of the Mejlis and decisions on the key points were made either at the Presidium or at the meetings of the Mejlis, the Mejlis Chairman also got into personal contacts with the leaders of various factions of the Supreme Council of Crimea. And this was normal. The only request that was repeatedly made at the Presidium of Mejlis by the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea R. Chubarov and the faction leader L. Arifov was that M. Dzhemilev should invite them or one of them for his personal contacts with the leaders of other factions. Otherwise the coordination of actions, which was absolutely necessary at that exceptionally difficult time, would be lost.

However, it became clear that M.Dzhemilev was negotiating with them (the leaders of "pro-Russian faction" Y.Podkopayev and V.Klychnikov in particular) behind the back of the faction. On April 15, 1997 on Presidium of Mejlis M.Dzhemilev unexpectedly offered the variant of agreement with opposition side which was already signed by Y. Podkopayev and V. Klychnikov. This option undermined both our position in the Supreme Soviet and our ability to participate in government formation. Most importantly, it did not correspond to the real balance of political forces. In a situation where the Chairman of the Mejlis can afford to conduct separate negotiations with the opposition factions without informing the Qurultay faction, it is impossible to lead the faction's

actions. The leader of the faction announced at the same Mejlis meeting that he had resigned as chairman of the Qurultay faction.

If we compare this fact with the Mejlis decision on the issue of "Imdat-bank" and letters signed by A.Demidenko in support of "Imdat-bank" organized in the same period, it becomes clear that the interests of "Imdat-bank" for Mejlis Chairman were above the general interests associated with both the activity of the faction and the formation of the government. [...] Lenur ARIFOV, Source: Newspaper "Avdet", No 23(186) 31.12.1997.

Conversion of the past

These are the stories associated with Dzhemilev's past. But even at the present stage, the public has questions for Dzhemilev. Here is how reporters from the "Kraina" portal tried to answer them back in 2013.

According to the information officially provided by the people's deputy of Ukraine, the leader of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Mustafa Dzhemilev, his total income in 2012 was 373,476 grivnas. The income of his family members - the wife Safinar Dzhemileva - amounted to 11,974 grivnas. The income of Mustafa Dzhemilev included: wages and other payments provided for in the employment contract - 207,487 grivnas. Other types of income - 165,989 grivnas.

The Head of Mejlis owns the following real estate: a flat in Kiev with an area of 111.4 square meters, shares in housing in Simferopol with an area of 16.9 and 50 square meters. In addition, Mustafa Dzhemilev has a house in Bakhchisaray with an area of 180 sq.m. and a land plot of 600 sq.m.

The MP owns two Toyota Camry cars manufactured in 2003 and 2008. Additionally, a 2004 Skoda Octavia is listed in the declaration as owned by family members.

Mustafa Dzhemilyev has 64,000 grivnas in his bank accounts. Funds in his wife's bank accounts are not listed. The declaration was filled out on 28 March 2013.

МИТНА ДЕКЛАРАЦІЯ

ЗАТВЕРДЖЕНО постановою Кабінету Міністрів України від 15 лютого 1997 р. № 748

• Заповнюється кожною особою, яка досягла 16-річного віку
 • Потрібна відповідь позначитися у відповідній рамці знаком **ТАК**
 Зберігається на весь період тимчасового в'їзду/виїзду і пред'являється митним органам під час повернення громадянина. У разі втрати не поновлюється.

УВЕД **ВИЇЗД** **ТРАНЗИТ**

1. Відомості про особу
 Прізвище: Дзємілев Ім'я: Мухомад По батькові: _____
 Місце народження: Україна, Криму, Сімферопольська область Серія: AC №: 280472

2. Відомості про називання багажу
 2.1. Супроводжувані багаж виключаючи ручну пошту: **ТАК** **НІ**
 Кількість міських _____ Кількість міжміських _____
 2.2. Несупроводжувані багаж (за вказівкою/продовженнями): **ТАК** **НІ**

3. Відомості про називання товарів
 При мені і в моєму багажі є товари та інші предмети, які підлягають обов'язковому декларуванню і переміщенню яких через кордон здійснюється за допомоганими документами відомими компанійними органами.
 3.1. Сума національної валюти України та інша валюта готівкою, валютних цінностей, кількість виробів з дорогоцінних металів та дорогоцінного каміння в будь-якому вигляді: **ТАК** **НІ**

Назва товару, валюти, цінностей або виробів	Кількість	Ліцензійна ліцензія

3.2. Будь-яка зброя, боєприпаси, вибухові речовини: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.3. Наркотики і психотропні речовини: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.4. Предмети старовини та мистецтва: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.5. Друковані видання та інші носії інформації: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.6. Отруйні та сильнодіючі речовини і ліки: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.7. Радіоактивні матеріали: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.8. Об'єкти флори і фауни, такі частини та одержані з них продукти: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.9. Високоактивні радіоелектронні пристрої і засоби зв'язку: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.10. Товари, що підлягають об'єднанню податковими ставками: **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.11. Товари, що тимчасово ввозяться (вивозяться): **ТАК** **НІ**
 3.12. Транспортний засіб: **ТАК** **НІ**

* Для митного контролю деталі відомості про товари, зазначені у підпунктах 3.2 - 3.12 (у разі їх наявності), слід вказувати на зворотному боці декларації у пункті 4.

4. Відомості про товари
 4.1. Відомості про товари, зазначені у підпунктах 3.2 - 3.11

№ п/п	Найменування та інші відомі ознаки товару, номер і дата видачі акцизного чеку/декларції/сертифікату, за якого вивіз	Кількість		Вартість у національній валюті або доларах США
		літрами	літерами	
	<u>Автомобіль TOYOTA CAMRY 2003 GT BE32KX3-X405725 двигун 2AZ-A027419</u>			
Загальна вартість (всього):				<u>16,500 US\$</u>

4.2. Відомості про транспортний засіб

Вид, марка: _____ Рік випуску: _____ Об'єм двигуна (куб. см): _____
 Шасі №: _____ Кузов №: _____ Двигун №: _____
 Митний режим: ввозення тимчасове ввозення зворотне ввозення
 вивезення тимчасове вивезення зворотне вивезення


Мені відомо, що повідомлення у декларації недостовірних відомостей тягне за собою відповідальність згідно з чинним законодавством.
 - 04-серпень 2003 р. Особистий підпис: _____


Для службових приміток
 Україна
 05090310
 А-8173, 87
 NAC-20318, 59
 N/587120


GOODS DESCRIPTION


S. NO	MAKE	CHASSIS	ENGINE	MODEL	COLOUR
1	TOYOTA CAMRY	6T1BE32KX3-X405725	2AZ-A027419	2003	SILVER

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN : JAPAN
 CIF - ILYCHEVSK
 TOTAL VALUE : 16,500/-US \$ (SIXTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED US DOLLAR ONLY)


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تلفون: ۲۲۸۲۸۰۰ (مکتب) ۲۲۸۲۸۱۹ (مکتب) ۰۴-۲۶۷۳۱۶۹ (مستودع) فاکس: ۲۲۸۲۸۱۱ (مکتب) ۰۴-۲۶۷۳۱۶۹ (مستودع) عربی: ۱۵۳۲۳-بیس ۳-ج
 Tel: 2282803 (Off), 04-2673129 (WH), Fax: 2282831 (Off), 04-2673165 (WH), P.O. Box: 15323, DUBAI, U.A.E.
 Email: albayan1@emirates.net.ae

But is everything so clean and transparent in the Crimean Tatar state led by Mustafa Dzhemilev and his "family"? According to one of the Nadra commercial bank receipts, Safinar Dzhemileva had 1100000 (one million one hundred thousand) grivnas in her bank account in 2008.

Квитанція № 7157

Дата здійснення операції 21 Липня 2008
 Дата валютування 21 Липня 2008

Назва валюти	N рахунку	Сума	Еквівалент у гривнях
цян Дебет	10023800001013	1100000,00	1100000,00
Кредит	25248800003031		
Загальна сума (цифрами)		1100000,00	1100000,00

Платник Джемілова Сафінар -
 Код платника ** _____
 Банк платника * _____
 Отримувач Центральне відділення філії ВАТ КБ "Надра" Кримське РУ
 Код отримувача * _____
 Банк отримувача Центральне відділення філії ВАТ КБ "Надра" Кримське РУ м. Сімферополь.
 Код банку отримувача * _____
 Загальна сума _____

Внесення коштів на депозит готівкою № 543323, власник рахунку - Джемілова Сафінар -

Додаткові реквізити _____

Підписи банку _____

* Еквівалент вказується в разі здійснення операцій з готівкою для зарахування на рахунок відкритий в іншому банку.
 ** Валютність в разі здійснення операцій з готівкою без відкриття рахунку в банку.

перемножує 30000 гривень 200 еквівалент цієї суми в існуючій валюті.

Філія відкритого акціонерного товариства
 комерційного банку "НАДРА"
 КРИМСЬКЕ РЕГІОНАЛЬНЕ УПРАВЛІННЯ
 Ідентифікаційний код 26485822

21 Липня 2008

Код касира № 8
 Номер електронної пошти ULNF
 ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЕ ВІДДІЛЕННЯ

Let's try to figure out where Dzhemilev's "family" gets its money from. There is no need to talk about the financial machinations surrounding the budgetary funds allocated by Ukraine for the accommodation of repatriates by the "father of the Crimean Tatar nation" through the scandalously known and no longer existing "people's" "Imdat-Bank". Everything is in the public domain and anyone is welcome to read it.

One of Mustafa Dzhemilev's hidden sources of income is the humanitarian aid coming from abroad to the addresses of numerous organizations controlled by his "family": the "Maarifchi" Association of Crimean Tatar Educators, the League of Crimean Tatar Women, the "Medical Center for the Deported People", the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea, etc.

These organizations receive several million grivnas worth of goods in the form of clothing, food, printed materials and medical equipment every month.

Suppliers of goods are mainly Turkey and the USA (TurkKizilayiAtacsok, Kizilay, Ankara, Turkiye; International Services Corporation 1629 K Street, Suite 502, Washington, D.C.20006, USA). More than one nation, for whose rights Mustafa Dzhemilev stands, could be fed and clothed with such huge humanitarian aid. But Mustafa Dzhemilev cannot solve the problems of his compatriots, because the last and main source of his financial well-being will be lost. All humanitarian aid is sold in Ukrainian markets, and funds are deposited in offshore accounts.

Mustafa Dzhemilev visited the Republic of Northern Cyprus in July this year, where he met with Selami Kacamak, director of the Turkish Labor Bank branch in Northern Cyprus, and checked his accounts, where several billion US dollars were accumulated over the years, for a good reason. It must be profitable to be the head of an oppressed people if you can afford to buy such a house," - the newspaper concluded, accompanying its conclusions with a picture of the house.



Dzhemilev's Turkish trail

But that's not all. In 2013, another scandal involving Dzhemilev's name and money from Turkey broke out. The Milli Firka (National Party), which is part of the Crimean Tatar People's Front, accused Mustafa Dzhemilev of manipulation with funds. The money was reportedly transferred by the head of the Federation of Crimean Communities of Turkey (KiDF), Ibraim Vefa Araci, to the accounts of the "Crimea" Fund, a charitable organization set up by the Mejlis leader. The purpose, according to "[Novoross.info](#)", is to support the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University and provide material assistance to three Crimean Tatar orphans to buy a house in Saki or Saki district.

However, here is what the [press service](#) of "Milli Firka" [reported](#). "Twice, in November and December 2011, Ibraim Aradzhi transferred \$50,000 each to the account of the "Crimea" Fund, whose founder is Mustafa Dzhemilev. This was his contribution for organising the II World Congress of Crimean Tatars in Turkey, in Eskisehir. However, the Mejlis flatly refused to hold the Congress in Turkey. Later, on 4 May 2013, a meeting of representatives of the Crimean Tatar diaspora abroad was organized in Crimea, where the question was discussed: where and when to hold the II World Congress of the Crimean Tatars. It was decided to hold it only in Crimea. Ibraim Aradzhi was also present at this meeting. He did not agree with the decision and left the meeting without waiting for the end of the event.

And suddenly, in violation of all the agreements, in the autumn of 2013 the head of the Mejlis' Foreign Relations Department Ali Khamzin spread the information that the II Congress would be held not in Crimea and not even in Turkey, but in Romania (?!), which caused a sharp negative reaction of the Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey, which invested a lot of effort and money into the preparation of the II Congress. One of the manifestations of this reaction was the **quite reasonable question about the fate of the 100,000 dollars transferred to the accounts of the Dzhemilev Foundation "Crimea"**. Mustafa Dzhemilev habitually chose to remain silent...

Here are the texts of two letters, addressed by Ibraim Araji to Mustafa Dzhemilev about the fate of the 100,000 dollars he sent to the head of Mejlis.

Letter 1: Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013

Dear Mustafa Dzhemilev.

As you know, on May 4, 2013 we took part in a meeting at the restaurant "Ayshe" in Simferopol at your invitation. After that meeting, you wanted the Ankara General Centre and especially dear Mukremin Şahin, the chairmen of the societies belonging to our federation (e.g. dear Ergin Batur) to confirm that the money I sent you, you allegedly returned to me.

However, the people mentioned could not have been informed in any way concerning this subject.

I personally have never spread the word about the money given to charity. I have never demanded or wanted the return of cash and non-cash funds invested in Crimea. I sent that money to support my compatriots, to help the people. I would like to remind you that I did not demand the return of funds. But if you did send the funds, I DID NOT RECEIVE them and they WERE NOT RETURNED. Please provide details of where you said you returned the funds you received in the amount of 100,000 (one hundred thousand) dollars. Details of the \$100,000 income are given in the annex below.

Out of the funds which you are very well aware of, I ask you to allocate to the Rector of KIPU (Crimean State Engineering and Pedagogical University), Fevzi Yakubov the sum of \$20,000 (twenty thousand) dollars on my behalf. If you do not need the remaining amount, please let me know and we will distribute this money to the people.

All the best.

(32A) VALUE DATE/CURR./INTERBANK SETTLED AMOUNT	
DATE	23.11.2013
CURRENCY CODE	USD
AMOUNT	50'000.00
(33B) CURR./INSTRUCTED AMOUNT	
CURRENCY CODE	USD
AMOUNT	50'000.00
(50K) ORDERING CUSTOMER - NAME & ADDRESS	
	MEYFA IBRAHIM ARACI
	IZMIT - TURKEY
(52A) ORDERING INSTITUTION	
(53A) SENDER'S CORRESPONDANT	
(54A) RECEIVER'S CORRESPONDANT	
(55A) THIRD REIMBURSEMENT INSTITUTION	
(56A) INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTION	
(57A) ACCOUNT WITH INSTITUTION	
(59) BENEFICIARY CUSTOMER	
	CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION
	FOND CRIMEA
(70) REMITTANCE INFORMATION	IRRETRIEVABLE FINANCIAL HELP
(71A) DETAILS OF CHARGES	OUR

(32A) VALUE DATE/CURR./INTERBANK SETTLED AMOUNT DATE CURRENCY CODE AMOUNT	08.12.2011 USD 50'000.00
(33B) CURR./INSTRUCTED AMOUNT CURRENCY CODE AMOUNT	USD 50'000.00
(50K) ORDERING CUSTOMER - NAME & ADDRESS	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX VEFA İBRAHİM ARACI XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX İZMİT - TURKEY
(52A) ORDERING INSTITUTION (53A) SENDER'S CORRESPONDANT (54A) RECEIVER'S CORRESPONDANT (55A) THIRD REIMBURSEMENT INSTITUTION (56A) INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTION (57A) ACCOUNT WITH INSTITUTION (59) BENEFICIARY CUSTOMER	XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION FOND CRIMEA IRRETRIEVABLE FINANCIAL HELP OUR
(70) REMITTANCE INFORMATION (71A) DETAILS OF CHARGES	

B. İbrahim Araci, Chairman of the Federation of Crimean Societies and the Kocaeli Society for Culture and Mutual Assistance of Crimean Tatars.

Letter 2: V. İbrahim ARACI

Sent: 30 September 2013

Dear Mr. Mustafa Dzhemilev. I want to inform you that I have not received a response to your email dated September 23, 2013. As you know, there are three orphans of our tribesmen living in Saki. I ask you to allocate \$20,000 from this amount for their purchase of a house. I would like to ask you to provide information about the amount of these funds allocated for charity on the holiday of Oraza Bayram from the Kocaeli Society of Crimean Tatars. All the best".

According to a Turkish source, İbrahim Araci has not yet received a response from Mustafa Dzhemilev. Also, neither the three orphans from the city of Saki nor the rector of the KIPU, Fevzi Yakubov, have received financial assistance," the organisation stressed.»

23.04.2014

Exhibit I

Milli Firka, *“Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis* (25 March 2011)

(translation)

Translation

Milli Firka, *“Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis* (25 March 2011), available at: <http://milli-firka.org/«имдат-банк»-и-кризис-в-меджлисе/>.

“Imdat Bank” and the Crisis in the Mejlis

Today everyone is aware of the rapid decline in the authority of the Mejlis among compatriots and, first and foremost, of its leaders, M.Dzhemilev and R.Chubarov. The first attempt to "cleanse the Mejlis from within" was undertaken in 1997 by a "group of 16" members of the Mejlis at the time, who were outraged by financial machinations around budgetary funds through the scandalously known and no longer existing "people's" Imdat Bank.

The protest by fighters for truth and democracy in the Mejlis was crushed, and the troublemakers were severely obstructed, finding themselves "out of the business" of the Qurultay-Mejlis. MF- Inform decided to return to those events, after which the processes of internal degradation of the Mejlis could no longer be hidden from the public.

We bring to your attention materials of newspaper "Avdet" #23(186) 31.12.1997, which disclose only small part of what and how Mustafa Jemilev and his today's closest surrounding started to fall "from pedestal". I give the floor to Professor Lenur Arifov, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences.

Crisis in the Mejlis

Lenur Arifov's supplementary report to the report of the Chairman of the Mejlis M.Dzhemilev for the period from July 1996 to December 1997.



Esteemed delegates, the reporting period is 1.5 years - the time of the Mejlis formed by the 1st session of the 3rd Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people. From the very beginning there has been a confrontation between the majority of Mejlis members and its Chairman on the assessment of the expediency and effectiveness of spending the budgetary funds allocated for the Programme for the Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatars through the commercial "Imdat-Bank".

The Chairman had the support of approximately one third of the Mejlis on this issue. Over time, the confrontation deepened, spilling over into other areas and, above all, into personnel appointments.

New features in the style and methods of leadership of the Mejlis also became increasingly apparent. If the Chairman's views differed from those of most members of the Mejlis, he refused to sign Mejlis decisions, refused to implement them and, moreover, took actions contrary to and contrary to the decision of the Mejlis. Persistently and persistently, the Chairman tried to introduce an authoritarian style to the leadership of the Mejlis. The spirit of democracy and collegiality was increasingly disappearing. This is the main reason for the deep crisis into which the initial, seemingly not-so-principled confrontation developed.

There have been occasions before, in the previous Mejlis, when on some political and organisational issues the opinion of the President did not coincide with that of the majority. This is the natural and normal state of any collegial body such as the Mejlis. And never before had such cases been perceived by anyone as a lack of confidence in the President. Moreover, these cases were in fact, and were perceived by the members of the Mejlis (and by the Chairman himself) as evidence of the free expression of opinion by each member of the Mejlis. The majority decision was binding on every member of the Mejlis, including the Chairman. The Chairman had to sign (and did sign!) the majority decision of the Mejlis, had to give effect to (and did give effect to!) the decision of the Mejlis.

What happened this time, then, and why did a seemingly insignificant issue on the scale of the national movement about the transfer of the Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea current account from "Imdat Bank" to another become a national issue? The chairman had to take a step whose consequences are difficult to predict: he tried to pervert the very essence of the Crimean Tatar representative body - to turn it from a collegiate body into an authoritarian one. Why?

For a year and a half, Mustafa Dzhemilev persistently contrary to the decision adopted and subsequently confirmed three times by the majority of the Mejlis, continued to take specific actions to keep the current account of the Capital development administration in "Imdat-Bank". Why? Why did the Chairman risk plunging the Mejlis into a deep crisis over a not-so-principled issue and provoke the convening of an extraordinary session of the Qurultay for the sole purpose of obtaining a new obedient membership of the Mejlis.

The answer lies in the chairman's personal interest in two economic and financial structures - the public organisation "Crimea" Fund and the Crimean commercial bank "Imdat-Bank" (now "Krym-Yurt"). In the first, "Crimea" Fund, he is the President. (Riza Shevkiev is the Director General of the Foundation). He actually controls the second structure, being the main founder of "Imdat-bank". It is through these two structures that large sums of money are withdrawn from the budget, which are aimed at settling Crimean Tatars, but end up stuck in someone else's pockets.

Concerned by the available information about the illegal diversion of part of the budgetary funds to service the financial problems of "Imdat-Bank", members of Mejlis raised the question for the first time at the closed meeting of Presidium of Mejlis on July 26 of last 1996.

It was initiated by Ilmi Umerov, then Deputy Prime Minister. Two circumstances should be pointed out, both from the outset and thereafter, that have characterised the discussion on everything concerning the "Imdat-Bank". The first one. Being aware of their responsibility, members of the Mejlis tended to keep the discussion and decision-making on this issue in private. It was only later that the logic of events took it outside the walls of the Mejlis. First and foremost, those who put forward absurd arguments about the influence of the intelligence services or the desire of some members of the Mejlis to "wash their dirty linen in public" should remember this circumstance.

The second circumstance. The Chairman immediately took the position of seeking to remove the issue of "Imdat-Bank" or the "Crimea" Fund from the control of the Mejlis. In reality, they were

never under the control of the Mejlis. But through the efforts of a few members of the Mejlis and some parties in interest, a public perception has gradually emerged in recent years that these economic and financial structures are under the control of the Mejlis, are subordinate to it or even are structures of the Mejlis. This myth has become widespread both among Crimean Tatars and in the external environment.

Paradoxically, many members of the Mejlis have also been caught up in this myth and, under the influence of leaked rumours of financial fraud, have attempted to implement their alleged control over "Imdat-Bank". But they faced a fierce reaction from the chairman, who used every excuse and pretext to delay the discussion of the "Imdat-Bank" issue and, when a decision was finally taken, sabotaged it in every way possible.

For three meetings of the Presidium of the Mejlis during the month, the question of the "Imdat-Bank" was invariably raised, but the decision to convene the Mejlis was never taken. Then 15 members of Mejlis applied for calling an extraordinary closed meeting of Mejlis on 17 August 1996. According to the Rules, the President is obliged to convene the Mejlis if at least a third (i.e. eleven) of the members of the Mejlis demand it. A closed meeting of the Mejlis was held on 24 August 1996. M. Dzhemilev refused to preside over this meeting and to sign the Mejlis resolution adopted by the majority of members. The following is an extract from the said resolution:

1. *To recommend the Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to transfer the current account of the Capital development administration from the "Imdat-bank" to one of the banks entitled to conduct operations with budgetary funds within 10 days.*
2. *. ...to take measures on return of the funds unreasonably withdrawn in 1995-1996 and used not for their target purpose to the current account of the Capital development administration.*
3. *For the damage caused to the interests of the Crimean Tatar people to propose the former member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea Kenzhe Reshat, in accordance with the commitments he made, to resign his deputy powers.*

At the next meeting of Mejlis (September 7-8, 1996) the Chairman of Mejlis initiated the revision of the Decision of Mejlis of August 24. As a result of a long and heated discussion, a working group of Mejlis members was set up and tasked with preparing a draft decision for the Mejlis.

The working group familiarised itself with the state of affairs at I "Imdat-Bank" (including the use of an official statement on "Imdat-Bank", its founders and the statutory fund, provided by the chairman of the bank's board); with the documented facts of the diversion of large sums of money from the Capital development administration account to cover the financial "holes" of the "Imdat-Bank" (a term used by the bankers themselves); and the group also interviewed the chairmen of the bank's board and the bank's council and the general director of the "Crimea" Fund, analyzed the data they had collected and came to conclusions that were signed by all members of the working group and the chairman of the Review Committee of the Qurultay. (It should be noted that the Chairman of the Review Committee of the Qurultay took part in all activities undertaken by the working group).

The facts of embezzlement and misuse of budget funds through the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-Bank" were confirmed. In three episodes alone, the debt to the Capital development administration on January 1, 1997 was 1 million 770.063 grivnas 50 kopecks. Currently, that debt has exceeded 2 million grivnas due to inflation indexation. And this is only one part of it. There are other episodes.

Especially outrageous and vividly demonstrating the cynicism and immorality of the Crimean Fund leaders is an episode connected with the allocation of funds from the budget for giving out financial

assistance to individual developers in dire need. In August 1995 the Capital development administration transferred 800 thousand grivnas to the "Imdat-bank" account of the "Crimea" Fund, which according to the contract between the Capital development administration and the "Crimea" Fund should have been distributed by the "Crimea" Fund to the individual developers according to the special lists drawn up for all districts and towns of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The financial security of the contract was guaranteed by the "Imdat-bank".

However, most of the "Crimea" Fund's money was used for completely different purposes of its own. More than five hundred Crimean Tatar families have still, more than two years later, not received this money. The "Crimea" Fund's debt for this episode amounted to 866719 grivnas as of 1 January 1997. Today it exceeds one million grivnas.

Answering the question of how such large budgetary sums of money could have been diverted from their intended purpose, and analysing the available data, the Mejlis working group concluded that a special instrument had been created, two components of which were the I "Imdat-bank", on the one hand, and the staff in the Capital development administration and Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, on the other.

Current accounts are opened at the bank for individuals and various companies, including the companies of the bank's founders, or those controlled by the bank's founders. If necessary, accounts are opened even in violation of the rules on opening current and budgetary accounts in banks (Resolution of the National Bank of Ukraine No117 of 31.10.93). The current account of Capital development administration is in "Imdat-bank".

The scheme of financial transactions in most cases is simple enough: Exerting pressure on officials of Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea achieve the conclusion of a contract with a controlled company for the performance of any work or provision of services and transfer of money from the account of Capital development administration on the account of this company under the contract. From then on, the money, in violation of the contract, is diverted to various accounts at the same bank on internal bank orders or on the orders of companies controlled by the bank.

The essence of the mechanism is that the same persons (not Mejlis, namely one or several persons) control the economic and financial structures of the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-bank" and influence the personnel in the Capital development administration and the Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. A nodal point is the current account of the Capital development administration placed in "Imdat-bank". All the above mentioned created favourable conditions for embezzlement and financial fraud with the budget funds allocated for the Program for Return and Settlement of Crimean Tatars.

Here is a quote from the interview of M. Dzhemilev to "Golos Krima" (No47, 28.11.97): "Another point of view on the issue of the bank, which I also hold, is that it's not about the bank itself, but about the people who work there and the officials who sign the orders on the distribution of funds".

Here M. Dzhemilev precisely formulates this particular instrument with two elements - the bank and the "Crimea" Fund on the one hand and the officials in the Capital development administration on the other - by which the money was taken from the budget. If M. Dzhemilev was an outsider, drawing conclusions from his observations, but he is directly related to this instrument.

It was him - the President of the "Crimea" Fund and the main co-founder of "Imdat-bank", he himself and on his behalf, under cover of the Mejlis, pushed through the government's decision to open a current account of the Capital development administration in "Imdat-bank". And his influence on officials is yet to be discussed. It was M. Dzhemilev, as the President of the "Crimea"

Fund, who delayed the payment of aid to the Crimean Tatar individual developers for two years and four months, and it is unclear when this money will be returned to them.

So what is the "Imdat-bank"? From the outset, some individuals, including the Chairman of the Mejlis, have insisted that it is a people's bank, or the national bank of the Crimean Tatars. Again, through someone else's efforts, this idea has become public. The widespread circulation of the myth about the Crimean Tatar national "Imdat-bank" is beneficial and convenient for those who have created favourable conditions for the manipulation of budgetary funds. Even the official letters of high-ranking officials use this myth and claim that the "Imdat-bank" is under the control of the Mejlis and the Qurultay faction of the Supreme Council of Crimea. The "Qurultay" faction has never controlled and could never control the "Imdat-bank". At no meeting of the faction, not a single decision on the "Imdat-Bank" was taken by the "Qurultay" faction and could not have been taken during the entire existence of the faction.

Assertions that the "Imdat-bank" is a national or people's bank of the Crimean Tatars are false. "Imdat-bank" is a private commercial bank. There are dozens of such banks in Crimea and Ukraine. It is the property of its founders, i.e., the property of several private companies, behind which are several specific individuals, Crimean Tatars by nationality. One of its founders is the "Crimea" Fund (30% of the bank's statutory fund). The fact that the founders are a group of Crimean Tatar entrepreneurs in no way makes it a national bank, just as the Jewish nationality of the owner of any other commercial bank does not make that bank a national Jewish bank. And like any private commercial bank "Imdat-bank" carries out and will continue to carry out financial operations in the interests of its owners, and primarily in the interests of its owners.

Here is a vivid illustration. In January-May 1996, "Imdat-bank" granted loans to Capital development administration, arranging them through inter-bank loans between "Krym-credit" and "Imdat-bank". "Imdat-bank" transferred to "Krym-credit" the amount of 54,610 grivnas 66 kopecks for interest on the loans. Capital development administration also transferred to "Imdat-Bank" the amount of 205,278 grivnas 27 kopecks for interest on loans. Thus, the difference in the amount of 150,667 grivnas 61 kopecks made a profit of the "Imdat-bank" and the budget accordingly lost this amount. The profit of "Imdat-bank" exceeded almost three times the profit of "Krym-credit". From the legal point of view, the operation is perfectly valid, but in fact it is a robbery. Moreover, it is "Imdat-bank", not "Krym-credit", that is robbing the Crimean Tatars in this operation.

The myth about the national "Imdat-bank" was needed in order to turn the Mejlis and the interests of the Crimean Tatars into a "political roof", in the shadow of which it is more convenient to make those "deals" that have already been made and will still try to be made by unscrupulous businessmen.

Commercial Bank "Imdat-bank" was registered by the National Bank of Ukraine on January 20, 1994. On November 14, 1996 its main founders were: the "Crimea" Fund (30.69%), a small private enterprise "Torshe" (22.48%), a small cooperative enterprise "RED" (28.05%), a private company "Sinan" (9.32%) and the "Oasis" enterprise (7.70%). Hiding behind the interests of Crimean Tatars, in the middle of 1994, the founders succeeded in obtaining an order from the Acting Prime Minister of Ukraine E. Zvyagilskiy to channel budgetary funds for the Programme for the Return and Settlement of Crimean Tatars through the "Imdat-bank".

The instrument was created and elaborate operations were launched to divert money from the budget in the interests of the bank's founders. The last operation of diverting money that was launched on August 7th of 1996 ended on November 5 of 1997 with a withdrawal of 89 thousand grivnas from the the account of Capital development administration.

By the way, about 89 thousand grivnas. M. Dzhemilev found it possible to answer only on this episode in the same interview to the "Golos Krima". Quote: "...I specifically dealt with this incident, as we were talking about the alleged violation by the new management of the bank. It turned out that the write-off was quite legal..." M. Dzhemilev's understanding of this incident was not good, because the bank failed to fulfil its obligation to the account holders. On August 7, 1996 "Imdat-bank" gave a credit to the Capital development administration in the amount of 89 thousand grivnas, on the next day, August 8, Capital development administration ordered the bank to transfer this amount to the account of "Torshe" enterprise, stating the purpose - advance payment for cable supply, according to the contract No2 of August 7, 1996. The Bank was obliged to ensure that "Torshe" would use the money for the designated purpose. Instead, thirty-two thousand grivnas of this amount were withdrawn by order of the Chairman of the Bank's Board A.Galagan to pay off debts of this company for loans dated 15.12.95 and 18.12.95.

7,496 grivnas were transferred to the account of the bank itself as interest on the loans from December 1995 to June 1996, and 49,500 grivnas were transferred to the account of the "RED" enterprise by the order of "Torshe" as a temporary financial assistance.

The Mejlis returned to the discussion on the transfer of the Capital development administration account on 8 February 1997. After a long and heated discussion on the materials submitted by the Mejlis working group it was decided: "To transfer the current account of the Capital development administration from "Imdat-bank" to one of the banks authorised by the National Bank of Ukraine. Eighteen members of the Mejlis voted for this decision and 11 voted against. Thus, on February 8, 1997, the Mejlis confirmed its previous decision of February 24, 1996.

After only ten days the Mejlis Chairman at the Presidium again initiated the revision of Mejlis and at the same time announced his intention to actually resign, formalizing it as a long holiday until the next session of Qurultay. A few days later, on February 22, 1997 a new meeting of Mejlis was held, on which the majority of Mejlis again confirmed the decision on transfer of the settlement account of Capital development administration. At the same time the Mejlis took note of the Chairman's statement about the so-called leave of absence and set the next meeting for March 1, 1997. At this meeting, the Chairman actually delivered an ultimatum to the Mejlis: either the Chairman resigns or the Mejlis cancels its decision on "Imdat-bank".

This meeting is quite revealing. It shows that none of the members of the Mejlis wanted, at least at that time, either his resignation or his going on extended leave. And most members of the Mejlis did not understand the real motives behind the Chairman's stubborn opposition to the majority of the Mejlis over the "Imdat-bank" account.

The Mejlis therefore took a "Solomon's" decision:

"3. To recommend to the Capital development administration of Republican Committee of Crimea not to take any action within a month (from 1 to 31 March 1997) regarding the closure of current account at the "Imdat-bank", provided that no financial abuses are committed by the "Imdat-bank" during this period.

4. Recommend to Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev to postpone consideration of his application dated 18.02.97".

The moratorium imposed by the Mejlis on its decision dragged on for three months until June 1997, when changes in the Crimean government were taking place. All this time the Mejlis did not return to the issue of the "Imdat-bank". But the Chairman did not stand idly by. It was in March that he organised letters from the leaders of Crimea to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Minister of Finance of Ukraine and the Chairman of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine in support of keeping the current account of Capital development administration at "Imdat-bank". In response, a

letter was received in May 1997 from the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine stating that the Ministry had no objection to the "Imdat-bank" continuing to service the financing of the Programme for the Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatars. This letter gave "Imdat-bank" the reason for later failing to execute the instructions of the head of the Capital development administration to close its current account.

Meanwhile, the President's confrontation with the Mejlis majority has spilled over into the sphere of personnel appointments. Here are some of the most striking cases:

1. In late May/early June of this year, the situation in the Crimean Supreme Soviet and government was ripe for the formation of a new government. On June 8, 1997, a meeting of the Mejlis discussed the candidates for the posts of chairpersons of the Republican Committee on Nationalities and Deported Citizens. Republican Committee on Housing and Communal Services and Minister of Labour and Social Protection. After discussing the candidates by secret ballot it was decided to recommend Z.Khalikov's candidacy to the Qurultay faction for the post of Chairman of the Republican Committee. He received 17 votes in favour and 11 against. The alternative candidacy of E. Gafarov did not get the necessary number of votes. The Chairman did not like this decision and at the next Mejlis on 15 June he initiated a second vote. The Mejlis, by secret ballot, again confirmed its previous decision. Nevertheless, not taking into account the decision of the Mejlis majority and contrary to the decision of the Mejlis, the Chairman tried to push E. Gafarov's candidacy through negotiations in the Supreme Council of Crimea.

2. For several months, from February to May 1997, the political situation in Crimea was very difficult. A struggle broke out between various forces for changing the composition of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Crimea, on the one hand, and the Crimean government, on the other. I remind that on February 7, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea V. Kiselev resigned, and on February 13, A. Gritsenko was appointed to this post. At the same time, the "Qurultay" faction managed to get four seats in the Presidium for its representatives. After the change of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet, the question of the resignation of the previous government and the appointment of the new chairman of the Council of Ministers and the new composition of the Council of Ministers arose in a very acute form. The situation was highly ambiguous and multi-component. Many forces came into play, both in Crimea and in Kyiv. At times the situation escalated to the point of losing control. Part of the deputies used extreme methods, up to and including open-air hunger strikes in winter conditions.

No one can deny that the deputy faction "Qurultay", despite its small number, had a worthy place in the Supreme Soviet of Crimea. In the period from the summer of 1996 to the spring of 1997 it was quite a significant force. Due to our faction's position, the government of Demidenko remained in power at that time. At this time the faction managed to lead in such composition of the Supreme Council two legislative acts: on March, 26th, 1997 - the Decision of the Supreme Council of Crimea "About recognition invalid and suspension of some decisions of the Crimean regional Council of People Deputies, its executive committee. On April 9, 1997 - the Decision of the Crimean Supreme Soviet "On the alphabet of the Crimean Tatar language". Both were carried out in pursuance of instructions from the Qurultay.

In February - May 1997 M.Dzhemilev was directly involved in the complicated negotiation process between the factions of the Supreme Council of Crimea on the issue of formation of a new government in February-May 1997. And not only through the faction. Although the faction informed in detail about the situation in the Supreme Council at each meeting of the Presidium of the Mejlis and meetings of the Mejlis and decisions on the key points were made either at the Presidium or at the meetings of the Mejlis, the Mejlis Chairman also got into personal contacts with the leaders of various factions of the Supreme Council of Crimea. And this was normal. The only request that was repeatedly made at the Presidium of Mejlis by the Deputy Chairman of the

Supreme Council of Crimea R. Chubarov and the faction leader L. Arifov was that M. Dzhemilev should invite them or one of them for his personal contacts with the leaders of other factions. Otherwise the coordination of actions, which was absolutely necessary at that exceptionally difficult time, would be lost.

However, it became clear that M.Dzhemilev was negotiating with them (the leaders of "pro-Russian faction" Y.Podkopayev and V.Klychnikov in particular) behind the back of the faction. On April 15, 1997 on Presidium of Mejlis M.Dzhemilev unexpectedly offered the variant of agreement with opposition side which was already signed by Y. Podkopayev and V. Klychnikov. This option undermined both our position in the Supreme Soviet and our ability to participate in government formation. Most importantly, it did not correspond to the real balance of political forces. In a situation where the Chairman of the Mejlis can afford to conduct separate negotiations with the opposition factions without informing the Qurultay faction, it is impossible to lead the faction's actions. The leader of the faction announced at the same Mejlis meeting that he had resigned as chairman of the Qurultay faction.

If we compare this fact with the Mejlis decision on the issue of "Imdat-bank" and letters signed by A.Demidenko in support of "Imdat-bank" organized in the same period, it becomes clear that the interests of "Imdat-bank" for Mejlis Chairman were above the general interests associated with both the activity of the faction and the formation of the government.

3. Only the desire to introduce an authoritarian regime into the work of the Mejlis can explain the subsequent actions of the Chairman within the Mejlis to remove inconvenient to him persons from the governing bodies of the Mejlis - Deputy Chairmen of the Mejlis Presidium and heads of the Mejlis departments. On 26 July 1997, he announced the abolition of the institution of deputy chairmen, which he had introduced on 6 June 1996 with the support of the majority of the Mejlis. It took three meetings of the Mejlis to form a new Presidium after multiple re-votes. The previous structure of the Mejlis was abolished and a new one could not be formed because the President was not in agreement with the majority.

4. In such an important issue as the participation of the Crimean Tatar people in the elections to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, M. Dzhemilev once again proved to be an authoritarian leader. Without consulting the Mejlis, he agreed on the people's participation in the election campaign together with the Rukh of Ukraine, and even sent a letter to the Rukh indicating specific individuals to be included in the Rukh's list. Only after this was the issue brought to a meeting of the Mejlis.

A lot of energy, energy and time during the reporting period was taken up by internal problems in the Mejlis. It took eight meetings of the Mejlis and six meetings of the Presidium of the Mejlis to discuss the "Imdat-bank" issue alone. This is the main reason, although not the only one, why many of the most important problems in the lives of our people have been overshadowed. The Mejlis was very sluggish or did not work at all on such defining bills as the status of the Crimean Tatar people in Ukraine, the law on indigenous peoples, representation of people in the legislative and executive branches of power in Ukraine and in Crimea, forms of self-determination of the people; the law on rehabilitation, etc.

From autumn 1995 to summer 1996, work on all these questions was quite lively at all levels. However, the proposed drafts, some of which are now at the Verkhovnaya Rada, cannot satisfy us. Control over their very drafting process has been lost. Sufficient attention has been paid to the citizenship of our compatriots, but there is no acceptable solution. Numerous meetings with representatives of international organisations, roundtables, seminars and other organisational activities are certainly necessary and make a positive contribution, taking the process of finding a solution to the next level. However, this is clearly not enough.

Virtually no attention has been paid to analysing ways of reuniting the people. The natural return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland could take dozens of years.

The situation is somewhat better in the field of education. Several new Crimean Tatar-language schools have been opened and the number of pupils has doubled this year, reaching 2,500. There is hope that this process is reaching the state level of solution. Besides the already mentioned decision of the Crimean Supreme Council "On the alphabet of Crimean Tatar language" the Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 260 dated 26 August 1997 "On the Program of Development of the Network of Educational Institutions, Classes with Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar Language of Study, Schools and Classes with Two Languages of Study" and the Decree of the Council of Ministers No. 466-r dated 20 October 1997 "On creation of the Republican Interagency Commission on Coordination and Control of the Transfer of the Crimean Tatar Language into Latin Script". The funds of the international "Vozrozhdeniye" Fund have been attracted for the publication of textbooks and manuals in the Crimean Tatar language. This year, projects for publishing textbooks and manuals of 12 titles have been approved and will be financed.

Esteemed delegates! Every single one of us is responsible for maintaining the most important achievement of the national movement - the representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people Qurultay and its elected Mejlis. They are currently the life-supporting bodies of the people. Only in the way of democratic forms of their functioning are they able to bring good to our people.

Lenur ARIFOV
(Avdet Newspaper, No.23 (186) 31 December 1997)

MF-inform

Exhibit J

Milli Firka, *Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis* (25 March 2011)

(translation)

Translation

Milli Firka, *Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis* (25 March 2011), available at: <http://milli-firka.org/кто-и-как-в-меджлисе-обворовывал-народ/>.

Who and How Ripped Off the People in the Mejlis

Today everyone is aware of the rapid decline in the authority of the Mejlis among compatriots and, first and foremost, of its leaders, M. Dzhemilev and R. Chubarov. The first attempt to "cleanse the Mejlis from within" was made in 1997 by a "group of 16" members of the Mejlis at the time who were outraged by financial machinations around budgetary funds perpetrated by the Mejlis leaders through the notorious and no longer existing "people's" "Imdat-Bank".

The protest by fighters for truth and democracy in the Mejlis was crushed, and the troublemakers were severely obstructed, finding themselves "out of the business" of the Qurultay-Mejlis. "MF-Inform" decided to return to those events, after which the processes of internal degradation of the Mejlis could no longer be hidden from the public.

We bring to your attention materials of newspaper "Avdet" No.23 (186) dated 31 December 1997 which are opening just a little part of what and how Mustafa Dzhemilev and his today's closest surrounding started to fall "from pedestal". I give the floor to Enver Muedinov.

Report of Enver Muedinov,

Chairman of the Review Committee of Qurultay

Dear Qurultay delegates!



In its activities, the Review Committee was guided by the Regulations on the Review Committee, approved by the Qurultay. During the reporting period after the first session of the III Qurultay the Review Committee held 12 meetings where there was always a quorum for taking decisions. During this period the Review Committee has considered about 20 applications.

The essence of many applications boiled down to almost one thing: to assist in solving the housing problem. Besides, there were applications from inhabitants of Ukrainka village about doubts in the results of elections of the chairman of Mejlis of Ukrainka village and applications from delegates of Kirov regional conference about violations during the conference.

All the applications were checked, the results of checks were discussed at the meetings of the Review Committee and decisions were made.

Audits of the financial and economic activities of the "Crimea" Fund for 1996, accounting department of the Mejlis for 1996, and 10 months of 1997 were conducted. I will elaborate on the results of the audits below.

The Review Committee attended all the meetings of the Mejlis during the reporting period.

The Review Committee of the Qurultay several times made statements and initiated meetings of the Mejlis and consideration of such issues as:

- on the activities of commercial bank "Imdat-Bank" and the transfer from this bank of the Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea account;
- on the activities of the deputy faction "Qurultay" in the Supreme Soviet of Crimea.

At the request of the Mejlis Chairman, the Qurultay Review Committee checked the reasons for the disruption of the Mejlis meeting in Foti Sala village.

The Review Committee, carrying out its work in a rather difficult environment, carried out the functions entrusted to it by the Qurultay.

The crisis in the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people could not but affect the Qurultay's Review Committee.

Until recently, there was no particular disagreement in the Review Committee. I, as the Chairman of the Review Committee, trying to comply with the principles of democracy, obeyed the decisions taken, although I didn't always agree with the decision. But when some members of the Review Committee tried to act as censors to forbid me to speak about negative phenomena discussed in the sessions of Mejlis, I refused to obey. This ended with the Review Committee meeting deciding to remove me from my position by expressing distrust of me, which only the Qurultay can do.

Thus, some members of the Review Committee in their eagerness to silence everyone who is unwanted are even exceeding their authority and violating the regulation on the Review Committee of the Qurultay. I have informed you about this in detail in my statements to the media.

Only the Qurultay may assess the activities of the Review Committee and hence my work as the Chairman of the Review Committee elected at the Qurultay, so I am submitting to your judgment a report on the work done by the Review Committee of the Qurultay.

I bring to your attention the report compiled without embellishing the facts, but also without glossing over the painful problems, the attempt to solve which led to the crisis in Mejlis.

So far, the desire not to wash dirty linen in public has worked for us while discussing these or those questions. But in order to understand the reasons of the created crisis it is necessary to wash this dirty linen as long as without telling the truth we won't achieve unity and solidarity of the national movement, without this it will be difficult to gain trust of the people, which has been noticeably shaken lately.

Some members of the Mejlis and the Review Committee are trying to blame for the crisis situation on those members of the Mejlis who sought to bring order to the Mejlis and in the distribution of funds allocated under the Program for Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People. All the "guilt" of these members of the Mejlis is that they made public the negative phenomena that were happening with the funds allocated under the program. And the Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev and his supporters are against publicising these facts.

Disclosure of which facts are the Chairman of Mejlis and his supporters afraid of?

At the Mejlis meetings from August 1996 to March 1997 the questions about the efficiency of the use of budgetary funds allocated under the Program for the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people and the principles of the relationship between the Mejlis and "Imdat-bank" were considered 6 times.

During this time, we witnessed how Mejlis commission was established to make recommendations on the activities of "Imdat-Bank", how extraordinary meetings of the Mejlis were initiated at the request of 13 members of the Mejlis and at the decision of the Review Committee in order to cancel the decisions made. We also faced such a fact as the refusal of the Mejlis chairman to sign and execute adopted decisions without taking into account the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members.

Even then, the first signs of the impending crisis appeared, but the Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev did nothing to eliminate the crisis phenomena, but on the contrary, did everything possible to deepen it.

The opinion of the majority of Mejlis members was categorical: to transfer the budget account of the capital development administration from "Imdat-bank" to one of those authorised by the national bank of Ukraine to service budget funds, thereby expressing distrust in the activities of "Imdat-bank" and its management.

The Mejlis Chairman, realising that he could not change the mind of the majority of the Mejlis members, went to an extreme step: it was stated that the Mejlis Chairman would resign if the budget account of the capital development administration was withdrawn from the "Imdat-bank". With this step, M. Dzhemilev went to the political blackmail of the Mejlis. He made it clear to everyone that he would reject any decision to withdraw the capital development administration account from the "Imdat-Bank".

What does the Chairman of the Mejlis and his supporters actually stand for, and what do most members of the Mejlis oppose so strongly?

Why does the Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev persistently continue to defend his pet project - "Imdat-bank" without taking into account the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members?

And everything turns out to be in the control, or rather, in the uncontrolled spending of budgetary funds allocated under the Program for the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people, in order to keep "Imdat-bank" afloat.

At one time, when "Imdat-Bank" was organised, it was entrusted with the functions of control over the efficient spending of funds allocated under the Program through the Public Fund "Crimea", which is one of the founders of the bank.

Much in the activities of "Imdat-bank" is hidden behind the term "commercial secret". No one can learn anything about the activities of the bank without the consent of all the founders of the bank.

In October 1995, by order of the Chairman of the Mejlis, a commission of the Mejlis conducted the first and so far the only partial inspection of "Imdat-Bank".

In parallel with this inspection by the commission, an audit of the "Imdat-Bank" activity was carried out by the specialists of an independent financial expertise from Kharkov, at the invitation of the Chairman of the Mejlis. The main purpose of the audit was to make a clear picture of the bank's activities.

Much about the activity of "Imdat-bank" became known due to the results of these inspections. Inspection reports were presented to the Chairman of Mejlis M. Dzhemilev. But the results of the inspections were so unexpected and overwhelming even for M. Dzhemilev that he decided to hide the acts of inspection under the carpet and, rolling up his sleeves, takes decisive measures to save the bank.

So what did the inspections on the activity of "Imdat-Bank" reveal, and what results of the inspections did the Chairman of the Mejlis decide to hide?

Here are a few excerpts from the act of inspections:

The bank's insolvency was caused by the fact that the bank's management... in violation of the requirements of the National Bank of Ukraine, regulating lending activities, in January-September 1994, issued loans totaling 72.303 billion krb. (karbovanets), which have not been repaid even at the time of the inspection. The issuance of unprofitable loans was made without analysing their recoverability and security.

The most serious mistake of the bank officials mentioned above is that credit resources were provided to a number of companies that already had outstanding loans and fees for using credit resources in this bank.

As a result of the inactive credit policy of the Council and the Board of the Bank, "Imdat-Bank" incurred losses amounting to 178.703 billion krb. (non-repayment of issued and guaranteed loans, lost income, as well as losses from interbank credit operations).

Despite the created situation, when the bank incurred losses, the Council of the Bank set the salary for the employees of the bank - 15% of the income received by the bank.

Incompetence of the management of "Imdat-bank" led to the fact that the bank was on the verge of bankruptcy. Changing the chairmen of the Board of "Imdat-bank", one after another, they tried to save the situation. Only in 1994, 5 chairmen of the bank's Board changed.

In an interview with a correspondent of the "All-Ukrainian News", R. Kenje, a former chairman of the bank's Board, stated that he had not worked at the bank when it was suffering losses. This is an impertinent lie. What can you expect from a man who does his best to justify these actions?

R. Kenje was forced to write a notice of resignation from the post of Chairman of the Bank during the inspection of "Imdat-bank" by the Commission of the Mejlis, i.e. in October 1995.

The 53rd meeting of the Mejlis adopted a decision in relation to R. Kenje as well, but no one executes this decision because of the disagreement of the Chairman of the Mejlis with it.

The tape recording of the 53rd meeting of the Mejlis and the minutes of the meeting of 24 August 1996, where the decisions on the account of the capital development administration in the "Imdat-Bank", on the bank officials were taken away and are kept personally by M. Dzhemilev.

The leadership of the Mejlis, the Imdat-Bank and the State Committee on National Security were busy with one problem - how to find funds to replenish the hole that had formed due to non-repayment of loans. They found both ways and means.

These were the budgetary funds of the Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea under the Program for the Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People. They used persuasion and, if necessary, threats of

physical violence in order to use the budget funds to the benefit of the bank founders and the managers of some companies. Through these companies and small businesses the budget funds intended for the arrangement of the Crimean Tatar people, flowed into the pockets of managers of various ranks, and the people began to be openly deceived, hiding behind the assurances that official Kiev is gradually phasing out funding for the Program of Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatar People.

Capital development administration of Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, its budget account in the "Imdat-bank" was the very cash cow, from the funds of which the bank still existed.

How else can be explained such a fact that the allocation of 80 billion krb. by the Capital development administration of the "Crimea" Fund in August 1995, which, according to the order of the State Committee of National Security, were intended for the payment of financial aid to individual developers for the completion of houses, were used by the President of the "Crimea" Fund M. Dzhemilev for strengthening the financial position of the "Imdat-bank", for the repayment of debts on loans previously taken by a number of small enterprises and companies.

In order to give the appearance of legitimacy of use of 80 billion krb. received from the Capital development administration, the contracts were concluded between the "Crimea" Fund and the "Geos" and "Arsen-bey" enterprises for the supply of building materials, and the money was transferred to these enterprises in the amount of 63,0 billion krb. and 10 billion krb. respectively, leaving 7,0 billion krb. on the current account of the "Crimea" Fund. But in those two years not a single karbovanets worth of building materials has been delivered.

Where was the money spent? With this money "Geos" and "Arsen-bey" enterprises bought their promissory notes in the "Imdat-bank".

Moreover, at the expense of the above mentioned 63.0 billion krb. "Geos" enterprise repaid the debts of the following enterprises:

1. "Zodiac" enterprise 9.9 billion krb.
2. "Turk-Krym" LLC 10.0 billion krb.
3. "RED" enterprise 12.7 billion krb.
4. "Sparta" LLC 4.62 billion krb.
5. "Ecotech" LLC 4.0 billion krb.
6. "Cruz" enterprise 4.7 billion krb.
7. "Avesta" enterprise 4.6 billion krb.
8. "Krymzemstroj" enterprise 4.6 billion krb.

And the "Arsen-bey" enterprise, at the expense of the public fund "Crimea" received 10 billion krb, has repaid debts of the enterprise "Marat-94" in the amount of 2,0 billion krb.

The way in which after some time the appearance of payment of a part of debts between "Geos" enterprise and Fund "Crimea" was created refers to the category of puzzles and when solving them one starts to wonder: who took credits after all and why one enterprises pay debts of other enterprises and what source was chosen for repayment of debts?

From March 12, 1996 to July 15, 1996 "RED" enterprise transferred to the Fund "Crimea" 25 219 565 000 krb., drawing up payment orders as a repayment of accounts payable. But in the accounting documents in the Fund "Crimea" there is no confirmation of the document on the presence of such debt, but there is a letter from the "RED" enterprise that the transferred amount of 25 219 565 000 Krb is the payment of the debt of "Geos" enterprise.

S. Tokhtarov was the Director of the "RED" enterprise and the Chairman of the Board of "Imdat-bank" at that time, and he probably chose budgetary funds as the source for paying the debt.

The events that happened after that belong to those that are called incredible. The leadership of the "Crimea" Fund decided to use part of the funds coming from compatriots living abroad to replenish the Fund's current account in the "Imdat-Bank". For this purpose, \$31,497 was allocated and handed over to S. Tokhtarov for currency exchange and crediting to the current account of the "Crimea" Fund.

For the execution of this operation S. Tochtarov chose the "Geos" enterprise. The "Geos" enterprise transfers 58107 grivnas to the "Crimea" Fund by issuing a payment order, as a return of accounts payable. Is this not absurd? The funds of the "Crimea" Fund are used to pay off debts to the "Crimea" Fund.

How can one think of choosing a partner to credit funds to a company that has been indebted to the "Crimea" Fund for more than one year? According to the accounting documents, "Geos" enterprise reduced its debt to the "Crimea" Fund at the expense of the funds received by SME "RED" and for the currency received. According to accounting documents, "Geos" enterprise reduced its debt to the "Crimea" Fund through funds received by "RED" enterprise and for the currency received.

All the funds received from "RED" enterprise and "Geos" enterprise the management of the Fund "Crimea" decided to direct for payment of material aid to individual developers for the completion of houses. In 1996, 347.776 grivnas 50 kopecks was allocated for payment of financial assistance to the developers, and to date the indebtedness of the "Crimea" Fund to the developers in the amount of 4,522,234 grivnas 50 kopecks remains.

But what happened with 80 billion krb. is not the only thing that happened with the budget funds. In the same way, 45 billion brb. was used to repay the debts of some enterprises through the "Poisk" enterprise and the "RED" enterprise. A total of 8.9 billion krb. was misappropriated through the "Toria" enterprise on August 7, 1996. And there are dozens and dozens of such facts.

From the outside it seemed that official Kiev did not notice, to put it mildly, "these tricks" of the "Imdat-bank" management. But, to its credit, the Ukrainian government has taken steps to streamline the budget. In accordance with Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No 401 of 03.04.96, enterprises and organisations financed from the state budget were obliged to transfer accounts to authorised banks determined by this resolution before 15.05.96. However, this decree, as well as the decisions of the Mejlis taken in accordance with this decree, have not been implemented to date.

The most vigorous opposition to the withdrawal of the Capital development administration account from "Imdat-Bank", following the decision taken at the Mejlis meeting, came from M. Dzhemilev and R. Kenje, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and former chairman of the bank's Council.

At a time when one part of the Mejlis members were trying to bring order to the use of budgetary funds, another part was actively working to keep the budgetary account of the Capital development administration in the "Imdat-Bank".

Without discussing it at meetings of the Mejlis, they held secret negotiations with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, A. Demidenko, and the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, V. Kiselev. As a result of these negotiations, a letter was initiated to the Prime Minister of Ukraine P.I. Lazarenko. I will read an excerpt from this letter:

"The incompetence of the former management, which manifested itself in misconduct, seriously complicated and worsened the financial situation of the bank, the new composition of the Council and the Board of the bank are taking measures to resolve the crisis situation. In these conditions, the control and audit department and the state treasury department of Simferopol charged the amount of 2,772,218 grivnas 85 kopecks on the balance of budgetary funds with penalties, while the authorised capital of the bank is 1,200,074 grivnas.

Taking into account the role of "Imdat-bank" which activity is under constant control of the Supervisory Board and the "Qurultay" faction of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea, I ask to consider it appropriate to withdraw the collection orders and give it the status of an authorized bank for servicing the funds sent from the State Budget of Ukraine, to finance the return and settlement of the Crimean Tatar people."

How they controlled, and how they wanted to control the use of budgetary funds, we have shown above.

How can we hope that the leadership of "Imdat-bank" will finally begin to show a sense of compassion for their people if they continue to steal from the Capital development administration, but now in a different way.

Imdat-bank's management takes inter-bank loans and lends them to the Capital development administration at a higher interest rate. During the first five months of 1996, the Capital development administration paid "Imdat-bank" interest of 205,278 grivnas and 27 kopecks, while "Imdat-bank" transferred 54,610 grivnas 66 kopecks for interbank credits to "Krym-credit" bank. The difference in the amount of 150,667 grivnas 61 kopecks is the profit of "Imdat-bank" received at the expense of the Capital development administration.

The "Crimea" Fund, being the founder of the bank, has more than 362 thousand grivnas in the "Imdat-bank" statutory fund, but has not received a single penny of dividends for these years.

So who do the resources of the fund work for and who gets dividends from it?

The answer to this question can only be given by the management of the "Crimea" Fund and "Imdat-bank".

The funds invested in the "Imdat-Bank" statutory fund by the management of the "Crimea" Fund are the funds collected on the donations of compatriots abroad, for the improvement of the entire nation, and not for the profits of a number of high-ranking leaders.

The funds for the operation of the "Crimea" Fund are allocated by the President of the Fund M. Dzhemilev. Only M. Dzhemilev knows the true sources and quantity of the incoming funds. The Crimean Republic can not say anything about it. Therefore, the verification covers that part of the documents which were provided to us.

Having failed to eliminate the contradictions that led to the confrontation in the Mejlis when addressing the issue of the effectiveness of the use of budgetary funds, the Mejlis Chairman continued to rely on the support of the majority of the Mejlis members when addressing other issues. This was particularly evident in the discussion of candidates for nomination to the new Crimean government

A majority of Mejlis members did not support the candidates for the Crimean government proposed by the Mejlis chairman. But M. Dzhemilev, without a decision of Mejlis, considered that Ennanov's candidacy for the post of Minister of Social Protection was the best one, and disregarding the opinion of the majority of Mejlis members, who rejected this candidacy, supported Ennanov and achieved his approval in this post.

The Mejlis chairman understood that decisions in Mejlis meetings are made by a majority vote of the Mejlis members, but he also understood that he could not persuade the majority of the Mejlis members to support his ideas.

And so, in this difficult situation, the Chairman of the Mejlis decided to go on leave, until the Qurultay session.

He was well aware that the Mejlis Rules do not foresee a situation where the Mejlis chairman goes on long-term leave on his own initiative before the Qurultay session.

The Mejlis meeting offered M. Dzhemilev to go on leave for 2-3 months, but he refused and insisted on taking leave until the Qurultay session.

And then the Mejlis meeting was forced to assign the duties of Mejlis chairman to the First Mejlis Deputy Chairman R. Chubarov until an extraordinary session of the Qurultay.

Having gone on leave, M. Dzhemilev became more active and began to meet more often with his compatriots in different regions of Crimea, which he did not do so often before.

Two weeks later, at a meeting of the Mejlis, R. Chubarov made a statement that he was physically unable to combine his duties as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and acting deputy chairman of the Mejlis, and asked to be relieved of his duties as chairman of the Mejlis.

But the real reason of R. Chubarov's unwillingness to act as Mejlis Chairman is that though Mejlis Chairman M. Dzhemilev went on holiday, he continued active work and all questions were agreed with him without taking into consideration Acting Mejlis Chairman, and that he is not willing to work in such circumstances.

The members of the Mejlis faced a dilemma: how to break the deadlock, how to untangle the tangle of painful problems in a situation when the Mejlis leadership withdrew from solving them, aggravating the crisis in the Mejlis.

All members of the Mejlis understood that any decision taken by the Mejlis would go against the rules of procedure of the Mejlis.

At such a critical moment when the issue was put forward: should the Mejlis be the representative body of the people, the majority of Mejlis members accepted Mr Chubarov's statement that he would step down as Mejlis chairman and hand his duties over to Reshat Ablaev on a temporary basis until an extraordinary session of the Qurultay.

Concluding my report I would like to hope that the delegates of the Qurultay will have the courage to assess in a balanced and objective manner the activity of the Mejlis and its President and moreover, to assess the causes of the crisis. I hope that Qurultay will find the ways of getting out of the crisis and create opportunities for strengthening the positions of the system of representative bodies of Qurultay and Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.

It will depend on you, the Qurultay delegates, what composition of the Mejlis you will choose.

But we must not allow the authority of the Mejlis to be used for mercenary purposes, by people with impure intentions - whoever these people are, whatever merits they have before the people.

You have a difficult decision to make, on which the unity of the people will depend.

I think Qurultay decisions will be realistic and their realisation will contribute to the restoration of rights of our people, their return and settlement on their native land.

Enver MUEDINOV

Newspaper "Avdet" No.23 (186) dated 31 December 1997

MF-inform

Exhibit K

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Extraordinary 2nd session of the 6th convocation of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people opened in Bakhchisaray* (29 March 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Extraordinary 2nd session of the 6th convocation of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people opened in Bakhchisaray (29 March 2014)*, available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728221035/http://qtmm.org/новости/4401-в-бахчисарае-открыла-работу-внеочередная-2-ая-сессия-курултая-крымскотатарского-народа-vi-созыва>.

News

Extraordinary 2nd session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of the 6th convocation opened in Bakhchisaray on 29 March 2014.

The extraordinary 2nd session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of the 6th convocation opened its work in Bakhchisaray on March 29, 2014.

Opening the session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of the 6th convocation, the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov said that 236 delegates of the Qurultay are registered in the hall.

The Presidium of the extraordinary 2nd session of Qurultay consisted of: Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Chairman Refat Chubarov, his Deputies Akhtem Chiyoq, Zaur Smirnov, Aider Adzhimambetov, Nariman Jelyal, Mufti of the Crimean Muslims Hajji Emirali Ablayev and the Chairman of the Qurultay Review Committee Ali Ozenbash.

President of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov and head of the Council of Muftis of Russia Ravil Gaynutdinov were present at the Qurultay session.

The session opened with the singing of the Crimean Tatar national anthem "Ant Etkenmen". ("I have sworn»).

Mufti of Muslims of Crimea Hajji Emirali Ablayev gave the traditional blessing of Qurultay.

Delegates of the Qurultay proceeded to the election of the working bodies of the Qurultay.

Elvedin Chubarov, Nariman Dzhelyal, Bekir Mamutov, Teyfuk Gafarov and Shevket Kaybullayev were appointed to the Drafting Commission.

The delegates of the national congress also approved the composition of the Secretariat of the session, which included Dilyaver Akiyev, Shefikha Abduramanova, Murat Yazydzhiyev, Dinara Seitgazyeva and Gayana Yuksel.



The delegates of the extraordinary 2nd session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people of the 6th convocation approved the agenda of the session.

The draft agenda was taken as a basis and included the issue "On the socio-political situation in Crimea and tasks of the national self-government bodies of the Crimean Tatar people».

After the approval of the agenda, the head of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov made a report on the socio-political situation in Crimea and the tasks of the national self-government bodies of the Crimean Tatar people.

Addressing the delegates of Qurultay of the 6th convocation the Head of Mejlis Refat Chubarov underlined that the draft resolution of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people "***On the realisation by the Crimean Tatar people of the right to self-determination on its historical territory - in Crimea***", which is proposed to discuss and adopt today, Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people announces all the parties about "***the beginning of political and legal procedures on establishing national and territorial autonomy of the Crimean Tatar people on its historical territory - in Crimea***".

Exhibit L

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for our place in the relationship between the two countries* (30 March 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for our place in the relationship between the two countries (30 March 2014)*, available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728201656/http://qtmm.org/новости/4412-замглавы-меджлиса-нариман-джелялов-мы-устали-искать-свое-место-в-отношениях-между-двумя-странами>.

Mejlis Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyalov: We are tired of looking for our place in the relationship between the two countries

30 March 2014

On Saturday, 29 March, Bakhchysaray hosted the first session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people since the start of the Russian occupation.

Focus talked to the deputy head of the Crimean Tatar People's Majlis, Nariman Dzhelyalov, about the most important decisions and their possible consequences.

- *What are the main decisions taken at the extraordinary session of Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people on March 29 and today's meeting of the Mejlis?*

Today the Mejlis discussed issues related to the instructions of yesterday's Qurultay. It was decided to continue the work on preparation of bullet points, which will enable us to make appointments and negotiate with international organisations, governments of different countries. A certain group of people will be allocated for that. We have some blueprints, now we have to specificate them.

We also handed Mustafa Dzhemilev - he is now in New York - the texts of Qurultay decisions and asked him to voice them at the UN Security Council meeting. This is about the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination.

As for interaction with the Crimean authorities, the Qurultay discussed this issue and instructed the Mejlis to make a final decision. It will be adopted next Tuesday, 1 April, in the morning.

- *So will the Mejlis cooperate with the Crimean authorities?*

There is no final decision yet, as I said. But the Qurultay voted for the Mejlis to recommend people who would join the Crimean government to protect the interests and rights of Crimean Tatars.

- *Can you name these people?*

We were just discussing and have not yet made a particular decision on the candidates.

- *During the Qurultay meeting Lenur Islyamov, owner of the ATR channel, said that he was ready to take the post of deputy prime minister in the Crimean government. Was he among the possible candidates?*

Today various candidates were discussed: those that were announced yesterday and others. But no decision has been made.

- *The Qurultay has decided to establish a national territorial autonomy of the Crimean Tatar people on its historical territory - in Crimea. Could you decipher what this means in practice?*

It is about the recognition of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous people in the fundamental documents of the autonomy - first of all, in the Constitution. It is the guaranteed participation of Crimean Tatars in the administration of the territory of this autonomy. We are not talking about 100% of our people in the authorities, we are talking about adequate and guaranteed participation. These are issues concerning the preservation, use and development of the Crimean Tatar language, the development of culture and everything related to these areas. There is no such experience in Ukraine, but there is in Russia - in the constitutions of Tatarstan and Udmurtia. This is what we are aiming at.

- *Do you want to achieve autonomy within Ukraine or in the Russian Federation?*

So far we do not know the exact answer to this question. But we are tired of looking for our place in relations between the two states. So we were concerned, first of all, with protecting the interests of our own people. We declared and clearly stated in the decision of the Qurultay our intention to enter into relations with Governments and Parliaments of different countries. Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov said it could be Ukraine, Russia and other countries. But of course, first of all, those who are directly related to the fate of Crimea.

- *Do Crimean Tatars recognise Crimea as part of Russia?*

Here we are not talking about recognition of Russia, but about recognition of the fact that Crimea remains de jure part of Ukraine - the General Assembly vote showed that, de facto Russian troops are here, Russian laws are in force, Russian roubles are in circulation and many other things are still going on. In fact, we are proceeding from what exists in reality at the moment.

- *Are Crimean Tatars demanding half the seats in the government?*

Some members of the Mejlis talk about half. But only some. Officially we gave a figure of 33%.

- *However, Crimean officials say the new Crimean constitution will not contain a provision on national quotas because this is not stipulated by Russian law...*

The Qurultay instructed us to talk to the national government, not to representatives of the subject of the federation, as they are now calling themselves. After we talk with the Russian leadership, that is when we will make final conclusions about quotas for Crimean Tatars.

- *What issues will Refat Chubarov discuss at the meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin that was announced the other day?*

Exclusively those issues that concern the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination. We have already discussed at the Qurultay points about national-territorial autonomy, we are still finalising them, and they will be offered for discussion to Mr. Putin, the authorities of Ukraine and the leadership of international organisations. And we want to hear answers to our proposals.

- *Whose proposals - those of Ukraine or Russia - are more acceptable to the Crimean Tatars, which side is more willing to engage in dialogue?*

Proposals have come from both sides. However, so far only Ukraine has offered specific solutions. I am referring to the resolution of the Ukrainian parliament a week ago on the recognition of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous people of Crimea. On the Russian side, there have been no written decisions of this kind so far. There have only been proposals voiced by Putin, before the signing of the famous treaty and federal constitutional law on the annexation of Crimea. There has been no concrete discussion. In this case, I cannot say that any side is more willing to engage in dialogue. There is a reality, and no matter what statements we make, we have to accept the realities.

The problem is that the Ukrainian authorities' decisions on the territory of Crimea are not realisable. Ukraine does not have the capacity, the strength, perhaps the desire, to enforce its decisions in Crimea. At the same time the decisions of Russian authorities are being actively implemented.

- How do you assess the possible effect of the law "on the occupied territories" adopted by the Ukrainian parliament - will it do more harm or good?

I do not see any benefit for the residents of Crimea in this draft law. First of all, it is the way it understands collaborationism; secondly, it is a ban on economic activities for Ukrainian citizens in Crimea. As for the implementation of a special regime for entry and exit, this can still be accepted. But some of the parameters would actually lead to us ending up in our homeland in the status of outcasts, people unable to feed their families, or worse, as criminals. For this reason, I cannot in any way welcome the adoption of such a law in the form it has been proposed.

- How does the Qurultay propose to solve the problem of obtaining/not obtaining a Russian passport?

We have not made a final decision. We are trying to find an intermediate solution. In order not to lose contact with Ukraine, we call not to give up the Ukrainian passport and not to lose our citizenship. But we are forced in the realities we have in Crimea to accept Russian citizenship. Otherwise we will remain foreigners in our native land. This applies not only to Crimean Tatars but also to many Crimean residents of other nationalities.

- The absence of the leader of the Crimean Tatar people Mustafa Dzhemilev at the Qurultay gave rise to speculation that the Qurultay is being held against his will. Is this true?

I will comment on this very simply. Modern means of communication allow Mr. Dzhemilev to address the Qurultay delegates even though he is physically very far away. Yesterday we were ready to provide such communication. There is no reason to claim that the Qurultay made decisions contrary to the will of Mr. Dzhemilev.

- How do you generally assess the reaction of the international community to the annexation of Crimea?

We have already come to terms with the fact that the reaction of the international community does not appear as quickly as the Crimean Tatars in particular expect. We understand that this is due to many factors. And we are very grateful to our leader Mustafa Dzhemilev for seeking to ensure a positive response for the Crimean Tatars. Today, he is actually fulfilling the task of ensuring that the international community, first, publicly and openly recognizes the Crimean Tatar people as the indigenous people of Crimea, and second, takes measures to ensure the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination. On Monday, Mustafa

Dzhemilev plans to take part in a meeting of the UN Security Council, where he will make a report on the situation in Crimea.

- What statements will he be making?

You understand that it is not customary in global diplomacy to make demands at once. First the situation is announced, then the reaction is listened to. However, Mustafa Dzhemilev has repeatedly said that the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination must be secured. In what form and with what tools is the second question. The main thing is to reach agreement in the UN on the main issue. Negotiations on more specific issues will follow.

- On the eve of the referendum, fears were expressed about misconduct by the so-called "self-defence" in Crimea and possible provocations and so on. Do the Crimean Tatars feel safe now?

The Crimean Tatars feel uncomfortable and anxious. The "self-defense" units have not gone anywhere. There is a huge set of questions and problems to which neither we nor the Crimean authorities have an answer so far. And these questions are facing all the residents of Crimea. These include the issues of citizenship, education and property rights. Until at least interim solutions are found, one cannot speak of any peace and confidence in tomorrow.

- In the comments on yesterday's Qurultay, there are accusations of "capitulation" by Crimean Tatar leaders to the Russian occupiers. How can you comment on this?

Every individual citizen as an individual can afford any maximalist reaction. As a representative body designed to ensure and protect the rights and interests of our people, we have no right to assess the situation in black and white. We are not proceeding from popular solutions but from protecting our people so that there will be no victims, people will be safe and their rights will be protected. Talking about capitulation, especially to Ukrainian officials who are withdrawing their troops from the territory of Crimea, is at the very least unethical.

FOCUS

Vitaly Atanasov

Exhibit M

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum*
(29 March 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, Head of Mejlis: *When we see that there is a need for a clear demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum (29 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728205431/http://qtm.org/новости/4403-глава-меджлиса-в-том-случае-когда-мы-увидим-что-потребуется-демонстрация-четкой-ясной-воли-крымскотатарского-народа-мы-будем-проводить-референдум>.*

Head of Mejlis: When we see that there is a need for a clear demonstration of the will of the Crimean Tatar people, we will hold a referendum

29 March 2014

This was stated by Refat Chubarov at a briefing during a break of the 2nd session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people on 29 March 2014.

Refat Chubarov also said that the draft Decision of the Qurultay "On the right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination in their historical territory - in Crimea" is based on international law and on many fait accompli and precedents in some states, including the



Russian Federation.

"We have done nothing more than any people would do in a situation when their land has become the subject of great discussions regarding sovereignty and rights to this land," the Mejlis head continued. - We have asserted our right to self-determination on this land. Therefore, all parliaments and states that proceed from the fundamental documents of the UN, first of all the UN Charter, have only one way out - to share the right of self-determination of the Crimean Tatar people on their land".



The head of the Mejlis stressed that the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people proceeds from the fact that the Crimean Tatars' right to self-determination is indisputable and is based on international documents. "We are waiting for the reaction of the parliament and the governments of the states. I have no doubt that one of the first to respond to our document should be the Ukrainian parliament," Chubarov concluded. - I do not know whether the Russian parliament will react and I do not know whether the parliaments of other neighbouring states will react".

Furthermore, the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov voiced his intention to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"We actually outlined a number of issues a week ago which, from our point of view, require outlining the processes that are taking place in and around Crimea and to discuss them I proposed to initiate such a meeting. Because according to international treaties, the country that acted as Russia is responsible for all the processes here, even though others are challenging its right to be in this status of territory. This side is responsible for all the processes on which people's lives depend and what will happen tomorrow, even if others are disputing its right to be on this territory. Who to negotiate it with but the president of the country that established its legal field here", - believes Refat Chubarov.

Exhibit N

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman* (17 May 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman* (17 May 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728214824/http://qtm.org/новости/4484-председатель-меджлиса-встретился-с-омбудсменом-рф>.

Mejlis chairman meets Russian Ombudsman

News

Mejlis Chairmen met with the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation on 17 May 2014.

On 17 May 2014, the central office of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people hosted a meeting between the Mejlis Chairperson Refat Chubarov and the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation Ella Pamfilova.

The meeting was also attended by the Deputy Chairman Nariman Dzhelyal, Head of the Secretariat Dilyaver Akiev and Head of the Department of Education in Crimean Tatar language and implementation of Crimean Tatar language in all spheres of state and public life of Crimea Emine Avamileva, Head of Legal Department Teyfuk Gafarov.

The Chairman of the Mejlis informed the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation about the situation regarding the Crimean Tatar people in different periods of history as well as about the work of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people.

Speaking about the attitude of the Crimean Tatars to the changes that have taken place in Crimea, Refat Chubarov stressed that "the main thing in today's reality is the safety of people, and in order to ensure it, the basic principles that guarantee Crimean Tatars their rights must be fulfilled. We also want to be a part of the people who have rights and take responsibility. We would like to participate in organising the government, but the Crimean Tatars are only 300 thousand and they live dispersed. This makes it very difficult to elect our representatives to the authorities".

Refat Chubarov stressed that Crimean Tatars would like to have such an electoral system that would enable them to delegate their representatives elected by Crimean Tatar people themselves to governmental authorities.

Also during the meeting he expressed his position that all 3 state languages should be equally studied in the schools of the Republic of Crimea.

"We are very apprehensive about the schools. Look. Vladimir Putin speaks and emphasises the three languages. The Constitution has written down the equality of the 3 languages, but we need an implementation mechanism to make it work," said Refat Chubarov. - A declaration will not help anything. We talked to educators, we told them that it is necessary to make it mandatory to study Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian languages in schools with Russian language».

"I will now talk about today's reality. No one, neither you nor I, can change it anymore. In the current situation we need to think about how we can help people. What should we do to solve the problems that arise," said Ella Pamfilova.

She also noted that now the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people should use all means to inform the country's leadership in Moscow, because even though the leadership is informed by representatives of the Crimean authorities and law enforcers, it happens to be one-sided information.

"Of course, it is necessary to definitely use all the possibilities in the legal field. Russian President Vladimir Putin is now, to a certain extent, going along with it. It seems to me that we should use all the chances. I think information should come from you as well. I'm ready to be an intermediary between you and the president of the Russian Federation," Pamfilova said.

The issue of banning the events on May 17 and 18 was also touched upon in the course of the meeting. Refat Chubarov noted that for the first time in all these years, a mourning rally on May 18 was banned and stressed that people were going to go to Simferopol.

Ella Pamfilova, speaking about this, noted that she was "categorically against the banning of such an event. "Another thing is if they have any serious concerns that there might occur provocations," the ombudsman said.

She also stressed that her main role is to be the person who will try to ease the tension in society as much as possible and "give answers to the problems that concern the residents of Crimea and the Crimean Tatar people. There are so many issues that require daily work".

Exhibit O

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis the right to identify candidates for republican authorities* (29 March 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis the right to identify candidates for republican authorities* (29 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140728204613/http://qtmm.org/новости/4406-курултай-крымскотатарского-народа-делегировал-меджлису-право-определить-кандидатов-для-работы-в-республиканских-органах-власти>.

Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis the right to identify candidates for republican authorities

29 March 2014

Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people has delegated to Mejlis the right to identify candidates for the republican authorities.

The decision was voted for by 157 Qurultay delegates on 29 March 2014 at the 2nd extraordinary session of the national congress.



On 30 March 2014, a meeting of the Mejlis will be held to consider this issue.

Exhibit P

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on inadmissibility of extremist activities* (4 May 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, *Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on inadmissibility of extremist activities* (4 May 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140729102618/http://qtmm.org/новости/4474-прокурор-крыма-зачитала-предупреждение-председателю-меджлиса-о-недопустимости-осуществления-экстремистской-деятельности>.

Crimean prosecutor reads warning to Mejlis chairman on inadmissibility of extremist activities

04 May 2014

On 4 May 2014, at 7 pm, Crimean prosecutor Nataliya Poklonskaya read out a warning to Mejlis Chairman Refat Chubarov "on the inadmissibility of extremist activities" at the office



of the Crimean Tatar People's Mejlis.

**WARNING
on inadmissibility of extremist activities**

City of Simferopol

3 May 2014

On 03.05.2014 the Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Chubarov R.A. in violation of the requirements of Articles 4-5 of the Federal Law "On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets" of 19.06. 2004 No. 54-FL planned, prepared and organized a public event in the city of Armyansk of the Republic

of Crimea and led the citizens he invited to the event, representing the interests of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people in the number of about 1500 people.

Accordingly, on 03.05.2014 at about 10 a.m. the convoy consisting of 100 cars, 2 buses and 2 minibuses, containing the citizens of Crimean Tatar origin, total number of about 1500 people, entered the territory of Armyansk.

These citizens, on the instructions of R.A. Chubarov, blocked the Kherson-Kerch road near the road sign "115" km and subsequently took part in a rally organized by R.A. Chubarov, who publicly spoke there in support of the unofficial leader of the Crimean Tatar people, people's deputy of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine M. Dzhemilev.

Dzhemilev M. is banned from entering the territory of Russia by the authorised agencies.

The protesters were formed into a column by R.A. Chubarov and with Crimean Tatar national flags marched towards the border checkpoint "Turecky Val", where, in violation of the requirements of federal legislation on the procedure for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, R.A. Chubarov and part of the protesting citizens in the number of about 500 people crossed the Russian Federation border with Ukraine near the above mentioned border checkpoint and walked to the border post from the Ukraine to meet with M.Dzhemilev.

At the same time, Chubarov R.A. and the aforementioned citizens under his leadership in an organized manner, including the use of physical force and despite the verbal protests of the authorized officials serving at the "Turecky Val" post, drove police officers and Russian Federation border guards from the post, effectively seized the "Turecky Val" border crossing and held it for about 5 hours, namely from 12 to 17 hours on 03 May 2014 until the arrival of law enforcement authorities.

Chubarov R.A., Dzhemilev M. and the protesters after negotiations with them refused to vacate the border crossing point "Turecky Val" and stop their illegal actions, thus preventing the legitimate activities of state authorities.

Thus, the actions of Mr. Chubarov, Mr. Dzhemilev and the citizens from the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people that have not yet been identified are seen as violations of the Federal Law "On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets" of 19 June 2004, No. 54-FL and the Federal Law "On Combating Extremist Activity" of 25 July 2002, No. 114-FL.

The actions of Mr. Chubarov, Mr. Dzhemilev and unidentified citizens who took part in the public event in question actually caused mass disorder in the city of Armyansk, obstructed the lawful activity of the State authorities and involved violence and threats of violence.

Moreover, on behalf of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Chubarov R.A. organised and prepared the said illegal actions, and publicly urged citizens arriving with him in Armyansk to carry them out.

Besides, in violation of the requirements of Articles 4-5 of the Federal Law "On assemblies, rallies, demonstrations, marches and pickets" dated 19.06.2004 N° 54-F3, Chubarov R.A. organized other illegal public events related to the protest actions in support of Dzhemilev M. on 03.05.2014, expressed in the blocking of roads by Crimean Tatar nationals representing the interests of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar

people in settlements in the area of Belogorsk, 95 km. of the highway Simferopol - Kerch, Bakhchisaray, village Amurskoye of Krasnogvardeyskiy district of Sudak city, Strogonovka village on the Alushta-Yalta highway, as well as in Leninsky, Sovetsky and other districts of the Republic of Crimea.

Illegal public events on behalf of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people in the territory of the Republic of Crimea continue.

Based on the above mentioned, being guided by Article 7 of the Federal Law "On Combating Extremist Activity" of 25.07.2002 No. 114-FL,

I WARN:

Chubarov Refat Abdurakhmanovich, Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people on the inadmissibility of extremist activities.

I demand the immediate cessation of extremist activities.

I clarify that if the violations of the federal legislation indicated in the warning are not eliminated, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people will be liquidated in the order established by the Federal Law "On Combating Extremist Activity" of 25.07.2002 No. 114-FL and its activity on the territory of the Russian Federation will be prohibited.

Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea,
Senior Adviser of Justice

[signature] N.V. Poklonskaya

The warning has been issued to me, its essence and the right to appeal in court have been explained to me.

(signature of the person to
whom the warning is issued)

Exhibit Q

Maidan.org.ua, *The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in the Rada*
(2 March 2004)

(translation)

Translation

Maidan.org.ua, *The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in the Rada (2 March 2004)*, available at: <https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1075827192.html>.

The Law "On restoration of rights of persons deported" in the Rada

02 March 2004

A draft law "On restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds" has been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

A draft law "On restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds" has been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The document establishes a clear legal concept of deportation, its characteristics, designation of the territory from which a citizen was deported and other legal criteria according to which a person can be considered subject to deportation. This was stated by the chairman of the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, Gennadiy Moskal, during a meeting with Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Kunitsyn. According to Moskal, this is an extremely important legal document, as many legal aspects of the problem related to the forced relocation of large ethnic groups and the Crimean Tatar people remain unresolved in Ukraine until now. To date, Gennadiy Moskal noted, the very concept of "deportation" has been interpreted according to Dal's dictionary.

During the meeting, the sides exchanged views on improving the mechanism of building and buying secondary market housing for the repatriate families. Proposals to simplify the scheme for financing housing buyouts have been submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the chairman of the State Committee on Interethnic Relations. The scheme will be shorter, the number of intermediate links will be reduced, and the role of local authorities, who will hold meetings of tender committees directly in the cities and districts, will be increased. The Crimean government, said Sergey Kunitsyn, is considering the possibility of merging the Capital development administration of the Council of Ministers of the republic with a similar structure in the Republican Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. According to the Prime Minister, this option will make it possible to save and manage budget funds more rationally.

The chairman of the Republican Committee on Nationalities and Deported Citizens Server Saliev and Assistant to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea Shevket Memetov participated in the meeting.

Exhibit R

Maidan.org.ua, *Kuchma Imposes Veto on Law on the Deported* (23 July 2004)

(translation)

Translation

Maidan.org.ua, *Kuchma Imposes Veto on the Law on the Deported* (23 July 2004), available at: <https://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldkrym/1090559805.html>.

Kuchma Imposes Veto on the Law on the Deported

23 July 2004

Chubarov explains Kuchma's veto on Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported by lawyers' objections.

President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma vetoed the Law "On the Restoration of Rights of the Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds" due to the fact that the legal department of the Presidential Administration had objections to a number of provisions of this document. This opinion was expressed by one of the authors of the law, people's deputy of Ukraine Refat Chubarov, "Context-Media" reports.

"Lawyers of the Presidential Administration have a number of questions regarding certain articles, they believe that the people's deputies should reconsider them," Chubarov said. In particular, according to him, the lawyers questioned the article of the law which provides land to repatriates who return to the countryside. According to Chubarov, the lawyers justify their objection with the fact that issues of land allocation are regulated by the Land Code of Ukraine.

"I cannot agree with all the objections that we have," the deputy said. - Some of them, from my point of view, may not have been voiced".

We shall remind you that on 19 July Leonid Kuchma returned to the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine the Law "On the Restoration of Rights of the Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds" adopted by the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine on 24 June.

Exhibit S

Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Draft Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported
on Ethnic Grounds, 24 February 2010

(translation)

Translation

Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, Draft Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds, 24 February 2010, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220306151430/https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_2?pf3516=5515&skl=7.



Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine

Draft Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds

Number, date of registration:	5515 as of 24.02.2010
Registration session:	5th session of the VI convocation
Included in the agenda:	<u>5199-VI</u> of 06.09.2012
Subject of legislative initiative:	People's Deputy of Ukraine
Initiator(s) of the bill:	<u>Dzhemilev M. VI convocation</u> <u>Taran V.V. VI convocation</u>
Main Committee:	Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations
Other committees:	Committee on Legislative Support of Law Enforcement Committee on Budget Committee on the Rules of Procedure, Deputy Ethics and Support of Activities of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Committee on European Integration
Text of the draft law and supporting documents:	<u>Draft law 13.01.2010</u> <u>Submission 13.01.2010</u> <u>Explanatory note 13.01.2010</u> <u>Draft law (as a substitute) 24.02.2010</u> <u>Submission 24.02.2010</u> <u>Explanatory note 24.02.2010</u>
Documents related to the work:	<u>Conclusion of the Main Scientific and Expert Department 07.04.2010</u> <u>Conclusion of the Committee 23.05.2012</u> <u>Draft law (revised) 30.05.2012</u> <u>Submission 30.05.2012</u> <u>Explanatory note 30.05.2012</u>

Passage of the draft law:

The latest state:	Being prepared for the second reading
The last stage:	Adopted in the first reading (20.06 2012)

Related draft laws:

Registration number	Date of registration	Title of the draft law
<u>5515/II</u>	25.10.2010	Draft Resolution on Sending the Draft Law of Ukraine on Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds
<u>5515/III1</u>	30.05.2012	Draft Resolution on Adopting as a Basis the Draft Law of Ukraine on Restoration of the Rights of Persons Deported on Ethnic Grounds

Exhibit T

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history* (28 February 2019)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history* (28 February 2019), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20190228/1116152860.html>.

How Crimea was hardened: five blockades in the peninsula's modern history



07:24 28.02.2019

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Evgeniya Martynenko, RIA Novosti Crimea correspondent

Day by day Crimea is approaching a landmark date - the first five-year anniversary of the Russian peninsula's recent history. In these February-March days, Crimea, like the rest of the country, is remembering the events of 2014, when Crimeans decided to reunite with Russia.

Over these years, the peninsula has gone through a difficult path of establishing the region as a full-fledged constituent entity of the Russian Federation, facing Ukrainian provocations time and again. In particular, With Russia's help, the peninsula went through five blockades imposed by Ukraine: economic, water, transport, energy and informational. On the eve of the anniversary of reunification with Russia, RIA Novosti Crimea recalls what it was like.

It all started with the water

Since Crimea became part of Russia and a new government was established in Ukraine, Kiev has repeatedly threatened to blockade its border with the peninsula. Kiev has had all the "trump cards" for this, as the peninsula, which is connected by land only with Ukraine, received resources and most goods from there.

The "provocative debut" was not long in coming - immediately after the peninsula became part of Russia, a water blockade was imposed.

Until 2014, Ukraine provided up to 85% of Crimea's fresh water needs through the North Crimean canal from the Dnepr River, this water was used to irrigate farmland. Approximately one third of the Kherson region was fed with water through the same canal. After the events of the "Crimean spring", the Ukrainian part of the waterway was taken under enhanced protection and the Administration of the North Crimean canal in Tavriysk (Khersonskaya Oblast - ed.) was instructed to close the flood-gates on the barrier near the border with Crimea. The inflow of water to the peninsula has practically stopped.

In May 2014, information emerged that a dam was being constructed on the territory of Kherson Oblast approximately 15 km from the border with Crimea. After the completion of this facility, "excess water" was discharged into the Black Sea gulf through one of the drains, drying up the channel of the North Crimean canal. A cofferdam was then built there with sluices and water metering structure in case of water supply to Crimea after conclusion of the relevant agreement. However, there were no official negotiations on this issue - Crimea took all sorts of measures on its own to provide itself with water and no longer depend on Ukraine in this matter.



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"The problem of sustainable water supply to the peninsula has always been there, the issue of drinking water quality was relevant many years ago. And the closure of the North Crimean canal directed us to solve the issue of sustainable water supply to

Crimea, now we are successfully dealing with these issues," Sergey Tsekov, a member of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, said in a commentary to RIA Novosti Crimea.

In the absence of water from the Dnepr River, the peninsula's agriculture suffered significant losses: the area of irrigated land decreased several times, the agricultural sector switched to drip irrigation and cultivation of drought-resistant crops, and the cultivation of some crops had to be abandoned altogether.

A number of projects have been implemented to supply water to consumers in Crimea. For example, in 2014, hydraulic engineering structures were built to fill the North Crimean canal with water from the Belogorsk and Taigan reservoirs along the Biyuk-Karasu River. Thanks to this engineering solution, residents of eastern Crimea, where the water supply situation was the most difficult, began to receive water.

In addition, construction of three water intakes in Nizhnegorsk and Dzhankoy districts - Novogrigoryevsky, Nezhynsky and Prostornensky - started in October 2014. The project, with a total cost of 1.2 billion roubles, envisaged drilling of 12 artesian wells from 110 to 180 metres deep at each of the water intakes. The water wells were constructed within two years, and this allowed to supply drinking water to about 200 thousand residents of the Eastern Crimea.



© Photo: Information Policy Department of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Crimea

As part of the implementation of priority measures for water supply 30 wells were drilled, repaired and equipped in 30 localities of the Republic. In a number of Crimean villages, where water was supplied by the hour for 15-20 years, a round-the-clock water supply has been established.

The ordeal of water scarcity did not break Crimea; on the contrary, the region was able to promptly begin to meet the challenges faced by the newly-formed Russian region.

"The water blockade of Crimea did not lead to the disastrous results our enemies hoped for. The water needs of the peninsula's population and guests for domestic and drinking needs have been fully met," stressed Sergey Aksenov, head of the Republic, during his annual report on the Council of Ministers' activities in 2018. - In five years, more than 173 million cubic metres of water have been supplied to the region's reservoirs".

The food supply was cut off



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The water blockade has not led to the desired effect for Ukraine and it has made its next move. This time, Kiev appears to have "checkmated" the peninsula's food security.

On September 8, 2015, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada and leaders of the Russian-banned organisation "Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people"* Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov said.

it was necessary to stop trade turnover with the peninsula. Dzhemilev announced preparations for a so-called "peaceful transport blockade" on the border between Kherson Region and Crimea. All Ukrainian patriots were urged to join the action. A week later, Russian-banned extremist organisation Right Sector* announced its intention to join the upcoming blockade. Later, the Kherson police said that they

were preparing to ensure law and order at the blockade and to provide the protesters with everything they needed.

While some officials from the rostrum in Kiev publicly "pitied" Crimeans and called for help to overcome the difficulties of the so-called "occupation", others tried in every way to isolate the peninsula from the outside world. Considering that Ukrainian goods were still actively supplied to Crimea at that time, the radicals took a drastic decision - to cut off the supply of products to the peninsula. The Russian side responded immediately, saying that the peninsula was not afraid of these threats and that only the Ukrainians themselves would be made worse off by the organisers.

"You didn't have to be a very smart state official to go along with it. In fact, they did not impose food blockade on us but on their producers. Everyone who grew their own vegetables, fruits and produced their own goods - they were simply deprived of the market. For us, however, this was an incentive to quickly replace and increase the productivity of our Crimean market," Senator Sergey Tsekov recalled.

However, Kiev has not heard the call for common sense . At noon on 20 September 2015, concrete checkpoints and a tent camp were set up at the Chongar checkpoint. Thus began the trade blockade of the peninsula. The following trucks into Crimea were blocked by radical Crimean Tatar representatives, who were joined by civic activists and members of volunteer battalions. All this with the tacit consent of the Ukrainian police.

Later, roads to the Chaplynka and Kalanchak checkpoints were blocked. The blockade only applied to trucks carrying goods to and from Crimea, which led to repeated clashes between truckers and activists. Personal vehicles were initially allowed through the border unimpeded, but later Right Sector members* began to inspect cars as well, checking the documents of people crossing the border and checking them in the database of the scandalous website "Mirotvorets".

In the first hours after the blockade began, trucks began to pile up at the checkpoints, and queues numbered in the hundreds. The transporters tried for some time to talk sense into the radicals, but they remained adamant that Ukraine would not feed and support the "traitors of the motherland". For his part, Petr Poroshenko said that the rally was held to "restore state sovereignty as soon as possible over Crimea". And the head of the Mejlis*, Refat Chubarov, stressed that the main goal of

this blockade was to demonstrate "to the whole world that Russia must pay for the upkeep of Crimea until it withdraws from there"



© RIA Novosti . Maks Vetrov

However, Kiev's calculations did not come true. Firstly, the republic's counters were already full of Russian goods, and there was plenty to choose from. Secondly, during the first days of the trade blockade more than 30 retail chains of the peninsula and the government of Crimea signed a memorandum on limitation of the prices. In addition, The Russian Federation did its best to provide the "cut off" peninsula with everything necessary through the Kerch ferry crossing. Despite the calls of the official authorities to boycott the region, a number of Ukrainian manufacturers tried their best to maintain trade relations with the peninsula and transported products via detour routes - by ships across the sea and through the Russian territory.

Experts believe the economic blockade was actually an attempt to control trade with Crimea where wages, pensions and effective demand increased sharply during the year. However, the attempt failed - the peninsula did not experience any deficit, continued to actively integrate into Russia, while Ukraine was left with ruins, as it was Ukrainian producers who suffered enormous losses from the blockade. After the first setback, Kiev played the second "card" - at the end of September, the Verkhovna Rada registered a draft law on the complete blockade of Crimea and Donbass. The document regulated the complete closure of railway, freight and bus traffic to these territories. This marked the beginning of the next blockade of the peninsula - the transport blockade.

No planes are flying and no trains are travelling



© AP Photo/Sergei Grits

In fact, Crimea saw the beginnings of a transport blockade back in late 2014, when Ukraine unilaterally halted train traffic across the border with the Russian peninsula. Passenger and freight trains travelling to Crimea ended their route in Kherson Region before reaching the border. The Ukrainian railway transport administration, "Ukrzaliznytsya", explained that it was impossible to ensure passenger safety.

Direct sea and air links between Crimea and abroad were interrupted. Crimeans with Russian passports began to fly abroad from mainland Russian airports. The carriers and owners of bus stations also received letters demanding that they stop selling tickets and carrying passengers on bus routes connecting the Ukrainian mainland with the territory of Crimea. The official bus service to the peninsula has also been terminated.

However, even here, the complete isolation that the Ukrainian side still hoped for did not happen. It was possible to reach Crimea from the neighbouring country, albeit with transfers: by driving through the territory of Ukraine to the border settlements, then by car to the checkpoint, then on foot through the border strip to the checkpoint on the Russian side and from there by any means of transportation through the towns of the peninsula. Later, a more convenient way of crossing the border was found - those who wished to do so could get to Crimea by private transport or use the services of enterprising carriers who drove people in their cars or minibuses. This service quickly became popular among residents of both countries as they had family and friends on both sides of the border. Taxi drivers are still making good money from the Crimea transport blockade to this day - they quickly 'took over' the service of transporting passengers across the border. So this blockade, too, was essentially ineffective in Kiev's attempt to cut off all ties with the peninsula.

Six months of blackout



© REUTERS/ Stringer

The peninsula's third and most severe blockade in a year began in November 2015. At that time, Crimea faced a phenomenon unprecedented in modern history: a group of extremists supported by the Ukrainian authorities blew up electricity transmission towers in the Kherson region and left the entire peninsula without electricity.

As the energy system of Crimea was in deficit in Ukrainian times and the main volume of consumed electricity was covered by overflows from other regions of Ukraine through four high-voltage power lines "Melitopol - Dzhankoy", "Kakhovka - Dzhankoy", "Kakhovka - Ostrovskoe", "Kakhovka - Titan", the peninsula was energy dependent on the neighbouring state. Crimea's own generation was no more than 20-25%, which radical political circles in Ukraine did not fail to take advantage of.

On the night of October 6, 2015, unknown persons damaged a high-voltage pole of one of the transmission lines that supplied electricity to Crimea. At first, the "Right Sector"* denied involvement in the incident and called it "a provocation aimed at discrediting the action to blockade the peninsula". However, the organisation later stood by the supporters of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis*, which is now banned in Russia, who prevented "Dneprenergo" specialists from repairing the power line tower.

In November, radical supporters from various regions of the neighbouring state began to flock to Kherson Region on the border with Crimea. The "Right Sector"* said that it had "received operational information about possible provocations due to the difficult internal situation" in Ukraine. On the night of 20 November, a group of Ukrainian radicals blew up the supports of the Melitopol-Dzhankoy high-voltage

power transmission line in Kherson Region near the border with the peninsula. The Kakhovka-Titan and Melitopol-Dzhankoy lines supplying Crimea are out of order. To clarify the circumstances, the Russian Energy Ministry set up an operational headquarters to supply power to Crimea.

A day later, "Ukrenergo" said that during an inspection of the power lines, experts also found damage on the two remaining lines: a crack in the reinforced concrete pole of the Kakhovka-Ostrovskaya line and damage to the metal structure on the "Kakhovka - Dzhankoy" line. The pylons were surrounded by activists of the so-called Crimean blockade who oppose electricity supplies to Crimea. They blocked the access of repair teams to the damaged power lines, which led to clashes with Ukrainian security forces who arrived on the scene.

And the next night, the peninsula was completely plunged into darkness - on November 22, all Crimean settlements went out of power. This time, all four power lines on the border with the peninsula were blown up, leaving nearly 2 million people without power supply. Lenur Islyamov, a former Moscow businessman who is now the leader of an armed Ukrainian militant extremist battalion and one of the most ardent supporters of the return of Crimea to Ukrainian control, was one of the organisers and sponsors of the attack. The Crimean and Sevastopol authorities introduced a state of emergency. All social facilities on the peninsula immediately switched to reserve power sources, and hundreds of additional diesel generator sets and fuel were transferred to Crimea from all regions of Russia.

The Ukrainian authorities were in no hurry to restore power supply and the peninsula's own generation facilities could not cover the region's needs, so they had to accelerate the commissioning of the power bridge, which had been under construction since April 2015 to connect Crimea to the Unified Energy System of Russia.

The first line was launched in early December, providing Crimeans with 200 MW of Russian electricity. The second was commissioned two weeks later, on December 15, and the third in April 2016. On 11 May 2016, the energy bridge started operating at full capacity - in a video conference, President Vladimir Putin launched the last, fourth string of the energy bridge from Krasnodar Region.

On 18 May, the state of emergency in Crimea was lifted. After Crimea, the state of emergency was also lifted in the hero city of Sevastopol.

The blackout in Crimea, which was organised by Ukrainian extremists and radicals, lasted almost six months. The Crimean prosecutor's office opened a criminal case against its organisers, and the damage caused by their actions was estimated at about 2.5 billion roubles. These six months were a serious test for Crimeans, but the peninsula's residents withstood all the difficulties of the energy shortage with honour.

International recognition in the sanctions regime



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After the reunification of the peninsula with the Russian Federation, the European and US authorities did everything possible to isolate it from the rest of the world. Thus, a large-scale information and political blockade was imposed on the newly-formed entities of Russia - Crimea and Sevastopol.

International media reported with enviable consistency on the "horrors" of the "occupied Crimea". A number of countries announced an international boycott of the Russian peninsula, securing their decision with sanctions and all kinds of restrictions.

However, despite the large-scale information blockade, some European politicians decided to personally check the situation in Crimea and visited the Russian entity. Some of them officially, some with a private visit, and some as part of large delegations.

In the past two years alone, about 100 official foreign delegations have visited the Republic, including from Germany, France, Norway, Bulgaria, the USA and other countries. And all the foreigners have been pleased with the visit, admitting that there is peace and order in the region. After the visits, they admitted that the picture painted in many Western media of what is happening in Crimea is far from reality, and each visit by foreign guests makes a significant contribution to breaking the information blockade of the peninsula.

The number of politicians openly supporting the reunification of the peninsula with the Russian Federation in Europe and other countries is increasing year by year.

More and more often, statements about the recognition of the Russian status of Crimea are heard not from members of the public, but from current officials who hold serious official positions in their states and members of national and European parliaments. This demonstrates that European countries are gradually realising the need to recognise the peninsula as part of Russia and to lift economic sanctions that are harmful to everyone.



© RIA Novosti . Aleksandr Polegenko

"In five years, it has become obvious to all sane people that attempts to isolate Crimea have completely failed. Much credit is due to the people's diplomacy. Last year, the leadership of the Council of Ministers paid official visits to Syria, China, Armenia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Laos and the Donetsk People's Republic. Crimea hosted 25 international events last year alone, - "Sergey Aksyonov said in his annual report to the State Council. - In just five years, representatives of at least half of the world's countries have visited Russia's Crimea, and if private visits are taken into account, of course, even more".

"The biggest blockade Crimea faced was when it was part of Ukraine. Everything was being destroyed then - the economy, infrastructure, agriculture. And all this was happening against the backdrop of creeping Ukrainianisation," Senator from the Republic Sergey Tsekov told RIA Novosti Crimea. - All of this combined has allowed us to successfully overcome the blockades that Ukraine put on us after reunification with the Russian Federation. So much so that we did not perceive Ukraine as our motherland, we considered it more as a stepmother, that when it arranged all these blockades for us, we coped with them very successfully. And they allowed us to quickly solve all the problems that Crimea needed to solve in principle".

**Organisations banned in Russia*

Exhibit U

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimea is ready for a possible food blockade — Aksyonov*
(8 September 2015)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimea is ready for a possible food blockade — Aksyonov* (8 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150908/1100924823.html>.

Crimea is ready for a possible food blockade — Aksyonov



15:19 08.09.2015

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Crimean head of Republic Sergey Aksyonov has dismissed statements by Ukrainian people's deputies Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilyev about a food blockade of Crimea by "Ukrainian activists".

SIMFEROPOL, 8 Sep - RIA Novosti (Crimea). Crimea is ready for a possible blockade, including a food blockade, by Ukraine. The head of the Republic of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, said this at a briefing in Simferopol, commenting on statements by a number of Ukrainian MPs on the need to impose a full blockade of the peninsula, RIA Novosti (Crimea) reports.

"We have always said that we do not want to break the longstanding ties of Crimean economic entities with businesses in Ukraine. Everyone is interested in making these contracts work, and the nationalists want to do something bad to our republic. Crimea is always ready, whether they will block or not. There will be no problems. In my opinion, they are shielding their citizens from allowing positive information about life in Crimea to reach Ukraine," Aksyonov said.

According to him, large Russian companies are currently willing to work in Crimea and are ready to fully provide food supplies to the peninsula. In addition, the Kerch Strait ferry line is operating normally, and cargo flow is stabilised.

"We have no fear of their claims at all. We've been preparing for this for a long time, that citizens having inadequate attitude towards Crimea will try to destabilise the situation at the border in some way. Moreover, this is disadvantageous for Ukrainians from Kherson and Nikolaev regions, who have traditional ties to market products in Crimea," Aksenov said.

On Tuesday, 8 September, Ukrainian people's deputies Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov said at a press conference in Kiev that a "peaceful transport blockade" of Crimea would be held to stop transport links and suspend mass deliveries of food and other goods to the peninsula.

Exhibit V

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Chubarov: Crimea blockade will begin on 20 September at noon*
(16 September 2015)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Chubarov: Crimea blockade will begin on 20 September at noon* (16 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150916/1100997459.html>.

Chubarov: Crimea blockade will begin on 20 September at noon



12:20 16.09.2015

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All three roads leading to the Crimean peninsula will be closed to trucks. Cars and pedestrians are promised to be allowed through unhindered.

SIMFEROPOL, 16 September - RIA Novosti (Crimea). [The goods blockade of Crimea](#) will start on Sunday at noon, Ukrainian people's deputy Refat Chubarov, leader of the unregistered Crimean Tatar Mejlis organisation, said from the rostrum of the Ukrainian parliament.

"On 20 September at 12 noon, we will block all three roads leading from mainland Ukraine to Crimea for trucks transporting goods to Crimea," Chubarov said.

According to him, the restrictions will apply only to trucks travelling from Ukraine to Crimea. Passenger cars and people will be able to move freely. At the same time, the people's deputy said that the action would be long-lasting.

We shall remind you that Crimean Tatar activists in Ukraine have repeatedly announced [the launch of a goods blockade](#).

Exhibit W

RBC, *Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to the Republic*
(22 November 2015)

(translation)

Translation

RBC, *Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to the Republic* (22 November 2015), available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/society/22/11/2015/5651b8cf9a79474f3a9e0f59>.

Shutdown in Crimea: The Threat of an Energy Blockade to the Republic

(Photo: Alexei Pavlishak/TASS)

The power supply to Crimea from Ukraine has been cut off due to the undermining of power transmission towers by unknown assailants. It will take up to two days to restore it if Crimean blockade activists do not obstruct repairs




Outdoor concession stand in one of the walking tunnels in Stroganovka village, Simferopol district

Shutdown in two days

Crimea's maximum demand for electricity is 1,200 MW per day. About 30% of this capacity is provided by its own generation (thermal, solar, and wind power plants), and from 500 to 900 MW, depending on the time of the day, is delivered by transmission lines from Ukraine. Energy purchases there, as well as from Crimean producers, are handled by the Settlement Implementation Centre, a subsidiary of Russia's "Inter RAO". It was allocated a budget subsidy of 10 billion roubles for 2015, of which 8.8 billion had been spent as of 1 November.

The scheme suffered its first failure on Friday. On the morning of November 20, the poles of two power transmission lines (PTL) were blown up by unknown assailants: Melitopol - Dzhankoy (330KW) and Kakhovskaya - Titan (220KW). The remaining two transmission lines took over the supply of electricity to the Crimean peninsula at this point: Kakhovskaya-Ostrovskaya (330KW) and Kakhovskaya-Dzhankoy (330KW). The second failure occurred on Saturday at 23:20 (00:20 Moscow time on Sunday), when "Ukrenergo", the Ukrainian energy company, received a signal that these two lines were also down.

The Crimean energy system



© RBC, 22 November 2015

The source "Ukrenergo" The map: openstreetmap.org

On Sunday morning, the Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that electricity supplies to consumers on the Crimean peninsula had been completely cut off. In addition, according to its estimates, there is a risk of disconnection of up to 40 percent of consumers in Kherson and Nikolaev regions. "Household consumers of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (about 1.9 million people) were left without electricity supply. The capacity of the disconnected consumers is 673 MW," the Russian Energy Ministry reported on Sunday.

No one has claimed responsibility for undermining the pylons. In late September, one of the initiators of the civil blockade of Crimea from the Ukrainian side, people's deputy of Verkhovna Rada Refat Chubarov, promised to de-energise the peninsula. Since 20 September, Crimean Tatar activists, supported by the representatives of the "Automaïdan" movement, "Right Sector" (an organisation banned in Russia), and other Ukrainian organisations have been blocking the movement of Ukrainian commercial vehicles into the peninsula.

One of the leaders of the Crimean Tatars, people's deputy Refat Chubarov, wrote in his Facebook account on Saturday that participants in the Civil Blockade of Crimea demanded that the authorities take effective measures aimed at protecting the rights of Ukrainian citizens "living in the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea". "As such a measure... appears to be the termination/restriction of electricity supplies from mainland Ukraine to occupied Crimea," Chubarov wrote. According to "Interfax-Ukraine" news agency, activists of the Civil Blockade of

Crimea movement posted photos of the fallen pylons on social media on Sunday morning, but did not claim any involvement in the incident, suggesting that it was "the work of saboteurs".

In an interview with "Interfax-Ukraine", one of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar movement, people's deputy Mustafa Dzhemilev, said that on Saturday he discussed with Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko "the incident between participants in the "blockade of Crimea" and law enforcers". The latter demanded that energy workers be allowed to access the damaged power lines in order to ground them, but blockade activists did not allow the repairmen to the pylons.

President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatsenyuk have not yet commented on the situation. Internal Affairs Minister's adviser and people's deputy Anton Gerashchenko said that he believed it was necessary to discuss the energy blockade of Crimea in parliament, but so far there have been no official statements on the issue.

The Ukrainian side did not give an exact deadline for eliminating the accident and restoring power supply on Sunday. The management of "Ukrenergo" said that it had started negotiations with the participants in the Crimean energy blockade "on the possibility of carrying out repair works". Dmitriy Marunch, co-chairman of the Ukrainian Energy Strategy Foundation, told RBC that two days would be enough to repair the blown-up power line poles if the activists do not block the repairs. According to Marunch, the poles of the power lines, which supply electricity to Crimea, will be restored in any case, as they also supply Ukrainian regions.

According to "Ukrenergo", in order for the situation in Crimea to normalise, it is enough to restore one of the transmission lines that feeds Crimea with a capacity of 330 kilowatts; then the peninsula will be able to receive 500-550 megawatts per day through it. For now, the Ukrainian energy sector has promised to notify the buyer of electricity, a subsidiary of "Inter RAO", about the force majeure.

Crimean Deputy Energy Minister Evgeniy Demin told "RIA Novosti" that fuel reserves for mobile power plants in Crimea will last for 25 days. In 2014, Russian Emergencies Minister Vladimir Puchkov reported that his ministry had sent about 1,400 mobile stations to the peninsula. In addition, nine large mobile gas turbine power plants (GTTPs) with a total capacity of 241 MW have been sent to Crimea from Sochi. "Currently, all reserve power sources are engaged in Crimea, all social infrastructure is connected, but it is impossible to increase the number of mobile stations and diesel generators - the peninsula's entire demand cannot be covered this way," a source in the republic's Energy Ministry told RBC.

No boilers and no fridge

The peninsula authorities have decided that street lighting will not work during dark hours "for the sake of economy". Crimean head Sergey Aksyonov also warned the region's residents about possible disruptions in the work of mobile communications and the Internet. Simferopol authorities said, that rolling blackouts in the city might last for up to nine hours. The Crimean capital has also turned off heating, however city head Gennadiy Bakharev said that this was due to the warm weather: the city recorded a temperature of plus 18 degrees on Sunday.

Crimean Industrial Policy Minister Andrei Skrynnik said Sunday afternoon that "according to operational monitoring, most retail businesses as well as retail markets continue to operate and have sufficient stock to meet consumer demand in full, despite restrictions on electricity supplies." Natalya Kashcheyeva, a spokeswoman for the agency, later noted that many retailers "are finding a way out by connecting to backup power sources".

The association "Assistance to Trade of Crimea" estimates are more pessimistic: according to its data, more than half of the chain shops in Crimea - at least 50 outlets - are without electricity. "Of these, only 5% are now operating on backup power supplies," says association chairman Sergei Makeyev. - But it is too early to talk about any serious losses for retailers: everyone has freezers, so that everyone can make it through the day. The general mood among the population is calm, there is no panic, no one is asking to go back to Ukraine. We do not notice an increase in demand for any goods".

Of the 13 shops of the "Yabloko" grocery chain, only two in Simferopol are not operating at the moment, director of the chain, Tatyana Pikalova, told RBC. "Two shops - one in Kerch and one in Evpatoria - are running on diesel. In Simferopol we have eight shops, only two are not working because the others are in areas where there is electricity," she said. - We have stored all the goods in freezers and will be able to keep them cold for the next eight to nine hours," she said. Authorities have kept us informed of the current situation. We are promised that within today the situation will improve and a schedule of rolling blackouts will be drawn up."

"At night we had power outages, now everything is working," Yanina Pavlenko, general director of Massandra winery, told RBC. - We will adjust our work to the blackout schedule. Ukraine has cut off our electricity supply before, so we are used to it".

Cable from Russia

The only way to make Crimea independent of Ukrainian energy supplies is to connect the peninsula to the Russian energy system. It was reported in July that the Energy Ministry had signed a state contract on the construction of a power bridge to Crimea. The total cost of the project (it includes four cable lines and the construction of two power plants in Crimea) exceeds 47 billion roubles, including value added tax. In 2015, 9.5 billion roubles was allocated to the project. The client is the Russian Energy Agency (part of the Ministry of Energy), and the main contractor is the "Engineering and Construction Management Centre of the Unified Energy System", a subsidiary of the Federal Grid Company.

How the energy bridge works

Four cable lines with a length of 13.5 km each will be laid on the bottom of the Sea of Azov. The cables will be laid at a depth of 8-18 m. The total area of the corridor in the water area of the strait will be 202.5 ha.

At the same time, the United Power Grids of the South will be prepared to serve the Crimean energy system. It is a question of building 500KW high-voltage lines Rostovskaya-Andreyevskaya-Vysheblyevskaya (Taman) and Kubanskaya-Vysheblyevskaya. The 500KW Kubanskaya substation will also be expanded and the 500KW Vysheblyevskaya substation will be built.

The construction of the energy bridge is being carried out in two stages. The first phase of the work should be completed by early 2016, Crimean Deputy Energy Minister Evgeniy Demin told reporters in October, and it will provide the peninsula with 300-400 MW of energy. "The cable for the power bridge has almost been laid, but in order to launch it, the infrastructure around it is still needed, so the urgent commissioning is out of the question now," a source close to the Ministry of Energy familiar with the details of the project told RBC.

The second stage, as the official said in an interview with kerch.com.ru a month ago, will be completed in the summer of 2016 (the deadline may be pushed back to 2017. - RBC) and will make it possible to supply a total of 600-800 MW to Crimea. The additional generation is to be provided by Rostov Atomic Power Station. Once the two new thermal power plants with a total capacity of

about 900 MW start operating (the first stage is scheduled for 2017), the peninsula will become energy-independent from Ukraine.

With the participation of Polina Khimshiashvili

Exhibit X

Vgorode, *“Right Sector” Joins Crimean Blockade* (23 September 2015)

(translation)

Translation

Vgorode, *"Right Sector" Joins Crimean Blockade* (23 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.vgorode.ua/news/sobytyia/269908-k-blokade-kryma-prysoedynylsia-pravyi-sektor>.

"RIGHT SECTOR" JOINS CRIMEAN BLOCKADE



Photo from <https://www.facebook.com/kivailva?fref=ts>

EVENTS 23 September 2015 08:00

Author: Aleksandra Zaloznaya

Ukrainian nationalist organisation "Right Sector", which takes part in the goods blockade of Crimea, has blocked the bypass earth-roads to the peninsula.

- Our fighters have blocked unpaved roads to Crimea, which had so far been used to bypass checkpoints and roadblocks," the organisation's press service said.

"Right Sector" clarified that the organisation's reconnaissance with the help of local residents found and took control over several secondary roads.

- They were not used by trucks, but by buses with contraband. We are looking further," the Right Sector commented.

We shall remind you that roads for cargo coming from Ukraine to Crimea have been blocked since 20 September, the "Krym Media" agency has reported.

Exhibit Y

Voicesevas.ru, *“Right Sector” announces that “Azov” has joined Crimean blockade*
(1 October 2015)

(translation)

Translation

Voicesevas.ru, "Right Sector" announces that "Azov" has joined Crimean blockade (1 October 2015), available at: <https://voicesevas.ru/news/17124-pravyy-sektor-soobschil-cto-azov-prisoedinilsya-k-blokade-kryma.html>.

"Right Sector" announces that "Azov" has joined Crimean blockade, Golos Sevastopolya - Novorossiia news, situation in Ukraine today

Fighters of the "Azov" battalion have joined the goods blockade of Crimea, the press service of the "Right Sector" extremist movement banned in Russia said on Thursday, 1 October, "RIA Novosti" reported.



© "RIA Novosti"

"The Crimea blockade has been joined by "Azov" fighters, who are setting up their tents at the Chongar checkpoint right now. According to the commander of the newcomers' group. "Azov" fighters will also stand at the Chaplynka and Kalanchak checkpoints in the future," the agency quoted the press service as saying.

We shall remind you that the goods blockade of the peninsula started on 20 September.

Exhibit Z

Moskovskiy Komsomolets, *Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea*
(14 January 2016)

(translation)

Translation

Moskovskiy Komsomolets, *Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea* (14 January 2016), available at: <https://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/01/14/poroshenko-priznalsya-chto-koordiniruet-blokadu-kryma.html>.

Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea

Photo: Natalia Gubernatorova

Poroshenko admits he is coordinating a blockade of Crimea

At his first press conference of the year, the Ukrainian President revealed to whom he had handed over his factories

In his first press conference of the new year, President Petr Poroshenko admitted that he was coordinating the actions of the organisers of the Crimea blockade.

"When we say that the blockade of Crimea is currently enforced by civic activists, we have to admit that they are doing their very important job. I meet regularly with representatives of the Crimean Tatar people - both Mustafa Dzhemilev and other activists - not just to support, but to coordinate actions. That is why the Russian government decided to ban the movement of trucks".

The president also made the Ukrainians feel happy: he finally made a decision on his chocolate business. According to Poroshenko, he signed an agreement to transfer his stake in Roshen to an independent trust. This trust will be managed by a respectable foreign bank, which will own, control and manage the assets. Poroshenko recalled that "blind trust" standards are used by US and European politicians in similar situations. According to him, this is the only tool for eliminating conflicts of interest, moreover, the "blind trust" obtains the authority to sell the corporation if it finds a worthy buyer. If you translate what Petr Alekseyevich said from the ornate to the simple language - the Roshen corporation may never be sold in four years. And then Poroshenko will return to managing his property. In the meantime, according to his explanations, Poroshenko has no right to sign the corporation's documents. But the President forgot to say that this does not mean that he will not receive dividends from its business activity.

However, the President also promised some categories of Ukrainian citizens to improve their financial well-being. In particular he promised a 7 thousand salary (in grivnas) to the soldiers-defenders of the Motherland. Those who are at the front line will receive an additional three minimum wages per month in addition to this sum. The year before last, presidential candidate Poroshenko, as you may recall, was talking about a thousand grivnas a day during the campaign rounds. To everyone. But journalists could not find at least one ATO fighter, who actually received this money.

To the rest, Poroshenko has promised that there will eventually be no free medicine in the country. The President did not say what will replace it. And he should have said, considering that one third of Ukrainian families are unable to survive without subsidies.

Exhibit AA

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in Ukraine* (17 September 2015)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in Ukraine* (17 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150917/1101007412.html>.

Nimetullayev: The Blockade of Crimea Is Targeting Crimean Tatars in Ukraine

SIMFEROPOL, 17 September - RIA Novosti (Crimea). Crimea's goods blockade will only affect Crimean Tatars living in Ukraine. This was stated by the head of the regional public organisation "Kyrym Birligi" and the Public Council of the Crimean Tatar people Seytumer Nimetullayev at the press conference at the multimedia press centre of the "Russia Today" news agency in Crimea, a correspondent of RIA Novosti (Crimea) reports.

"We have toured all the shops and counters in Simferopol and nearby areas, there are no problems with food in Crimea, more than 90% of the products are Russian-made. The action that the Mejlis wants to carry out today will only affect Crimean Tatars living in Ukraine. I worked as a collective farm chairman for over 20 years and I know what life is like for Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. The main business is vegetable growing, they grow, sell and that is what their families live on. Growing vegetables is just a part of the job, the main task is to sell them and feed their families", Nimetullayev said.

According to him, residents of Kherson Region, who sell most of their products on the peninsula, are strongly against the blockade. Part of the Crimean Tatars who left for Ukraine after the referendum and settled in Novoalekseevka, according to Nimetullayev, "will never support this action".

"The Crimean Tatars, who have been living in Ukraine since 1967 until today did not support the Mejlis. Only 3-5 percent supported it and ran for office. The population of Kherson oblast itself has never been for it, did not support its policies, did not govern the Crimean Tatars either then or now", stressed the head of the Public Council.

"This statement by Mustafa Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov is provocative in nature and deeply cynical, because if we talk about interrupting the supply of occupant troops, as they believe, then I am deeply confident that Russia will provide its troops, if necessary anywhere on earth, anytime. And the statement itself is directed against their own Crimea, Crimeans and their own people, which is based on the principle "let me stop feeding you and you will start loving Ukraine for it", the deputy head of the Crimean Tatar Public Council, Enver Kantemir-Umerov, added.

According to Kantemir-Umerov, some Crimean Tatars who were disappointed with the policies of Ukrainian leaders returned to the peninsula. This was also facilitated by the fact that the heads of the unregistered organisation Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars and the Ukrainian authorities did not fulfil the promises they made to the Tatars who moved to Ukraine. Nimetullayev stressed that the majority of Crimean Tatars still have not found a solution to the problem of housing and employment.

"Promising something does not mean actually doing it. No building is given, nothing. Today they live in the state institutions where there used to be tabors, people without flats, without employment", - said Nimetullayev.

According to the leaders of the Crimean Tatar Public Council, "all Crimean Tatars have the road home".

Exhibit AB

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border*
(17 September 2015)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border* (17 September 2015), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20150917/1101007975.html>.

Crimean Tatars Want to Meet Chubarov and Dzhemilev at the Border



13:34 17.09.2015

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Crimean Tatars living in Crimea have expressed a wish on social media to travel to the border with Kherson Oblast and personally express their outrage at the food blockade to Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev.

SIMFEROPOL, 17 September - RIA Novosti (Crimea). Crimean Tatars living in Crimea intend to go to the Kherson region and personally express their opinion to Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev, who are the initiators of the goods blockade of Crimea. This was announced on Thursday at a press conference in Simferopol by Remzi Ilyasov, chairman of the “Kyrym” movement and deputy speaker of the Crimean parliament, RIA Novosti (Crimea) reports.

“I know that there are a lot of different statements on this topic in social networks, with which it is difficult to disagree. A person is free to make his or her own choice as long as he or she does not break the law. If people really go there, I support this action. Why not go and tell them to their faces (Chubarov and Dzhemilev - ed.) that we do not need them and do not have to decide for us”, Ilyasov said.

He also urged Crimeans to remain calm.

“I appeal to all residents of Crimea in connection with the planned so-called food blockade, to remain calm, order and respect each other, regardless of nationality, with the understanding that Crimea is our common home,” Ilyasov stressed.

Exhibit AC

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish Military Instructors in Ukraine* (5 March 2016)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Speak Out About Turkish Military Instructors in Ukraine* (5 March 2016), available at: <https://ria.ru/20160305/1385199067.html>.

Crimean Authorities Speak Out about Turkish Military Instructors in Ukraine

SIMFEROPOL, 5 March - RIA Novosti. Crimean Deputy Prime Minister Ruslan Balbek has said that specially trained Turkish military instructors are in Kherson Region of Ukraine, whose task is to train mercenaries for combat operations.

“We have reliable information that quite a few military instructors from Turkey have arrived in the Kherson region of Ukraine. As of today, they are trying to set up a training ground there for mercenaries to conduct combat operations both in open terrain and urban conditions”, Balbek told RIA Novosti.

The hosts, according to the Deputy Prime Minister, are leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. “The task is to create a capable combat unit under the Mejlis”, Balbek noted.

According to him, today the Kherson region, in fact, has become “a place of attraction for international terrorists”. “Radicals from Turkey represented by the extremist group Grey Wolves are brought in, as well as fighters who took part in the war in Syria on behalf of ISIS and in the coups in Egypt and Libya, as well as militants from the Caucasus who are on the federal wanted list,” the Crimean deputy prime minister said.

According to Balbek, Turkish forces in Ukraine are playing an independent game secretly from the Ukrainian authorities, as they are interested in destabilising the internal political situation. “Given the existing collusion between the Mejlis and disgraced Ukrainian oligarchs, including Igor Kolomoyskiy, it is possible that the militants could be turned against the Ukrainian authorities themselves to organise a new Maidan and a new coup d’état,” Balbek told the news agency.

Mejlis is the executive body of the Qurultay, which is a national congress, the highest representative plenipotentiary body of the Crimean Tatar people. Delegates of the Qurultay are elected every five years. The leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, Ukrainian politicians Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev, opposed Crimea’s reunification with Russia and left the peninsula. They were banned from entering Russia for five years in 2014 because of extremist statements inciting national discord.

Exhibit AD

RG.ru, *Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders* (5 March 2016)

(translation)

Translation

RG.ru, Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders (5 March 2016), available at: <https://rg.ru/2016/03/05/reg-kfo/krymskotatarskie-materi-prizvali-nakazat--medzhlis.html>.

Crimean Tatar mothers call on UN to punish Mejlis leaders

Ilya Izotov

“We support the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in calling on Kiev to investigate human rights violations during the blockade of Crimea and arrest their organisers”, the document reads. - We, Crimean Tatar mothers, believe that the blockade of Crimea organised by fugitive Mejlis radicals is a genocide against all Crimeans, and demand that the international community do not allow the Ukrainian authorities to avoid punishing criminals fairly. We ask that they be forbidden to form illegal armed units, which are created on ethnic and religious grounds and are intended for combat operations on the territory of the Republic of Crimea.

Crimean Tatar mothers disassociated themselves from the leaders of the unregistered Mejlis, which speaks on behalf of one of the peninsula's indigenous peoples. Through their irresponsible actions, the mothers say, these politicians are discrediting the entire Crimean Tatar people.

“The organisers of the war urge Crimean Tatar men to leave Crimea and join a punitive battalion”, the resolution reads. - But this is a call for the destruction of families. Isn't the destruction of the traditional Crimean Tatar family their real aim? It is precisely the calls to leave one's home and join some battalions that have stained themselves with the blood of civilians that show the true aims of the organisers of the blockade of Crimea.”



The presidium members of the forum condemned the actions of radicals in Kherson and Zaporozhye regions who are forcibly recruiting Crimean Tatars into punitive battalions. According to the resolution, sensible Crimean Tatar men do not succumb to this agitation, which is why radicals and militants from Turkey and Syria, who pretend to be Crimean Tatars, are now being actively brought to Ukraine.

“Our people worked painstakingly to create institutions of national self-government, and now they have been discredited by the extremist and destructive activities of pseudo-leaders. Once again, they

are trying to use us as a bargaining chip. For whom and why should we fight? We value the lives of our loved ones. We do not want to mourn our sons, brothers and husbands who were killed for obscure slogans.

- We will not give up our children and we will not let grief into our homes. The mothers of Crimea are against such calls. No to war, no to terrorism!”, said a member of the presidium of the forum Aliye Finenko.

About 500 Crimean Tatar women from different cities and regions of Crimea took part in the forum.

We shall remind you that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has published in Geneva the 13th UN report on the situation of rights and freedoms in Ukraine. The document covers events in the country from 16 November 2015 to 15 February 2016. Its authors note that as a result of Kiev's blockade of goods, as well as the bombing of power lines by nationalists in November 2015, the rights of the most vulnerable segments of the peninsula's population have been infringed upon. The report also states that the “civil blockade” of Crimea was carried out by activists “who illegally performed law enforcement functions”. The summary calls on the authorities in Kiev to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed during the so-called blockade of Crimea.

Exhibit AE

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the Mejlis* (31 March 2016)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *The Crimean Inter-Ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the Mejlis* (31 March 2016), available at: <https://ria.ru/20160331/1400577129.html>.

17:59 31.03.2016

The Crimean Inter-ethnic Committee Will Support the Prosecution of the Mejlis



© RIA Novosti / Sergey Malgavko

The actions of the Mejlis to blockade Crimea and organise armed and extremist illegal groups do not give it the right to be called Crimean Tatar, the head of the Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of Crimea, Zaur Smirnov, has said.

SIMFEROPOL, 31 March - RIA Novosti. The State Committee for Inter-Ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of Crimea will support the prosecution side in court in the case to recognise the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people as an extremist organisation and ban it on Russian territory, the head of the Committee, Zaur Smirnov, said.

The Supreme Court of Crimea has moved to consider the merits of an administrative lawsuit to recognise the Mejlis an extremist organisation and ban it on the territory of the Russian Federation. The lawsuit was filed by the republic's prosecutor, Nataliya Poklonskaya. To a large extent, the statements and actions of the leaders of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev were the basis for the lawsuit. The defendant is First Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis Nariman Dzhelyal, who represents the interests of the association in Crimea.

In doing so, the court brought in the State Committee for Inter-ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of Crimea as a new party to a case.

“We will fully support the prosecution side, we are preparing all materials. I believe that the Mejlis has lost the right to be called Crimean Tatar,” Smirnov said at a meeting with Crimean head Sergey Aksyonov.

In his opinion, the actions to blockade Crimea and organise armed and extremist illegal formations with the participation of the Mejlis have long given it no right to be called Crimean Tatar. “I am sure that such an organisation in Crimea and in the Russian Federation should be banned, we will stand up for this point in court,” Smirnov said.

The Mejlis is the executive body of the Qurultay (national congress), which identifies itself as the representative plenipotentiary body of the Crimean Tatar people. The leaders of the Mejlis, Ukrainian politicians Refat Chubarov and Mustafa Dzhemilev, opposed Crimea’s reunification with Russia and left the peninsula. They were banned from entering Russia for five years in 2014 because of extremist statements inciting national discord. Both politicians have also organised goods and energy blockades of the peninsula.

Exhibit AF

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance from Disgrace”* (29 September 2016)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance from Disgrace”* (29 September 2016), available at: <https://ria.ru/20160929/1478161775.html>.

18:55 29.09.2016

Crimean Authorities Call Judgement on Mejlis “a Deliverance from Disgrace”



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Crimea has finally got rid of the disgraceful phenomenon called the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, which is linked to sabotage and crimes against Crimeans, Crimean government member Zaur Smirnov claimed.

SIMFEROPOL, 29 September - RIA Novosti. Crimea has finally got rid of the disgraceful phenomenon called the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, which is linked to sabotage and crimes against Crimeans, Crimean government member Zaur Smirnov told RIA Novosti.

Russia’s Supreme Court on Thursday ruled that the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People is an extremist organisation and banned its activities in Russia.

“Crimea has finally got rid of the disgraceful phenomenon represented by the Mejlis, which Crimeans associate exclusively with extremism, sabotage, energy, goods and transport blockades”, Smirnov said.

Furthermore, he said, the decision to ban is shared by the majority of Crimean Tatars who do not want to be associated with the “criminal Mejlis”.

“Today is a landmark day, because the Crimean Tatars will no longer be identified with a criminal organisation that has solely taken on the right to speak on behalf of the entire nation,” Smirnov stressed.

“The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people” has been recognised as an extremist organisation and banned in Russia in April this year by a decision of the Crimean Supreme Court. The ban was initiated by Crimean prosecutor Nataliya Poklonskaya, who accused Mejlis leaders of organising an energy blockade of Crimea through sabotage.

Exhibit AG

SK Consol-Stroy, *Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New Residential Building for Repatriates* (21 April 2015)

(translation)

Translation

SK Consol-Stroy, *Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New Residential Building for Repatriates* (21 April 2015), available at: consolstroy.ru/news/news_post/noviy-dom-dlay-repatriantov.

SK Consol-Stroy | Bakhchisaray Celebrates Commissioning of a New Residential Building for Repatriates



Bakhchisaray celebrates commissioning of a new residential building for repatriates.

In Bakhchisaray, on 21 April 2015, on the first anniversary of the Day of the Revival of the Rehabilitated Peoples of Crimea, the keys to the flats in the new 70-apartment residential building at 5 Mira Street were solemnly handed over.

The event was attended by the Head of the Government of the Republic of Crimea - Sergey Aksyonov, Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea - Vladimir Konstantinov, as well as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea - Ruslan Balbek, Deputy Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea - Remzi Ilyasov, Chairman of the State Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens of the Republic of Crimea - Zaur Smirnov, Head of Bakhchisaray District Council - Refat Dardarov, Head of Bakhchisaray City Administration - Vladimir Verkhovod.

Welcoming the happy owners of the keys to the new flats, Sergey Aksyonov reminded of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On measures for the rehabilitation of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples and state support for their revival and development” signed exactly one year ago.

“Today's event proves that the Crimean Tatar people together with Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Germans in our multinational Crimea have returned to their historical homeland - Russia, to their home, where the country takes care of its people, its citizens. This is the first initiative - a home for the deportees, for those who have been on the waiting list for a long time, desperate for housing: these are families with many children, in dire need of housing. And now, finally, justice has been served,” said the Head of the Republic.

According to his information, in pursuance of the presidential decree on the rehabilitation of citizens deported on ethnic grounds, which was signed on 21 April 2014, 112 million roubles were allocated from the national budget to put the apartment building into operation.



The Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea, Vladimir Konstantinov, congratulated those present and said: “We have occupied 18 flats today. In total there are 70 flats in the building. The rest are drawing up documents, dealing with the queue. The house will be inhabited within one month,” he added: “This is social housing, nevertheless, the level is decent. So that people can live and not need anything. Getting a flat is a very important event in everyone's life, especially if one has been waiting for years.”

According to him, the construction and commissioning of the house meant for the repatriates is only the beginning of a big journey: “Today we are presenting not so much the house as the implementation of the programme, which costs 10 billion roubles. It will make it possible to solve the problems of settling the deported citizens and provide them with housing”.

“This is the first, by no means the last, house commissioned in Bakhchisaray” - assured Vladimir Konstantinov. Recall that the house was built and put into operation in execution of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation and within the framework of the development programme, for which 10 billion rubles were allocated until 2020.

The Head of the State Committee of Crimea on Interethnic Relations and Deported Citizens Zaur Smirnov reported that in the nearest future 160 Crimean Tatar families, who have been on the waiting list for 25 years, will receive keys to new flats in Simferopol and Bakhchisaray. This will close the housing needs of the repressed peoples by 70%.

After the welcoming speeches of the responsible persons and the ribbon-cutting ceremony, the keys to the flats were handed over to the Crimean Tatar families. Sergey Aksyonov and Vladimir Konstantinov handed over the keys to the coveted flats to the rehabilitated citizens registered in the city

Exhibit AH

RIA Novosti (Realty), *90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to New Flats*
(12 December 2016)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Realty), *90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to New Flats* (12 December 2016), available at: <https://realty.ria.ru/20161212/408195455.html>.

09:29 12.12.2016

90 Crimean Tatar Families in Simferopol Receive Keys to



new flats

© РИА Новости / Сергей Мальгавко

The keys to 90 flats in a multi-storey building in Simferopol have been handed to Crimean Tatars, who have been on the waiting list for decades as victims of deportation, the newcomers were congratulated by the head of the Crimean republic, Sergey Aksyonov, and the head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, Igor Barinov.

SIMFEROPOL, December 12 - RIA Novosti, Maxim Groznov. The keys to 90 flats in a multi-storey building in Simferopol have been handed to Crimean Tatars who have been on the waiting list for decades as victims of deportation, the newcomers were congratulated by the head of the Crimean Republic, Sergey Aksyonov, and the head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, Igor Barinov.

"This programme - on the rehabilitation of the deportees is operated by presidential decree. The state provides people with flats free of charge under the program. Today 90 families are receiving flats," Aksyonov said.

The flats are free of charge; they come with finish work and everything needed for living. If any flaws or defects are found in the finishing works of the new housing, the Crimean leader

recommended the new residents to contact the state authorities and promised an immediate appropriate response. The newcomers at the ceremony applauded the commissioning of the house.

A total of 180 families have received housing under the programme this year in Crimea, and 450 families have received housing since the start of the programme in 2014, the Crimean leader said. However, there are about seven thousand families in Crimea as a whole on the waiting list for housing under the programme, the republican authorities said.

"People have been waiting for this for many years, for instance, a woman said - 18 years. Crimea has received some problems from the past. Presenting people with flats is realisation in practice of promises that the state made to those who suffered from deportation," Igor Barinov, head of the Russian Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, said at the ceremony to present the keys to the flats.

Ten billion roubles will be allocated to implement the programme in 2020. The money will be used to build housing, linear and social facilities, and infrastructure.

Exhibit AI

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants of “Protest Glades” in Crimea Is Going* (23 January 2020)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti (Crimea), *How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants of “Protest Glades” in Crimea Is Going* (23 January 2020), available at: <https://crimea.ria.ru/20200123/Kak-idet-protsess-vydeleniya-zemli-uchastnikam-polyan-protesta-v-Krymu-1117887486.html>.

How the Process of Allocating Land to the Participants of “Protest Glades” in Crimea Is Going



19:46 23.01.2020

© RIA Novosti Crimea. Aleksandr Polegenko

SIMFEROPOL, 23 January - RIA Novosti Crimea. The process of allocating land plots to participants of the so-called "protest glades" in Simferopol and the Simferopol district is almost complete, the chairman of the state committee for interethnic relations, Albert Kangiyev, said at a press conference at the multimedia press centre of the “Russia Today” news agency in Simferopol.

“Regarding the ‘protest glades’ today, the issue has been practically resolved for Simferopol and the Simferopol district, except for the protest glade near General Vasiliev Street. A solution to the problem has not been found there yet,” the head of the State Committee on Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea said.

According to Kangiyev, this year the authorities plan to "start active actions" to provide land to participants of the "protest glades" on the South Coast of Crimea.

"The issues there are much more complicated. There are 13 protest glades in Bolshaya Yalta alone, and due to the lack of available land there is nowhere to move them and no alternative land plots can be offered. Nevertheless, we are aiming at solving this problem," he said.

At the same time, the head of the agency found it difficult to say how many participants in the "protest glades" have already received alternative land plots.

Exhibit AJ

Government of the Republic of Crimea, *The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea*
Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the allocation of land plots free
of charge for ownership (24 August 2021)

(translation)

Translation

Government of the Republic of Crimea, *The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the allocation of land plots free of charge for ownership* (24 August 2021), available at: <https://rk.gov.ru/ru/article/show/13015>.

The Ministry of Property of the Republic of Crimea Informs Citizens Participating in the “Glades of Protest” about the Allocation of Land Plots Free of Charge for Ownership

The orders are ready for 203 applicants

The Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the Republic of Crimea informs citizens participating in the "protest glades" about the allocation of land plots owned by the state of the Republic of Crimea free of charge for individual residential development.

The relevant decisions of the Ministry of Property of Crimea were taken in respect of 203 applicants.

“We are talking about the issue of extracts from the corresponding order to the citizens, who had previously applied with the necessary list of documents, and in respect of whom the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea made a decision to determine the plots of land that are in state ownership of the Republic of Crimea to be provided to citizens for free ownership for individual residential development. The land plots are located on the territory of Kamyshinka village of Chistenskoye rural settlement of Simferopol region”, - said the Minister of Property and Land Relations of the Republic of Crimea Larisa Kulinich.

The documents are issued at the following address: Simferopol, Sevastopolskaya Street, 17, from Monday to Friday from 9.00 to 18.00 (break from 13.00 to 14.00). Please call +7978 9139380 or 8 (3652) 550-724 to check the readiness of your documents.

We also remind you that on the basis of received documents, citizens need to carry out the state registration of ownership in accordance with current legislation.

Earlier, extracts from the order of the Ministry of Property were ceremoniously received by 8 citizens participating in the protest.

According to the press service of the Ministry of Property and Land Relations of the Republic of Crimea

Exhibit AK

*TASS, In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously Deported Citizens
Have Been Built in Five Years (18 May 2020)*

(translation)

Translation

TASS, *In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously Deported Citizens Have Been Built in Five Years* (18 May 2020), available at: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/8496051>.

In Crimea Kindergartens and a Residential Building for Previously Deported Citizens Have Been Built in Five Years

SIMFEROPOL, 18 May. /TASS/. Kindergartens for more than 1,000 places, 72-apartment residential buildings, over 70 km of gas, electricity and water supply networks have been built for the formerly deported citizens in the Republic of Crimea over five years. The republic also publishes books in native languages - more than 130 books have been published since the peninsula's reunification with Russia, Elmar Mambetov, First Deputy Chairman of the Republic's State Committee for Interethnic Relations, told TASS.

The Day of Remembrance of the Deported Peoples is celebrated in Crimea on May 18. It was established in 1994 by regional law to commemorate the beginning of the forced relocation of Crimean Tatars from the peninsula in 1944.

“As of 1 April 2020, construction and installation works have been completed on 17 objects: this is the construction of a 72-apartment residential building in Kerch, as well as the construction of four pre-school educational organisations for 260 places each in the districts of Fontany, Lugovoye, Khoshkeldy of Simferopol City, as well as in the Molodezhnoye settlement of Simferopol District,” Mambetov said.

According to him, 9 kilometres of gas pipeline, over 28 kilometres of gas supply networks, over 38 kilometres of electricity networks, and 10.6 kilometres of water supply and sewerage networks have also been built in the Molodezhnoye settlement in Simferopol City and in settlements in Sudak, Belogorsk and Simferopol districts.

By the end of 2020 it is planned to complete the construction of 18.3 km of paved roads in four microdistricts in Yevpatoriya, Simferopol and Simferopol district.

In 2021, the construction of a memorial complex in the Bakhchisaray District, which began to be constructed in 2016 at the Siren station, where the first trains carrying deported Crimean Tatars left on 18 May 1944, is expected to be completed. One of the centrepieces of the complex will be a mock-up of a “teplushka” wagon, similar to the ones used to transport people from the peninsula. The complex also includes an Orthodox chapel and a Muslim mosque. The total cost of the complex is about 378.2 million roubles.

Unity Date

The Crimean authorities will continue to provide assistance to formerly deported peoples and resist attempts to use the deportation tragedy to incite hatred, the republic's head, Sergey Aksyonov, said on his VKontakte page on Monday.

“Today is Memorial Day for the victims of the deportation. This commemorative date unites all Crimeans regardless of nationality. We condemn the deportation of peoples as one of the greatest crimes. We grieve for those who have not lived to return to their homeland and express our deep

sympathy to all our fellow countrymen who have been subjected to repression, their relatives and loved ones. We will continue to resolutely and firmly resist the attempts of the enemies of Crimea to use the tragedy of the deportation to incite hatred and hostility,” Aksyonov wrote.

According to him, the Crimean government continues to work to implement the decree and republican programmes aimed at ensuring interethnic unity. According to the results of last year, Aksyonov noted, the construction of a number of important social facilities, including three kindergartens, has been completed. Energy and transport infrastructure facilities have been built, people have received the keys to new flats, financial assistance to complete individual housing and improved their living conditions.

Aksyonov noted that a number of socially significant projects in the sphere of settling the representatives of the rehabilitated peoples, despite the situation with the coronavirus, will be implemented this year as well.

The First One in 100 Years

In Crimea, books in native languages have begun to be actively published. Since 2014, according to Mambetov, 136 books have been published with a total circulation of 54,600 copies in Crimean Tatar, Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Bulgarian and Greek.

“The number of publications and the volume of books published increases every year. While in 2015 11 books were published with a total circulation of 5,700 copies, in 2019 there are already 36 books with a circulation of 15,500 copies,” he said.

"The Dictionary of the Crimean Tatar Language of 1916" is being prepared for publication for the first time this year. One of its compilers, Doctor of Philological Sciences Ismail Kerimov, who is director of the research centre for the Crimean Tatar language, literature, history and culture at the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University named after F. Yakubov, told TASS that the 520-page dictionary consists of more than 14,000 words.

“What makes it interesting is that it is the first edition of a dictionary of the Crimean Tatar language in Arabic. There really was no such dictionary. They tried to publish it in 1916 and later, but didn't succeed,” Kerimov said. The fact is that until 1928, all books in the Crimean Tatar language were published in Arabic script. From 1928 to 1938, the Crimean Tatar alphabet was converted to the Latin alphabet, and from 1938 to the present day the Cyrillic alphabet has been used.

In 2020, the republic also plans to publish 30 books in Russian, Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian and Armenian languages with the total circulation of 10,800 copies at the expense of the budget. Among them there is a photo album about twice Hero of the Soviet Union, pilot Amet-Khan Sultan, collections “Crimean Tatar Women in the Great Patriotic War”, “Contribution of the Repressed Peoples of the USSR to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War”, “Crimean Tatar Music of Professional Composers” and others.

Main Mosque

A Cathedral Mosque is under construction in Simferopol and is expected to open next year. Deputy Mufti of Muslims of Crimea Aider Ismailov told TASS that the exact deadline for the mosque's completion has not yet been set due to the coronavirus situation. The mosque is 85% ready.

Preparations for the painting are underway: framings (mukarnas), niches in the walls (mihirabs) and other elements are being installed. Turkish specialists are involved in the works for stone, marble and further painting.

According to the project, the mosque will have a total area of 5.7 thousand square meters, and a capacity of 2.6 thousand people. The structure consists of two parts - the main building with a dome and a courtyard with colonnades and a place to perform ablution before performing namaz. Construction of the mosque began in October 2016. Its opening is one of the most anticipated events for Crimean Muslims.

According to the Spiritual Administration of Muslims, four to five mosques have been opened annually in Crimea since 2014. If six years ago there were 304, now there are 354. Old mosques of the 17th-19th centuries are also being restored.

Aid to Crimea

In addition to assistance programmes for rehabilitated peoples, the region is implementing the federal targeted program for the socio-economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol, which was adopted in 2014. It is designed to modernise engineering, transport and social infrastructure. Its total financing, taking into account recent adjustments, amounts to 961.2 billion roubles.

In 2020, a total of 242 facilities are planned to be implemented under the federal targeted program in Crimea. This is a major repair of houses of culture, public roads in Kerch, reconstruction and overhaul of two collectors of deep outlet in Alushta, Rybachie, Alupka and Partenit, the development of urban planning documentation totaling more than 77 billion roubles.

Earlier, in March, the head of the republic, Sergey Aksyonov, reported that the amount of funds for road repairs in the Crimea, following an order from Russian President Vladimir Putin, has increased to about 20 billion roubles, which will bring more than half of all roads in the region to normal condition by 2022.

On deportation

From 1941 to 1944 more than 200,000 Crimean Tatars, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians and Italians were deported from the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. In 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared illegal and criminal the repressive acts against the peoples who had been forcibly resettled in the regions of Siberia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

According to the State Committee on Interethnic Relations of the Republic of Crimea, 268,700 of the deported (rehabilitated) peoples of Crimea live in the region, including Crimean Tatars - 260,100, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Germans - 8,600.

The news has been amended (09:27 Moscow time) - details have been added in paragraphs 7-10.

Annex 18

Expert Report of Alexei Stanislavovich Avtonomov, 28 February 2023

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**

(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

**EXPERT REPORT OF
ALEXEI STANISLAVOVICH AVTONOMOV**

28 FEBRUARY 2023

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A. INTRODUCTION

1. I am the Vice-rector of the Institute for International Law and Economics named after Alexander Griboedov and a head of its International Law Chair. I have a degree in Law equivalent to LLD received from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations in 1984 and a degree equivalent to Doc. Hab. received from Institute of State and Law (Russian Academy of Science) in 1999 (confirmed by the Higher Attestation Commission in 2000), a degree of Professor of Law in Russia from the State University of Humanitarian Sciences in 2003 and a degree of Professor of Law in Kazakhstan from the Academy of Law named after Dinmukhamed Kunaev. I am an author of more than 390 publications in Russia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Romania.
2. I worked in the Moscow Institute for International Relations, Institute of State and Law (Russian Academy of Science), Higher School of Economics, Institute for Legislation and Comparative Law Studies, a guest professor at the Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada, 1994), at the Kazakh National University named after Al-Farabi (Almaty, Kazakhstan, 2012).
3. I am attorney-at-law since 2011.
4. I have been a member of various international bodies in the field of international human rights promotion and protection: 2003-2020 – member of the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter – the “**CERD**”) (within the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter – the “**ICERD**”)); 2004-2008, 2010-2012, and 2014-2020 – member of the working group on early warning and urgent measures procedure (2014-2016 – chairperson of the working group); 2008-2010, and 2014-2016 – vice-chairperson; 2012-2014 chairperson; 2016-2018 – rapporteur; 2016-2020 – member of the working group on individual communications (which performed also functions of the working group on inter-states communications since 2018); 2014-2015 – Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, Focusing also on Intolerance Against Christians and Members of Other Religions (Switzerland-2014, Serbia-2015); 2014-2022 – an expert of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism; 2021-2022 – a member of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

5. I am also a member of Russian national bodies in the field of domestic human rights promotion and protection: 2015-now – member of the Civic Collegium on Mass Media Complaints; 2017-now – member of an Expert Scientific Council of the Commissioner on Human Rights of Russian Federation.
6. In this Report, I would like to review the Ukraine’s Memorial and Reply in the case concerning application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and ICERD, as well as the experts reports by Professor Robert Magocsi (Second Report), Professor Sandra Fredman and Professor Martin Scheinin annexed thereto, and address the following issues of international human rights law:
 - (a) Are common political purposes and loyalties attributes of an ethnicity?
 - (b) The requirement of proving “systematic comparing of racial discrimination” in this case under the ICERD.
 - (c) Can there be limitations of human rights under the ICERD? Is the practice of other international bodies constituted under different treaties relevant in the context of the ICERD?
7. In this Report, based on the study of the ICERD and other documents related to practice of its application, as well as on a comparison with some other international human rights instruments, I am going to show that a common political purpose or political loyalty is not a characteristic of an ethnic group. The position of the ICERD in this regard is clear-cut. I am going to demonstrate that replacing the research of the ICERD with the study of other international human rights instruments leads Professor Fredman and Professor Scheinin to the wrong conclusions, as they constantly stray from the consideration of such a specific phenomenon as racial discrimination to a discussion of general problems of human rights or approaches typical for other branches of international law (for international criminal law, for example), but distinct from approaches characteristic for the international law of human rights in the field of elimination of racial discrimination. I am going to show that in this case the establishment of “systematic campaign discrimination” is required. I am going to clarify that the ICERD requires limitations of certain human rights, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly etc., in order to halt and prevent racial (including ethnic) discrimination and to promote anti-discrimination struggle.

B. ARE COMMON POLITICAL PURPOSES AND LOYALTIES ATTRIBUTES OF AN ETHNICITY?

8. In paragraph 48 of her First Report, Professor Fredman suggests that “a common political purpose might be an aspect of ethnicity”¹. But she does not support her conclusion with any quotations. In a footnote on page 21, she cites some general comments that ethnic minorities should be able to participate in the development and adoption of decisions that affect them. But in this point there is a substitution of concepts: since access to participation in politics and in government, which is the right of any person, regardless of ethnicity, differs from political monolithic identity by analogy with cultural identity, which is one of the characteristics of an ethnic group (the analogy between cultural identity and political identity as a sign of an ethnic group is drawn by Professor Fredman in paragraph 45). Any social group – youth, women, carpenters, farmers, entrepreneurs, children, sailors, persons with disabilities, engineers, etc. – should have the right to participate in politics, especially in development and adoption of decisions affecting them, but it does not mean that all these social groups are ethnic.
9. I am not aware of any case in the CERD practice of an individual or a group of individuals claiming certain ethnicity on the basis of his/her or their common political goals or common political views. There is no case of the CERD’s recommendations recognizing any group as an ethnic one in accordance with this group’s common political goals.
10. Professor Fredman cites the UN Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities², which provides for the right of those persons to set up an association, and believes that it is equal to political identity as a feature of an ethnic group. But an association may be created by any social group. An association is not the same organization as a political party³.
11. An association promotes certain relatively narrow interest and as such can affect some policies within the scope of its activity by lobbying, for example, while a political party has a global vision of problems and challenges and in case of coming to power should govern

¹ First Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman, p. 20, ¶48. *See* Memorial, Annex 22.

² *Ibid.*, p. 6, fn. 14.

³ F. Capotorti, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, *STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES*, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (United Nations Publication, 1979), p. 35, ¶209, available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/903/66/PDF/NL790366.pdf?OpenElement>.

taking into account interests of sundry social groups, including ethnic groups, expressed by various associations.

12. Quite in opposite of what Professor Fredman says, the CERD considers a situation of concern if political parties are based on ethnic belonging. For instance, in its Concluding Observations of 2009 on a periodic report of Ethiopia, the CERD states: “The Committee notes that political parties in the State party are largely structured on ethnic lines. The Committee is concerned that the above arrangements, in the specific circumstances of the State party, have the potential to contribute to an increase in ethnic tension”⁴. “The Committee recommends that the State party encourage the development of integrationist multi-racial organizations, including political parties, in line with the provisions of article 2, paragraph 1 € of the Convention”⁵. Earlier, in 1994, members of the CERD “welcomed Senegal’s obvious commitment to human rights”⁶ upon having received information from Senegal that “article 3 (1) of the Constitution stated, inter alia, that no political party or association was allowed to identify itself with a particular race, ethnic group, sect, language or religion”⁷. The CERD is equally concerned about ethno-territorial entity. In its Concluding Observations of 2007 on Ethiopia’s periodic report, “the Committee is concerned that the decentralized system of ethnic federalism adopted by the State party through its constitution could lead to the displacement of persons, as well as increase tensions between ethnic groups in regions where ethnic coexistence is a demographic feature”⁸. In this connection “the Committee recommends that the State party ensure that the system of ethnic federalism serves to protect the rights of all ethnic groups and promote peaceful coexistence amongst them. The CERD further recommends that the State party provide information on the measures taken to combat racial prejudices and intolerance

⁴ CERD, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations No. CERD/C/ETH/CO/7-16, 7 September 2009, ¶13, available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FCO%2FETH%2FCO%2F7-16&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ CERD, Report No. A/49/18, 19 September 1994, ¶335, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=A%2F49%2F18&Lang=en.

⁷ *Ibid.*, ¶334.

⁸ CERD, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding observations No. CERD/C/ETH/CO/15, 20 June 2007, ¶16, available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FCO%2FETH%2FCO%2F15&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

between ethnic groups”⁹. So, the CERD, according to its long-standing position, does not accept ethnically monolithic parties or States.

13. The CERD disregards requests by certain non-governmental organizations in their alternative reports, which suggest that the CERD should recommend, in its concluding observations, to a relevant State Party to lift the legislative prohibition of mono-ethnic parties (for instance, in 2008, while dealing with a periodic report of Moldova).
14. In reality people belonging to one ethnic group may join different political parties or might be apolitical, and this does not affect their ethnic belonging. People of the same ethnic origin may live in different countries and be loyal to those countries where they live. The most obvious example is the Republic of Korea and Korean People’s Democratic Republic. There are two States, but the people living in both States are the same people, – Koreans. The CERD does not distinguish between Koreans, coming to Japan from different countries, recommending that their rights as ethnic immigrants be respected without distinction of the State of their origin, namely the Republic of Korea or the Korean People-Democratic Republic. In its Concluding Observations of 2018 on a periodic report of Japan, the CERD refers to Koreans as such without specifying the State of their origin¹⁰. In particular, the CERD recommends that Japan “eliminate the permit requirement prior to departure for some permanent residents so that they may enter and exit the country in the same manner as other permanent residents”¹¹. Previously, when there were two German States: the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and both were States Parties to the ICERD, and the CERD never put under question belonging of the majority of population of each of these States to the same German ethnos, while distinguishing the distinct political identity of citizens of each of the abovementioned States, in particular bearing in mind the differences between the socialist country (the German Democratic Republic) and the non-socialist one (the Federal Republic of Germany). Thus, in 1981, by analyzing a periodic report of German Democratic Republic members of the CERD “expressed satisfaction at the replies given in the report to questions raised during the consideration of the previous report

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ CERD, Concluding observations No. CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11 on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Japan, 26 September 2018, ¶21-22, available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FJPN%2FCO%2F10-11&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, ¶34(f).

and at the ample information on internal and international measures aimed at combating racism and racial discrimination” but “pointed out, however, that the report placed too much emphasis on ideological considerations”¹². Considering a periodic report of Federal Republic of Germany in 1981, members of the CERD “noted with satisfaction that the report had been prepared in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Committee and represented a serious effort to reply to questions raised in connexion with previous periodic reports and to give effect to the provisions of the Convention”¹³, but “the facts showed that both the membership and the number of groups engaged in terrorism and adherence to neo-Nazi ideas had increased”¹⁴. The CERD gave distinct recommendations to each mentioned State in order to assist to resolve their problems resulted from different political, social and economic orders of those States, with which their citizens were identified, not challenging the common ethnic identity of the majority of citizens of the States concerned.

15. There are a lot of other, probably, less obvious examples. Thus, Quechua and Aymara live predominantly in Bolivia, Peru, and partially in certain neighbouring countries. In 2010, the Government of Bolivia decided to construct a highway through a territory of indigenous peoples and national park under the name in Spanish of Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécuré (hereinafter – the “**TIPNIS**”). The Government planned to improve the transport communication between certain regions of territorial department of Beni and Cochabamba. However, communities of indigenous peoples (Chimán, Yuracaré, and Moxeño) living there strongly opposed it. In 2011, there were organized political manifestations and rallies, a march to La Paz, clashes between police forces and protesters took place. Two ministers of the Government, who belonged ethnically to indigenous peoples, resigned to demonstrate their support of indigenous communities of the TIPNIS. Finally, a law (No. 180 of 24 October 2011) was adopted prohibiting the construction of a highway thorough this territory¹⁵. But then the Government organized direct consultations with the TIPNIS communities of indigenous peoples. It appeared that many members and

¹² CERD, Report No. 18, No. A/36/18, Report of German Democratic Republic, ¶135, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=A%2F36%2F18%28SUPP%29&Lang=en.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Report of Federal Republic of Germany, ¶326.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Report of Federal Republic of Germany, ¶331.

¹⁵ L. Farthing, B. Kohl, *Evo's Bolivia: Continuity and Change* in JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES (University of Texas Press, 2014), p. 52-54.

even leaders of a considerable number of communities were not against in principle of that highway construction. They had certain fears, doubts and hesitations, but they were not absolute opponents. During the mentioned consultations the fears were allayed, the doubts and hesitations were overcome and, meantime, construction plans were corrected and adjusted to meet the wishes of communities' members. As a result of the consultations, 55 of 65 communities residing in the TIPNIS consented to the construction of a highway through this territory¹⁶. In 2017, a Law No. 969 "On the Protection, Integral and Sustainable Development of the Territory of the Indigenous Peoples of the Isiboro Sekure National Park" (Ley de Protección, Desarrollo Integral y Sustentable del Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécore) of 13 August 2017 was approved, lifting the unequivocal ban for this highway construction. Meanwhile, a group of irreconcilable opponents of this construction remained. So, it appeared that persons belonging to the TIPNIS indigenous peoples had in reality different opinions regarding the decision of the Government. Meanwhile, the hard-line opposition to the highway construction was supported by a number of environmentalists, who were not members of the TIPNIS indigenous communities' members. Therefore, the same political purpose has divided the indigenous communities of the TIPNIS.

16. Accordingly, I find that the Professor Magocsi's study of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and their allegedly common desire to live within a separate political state (however illuminating that study is) completely irrelevant to the process of defining ethnicity within application of the ICERD, for such "common" political purpose can never serve as a characteristic of any ethnic group.
17. **Conclusion.** Based on the above, the position of the CERD is that a common political purpose is not a characteristic of an ethnic group, and political loyalty as well as a common political purpose does not serve a ground for an ethnicity. This position is clear and generally accepted.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

C. THE REQUIREMENT OF PROVING "SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION" IN THIS CASE UNDER THE ICERD

18. In paragraph 6 of the Second Report, Professor Fredman seeks to deny the requirement of proving a “systematic campaign of racial discrimination” in the case under consideration. In the Professor Fredman’s view, it somehow follows from the fact that “Article 1(1) of the ICERD defines "racial discrimination" as a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race which has "the purpose or effect" of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of rights and freedoms”¹⁷. This approach is misleading, since allegations of violations of Article 1 maybe of different nature. Some allegations pertain to individual instances of violations others refer to systematic campaigns. According to the ICERD and CERD the former are subject to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, while the latter are exempt from such a rule. The requirement to prove “systematic campaign” follows from the CERD’s practice.
19. In the case *Qatar vs. the United Arab Emirates*¹⁸, the CERD stated the following:

“The Committee notes that the allegations of the Applicant State refer to measures, "undertaken as part of a policy ordered and coordinated at the highest levels of government, represent a generalized policy and practice". To substantiate their conflicting views on the requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the States parties concerned invoke a multitude of factual elements which can only be verified at the stage of the examination of merits of the communication. Moreover, *the Committee considers that exhaustion of domestic remedies is not a requirement where a "generalized policy and practice" has been authorized.*”

20. The same approach was taken in the case *State of Palestine vs Israel*¹⁹, where the CERD stated the following:

“Against this background, the Committee considers that the allegations of the applicant refer to measures taken as part of a policy ordered and coordinated at the highest levels of government, which may amount to a generalized policy and practice with regard to a range of substantive issues under the Convention. *The Committee considers that exhaustion of domestic remedies is not a requirement where a generalized policy and practice has been authorized.* In

¹⁷ Second Expert Report of Professor Sandra Fredman, ¶7. See Reply, Annex 5.

¹⁸ *Qatar v. the United Arab Emirates*, Document No. CERD/C/99/4 on Admissibility of the Inter-state communication submitted by Qatar against the United Arab Emirates, 30 August 2019, ¶40, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CERD/CERD-C-99-4.pdf>.

¹⁹ *State of Palestine v. Israel*, Document No. CERD/C/103/4 on Inter-State communication submitted by the State of Palestine against Israel: decision on admissibility, 17 June 2021, ¶63, available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2F103%2F4&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

line with the jurisprudence of regional human rights commissions and courts, the Committee considers, however, that it is not sufficient that the existence of such a generalized policy and practice is merely alleged; rather, prima facie evidence of such a practice must be established.”

21. As I understand, a “systematic campaign of racial discrimination”, has been alleged in this case and on the basis of this allegation the rule of the exhaustion of the local remedies therefore has not been applied. In accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation, as reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties the words “systematic” and “campaign” are to be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. To understand the meaning of the mentioned words, it is necessary to refer to dictionaries.
22. The term “systematic” in the Webster New World Dictionary has two meanings: “**1** of a system” and the second belongs to the field of physiology and, therefore is not relevant for the present Report. So, in the same Dictionary “system” is defined as follows: “**1** a set or arrangement of things so related or connected as to form a unity or organic whole [*a solar system, school system, system of highways*] **2** a set of facts, principles, rules, etc. classified or arranged in a regular, orderly form so as to show a logical plan linking the various parts **3** a method or plan of classification or arrangement **4a**) an established way of doing something; method; procedure **b**) orderliness or methodical planning in one’s way of proceeding **5a**) a body considered as a functioning organism **b**) a number of bodily organs acting together to perform one of the main bodily functions [*the digestive system*] **6** a related series of natural objects or elements, as cave passages, rivers, etc.”²⁰; seventh meaning relates to chemistry, eighth to crystallography, ninth to geology and thus are not relevant for the present Report. Oxford Student’s Dictionary of Current English gives such a definition of “system”: “**1** group of things or parts working together in a regular relation: *the nervous–; the digestive–; a railway–*. **2** ordered set of ideas, theories, principles, etc.: *a – of government; a computer–*. **3** organization: *You mustn’t expect good results if you work without–*”²¹. So, both dictionaries show that “systematic” derived from “system” means nothing more than something organized, arranged, and when carried out by humans or their organizations, then in accordance with a logical plan (therefore, with a certain goal and

²⁰ V. Neufeldt, D. Guralnik, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1988), p. 1359.

²¹ A. Hornby, OXFORD STUDENT’S DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (OUP, 1984), p. 665.

intention) from linked or connected or related components (parts) to form a unity or an organic whole.

23. The term “campaign”, according to the Webster New World Dictionary, signifies “**1** a series of military operations with a particular objective in a war **2** a series of organized, planned actions for a particular purpose, as for electing a candidate”²². Oxford Student’s Dictionary of Current English defines “campaign” as follows: “**1** a group of military operations with a set purpose, usually in one area. **2** series of planned activities to gain a special object: *an advertising-*”²³. So, any campaign to be recognized as such, as a campaign, should be a series of planned, i.e. organized with a specific target and intention, actions to achieve a particular purpose.
24. Thus, a word “systematic” underlines the purposefulness of linked and intentional series of actions making a campaign, which itself is a set of interrelated actions built in accordance with the plan, united by a single aim and intention. Therefore, based upon meaning of the words “systematic” and “campaign”, any systematic campaign (including a systematic campaign of racial discrimination) can be assessed and recognized as such in case of detection and proof of intentionality of linked actions planned and arranged to achieve a specific purpose (for example, to discriminate against a particular ethnic group). Scattered actions, regardless of their number, according to the meaning of the words “systematic” and “campaign” shown above, cannot be a systematic campaign, unless the interconnection of such actions organized and arranged according to a single plan with a specific purpose and intention is not established and proven.

D. CAN THERE BE LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE ICERD? IS THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES CONSTITUTED UNDER DIFFERENT TREATIES RELEVANT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ICERD?

25. The arguments and reasoning of Professor Martin Scheinin and the data he cites do not correspond to his conclusions.

²² V. Neufeldt, D. Guralnik, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1988), p. 201-202.

²³ A. Hornby, OXFORD STUDENT’S DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (OUP, 1984), p. 84.

26. Thus, Professor Scheinin states that “[t]he concept of ‘national security’ is recognized in international human rights law as a legitimate aim that may justify necessary and proportionate restrictions upon many human rights” (he refers to Articles 12, 13, 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). “Other per se legitimate aims of public order, (public) health or morals, or the rights of others appear in varying constellations in the limitations clauses of various ICCPR” – Articles 12(3), 14(1), 18(3), 19(3)(a)-(b), 21 and 22(2)²⁴.
27. Then Professor Scheinin argues that the context of counter-terrorism “constitutes a *prima facie* legitimate invocation of national security as a legitimate aim under item (5) of the permissible limitations test”, adding that “[t]here is a large number of international conventions and protocols that impose upon States international legal obligations in the field of counter-terrorism”²⁵. After having explained all this, Professor Scheinin suddenly writes that “even assuming that Russia could demonstrate that its measures meet all other requirements of the permissible limitations test except compliance with other human rights (item 7 in the list presented in paragraph 22 above), Russia’s argument still fails, because a reference to national security or another per se legitimate aim cannot justify a deviation from the ICERD and its absolute prohibition against racial discrimination”²⁶.
28. What does he mean? Does he mean that a mere reference of any person to the fact that he or she belongs to an ethnicity (and everyone belongs to this or that ethnicity) permits the mentioned person to violate human rights of other persons, especially those who belong to other ethnicities, to undermine national security, to commit terrorist acts, etc.? Does he mean that the ICERD as a result of its absolute prohibition against discrimination nullifies all other international human rights instruments?
29. Professor Scheinin believes that “[t]here is no derogations clause or limitations clause in the Convention”²⁷, speaking about the ICERD. It is not true, as Article 5b of the ICERD establishes “the right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual, group or

²⁴ Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, pp. 12-13, ¶24, fn. 22-23. *See Reply*, Annex 7.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13, ¶25.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14, ¶28.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14-15, ¶29.

institution”²⁸, which restricts any person or group or organization to violate the right to security of other people. This provision echoes Article 29.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which stipulates that “in the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due to recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society”²⁹. Article 29.3 adds that “these rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”³⁰. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose principles are developed in the ICERD, is directly referred to in its Preamble and Article 4, according to which “States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas and theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination”³¹. Further, Article 4a insists that to this end States Parties “shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof”³². The use of the modal verb “shall”, which grammatically signifies and even emphasizes the existence of an obligation, testifies to the duty of States to impose appropriate limitations and restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association.

30. Bearing in mind the cited above provisions of the ICERD, the CERD in its General Recommendation No. 35 (2013) “Combating racist hate speech” advised States Parties: “13. As article 4 is not self-executing, States parties are required by its terms to adopt legislation to combat racist hate speech that falls within its scope. In the light of the provisions of the Convention and the elaboration of its principles in general recommendation No. 15 and the

²⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, THE CORE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (United Nations, 2006), p. 61, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/coretreatiesen.pdf>.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 60-61.

present recommendation, the Committee recommends that the States parties declare and effectively sanction as offences punishable by law:

- (a) All dissemination of ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred, by whatever means;
 - (b) Incitement to hatred, contempt or discrimination against members of a group on grounds of their race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin;
 - (c) Threats or incitement to violence against persons or groups on the grounds in (b) above;
 - (d) Expression of insults, ridicule or slander of persons or groups or justification of hatred, contempt or discrimination on the grounds in (b) above, when it clearly amounts to incitement to hatred or discrimination;
 - (e) Participation in organizations and activities which promote and incite racial discrimination”³³.
31. So, the CERD encourages States Parties to introduce criminal liability for above mentioned deeds, which are, in fact, limitation of the freedom of speech in order to achieve the goals of the ICERD.
32. Absolute prohibition of racial discrimination means that each human being independently of her or his “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” (Article 1.1 of the ICERD) has the same rights, freedoms, obligations, responsibilities as any other human being independently of his or her “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”. In terms of responsibility that means that if any person independently of her or his “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” individually or collectively (along with other persons) commits an offense against the law such a person will be liable to the law in proportion to her or his guilt, as any other person, and won’t be exempted from liability solely on the ground of a particular “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”. If there are allegations that a person or a group of persons are on trial and are convicted because of his/her or their specific

³³ CERD, General recommendation No. 35 on Combating racist hate speech, No. CERD/C/GC/35, 26 September 2013, p. 4, ¶13, available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G13/471/38/PDF/G1347138.pdf?OpenElement>.

“race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” such allegations cannot be presumed, but must be supported by facts.

33. Professor Sheinin in his Report, on the one hand, cites cases of the application of the Russian anti-extremism statute (Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 “On Combating Extremist Activities”), which relate to organizations set up by people of different ethnic origin in different parts of Russia, on the other hand, among many organizations created by Crimean Tatars could find the only one prohibited judicially while enforcing the anti-extremism statute. Therefore, he failed to prove that the application of this law discriminates against a concrete ethnic group within the framework of the ICERD.
34. Professor Scheinin in his Report (paragraph 34) recognizes that “[t]he word ‘extremism’ has gradually made its way into international policy documents, usually in the qualified form of ‘violent extremism’ or, more complete formulation, ‘violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism’ or ‘violent extremism that can lead to terrorism’ (footnotes omitted)”³⁴. But in reality, the term ‘extremism’ in various word combinations is intensively used in the 21st century at the level of international organizations and at the national level. It is possible to add some examples to only two mentioned by Professor Scheinin. Thus, on 12 February 2016 the UN Secretary-General presented to the UN General Assembly the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. This Plan of Action was welcomed by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution A/70/674. In the same year, on 7-8 April, the Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism – The Way Forward was held³⁵. At the UN General Assembly (Seventy-Fifth Session, 89th Meeting) on 6 July 2021 (GA/12344) speakers stress need to address root causes of terrorism, violent extremism amidst fallout from pandemic, as General Assembly continues debate on global strategy³⁶. The Sixteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member States in Countering the Threat reads (1 February 2023): “The United Nations and the African Union organized two meetings of a joint technical working group on preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism and countering terrorism to strengthen coherence, coordination and

³⁴ Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, p. 18, ¶34. *See Reply*, Annex 7.

³⁵ United Nations, Office of Counter-Terrorism, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, available at: <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/plan-of-action-to-prevent-violent-extremism>.

³⁶ United Nations, Meetings Coverage of the seventy-fifth session, 89th meeting, No. GA/12344, 6 July 2021, available at: <https://press.un.org/en/2021/ga12344.doc.htm>.

cooperation, inform joint analysis and develop recommendations to address the threat of terrorism in Africa”³⁷.

35. It is noted on the Website of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (dated back to March 2019) with the reference to the UN Security Council that “states have an obligation under international human rights law to protect individuals from terrorist acts and incitement of such acts motivated by extremism and intolerance”, complying simultaneously with the international human rights standards³⁸. Experts also use the term ‘extremism’ in the international context: for instance, article by Louis Rene Beres “Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption, and Irrationality”³⁹, by Aisha Javed Qureshi “Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism. A National Issue Within a Global Context” (“In the United States, terrorists are usually associated with one of the six most commonly known ideologies: right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, environmental extremism, nationalist/separatist extremism, religious extremism, and single-issue extremism. Further, the nature of radicalization and types of extremist attacks are dynamic, changing from year to year and from decade to decade”)⁴⁰, by Heather Ashby “Far-Right Extremism Is a Global Problem. And it is time to treat it like one” (“Over the course of the 2000s, right-wing extremist ideas were mainstreamed as they permeated political parties and influenced politicians”; analysis of the roots and consequences of several attacks including of Breivik’ attack in Norway in 2011, racist attacks in South Carolina, US in 2015 and in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, etc.)⁴¹. These are just some examples that show an understanding at the international level of the importance of preventing extremism and combating extremism.

³⁷ CERD, Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General No. S/2023/76 on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 1 February 2023, p. 12, ¶58, available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2023%2F76&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

³⁸ K. Lavery, ANTI-EXTREMISM LAWS (US Commission on International Religious Freedom, March 2019), p. 1, available at: https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20Extremism_0.pdf.

³⁹ L. Beres, *Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption, and Irrationality* in CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Volume 39, Issue 3, 2007-2008, p. 709-730, available at: <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=jil>.

⁴⁰ A. Qureshi, *Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism, a National Issue Within a Global Context* in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE JOURNAL, 14 August 2020, available at: <https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism>.

⁴¹ Foreign Policy, *Far-Right Extremism Is a Global Problem* (15 January 2021), available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/far-right-extremism-global-problem-worldwide-solutions/>.

36. In paragraph 39 of his Report⁴², Professor Scheinin finally turns to the document directly connected to the ICERD, to the CERD’s Concluding Observations of 2017. But he touches upon these Concluding Observations superficially. Paragraph 11 of the CERD’s Concluding Observations of 2017 does not support conclusions of Professor Scheinin: although Concluding Observations describe the legal definition of extremist activity as “vague and broad” the concern is expressed “that such broad definitions can be used arbitrarily”⁴³, nevertheless, the use of the modal verb “can” emphasizes ability, but not certainty. The CERD does not advise repealing the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activities”. So, the CERD does not assess the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activities” in whole as a problematic and proposes only to make corrections in the wording of the definition of extremism connecting it directly with Article 4 of the ICERD, and as it was mentioned “the Committee recalls the mandatory nature of article 4, and observes that during the adoption of the Convention, it ‘was regarded as central to the struggle against racial discrimination’⁴⁴, an evaluation which has been maintained in Committee practice”⁴⁵.
37. Professor Scheinin makes an unfounded conclusion that the assessment of Russia’s anti-extremism law by the CERD in paragraph 11 of Concluding Observations of 2017 “provides further support to conclude that, since 2014, the law had become a tool for suppressing protest and dissent by Crimean Tatars and members of the Ukrainian ethnic community in Crimea”⁴⁶. However, neither Crimean Tatars, nor members of the Ukrainian ethnic community are mentioned in paragraph 11 of the CERD’s Concluding Observations of 2017, nor is Crimea mentioned in paragraph 11. The CERD never hesitates to indicate in its concluding observations a specific ethnic community or group, which, in the CERD’s opinion, is considered to be discriminated against. Since the CERD did not designate

⁴² Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, p. 22-23, ¶39. *See Reply, Annex 7.*

⁴³ CERD, Concluding observations No. CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic reports of the Russian Federation, 20 September 2017, ¶11, available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FRUS%2FCO%2F23-24&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

⁴⁴ General recommendation XV on Article 4 of the Convention (1993) in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty No. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.8, 8 May 2006, p. 248, ¶1, available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=HRI%2FGEN%2F1%2FRev.8&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

⁴⁵ CERD, General recommendation No. 35, No. CERD/C/GC/35, 26 September 2013, p. 3-4, ¶10. Available at: <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=CERD%2FC%2FGC%2F35&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>.

⁴⁶ Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, pp. 22-23, ¶39. *See Reply, Annex 7.*

Crimean Tatars members of the Ukrainian ethnic community (in Crimea) as discriminated against in paragraph 11 of Concluding Observations of 2017, which is also devoted to the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activities”, it means that the CERD did not detect the use of the Russia’s anti-extremist statute to discriminate against Crimean Tatars and members of the Ukrainian ethnic community in Crimea. That is why the above-mentioned conclusion of Professor Scheinin is unfounded.

38. Professor Scheinin in his Report gives three examples of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the Court found the violation of provisions of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by Russia through applying the anti-extremist statute⁴⁷. Firstly, it should be noted that three cases, where a court find some fault in a particular instance of the application of the law does not prove anything beyond those particular cases. Secondly, two of these cases – *Yefimov & Youth Human Rights Group v. Russia* (ECtHR App. Nos. 12385/15 & 51619/15, Judgment [Merits] 7 December 2021) and *Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia* (ECtHR App. No. 1413/08 & 28621/11, Judgment [Merits] 28 August 2018) – deal with religious matters and as such are not relevant to the ICERD, in particular the CERD in its Opinion on individual communication No 37/2006 “recalls that the Convention does not cover discrimination based on religion alone, and that Islam is not a religion practised solely by a particular group, which could otherwise be identified by its ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’”⁴⁸.
39. The third example given in Professor Scheinin’s Report is the case *Mukhin v. Russia* (ECtHR App. No. 3642/10). The Judgment on the merits was adopted by the European Court of Human Rights on 14 December 2021 and a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR on the freedom of expression was found, despite the fact that the newspaper “Duel” closed by a Russian court decision had regularly disseminated anti-Semitic publications. In these publications a pejorative name for Jews – Yids (жиды) – was used. The Judgment of the ECtHR contains some excerpts from those publications. One of such examples is as follows:

“The media regulator commissioned a report from a panel of linguists about the material published on 4 July 2006. On 9 April 2007 the panel concluded that the following parts of D.’s text constituted calls for undermining the national

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23, fn. 40.

⁴⁸ *A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark*, Opinion No. CERD/C/71/D/37/2006 of 8 August 2007, Communication No. 37/2006, ¶6.3, available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2F71%2FD%2F37%2F2006&Lang=en.

security of the Russian Federation; statements aimed at inciting ethnic and religious discord (рознь) as well as social discord combined with calls to violence; statements aimed at debasing the dignity of the Russian nation (русская нация); statements calling for the full destruction of the Russian State and people of Jewish and Russian ethnicity: ‘All those people are corrupt, went crazy, became morons, chauvinists and patriotic bourgeois ... All fully support and actively strengthen their bastard Yid (жидовская) army of Russian slaves and Jewish generals, their bloody dogs of cops and FSB officers; their frantic ‘Israeli’-type patriotism, their rotten church of Satan and Antichrist (Russian Orthodox Church) with its Yid priests and Yid bishops and so on. Only a bunch of nationalists of the Russian blood argue for the total destruction of the Jewish Russia. Russia is a Satanist Russia as even the atheist Limonov stated. It should be fully destroyed. In the name of God and the Aryan Russian nation’’⁴⁹.

40. As one can notice at the end of this citation *Aryan Russian nation* is mentioned, which is an obvious connotation with Nazi and neo-Nazi terminology.
41. The CERD also has experience dealing with cases in which freedom of expression and racist (in particular, anti-Semitic) statements collide. One of these cases is *the Jewish community of Oslo et al. v. Norway*, the Opinion of 15 August 2005. In this case, several Jewish and human rights organizations complained that under the pretext of protecting freedom of speech the Supreme Court of Norway exempted from liability persons disseminating racist statements and appeals. In particular, on 19 August 2000, during a neo-Nazi group march its leader Mr Terje Sjølie (Sjølie) pronounced as follows: “While we stand here, over 15,000 Communists and Jew-lovers are gathered at Youngstorget in a demonstration against freedom of speech and the white race. Every day immigrants rob, rape and kill Norwegians, every day our people and country are being plundered and destroyed by the Jews, who suck our country empty of wealth and replace it with immoral and un-Norwegian thoughts. ... Our dear Führer Adolf Hitler and Rudolf Hess sat in prison for what they believed in, we shall not depart from their principles and heroic efforts, on the contrary we shall follow in their footsteps and fight for what we believe in, namely a Norway built on National Socialism...”⁵⁰ The Committee considered

⁴⁹ *Mukhin v. Russia*, No. 3642/10, Judgment of 14 December 2021, ¶26, available at: <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-213867%22%5D%7D>.

⁵⁰ *The Jewish community of Oslo et al. v. Norway*, Opinion No. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 of 15 August 2005, Communication No. 30/2003, ¶2.1, available at: <https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD67/CERD-C-67-D-30-2003-En.pdf>.

“these statements to contain ideas based on racial superiority or hatred; the deference to Hitler and his principles and ‘footsteps’ must in the Committee’s view be taken as incitement at least to racial discrimination, if not to violence”⁵¹.

“As to whether these statements are protected by the ‘due regard’ clause contained in article 4, the Committee notes that the principle of freedom of speech has been afforded a lower level of protection in cases of racist and hate speech dealt with by other international bodies, and that the Committee’s own General recommendation XV clearly states that the prohibition of all ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred is compatible with the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The Committee notes that the ‘due regard’ clause relates generally to all principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not only freedom of speech. Thus, to give the right to freedom of speech a more limited role in the context of article 4 does not deprive the due regard clause of significant meaning, all the more so since all international instruments that guarantee freedom of expression provide for the possibility, under certain circumstances, of limiting the exercise of this right. The Committee concludes that the statements of Mr. Sjolie, given that they were of exceptionally/manifestly offensive character, are not protected by the due regard clause, and that accordingly his acquittal by the Supreme Court of Norway gave rise to a violation of article 4, and consequently article 6, of the Convention”⁵².

42. It is noteworthy that Professor Scheinin in his Report, which is expected to be devoted to the analysis of the ICERD), is based predominantly on instruments and acts not relating directly to the ICERD. Professor Scheinin in his Report (paragraph 22) writes that his analysis focuses on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “due to its close interrelationship with the ICERD”⁵³.
43. I dare to quote so extensively from the CERD’s Opinion on Communication No. 30/2003 (The Jewish community of *Oslo et al. v. Norway*) just to show that although international human rights bodies act in harmony, their attitudes to limitation of certain human rights, correlation between human rights, which are to be protected, do not coincide completely. That is why conclusions about a particular human rights international instrument cannot be primarily based on a study of the text and practice of applying other human rights international instruments.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ¶10.4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, ¶10.5.

⁵³ Expert Report of Professor Martin Scheinin, p. 10, ¶22. *See Reply*, Annex 7.

Expert

A handwritten signature in black ink, written in a cursive style, reading "Автономов". The signature is positioned above a horizontal line.

Alexei Stanislavovich Avtonomov

Moscow, 28 February 2023

Annex 19

Expert Report of Valery Viktorovich Engel, 28 February 2023

(translation)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF
ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**

(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

**EXPERT REPORT
OF VALERY VIKTOROVICH ENGEL**

28 FEBRUARY 2023

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. I, Valery Viktorovich Engel, have previously prepared an expert report on the issues raised in the dispute with Ukraine in the case concerning the application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter the “First Report”).

A. FIRST REPORT

2. The First Report dealt with an assessment of current threats posed by extremism and radicalisation of society, and how to counter those threats, including in Crimea. In the First Report I came to the following conclusions, in particular:

- (a) Although there are different views on extremism in different countries, there is consensus on its main feature as an activity based on extreme views aimed at destroying *the basic values of society and dismantling existing social and political systems*. There is also consensus that extremism exists in two forms – violent and hateful. Some countries have criminalised only violent extremism (the so-called “American” model), while others have criminalised both violent and hateful extremism, i.e. not only terrorism and everything related to it, but also the incitement of hatred and spreading hateful views (the so-called “European” and “Shanghai” models of countering extremism). The latter include such countries as Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, all the countries of the former Soviet Union, and a number of other countries in Europe and Asia. They proceed from the premise that inciting hatred against certain social groups leads to the radicalisation of the population, which leads to violent extremism and terrorism. This viewpoint is gaining popularity worldwide, as evidenced by recent scientific research.
- (b) The main actors in extremist manifestations are extremist communities and individual extremists who do not belong to any community.
- (c) All of the countries we have monitored have similar methods of countering extremism. These include preventive and precautionary measures, which are generally implemented by law enforcement agencies with the involvement of civil society institutions, social, educational and medical services; measures to thwart

extremist crimes (if they could not be prevented) and protect infrastructure facilities; and measures to deal with their consequences.

- (d) Security requirements over the past 20 years have led to stricter anti-extremist legislation in most countries around the world. All of the countries we have monitored have enacted legislation expanding the scope of such legislation to varying degrees, increasing penalties and extending the powers of special services in combating extremism, including control over the Internet. Besides, immigration rules have also been tightened. Russian lawmaking in that sense has evolved in line with the general trend.
 - (e) An analysis of law enforcement practices in countering extremism shows that they have also evolved in the direction of tightening in all monitored countries. In general, it implied more active and frequent application of controls over the activities of radical organisations in online and offline environments, as well as measures to suppress extremist activity, including arrests and detentions, banning religious, non-governmental organisations and political parties affiliated with extremist groups.
 - (f) An analysis of the ideology, strategy and tactics of the activities in Crimea of the three organizations banned in the Russian Federation, namely Tablighi Jamaat (recognized in Russia as an extremist organization in 2009), Hizb ut-Tahrir (recognized in Russia as a terrorist organization in 2003) and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (recognized in Russia as an extremist organization in 2016), has shown that their prohibition is justified not only under the Russian anti-extremist legislation, but also under international law, as they either seek to destroy the existing socio-political system (dismantling the secular state and replacing it with a religious Islamist state) or support and use blatantly violent terrorist methods to achieve their political goals.¹
3. This Expert Report supplements the First Report and also provides an assessment of some of Ukraine's arguments regarding extremist legislation and law enforcement practices in the Russian Federation as set out in Ukraine's Reply to the Russian Federation's Counter-

¹ Expert Report of Valery Victorovich Engel, ¶¶456-479. See Counter-Memorial (CERD), Annex 22.

Memorial (hereinafter, “Ukrainian Reply”) and in the Expert Report by Professor Martin Sheinin annexed to the Ukrainian Reply (hereinafter, “Sheinin Report”).

B. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE EXPERT

4. I, Valery Viktorovich Engel, am a Candidate of Science (History), a specialist in human rights in international relations, and Head of the Centre for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism attached to the Moscow Institute of Economics. I am also a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Analysis of Right-Wing Radicalism in London (FRAN) and Director of the Institute for the Study of National Policy and Interethnic Relations (Russia), which specialises in research of xenophobia and radicalism within the OSCE area. I am also an Honorary Doctor of the Department of Hebraic Studies at the Sorbonne II University in Paris (1994) and a member of the Global Research Network (GRN) of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) of the United Nations Security Council.
5. I also lead an international research team that has been preparing reports on the state of xenophobia, radicalism, extremism and minority rights violations in Europe since 2012, and have participated in regular expert meetings on right-wing radicalism since 2018 at the invitation of the UNHRC. In 2021-22, I provided advice on anti-Semitism and xenophobia to the Section for Combating Racial Discrimination, Rule of Law and Equality against Racial Discrimination of the UN Human Rights Office.
6. I have extensive personal experience of working with ethnic and religious groups, as I have long worked in various Jewish organizations, was a member of the executive committee of the World Jewish Congress from 1990 to 1995, was vice-president of the Federal Jewish National Cultural Autonomy of Russia, served as executive vice-president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia, where I was engaged, among other things, in combating anti-Semitism and xenophobia, as well as in issues of cooperation with religious organizations and ethnic unions.
7. I have also authored and co-authored 10 monographs and over 60 articles dedicated to minority rights, xenophobia, extremism and radicalism, and analysis of legislative and law enforcement trends in countering those phenomena.

C. STRUCTURE OF THIS EXPERT REPORT

8. Having analysed Ukraine’s arguments, I come to the following conclusions regarding contemporary international law and law enforcement practices relating to extremism in this Report:
 - (a) In **Section II**, I refute the Ukrainian expert Prof. Sheinin’s assertion that national security and other legitimate aims, including combating extremism, cannot constitute grounds for restricting rights that exclude racial discrimination.
 - (b) In **Section III**, I show that, contrary to the claims of Ukrainian expert Prof. Sheinin, countering extremism is a universally accepted goal and justifiable objective that is legitimate from the perspective of the international community. Although there is some divergence between different models of countering extremism, so-called “hateful extremism” is recognized as a threat both in the West (“European model”) and in the East (“Shanghai model”).
 - (c) In **section IV**, I argue that combating “hateful extremism” is a legitimate goal stemming from, among other things, obligations under ICERD, and refute the highly dubious position of Prof. Sheinin that, allegedly, the promotion of interracial and interethnic discord can somehow be an integral part of ethnic origin, and that combating that phenomenon allegedly constitutes “racial discrimination”.
 - (d) In **Section V**, I note that ethnicity does not include political beliefs, including those concerning the statehood of a territory. That issue is discussed in more detail in Prof. Avtonomov's report.
 - (e) In **Section VI**, I demonstrate that the protection of territorial integrity under the Russian law does not discriminate against any ethnic group either in purpose or in effect in the sense of Article 1.1 of ICERD.
9. In **section VII** I show that banning extremist and terrorist organisations has nothing to do with racial discrimination in purpose or effect, and in **section VIII** - that such a ban does not constitute a restriction of the right to freedom of association.

II. COMBATING EXTREMISM CAN BE A LEGITIMATE GROUND FOR RESTRICTING RIGHTS WITHOUT RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

10. First of all, I would like to dispel the unfounded assertion by the Ukrainian expert, Prof. Sheinin, that any reference by the Russian Federation to national security interests or any other legitimate aims, including the fight against extremism, “cannot justify a deviation from ICERD and its absolute prohibition against racial discrimination.” The Ukrainian expert has substituted concepts: the very existence of racial discrimination, according to its definition in Article 1 of the Convention, depends on whether there has been “distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” If human rights have been restricted not because of the above differentiation on racial grounds, but because of legitimate measures taken to protect public interests such as national security, public order and the protection of human rights (which includes combating extremism), then there was no racial discrimination *ab initio*.
11. The text of the Convention confirms the existence of exceptions to the regime it establishes; and Prof. Sheinin himself recognizes this in his report.² The Ukrainian side has also recognised in its Memorial that differential treatment does not constitute racial discrimination where there is an “objective and reasonable justification”³ and has included national security, public order, prevention of crime, protection of public health and protection of the rights and freedoms of others among the possible justifications.⁴
12. Thus, contrary to Prof. Sheinin’s assertion, the above-mentioned legitimate aims, which, as I prove in my conclusions, include the fight against extremism, can constitute a ground for restricting rights without racial discrimination. Moreover, as will be shown below, in some cases such measures are necessary precisely in order to combat racial discrimination and implement obligations under ICERD.

² Reply, Annex 7, ¶12.

³ Memorial, ¶574.

⁴ Memorial, ¶482.

III. INVALIDITY OF THE THESIS ON DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION IS SUPPORTED BY INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE

13. Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin groundlessly declare Russian anti-extremist legislation to be an instrument of racial discrimination:

“a mechanism for targeting not only violent or dangerous actions but also any mobilization or activity of ethnic communities that could be perceived to indicate disloyalty to the central government.”⁵

“The argument presented in Russia's Counter-Memorial that conduct by Mejlis leaders ‘undoubtedly meet the criteria of extremism that are uniformly applied by the [Russian] Supreme Court in all cases without distinction’,” writes Prof. Sheinin, “is irrelevant if the anti-extremism statute is inherently discriminatory, or at least allows for its discriminatory application by targeting groups based on their ethnic origin, or targeting their members, for anti-extremism measures because the criteria for its application are discriminatory or allow for discriminatory application.”⁶

14. In support of his statements, Prof. Sheinin refers to expert Opinion No. 660/2011 (2012) of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (“Venice Commission”, “VC”) based on expert examination conducted in 2011-12.⁷ It should be noted that the conclusions of that Opinion do not correspond to those of Prof. Sheinin. However, before proceeding to the analysis of the Opinion, it is necessary to shed light on the practice of states in the field of countering extremism.

A. COUNTERING EXTREMISM IS A UNIVERSALLY RECOGNISED CHALLENGE, WHILE MODELS OF COUNTERING EXTREMISM MAY DIFFER

15. I wrote about it in detail in my First Report.⁸ There are three main models that guide countries. Prof. Sheinin has not commented in any way on this fact and has not explained why states cannot adhere to one or the other model for their legislation, countering terrorism being an integral part of each of them. They are the so-called “American” model, which criminalises only violent extremism and everything related to it, including

⁵ Martin Sheinin Expert Report Part V, ¶43. *See* Reply, Annex 7.


⁶ *Ibid*, ¶46.

⁷ Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Combating Extremist Activity (20 June 2012), available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2012\)016-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e).

⁸ Expert Report of Valery Victorovich Engel, ¶1. *See* CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.

propaganda, justification, training of terrorists, etc.; the “European” model, which criminalises not only violent extremism, but also so-called hateful extremism, which is understood as the spread of hatred; and the “Shanghai” model similar to European.

Figure 1. Violent and Hateful Extremism in “American”, “European” and “Shanghai” models



16. The “European” model of countering extremism is based on a number of European international documents. These include, first of all, PACE Resolution No. 1344 “Threats Posed to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe” (2003), Article 13 of which calls on Council of Europe member states “to provide in their legislation that the exercise of freedom of expression, assembly and association can be limited for the purpose of fighting extremism” while respecting the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is also PACE Resolution 1754 (2010), which outlines several forms of extremism that it proposes to combat – racism, xenophobia and

intolerance, “in the light of the rise in electoral support for parties inspired by racist ideas”,⁹ as well as Muslim fundamentalism.¹⁰

17. The “Shanghai” definition is similar to the “European” one, but contains a number of distinguishing features. It was formulated on 15 June 2001 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) conference in the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism signed by the participating countries, and then updated in the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism on 9 June 2017. The Shanghai model views extremism as a “violent and unconstitutional” way of resolving “political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts”. In contrast to the European definition, the Shanghai model designates as extremism not only the incitement of racial, ethnic and religious hatred, but also political and social discord.
18. The high likelihood of Prof. Sheinin being a proponent of the “American” model of countering extremism in no way makes other models non-existent and not widely spread around the world. Each model has its advantages and disadvantages. The “American” model focuses on violence but overlooks activities that lead up to it, i.e. spread hatred. The “European” model differs in its broader definition of extremism, which includes “hate speech”, the criminalisation of which prevents the situation from escalating to direct physical violence. The “Shanghai” model of extremism does not differ much from the “European” model, the difference being in the protected groups and the presence of the principle of “constitutionality”, which is interpreted differently in each country depending on the specifics of national legislation.
19. Prof. Sheinin’s attempt to present the American model exclusively as the only one that “enjoy[s] legitimacy in the eyes of the international community” is bewildering. Even the “European” model is adopted in more states and by larger population than the “American” one; while the “Shanghai” model is the most widely spread in terms of population and territory. The fact that Prof. Sheinin denies billions of people the legitimacy of their legal regulation testifies to the blatant bias of his approach.

⁹ PACE Resolution 1454 (2010), ¶2, available at: <https://pace.coe.int/pdf/53f0236cc815b3e4910d3adf1628681fc418a4620b2a2ca7da2cb9ee27a8e2af/resolution%201754.pdf>.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, ¶3.

B. THE MODEL OF COUNTERING HATEFUL EXTREMISM IS USED IN BOTH THE “EUROPEAN” AND “SHANGHAI” DEFINITIONS

20. Countries that take these approaches to countering extremism include all former Soviet republics, including the Baltic States and Ukraine itself, the SCO countries, France, Italy, Germany, Britain (Scotland), Spain and others. These countries are moving away from a model of countering exclusively violent extremism, criminalizing incitement and dissemination of hatred, although they often do not use the term “extremism” as such. This is a given, confirmed by my, and not only my, many years of research, which I cite in the First Report.¹¹ Prof. Sheinin denies those facts, but provides no evidence of other tendencies.
21. As already indicated in the First Report, the position of the aforementioned countries was most clearly expressed by Ms. Sarah Khan, the British government's Independent Advisor on Extremism, who introduced the term “hateful extremism” into legal circulation. In 2019, she set forth her findings in a report entitled “Challenging Hateful Extremism”, in which she characterised it as behaviours:
- (a) that can *incite and amplify hate*, or engage in persistent hatred, or *equivocate* about and *make the moral case* for violence;
 - (b) that draw on hateful, hostile or supremacist beliefs directed at an *out-group* who are perceived as a threat to the wellbeing, survival or success of an *in-group*;
 - (c) that cause, or are likely to cause, harm to individuals, *communities* or wider *society*.¹²
22. Significantly, in support of the need for a broad interpretation of the term “extremism”, the British Commission on Countering Extremism has determined that examples of incitement of hatred against others may include active hate propaganda against minorities “from far right demonstrations in Sunderland or activists from Hizb ut-Tahrir spreading

¹¹ See V. Engel, J. Camus, *et al.*, XENOPHOBIA, RADICALISM AND HATE CRIMES IN THE UN REGION 2018-2020 (Moscow Economic Institute, European Center for Democracy Development, 2021), available at: https://civication.org/pan-european-report/Report_radicalism_2018_2020.pdf; E. Bleich, *The FREEDOM TO BE RACIST? HOW THE US AND EUROPE STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND COMBAT RACISM* (OUP, 2011), Chapter 5, pp. 85-105, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739684.003.0005>.

¹² GOV.UK, *Independent advisor calls for overhaul of extremism strategy* (7 October 2019), available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-advisor-calls-for-overhaul-of-extremism-strategy>

hate-filled views about LGBTQ+ people.”¹³ In other words, the issue is not about threats to individual persons, which would fit well with the “American” model of violent extremism, but about provoking hatred *against social groups* (and not only along ethnic lines). In fact, this is the main difference between the two models.

23. Accordingly, all anti-extremist legislation in countries adopting the “European” or “Shanghai” concept of extremism is built precisely on protecting the rights and freedoms not only of individuals, but also of social groups, as this creates an opportunity to prevent violent crimes against individuals.
24. The “European” model of countering extremism differs from the “American” model in that it includes preventive law enforcement measures, which, as I pointed out in my First Report, include actions to stop the spread of hatred and radicalisation of citizens in online and offline environments. I also gave examples from EU law enforcement practices there, which were not taken into account by the opponents.
25. As already indicated, the “Shanghai” model of extremism in that sense does not differ much from the European model. Its concept of extremism comprises infringement on the constitutional order, which is also considered to be a crime against the state in Western countries, but does not include among the protected groups minorities characterized by gender, age and sexual orientation, and criminalises incitement of discord based on socio-political grounds.
26. Anyway, both the European and Shanghai models are models based on the theory of hateful extremism, when at issue is a social group rather than an individual, and not a specific physical threat, but instigation of hatred against that group.
27. There exist a number of examples of European legislation based on that model. For example, legislation in Scotland was supplemented in March 2021 with the “Hate Crime and Public Order Act”,¹⁴ which criminalised a new separate offence of “Intentionally stirring up hatred” against social groups characterised by age, disability, race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), ethnic or national origin, religion or perceived religious affiliation, sexual orientation, transgender identity and variations of sex

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2021/14/enacted/data.pdf>.

characteristics.¹⁵ The law contains many general terms that allow for judicial discretion, such as “prejudice”, “malice”, “reasonable person's” opinion and “ill-will”, which are not specified in the law.

28. The fact of prejudice is determined here by the victim's affiliation with one of the protected groups. That was characteristic of the British law and of the Anglo-Saxon law in general even before. However, while previously this was an aggravating circumstance for offenders committing crimes against persons belonging to minorities (hate crimes), now the list of such crimes in Scotland has been supplemented with “racially aggravated harassment” or a situation where “it would appear to a reasonable person” that racially motivated harassment, or “stirring up hatred” against a particular social group is taking place.
29. Another example is France. In that country exists Article 212.1 of the Internal Security Code (as amended 24 August 2021), which is directed against organisations that propagate “discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group of persons”. In particular, it provides for the prohibition of activities of those associations and unions
 - (a) that provoke armed demonstrations or violent acts against people or property;
 - (b) that resemble combat groups or private militias by their uniform and organisation;
 - (c) whose goals or actions are aimed at undermining the integrity of the national territory or attacking the republican form of government by force;
 - (d) whose aim is either unification of those found to have collaborated with the enemy, or glorification of such collaboration;
 - (e) that either incite, or promote through their actions, discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or *group of persons* on the grounds of their origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or their true or supposed affiliation or non-affiliation with an ethnic group, nation, supposed race or religion, or the promotion

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, ¶1.

of ideas or theories aimed at justifying or encouraging such discrimination, hatred or violence.¹⁶

30. As we can see, here, too, there exist a number of provisions which can be interpreted quite broadly. For example, “cooperation with the enemy”, “glorification of this cooperation”, “actions which promote discrimination”. At the same time, according to Article 212-1-1, to charge an entire organisation with such unlawful acts, which the law equates to crimes against the state power,¹⁷ the actions of one or several persons belonging to that organisation will be sufficient.¹⁸
31. The French law, as well as legislation of some other countries that follow the model of countering hateful extremism, provides for criminal penalties for such offences. For example, Article 24 of Law No. 2012-1432 “On Security and Combating Terrorism,” criminalised in 2019, prescribes punishment of one year in prison or a €45,000 fine for persons who “have provoked discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or group of persons on the grounds of their origin or their affiliation or non-affiliation with an ethnic group, nation, race or a particular religion.”¹⁹
32. Paragraph 85 (violation of the ban on forming an association) of the German Criminal Code provides for up to 3 years’ imprisonment for participating in the activities of a banned public organisation or political party.²⁰ Paragraph 90a provides for the same punishment for insulting or “maliciously humiliating” the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its lands, or their constitutional system. All of these formulations are also of a general nature and subject to interpretation.

¹⁶ French Internal Security Code, ¶L212-1, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000025503132/LEGISCTA000025505187/#LEGISCTA000025508342.

¹⁷ French Penal Code, Chapter I: Crimes against Peace, ¶¶431-1 - 431-30, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006070719/LEGISCTA000006136046/#LEGISCTA000006136046.

¹⁸ French Internal Security Code, ¶L212-1, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000025503132/LEGISCTA000025505187/#LEGISCTA000025508342.

¹⁹ LOI No. 2019-222 on 2018-2022 programmes and justice reforms, 23 March 2019, ¶71, available at: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/LEGIARTI000038262626/2019-03-25/>.

²⁰ German Criminal Code, Section 85, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/_85.html.

33. Interestingly, although Ukraine does not have a specific legal act on extremism, it can be inferred from its legislation that it also follows a model of countering hateful extremism.

Part 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code of that country reads as follows:

“Intentional acts aimed at inciting national, racial or religious enmity and hatred, humiliating national honour and dignity or insulting the feelings of citizens in relation to their religious beliefs, as well as direct or indirect restriction of rights or establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on grounds of race, colour, political, religious or other beliefs, gender, disability, ethnic and social origin, property status, place of residence, language or other characteristics -

shall be punishable by a fine of from two hundred to five hundred untaxable minimum incomes of citizens or by restriction of liberty for up to five years, or by deprivation of liberty for up to three years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years.”²¹

34. As we can see, that Article is also replete with opportunities for various broad interpretations of its provisions such as “inciting enmity”, “humiliation of national honour and dignity”, “insulting religious feelings” and limiting the rights of citizens “on other grounds”.
35. In addition, the term “extremism” is contained in certain legal acts of Ukraine, primarily in decisions of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) and texts of court decisions.
36. For instance, the NSDCU decision of 4 November 2014 instructed the State Television and Radio Committee of Ukraine to “intensify work to counter propaganda of separatism, extremism and radicalism.”²² Approved by the NSDCU on 15 October 2021 and enacted by Decree of President V. Zelensky No. 685/2021 of 28 December 2021, the “Information Security Strategy” blames the Russian Federation for “provoking manifestations of extremism in Ukrainian society.”²³ In the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, approved by the NSDCU on 14 September 2020 and enacted on the same day by

²¹ Criminal Code of Ukraine, Special Part, Section 5, Article 161, available at: <https://urist.com.ua/ru/uku/st-161>.

²² Decision of the NSDCU “On urgent measures to ensure state security” (4 November 2014), available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0014525-14#Text>.

²³ President of Ukraine Decree No. 685/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 15 October 2021 ‘On Information Security Strategy’” (28 December 2021), available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/685/2021#Text>.

Presidential Decree No. 392/2020, the term “extremism” is used three times among relevant threats.²⁴

37. In October 2017, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law No. 2165-VIII “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Artistic Touring’ Dealing with Certain Peculiarities of Holding Artistic Touring Events with the Participation of Citizens of the Aggressor State”. It prohibited “propaganda of war, terrorism, extremism, separatism, communist and/or national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and their symbols” during concerts.²⁵
38. The annual Ukraine-NATO national cooperation programme for 2013, approved by Presidential Decree No 371/2013 of 5 July 2013, envisaged information exchange with the Alliance on “international extremist and terrorist organisations”.²⁶
39. The Unified State Register of Court Decisions of Ukraine has 365 court decisions (including 64 on criminal cases) that refer to the concept of “extremism” and 910 (including 82 on criminal cases) that use the adjective “extremist”.
40. Ukraine’s internal affairs bodies, at least as of the summer of 2014, had departments for “combating ethnic organised crime and extremism”.²⁷
41. Ukrainian criminal law doctrine, including textbooks for training law enforcement officers, refers to extremism in the general context of hate crimes and discrimination.²⁸

²⁴ President of Ukraine Decree No. 392/2020 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 14 September 2020 on the National Security Strategy of Ukraine” (14 September 2020), available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/392/2020#Text>.

²⁵ Law No. 2165-VIII “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Artistic Touring’ Regarding Peculiarities of Artistic Touring Events Involving Citizens of the Aggressor State” (5 October 2017), available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2165-19#Text>.

²⁶ President of Ukraine Decree No. 371/2013 “On Approval of the Annual National Cooperation Programme Ukraine-NATO for 2013” (5 July 2013), available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/371/2013#Text>.

²⁷ See: Determination of the Stryi District Court of Lvov Oblast of 15 August 2014 on case No. 456/3188/14-k. Available at: <https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/50872739>; See also the Ruling of the Lutsk City Court of the Volyn Oblast of 8 August 2014 on case No. 161/12742/14-k. Available at: <https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/48267276>.

²⁸ See: A.A. Grinchak. COUNTERING RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND EXTREMISM. Kiev. 2018. p.150. Available at: https://nlu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/phd_5_copy-1.pdf; See also: COUNTERING MANIFESTATIONS OF TERRORISM, SEPARATISM, EXTREMISM AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN MODERN CONDITIONS. CONFERENCE MATERIALS, DNEPR (28 October 2016), available at: <https://dduvs.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/files/Structure/library/student/20161103.pdf>.

42. Thus, countries that follow a model of countering hateful extremism use broader language in their legislation, which is also reflected in their criminal law, which criminalises the spread of hatred, including through the participation of citizens in the activities of banned organisations and public events.
43. The criticism of the Ukrainian side also suggests that, as Prof. Sheinin writes, “[t]here is a fundamental difference between countering terrorism and countering ‘extremism’, as there is a large number of international conventions and protocols that impose upon States legal obligations in the field of counter-terrorism.”²⁹ He refers to the fact that the Shanghai Convention “is not an instrument comparable to global conventions and protocols against terrorism.” It is not quite clear on what grounds Prof. Sheinin proposes to make such a comparison. It is an obvious fact that states regularly conclude regional conventions on issues that have not yet been the subject of universal conventions; in no way does it detract from their importance.
44. Besides, in addition to the Shanghai Convention, there are a number of international documents that prescribe the countering of hate extremism. It is not only the Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Combating Extremism (whose importance, incidentally, was noted by the Venice Commission),³⁰ which criminalises incitement of political, social, racial, national and religious hatred; propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the basis of his/her political, racial, national and religious affiliation; public calls to commit the above acts; as well as mass production, storage and distribution of extremist materials for the purpose of extremist propaganda.
45. It is also worth mentioning Article 13 of PACE Resolution 1344 (2003) “Threats Posed to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe” which I have already cited, as well as PACE Resolution 1754 (2010). In the latter, PACE reiterated its call on member states to introduce provisions in their criminal legislation “against incitement to racial hatred or hate speech”;³¹ to ensure the systematic and consistent application of anti-

²⁹ Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶33. See Reply, Appendix 7.

³⁰ Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Combating Extremist Activity (20 June 2012), ¶12, available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2012\)016-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e).

³¹ PACE Resolution 1454 (2010), ¶13.6, available at: <https://pace.coe.int/pdf/53f0236cc815b3e4910d3adf1628681fc418a4620b2a2ca7da2cb9ee27a8e2af/resolution%201754.pdf>.

extremist legislation to all forms of extremism, and to “enforce the penalties foreseen by their legislation against public incitement to violence, racial discrimination and intolerance...”.³²

46. Note also the Venice Commission’s Report on the Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion (2008), which explicitly states that a person who incites hatred cannot enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10.1 of the ECHR, as “hate speech thus justifies criminal sanctions”.³³
47. The Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 2009 adopted a model law “On Countering Extremism”, which defines extremism as follows:

“Extremism is an infringement on the foundations of the constitutional order and the security of the state, as well as a violation of human and civil rights, freedoms and legitimate interests carried out through the denial of legal and/or other generally accepted norms and rules of social behaviour;

Extremist activity: the activity of a public or religious association, the media or another organization or individual in planning, organizing, preparing or committing acts aimed at

- forcible alteration of the foundations of the constitutional order and violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state;
- public justification of terrorism or public calls for terrorist activities;
- inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred;
- propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person (social group) on the grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude towards religion;
- violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of a person and a citizen on the grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
- obstructing the exercise by citizens of their voting rights and the right to participate in a referendum or violating the secrecy of the vote by violence or the threat of violence.”³⁴

48. Thus, there are not only international conventions and protocols that impose legal obligations on states to counter terrorism, but also documents that prescribe countering

³² *Ibid.*, ¶13.5.

³³ Venice Commission, Report No. 406 / 2006 “On the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of religion: the issue of regulation and prosecution of blasphemy, insults to religion and incitement to religious hatred” (23 October 2008), available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD\(2008\)026-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2008)026-e).

³⁴ CIS IPA Resolution No. 32-9 (14 May 2009), available at: https://base.spininform.ru/show_doc_fw?rgn=30827.

extremism, including the spread of hatred. In other words, the concept of hateful extremism is becoming increasingly widespread around the world. Moreover, the legislation of the Russian Federation is in line with global trends in combating extremism. The opponents' references to the fact that there exist more documents related to combating terrorism and violent extremism in the world than to combating hateful extremism is no proof that states are limited in adopting and enforcing such legislation.

C. RUSSIAN ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION CONFORMS WITH THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED MODEL OF COUNTERING HATEFUL EXTREMISM

49. Countering hateful extremism is generally driven by objective reasons. The model is mostly used in those countries that have been severely affected by domestic terrorism. Russia, which from the collapse of the USSR until 2013 experienced an exponential increase in extremist crime, including serious terrorist attacks, separatist conflicts and sharp spikes in right-wing radical and Islamist crime, is also among them.³⁵
50. As in other countries, the Russian Federation's anti-extremist legislation aims to protect certain social groups. According to Article 1 of the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity No. 114 FZ, as well as Article 282 of the Criminal Code, such groups include: races; ethnic groups; religious groups; linguistic groups; social classes; gender groups; and origin groups.
51. As can be seen, the list of social groups protected by Russian legislation partially includes groups protected by countries adhering to the "European" model of countering extremism. Besides, based on the "Shanghai" model, Russia considers as extremist acts violent alteration of the foundations of the constitutional system; violation of territorial integrity, justification of terrorism; incitement of social, racial, national or religious discord; propaganda of exclusivity on the grounds of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; violation of human rights on the same grounds; violation of electoral rights; obstruction of activities of state bodies, electoral commissions or public and religious organizations; use of Nazi insignia and symbols;

³⁵ Ria, *Russia's Largest Terrorist Attacks in 2000-2007. Synopsis* (4 August 2008), available at: <https://ria.ru/20080804/150102309.html>.

financing of the abovesaid; and public and consciously false accusation of state officials of extremist crimes.

52. Prof. Sheinin, in support of his position, refers to Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) No. 660/2011 “On the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity.” However, the Venice Commission (VC) does not say anywhere in its opinion, as Prof. Sheinin tries to suggest, that the law “On Combating Extremist Activity” is discriminatory towards ethnic or racial minorities or aims to diminish their rights.
53. In his conclusion, Prof. Sheinin argues that the provision of the law relating to incitement to social, racial, national or religious discord is formulated in a way that “represents intended or at least likely application of the clauses to restrict the peaceful ways through which groups based on their ethnic origin express their ethnic identity and their commitment to maintaining it.”³⁶ Prof. Sheinin makes such bold statements without supporting them with any citations or arguments.
54. I think that he does not take into account the fact that such wording in the Russian law is common in other countries which are guided by the model of countering hateful extremism. It is difficult to understand how the wording of the Russian law “On Combating Extremist Activity” quoted by him is any better than the wording given, for example, in the Scottish law “The Hate Crime and Public Order Act” to describe offences involving incitement to hatred: “A person commits an offence if he or she behaves in a manner that a reasonable person would consider to be threatening, abusive or insulting ... in doing so, the person intends to stir up hatred against a group of persons based on the group being defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), or ethnic or national origins, ...or a reasonable person would consider the behaviour ... to be likely to result in hatred being stirred up against such a group.”³⁷
55. On the contrary, the Venice Commission recognises the “legitimate efforts” of the Russian authorities “to combat extremism and related threats” and notes that the PACE “expressed its concern over the challenge of fighting extremism and its most recent forms

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Hate Crime and Public Order Act (Scotland) 2021, Part 2, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2021/14/enacted/data.pdf>.

- and encouraged the member States of the Council of Europe to take resolute action in this field”.³⁸
56. The Commission only saw a certain flaw in this law in its lack of a violent element as the only characteristic of extremism. In other words, the VC assumed that extremism can only be violent.
 57. In particular, paragraph 36 of the above-mentioned document states that “The Venice Commission is of the opinion that in order to qualify ‘stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord’ as ‘extremist activity’, the definition should expressly require the element of violence.”³⁹
 58. That approach reflects the realities of 2011/12, when the Opinion was prepared. At that time, most countries were indeed guided by the “American” model of violent extremism, but this is in no way characteristic of today's realities, where there is a clear trend away from this model. Thus, the Commission refers to the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (SCO, 2001) definition of extremism, but naturally does not take into account the changes that were later reflected in the 2017 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Convention on Countering Extremism. Nor does it take into account the changes in anti-extremist legislation that have taken place in countries such as France, Italy, Britain (Scotland), Latvia, Lithuania and many others.
 59. If these realities are not taken into account, the same questions should be addressed to other countries that adhere to the model of hateful extremism. They, as already indicated, include not only the states mentioned above, but also Germany, Poland, Spain, Ukraine, other countries of the former Soviet Union, etc.
 60. The same applies to the conclusions of the Venice Commission that “to proclaim as extremist any religious teaching or proselytising activity aimed at proving that a certain worldview is a superior explanation of the universe, may affect the freedom of conscience or religion of many persons.”⁴⁰ This position is also no longer relevant, since Article 3.1

³⁸ Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Combating Extremist Activity (20 June 2012), ¶73, available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2012\)016-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, ¶36.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, ¶38.

was added to the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activity” on 23 November 2015, according to which “the Bible, the Koran, the Tanakh and the Ganjur, their contents and quotations therefrom cannot be recognised as extremist materials.”⁴¹ Besides, the legislator in the explanatory note referred to Article 28 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation that guarantees “freedom of conscience, freedom of religious beliefs, including the right to profess individually or jointly with others any religion or not to profess any,” as well as to the law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.”

61. The VC's criticism also concerned the singling out of public officials from the entire body of citizens of the Russian Federation, knowingly false accusations of whom of extremist crimes are considered to be extremism,⁴² while the same acts committed against private individuals are not considered to be such. Interestingly, this provision of Russian law practically echoes §90b of the German Criminal Code, which prescribes up to 5 years imprisonment for persons who “denigrate the legislative body, government or constitutional court of the FRG or one of its members in that capacity in a manner which endangers the reputation of the state.”⁴³
62. It was exactly the threat to the reputation of the State from deliberately false fabrications disseminated in the social environment and groundlessly provoking unrest, thereby endangering public order, that gave rise to this subclause in Article 1.1 of the Federal Law “On Combating Extremist Activities.”
63. Considering that the element of violence in defining extremist activity is no longer a mandatory criterion, the issue remains of the broad interpretation of the law’s provision by the Russian legislator. In other words, the Russian law delegates the interpretation of a number of formulations to law enforcement bodies under the supervision of the judiciary. As far as I am aware, that concern of the Commission has largely been rendered

⁴¹ Federal Law No. 114-FZ “On Combating Extremist Activity” (23 November 2015), Art. 3.1, available at: <https://base.garant.ru/12127578/802464714d4d10a819efb803557e9689/>.

⁴² Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Combating Extremist Activity (20 June 2012), ¶43, available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2012\)016-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e).

⁴³ German Criminal Code, Section 90b, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/_90b.html.

moot by the serious attention that the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has been giving to the application of anti-extremist legislation.⁴⁴

IV. COMBATING “HATEFUL” EXTREMISM IS A LEGITIMATE GOAL RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER ICERD

64. As one of his main arguments, Prof. Sheinin states that Federal Law No 114-FZ allegedly “carries clear signs of the intended or likely use of its framework to target with adverse effect groups characterized by their ‘race, colour, ... or national or ethnic origin.’”⁴⁵ In his conclusion, Prof. Sheinin argues that the provision of the law relating to incitement to social, racial, national or religious discord is worded in a way that “constitutes an intentional or at least likely use of these provisions to limit the peaceful ways in which groups based on ethnicity express their ethnic identity and commitment to maintaining it.”⁴⁶ Prof. Sheinin makes such bold statements without supporting them with any citations or arguments.

65. That statement by Prof. Sheinin is not just surprising, but truly shocking. One gets the impression that the Ukrainian expert has either not read the Russian law on combating extremism, or deliberately misleads his readers. Since Prof. Sheinin is an authoritative scholar, the first assumption is clearly implausible; hence, the second one remains.

66. The issue is that the phrase he quotes from Art.1.1 of the Law is taken out of context. Prof. Sheinin does not cite the relevant provision in full, and in reality it reads as follows:

“(1) Extremist activities (extremism):

Propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the grounds of his/her social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;

Violation of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of persons and citizens on the grounds of their social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion.”

⁴⁴ Resolutions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court No. 11 of 28.06.2011, No. 41 of 03.11.2016, No. 32 of 20.09.2018 and No. 32 of 28.10.2021.

⁴⁵ Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶44. *See Reply*, Appendix 7.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

67. Thus, the wording that Prof. Sheinin declares discriminatory is, on the contrary, aimed at combating discrimination, and specifically at implementing Article 4 of ICERD, which reads as follows:

“States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:

(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;

(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;

(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.”

68. It is striking that Prof. Sheinin blatantly neglects to conduct a comparative analysis of this provision of the Russian law and the legislation of other countries. It is easily explained by the fact that, as a matter of fact, the wording of the Russian law is common to the other countries that follow the model of countering hateful extremism. It is difficult to understand, for example, how the wording of the Russian law “On Combating Extremist Activity” quoted by him is better than the wording given, for example, in the “Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act” to describe offences involving incitement to hatred:

“4. Offences of stirring up hatred

(1) A person commits an offence if-

(a) the person-

(i) behaves in a manner that a reasonable person would consider to be threatening, abusive or insulting, or

(ii) communicates to another person material that a reasonable person would consider to be threatening, abusive or insulting, and

(b) either-

(i) in doing so, the person intends to stir up hatred against a group of persons based on the group being defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), or ethnic or national origins, or

(ii) a reasonable person would consider the behaviour or the communication of the material to be likely to result in hatred being stirred up against such a group.”⁴⁷

69. Prof. Sheinin ignores even the opinion of the CERD Committee, which specifically recommended that Russia, in the application of the Extremism Law and Article 282 of the Criminal Code, focus on combating extremist organizations and members thereof that are involved in activities motivated by racial, ethnic or religious hatred:

“The Committee recommends that the State party give primary consideration to combating extremist organisations, and their members, engaging in activities motivated by racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity, when applying the Law on Combating Extremist Activities as well as article 282 of the Criminal Code.”⁴⁸

70. The Ukrainian side's assumptions are based on the fact that provisions of Russian anti-extremist legislation have been used to suppress the activities of organisations whose membership included ethnic Crimean Tatars. However, in my First Report, I show that organisations such as the Mejlis, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat are extremist not only according to the Russian Federation Criminal Code, but also according to international practice.⁴⁹ The fact that these groups include, for example, Crimean Tatars is explained both by their objectives (Mejlis) and by the ethnic composition of Crimean Muslims, as far as the latter two religious organisations are concerned. At the same time, the principle of equality before the law, declared in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 4 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, prohibits unequal treatment of persons who have committed a criminal or administrative offence based on their affiliation with a particular social group, including ethnic, religious and racial communities.
71. If we follow Prof. Sheinin's logic, we should recognise that, for example, banning French Muslims from participating in the activities of banned Salafist organisations such as the

⁴⁷ Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021, Part 3, available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2021/14/enacted/data.pdf>

⁴⁸ Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination regarding the Russian Federation, CERD/C/RUS/CO/19 (20 August 2008), ¶17.

⁴⁹ See, for example, Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶407-420. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.

Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France (CCIF) in France, Ansaar International in Germany or any of the banned “radical” mosques in France or Austria is an obstacle to the expression of their ethnic identity by the Arab or Turkish population of those countries.

72. The same can be said about the prohibition in the Russian Federation of right-wing radical nationalist organizations, which unite in their ranks, among others, ethnic Russians, such as: Religious group Krasnodar Orthodox Slavic community “Vek RA” (Vedic Culture of Russian Aryans) of Scythian Vesi Rasseniya, Ryazan City Public Patriotic Organization “Russian National Unity”, International Public Association “National Socialist Society”, Primorye Regional Human Rights Public Organization “Union of Slavs”, Interregional Public Movement “Slavic Union”, Interregional Public Association “Rus Spiritual Kindred State” and others.
73. In 2022, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to ban the Ukrainian paramilitary nationalist association “Azov” (“Azov Regiment”) from operating in the country came into force.
74. The Azov Regiment's ultranationalist ideology has repeatedly been the subject of criticism both inside Ukraine and from Western countries. For example, in October 2019 a group of 40 congressmen - members of the US Democratic Party - sent an appeal to the State Department demanding that Azov be recognized as a terrorist organization. The statement notes that Azov openly invites neo-Nazis into its ranks, and “in the relatively short history of this group, the UN has documented human rights violations and cases of torture.” The congressmen also pointed out in the appeal that Brenton Tarrant, who had shot 50 people in a New Zealand mosque in March 2019, was linked to Azov and trained at their base.⁵⁰ The UN and human rights organisations have repeatedly informed about the kidnapping, torture and rape of civilians by Azov servicemen.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Strana.ua, *The link between Azov and terrorist attacks in America is obvious. Why the US wants to equate Ukraine's National Guard regiment with ISIS* (October 22, 2019), available at: <https://strana.today/news/229127-azov-khotjat-vnesti-v-spisok-terroristov-ssha-chto-eto-oznachaet.html>.

⁵¹ OHCHR, Report No. A/HRC/34/CRP.4 “On Sexual Violence Related to Conflict in Ukraine” (from 14 March 2014 to 31 January 2017), available at: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwici5rp86j9AhVE4qQKHR_LDZsQFnoECBEQAw&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FHRBodies%2FHRC%2FRegularSessions%2FSession34%2FDocuments%2FA_HRC_34_CRP.4_E.doc

75. Consequently, the mere fact that an extremist organisation has members of particular ethnic groups does not mean that banning the group would be racially discriminatory.
76. Overall, the conclusion of this subsection is that Russian anti-extremist legislation is in line with similar legislation in countries that follow the model of countering hateful extremism. It means that it criminalises not only violent extremism, but also the dissemination of hatred towards social groups in order to prevent violence. This approach has its justification in international documents such as ICERD (Article 4), the 2017 Shanghai Convention, PACE resolutions 1344 (2003) and 1754 (2010), etc.
77. It does not discriminate against ethnic minorities due to ethnic affiliation of activists of such banned extremist groups, because the activities of such groups were terminated not because of the presence of individual members therein, but due to threats of violence or incitement to hatred against other social groups.

V. ETHNICITY DOES NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL BELIEFS RELATING TO THE STATUS OF TERRITORIES

78. One of the main arguments of Prof. Sheinin is that ethnicity is somehow inextricably linked to certain political beliefs regarding the status of a particular territory. It is on the basis of this assertion that Prof. Sheinin attempts to justify the allegedly discriminatory nature of the anti-extremist legislation. I will not argue why Prof. Sheinin is wrong in this basic premise of his position - my colleague, the expert Prof. Avtonomov, has already done it well enough in his Report.
79. In essence, Prof. Sheinin ascribes some innate political qualities and attitudes to ethnic groups, which in fact is not much different from racist ideas about the innateness of other qualities in individual races.
80. Moreover, Prof. Sheinin's assertion in that context that the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar ethnic groups have anti-Russian sentiments and the Russian group has anti-Ukrainian sentiments is objectively provoking interethnic discord, and not only in Crimea.

x&usg=AOvVaw0A14l-HsImtLVfbd2GyWcL; OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (16 February to 15 May 2016), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraine16May-15Aug2019_EN.pdf.

81. Having outlined this general position, I will further elaborate in my conclusion on a specific aspect - that the protection of territorial integrity, in particular, does not constitute a discriminatory factor in terms of the Convention.

VI. THE PROTECTION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY UNDER RUSSIAN LAW DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ANY ETHNIC GROUP EITHER IN PURPOSE OR IN EFFECT WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 1.1 OF ICERD.

82. Ukraine's Reply states that Russia allegedly uses Article 1.1. of the Law “On Combating Extremist Activity” and Article 280.1 of its Criminal Code, which establishes liability for public calls for actions aimed at violating territorial integrity of the country, to discriminate against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea, who it believes are entirely in favour of the return of the peninsula to Ukraine.
83. Our opponents argue that the legislation in question, in their view, contains “clear signs of the purported or enabled use to target groups characterized by their `race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’.”⁵²
84. Prof. Sheinin explains that position in his Report by stating that the legislation in question was applied to “the inhabitants of Crimea, including upon persons belonging to the distinct ethnic communities of Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea.”⁵³ He further writes that “[w]hile many Russian-speakers or persons with a Russian ethnic identity may have felt loyalty towards Ukraine, even more so members of the Ukrainian ethnic community and of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea would naturally have had a moral obligation of loyalty towards Ukraine.”⁵⁴
85. Here, Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin use a false argument about the existence of separate ethno-political communities in Crimea, one part of which (Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians) support the return of the peninsula to Ukraine, while the other (Russians) oppose it.⁵⁵ Consequently, by applying the above article in Crimea, Russia, in their view,

⁵² Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶37. *See* Reply, Appendix 7.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, ¶38.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

again demonstrates a “discriminatory purpose” and a “discriminatory effect” on the Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians living there.⁵⁶

86. However, Prof. Sheinin does not substantiate his claims that all Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars are allegedly in favour of Crimea being part of Ukraine, and *vice versa* - that all Russians have the opposite viewpoint. It should also be mentioned that there exist a number of independent sociological studies which prove that there is no compartmentalisation of ethnic groups on the peninsula, let alone political contention between them, including on the issue of the territorial affiliation of Crimea.⁵⁷
87. Meanwhile, most UN member states have a prohibition in their legal systems against activities aimed at violating the territorial integrity of their countries. For example, Article 212.1 of France's Internal Security Code prohibits the activities of any organisation and criminalises participation in its activities if their “goals or actions are aimed at undermining the integrity of the national territory or attacking the republican form of government by force”:⁵⁸
- (a) Article 241 of the Italian Criminal Code provides for a minimum of 12 years imprisonment for committing violent acts aimed at undermining the unity of the state.⁵⁹
 - (b) Paragraph 82 of the German Criminal Code (high treason) provides for 1 to 10 years imprisonment for persons who violate the territorial integrity of the state by force or threat of force,⁶⁰ and Paragraph 83 (preparation of high treason) provides for 1 to 10 years imprisonment for preparing such acts.⁶¹

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See for example: G. Sasse, TERRA INCOGNITA - SOCIAL THINKING IN CRIME (ZOiS, no. 3, November 2017), available at: <https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/terra-incognita-the-public-mood-in-crimea>.

⁵⁸ French Internal Security Code, ¶L212-1, available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000025503132/LEGISCTA000025505187/#LEGISCTA000025508342.

⁵⁹ Criminal Code of the Italian Republic, 19 October 1930, no. 1398, ¶241, available at: https://www.brocardi.it/codice-penale/libro-secondo/titolo-i/capo-i/art241.html#google_vignette.

⁶⁰ German Criminal Code, Section 82, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/_82.html.

⁶¹ German Criminal Code, Section 83, available at: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/_83.html.

- (c) Article 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine also provides for three to five years' imprisonment with confiscation of property for “deliberate acts committed to change the territorial boundaries or the state border of Ukraine.”⁶² Moreover, that article does not mention violent actions, as does, for example, the German legislation. Consequently, public calls for the violation of territorial integrity also fall under the category of “deliberate acts.”
- (d) Article 308 of the Criminal Code of Georgia provides for 10 to 15 years' imprisonment for “actions against Georgia aimed at the transfer to a foreign state of all or part of the territory of Georgia, or separation from the territory of Georgia of a part thereof.’ The law does not specify what kind of “actions’ are meant.
88. In the Russian Federation, Article 13.5. of the 1993 Constitution prohibits “the forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation.” Besides, Article 20.3.2. of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) provides for administrative liability for public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, while Article 280.1. of the Criminal Code provides for criminal liability and punishment for repeat offences from a fine of RUB 200,000 to 4 years' imprisonment.
89. In other words, following the logic of combating hateful extremism (see above), Russia, like Ukraine, Georgia and France, has also criminalised non-violent actions aimed at violating the country's territorial integrity.
90. Interestingly, Ukraine easily accuses the activists of national minority movements on its territory of separatism and violation of territorial integrity. This is the case, for example, with the Ruthenians, who make up the majority of the population of Transcarpathia. For over 30 years Ukraine has refused to recognise this group as a separate national minority, despite recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2008), decisions and appeals by the Transcarpathian Regional Council in 1992, 2002 and 2007 to the Ukrainian central authorities, etc. At the same time Ukraine accuses Ruthenians of separatism and attempts to violate the territorial integrity of the

⁶² Criminal Code of Ukraine, Article 110, available at: <https://urst.com.ua/ru/uku/st-110>.

country.⁶³ In fact, the Ruthenians for the most part demand national-cultural autonomy - opening of Ruthenian schools, a department of the Ruthenian language and literature at Uzhgorod University, as well as granting the region the status of self-governing territory according to the will of Transcarpathians at the referendum back in 1991.⁶⁴

91. Those Ruthenian organizations that lost faith that Ukraine can grant them national-cultural autonomy and recognize them as a national minority and bring the Ruthenian question into the legal framework, and declare the need to recreate Ruthenian statehood (e.g. the Trans-Carpathian Association of Ruthenian Organizations “Sojm Podkarpacki Rusyns”), are subjected to persecution and their leaders to reprisals. For example, the chairman of Sojm, Archpriest Dmitriy Sydor, was sentenced to three years in prison in 2012. He was accused exactly of calling for a change in state borders.⁶⁵
92. Yet Ukraine has not raised the issue of racial discrimination against the Ruthenians, it has simply refused to consider them a national minority. For Ukraine, those people are ordinary separatists.
93. The same applies to Ukraine's actions in the territories of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts that decided to secede from it in 2014. Ukraine did not simply fail to recognise these decisions, but used military force to suppress them.
94. The arguments of Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin that criminal prosecution for violation of Art. 280.1 in Crimea allegedly constitutes racial discrimination are based, as already explained, on the erroneous thesis that the ethnic groups of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars live separately in Crimea and that they share the same political views on the territorial affiliation of the peninsula due to their ethnic origin, which is not true. This approach is based on the chauvinist paradigm of its authors, and is in itself discriminatory against both ethnic Russians living in Crimea and ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, to whom certain political views are attempted to be ascribed based on their ethnic origin.

⁶³ Today, *The Whole Truth About Ruthenians and Separatists* (9 December 2008), available at: <https://ukraine.segodnya.ua/ukraine/vcja-pravda-o-rucinakh-i-ceparaticakh-144213.html>

⁶⁴ Trud.ru, *Stanislav Prokopchuk, I was, am and will be a Ruthenian* (26 January 2006), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20070328031640/http://www.trud.ru/trud.php?id=200601260121101>.

⁶⁵ Vesti.ru, *Orthodox priest found guilty of encroaching on Ukraine's integrity* (21 March 2012), available at: <https://www.vesti.ru/article/1960029>.

95. Thus, Prof. Sheinin has not answered the question of how Russian legislation differs from similar legislation in other countries on the issue of territorial integrity and what the basis for the accusations of its discriminatory nature is (see above).
96. In an attempt to prove Russia's violation of ICERD, Ukraine, as already pointed out, artificially draws a non-existent element of ethnicity into the socio-political processes taking place in Crimea. The same purpose is served by Prof. Sheinin's thesis that it is the Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who allegedly resist en masse the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation (without providing any evidence),⁶⁶ while ethnic Russians obstruct that by trying to create ideological grounds for hostility. Meanwhile, there are cases of participation of ethnic Russians in the protest movement in Crimea, and there is mass participation of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in the political processes of integration of Crimea into Russia.⁶⁷ Therefore, the conclusion that allegedly all Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, due to their ethnic origin, do not recognise the accession of Crimea to Russia, blatantly contradicts the reality.⁶⁸
97. Moreover, the results of the 2014 referendum show that the overwhelming majority of the population of Crimea supported the peninsula's accession to Russia. I emphasise that we are not talking here about the legality or illegality of the 2014 referendum,⁶⁹ but about the political sentiments of Crimean residents at the time, with no confirmed data on mass falsification of the referendum results available to the expert community.
98. The legislation of the Russian Federation protects the territorial integrity of the State. The practice of the Russian Federation in this respect does not differ from that of other countries.
99. In any case, I hope that Prof. Sheinin does not advocate the position that belonging to an ethnic group should be a mitigating or aggravating factor in the application of administrative and criminal law. As has already been pointed out, attempts to introduce the principle of ethnicity into the legislative and law enforcement practice of any country violate the most important principle of democracy reflected in Article 7 of the Universal

⁶⁶ Martin Sheinin Expert Report, Part V, ¶43. *See* Reply, Annex 7.

⁶⁷ First Expert Report by Dmitriy Frank, ¶16. *See* CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 21.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, ¶15.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, ¶17.

Declaration of Human Rights, namely, the principle of equality of all citizens before the law. The principle of equality before the courts and all other organs administering justice is also protected by Article 5(a) of ICERD. This principle is also protected by constitutional (Article 19 of the Constitution) and criminal (Article 4 of the Criminal Code) law of the Russian Federation which prohibits unequal treatment of citizens who have committed crimes on the basis of their “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, property and official status, place of residence, attitude towards religion, beliefs, membership of public associations, and other circumstances.”⁷⁰

100. Thus, the assertions of Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin that Russian anti-extremist legislation, including provisions on the protection of territorial integrity, does not comply with international standards, and that this legislation itself is an instrument of racial discrimination, are untenable and therefore cannot be an argument in the system of evidence. On the contrary, this legislation protects ethnic minorities from manifestations of racism, as reflected in Article 1.1. of Law No. 114-FZ and Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

VII. PROHIBITING EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH RACIAL DISCRIMINATION EITHER IN PURPOSE OR IN EFFECT

101. Ukraine believes that restrictions on the activities of members of extremist and terrorist organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People based on national security interests “are based on no grounds at all” and violate Crimean Tatars’ right to equal treatment before courts and other justice bodies, right to personal security, and political and civil rights guaranteed by Article 5 of ICERD both in the purpose of such restrictive measures and in their consequences.
102. As already indicated, there is a wealth of law enforcement practice from around the world, both within and outside the EU, relating to the prohibition of both terrorist and extremist organisations of Islamist or nationalist nature. Such practice meets the requirements of Art. 4. of ICERD, which states that member states “shall declare illegal and prohibit organisations, and also organised and all other propaganda activities, which promote and

⁷⁰ Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Article 4, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/ca44f5ca7fe63fad08f66b87e34e9a2c91b7d329.

incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organisations or activities as an offence punishable by law”.

103. In my First Report⁷¹ I elaborate and prove that even without reference to the Russian law, the activities of Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir correspond to those of international extremist and terrorist groups, since they are aimed at destroying the basic values of society. In particular, the ideology of these organizations involves the destruction of the secular state and its institutions, replacing it with a religious Islamic state - the “World Caliphate”. At the same time, they allow violent methods of struggle. Both organizations have preached religious exclusivity and intolerance and ignored the human rights standards that European countries ensure under the international law, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights.⁷²
104. Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat are banned not only in Russia, but also in a number of other countries. Thus, Tablighi Jamaat is recognised as an extremist association in Uzbekistan (2004), Tajikistan (2006) and Kazakhstan (2013). In December 2021, the movement was banned in Saudi Arabia, which declared it “one of the gates of terror”, indicating that its goals and means are far removed from those of Islam.⁷³ Hizb ut-Tahrir, in turn, has been banned in Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and many Arab countries.⁷⁴ The fact that those organisations operate legally in Ukraine is no excuse.
105. Since Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat are Muslim organisations and 99% of Muslims in Crimea are Crimean Tatars, their prevalence among the convicted is understandable exactly for that reason, and not because of racial bias of Russian law enforcement agencies.
106. The thesis about the discriminatory effects of restrictive measures cannot be considered valid in this case either, because it would imply unequal treatment of a particular ethnic group in comparison to other ethnic groups. The argument cannot be accepted because

⁷¹ Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶93-136. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.

⁷² *Ibid.*, ¶¶328-422.

⁷³ Kazislam.kz, *Saudi Arabia bans Tablighi Jamaat* (December 20, 2021), available at: <https://kazislam.kz/saudovskaya-araviya-zapretila-deyatel-nost-tabligi-dzhamagat/#:~:text=Saudi Arabia has banned Tablighi, 'one of the gates of terrorism'>.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, ¶387.

there is no evidence of such unequal treatment of ethnic groups in Crimea. As mentioned above, Prof. Sheinin considers the only “evidence” of such unequal treatment to be the measures applied to limit the negative effect of the propaganda of extremist political beliefs that provoke conflicts based on ethnic, religious or racial hatred. Political beliefs are not an element of racial discrimination under ICERD. In any case, there are no restrictions on the activities of Islamic organizations in Crimea. Nor are there any restrictions on the activities of non-Islamic religious organizations, with the exception of extremist religious groups. Thus, in my First Report I wrote that 7 non-Islamic religious groups are banned in Russia, including the “Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses”, where the overwhelming majority is representatives of Slavic ethnic groups.⁷⁵ However, except for extremist and terrorist organisations banned in the Russian Federation, other religious communities operate legally in Crimea.

107. As stated in the IEA RAS Expert Report, “the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation reports that as at 1 October 2015 there were 335 religious organisations registered in the territory of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol”;⁷⁶ Imam training courses were opened.⁷⁷ Besides, 150 additional mosques had been built in Crimea by July 2016, with their number growing 50 percent as a result.⁷⁸ At the same time, there still exist up to two dozen so-called “independent” Islamic communities in Crimea, which are not subordinate to the main Muslim religious organization on the peninsula - the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol (DUMKS). For the most part, they are affiliated with the Spiritual Administration of Muslims “Tavrida Muftiyat”.
108. In other words, Muslims in Crimea have an alternative to the two religious organisations that are banned in Russia as extremist or terrorist. To argue otherwise would be similar to someone insisting that banning ISIS, which also aims to create a “World Caliphate”, but by blatantly military-terrorist means, discriminates against Arabs, Turks, the same Crimean Tatars and other members of ethnic groups that traditionally practice Islam. Hence, arrests of people supporting Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat do not mean racial discrimination of Crimean Tatars, as well as arrests of people supporting ISIS do

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, ¶251.

⁷⁶ Dimitriy Frank Expert Report, ¶146. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 21.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, ¶150.

⁷⁸ Ria, *The number of mosques in Crimea has increased by half since joining Russia* (29 July 2016), available at: <https://ria.ru/20160729/1473218518.html>.

not mean racial discrimination of ethnic Arabs, representatives of Central Asian ethnic groups, Crimean Tatars and representatives of other ethnic groups who could be activists of that terrorist organisation. As we know, not just arrests but also physical elimination of the “Islamic State” leaders, as well as leaders of other extremist organisations, are carried out all over the world.

109. Speaking of prosecuting members of extremist groups, several examples come to mind. For example, following the murder of teacher Samuel Pati in October 2020, the French police questioned several hundred people, arrested 15, conducted 80 investigations into online hate speech, and opened 51 cases to dissolve non-governmental organisations belonging to the ethnic Muslim community.⁷⁹ Again, no one accused the French authorities of racially discriminating against Arab adherents of Islam living in France.
110. In March 2017, the German authorities banned the activities of the German-speaking Islamic Circle in Hildesheim (DIK). Raids followed, in which police searched a number of business premises, the homes of eight people associated with the group, and a mosque belonging to the association. At the time, the Minister of the Interior of Lower Saxony and Social Democrat (SPD) Boris Pistorius said that in banning the DIK “a hotspot of the radical Salafist scene in Germany had been shattered”, but was “not directed against the many Muslims who live peacefully here.”⁸⁰
111. Interestingly, the opponents do not deny that detentions of Crimean Tatars were mainly related to their activities for Hizb ut-Tahrir or Tablighi Jamaat, rather than to their ethnic origin. Moreover, they also indirectly confirm that arrests also involved members of other ethnic groups affiliated with religious organisations recognised as extremist under the Russian law, such as the aforementioned Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses,⁸¹ among which there are virtually no Crimean Tatars, but many ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and representatives of other non-Muslim ethnic groups.

⁷⁹ France 24, *French police conducted dozens of raids on suspected extremism after beheading of teacher* (19 October 2020), available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20201019-additional-police-operations-under-way-over-beheading-of-french-teacher>.

⁸⁰ Deutsche Welle, *German police raid Islamists* (14 March 2017), available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/german-police-carry-out-raids-on-islamists-in-hildesheim/a-37923597>.

⁸¹ Reply, Chapter 12, ¶513.

112. The same applies to the “Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people”. The Ukrainian side insists that the 2016 ban on the Mejlis as an extremist organisation had nothing to do with legitimacy, but was “punitive measures directed explicitly at the Crimean Tatar community which have the indisputable effect of sharply curtailing that community’s civil rights and entrenching racial discrimination.”⁸²
113. I would like to remind that in my First Report I elaborated on the reasons why the Mejlis can be considered an extremist organisation that resorts not only to hate speech but also to violent extremism, in the sense that phenomenon is assessed by international legislative and law enforcement practice, the rightfulness of which Prof. Sheinin does not deny.⁸³ Let me remind that according to international practice, the Mejlis is an extremist organisation because:
- (a) Its strategic goals and practices were inherently separatist, aiming to create an independent Crimean Tatar national state in Crimea. Separatist manifestations were clearly present in its activities both before and after 2014.
 - (b) The Mejlis has used violent means both during the Ukrainian and Russian jurisdictions in Crimea. At times this has led to armed clashes. For example, mass events in Alushta in 1992 resulted in riots across Crimea: in Simferopol - the Prosecutor's Office building was vandalised, crowds of thousands stormed the building of the Supreme Soviet (the legislative body) of Crimea and beat up police officers; in 1995, mass disturbances resulted in vandalism of petrol stations and car parks in Sudak and Feodosia; in 1998, Mejlis activists blocked railway tracks and highways, there were direct clashes with the police at the railway station in Simferopol. In 1998, Mejlis activists blocked railway tracks and motor roads and clashed directly with police at the railway station in Simferopol.⁸⁴
 - (c) The actions of the Mejlis in connection with the food and energy blockade of Crimea were clearly extremist in nature, since violent actions, including sabotage of livelihood facilities, were aimed at intimidating and coercing the authorities and

⁸² Reply, Chapter 11, ¶471.

⁸³ Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶441-446. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.

⁸⁴ Pravda ru, *Inna Novikova, The Crimean War* (29 April 2005), available at: <https://www.pravda.ru/world/50927-crimea/>.

civilian population to take certain political decisions, which is consistent with the international understanding of violent extremism.

114. The opponents' claim that the Mejlis did not make any collective decision to initiate, organise or participate in the blockade of Crimea, or to undermine power lines, and "[t]he Mejlis members who did participate, namely Mr. Chubarov and Mr. Dzhemilev, did so in their individual capacities",⁸⁵ does not stand up to criticism. The organisation could have dissociated itself from the statements and actions of the leaders, but it did not. Similarly, one could justify ISIS saying that the murderers responsible for hundreds of hostage executions had no official authorisation from the collective leadership of the terrorist organisation. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in its appeal ruling, refuted arguments that the actions of the individuals in question were carried out by them in their personal capacity and not on behalf of the Mejlis, as confirmed by numerous video recordings.⁸⁶
115. If we turn to examples from international law enforcement practice, it is worth recalling Spain's struggle, supported by France, with the separatists of the Basque organisation ETA ("Basque Country and Liberty"), which seeks independence for the Basque Country, a region situated in northern Spain and south-western France. In September 2015, for example, the police of the two countries arrested two of the organisation's leaders, Iratxe Sorzabal and David Pla. It happened despite the fact that the group had announced a cessation of violence and armed struggle back in 2011. The arrested were accused of "management of ETA's remaining arms stash".⁸⁷ Concurrently, massive police raids and searches were carried out in the homes of Basques suspected of belonging to the organisation. However, no one accused Spain or France of racial discrimination in this connection.
116. There are numerous examples related to the banning of such organisations. For example, in 2019-2020, the German security services conducted a series of raids and searches in the homes of members of certain extremist groups under the general name "Citizens of the Reich". Representatives of the network of such often unconnected organizations (the

⁸⁵ Reply, Chapter 11, ¶492.

⁸⁶ Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Appeal Decision No. 127-APG 16-4.

⁸⁷ Reuters, *Spain, France arrest leaders of Basque separatist ETA militants* (22 September 2015), available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-spain-arrests-eta-idUKKCN0RM1ZW20150922>.

Free State of Bavaria, the Himgau Community, the Free German Republic, the United German Nations and Tribes and others) believe that the “Third Reich” did not cease to exist after Germany had capitulated in 1945. They do not recognise the FRG as a legitimate state. Some groups print their own “passports” and “banknotes” and hold “elections” for “deputies” to the self-proclaimed “Reichstag”. Demonstrations, rallies and other actions are staged.

117. Among estimated 19,000 “Reichsbürgers”, 950 were identified by the German law enforcement as right-wing extremists.⁸⁸ In March 2020 alone, the FRG conducted 21 searches in the flats of the leaders of those organizations by 400 police officers.⁸⁹ Moreover, those activities took place at a time when the organisations in question did not resort to violence.
118. Recent events have shown that those measures were quite justified and even insufficient: on 7 December 2022, the German police reported an attempted coup d’état prepared by “Reich citizens”. In raids across the country, “the German police arrested 25 suspected members and supporters of [this] far-right group who were allegedly seeking to overthrow the state by force.” Around 3,000 officers conducted raids on 7 December 2022 at 130 sites in 11 German federal lands against supporters of this movement.⁹⁰
119. Claims that it is impossible to ban an organisation that does not exist de jure do not stand up to criticism either, as many extremist organisations that have been banned in various countries did not have any state registration. For example, the neo-fascist Revolutionary Nationalist Youth group was banned in France in 2013, as was the Third Way group, none of them being legally registered.⁹¹ The same concerns the majority of the banned Islamist organisations in the world.

⁸⁸ Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, Verfassungsschutzbericht, Fakten und Tendenzen, 2019, available at: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/sicherheit/vsb-2019-kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.

⁸⁹ Frankfurter Allgemeine, *Very dangerous spinners* (19 March 2020), available at: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/verbotene-reichsbuerger-gruppe-rechtsextrem-und-hochgefuehrlich-16686793.html>

⁹⁰ Aljazeera, *Germany arrests 25 people in connection with alleged far-right group conspiracy* (7 December 2022), available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/7/germany-arrests-25-people-accused-of-planning-armed-coup>.

⁹¹ Le Figaro, *Christophe Cornevin, Extremist groups: the headache of disintegration* (7 June 2013), available at: <https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/06/07/01016-20130607ARTFIG00606-groupes-extremistes-le-casse-tete-de-la-dissolution.php>.

120. The conclusion is that the Mejlis was banned for objective reasons that allow its activities to be classified as violent extremism in terms of global legislative and law enforcement practice.
121. Attempts to portray restrictions on the activities of extremist organisations, including terrorist organisations, as racial discrimination are contrary to the letter and spirit of the international law.

VIII. BANNING EXTREMIST ORGANISATIONS IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

122. Obviously, the attempt to present the Mejlis, which engaged in extremist activities as defined by all relevant norms of the international law, as a legal and sole representative institution of Crimean Tatars is not only legal nonsense, but also a very dangerous precedent in the arguments of Ukraine and Prof. Sheinin and in effect a justification of violent extremism.
123. History has seen a number of cases in which extremist organisations, including terrorist ones, have claimed representation on behalf of ethnic or religious groups. Such organisations include the already mentioned Basque group ETA, the Kurdistan Workers' Party – a Kurdish separatist group operating mainly in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey,⁹² and a number of others. Mention should also be made of the terrorist organisation “the Islamic State”, which, with its goal of establishing a “World Caliphate”, clearly claimed to be the sole representative body of all Muslims. At the same time, the international community in its majority condemns such organisations for violence and propaganda of extremist views, does not recognise their representative status and seeks to build relations with other, alternative, legal groups representing the same ethnic or religious communities. Countries around the world where such organisations operated have generally banned their activities and those of affiliated groups. For example, the Batasuna party, ETA's political wing, was banned in Spain in 2003.⁹³

⁹² Amikam Nahmani, THE KURDISH CHALLENGE, July 2003. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719063701.003.0003>

⁹³ E. Foruria, THE PROHIBITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SPAIN (THE BATASUNA CASE) (University of the Basque Country, 2015), pp. 6-7, available at: https://bibliotecadigital.tse.jus.br/xmlui/bitstream/handle/bdtse/2718/2015_foruria_banning_political_parties.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

124. Above, as well as in my First Report, I have shown that the Mejlis is an organisation which pursues violent extremist tactics in its activities in accordance with international law. I point out in the First Report that the Mejlis has never been a legally established organisation as it has never attempted to register as a legal entity under either the Ukrainian or the Russian law, although both Ukrainian and Russian authorities have repeatedly suggested that it do so.⁹⁴
125. Ukraine argues that “the Mejlis, a body indirectly elected by the entire Crimean Tatar population, has long been recognized as the community’s authentic voice.”⁹⁵ The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minority Rights document “The integration of formerly deported people in Crimea, Ukraine” of August 2013 is cited as evidence.⁹⁶ In its Reply, Ukraine points out that “[a]ccording to a 2013 needs assessment for the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities, the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar People “is regarded by most Crimean Tatars as their representative body,” with turnout in the early phases of the 2013 Qurultay elections ranging between 57 and 68 per cent of the Crimean Tatar electorate.”⁹⁷ At the same time, it is worth noting that it is the representative nature of the Qurultay and not the Mejlis that is at issue here. Moreover, the High Commissioner's report contains ample evidence that the Mejlis was not the only universally recognised representative of Crimean Tatars even under Ukrainian jurisdiction:
- (a) The OSCE report states that “[s]ome, including the [Ukrainian] authorities, claim that Crimean Tatar support for the Mejlis is waning and cite evidence such as a recent decision by the Qurultay to lower the quorum for Crimean Tatar participation to one-third.”⁹⁸
 - (b) The OSCE report stated that in 1989 the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars (NMCT), founded in 1956, “was transformed into the ‘Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement’ (OCTNM), headed by Mustafa Dzhemilev. OCTNM

⁹⁴ Expert Report of Valery V. Engel, ¶¶423. See CERD Counter-Memorial, Annex 22.

⁹⁵ Reply, Chapter 11, ¶476.

⁹⁶ High Commissioner on National Minorities, *Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment* (August 2013), available at: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/104309.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Reply, Chapter 11, ¶477.

⁹⁸ High Commissioner on National Minorities, *Integration of Formerly Deported People in Crimea, Ukraine: Needs Assessment* (August 2013), available at: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/a/104309.pdf>.

advocated for immediate, large-scale return and national self-determination, while the minority faction of the NMTC that did not join the OCTNM preferred a more gradual approach in close co-operation with the then Soviet authorities. This division still exists within the Crimean Tatar community and has become more pronounced since, with some groups advocating for an even more radical approach while others prefer to work on establishing closer links with the authorities.”⁹⁹

- (c) The same OSCE report states that “to avoid a split Crimean Tatar vote in Ukraine’s winner-take-all electoral district system, Qurultay delegates are prohibited from running against candidates proposed by the Mejlis, upon penalty of expulsion from the Qurultay.” “This constraint on internal political pluralism,” the report stresses, “is sharply criticized as undemocratic by opponents of the Mejlis. As a result, several opposition groups such as ‘Milli Firqa’, the Sebat association of land squatters and other groups that have recently allied themselves in the ‘Crimean Tatar National Front’ (CTNF) fiercely challenge the Mejlis for the right to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatar people. This internal competition within the Crimean Tatar community is a source of constant tensions and is sometimes instrumentalized by the Crimean [Ukrainian] authorities.”¹⁰⁰
- (d) The OSCE report points out that already President Yushchenko stopped convening the Council of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar People on a regular basis, it being of the same composition as the Mejlis – a pragmatic decision by President Leonid Kuchma in 1999 due to the Mejlis' refusal to officially register as an NGO. Moreover, the document points out that “[the Council’s] composition was altered unilaterally by President Yanukovych in 2010, who reduced its membership from 33 to 19. Out of these, eight were also members of the Mejlis and 11 were selected from the Crimean Tatar opposition.”¹⁰¹

126. Thus, the Mejlis did not represent the entire Crimean Tatar people even during the period of Ukrainian control of Crimea. It was confirmed by activists of the Crimean Tatar national movement, among others. Back in 2011, the President of the “Fund for Research

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

and Support of Indigenous Peoples of Crimea” Nadir Bekirov said that “Milli Mejlis is far from being the entire Crimean Tatar national movement. Moreover, even by their own figures, they represent less than a third of the Crimean Tatar people. That is, there is no consolidated leadership of the Crimean Tatar people or even the movement, although the Milli Mejlis tries to claim this, hiding, in general, from everyone it can, that it is a smaller part of the movement.”¹⁰²

127. As can be seen, both representatives of the Crimean Tatar national movement and the Ukrainian authorities did not share the Mejlis' claim to sole political representation of the Crimean Tatars. Representation of various Crimean Tatar organizations, including those led by leaders opposed to the Mejlis, was supported by the authorities until 2014.
128. Overall, we can state that the Mejlis itself created conditions for its decline in popularity: first, by the clear disregard for democratic procedures in its work, including in the election process (see above), and second, by active participation of its leaders in Ukrainian political life on the side of one of the political forces. As a rule, those were liberal parties,¹⁰³ which made the Crimean Tatars hostage to the political ambitions of the Mejlis leadership and created problems when interacting with representatives of other forces in parliament, especially when they were in power. After all, the support of the Mejlis for liberals gave the outward impression that all Crimean Tatars supported them, even though many of them voted for other parties. It caused discontent among many of them.¹⁰⁴ Third, the Mejlis' use of violent methods and involvement in the energy and food blockade of Crimea and in the blowing up of power lines, which left large residential areas, including the Crimean Tatar population, without electricity, further undermined its influence within that ethnic group.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Political News Agency, *Nadir Bekirov: Crimean Tatars have only themselves to rely on* (17 January 2011), available at: <https://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=23544>.

¹⁰³ For example, Dzhemilev has in recent years been a member of the Ukrainian parliament from the Batkivshchyna and European Solidarity parties - author's note.

¹⁰⁴ Political News Agency, *Nadir Bekirov: Crimean Tatars have only themselves to rely on* (17 January 2011), available at: <https://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=23544>.

¹⁰⁵ Gazeta ru, *Alexandra Ippolitova, Crimea announces reward for catching organizers of water blockade* (17 March 2022), available at: <https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2022/03/17/17437141.shtml>.

129. Thus, the Mejlis has never functioned as a representative body of Crimean Tatars. Its credibility has fallen over the past few years, especially after it became involved in extremist activities.
130. Ukraine in its Reply claims that “Russia’s reference to some ‘other public organizations that continue to represent the Crimean Tatars in Crimea’ that purportedly ‘enjoy[] very high degrees of representativeness and legitimacy’ is without basis.”¹⁰⁶ However, as we can see, the entire previous history of the Mejlis shows that there have always been alternative organisations in Crimea that were supported by both the authorities and a significant part of the Crimean Tatar people. The situation has not changed today. Ukrain’s Reply mentions, for example, the “extraordinary session of the extended Qurultay of the Muslims of Crimea”, which took place on 17 February 2018 and at which the Council of the Crimean Tatar People was elected, or the “Shura” led by the Crimean Muslim Mufti Emirali Ablayev, whom the Ukrainian side calls an “renegade.”¹⁰⁷ However, he enjoys the trust and respect of many tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars today.¹⁰⁸
131. At the same time, the Shura is by no means the only organisation of Crimean Tatars in Crimea today. Under Federal Law No. 74-FZ “On National Cultural Autonomy”,¹⁰⁹ every minority ethnic community in the Russian Federation may form a cultural autonomy at the local, regional or federal level. Such a body has been officially established by Crimean Tatar organizations in Crimea. It is the “Regional National Cultural Autonomy of the Crimean Tatars of the Republic of Crimea”, which was registered on 19 April 2016 in Simferopol.¹¹⁰ Thus, there are a number of NGOs and religious organizations representing Crimean Tatars, which have different socio-political and cultural preferences, programmes and interests. They are the Regional Public Organization “Adalet - Justice”, the Crimean Republican Public Charitable Organization “Association of victims of illegal political repressions of the peoples of Crimea”, the Interregional

¹⁰⁶ Reply, Chapter 11, ¶484.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, ¶482.

¹⁰⁸ Primamedia ru, *Emirali Ablayev elected Mufti of Muslims for the fifth time* (27 October 2018), available at: <https://primamedia.ru/news/753444/>

¹⁰⁹ Federal Law No. 74-FZ “On National Cultural Autonomy”, 17 June 1996, available at: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/9578/page/1>.

¹¹⁰ Rusprofile, *OOO RNKA Crimean Tatars of the Republic of Crimea*, available at: <https://www.rusprofile.ru/id/10445522>.

Public Movement of the Crimean Tatar People “Qirim”, the Crimean Regional Public Organization of Social and Cultural Development “Milli Firka”, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol (DUMKS), the Spiritual Administration of Muslims “Tavrida Muftiyat”, etc.

132. Thus, there are quite a few alternative Crimean Tatar organisations in Crimea. While one can agree that the Mejlis remains an émigré organisation representing the interests of a small group of Crimean Tatars opposed to Russia and its presence in Crimea, one cannot today claim that it is a legitimate representative of the entire Crimean Tatar people living on the peninsula.
133. The conclusion of this section is that the prohibition of extremist, including terrorist, ethno-religious organisations is not a violation of the right to freedom of association for such groups, as the vast majority of people in the ethnic group, in this case Crimean Tatars, do not share extremist ideas, and because there are a sufficient number of alternative non-governmental and religious organisations that can function as their legitimate representation.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

134. I have shown in this Report, why the claims by the Ukrainian side and its expert Prof. Sheinin that the Russian anti-extremist legislation is allegedly incompatible with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are erroneous, misleading and fundamentally contradictory to the Convention itself.
135. First of all, I have proved the groundlessness of Prof. Sheinin's claim that countering hateful extremism is allegedly not, in itself, a legitimate goal and not seen as “legitimate in the eyes of the international community”. On the contrary, combating hateful extremism is a universally recognised legitimate goal, and the need to counter not only “violent” but also “hateful” extremism is recognised by numerous states around the world comprising billions of people.
136. Moreover, countering “hateful” extremism is an obligation of states under ICERD. Prof. Sheinin's assertion that “groups based on their ethnic origin express their ethnic identity” by advocating exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person and violating their rights,

freedoms and legitimate interests on the basis of their social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude towards religion, is discriminatory and inherently racist.

137. Further, I have demonstrated that protecting territorial integrity is not discriminatory, and a number of states, including Ukraine and EU countries, have legislation to this effect.
138. Besides the (“American”) model of countering violent extremism, there are other models that criminalise not only terrorism and everything related to it, but also the spread of hatred. A growing number of countries have resorted to the model of countering hateful extremism, guided, among other factors, by international treaties. I am not advocating any particular model of countering extremism; I have only identified the global trends in countering this phenomenon.
139. According to Article 4 of ICERD, Article 13 of PACE Resolution 1344 (2003), PACE Resolution 1754 (2010), Article 10.2 of the ECHR and in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations in its Report on the Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion (2008), incitement to hatred in itself already justifies criminal sanctions. Consequently, violence is not a necessary feature of extremism today. Its absence is quite legitimate, not only on the basis of a number of international documents cited, but also on the basis of the already extensive experience of the legislative and law enforcement practices of a growing number of countries around the world, which include many countries in Europe and Asia, such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Baltic States, the United Kingdom (Scotland), China, as well as the former Soviet Union, among others.
140. Accordingly, the Russian Federation's anti-extremist legislation is in line with these global trends. Moreover, the Russian law “On Combating Extremist Activity” mentions race, ethnicity, religious and linguistic groups as protected social groups. The presence of linguistic groups in the list of protected groups indicates that Russian legislation is aimed at protecting ethnic groups in the broadest sense.
141. Thus, Russian anti-extremist legislation does not prioritise issues of national security over the rights of ethnic minorities, because the spirit and letter of that legislation is aimed precisely at protecting those rights, and not vice versa. In other words, respect for the rights of the aforementioned minorities is one of the goals of the Russian Federation's anti-extremist policy. Consequently, there are no contradictions between the interests of

national security and those of ethnic and religious groups in Russia, which is natural for such a multi-ethnic country.

142. In line with the principles of countering hateful extremism, Russia, like countries such as France, Georgia, Ukraine and others, has criminalised repeated calls to change borders and violate the territorial integrity of the country. None of the ethnic groups living in Crimea is exempt from the law, so those of them who violate the relevant norms of administrative or criminal law are subject to liability on an equal basis.
143. Different approaches to crimes committed by members of the ethnic majority and an ethnic minority are not acceptable, as this violates the most important democratic principle - the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, and contradicts the Russian and international law.
144. Prosecution for actions related to the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation is carried out under the law and on the same grounds as in other countries of the world without distinction as to the ethnic, religious or other origin of the offender. Ethnic groups in Crimea are not isolated or opposed to each other on the basis of political views.
145. Banned organisations (Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, Mejlis) are extremist not only under the Russian anti-extremist legislation, but also according to the international law and international law enforcement practices, given the goals of those organisations and methods they employ.
146. The predominance of Crimean Tatars among the members of those organisations can be explained by the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat (recognised as extremist organisations in the Russian Federation) are organisations that admit only Muslims, which in Crimea are mostly Crimean Tatars; while the Mejlis is an organisation established in the 1980s, which initially admitted only people related to the Crimean Tatar ethnic group.
147. It has nothing to do with discrimination, as there is no unequal treatment of one ethnic group compared to another: religious and non-religious organizations that include members of a wide range of ethnic groups operate legally in Crimea. In a similar way are banned other extremist groups unrelated to ethnic Muslims.

148. Besides, the “Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People”, which is declared by Ukraine to be a “legitimate representative organization of the Crimean Tatars”, was not such even during Ukraine's control of Crimea, as it has never, de jure or de facto, represented all Crimean Tatars on the peninsula. In today's Crimea there are a number of Crimean Tatar NGOs that claim to have such representation. There are more than 150 legal religious Islamic and several hundred non-governmental organizations that comprise Crimean Tatars, representing them in varying degrees by virtue of their specialisation.
149. In accordance with Russian legislation, a “Regional National Cultural Autonomy of the Crimean Tatars of the Republic of Crimea” was established in Crimea. The interests of Crimean Tatars are represented by the Council of the Crimean Tatar People, or “Shura”, elected by the Qurultay of Muslims of Crimea in February 2018, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Sevastopol and dozens of other non-governmental organisations, each with its own specific goals and objectives.

X. EXPERT DECLARATION

150. I confirm that all issues on which I have given my opinion are within my competence and professional knowledge.
151. I understand that it is my duty to assist the International Court of Justice in resolving issues dealt with in this Report. I have discharged that responsibility and will continue to do so in the future.
152. I confirm that the conclusions I have reached in this Report are unbiased, objective and impartial; they have not been influenced by the proceedings or by any of the parties to the proceedings.

Expert

[Signature] _____

Valery Viktorovich Engel

Moscow, 28 February 2023

Annex 20

Expert Report of Viktor Viktorovich Merkuryev, 1 March 2023

(translation)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION**

(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

**EXPERT REPORT OF
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A. QUALIFICATIONS

1. My name is Viktor Viktorovich Merkuryev. I have been working in the procuracy system since 2008, first as a leading researcher, then as head of the department for issues of countering organised crime, terrorism and extremism. Since 2018, I have been head of the department for scientific support of procuratorial supervision and the strengthening of legality in the sphere of federal security, interethnic relations and countering extremism at the Research Institute of the University of Procuracy of the Russian Federation. I hold the rank of Senior Counsellor of Justice. Prior to joining the procuracy service, I was head of the criminal law and criminology department and deputy head of Vladimir Law Institute of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FPS of Russia).
2. In 1993, I graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod Higher School of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA of Russia), qualifying as a lawyer. From 1995 to 1998, I took postgraduate studies as an adjunct at Ryazan Institute of Law and Economics of the MIA of Russia and in 1998 defended my Candidate of Sciences thesis on the topic of ‘Necessary Defence: Criminal Law and Criminological Aspects’ there. In 2007, I defended my Doctor of Sciences thesis at the Academy of Law and Management of the FPS of Russia on the topic of ‘Theoretical and methodological problems of the criminal law support of a person’s right to civil self-defence.’ On 15 October 2008, I was awarded the academic title of professor at the department of criminal law and criminology. I am a member of the Dissertation Council D 170.001.02 at the University of Procuracy of the Russian Federation since 2012.
3. The main areas of my research are terrorism, extremism, organised crime, organised resistance to countering crime, necessary defence and criminal law instruments of civil self-defence, national security, interethnic relations and penitentiary crime. I have published over 250 scientific works, including 10 monographs (some of them co-authored), 5 textbooks, 10 study guides, 4 commentaries to the Criminal Code and the Penal Enforcement Code of the Russian Federation.
4. This Report provides an analysis of the legislative history of the Russian Federation and law enforcement practice on countering extremism and assesses their compliance with international human rights standards. In addition, I have considered Professor Sheinin’s statements regarding the abovementioned legislation.

B. HISTORY OF RUSSIAN LEGISLATION ON COUNTERING EXTREMIST ACTIVITY

5. Acknowledgement of special danger of extremist threats and recognition of counteraction to extremism as one of important directions of state law enforcement activity was first reflected in Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 310 dated 23 March 1995 ‘On measures of providing coordinated actions of state authorities in countering manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism in the Russian Federation.’ In particular, the Decree stated that

‘Incidents of dissemination of fascist ideas have become more frequent in the Russian Federation.[...].

The activities of political extremists, many of whom openly claim ideological affinity with National Socialism and use fascist or similar slogans, insignia and symbols, deeply offend the memory of the victims of the Great Patriotic War and the feelings of veterans cherished by Russians. In the year of the 50th anniversary of Victory over Hitler's Germany, such actions are particularly provocative[...].

There is little response from the state and local authorities to these processes, which threaten the constitutional order.

The norms that provide the legal basis for a real fight against this phenomenon, and above all the provision of Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation prohibiting the establishment and activities of associations whose aims or actions are unconstitutional, are hardly ever applied.’

6. The idea of anti-extremist legislation was thus prompted by a desire to halt the spread of fascist ideology, which is unacceptable to the Russian society, and to provide real counteraction to incitement to social, racial, national and religious enmity, since such acts clearly constitute a serious threat to the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional people of the Russian Federation.
7. Presidential Decree No. 1143 of 27 October 1997 set up the Commission for Countering Political Extremism in the Russian Federation. It comprised representatives of law enforcement agencies, the Presidential Administration and the State Duma of the Russian Federation. The Commission had an Expert Council headed by O.E. Kutafin, a well-known Russian legal scholar and one of the developers of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The Commission came to the conclusion that it was necessary to draft federal laws aimed at countering extremism in the country.

8. In 1999, the Government of the Russian Federation submitted the draft Law “On Countering Political Extremism” to the State Duma.¹ On 9 February 2001, parliamentary hearings were held in the State Duma of the Russian Federation to discuss the problems of countering political extremism and banning the dissemination of Nazi symbolism in the Russian Federation. Participants in the hearings noted, in particular, that the creation of illegal armed units, security services and self-defence units attached to certain extremist movements increased the violent potential of political extremism, which made it urgent to amend the Russian legislation so as to make it possible to combat extremist manifestations and their causes.²
9. In the process of considering the draft law “On Countering Political Extremism”, it was decided to include not only political extremism but also other types of extremism in its subject matter. As a result, Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 “On Countering Extremist Activity” was adopted, defining extremism and setting out the direction and principles for countering the same. Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 was subsequently amended to reflect the evolution of extremist threats, and currently covers:
- (a) Forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional order and/or violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation,
 - (b) Public justification of terrorism,
 - (c) Incitement to social, racial, national or religious strife; propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the grounds of his/her social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion;
 - (d) Violation of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of a person and citizen on the grounds of his/her social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude towards religion;

¹ Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 855-r of 4 June 1999 “On draft Federal Laws “On Countering Political Extremism” and “On Introduction of Amendments and Additions to Legislative Acts in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law “On Countering Political Extremism”, available at: <https://www.szrf.ru/szrf/doc.php?nb=100&issid=1001999024000&dodid=1877>.

² State Duma of the Russian Federation, Information and Analytical Materials of the State Duma, available at: <http://iam.duma.gov.ru/node/1/4170>.

- (e) Obstructing citizens from exercising their electoral rights by violence or threat of violence;
 - (f) Obstruction of lawful activities of state bodies and religious associations or other organisations, combined with violence or threat of violence;
 - (g) Use of Nazi insignia or symbols,
 - (h) Mass dissemination of manifestly extremist materials, as well as their production or possession for the purpose of mass distribution;
 - (i) Consciously false public accusation against a person holding a public office of the Russian Federation.³
10. As stated in the preamble to Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002, its purpose is to protect human and civil rights and freedoms and the foundations of the constitutional order and to ensure the integrity and security of the Russian Federation by providing a legal and organisational basis for countering extremist activities and establishing liability for the performance thereof.
11. Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 was adopted as a further development of the constitutional provisions and corresponding international legal norms that are part of the legal system of the Russian Federation. Thus, Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 has become a conventional and framework law incorporating the provisions of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of 15 June 2001 ratified by the Russian Federation.⁴
12. It should be noted that Russian legislation to combat extremist activity has evolved in line with and at the same time as international efforts in this area. The first official definition of the term ‘extremism’ was formulated in the above-mentioned Shanghai Convention of

³ Federal Law No 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 “On Countering Extremist Activity” (translation into English), Arti. 1, available at: https://legislationline.org/sites/default/files/documents/f6/Russian_Federation_Law_Counter_Extremism_2002_am2020.pdf.

⁴ Russia has ratified that document (Federal Law No. 3-FZ of 10 January 2003 “On the ratification of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, available at: <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&firstDoc=1&lastDoc=1&nd=102079694>).

15 June 2001. That convention and the definitions contained in it had a significant impact on the formation of Russian anti-extremist legislation, as will be discussed below.

13. As will be shown below, the application of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002, within the framework of the constitutional requirements for the protection of human rights, which in turn reflect corresponding norms of international law, is made more specific by individual sectoral laws, in particular the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) of the Russian Federation, as well as in the court practice. Thus, the development of sectoral anti-extremist legislation has resulted in a range of legal norms providing for both criminal and administrative liability for unlawful acts related to extremism, which in practice makes it possible to combat manifestations of extremism more effectively. Considerable attention in application of the Law is paid to preventive measures.
14. It should also be noted that a very significant recent trend in Russian law-making is decriminalisation of anti-extremist legislation.
 - (a) Thus, in order to exempt persons whose actions do not pose a serious threat to the constitutional order of the Russian Federation from criminal liability, Federal Law No. 519-FZ of 27 December 2018 ‘On Amendments to Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation’ significantly limited the scope of Article 282 of the Criminal Code (incitement of hatred or hostility, as well as humiliation of human dignity) by introducing a mechanism of administrative prejudice: first-time committers of incitement of hatred or hostility, as well as humiliation of human dignity, bear administrative liability (Article 20.3(1) of the CAO), while criminal liability (Article 282 of the Criminal Code) is established only in case of repeated commission of the said unlawful act within a year or in the presence of aggravating circumstances. Thus, the legislator has decriminalised a significant portion of acts falling under Article 282 of the Criminal Code;
 - (b) Federal Law No. 421-FZ of 02 December 2019 ‘On amendments to Article 6 of the Federal Law “On the Commemoration of Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945” and Article 1 of the Federal Law “On countering extremist activities”’ lifted the absolute ban on the use of Nazi insignia and symbols. Its use is now permitted on condition that a negative attitude towards the

ideology of Nazism is formed and there is no indication of propaganda or justification of Nazism. In 2020, a note of similar content was added to Article 20.3 of the CAO of the Russian Federation.

15. Thus, the anti-extremist legislation of the Russian Federation was adopted after the collapse of the USSR many years before the reunification of Crimea with Russia. Its adoption was caused by manifestations of fascism and other forms of political extremism, has no connection with the reunification of Crimea with Russia and was developed in conjunction with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 is a framework law and, as will be shown below, is specified in the norms of the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation.

C. APPLICATION OF THE LAW ON COUNTERING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

16. Pursuant to Article 3 of Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002, the main areas of anti-extremist activity are as follows:
 - (a) Preventive activities aimed at eliminating circumstances and factors contributing to the development of unlawful extremist behaviour;
 - (b) Identification and prevention of the extremist activities of specific individuals and entities.
17. Extremism is currently countered through a range of general and specific mechanisms based on relevant international and domestic laws and regulations. A comprehensive approach to countering extremism is ensured through a combination of precaution, prevention and suppression, as well as inter-agency cooperation with active participation of a number of authorised state bodies of the Russian Federation (Prosecutor's Office, Investigative Committee, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring), Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor), etc.) under the key role of courts.
18. Judicial review is undoubtedly the most effective way of protecting the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of individuals and citizens, since judicial proceedings, regardless of their form, involve compliance with the principles of independence of judges,

adversariality, equality of the parties, transparency and openness, while criminal proceedings, in addition, involve the presumption of innocence, free qualified legal assistance and the right to protection against unwarranted prosecution, which ensures objectivity and legality and excludes unwarranted prosecution.

19. Thus, Article 9 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 provides procuratorial bodies with the authority and legal means to apply to the courts to declare organisations extremist and prohibit their activities (or, in case they have organisational and legal status, to liquidate them) in order to suppress and prevent offences against State and public security. In order to ensure the protection of rights and freedoms, the final decision in such cases is taken solely by the courts; procuratorial bodies can only initiate this process.
20. In accordance with article 13 of Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002, it is prohibited to disseminate extremist materials in the Russian Federation or to produce or store such materials for the purpose of dissemination. This provision of the Law is applied in accordance with Article 10 of Federal Law No. 149 of 27 July 2006 ‘On information, information technologies and protection of information,’ which provides that dissemination of information in the Russian Federation can be done freely on condition of compliance with requirements set by the law of the Russian Federation. The dissemination of information aimed at war propaganda or inciting ethnic, racial or religious hatred or enmity is prohibited, as is the dissemination of other information punishable under criminal or administrative law.
21. Information materials are recognised extremist by a federal court at the place of discovery, dissemination or location of the organisation having produced such materials, based on a procurator's application or in the corresponding administrative, civil, or criminal proceedings (Art. 265.8 of the Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure). The court also rules to confiscate information materials at the same time as it rules to declare them extremist. A copy of a decision that enters into legal force is sent by the court within three days to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, as the federal authority for state registration, which enters them in the Federal Register of Extremist Materials within 30 days. The procedure for maintaining the Register is strictly regulated and approved by Order of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation No. 289 dated 11 December 2015 ‘On the Procedure for Maintaining the Federal Register of Extremist

Materials.’ The Register itself is available on the Internet on the official website of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation; it is also subject to publication in the media.

22. Thus, an exclusively judicial procedure for declaring materials extremist is contemplated. A mandatory prerequisite for such a decision by the court is linguistic expert examination with a positive conclusion that the materials contain extremist features.
23. In accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ of 27 July 2006 ‘On information, information technologies and protection of information,’ competent authorities have the right to request Roskomnadzor to restrict access to information materials of organisations whose activities have been recognised as extremist, and also to information containing substantiation and/or justification of extremist activities.
24. That administrative procedure includes a number of steps to ensure compliance with the law. Thus, an authorised body initiates such procedure on the basis of inspection materials only as a last resort, when all other possibilities have been exhausted, or when the relevant actors do not respond to prescriptions and warnings. In order to block a website containing prohibited information, it is first entered into the relevant register. The grounds for this can be either a decision by Roskomnadzor,⁵ a court decision, or an order from a bailiff. Then the relevant hosting provider is identified and notified. The provider, in turn, must inform the owner of the website of the requirement to remove the prohibited information. If the website owner ignores that notification, the hosting provider will restrict access to the website. If the provider fails to comply, access to the site will be restricted by the telecom operator. In any case, all decisions by state authorities in this matter can be challenged in court.⁶
25. On 23 November 2015, in order to avoid any contradictions in the interpretation of provisions of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 with the constitutional right to freely choose, have and disseminate religious and other beliefs,⁷ Federal Law No. 314-FZ made amendments to the aforesaid Federal Law, according to which the main sacred

⁵ Regulation on the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technologies and Mass Media (approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 228 of 16 March 2009) article 5.1.7.1, available at: <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102128289>.

⁶ Code of Administrative Judicial Procedure of the Russian Federation, Article 218, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_176147/98b69fee6357343965f5b57193fcaaa54b0f21e4.

⁷ Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 28, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_28399/69de606a34754e42f0767090ca6c640885cdf63d.

texts of Christians, Muslims, Jews and Buddhists may not be recognised as extremist. The Law applies to the full texts and quotations from the Bible, the Koran, the Tanakh and the Ganjur.

26. The current Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation No. 195-FZ of 30 December 2001 contains a number of special norms prescribing liability for various manifestations of extremism:
 - (a) Article 13.15(2) of the CAO - for disseminating information about a public association or other organisation on the published list of public and religious associations and other organisations in respect of which there is an enforceable court decision to liquidate or ban their activities on grounds prescribed by Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 'On Countering Extremist Activities';
 - (b) Art. 13.37 of the CAO - for distribution of information with extremist content by the owner of an audio-visual service;
 - (c) Article. 20.3 of the CAO - for propaganda or public display of Nazi, extremist and other legally prohibited insignia or symbols;
 - (d) Art. 20.3(1) of the CAO - for incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity;
 - (e) Art. 20.3(2) of the CAO - for public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;
 - (f) Art. 20.3(3) of the CAO - for public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, maintaining international peace and security, or the exercise by state bodies of the Russian Federation of their powers for such purposes;
 - (g) Art. 20.29 of the CAO - for the production and distribution of extremist materials.
27. At the same time, the sanctions of these norms provide for a combination of an administrative fine and confiscation of the instrument or object of the administrative offence, which allows not only to prosecute the offenders, but also to seize, for example, materials of extremist content, equipment suitable for their production and distribution,

etc. The legislator's focus with such offenders is, to a greater extent, on influencing them through material losses.

28. Criminal liability is an extreme and exceptional form of coercion. At the same time, the application of criminal law measures for the commission of extremist crimes is regulated in detail and is based on the recognition of and respect for human rights and freedoms.
29. In each specific case, it must be established that the person who posted the extremist material was aware that the act was aimed at violating the foundations of the constitutional order and that it was intended to incite hatred or enmity or to disparage a person or group on the grounds of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or membership of a social group.⁸
30. A person's intention to incite hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity, is evidenced, in particular, by the use of extremist materials in combination with statements justifying and/or asserting the need for genocide, mass repression, deportation or the commission of other illegal acts, including the use of violence, against members of a nation or a race, or adherents of a particular religion.⁹
31. Criminal prosecution is generally only permissible following administrative prosecution for similar acts, i.e. when there is a repeat commission of an extremist act (Arts. 280.1 , 280.3 , 282, 282.4 of the Criminal Code), which follows from paragraph 14.
32. For example, liability under Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code is incurred if public calls for actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation are made by a person within one year of being held administratively liable for a similar act under Article 20.3.2, paragraph 1 or 2, of the CAO. This circumstance allows the courts to impose punishment only on persons with persistent extremist convictions.
33. The aforesaid provision of the Criminal Code is applied uniformly throughout the Russian Federation regardless of the nationality of the person being criminally prosecuted, and one should note that courts rarely convict the guilty party to actual deprivation of liberty.

⁸ Resolution No. 11 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 28 June 2011 "On judicial practice in criminal cases involving extremist offences", ¶8, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_115712.

⁹ *Ibid.*, ¶7.

For example, the following persons have been criminally prosecuted under Article 280.1 of the Criminal Code:

- (a) V. Zavarkin - for calling for the secession of the Republic of Karelia from the Russian Federation; sentenced to a fine;¹⁰
- (b) Y. Avdoshkin - for calling for the secession of the Republic of Komi from the Russian Federation; sentenced to compulsory labour;¹¹
- (c) A. Nikolaev - for calling for the secession of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) from the Russian Federation; sentenced to compulsory labour;¹²
- (d) V. Melnikov - for calling for the secession of the Kotelnikovo District of Volgograd Oblast from the Russian Federation; sentenced to compulsory labour;¹³
- (e) O. Bystrukhina - for calling for the secession of Siberia from the Russian Federation; sentenced to a suspended sentence of imprisonment, without actually serving time in prison.¹⁴

It follows from the above that the Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activities is concretised and applied through the provisions of the Criminal Code and the CAO. The law enforcement agencies' efforts in implementing the Law are aimed at preventing crimes. The rights of persons involved in unlawful acts are restricted on the basis of court decisions. As a rule, criminal prosecution is allowed only after administrative liability has been incurred for similar acts, i.e. when an extremist act has been repeatedly committed.

¹⁰ RAPSİ, Karelian Deputy Is Fined at 30 Thousand Roubles for Separatism Calling (27 November 2015), available at: https://rapsinews.ru/judicial_news/20151127/274990719.html

¹¹ Sentence of Syktyvkar City Court of the Republic of Komi of 03 June 2015 in case N 1-502/2015, available at: <https://sudact.ru/regular/doc/SfcvVdxvC0dv/>.

¹² Sentence of the Mirny District Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) of 08 July 2020 in case N 1-110/2020, available at: https://mirny-jak.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=60395772&case_uid=e8854dd-ee1e-445b-b7dd-3b4e105538cc&dello_id=1540006.

¹³ Sentence of the Kotelnikovo District Court of Volgograd Region of 23 August 2017 in case No. 1-64/2017, available at: https://kotel-vol.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=359610435&case_uid=f8ee32aa-d64d-4005-b9ae-7378190a91d9&dello_id=1540006.

¹⁴ Sentence of Choi District Court of the Republic of Altai dated 17 February 2017 in case No. 1-13/2017, available at: https://choisky-ralt.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&srv_num=1&name_op=case&case_id=51588231&case_uid=7220b1b8-ef29-402c-aa71-a8d6455780ac&dello_id=1540006.

D. STATISTICS ON STATE ACTIVITY AGAINST EXTREMISM SHOW NO DISCRIMINATION

34. As of 17 February 2023, the list of extremist organisations includes 101 public or religious organizations.¹⁵ Analysing the list, one can see that ethnic or religious orientation of such organisations is different and does not give grounds to deduce the discriminatory nature of the legislation, at the very least due to the fact that, out of all organisations included in the above list, an overwhelming majority (77) belong to the organisations of pseudo-religious¹⁶ and pseudo-Russian nationalist nature¹⁷ not related to the peoples living on the

¹⁵ Website of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, *List of Public Associations and Religious Organisations, in respect of which a court has made an enforceable decision to liquidate or ban their activities on the grounds provided by Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25.07.2002 'On Counteracting Extremist Activity' (25.11.2022)*, available at: <https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/documents/7822/>.

¹⁶ Religious Group Krasnodar Orthodox Slavic Community 'VEK RA' (Vedic Culture of Russian Aryans) of Scythian Vesi Rassenia (Judgment of Krasnodar Regional Court dated 05.10.2006 to prohibit activity); Local religious organisation Asgard Slavic Community of Spiritual Administration of Asgard Vesi Belovodya of Ancient Russian Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-Ynglings (Judgment of Omsk Regional Court dated 30.04.2006 to liquidate); Local religious organisation Slavic Community of the Temple of Veda of Perun of Spiritual Administration of Asgard Vesi Belovodya of Ancient Russian Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-Ynglings (Judgment of Omsk regional court of 30.04.2004 to liquidate), Religious Organisation Men Religious Seminary Religious Institution of Professional Religious Education Ancient Russian Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-Ynglings (Judgment of Omsk Regional Court of 30.04.2004 to liquidate), Religious Group of O.V.Sokolov, V.V. Russkikh and A.G. Petin, confessing, cultivating and disseminating the ideas of the doctrine of the Ancient Russian Yngliist Church of Orthodox Starover-Ynglings (Judgment of the Maikop District Court of the Republic of Adygea of 12.12.2008), the Orthodox religious group 'In honor of the Icon of the Mother of God 'Derzhavnaya' (Judgment of the Tula Regional Court of 25.07.2016 and the Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 21.03.2017) (date of posting: 01.08.2018), Local religious organisation Jehovah's Witnesses 'Taganrog' (Judgment of the Rostov Regional Court of 11.09.2009 and Ruling of the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 08.12.2009), Religious Group 'Noble Order of the Devil' (Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Mordovia of 27.12.2010), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses in Samara (Judgment of the Samara Regional Court of 29.05.2014 and Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Russian Federation Supreme Court of 12.11.2014) (date of posting: 20.03.2015), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses of Abinsk (Judgment of the Krasnodar Regional Court of 04.03.2015 and Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 05.08.2015) (date of posting: 11.12.2015), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses of Sary Oskol (Judgment of the Belgorod Regional Court of 10.02.2016 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 16.06.2016 (date of posting: 13.09.2016), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses of Belgorod City (Judgment of Belgorod Regional Court dated 11.02.2016 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 09.09.2016) (date of posting: 13.09.2016), The local religious organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses of Elista (Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kalmykia of 25.02.2016 and the Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 07.07.2016) (date of posting: 30.11.2016), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses 'Oryol' (Judgment of the Oryol Regional Court of 14.06.2016 and the Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 18.10.2016) (date of posting: 23.12.2016), Local Religious Organisation of Jehovah's Witnesses in the city of Birobidzhan (Judgment of the Court of the Jewish Autonomous Region of 03.10.2016 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 09.02.2017) (date of posting: 06.04.2017), Religious organisation 'Administrative Centre of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia' and local religious organisations (395 branches) that are part of its structure;

¹⁷ Ryazan city public patriotic organisation 'Russian national unity' (in absentia judgment of Ryazan Railway district court of 12.02.2008 and ruling of Ryazan Railway district court of 24.12.2009), the Tatarstan regional

territory of the Republic of Crimea, and only 8 of them, *i.e.* less than 10%, are Ukrainian extremist organisations.

35. Similarly, the vast majority of banned extremist materials (which are audio-visual materials¹⁸ as well as a small number of printed publications¹⁹) are pseudo-religious and openly Nazi in nature, and no more than 0.5% of banned extremist materials could be attributed to Ukrainian or Crimean-Tatar oriented materials.²⁰
36. While before 2017, there was a tendency for the number of registered extremist crimes to grow, in subsequent years the situation reversed. In 2018 a tendency of annual growth of extremist crimes stopped with a decrease recorded in 2018.²¹ In 2018 and 2019, 1,265

branch of the all-Russian patriotic movement 'Russian national unity' (Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan of 21.05.2003), the Inter-regional association 'Russian nationwide union' (decision of the Vladimir regional court of 30.05.2011 and Ruling of the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 06.09.2011), Public association (movement) 'Omsk organisation of public political movement 'Russian national unity' (Judgment of Omsk regional court of 10.10.2002), Community of Native Russian people of Shchelkovsky district of Moscow region (Judgment of Shchelkovsky city court of Moscow region of 25.02.2014) (date of posting: 20.08.2014), Interregional Public Association 'Ethnopolitical Association 'Russians' (decision of the Moscow City Court of 28.10.2015 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 11.05.2016) (date of posting: 26.08.2016); The Regional Public Association 'Russian National Association 'Ataka' (decision of the Moscow City Court of 11.08.2016) (date of posting: 24.10.2016), Community of Native Russians of Astrakhan Oblast (decision of the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan city) (date of posting: 24.10.2016), Community of Native Russians of the city of Astrakhan, Astrakhan Oblast (Judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of Astrakhan city) (date of posting: 30.11.2016), Interregional Public Association 'Russian Republic of Rus' (Judgment of the Moscow City Court of 20.05.2020) (date of posting: 24.08.2020), Regional Public Association 'Russian Patriotic Club-Novokuznetsk/RPC' (Judgment of the Central District Court of Novokuznetsk in the Kemerovo Region of 07.12.2020 and Appeal Ruling of the Judicial Board for Administrative Cases of the Kemerovo Regional Court of 04.03.2021) (date of posting: 02.07.2021);

¹⁸ For example, the audio file of the performer Christ the Saviour and Mother Earth Ensemble entitled: 'You are Banned', lasting 2 minutes and 43 seconds, beginning with the words 'You are banned from war and victory...' and ending with 'F.. king beat, burn and hang', available on the Internet (Judgment of the Central District Court of Krasnoyarsk of 27.07.2021) or a video recording titled 'William Pearce - truth about Kikes,' 14 minutes 51 seconds long, beginning with 'Hello, at the end of another radio interview' and ending with 'because there are still those who deny the Holocaust', posted on the Internet (Judgment of the Maikop city court of the Republic of Adygeya of 19.08.2021);

¹⁹ For example, Joseph Goebbels' work entitled 'Nazi-Soci: Questions and Answers for the National Socialist', consisting of 24 sections, starting with the section 'The 10 Commandments of the National Socialist', ending with the section 'German Freedom', beginning with the words 'Motherland is the main driving force of your life. Never forget that!' ending with 'Then we will form a new Germany - a nationalist, socialist Third Reich!' (Judgment of the Central District Court of Barnaul dated 03.03.2022);

²⁰ Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, *Extremist Materials*, available at: <https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/extremist-materials/>.

²¹ Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, *Legal Statistics Portal*, available at: http://crimestat.ru/offenses_chart.

and 585 of such crimes were recorded, respectively.²² Thus, in 2019 there was more than a twofold reduction in absolute numbers.

37. In addition, it should be noted that the reunification of Crimea with Russia did not lead to an increase in the number of recorded crimes of the category under review; on the contrary, in the year of reunification the growth rate of this type of crimes even slowed down. Thus, in 2013 it was a 28.7% growth, in 2014 (the year of Crimea's reunification with Russia) – just half of that - 15.4%, in 2015 - 28.5 % (lower than in 2013) and in 2016 - 9.1% (three times lower than in 2013).²³ In other words, there was no spike in crime related to extremist activities during the reunification of Crimea with Russia, which testifies that there is no discrimination on the part of the Russian Federation in relation to various kinds of public organisations operating in the Republic of Crimea.
38. Since 2020, extremist crime has been characterised by a growing trend, driven by increased activity of members of international extremist and terrorist organisations against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was affirmed, among others, by the UN Secretary-General in December 2020.²⁴
39. In the structure of crime as a whole, the share of extremist crimes remains insignificant. For example, in 2022 the share of such crimes was less than 0.08% (1,566 out of 1,966,795).²⁵
40. A majority of extremist crimes are recorded in the Central Federal District. The Moscow region traditionally accounts for the highest proportion of such crimes. In 2022, the highest numbers of extremist crimes among the federal subjects of the Russian Federation were recorded in Moscow (280), Stavropol Krai (60) and the Republic of Dagestan (56) (see figure 1).

²² Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, *Legal Statistics Portal*, available at: http://crimestat.ru/offenses_chart.

²³ Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, *Legal Statistics Portal*, available at: http://crimestat.ru/offenses_chart.

²⁴ UN News, *Taking Advantage of Pandemic Difficulties, Terrorists and Extremists Are Increasingly Active* (11 December 2020), available at: <https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/12/1392252>

²⁵ Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, *Legal Statistics Portal*, available at: http://crimestat.ru/offenses_table.




Figure 1 - Number of recorded extremist crimes by federal district in 2022

Legend:

(left column, top to bottom) Central Federal District – 492/31.4% (Moscow – 280, Moscow Oblast – 30, Belgorod Oblast – 21); Southern Federal District – 185/11.85% (Republic of Crimea – 47, Rostov Oblast – 42, Krasnodar Krai – 23); Northern Caucasus Federal District – 167/10.7% (Stavropol Krai – 60, Rep. of Dagestan – 56, Kabardino-Balkar Rep. – 18); North-West Federal District – 87/5.6% (St. Petersburg – 31, Rep. of Komi – 13, Kaliningrad Oblast – 10);

(right column, top to bottom): Privolzhsky Federal District – 239/15.3% (Saratov Oblast – 36, Samara Oblast – 31, Perm Krai – 21); Ural Federal District – 56/3.6% (Kurgan Oblast – 47, Sverdlovsk Oblast – 13, Chelyabinsk Oblast – 13); Siberian Federal District – 173/11% (Krasnoyarsk Krai – 42, Kemerovo Oblast – 33, Novosibirsk Oblast – 22); Far-Eastern Federal District – 115/7.3% (Primorsky Krai – 32, Khabarovsk Krai – 23, Amur Oblast – 15)

41. At the same time the Republic of Crimea, whose population numbers about 2.5 million people, accounted for just 47 such crimes, which is only 3% of all registered extremist crimes. This is proportion-wise less than, for example, in the capital of Russia - Moscow, where 280 extremist crimes were registered per 13 million population, *i.e.* about 17.9% of extremist crimes registered in the entire territory of Russia in 2022. Thus, with a 5 times larger population, the number of extremist crimes in Moscow is almost 6 times higher, which indicates absence of any disproportionality as regards Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians.
42. For extremist crimes, predominantly non-custodial sentences are imposed. In 2021, 101 persons were sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment.²⁶
43. Finally, due to the fact that the activities of certain extremist organisations banned in Russia was permitted in Ukraine (Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat), law enforcement authorities granted Crimean residents a transition period of application of anti-extremist

²⁶ Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Judicial Statistics Data, 'Report on the number of persons convicted and types of criminal punishment', available at: http://www.cdep.ru/userimages/Statistika_zameni/10.1-svod-2021.xls.

legislation, i.e. did not prosecute them for at least 1 year for participating in the activities of such extremist organisations and did not seize extremist literature from them.²⁷

44. It follows from the abovesaid that organisations carrying out their activities on the territory of the Republic of Crimea have not been subjected to discriminatory persecution by the Russian Federation. Extremist crimes constitute an insignificant part of all crimes committed in the Russian Federation. Such crimes are fought with throughout the entire territory of Russia. The highest number of crimes is recorded in the Moscow region. The reunification of Crimea with Russia did not have a significant impact on the number of extremist crimes on record.

E. FEDERAL LAW ON COUNTERING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES WAS ADOPTED ON THE BASIS, AND IS APPLIED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK, OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

45. Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 was adopted to develop the constitutional provisions and corresponding norms of international law that are part of the Russian legal system. Federal Law No. 114 of 25 July 2002 became a conventional and framework law that, inter alia, implements the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, ratified by the Russian Federation.
46. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, establishing that the individual, his rights and freedoms are of supreme value and recognising ideological diversity as one of the foundations of the constitutional order, guarantees everyone freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or collectively any religion or not to profess any, to freely choose, have and disseminate religious or other beliefs and act in accordance with them; freedom of thought and speech; the right to seek, receive, transmit, impart and disseminate religious or other beliefs and act in accordance with them; freedom to seek, obtain, produce and disseminate information by any legal method (Arts. 2, 13(1), 28.1 and 29(1), 29(4)), and other rights and freedoms, including the right to association and freedom of public association activities (Art. 30(1)); said freedoms determining the meaning, content and application of laws, activity of legislative and

²⁷ As far as I understand, this practice of law-enforcement authorities is described in A.G. Zhafyarov witness statement.

- executive powers, and local self-government, and are ensured by the judicial system (Art. 18).
47. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, taking into consideration the importance of promoting civil peace and harmony, preserving the historically established state unity and ensuring the well-being and prosperity of the present and future generations of the multi-ethnic people of Russia (Preamble), proceeds from the principle that the exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms must not violate the rights and freedoms of others (Art. 17(3)).
 48. The Constitution of the Russian Federation prohibits the establishment and activities of public associations whose goals or actions are aimed at a violent change in the foundations of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining the security of the State, setting up armed formations and inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity (Art. 13(5)).
 49. Also prohibited is any form of restriction of the rights of citizens on social, racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds (Article 19(2)); propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and enmity, and propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic superiority (Article 29(2)).
 50. The aforesaid constitutional provisions conform with Articles 18, 19 and 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948), Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966 by Resolution 2200 (XXI) at the 1496th plenary session of the UN General Assembly), Article 5 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted in 1965 by the UN General Assembly and entered into force on 01 January 1969) and other international legal acts.
 51. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifies that any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence should be prohibited by law.
 52. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in Article 5, imposes an obligation on states that have adopted it to prohibit and eliminate discrimination in all forms.

53. According to Article 15.4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, international treaties of the Russian Federation are an integral part of its legal system. Such a conclusion follows not only from Article 15, but also from the content of other norms of the Russian Constitution. For example, Article 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, devoted to the protection of human and civil rights and fundamental freedoms, recognises and guarantees such rights in accordance with the universally recognised principles and norms of international law and in accordance with the Constitution.
54. In accordance with Resolution No. 8 of 31 October 1995 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ‘On certain questions concerning the application by the courts of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in the administration of justice,’ in administering justice the courts must proceed from the fact that the commonly recognised principles and norms of international law, contained in international agreements, conventions and other instruments (in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and international treaties of the Russian Federation, are, pursuant to Article 15(4) of the Constitution, a constituent part of its legal system.
55. The above provisions of the Constitution and international legal instruments have been reflected in the Federal Law ‘On Countering Extremist Activities.’
56. Thus, Article 2 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002, setting out the basic principles for countering extremist activity, gives priority to the principle of recognition, respect and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms and the legitimate interests of organisations. Among others, that norm provides for such principles as legality, transparency and cooperation of the State and public and religious associations, other organisations and citizens in countering extremist activities.
57. Article 17 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 prohibits the activities of public and religious associations and other non-profit organisations of foreign States and their subdivisions whose activities are deemed extremist under international legal documents, and provides for cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign States, their law

enforcement agencies and special services, and international organisations engaged in countering extremism.

58. Thus, the anti-extremist legislation in force in the Russian Federation has been adopted on the basis of international legal acts and the Constitution of the Russian Federation and fully complies with international standards of human rights protection.
59. The judicial system of the Russian Federation, in turn, guarantees the implementation in practice of these legal provisions, as will be shown below.

F. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION GUARANTEES RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATION ON COMBATING EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

60. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, human and civil rights and freedoms are recognised and guaranteed in the Russian Federation in accordance with the generally recognised principles and norms of international law.
61. Article 19 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees the equality of human and civil rights and freedoms regardless of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, property or official status, place of residence, attitude to religion, beliefs, membership of voluntary associations or other circumstances; all forms of restrictions on the rights of citizens on social, racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious grounds are prohibited.
62. The Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees everyone state protection of his rights and freedoms, including judicial protection. The right to judicial protection is directly applicable and is recognised and guaranteed in accordance with the generally recognised principles and norms of international law and in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
63. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in its Resolution of the Plenum No. 55 of 29 November 2016 ‘On Court Sentence’ stresses that evidence can only form the basis of the court's findings after it has been checked and assessed under the rules set out in Articles 87 and 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (CPC), including in terms of credibility of information constituting its content. The substantiation of a sentence with reliable evidence ensures the veracity of conclusions contained therein

on the main issue of the criminal case - the guilt of the defendant for the crime charged against him.

64. In providing clarification to the courts, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in paragraph 1 of Resolution No. 11 of 28 June 2011 ‘On judicial practice in criminal cases involving extremist crimes’ specifically states that, when considering criminal cases involving extremist crimes, ‘the courts *must, on the one hand, ensure protection of public interests (the foundations of the constitutional order, integrity and security of the Russian Federation), and on the other hand - the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Russian Constitution: freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, expression, mass media, right to freely seek, obtain, transmit, produce and disseminate information by any legal means, right to assemble peacefully and without arms, hold meetings, demonstrations, marches and events.*’
65. Furthermore, the attention of the courts is drawn to the norm that ‘*freedom of thought and expression guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and international legal instruments, as well as the right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information by any lawful means may only be restricted in exceptional cases expressly provided for by a federal law to the extent necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of others, to ensure the defence of the country, state security, public order and territorial integrity.*’
66. Furthermore, in paragraph 2.1 of the Resolution, the Plenum draws the courts’ attention to the requirement that, when considering appeals against decisions to initiate criminal proceedings for extremist offences, *courts ‘must carefully verify not only whether there is a reason, but also the basis for instituting proceedings, which requires the submission to the court of materials containing sufficient data containing elements of relevant crimes.*’ Thus, for example, with regard to offences under Articles 280, 280.1 and 282 of the Criminal Code, the courts must proceed ‘*not only from the mere fact of the posting on the Internet or another network of text, images, audio or video files containing indicia of calls to extremist activities or actions aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, inciting hatred or enmity, or disparaging a person or group, but also other information indicating the social danger of the act, including intent and motives of*

committing such actions by a person, which are also subject to mandatory proof (Art. 73(1)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation).

67. For the purpose of preventing political censorship, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation stated that

‘The [extremist] offences referred to in articles 280, 280.1 and 282 of the Criminal Code **are committed only with direct intent and with the intention to incite others to carry out extremist activities**, commit acts aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, or incite hatred or enmity, or disparage an individual or a group on the grounds of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or membership of any social group.

The posting by a person on the Internet or other information and telecommunications network, particularly on his or her own page or the pages of other users, of a material (video, audio, graphic or text) created by him or herself or another person, including information previously recognised by a court as extremist material, may constitute a crime under Articles 280, 280.1 or 282 of the Criminal Code **only if it is established that the person posting the material was aware that the act was aimed at the disruption of the constitutional order and had the intent to incite others to commit extremist activities** or actions directed at the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, or the purpose to incite hatred or enmity, humiliate dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or affiliation with any social group.

In determining whether or not a person has the direct intention and intent to incite others to carry out extremist activities, commit acts aimed at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or incite hatred or enmity, or disparage human dignity by posting material on the Internet or another information and telecommunications network, the court **should proceed from the totality of the circumstances of the offence** and take into account, in particular, the form and content of the posted information, its context, the presence and content of the person’s comments or other expressions of attitude, whether the person personally created or borrowed the relevant audio, video, text or image, the content of the person’s entire page, information about the person's activities before and after posting, in particular actions aimed at increasing views and widening the user audience, information about his/her identity (for example, commitment to radical ideology, participation in extremist associations, previous administrative or criminal convictions for extremist offences), the size of the information, frequency and duration of posting thereof, intensity of updates etc.

It is not an offence under Article 280, 280.1 or 282 of the Criminal Code **to state judgments or deductions based on facts about interethnic, interconfessional or other social relations in academic or political discourse or texts, and not connected with the intention to incite others to extremist activities** or actions directed at the violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, or with the purpose to incite hatred or

enmity, humiliate dignity of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude to religion or affiliation with any social group.’²⁸

68. Thus, the Plenum drew attention to the fact that, when deciding on the aim of a person to commit an extremist crime, it is required to prove direct intent and intention to induce to the performance of extremist activity precisely as a subjective (mental) element, i.e. the full awareness of a person of the nature of his/her actions. The Plenum emphasizes that the expression of opinions that objectively involve facts of interethnic, interconfessional and other social relations, but are not connected with the intent to incite to extremist activity, does not fall under that category of crimes.
69. Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 32 of 20 September 2018 ‘On Amendments to Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11 of 28 June 2011 “On Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases on Extremist Crimes”’ provided clarifications aimed at streamlining (essentially limiting) the application of criminal liability for reposting, statements in mass media and social media.
70. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in its function of interpreting and ensuring uniform application of the law throughout the Russian Federation, pays serious attention to the implementation of anti-extremist legislation and the protection of human rights in the course of its application.

G. DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-EXTREMIST LEGISLATION IN RUSSIA IS IN LINE WITH INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

71. There is currently no common understanding of the term 'extremism' around the world. One can speak of the definitions adopted by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).
72. The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (Shanghai, 16 June 2001) defines extremism as act aimed at violent seizing or keeping

²⁸ Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 11 ‘On Judicial Practice in Criminal Cases Involving Extremist Crimes’, 28 June 2011, ¶8, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_115712.

power, and violently changing the constitutional system a State, as well as a violent encroachment upon public security, including organization, for the above purposes of illegal armed formations and participation in them.

73. Following up on the provisions of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of 15 June 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Convention on Countering Extremism²⁹ was signed in Astana on 09 June 2017, which did not abolish the 2001 Convention, but was concluded in its development and created a single (within a regional international organisation) international legal framework to counter extremism for the first time in the practice of international relations. The new Convention also contained a new definition of extremism as *‘an ideology and practice aimed at resolving political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts through violent and other unconstitutional actions.’*
74. Thus, extremism, according to the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism signed on 09 June 2017, is an unconstitutional way of resolving political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts; while the phrase ‘other unconstitutional actions’ covers not only violent, but also other, non-violent, actions.
75. Another key element of the 2017 SCO Convention is the definition of an ‘extremist act’, which includes, in addition to the acts specified in the 2001 Shanghai Convention, also ‘inciting political, social, racial, national or religious enmity or discord; propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person on the grounds of his political, social, racial, national or religious affiliation; public calls to commit such acts; mass production, storage and distribution of extremist materials for the purpose of extremist propaganda.’³⁰
76. Similar provisions were included in the Russian Law on Counteracting Extremism even earlier - in 2007, long before Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation.³¹

²⁹ In addition to Russia, the Convention has been signed by: the Republic of Kazakhstan (population over 19.5 million), the People's Republic of China (population over 1.4 billion), the Kyrgyz Republic (population over 6.7 million), the Republic of Tajikistan (population over 10 million) and the Republic of Uzbekistan (population over 36 million).

³⁰ Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Convention on Countering Extremism (9 June 2017), Article 2(1)(3), available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201910280036>.

³¹ See Federal Law No. 211-FZ of 24 July 2007 “On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Relation to Mastering Public Governance in the Sphere of Countering Extremism”, Article 8, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_52146.

77. The anti-extremist legislation of SCO member states has evolved in line with the ‘Shanghai’ definition, but each state has introduced its own specific features into its domestic legislation.
78. Thus, the original ‘Shanghai’ definition, which formed a foundation for the definition of extremism in the original wording of Art. 1 of Federal Law No. 114-FZ dated 25 July 2002, in contrast to the PACE definition, which will be reviewed below, did not consider a threat to democratic values to be the main characteristic of extremism, the latter being understood as a threat to the constitutional order only. However, as noted above, over time, the concept of extremism has also come to include ‘hateful extremism’, which is a threat to human rights.
79. The notion of ‘extremism’ was also enshrined in Resolution 1344 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ‘On Threats to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe’ of 2003.³² That resolution defines ‘extremism’ as ‘*a form of political activity that overtly or covertly rejects the principles of parliamentary democracy and very often bases its ideology and its political practices and conduct on intolerance, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and ultra-nationalism.*’ Hence, the PACE recognizes threats to democratic values as a distinguishing feature of extremism. The resolution also recommends establishing proportionate penalties for public calls for violence, racial discrimination and intolerance, and applying measures to disband organisations that carry out and encourage such activities.
80. A definition of extremism was also developed in 2009 within the CIS framework. Thus, the model law of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly ‘On Countering Extremism’ adopted at the 32nd plenary session of CIS IPA (Resolution No. 32-9 of 14 May 2009) defines extremism as ‘*an infringement on the foundations of the constitutional system and state security, as well as violation of human and civil rights, freedoms and legitimate interests carried out as a result of the negation of legal and/or other generally accepted rules and norms of social conduct.*’³³ The model law also contains a definition of

³² PACE Resolution No. 1344 (2003) on ‘Threats to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe’, ¶3, available at: https://www.coe.int/t/r/parliamentary_assembly/%5Brussian_documents%5D/%5B2003%5D/%5BSept_2003%5D/Res%201344%20Rus.asp.

³³ CIS IPA Resolution No. 32-9 (14 May 2009), available at: https://base.spinform.ru/show_doc_fw?rgn=30827.

'extremist activity', which includes, among other things, the following acts covering 'hateful extremism':

- (a) inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred;
- (b) propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of a person (social group) on the grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude towards religion;
- (c) violation of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of a person and citizen on the grounds of his social, racial, national, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion.³⁴

In 2012, the CIS IPA approved recommendations for the improvement of legislation of CIS member states in the field of countering extremism).³⁵

- 81. The issue of combating extremism, although not so comprehensively, is also a subject of discussion at the UN and the OSCE. Thus, the latest UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review³⁶ condemns not only violent extremism but also incitement to terrorism and calls for countering radicalisation. In turn, OSCE Decision No. 5/07 on Public-Private Partnerships in Countering Terrorism (2007) contains recommendations for enhancing cooperation between state authorities and civil society institutions to counter violent extremism and radicalisation that lead to terrorism.
- 82. Among other things, the UN Security Council has called on states to counter specific forms of extremism (for example, UN Resolution No. 1624 of 2005, paragraph 1 of which calls on all states to take steps to prohibit incitement to commit terrorist acts by law, and to deny asylum to any persons with respect to whom there is credible information that they have been involved in incitement to terrorism).

³⁴ *Ibid*, Article 1.

³⁵ Recommendations for the improvement of legislation of CIS member states in the field of countering extremism (Adopted by CIS IPA Resolution No. 38-16 (23 November 2012), available at: https://iacis.ru/baza_dokumentov/modelnie_zakonodatelnie_akti_i_rekomendacii_mpa_sng/rekomendacii/60.

³⁶ The Resolution A/RES/72/284 adopted by the General Assembly on 26 June 2018, available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1632770?ln=ru>.

83. The aforementioned list of international legal instruments important for countering extremism is not exhaustive. Many other international legal instruments address issues related to countering racial, national and other intolerance.
84. The problem of combating extremism is a legitimate task facing States, and it is attracting growing attention of the international community. The current lack of a unified definition of extremism does not diminish in any way the sovereign right of States to regulate such activity through their national legislation.
85. According to the Russian law on extremism, the possible victim of extremist activity can be not only the state, which is generally common in SCO countries, but also a social group, which is in line with the PACE definition. The definition of extremist activity is also consistent with the Model Law adopted by the CIS IPA. In its approach to the definition of extremism, the Russian Federation seeks to use all available best practices and experience in the field of countering extremism, as confirmed by the Federal Law 'On Countering Extremist Activities,' the provisions of which are consistent with international practice of combating extremism.

H. PROFESSOR SHEININ'S CRITICISM OF RUSSIAN LAW IS UNFOUNDED

86. In support of his claims against Russian legislation on extremist activity, Professor M. Sheinin relies on Opinion of the Venice Commission No. 660 / 2011 CDL-AD(2012)016 dated 20 June 2012 about Federal Law No. 114-FZ, which asserts that the latter defines some notions in a good way, but other notions are wide an can be interpreted by the authorities differently, and result in practice in the application of harsh anti-extremist measures based on Federal Law No 114-FZ and the Russian Criminal Code, and draws far-reaching conclusions that the (Russian) legislation on countering extremism is discriminatory in nature.
87. Professor Sheinin is misleading as to the opinion of the Commission, which never reached such conclusions.
88. The Commission does not question the right of the state to regulate at national level the fight against extremism. Moreover, the Commission refers to the opinion of PACE, which 'has expressed concern about the challenge of combating extremism and its most recent

forms and calls on Council of Europe member states to take decisive actions in this area.³⁷

89. The Commission recognises the ‘legitimate efforts’ of the Russian authorities ‘to counter extremism and related threats.’ The Commission “is aware of the challenges faced by the Russian authorities in their legitimate efforts to counter extremism and related threats.” The Commission recognises the relevance of the Shanghai Convention on Countering Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism signed on 15 June 2001.³⁸
90. The Commission's conclusions do not mention the incompatibility of the law with international law, let alone its discriminatory nature, as Sheinin attempts to suggest. The Venice Commission in its report raises certain issues and makes recommendations, including those related to the wording of the law, which may be subject to broad interpretation. Those issues have been analysed in detail by the Russian Federation in the course of its interaction with the Commission on the Report.
91. As can be seen from the aforesaid, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation closely monitors law enforcement practice in the area of combating extremist activity and provides guidance to lower courts aimed at interpreting the law correctly in light of the protection of human rights and freedoms (see paragraphs 63-70 of this Report).
92. It should be noted that the Venice Commission, according to its 2002 Statute, ‘is an *independent consultative body* which cooperates with member States of the Council of Europe, as well as with interested non-member States and interested international organisations and bodies’³⁹. Cooperation with the Commission is purely voluntary, even for member states of the Council of Europe. The opinion of this body is therefore purely recommendatory and is given to a State so it could take it into account in its legislative work.
93. Russia voluntarily engaged in a dialogue with the Commission which resulted in a series of recommendations which are very far from the conclusions Professor Sheinin is trying

³⁷ Venice Commission, Opinion No. 660/2011 on the Federal Law on Countering Extremist Activity of the Russian Federation, (20 June 2012), ¶73, available at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2012\)016-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)016-e)

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Statute of the Venice Commission (21 February 2002), Article 1, available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/default.aspx?p=01_01_Statute&lang=RU.

to make. The Commission itself mentions this dialogue in its conclusions: *‘The Institute for Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation provided comments on the law under consideration (CDL(2012)024), which were duly taken into account in the preparation of the Opinion. Some additional clarifications were provided by the representatives of the Russian authorities during a meeting held in Paris on 27 April 2012.’*

94. Below I will provide some comments on the conclusions of the Venice Commission to which Professor Sheinin refers.
95. Professor Sheinin refers to the conclusion in paragraph 7 of the Venice Commission Opinion that the Russian legislation allegedly does not contain a clear notion of ‘extremism’. However, Russia clarified that the law did not clearly define the notion of ‘extremism’ due to the fact that at the time when the draft law was under consideration, international practice did not comprise a uniformly understood notion of ‘extremism’/‘extremist activity’ either. In this regard the legislator, based on Art. 29 and Art. 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation,⁴⁰ decided to provide a list of extremist acts (already illegal under existing legislation), so as not to make different illegal acts fit a single concept. On the contrary, it allows legislation to be more responsive to the interests of protecting human and civil rights and freedoms from manifestations of extremist activity.
96. Professor Sheinin then criticizes provisions of the anti-extremist legislation on the breach of territorial integrity. In doing so, Professor Sheinin ignores the position repeatedly expressed by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, namely, that the provisions of the Law ‘On Countering Extremist Activity’, which impose a ban not only on violent actions infringing upon the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but also on appeals to such actions, are consistent with the constitutionally relevant purposes of such restrictions and are conditional upon the obligation of the state to establish legal arrangements, in the utmost degree contributing to public security, prevention and

⁴⁰Article 29 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation prohibits propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and enmity. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic superiority shall be prohibited.

Article 55 (3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation allows human and civil rights and freedoms to be restricted by federal law only to the extent necessary for the protection of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other persons or for the defence of the country and of State security.

thwarting crimes, averting their negative consequences for human and civil rights and interests protected by law. In the exercise of the right to freedom of thought and speech, the right to freedom of expression, the right to hold and disseminate beliefs and to act in accordance with them, a person can only be held liable according to the law in the event of a socially dangerous and unlawful violation of the rights and freedoms of others.⁴¹

97. Moreover, it should be noted that the provisions of the Law on Countering Extremism and the position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation are nothing more than an implementation of the norms enshrined in international legal acts, according to which:

- (a) the exercise of rights and freedoms may be subject to certain restrictions as prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, in particular in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public order, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or of the rights of others;⁴²
- (b) irrespective of its nature, extremism is a form of political activity that overtly or covertly rejects the principles of parliamentary democracy and is based on ideologies and practices of intolerance, exclusion, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and ultra-nationalism, and the tendency of some extremist movements to seek justification for their actions in religion carries a twofold danger: on the one hand it fosters intolerance, religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, and on the other it

⁴¹ Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 27 October 2015 No 2450-O ‘On refusal to accept for consideration the complaint of citizens Kolpakidi Alexander Ivanovich and Nikolaev Sergey Vasilyevich on violation of their constitutional rights by paragraph 3 of Article 1 and Article 13 of the Federal Law ‘On countering extremist activities’, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_189000/; Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 2 July 2013 No 1053-O ‘On refusal to accept for consideration the complaint of citizen Kochemarov Vladislav Sergeevich on violation of his constitutional rights by the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 1 and part three of Article 13 of the Federal Law ‘On countering extremist activity’, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_149425/; Opinion of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of 16 March 2020 N 1-Z ‘On conformity with the provisions of Chapters 1, 2 and 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the provisions of the Law (not yet in force) of the Russian Federation on Amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation ‘On improving regulation of certain issues of organisation and functioning of public authorities,’ and also on the conformity with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of the procedure for entry into force of Article 1 of said Law in connection with the inquiry of the President of the Russian Federation”, available at: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_347691.

⁴² Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948), Articles 18, 19 and 29(2), available at: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/declhr.shtml; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1996), Article 19, available at: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/pactpol.shtml; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950), Articles 9, 10, available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_rus.pdf.

leads to the isolation of entire religious communities because of certain individuals who abuse universal values of religion.⁴³

98. The criticism by Professor Sheinin and the Commission of the failure to include violence as a necessary element of extremism is also unfounded. Of course, extremist acts can and often are accompanied by elements of violence. A certain part of acts described as extremist activity in the Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 25 July 2002 does not include violence as a mandatory component. In that regard, Russia follows the ‘hateful’ model of countering extremism, which is characteristic of a number of countries.⁴⁴ The Shanghai Convention on Countering Extremism also follows that model and envisages cooperation in combating not only violent but also hateful extremism. Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also requires criminal prosecution for the dissemination of ideas of racial superiority, hatred and incitement to racial discrimination, without including the element of violence in the definition of such prohibited activities. For example, the Russian law, pursuant to the Convention, prohibits the display of Nazi insignia, which is an important element in the dissemination of ideas of racial superiority.
99. The comments in respect of designating religious and other materials as extremist, to which Professor Sheinin refers, are also unfounded. First, the Commission acknowledged that judicial decisions of this kind ‘*[are] based on prior expert review and may be appealed against in court*’. Besides, the Commission admitted that it had no information on how exactly the list of extremist materials was formed, which makes it difficult to consider its conclusions fully viable, completely and accurately reflecting reality. As stated above, the sacred texts of the world’s major religions are exempt from the scope of application of anti-extremism measures.⁴⁵
100. The main criterion for designating certain materials as extremist is not their affiliation to a religion or social organisation, but calls for extremist activity contained therein, substantiation or justification of extremist activity. It should be noted, once again, that all

⁴³ PACE Resolution 1344 (2003) on ‘Threats to Democracy by Extremist Parties and Movements in Europe’, ¶¶3-4, available at: https://www.coe.int/t/r/parliamentary/_assembly/%5Brussian_documents%5D/%5B2003%5D/%5BSept_2003%5D/Res%201344%20Rus.asp.

⁴⁴ As far as I understand, this issue has been covered in detail in the expert report of V.V. Engel.

⁴⁵ See above, ¶25.

court trials in such cases are open and adversarial, with the possibility of appeal to higher court authorities.

101. Examples of extremist materials include, for example, the writings of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany, which substantiate national racial superiority, justify the commission of war crimes or other crimes aimed at the extermination of an ethnic, social, racial, national or religious group. With regard to religious organisations, prohibited are certain materials that advocate the rejection of certain types of medical care or provide an extremist interpretation of peace-loving doctrines. An example would be the Wahhabis' declaration of 'jihad' (holy war) against infidels; materials of that sort are extremist not because their authors are Muslims, but because they justify the use of violence.
102. As for the definition of an 'extremist organization,' the Commission's comments on imperfect legislative technique and 'looping' of the definition do not indicate any violations on the part of State authorities either. On the contrary, the fact that the main criterion for designating an organisation as extremist is the existence of a **court decision which has entered into force** banning the activities of, or liquidating, such an organisation due to its extremist activities, underlines the fact that the activities of such an organisation are investigated by a court in an adversarial process that determines whether the organisation has committed acts that are extremist. At the same time, persons leading such organisations have the opportunity to present and defend their position and to appeal against the court's decision to higher instances.
103. Finally, with regard to Professor Sheinin's reference to paragraph 66 of the Commission's conclusions on the duty of the organisers of assemblies to suppress extremist activities and liability for breach of that duty, it should be noted that such requirements are established in the federal legislation on rallies. If the organiser takes no steps to prevent, for example, the display of Nazi insignia at his/her event, he is deemed accomplice to the crime and must incur the corresponding liability under the Russian Criminal Code.
104. Hence, Professor Sheinin's conclusions are not based on facts and are misleading as to the content and application of the Russian Federation's anti-extremism legislation. The professor also fails to take into account the fact that Russian legislation in this area is

developing within the framework of the regional cooperation mechanisms of the SCO and CIS.

I. EXPERT DECLARATION

105. I confirm that all issues on which I have given my opinion are within my competence and professional knowledge.
106. I understand that it is my duty to assist the International Court of Justice in resolving issues dealt with in this Report. I have discharged that responsibility and will continue to do so in the future.
107. I confirm that the conclusions I have reached in this Report are unbiased, objective and impartial; they have not been influenced by the proceedings or by any of the parties to the proceedings.

Expert

Viktor Viktorovich Merkuryev

Moscow, 1 March 2023