

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION**

(UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION)

REJOINDER

SUBMITTED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Annex 294

National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies.
Alexander Sych. Thesis “Modern Ukrainian nationalism: political science aspects of paradigm
transformation”

(translation)

**Excerpt
Translation**

National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies. Alexander Sych. Thesis “Modern Ukrainian nationalism: political science aspects of paradigm transformation”, available at: <https://ipiend.gov.ua/spetsializovana-vchena-rada-svr/dysertatsii/>.

**National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
I.F. Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies**

Qualifying scientific work
on the rights of the manuscript

**ALEXANDER MAXIMOVICH SYCH
UDC: 323.1:141.3](=161.2)
C4**

**DISSERTATION
MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM: POLITICAL SCIENCE ASPECTS
OF PARADIGM TRANSFORMATION
23.00.01 - theory and history of political science**

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Political Science

The dissertation contains the results of my own research. Use of ideas, the results and texts of other authors are referenced to the appropriate source

_____ O. M. Sych

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Kyiv - 2020

naturalistic voluntarism, total biology, racism, Nordism, and a separate system of leadership. Ukrainian nationalism defines the nation not by race and blood, but by a common will, idea and political activity." At the same time, he warns that in Ukrainian circles "there should not be blind and uncritical imitation of National Socialism, so as not to fall under the spiritual and later political influence of Germany" [148, p. 131].

Obviously, the successes of fascism and Nazism in the initial stages of their stay in power attracted the attention of political movements in other European countries. Some of them copied this experience, and these were most likely those that did not have their own authentic national movements. Still others, who already had their own organizational models, adapted this experience creatively and fragmentarily to local national conditions. Analyzing these facts, we should realize that fascism and especially Nazism committed mass crimes much later. Therefore, those who adopted their experience of political growth could not foresee the course of history and the future condemnation of these ideologies and political movements. Obviously, with this in mind, T. Snyder noted: "The small nationalisms of interwar Europe, such as Ukrainian, must also be seen in relation to their relationship to larger nationalisms, such as Italian and German" [280, p. 177].

However, the OUN belonged to the category of those political movements that were already based on the considerable experience of their predecessors. That is why it used the experience of the early successes of fascism and Nazism, but did not copy them blindly. This is evidenced by the statement of D. Myron-Orlyk: "Undoubtedly, it is necessary to follow the development of nationalist movements in other countries, in particular to learn from the experience of fascism and national socialism, but everything must be adapted to Ukrainian relations and needs, organically assimilated and melted in the crucible of the Ukrainian spirit and thought" [148, p. 132].

4.4. Influence of nationalist structures on the course of the Revolution of Dignity

If we analyze the state of the Ukrainian nationalist movement on the eve of each of the analyzed revolutionary disruptions, it should be noted that during the Revolution on the Brink of 1990 it was embryonic, by the Orange Revolution of 2004, although it had reached a significant level of organizational development, it was in crisis and deconsolidated, and entered the Revolution of Dignity in a much more crystallized form [241].

The parliamentary elections of 2012 clearly placed the accents of influence in the nationalist environment. On the one hand, Svoboda became its undisputed leader. In these elections, the party received 10.44% of the vote in the multi-mandate constituency and 13 of its candidates were elected in single-member districts. Thus, Svoboda managed to form a fairly large parliamentary faction consisting of 38 MPs.

On the other hand, by the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity, previously well-known nationalist organizations either ceased to exist (DSU) or became uninfluential in the political process (KUN, UNA-UNSO, Tryzub). In the 2012 parliamentary elections, the KUN participated in a bloc with Nasha Ukraina, and the association received 1.11% of the vote. The partially reunited in 2005 UNA under the leadership of Yuriy Shukhevych received the penultimate result of 0.08%. The OUN-B and OUN-M do not go beyond the scope of public education; the ISC and the National Alliance are exclusively engaged in youth education. Established in 2005, the UNTP transformed within a year into the movement of the "autonomous right," which in turn split into a number of competing groups by 2011. The SNA also failed to become an influential factor in the political process [4, p. 172-178].

The pre-revolutionary level of influence was also reflected in the participation of nationalist forces in the events of the Revolution of Dignity. The dominant positions in it were occupied by Svoboda and the Right Sector (RS) social movement.

In particular, Svoboda, together with Batkivshchyna and V. Klitschko's UDAR party, formed the political core of the revolutionary Maidan. Accordingly, its leader O. Tiahnybok and leading members of the party were members of the governing bodies of the revolutionary

[...]

It is worth noting that the already quite extensive literature on the Revolution of Dignity, both in journalistic and academic literature, tends to overstate the self-organizing potential and downplay the role of organized political structures, and in particular the parliamentary opposition of the time. For example, here are some of them.

In particular, R. Balaban states: "Not being organized by political parties, the Maidan as a synergistic force was forced to pass on its political mouthpiece. This "mouthpiece" was taken up not by political parties, but by individuals - A. Yatsenyuk, V. Klitschko, O. Tyahnybok, who, in order to increase their own rating, actualized "Maidan parties" - All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna", "UDAR", All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda". However, the Maidan did not have a single control center and a single force or structure at its core." Although the author recognizes that they acted as "stabilizers" of the Maidan and its "negotiators" [9, p. 127]. The inappropriateness of the statement about the "actualization" of parties that won a fairly significant support of Ukrainian voters in the recent parliamentary elections is striking. Similar statements are made by Y. Potapenko: "The next important feature of Euromaidan, repeatedly emphasized by its participants, experts and scholars, is the indication of the unconstructiveness of the idea that opposition leaders and party functionaries led it and directed the actions of the protesters. Any talk of Maidan's "controllability" and its absolute loyalty to Klitschko, Yatsenyuk, Turchynov and Tyahnybok is completely groundless" [201, p. 9].

While we pay tribute to the self-organizing potential of the revolutionary Maidan, we do not agree with such an unequivocal denial of the role of organized political structures in general and parliamentary parties of the time in particular in its functioning and confrontation with the current political regime. The above facts indicate the opposite. We believe that such statements, on the one hand, are an inertial manifestation of the opposition of the apolitical Euromaidan to the organized political forces, which at the initial stage of the Revolution of Dignity, for their own purposes, technologically subtly organized and

used by the current regime. In this regard, M. Kugutyak and M. Vitenko, analyzing the chronology of the Revolution of Dignity, note: "The media spread the idea that one Maidan was good and the other was bad; one was functioning within the framework of the law, and the other was not. Later it became known that the security forces had introduced their agents into the organizing committees of both camps, who sought information, set up various provocations, and tried to quarrel opposition politicians with student activists" [307, p. 50]. And on the other hand, we believe that such a nihilistic attitude to the role of political parties in the organization of the revolutionary Maidan generally corresponds to the inherent tendency of the postmodern denial of the role and importance of institutions in society [71, p. 211-216].

The official opposition status of Svoboda on the revolutionary Maidan also caused significant image losses. The party and its leader, along with their political partners, were politically responsible for the course of the revolutionary events and the fate of the people involved. In our opinion, the party leader's participation in negotiations with the current government and coordination of her positions with ideologically incompatible partners demonstrated her political maturity and conscious statehood. But at the same time, they sharply discorded with the already formed revolutionary image, "contradicted their earlier rhetoric" [126, p. 6]. In addition, the freedom of action of the party leadership was also limited by European and American diplomats, who demanded that the parliamentary opposition adhere to the exclusively peaceful nature of protest actions and warned against radical actions, threatening to deny the support that the opposition forces desperately needed in the fight against the current regime [19, p. 81-98]. The balanced nature of the actions of the head of the HE

"Svoboda did not correspond to the revolutionary mood of the protesters, and this was ~~the~~ exacerbated by the atmosphere of hostility towards the political leaders of Maidan, which was created by provocateurs of the regime's security forces who were massively infiltrated among the participants of the revolution.

In our opinion, the violent clashes on Hrushevskoho Street on January 19-24, 2014, were a negative turning point for the party's image.

None of the representatives of the parliamentary opposition could take responsibility for these events, given the established framework of communication with diplomatic circles. In particular, Svoboda could not do so either, although its members took part in those confrontations en masse. "The first person to be arrested on Hrushevskoho Street was also a Svoboda member, by the way. We were forbidden to be there, Tyahnybok said that the party would be banned as an extremist party, but we already had two hundred arrested, then it reached three hundred. It was either us or them. I remember peasants calling: 'Kyrylo, we have folded our party flags, we are taking off our stripes, we are going to Hruscha,'" K. Dolenko later recalled [19, p. 181]. At this stage, the leadership of Svoboda was considering in detail the same scenario of the arrest of its leading members and the very ban of the party that had befallen the nationalist organization Golden Dawn in Greece [290].

In the context of the escalation of the violent confrontation, the party was sinking deeper and deeper into a political image trap. On the one hand, the situation required increased diplomatic efforts to prevent a bloody outcome, but on the other hand, such actions were increasingly destroying its established revolutionary image.

At the same time, the greater image losses on the Maidan were suffered by the "The more dynamic nationalist leadership positions in the parliament and in society were occupied by the Right Sector movement. The date of its creation is November 28, 2013, and its name comes from its location in a revolutionary tent camp to the right of the Independence Stele near the monument to the founders of Kyiv. The movement included both well-known nationalist organizations that were in crisis on the eve of the revolution and no longer played a significant role in the political process, and those that had a local impact on socio-political processes. In particular, the revolution gave the former a chance to resuscitate their influence, and the latter the same chance to realize it fully. It is no coincidence that Tryzub is considered to be the initiator of the SAR. It included representatives of two other well-known nationalist structures - UNA-UNSO and Patriot of Ukraine, as well as organizations little known to the general public "The White Hammer, the Black Committee, the Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners, the Carpathian

Sich, individual nationalists and football fans. According to the leader of the PS, D. Yarosh, each of these groups consisted of 100-200 people, and the Tryzub itself had about 500-600 members in its ranks in the pre-revolutionary period [19, p. 101-103]. However, after the arson of the Trade Union Building on February 18, the organization

"The White Molot decided to change its location and, together with the Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners, Patriot of Ukraine and several hundred members of the Self-Defense, moved to the Kyiv City State Administration and created an alternative Right Sector. Later, on March 6, the Right Sector issued a statement that Bilyi Molot had been expelled from the Right Sector. As follows from an interview with the representative of the White Hammer, V. Goranin, the grounds for the split in the SAR appeared much earlier - in the process of joint activities on the Maidan [13].

At the first stage of the revolutionary processes, the SAR was generally unknown to the public. Although, according to some reports, members of organizations that later joined it participated in the protection of students from beatings on the night of November 30, in the seizure of the Kyiv City State Administration and in clashes near the Presidential Administration on December 1. After the organization of the Maidan Self-Defense, the "PS" joined it and was listed as one of the hundreds at number 23 (there were 39 hundreds in total) [288, pp. 127-128]. D. Yarosh even claims that "it was the 'SAR' that organized the first hundreds of the Self-Defense, which later became what it is today". In our opinion, this statement is an exaggeration, since the first Self-Defense units were formed on Mykhailivska Square after the dispersal of Euromaidan and the "SAR" did not exist at that time. After the security forces attempted to clear the Maidan on the night of December 10-11, the RS moved to the 5th floor of the Trade Union Building. All the time, it tried to maintain autonomy in its actions. As the Kapranov brothers note in their study,

"'Right Sector' at the beginning of Euromaidan was mainly an agitation and discussion platform, far from the scene both geographically and ideologically" [19, p. 105-106].

However, starting in January 2014, the informal status of the leader of the nationalist movement on the revolutionary Maidan slowly began to be established for the PS. He was not bound by political responsibilities

and the diplomatic conventions that limited the actions of the rival Svoboda. The atmosphere of Maidan, by definition, required a revolutionary trend, and this was skillfully used by experienced politicians of UNA-UNSO, Tryzub, and Patriot of Ukraine, which united under the new brand of the Right Sector.

The SPS's finest hour came on January 19. On that day, about 500,000 people gathered in Kyiv for a regular assembly, outraged by the adoption of the "dictatorial laws" of January 16. Before it ended, one of the leaders of Automaidan, S. Koba suddenly called from the stage to block the parliament. This seemed to make no sense, as the Verkhovna Rada building was empty on a Sunday afternoon. However, several hundred Automaidan participants headed to European Square. They stopped in front of the checkpoints of the Internal Troops (VTs) at the beginning of Hrushevskoho Street. Gradually, more and more protesters approached this place, and in a few hours their number reached thirty thousand. Suddenly, a group of 30-40 people broke into the space between them and the military and started a fight. According to eyewitnesses, they chanted chants typical of Russian ultras, "Come on, let's go..." [288, c. 172-173].

According to D. Yarosh, the conflict on Hrushevskoho Street was activated by members of the "SPS". "I said to Parubiy: 'Andriy, give me an additional hundred Self-Defense men, and we will be able to make a breakthrough, we won't go far, but the situation can be changed. I am grateful that he gave not one but two hundred, they closed our flanks, and our assault units set fire to the bus and moved forward," he recalls [19, p. 107].

As a result, the confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street became fierce and massive. Regardless of the controversial judgments as to who initiated it and why, it took on the symbolic character of a revolutionary struggle against the current government, which was trying to establish a dictatorial regime in Ukraine with the "laws of January 16". Participants of the revolution, regardless of party affiliation, including members of parliamentary opposition parties, took part in it en masse. Here, O. Strazhnyi is wrong, arguing that neither the activists of

"Neither the Self-Defense nor opposition politicians supported the confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street [288, p. 178]. Even superficial estimates indicate that at that time

"The Opposition Party did not have in its ranks the number of people who participated in it. However, due to the above diplomatic conventions, none of the leaders of the opposition parliamentary parties could take responsibility for such actions. At the same time, this was effectively used by the Right Sector and its leader D. Yarosh [203]. A participant in the events recalls: "In February, we were faced with the fact that we were all becoming the Right Sector somewhere in our hearts. Everyone began to lean toward a violent solution to this political conflict" [288, p. 228].

After the active phase of the confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street ended, negotiations between the leaders of the parliamentary opposition and Viktor Yanukovich began. As for the participation of representatives of nationalist structures in them, they left an ambiguous and rather paradoxical imprint on their image. Thus, for the mere fact of participating in such negotiations and even for the fact that the leader of Svoboda, O. Tyahnybok, shook hands with Viktor Yanukovich, he was harshly criticized on the revolutionary Maidan. At least, it seemed that shaking hands during diplomatic talks between opponents was a common protocol. It is characteristic that this criticism was tended to be addressed only to O. Tyahnybok and did not affect other leaders of the parliamentary opposition - A. Yatsenyuk and V. Klitschko. And this, obviously, can be seen as a manifestation of the use of competitive technologies even in such critical conditions. When, after the final stage of negotiations, O. Tyahnybok, responding to the critical public outcry, did not shake hands with V. Yanukovich, the Maidan did not notice this [19, p. 228]. Against O. Tyahnybok as the leader of the VO

"Svoboda used this "handshake" to great effect in the 2014 presidential and parliamentary election campaigns. At the same time, his allies A. Yatsenyuk and V. Klitschko and the parties they led received high electoral support.

It should also be noted that there were also secret separate negotiations with Yanukovich by his future short-term successor in the status of "acting" O. Turchynov. As A. Mokhnyk recalls, every

negotiations between the opposition leaders and V. Yanukovich took place with the consent of the Maidan, and after they were held, they reported to it on their results. Only O. Turchynov conducted such negotiations without the knowledge of the revolutionary Maidan and its political leaders [288, p. 202; 19, p. 156].

The leader of the "PS" D. Yarosh also had such secret talks with Yanukovich. In our opinion, his actions at that time were generally well-calculated political technology aimed at increasing his own political rating by positioning himself as an alternative to the political leaders of Maidan, and in particular to the rival O. Tiahnybok and Svoboda. For example, on January 1, on the occasion of the birthday of OUN leader S. Bandera, the PS held a separate event from Svoboda [205]. It is noteworthy that at that time it did not resonate on Maidan as much as the mass torchlight procession of Svoboda. When the negotiated lull came after January 25, Yarosh continued to call from the Maidan stage for violent actions against the government (in particular, during the February 10 assembly). When the Maidan Council decided to launch a so-called "peaceful offensive," before it began, D. Yarosh, on the contrary, appealed to the authorities and the opposition to "resume the negotiation process." Instead, after the tragic confrontation on February 18, when the opposition leaders, after a series of fruitless meetings with V. Yanukovich, managed to reach a compromise with him, D. Yarosh voiced a different position on Facebook: "Someone wants to stop the people's uprising by declaring a false truce. I officially declare: "The Right Sector did not sign any agreements and did not negotiate with anyone, so the offensive of the rebellious people must continue." At the same time, he himself held secret talks with Yanukovich [288, p. 198; 205]. And after them and after the signing of the "Agreement on the Settlement of the Crisis in Ukraine", D. Yarosh again made an alternative statement that the "Right Sector" would not lay down its arms until Yanukovich resigned from the presidency and was "ready to take responsibility for the further development of the revolution in Ukraine" [19, p. 162].

When the information about D. Yarosh's secret negotiations with V. Yanukovich became public, it caused some suspicion

among the Maidan participants, but it did not cause him personally and the Opposition Platform as much negative image as the negotiations held with the consent of its participants, but it did not cause him personally and the Opposition Platform as much image damage as the negotiations that took place with the consent of Maidan did to O. Tiahnybok and the Svoboda party. In our opinion, this is also evidence of the use of appropriate technologies in the competitive political struggle, which, surprisingly, did not stop even during the period of the most intense confrontation during the Revolution of Dignity. Once again, members of Svoboda and the Opposition Platform were equally involved in them during the most tragic phase of February 18-20, as they had the most relevant experience, including during their time in paramilitary structures. However, after the elections were over, the rules of political competition came back into play. Already on March 27, less than a month after the establishment of the post-revolutionary government, "The PS picketed the Verkhovna Rada and, among other things, demanded that the former Defense Minister, a member of the Svoboda party, Admiral I. Tenyukh, be put on trial [204]

In the end, such competition did not benefit both political forces and the nationalist movement as a whole. As is well known, they and their leaders failed in the early presidential and parliamentary elections.

Instead, both political forces significantly influenced the ideological transformation of the revolutionary Maidan and Ukrainian society in general. VO

"In addition to participating in the confrontation with the power structures of the regime, Svoboda and the Right Sector were actively engaged in propaganda of their ideas - they published and distributed leaflets, newspapers, appeared on the radio, voiced their ideological principles from the Maidan stage, including on live television. They also carried out actions that had a deeply symbolic ideological significance, such as the overthrow of the Lenin monument in Kyiv and public events honoring the OUN leader S. Bandera. For example, when on December 8, activists of the Svoboda party organized the demolition of the Lenin monument in Bessarabka in Kyiv, it provoked an equally sharp reaction from both representatives of the current government and political partners. This rejection was even expressed by the Maidan's host Ruslana from the stage. The situation was resolved only after a number of European politicians voiced their approval [19, p. 171-172]. At the same time, this action caused a massive

[...]

The first such revolutionary upheaval in modern Ukrainian society was the Revolution on the Granite in 1990, which coincided with the birth of the first nationalist organizations, such as the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Front, the Ukrainian Nationalist Party, and Varta Rukhu. There is no information about their influence on the organization and course of this action, but a number of participants in the student hunger strike were imbued with a nationalist worldview. The second revolutionary upheaval was the Orange Revolution of 2004. By this time, the Ukrainian nationalist movement had gained significant organizational development, was characterized by a developed network of nationalist, political, civic and paramilitary structures, and was in opposition to the current regime. Unlike the 1990 Revolution on the Granite, nationalist structures became a significant factor in the Orange Revolution. The most effective among them were the UNA-UNSO, KUN, Svoboda, and the Bandera Trident. Although V. Yushchenko's election headquarters, actively using the potential of nationalist structures, did not advertise its connection with them for ideological reasons, the revolutionary Maidan itself was largely filled with nationalist content and for the first time it began to raise topics that had previously been the domain of exclusively nationalist discourse.

The Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014 was the third revolutionary failure in Ukraine. Our periodization of this event is based on the criterion of radicalization of its participants' moods depending on the escalation of violence against them by the current political regime, and includes the following periods: Period I - apolitical Euromaidan (November 21-30, 2013); Period II - non-violent political protest (December 1, 2013 - January 19, 2014); Period III - escalation of the violent confrontation on Hrushevskoho Street (January 19-24, 2014); Period IV - relative lull in the political confrontation (January 25 - February 18, 2014); Period V - mass shootings of protesters and the victory of the Revolution of Dignity (February 18-21, 2014).

The nationalist forces of Svoboda and the Right Sector civic movement played a significant role in the Revolution of Dignity. Having relevant experience in nationalist paramilitary structures, their members contributed to

Annex 295

A. Sych. The Influence of the National Liberation Struggle of the OUN-UPA on the
Militarization of the Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement

(translation)

A. Sych. The Influence of the National Liberation Struggle of the OUN-UPA on the Militarization of the Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement, available at: <http://regionalstudies.uzhnu.uz.ua/archive/16/21.pdf>.

№ 16

SECTION 5 THEORY AND HISTORY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE UNITED NATIONALIST PARTY ON THE MILITARIZATION OF THE MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE UKRAINIAN UNION ON THE MILITARIZATION OF THE MODERN UKRAINIAN

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

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In the article, the author analyzes the paramilitary structures of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement from 1990 to the present and the influence of the armed national liberation struggle of the 40s and 50s of the twentieth century on their formation. Depending on this influence, three categories of paramilitary nationalist organizations were formed. Those that mainly based their activities in the West and Center of Ukraine were subject to indirect ideological (SNPU, transformed into the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", and paramilitary organizations that belonged to its sphere of influence) or direct organizational and ideological (Warta DSU and Tryzub named after S. Bandera) influence of the OUN-B and the traditions of the UPA national liberation struggle. Instead, those of them that have operated and are still operating in the East and South of Ukraine (UNSO, Patriot of Ukraine, SNA) are not subject to such influence.

Keywords: modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, paramilitary nationalist organizations, OUN-B, national liberation struggle of the UPA, Revolution of Dignity, Russian-Ukrainian war, volunteer battalions.

In the article, the author analyzes the paramilitary structures of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement from 1990 to the present day and the influence of the armed national liberation struggle of the 40s and 50s of the twentieth century on the process of their formation. Those that mainly based their activities in the West and Center of Ukraine experienced indirect ideological (SNPU, transformed into the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda", and paramilitary organizations that belonged to its sphere of influence) or direct organizational and ideological (Strazha DSU and Trezub named after S. Bandera) influence of the OUN-B and the traditions of the UPA national liberation struggle. Those of them that have operated in the East and South of Ukraine (UNSO, Patriot of Ukraine, SNA) have no such influence.

Key words: modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, paramilitary nationalist organizations, OUN-B, national liberation struggle of the UPA, Revolution of Dignity, Russian-Ukrainian war, volunteer battalions.

In the article, the author analyzes the paramilitary structures of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement from 1990 to the present day and the influence of the armed national liberation struggle in the 40-50s of the twentieth century on the process of their formation. Three categories of paramilitary nationalist organizations were formed depending on such influence. Those of them who mainly based their activities in the West and in the Center of Ukraine were subjected to an indirect ideological influence (SNPU, transformed into "Svoboda", and paramilitary organizations that have belonged to and will continue to belong to its sphere of influence), or direct organizational and ideological influence ("Warta DSU" and "Tryzub" named after S. Bandera) of the OUN-B and traditions of the national liberation struggle of the UPA. Instead, there are no such influences on those that have been active and operate in the East and South of Ukraine (UNSO, "Patriot of Ukraine", SNA).

Key words: modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, paramilitary nationalist organizations, OUN-B, national liberation struggle of the UPA, Revolution of Dignity, Russian-Ukrainian war, volunteer battalions.

Statement of the problem. Since the beginning of the Russian military aggression in 2014 and in the conditions of the Ukrainian army destroyed by the political regime of V. Yanukovich, the volunteer movement has become

aggression. The process of their formation was largely influenced by Ukrainian paramilitary nationalist structures, and the experience they gained during their existence was of great

widespread in Ukraine. At the initial stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it was volunteer battalions that played an important role in deterring Russian

importance in their combat activities. In view of this, the issue of studying the militarization of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the impact of

of the armed national liberation struggle of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the formation of paramilitary structures in the modern nationalist movement.

Formulation of the objectives of the article (statement of the task). The author of the article aims to study the process of formation of Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary structures during the period of Ukraine's independence and to identify the influence of the national liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA on it. Thus, the object of this study is the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, and the subject is its paramilitary component.

Analysis of recent research and publications. In modern studies of the modern political history of Ukraine, the topic of the formation of the nationalist component of the party-political and public space remains insufficiently covered. Among others, we can note the works of V. Kulyk, V. Panchenko, and E. Adriushchenko's PhD thesis, which also provides a detailed analysis of the historiography of the problem [1]. The permanent scientific conference "Ideology of Ukrainian Nationalism at the Present Stage of Development of the Ukrainian State" has become a good scientific platform for intensifying such research. Within its framework, scientific articles were written by C. Adamovych, V. Altukhov, V. Buslenko, B. Halayko, V. Trush, V. Roh, I. Kononov, M. Molochko, B. Paska.

Highlighting previously unresolved parts of the overall problem. The paramilitary component of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement is even less studied. The most thorough study to date is the aforementioned dissertation by E. Andriushchenko, which includes a review of nationalist paramilitary structures. At the same time, it does not fully cover all aspects of the formation of the paramilitary component of the modern nationalist movement, including the influence of the armed national liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA on its formation. It also reflects quite schematically the changes that occurred in the nationalist movement in general and in its paramilitary segment in particular after the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014 and in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. This article is dedicated to the study of these aspects.

Summary of the main material. In the beginning of this study, the author hypothesizes that the armed national liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA in the 40s and 50s of the twentieth century had an indirect impact on the formation of most structures of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement and will focus on the arguments to support it.

This struggle took place in various forms, initiated by both formations of the once united OUN-

the OUN was divided into the OUN-Melnyk (OUN-M) and the OUN-Bandera (OUN-B). But of course, the most significant was the more than ten-year-long two-front underground armed struggle of the UPA against the armies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. It left the most significant mark on the minds of Ukrainians and shaped the social atmosphere in which paramilitary nationalist structures were created on the eve and after the declaration of Ukraine's independence [2, p. 28-30].

The first such paramilitary association was the Varta Rukhu. It was created to protect the public actions of the People's Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika (Rukh) during the Soviet regime and was officially registered in late 1990. The organization's charter was written in accordance with the requirements of the legislation of the time, but in fact did not reflect its real goals and objectives. The leaders of Varta did not limit them to protecting the peaceful actions of the Rukh, but were ready to turn the organization into the core of armed resistance to the Soviet regime. A well-known Ukrainian dissident and political prisoner V. Moroz, who considered the creation of his own armed forces to be the main condition for Ukraine's independence and advocated the transformation of Galicia into a kind of "Ukrainian Prussia," praised the activities of the Rukh Varta: "This is the first real formation of Ukrainian self-defense...this is the first real force." The Centennial Foundation, which he created in Canada, raised funds for this Ukrainian paramilitary force. In 1991, Varta Rukhu became one of the basic organizations for the newly formed Social National Party of Ukraine (SNPU). This was the beginning of V. Moroz's rapprochement with the SNPU, and the leader of the Varta Rukhu, Y. Kryvoruchko, joined the party's highest executive body, the Committee of Commissioners, becoming the ideology commissioner [1, p. 42; 3, p. 188; 4, p. 58].

After the formation of the SNPU, it took over the radical methods of the Varta Rukhu. For example, in 1992, the party actively supported the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP), and its units took individual church buildings under protection: The Holy Assumption Cathedral in Volodymyr-Volynskyi, the Holy Trinity Cathedral in Lutsk, etc. During the signing of the 1993 Massandra Accords the SNPU, together with the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party (UCRP), the State Independence of Ukraine (SOU) and other public and political organizations, participated in the creation of the Extraordinary Committee for the Salvation of the Nation and State (NCSNS). At the same time, the party initiated the formation of a voluntary paramilitary association, the People's Detachments (PD). Two hundred volunteers were recruited, including workers and students. Their members were actively trained by the founder of the Combat

V. Pilat and his students. And on September 22-24 of that year, clashes between NZ volunteers and law enforcement officers took place in Kyiv. They came to the action in black uniforms, which immediately caught the eye and clearly distinguished them from the "UnSoviets" dressed in camouflage uniforms [5; 4, p. 61; 1, p. 56].

In 1996, the Patriot of Ukraine Society for Assistance to the Armed Forces and the Navy was created under the NPU. Participants in those events claim that at its height, the organization consisted of about three thousand organized and trained young people of military age. At the same time, scholars put the number at a much more modest level, between 300 and 400 people. Since in 1993 Ukrainian legislation introduced criminal liability for the creation and activity of illegal paramilitary groups, the constituent documents of this public organization corresponded to the formal name. However, in reality, Patriot of Ukraine continued the traditions of using radical methods of Varta Rukhu and NZ and participated in street clashes with ideological opponents and law enforcement officials. The most significant of these was a clash on November 7, 1997, in Lviv with supporters of communist ideology who were brought by political opponents from the eastern regions of Ukraine for propaganda purposes. Criminal cases were brought against several members of the party. After the SNPU was transformed into the Svoboda party in 2004, the Patriot of Ukraine was officially disbanded [1, p. 130, 171; 4, p. 67; 3, p. 189].

Thus, analyzing the activities of the paramilitary nationalist structures that were in the sphere of influence of the SNPU, we believe that the Varta Rukhu, People's Detachments and Patriot of Ukraine belong to the same organizational and political tradition. Since the SNPU based its ideological principles on the works of one of the leading figures of the OUN-B, Y. Stetsko, it should be assumed that it was formed under the indirect ideological influence of the OUN-B and the national liberation struggle of the UPA.

The Ukrainian People's Self-Defense (UNSO) was the second oldest, but the first influential and most historically rich nationalist paramilitary structure. It was created under the Ukrainian Inter-Party Assembly (UPA) in 1991 in the wake of an attempted coup d'état in the Kremlin. Subsequently, the UNSO carried out its activities without being registered by the state. Already in the same year, the organization clashed with participants of the traditional communist demonstration on November 7 in Kyiv. The following year, the UNSO took part in a "march to Crimea" aimed at "demonstrating strength"

local separatists. At the same time, it established cooperation with the UOC-KP and supported it in its struggle for separation from the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate (MP). In July 1995, members of the UNSO took part in mass clashes with the police during the burial of Patriarch Volodymyr Romaniuk of the UOC-KP (the so-called "Black Tuesday"). The next and perhaps the last resonant surge in UNSO activity was its participation in the 2001 political campaign "Ukraine without Kuchma". As a rule, after each such action, UNSO members were subjected to criminal persecution. During its heyday in 1991-1995, the organization, according to researchers, numbered about 5 thousand fighters [1, p. 53, 97, 125].

However, the UNSO became most famous for its participation in foreign armed conflicts. The first of these was the war in Transnistria. About half a thousand UNSO fighters fought on the side of pro-Russian forces. However, in the Abkhazian war of 1993, about 150 of its members took the opposite position, fighting on the side of Georgia against pro-Russian separatists. A much smaller number of them took part in military operations on the territory of Georgia in 1997-2001. The third large-scale military campaign involving members of the UNSO was the First Chechen War. In 1994-1996, about a hundred UNSO members fought on the side of the Chechens. Members of the UNSO also supported Chechen fighters in the fight against Russia during the Second Chechen War, but in much smaller numbers. Small groups of UNSO fighters also took part in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (both on the side of Croatia and Republika Srpska), Nagorno-Karabakh (on the side of Azerbaijan), and Tajikistan [1, pp. 97-101, 110].

In general, for ideology and practice the UNSO was characterized by pan-Slavic motives, which was manifested both in ideological constructions and in the contradictory practice of participating in foreign armed conflicts, either on the side of pro-Russian separatist forces or against Russia itself. Despite the involvement of the son of the UPA Commander-in-Chief Yuriy Shukhevych, it is still possible to talk about the influence of the forms of the UPA national liberation struggle on the UNSO, but not its ideological foundations.

The DSU also created its own paramilitary unit in 1993. It operated for several years under the name "DSU Guard" was also listed in the statutory documents as its "sports reference". The clear ideological position of the party, in particular the interpretation of the nation as an ethnic community, was reflected in its paramilitary structure, in particular, in the meticulous attitude to the nationality of candidates. During the entire period of its existence, the "Varta DSU" had about 200 members, did not demonstrate

bright pages in its political activity, also declined and ceased to exist in parallel with the development of internal conflicts and the decline of the DSU. During these conflicts, the commander of the DSU Guard, V. Stadnichenko, left the party [1, p. 50, 97; 6, p. 244].

Another paramilitary association, the S. Bandera Public Sports and Patriotic Organization "Tryzub" ("Trident"), was created at the initiative of the OUN-B. The date of its creation is considered to be October 14, 1993. The first chairman of the organization was V. Ivanyshyn, a well-known contemporary ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism at the time. The organization was never registered at the state level, although some of its local units were legalized. "Tryzub expanded its activities not only in the West of Ukraine, but its branches were also established in the Center and East. The peak of the organization's activity is considered to be 1995, and after that a number of its members were prosecuted. In 1996, V. Ivanyshyn handed over his powers as head of the Central Leadership to D. Yarosh, and in 1998 to Y. Fil. At the same time, relations between Tryzub and the OUN-B deteriorated, and in 1999 they were officially severed [1, p. 58-61; 7].

From the very beginning, Tryzub was assigned the role of the KUN's power structure. Although its representatives themselves emphasize that they have always been subordinated exclusively to the OUN-B leadership and rely on the "bird theory" propagated by V. Ivanyshyn. Ivanyshyn's "bird theory," according to which the OUN was its body, and the KUN political party and the Trident order organization were its wings. Researchers believe that in the best years of its activity (1995-1996), the organization had 2-3 thousand members. The main forms of its activity were the protection of the events of the KUN, the All-Ukrainian Brotherhood of the OUN-UPA, the protection of the buildings of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) during its formation and the transfer of parishes of the UOC-MP to it, and ensuring order during nationwide pilgrimages in the village of Zarvanytsia in the Ternopil region, conducting propaganda marches and raids, educational work, physical training, etc. A special resonance among the public was caused by the Crimean propaganda campaign led by the then kurinnya D. Yarosh in 1995, a five-thousand march together with veterans of the OUN-UPA and the Cossacks in Kyiv on the Intercession of the Intercession holiday in 1995, and a similarly large march during the pilgrimage to Zarvanytsia in 1996 [7].

The author was among the organizers of the All Ukrainian methodological seminar-training on the problems of organizing nationalist training for youth and youth sports and patriotic clubs for active "Tryzub", which took place on May 13-15, 1994, in Yaremche, Prykarpattia. It was based on the experience of organizing nationalist

The author was also involved in the organization of the "Idea to rank" training for high school boys in October 1993, and the functioning of the youth sports and patriotic club "Zvytyaga" in Yaremche in 1993-1994, which was also created and operated by the author. At the same time, Tryzub for the first time publicly demonstrated its paramilitary character by holding a large and unusual march of its fighters in this small Carpathian town [8; 9].

Law enforcement officers often detained members of the

"Tryzub" with weapons, which led to the opening of criminal cases. The story of an attack by several members of the organization on a military unit in the Kharkiv region to seize weapons was a resonant one at the time. Its members were detained and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. The confrontation between the organization's members and representatives of criminal structures in Dniprodzerzhynsk ended in a shootout and a court case for one of its members. There were also cases of involvement of Tryzub members in the settlement of business and commercial relations (protection of the Chernivtsi machine-building plant and clashes with law enforcement officers). The organization's participation in the "Ukraine without Kuchma" campaign was controversial. At that time, opposition forces of different ideologies, from the right-wing to the left, united against the current government. However, the leadership of Tryzub stated that blocking with the left was unacceptable and repeatedly organized attacks on their representatives, which led to accusations of provocations [1, p. 97, 127-129, 13; 7].

Unlike UNSO, Tryzub did not participate in the in international armed conflicts. At the same time, he made attempts to establish cooperation with Belarusian nationalists. In particular, in 1997, contacts were established with them, and in 1998-1999, with the assistance of Tryzub, a Belarusian paramilitary nationalist structure, the Kray Sports and Patriotic Organization, was created. Its members were trained in Trident training camps in Ukraine [1, p. 171].

Given that the OUN-B had a substantive influence on the creation of the SSU and initiated the creation of the Trident, it was quite natural that the Varta SSU and the Trident, among other analyzed paramilitary structures, adhered to the most verified ideological line of traditional Ukrainian nationalism in its interpretation, including inheriting the traditions of the UPA national liberation struggle.

Since 2005, the Patriot of Ukraine (PU) civic organization has been operating in a new status. It was formed in 2005 in Kharkiv, and its leaders declared continuity with the Patriot of Ukraine of the Lviv period, which existed under

SNPU, and continued to use the symbols of this party. The organization was officially registered, its leader was the former head of the Kharkiv regional organization of Tryzub, A. Biletskyi, and its ranks were joined by people from Kharkiv cells of the SNPU, Tryzub and UNA-UNSO. E. Andriushchenko believes that the organization's forms of activity were clearly marked by paramilitary and ideological motives, including neo-Nazi and racist ones. A. Soshnikov comes to similar conclusions, believing that the Patriot of Ukraine "develops a racist and general East Slavic (with a strong admixture of paganism) rather than Ukrainian ethnic line" [1, p. 171; 10].

It was on the basis of the latter that the Patriot of Ukraine finally split from the "Svoboda, although until then a number of activists belonged to both organizations simultaneously (such as O. Odnorozhenko, who headed the Kharkiv regional organization of Svoboda and was also an ideological referent of Patriot of Ukraine). On December 15, 2007, an internal party ideological conference "Modern Challenges and Responses: Ideological Foundation and Current Program of Svoboda" was held in Ivano-Frankivsk. The main discussions centered on the issue of the so-called "racial nationalism," from which O. Odnorozhenko based his report. However, it did not receive support from nearly three dozen conference participants representing party organizations in Volyn, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Lviv, Luhansk, Rivne, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Chernihiv, and several others [11].

On December 17 of the same year, Patriot of Ukraine released a statement in which it "accused the leadership of Svoboda of crimes against the nation" and announced the severance of relations with it. "For a long time, the Patriot of Ukraine has been tied to Svoboda by observers. This was done completely without any reason, given that Patriot of Ukraine and Svoboda are conceptually different structures in ideological, organizational and practical terms," the statement said. By taking this step, its initiators were counting on the creation of their own party. The statement of December 17 read: "By severing all relations with Svoboda, the Patriot of Ukraine Organization understands that it is taking on the entire burden of the struggle for a future social-nationalist Greater Ukraine. The organization "Patriot of Ukraine", which is built on the principle of "party-army", takes a strategic course to create a powerful All-Ukrainian Social-Nationalist Movement, in which the newly formed Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine, together with the combat units of the "Patriot of Ukraine" and social-nationalist trade unions, will take a worthy place" [12].

Indeed, in November 2008, on the basis of the "The Social National Assembly (SNA) was created on the basis of the Patriot of Ukraine. In addition to it, the SNA included several radical civic initiatives: National Action "RiD", Chernihiv right-wing movement "Ukrainian Alternative", Odesa public association "Glory and Honor" (Sich). The Ukrainian National-Trade Party (UNTP), St. Andrew's Cossack Kuren, and the Civic Association "Sober Kyiv". Among the regional divisions of the organizations that were part of the SNA, only one was located in the west - in Ivano-Frankivsk region. However, it did not manifest itself in the local social and political life. The rest were concentrated in the Center (mainly in the Kyiv region) and in the South and East of Ukraine (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odesa) [10]. They also tried to conduct their actions there, characterized by radical paramilitary methods typical of the Patriot of Ukraine. Ultimately, the SNA failed to become an influential factor in the political process.

Analyzing the ideological foundations of the Patriot of Ukraine and the SNA, we can conclude that it was not inherent in them to follow the ideological line of traditional OUN nationalism, and the forms of their activities were not influenced by the history of the UPA's national liberation struggle.

The participation of paramilitary nationalist organizations in the revolutionary events of the Independence period is a separate and extensive topic for research. It is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, we will only note in passing that the use of their potential in the 1991 Revolution on Granite, the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity gradually increased as the nationalist movement itself grew and the revolutionary processes in Ukraine became more dynamic and radicalized. They peaked during the Revolution of Dignity. Its course and victorious conclusion would not have been possible without the paramilitary self-organization of Euromaidan [13].

It was during this revolution that the real, not declarative, capacity of Ukrainian nationalist structures and their participation in this self-organization became apparent. Svoboda, which dominated the nationalist movement at the time, mobilized its members on a massive scale and regularly rotated its "hundreds" to participate in the capital's protests and confront law enforcement agencies. Independent experts point out that among the other parties, Svoboda dominated by the number of members involved both on the central Maidan in Kyiv and on all regional Maidans from Galicia to Crimea. Its participation was also recorded in the percentage of the largest number of protest actions [13, p. 263].

In addition to Svoboda, another distinctly nationalist structure in this revolution was the Right Sector movement. The date of its creation is considered to be November 28, 2013, and its name comes from its location in a revolutionary tent camp. It included both well-known nationalist organizations that were in crisis on the eve of the revolution and no longer played a significant role in the political process, and those that had a local impact on social and political processes. For the former, the revolutionary events of 2013-2014 offered a chance to revive their influence. The initiator of the Right Sector is considered to be Tryzub. It included representatives of two other well-known nationalist structures, UNA-UNSO and Patriot of Ukraine, as well as organizations such as White Hammer, Black Committee, Committee for the Liberation of Political Prisoners, Carpathian Sich, close to Svoboda, individual nationalists and football fans. Since January 2014, the Right Sector has been slowly gaining the informal status of the leader of the nationalist movement [13, p. 264].

The post-revolutionary atmosphere, and especially the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, became a favorable environment for the further development of the paramilitary movement and the use of military themes in the political process. Volunteer battalions were created, new political forces with a paramilitary bias emerged, and the military theme was actively exploited in the technologies of early presidential and parliamentary elections.

The experience of nationalist paramilitary organizations was particularly valuable in the creation of volunteer battalions. One of the first to emerge was the Azov battalion, which included representatives of the Patriot of Ukraine, the SNA, and "Automaidan". Its commander was the leader of the first two nationalist structures, A. Biletsky. The next one to be initiated by the Right Sector was "The Volunteer Ukrainian Corps (DUK). It was headed by A. Stempitsky, who also remained the commander of the Trident. The Svoboda party, using its presence in the parliament and the post-revolutionary government, created the Sich Interior Ministry battalion under the command of O. Pysarenko and the Carpathian Sich volunteer battalion led by O. Kutsyn. The latter was later transferred to the 93rd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) as a consolidated assault company. A volunteer OUN battalion was formed in the summer of 2014 on the basis of the territorial defense battalion in Nizhyn without any particular political force. For some time, it was part of the DUK, and later it was formed as a separate volunteer battalion led by a well-known nationalist activist M. Kokhanivsky. It is worth noting,

that he had no real relation to both OUN formations, and even more so - after the 2017 shootout in Kyiv and the criminal case against M. Kokhanivsky, both traditional OUN-M and OUN-B formations dissociated themselves from him and called on the public not to abuse the name of the OUN. A separate unit was formed by members of D. Korchynskyi's Brotherhood organization. Initially, it was part of the Azov battalion, then moved to the Shakhtarsk battalion, and eventually a special purpose company of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "St. Mary" was formed on its basis, commanded by D. Linko, who was later replaced by O. Seredyuk. There was also information about the creation of a separate unit by members of the UNSO [1, p. 190-192; 14].

The current situation has created favorable documents of the UNA and by renaming it conditions for rebranding and reformatting of those paramilitary nationalist structures that were in crisis on the eve of the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 and ceased to have a significant impact on socio-political processes. In March 2014, a social movement was transformed into a political party on the basis of the constituent "Right Sector (RS). D. Yarosh was elected its leader, and the leadership also included representatives of Tryzub, UNA-UNSO, and Patriot of Ukraine-SNA. However, the recent revolutionary popularity of the SPS has not been converted into relevant political results. During the early presidential elections, D. Yarosh received only 0.7% of the vote, while the PS received 1.8% in the same parliamentary elections. At the end of 2015, D. Yarosh left the party, announcing the formation of a new political project on the basis of individual battalions of the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps - the National Movement "Yarosh's Statehood Initiative" (Diya). However, so far little is known about the party's actual activities: the party's website mainly publishes statements, reports on the creation of regional organizations, and reports on military and sports exercises or news from the front [15].

Soon after the registration of the SAR, representatives of the UNA-UNSO and Patriot of Ukraine-SNA left it, trying to resume their own political projects. In 2015, UNA-UNSO made unsuccessful attempts to do so, eventually being denied registration by the Ministry of Justice. The Patriot of Ukraine-SNA has been much more successful. Having practically ceased to exist in 2014 and transformed into the Azov regiment and the Civil Corps NGO, in the spring of 2015 their representatives returned to the idea of reviving the party project and created the "National Corps. However, the process dragged on until 2016, and the symbolic day of the party's creation is considered to be a significant date for Ukrainians

October 14 is the feast of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary. The party was headed by A. Biletskyi, who was elected to the parliament in the 2014 early elections in the capital's majority constituency No. 217 [15].

Svoboda partially lost its popularity after the Revolution of Dignity, as reflected in the results of the early presidential and parliamentary elections. In the first, its leader O. Tyahnybok received 1.16% of the vote, and the party in the parliamentary elections - 4.71%. At the same time, six members of the party became MPs in single-member majoritarian constituencies. Many party members and supporters perceived these results as a defeat. However, Svoboda continued to fight for its electoral and nationalist niche. Its arsenal of methods included paramilitary traditions: public marches, torchlight processions, internal training, etc. This area of activity was significantly strengthened by the Legion of Freedom, created from participants in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the Sokol public organization, which is under the party's influence and whose many members also took part in the war.

In early 2017, three most authoritative nationalist forces of the post-revolutionary period - Svoboda, the National Corps and "Right Sector" - announced that they would join forces to achieve their goals together. For this purpose, their leaders O. Tyahnybok, A. Biletskyi and A. Tarasenko signed the "National Manifesto" on March 16, 2017, in the Kyiv City Teacher's House, in which they outlined a further action plan in case of victory in the elections. This political document was also supported by the OUN-M, led by B. Chervak, the KUN (S. Bratsyun) and the C14 organization (S. Mazur). This association significantly increased the cumulative effect of nationalist actions, which was clearly demonstrated by the traditional "March of Glory of the UPA", which was held jointly by the three political forces on October 14, 2014 in Kyiv for the first time, and according to various sources, it had from 10 to 20 thousand participants [16; 17; 18].

Analyzing the prospects of this nationalist association, a number of experts agree that it has a real chance of entering the Ukrainian parliament, as the nationalist electoral field reaches 7-10% of those citizens who can potentially participate in the next elections. At the same time, on the eve of the 2019 presidential election, the association's members failed to maintain the level of consolidation achieved. Svoboda, with the support of the OUN-M, KUN, Right Sector, and the C14 movement, nominated R. Koshulynskyi, the Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada in 2012-2014, as a candidate for the presidency. R. Koshulynskyi, who is positioned as the "only nationalist candidate". Instead, the National Corps party, which was

whose supporters started a discussion on social media with their opponents from Svoboda about who would be a better candidate for this position - R. Koshulynskyi or their leader A. Biletskyi - ultimately abstained from participating in the election [17; 19; 20].

Since the organizational foundations of these parties, regardless of the rebranding and transformations, are rooted in their or their predecessor organizations' pre-revolutionary activities, their ideological foundations have not undergone significant changes. Obviously, with the clarification that against their will, under the influence of Russian propaganda, which presented all defenders of Ukraine from Russian military aggression as "Banderites," the ideological influence of traditional Ukrainian nationalism and the national liberation struggle of the UPA began to spread to the National Corps as the organizational successor of the Patriot of Ukraine - SNA. A manifestation of this is obviously the fact that the date of the party's foundation is considered to be October 14, which is symbolic for Ukrainian nationalists and, in addition to its religious meaning, is also considered to be the date of the UPA's foundation.

Thus, in the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement since 1989 and until today, a paramilitary component has always been significantly present. The first of these organizations was Varta Rukhu, which later became one of the basic structures for the creation of the SNPU, later transformed into Svoboda. The SNPU-Svoboda took over from Varta Rukhu the tradition of using paramilitary methods of political struggle and constantly used them both independently and through the created party structures: "Narodni Zahony" and the Patriot of Ukraine Society for Assistance to the Armed Forces and the Navy in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the Legion of Freedom and Sokil after the Revolution of Dignity and during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Since the SNPU used the ideological heritage of the leading OUN-b figure Y. Stetsko as its ideological base, all subsequent paramilitary structures genetically related to it also followed this line, and their activities were indirectly influenced by the traditions and methods of the UPA's revolutionary liberation struggle.

Direct organizational, resource and The OUN-B, which was involved in the creation of the DSU and initiated the creation of the KUN and the "S. Bandera's Trident. Accordingly, the latter was under the ideological influence of the OUN-B and the traditions of the UPA's national liberation struggle, and this influence was also automatically transferred to the paramilitary parapatrisan structure of the DSU - the DSU Guard.

The most significant Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary organization during the entire period of Ukraine's independence was the UNSO. Its history is full of participation in both domestic political processes and international military conflicts. However, despite the involvement of the son of the UPA Commander-in-Chief Yuriy Shukhevych in its leadership at various times, the ideological foundations of this organization differed from the ideological foundations of traditional Ukrainian nationalism and were largely based on pan-Slavic concepts. Accordingly, the influence of the UPA's national liberation struggle was limited to imitation of its methods.

The traditional ideology of Ukrainian nationalism was not inherent in them, and the traditions of the UPA's national liberation struggle did not influence the paramilitary nationalist structures that were organizationally based in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, such as the Patriot of Ukraine, which was restored in Kharkiv after the rebranding of the SNPU and the SNA created on its basis. In addition to pan-Slavic motives, their worldview was also characterized by neo-Nazi and racist motives.

The Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014 gave a chance for political resuscitation to those paramilitary organizations that had ceased to have a significant impact on socio-political processes: UNSO, Tryzub, Patriot of Ukraine-SNA. They joined the Right Sector public movement, which, along with the pre-revolutionary leader of the nationalist movement, the Svoboda party, had the greatest influence on the course of the revolution among other nationalist structures.

With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the experience of Ukrainian nationalist paramilitaries

The development of civil society organizations had a decisive impact on the formation of the volunteer movement, which played a significant role in deterring Russian military aggression. The Patriot of Ukraine-SNA created the Azov battalion, the Right Sector created the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps, and Svoboda formed the Sich Interior Ministry battalion and the Carpathian Sich volunteer battalion, D. Korczynski's "Brotherhood" formed the special purpose company of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "St. Mary", a volunteer battalion "OUN" was formed regardless of party influence, etc.

With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, military issues became a leading theme in political processes and party building. It is used by political forces of different ideological orientations. In particular, this atmosphere also contributes to the transformation of a number of paramilitary nationalist forces. Having practically used the constituent documents of the UNA, Tryzub transformed into a party "Right Sector, and the SNA-Patriot of Ukraine to the National Corps party.

Under the influence of the military confrontation with Russia, which propagandistically classified all defenders of Ukraine as "Banderites," the ideological influence of traditional Ukrainian nationalism and the armed national liberation struggle of the UPA on all nationalist structures analyzed, including the National Corps as the organizational successor of the Patriot of Ukraine and the SNA, has increased.

The article opens up the prospect of further research on the modern nationalist movement, in particular, the experience gained during the years of independence and the prospects for consolidation processes in the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

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Annex 296

Unn.com.ua, *Financing of terrorism by Rybalka's companies: pre-trial investigation continues, examinations appointed* (17 October 2018)

(translation)

Translation

Unn.com.ua, *Financing of terrorism by Rybalka's companies: pre-trial investigation continues, examinations appointed (17 October 2018)*, available at: <https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1758010-finansuvannya-terrorizmu-kompaniyami-ribalki-dosudove-rozsliduvannya-trivaye-priznachen-ekspertizi>.

Financing of terrorism by Rybalka's companies: pre-trial investigation continues, examinations appointed

Petr Ivasyuk

KIEV. 17 October. UNN. The Zarechny District Court of Sumy granted the request of the SBU investigator to conduct a forensic economic examination in the criminal proceedings on the financing of terrorism involving the company Snack Export LLC, which, in turn, belongs to the father of people's deputy from the RPOL (Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko) Sergey Rybalka - Viktor Rybalka. This is evidenced by the data of the Unified Register of Court Decisions, UNN reports.

In particular, this refers to criminal proceedings No. 2201820000000034 dated 20 March 2018.

Thus, during the pre-trial investigation in the said criminal proceedings, it was established that from January 2016 to the present (a more precise date has not been established by the pre-trial investigation), a group of persons, which, in particular, included the deputy director of the department for foreign economic activity of "Snack Export" LLC (name and surname are not specified - ed.), acting intentionally and for mercenary motives, by prior conspiracy with a temporarily unemployed citizen of Ukraine (name and surname withheld - ed.) and officials of "Mir Piva" LLC (Republic of Belarus), as well as other unidentified individuals and legal entities, including those operating in the territories controlled by the terrorist organisations "DPR" and "LPR", carried out activities aimed at financing the said terrorist organisations.

"Realising the goal of the criminal conspiracy and guided by a mercenary motive, a group of people, which included PERSON_1 (Deputy Director of the Department for Foreign Economic Activity of "Snack Export" LLC - ed.), together with PERSON_2 and other persons, being aware of the fact that the terrorist organisations "DPR" and "LPR" were operating in part of the territories of Lugansk and Donetsk regions, set up illegal supplies of "Snack Export" products to the said temporarily occupied territories," the document says.

Also, according to the register of court decisions, the criminal scheme consisted in the fact that "Snack Export LLC", which is part of "SGroup" Corporation on the basis of relevant foreign economic agreements, "supplies its own products (snacks, crackers, chips, etc.) to "Mir Piva" LLC".

"Subsequently, "Mir Piva" LLC and other companies, in violation of Ukrainian and international law, under circumstances that are currently being established, on the basis of relevant foreign economic agreements, supply the said products to the temporarily occupied territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, in particular to legal entities operating in the territories controlled by the terrorist organisations "DPR" and "LPR", through temporarily blocked checkpoints across the state border of Ukraine from the Russian Federation, while paying for the interests of the terrorist organisations.

It is also noted that after the actual delivery of the products to the temporarily occupied territory and payment of the so-called "customs duties" to the budget of the "DPR" and "LPR", they are distributed for sale in stores and retail chains that have been arbitrarily seized ("nationalised") by the leaders of terrorist organisations.

"Thus, the so-called "customs duties" and "taxes" paid as a result of the hidden transit of goods by "Snack Export" LLC are used to support the activities of these terrorist organisations and their individual leaders and members," the document says.

On September 18, 2018, the investigator of the SBU Office in Sumy region conducted a review of the materials of criminal proceedings No. 2201820000000034 dated 20 March 2018.

It is reported that during the review of the criminal proceedings, it was established that they contain information relevant to determining the amount of the so-called "customs duties" and "taxes" to be paid to the budgets of the terrorist organisations of the self-proclaimed DPR and LPR.

"In order to clarify the circumstances that are essential for the criminal proceedings, for the purpose of a full, comprehensive, impartial investigation of the said criminal proceedings, it became necessary to conduct a forensic economic examination, which requires special knowledge," the document says.

The court granted the investigator's request, thereby instructing the experts of the Sumy Scientific Research Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine to conduct a forensic economic examination in criminal proceedings No. 2201820000000034 dated 20 March 2018.

The day before, the Zarechny Court of Sumy delivered a guilty verdict against one of the managers of Rybalka's family company "Snack Export" LLC on the fact of assistance in financing terrorism.

Earlier, the leader of the Radical Party, Oleg Lyashko, said that those who trade with some parts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions should be imprisoned.

"This issue is currently under investigation. It is being conducted by the Security Service of Ukraine. I'm not interfering yet, because I want everything to be done in accordance with the law. If the facts are confirmed, I don't care what the surname of the person who trades with the occupied territories is. This is a crime. And he must be held accountable. Rybalka himself claims that this is not the case. But I say again that I am not interfering in the situation. I demand that law enforcement agencies investigate this case. And if someone trades with the occupied territories, they should be imprisoned for life. Because such trade is a trade in blood," Lyashko said on one of the Ukrainian TV channels.


Annex 297

YouTube, *Victoria Nuland's Admits Washington Has Spent \$5 Billion to "Subvert Ukraine"*
(9 February 2014)

(translation)

Transcript

YouTube, *Victoria Nuland's Admits Washington Has Spent \$5 Billion to "Subvert Ukraine"* (9 February 2014), available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2fYcHLouXY>.



Victoria Nuland's Admits Washington Has Spent \$5 Billion to "Subvert Ukraine"

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Transcript

[0:05]

Ladies and gentlemen, it's my great honor and pleasure to introduce to you the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland. Victoria just recently returned from Kiev and has an update on the situation there as well as the US' Government position. Victoria.

[0:40]

Thank you Roman. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for you being here and for your continued support for the U.S.-Ukraine relationship and thank you for the invitation to speak to you today.

[0:53]

Still jet-lagged from my third trip in five weeks to Ukraine and my days in Kiev earlier this week. I don't have to tell this crowd that these are historic and challenging times for the people of Ukraine, for the Ukrainian-American relationship, and for people everywhere who care about the future of that great country.

[1:20]

The world is watching the drama that is unfolding in the center of Kiev. The Euromaidan movement has come to embody the principles and values that are the cornerstones for all free democracies.

[1:34]

What began on November 24th as a protest against President Yanukovich's decision to pause on the route to Europe has become much deeper and bigger. After blood was spilled by security forces on November 30th the movement also became about justice and civil rights and Ukraine's desire to have a government.

[1:55]

Ukrainians desire to have a government that respects them, that listens to them, that protects them and that provides for them - a modern democratic government. That was palpable when I made my first visit to the Maidan on December 5th. When Ukrainians say they are European, this is what they mean. And as one very prominent Ukrainian businessman said to me, the Maidan movement's greatest achievement is that it has proven that the people of Ukraine will no longer support any president...

[2:30]

...this one or a future one who does not take them to Europe. Throughout this period the United States' message has been clear and unequivocal: we stand with the people of Ukraine in their search for justice, human dignity, security, a return to economic health, and for the European future that they have chosen and that they deserve.

[2:53]

As you know and as Roman said I returned to Ukraine for my third visit in five weeks last Tuesday in support of these very goals. This time conducting parallel coordinated high-level diplomacy with EU High Representative Cathy Ashton with all of the key Ukrainian stakeholders.

[3:15]

Then halfway through our visit, in the wee hours of Wednesday, December 10th, we witnessed the appalling show of force by government forces, who turned riot police, bulldozers, and tear gas on the Maidan demonstrators as they sang hymns and prayed for peace.

[3:33]

Ukrainians of all ages and backgrounds flooded to the Maidan to protect it. Secretary Kerry wasted no time in expressing the United States' disgust at this decision of the Ukrainian government and

by morning the riot police had been forced to retreat. Later that same day I spent more than two hours with President Yanukovych.

[3:58]

It was a tough conversation but also a realistic one. I made absolutely clear to him on behalf of the United States that what happened on December 10th and more generally what has been happening in security terms is absolutely impermissible in a European State, in a democratic State. But I also made clear that the United States believes there is a way out for Ukraine, that it is still possible to save Ukraine's European future and that that is where we wanted to see the President lead his country.

[4:35]

And that was going to require immediate steps to de-escalate the security situation and immediate political steps to end the crisis and get Ukraine back into a conversation with Europe and with the International Monetary Fund. As you all know and as I'm sure you just heard from Anders and other colleagues, Ukraine's economy is in a dire state, having been in recession for more than a year and with less than three months' worth of foreign currency reserves in place.

[5:02]

The reforms that the IMF insists on are necessary for the long-term economic health of the country. A new deal with the IMF would also send a positive signal to private markets and would increase foreign direct investment that is so urgently needed in Ukraine. Signing the association agreement with the EU would also put Ukraine on a path to strengthening the sort of stable and predictable business environment that investors require.

[5:30]

There is no other path that would bring Ukraine back to long-term political stability and economic growth. We also commend the EU for leaving the door open on the association agreement and for continuing to work with the Ukrainian government on a way forward. The Ukrainian Parliament has already passed some 18 separate pieces of required legislation in advance of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius.

[5:56]

Although that was a missed opportunity, it would be a huge shame to see five years' worth of work and preparation go to waste if the AA is not signed in the near future. So, it is time to finish the job. As Vice-President Biden said in remarks last night, President Yanukovych has a choice – he can choose the path that leads to division and isolation or he can take a leap and take immediate tangible steps to defuse his country's crisis and start a genuine dialogue with the opposition and agree on a path that returns Ukraine to economic and political health.

[6:38]

While these are challenging times in many ways, we also can't lose sight of the fact that this is a time for great optimism as well. You only have to be on the Maidan to feel the energy, to feel the hope of Ukrainians coursing through the center of Kiev and across the country. People are engaging because they know they have a stake in the future of their country.

[7:04]

We see energy, we see optimism that simply didn't exist in Ukraine 20 years ago. People of all ages, of all classes, of all walks of life are taking ownership of their future and coming out into the streets to demand a European future. They're doing so peacefully, with great courage, and with enormous personal restraint.

[7:26]

Since Ukraine's independence in 1991 the United States has supported Ukrainians as they build democratic skills and institutions, as they promote civic participation and good governance, all of which are preconditions for Ukraine to achieve its European aspirations. We've invested over five billion dollars to assist Ukraine in these and other goals that will ensure a secure and prosperous and democratic Ukraine.

[7:51]

Today there are senior officials in the Ukrainian government, in the business community, as well as in the opposition civil society and the religious community who believe in this democratic and European future for their country, and they've been working hard to move their country and their President in the right direction.

[8:14]

We urge the government, we urge the President to listen to these voices, to listen to the Ukrainian people, to listen to the Euromaidan and take Ukraine forward. The support of the people in this room is absolutely essential.

[8:31]

We thank you for all you are doing, we thank you for your partnership all these years, and we look forward to continuing to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with you as we take Ukraine into the future that it deserves. Thank you very much for the time today.

[Applause]

Annex 298

Unian.ua, *In Lvov activists continue to block the RSA building, "Berkut" bases and internal troops* (24 January 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Unian.ua, *In Lvov activists continue to block the RSA building, "Berkut" bases and internal troops* (24 January 2014), available at: <https://www.unian.ua/politics/875962-u-lvovi-aktivisti-prodovjuyut-blokuvati-budivlyu-oda-bazi-berkutu-i-vnutrishnih-viysk.html>.

In Lvov activists continue to block the RSA building, Berkut bases and internal troops

09:24, 24.01.14



Activists block the gates of a military unit in Lvov

According to a UNIAN correspondent, during the night all the blocking points were calm and uncrowded, starting from 7.30 am Lvov residents started to come to the blockers, people also gathered at Lvov Euromaidan.

Currently, there are about 50 activists near the Lvov Regional State Administration, warming themselves near barrels with a fire. During the night, the protesters erected a barricade near the RSA building made of bags filled with snow, wooden logs and tires. A stage was also set up, but no one is currently speaking from it.

People stayed in the building of the regional state administration all night, according to the activists themselves, there were several dozens of them. A "field canteen" has been set up in the RSA building, with women preparing sandwiches and hot drinks.

The protesters behaved calmly and made no attempts to break down doors or damage other property. In the corridors, they pinned leaflets with inscriptions: "Ukraine, get up!".

According to the activists of the "Soten' samooboroni", they do not plan to leave the RSA building, as "Lvov Regional State Administration is criminal" and express their readiness to keep the siege until the formation of local People's Councils.

Also, Lvov residents, including relatives of "Berkut" officers and soldiers, continue to block the bases of the Special Forces and Internal Troops. As of 8:00 a.m., there are about 200 people near the bases, who calmed down after regional police leaders assured them that there are no plans to send special forces to Kiev. No attempts are being made to break through or leave the bases. The situation here is calm, people are warming themselves near barrels with fires, food and drinks and warm clothes are brought to them.

As activists of the Lvov Euromaidan told a UNIAN correspondent, today about 600 people left Lvov for Kiev by buses and minibuses, and on the night of January 23-24, about 300 activists left the region for the capital by their own transport and by rail.

There are currently about 20 people at Lvov's Euromaidan, clearing snow near the tents. In the headquarters tent, they are sorting warm clothes that are constantly brought here by Lvov residents to send them to Kiev with the next batch of activists who will leave for Kiev today.

At the same time, according to "Euromaidan SOS" on Facebook, tonight in Yavorovsky district, Lvov region, people blocked the Lvov-Krakovets road, burning tires and not letting trucks pass.

According to anonymous sources, the road was probably blocked in order to prevent the military from leaving the town of Novoyavorovsk.

As UNIAN reported, on January 23 in Lvov, protesters seized the building of the regional state administration and forced the governor Oleg Salo to write a letter of resignation. Later, the press service of the governor said that he had written the letter under pressure.

Criminal proceedings were opened over the seizure of the Lvov Regional State Administration on the grounds of a criminal offence under Paragraph 1 of Article 341 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (seizure of state or public buildings or structures).

Annex 299

DailyLviv.com, Lvov Regional State Administration and "Berkut" and Internal Troops bases are
being blocked (24 January 2014)

(translation)

Translation

DailyLviv.com, *Lvov Regional State Administration and "Berkut" and Internal Troops bases are being blocked* (24 January 2014), available at: <https://dailylviv.com/news/polityka/u-lvovi-blokuyut-prymishchenny>.

Lvov Regional State Administration and "Berkut" and Internal Troops bases are being blocked

24 January 2014, 11:14

The protesters behaved calmly, and there were no attempts to break down doors or damage other property.

According to a UNIAN correspondent, during the night all the blocking points were calm and uncrowded. Starting from 7:30 am, Lvov residents began to come to the blockade, and people are also gathering at Lvov's Euromaidan.

Currently, there are about 50 activists near the Lvov Regional State Administration, warming themselves near barrels with fire. During the night, the protesters erected a barricade near the RSA building made of bags filled with snow, wooden logs and tires. A stage was also set up, but no one is currently speaking from it.

People were staying in the building of the regional state administration all night, according to the activists themselves, several dozen of them. A "field canteen" has been set up in the RSA building, with women preparing sandwiches and hot drinks.

The protesters are behaving calmly, there have been no attempts to break down doors or damage other property. In the corridors, they have pinned leaflets with inscriptions: "Ukraine, get up!".

According to the activists of the "Soten' samooboroni", they do not plan to leave the RSA building, as "Lvov Regional State Administration is criminal" and express their readiness to keep the siege until the formation of local People's Councils.

Also, Lvov residents, including relatives of "Berkut" officers and soldiers, continue to block the bases of the special forces and Internal Troops. As of 8:00 a.m., there are about 200 people near the bases, who calmed down after regional police leaders assured them that there are no plans to send special forces to Kiev.

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At the same time, as reported by "Euromaidan SOS" on Facebook, tonight in the Lvov region in Yavorovskiy district, people blocked the Lvov-Krakovets Road, burning tires and not letting trucks pass.

According to anonymous sources, the road was probably blocked in order to prevent the military from leaving the town of Novoyavorovsk.

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Criminal proceedings were initiated over the seizure of the Lvov Regional State Administration on the grounds of a criminal offense under Paragraph 1 of Article 341 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (seizure of state or public buildings or structures).

Meanwhile, Radio Svoboda journalist Galina Tereshchuk reported the following about the events in Lvov at night:

"The premises of the Lvov regional administration were "seized" by Lvov residents. The headquarters of the Maidan People's Council is located in one of the offices here, and people will be on duty all night.

A barricade has been set up in front of the building. The protesters also forced the head of the Lvov Regional State Administration, Oleg Salo, to write a letter of resignation, which he later withdrew.

On Wednesday morning, several thousand Lvov residents came to Lvov's Maidan, joining the nationwide strike called by opposition representatives. Some of the people marched to the Lvov Regional Administration building, accompanied by local politicians and trade union activists.

People rushed to the building's doors, but the guards did not let them in. However, on the instructions of the regional council members and one of its leaders, Lvov residents entered the building.

They blocked the door to the reception room of the head of the regional state administration. The head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aleksandr Rudyak, immediately arrived at the administration and had a long conversation with the people, asking them not to commit illegal actions or block the state institution.

- "Can you promise that you will not send our sons to Kiev?"
- "Who will be responsible for the murders of people? - asked the people of Lvov.

The conversation ended with shouts of "Shame" and even a demand that the police chief write a letter of resignation. But he, unlike the head of the regional state administration, Oleg Salo, did not do so. Oleg Salo went out to the street and people forced him to write a letter of resignation.

"Now we will register it in the office and this statement will be sent to the presidential administration. Lvov residents came to express their position in view of the atrocities of the authorities," said Lubomyr Melnychuk, a deputy from the "Svoboda" party. The statement was registered, but within minutes Oleg Salo withdrew it and explained his action by saving the employees of the regional state administration, emphasising that he wrote the statement under pressure from the crowd.

The prosecutor's decision did not stop people

The premises where the RSA is located are communally owned by the local community. The administration leases only part of the space from the regional council, according to an agreement that was not renewed on January 1. And the deputies have repeatedly decided to evict officials, but the prosecutor's office has challenged this.

And this time, a criminal proceeding was registered over the seizure of the LRSA building on the grounds of a criminal offence under Article 341 of the Criminal Code (seizure of state and public buildings or structures). Law enforcement officers have launched a pre-trial investigation. Such illegal actions are punishable by up to three years in prison.

But this decision of the prosecutor's office did not stop Lvov residents. They calmly walked around the spacious premises, admired the interior and did not damage any of the property.

- "What kind of mass disorder is this, we came here to our building, they live on our taxes. I'm here for the first time because of the security. This place would be better suited for a hospital than these officials sitting here.

- It's a horror what is happening in Kiev, people are being killed there. We came here to our building because it is the people's property, and there are officials here who live off our taxes. They should remember this.

- This will be a disaster for the entire Ukrainian people, if we don't stand together, it will be the end of everything.

- No one guarantees anything to anyone, if you are not here, if you do not stand up, then bandits will come to you, - the people of Lvov could not contain their emotions.

In the evening, local "Svoboda" members and Maidan activists set up a barricade in front of the RSA building. The headquarters of the People's Council of Maidan, which is supposed to create an executive committee and take over the powers, is located in the building of the regional administration.

However, many Lvov residents cannot understand why they should barricade the building where the administration and council are located if they need to mobilise to Kiev and defend justice and the future of the country. There is even an opinion that certain forces in Lvov are trying to deliberately destabilise the situation in order to push the authorities to introduce a state of emergency in the country. Lvov Mayor Andrey Sadovy warned Lvov residents against provocations in a video message.

Annex 300

TSN, *Map of seizures of regional state administrations in Ukraine: eight regions are under the control of demonstrators* (24 January 2014)

(translation)

Translation

TSN, *Map of seizures of regional state administrations in Ukraine: eight regions are under the control of demonstrators* (24 January 2014), available at: <https://tsn.ua/politika/karta-zahopen-oda-v-ukrayini-visim-regioniv-opinilisya-pid-kontrolem-demonstrantiv-331198.html>.

Map of seizures of regional state administrations in Ukraine: eight regions are under the control of demonstrators

TSN Editorial

In Lutsk and Uzhgorod, regional administrations are under siege.

In the regions, regional councils and regional administrations were seized en masse, according to a report by "TSN" 19:30.

After several hours of storming, the protesters occupied the Chernovtsy Regional State Administration, and a little earlier - Ivano-Frankovsk. People are already cleaning up the premises of the Khmelnytsky regional and Zhytomyr city administrations.

In Lvov, protesters have been holding the administration since yesterday. The uprising has spread to the districts of Lvov region.



The geography of protests in Ukraine is expanding / Photo: TSN.ua

Protesters are also controlling the Ternopol and Rovno regional administrations and, for two months now, the Kiev city administration. The regional state administrations in Lutsk and Uzhgorod are under siege.

In Cherkasy, the police took back the premises of the previously seized administration from the protesters. The prosecutor's office opened criminal cases over all the facts of the storming.

Annex 301

2000.ua, *Mysterious Maidan snipers* (14 October 2015)

(translation)

Translation

2000.ua, *Mysterious Maidan snipers* (14 October 2015), available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220125010212/https://www.2000.ua/specproekty_ru/rassledovanie/tainstvennye-snajpery-majdana.htm.

Mysterious Maidan snipers

Yuri LUKASHIN

Special investigation "2000" of mass shooting case: Maidan rioters and Berkut servicemen point to a third party



Court hearing. Sergey Zinchenko and Pavel Abroskin

Over the past year and a half, against the backdrop of the war in Donbas and the thousands of dead, maimed, and dispossessed citizens, the Maidan shootings in the winter of 2014, which claimed the lives of about a hundred and fifty people (from the Maidan and security forces), may not seem like a significant episode of the giant bloody drama that the country was plunged into. Nevertheless, it was those first shots and then the mass murders committed that unfortunate winter by still unidentified snipers that proved to be the rubicon after which everything that Ukraine has endured and will continue to endure became possible.

Who really pulled the trigger first? In whose interest was it done? What direction is the investigation taking and, in general, is it considering any alternative versions of what happened?

Presumably, we have long been acquainted with, and know well enough, the official version of the Bankovaya, the Prosecutor General's Office, the Interior Ministry and all those who are now investigating those events on behalf of the authorities. For a year and a half this interpretation of events has been diligently implanted in the ears of the average man. But the further the official investigation progresses, the more new questions and very strange inconsistencies in the official version arise.

Why drag out the case

According to the Prosecutor-General's Office, investigators have identified 22 members of the Berkut special squad who were part of the so-called "black company" which allegedly carried out the mass shooting of the Heavenly Hundred. At least 17 Berkut officers from this list are wanted. Remarkably, no one knows whether these people are alive at all! The official version indicates that they are simply hiding from the investigation and fled the country.

Five Berkut officers are now under arrest. They are: two junior sergeants, Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko (who were arrested in March-April 2014 right in their quarters); special company soldiers Alexander Marinchenko and Sergey Tamtura (arrested almost a year after the first suspects on 24 February 2015); and former Deputy Commander of the special police regiment of the Chief Department of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry in Kiev, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Yanyshovsky (arrested 28 June 2015).

All those detained at the time of their arrest were still serving in their units. Only the commander of the Berkut special company Dmitriy Sadovnyk suddenly fled from the investigation on 4 October 2014. But he, too, had been arrested for several months at first, and then released by the court under house arrest due to lack of evidence. However, immediately after his disappearance, the Pecherskiy District Court judge Svetlana Volkova, who had changed the form of his pre-trial restriction, was dismissed. A criminal case was then opened against her as well - for issuing a knowingly unlawful ruling.

The most high-profile trial in the mystery sniper case involves the first detained Berkut servicemen Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko, who are accused by the PGO of shooting at least 39 people. Until July of this year, for a year and a half, the Svyatoshinsky District Court of Kyiv that hears the case, only prolonged the pre-trial restriction (detention in Lukyanovskoye pretrial isolation facility) every few months at the request of the prosecutors. It took many months and a series of judicial deliberations just to assemble a full jury that will sit in court and decide the fate of the defendants together with the judges.

The ice has broken

It is not hard to foresee that when the criminal cases against the other Berkut officers are sent to court, judges will behave in the same way. After all, no one has presented comprehensive evidence that it was law enforcers who carried out the mass shootings on the orders of either Yanukovich or one of the then heads of the security agencies. In other words, there is still no legally substantiated fact that law enforcers were given the order to shoot, let alone to kill. This means that it is not clear who organised and carried out the shootings and why.

On the other hand, it is high time that the courts, prosecutors and, most importantly, our post-Maidan political elite provide society with at least some hard evidence that what

they have been telling us on TV from the beginning is what really took place on the Maidan in the winter of 2014. Otherwise, the further they go, the more doubts people will have about it. Moreover, several groups of lawyers from the defence side are trying to conduct their own alternative investigation: one after another new facts emerge, which one day may completely dismantle the official version.

As a result, the courts handling Berkut cases have come under unprecedented pressure both from the top and Maidan activists, as well as numerous relatives of the dead who, among other things, seek multi-million compensations. The judges cannot simply acquit or release, say, under house arrest any of the other suspects now either. Obviously, this is why we have seen all these long months of strange, to put it mildly, procedural red tape that has prevented the courts from considering the merits of the case. The first developments in the Abroskin and Zinchenko case came only on 16 July of this year, when the court finally started hearing evidence statements of the first group of witnesses and victims.

Among them were relatives of the dead Maidan activists: Eduard Grynevych's mother, Igor Kostenko's father, Maxim Shimko's father and Sergey Baidovsky's father. In the first cross-examination, prosecutors, for the first time, asked similar questions of all the speakers on behalf of the victims: "Did the deceased have weapons? Did they have the intention or opportunity to acquire them? At what time and where were they located at the time of the shooting?"

Despite the fact that the parents of the four Maidan participants on 20 February were not near their sons at the time of their murder, their answers were typical: "There was a wooden shield and a stick (plastic/wooden)."

The Berkut's lawyers tried to find out from each of the plaintiffs exactly at whom their claims are directed and why they were sure that it was the two defendants who had killed their sons. According to the lawyers, the Berkut officers needed to cover up somehow the retreat and removal of the bodies of their wounded and dead comrades-in-arms. And if the 'siloviki' did shoot, they did it not to kill but were shooting in the air and at the ground with Kalashnikovs, which - due to their design and intended use - simply cannot be used for well-aimed sniper fire. The relatives of the victims themselves have stated that, judging by the nature of the wounds, their sons were targeted with sniper shots - in the head, neck (artery), heart - in order to inflict wounds incompatible with life.

The suspects' lawyers also drew the court's attention to the fact that hundreds of different people - both protesters and siloviki - were moving around, entering and exiting the perimeter of the street where the plaintiffs' relatives were killed; among siloviki, there were also, besides Berkut, the special groups Alfa, Omega etc. Igor Kostenko, the father of one of the dead, responded: "Abroskin and Zinchenko were part of the shooting group... The prosecutor's office knows the trajectories of the bullets. In Sadovnik's group, Sadovnik himself fired eight shots from his automatic rifle, while there were three shooters. One of them killed my son."

But we draw your attention to one of several mysterious videos confirming that there may have been some people in various buildings not under siloviki's control who could have been the mysterious snipers who fired shots at both sides of the conflict.

In this video, some masked men who do not speak Russian or Ukrainian hurriedly leave the Dnipro Hotel immediately after the active shootings, carrying large bags that could well have contained weapons. This video and many similar pieces of photo and video evidence (not even taking into account a lot of small incidents like 'Pashinskiy's rifle') should be the subject of the closest investigators' attention.

At the moment, it is clear that the relatives of the victims in the court hearings are sticking to the version promoted solely by the prosecutors and the lawyers' group of the Heavenly Hundred.

And this version is simple. Even if the defendants Abroskin and Zinchenko never shot anyone at all, they were still not far from the scene of the Maidan rioters' death and should therefore be in jail, because they may be concealing the real culprits, i.e. their former fellow officers.

At the same time, our personal contacts with some of the relatives of the dead have shown that even they have good reason to doubt the official version. They even tried to hold several rallies during the Svyatoshinsky court hearings where they demanded that a special investigative commission be set up to oversee the investigation and the courts and prosecutors' handling of the evidence under the auspices of the general public. Zoya Kuzmenko, the mother of Maksim Shimko who had died on the Maidan, told us about a lot of inconsistencies in the official version.

Sergeants in the role of scapegoats

As part of our journalistic investigation, we managed to talk to the closest relatives of Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko. That is what shocked us most of all: they say that practically no Ukrainian TV channels, or other media outlets, show any interest in the position of either the suspects or their lawyers at all.

During a series of court hearings that we were able to attend, we were surprised to discover that Ukrainian journalists really do not even try to communicate with the main defendants, their relatives or their lawyers. Yevgeniya, Pavel Abroskin's sister, explains it simply: this is the editorial policy of most domestic media, where an unspoken taboo has been imposed on any version of events that may contradict the official one.

Therefore, the few comments that Pavel's and Sergey's relatives tried to give to Ukrainian TV channels were either severely distorted in the process of video editing of the stories or simply did not make it into the newscasts. Speaking with Pavel Abroskin's sister Yevgenia, we managed to find out a lot of curious details - about the behaviour of the investigators, about a number of events during court hearings that have not been made public in the media until now.

The relatives of both suspects point out that after Yanukovich had fled, a significant number of the Berkut officers, as well as members of other special units, left as early as March 2014 for Crimea, Russia and the self-proclaimed republics of Donbas. But Pavel and Sergey continued to serve in their unit in the spring of 2014 (disbanded only later).

And so, says Mikhail Alekseevich, Pavel Abroskin's father, almost a month after the events on the Maidan, they are suddenly arrested right at work, on the grounds of the allegedly existing photo and video evidence that identified their faces. Thus, according to the investigation, the two young men, aged just over 25, turn out to be the main perpetrators of the Maidan shootings.

In particular, Abroskin, according to his relatives who are leading their civilian investigation into the case, was, intentionally or not, mistaken for a man in a Maidan photo who is considerably taller than Pavel.

According to relatives, a photo of a well-known internal troops colonel, Sergey Asavelyuk, who is now serving in the ATO zone, may also be used as 'Pavel'.

When we visited both the families of Sergey Zinchenko and Pavel Abroskin, we found it even harder to believe that they would be capable - even hypothetically - of mass murder.

Both come from well-to-do military families. They are not rich, they are ordinary people like millions all over Ukraine. By the way, Berkut has for many years been considered one of the most elite and prestigious special forces units in Ukraine. It was a dream of thousands of young people from all over the country to get there. In a unit that had in place a polished to perfection mechanism of the most thorough selection of candidates, the probability of there being servicemen capable of shooting people arbitrarily is close to zero.

The main evidence against the second Berkut officer, Zinchenko, is that he is left-handed. A left-handed policeman was photographed near Zhovtneviy firing in the direction of the protesters. However, family, friends and fellow officers assure that Sergey only wrote with his left hand, but did everything else with his right since childhood. His sister Tatiana shows photos of him from the service, including some amateur ones in which he is depicted with a submachine gun in his right hand and in a right-handed posture. In the opinion of Zinchenko's family, Sergey and other Berkut officers, despite the lack of evidence, are being put on a show trial. And those who are trying to cover up the tracks of the real snipers, who shot at both the siloviki and the protesters, have chosen the ordinary sergeants as scapegoats.

Clear inconsistencies

The pictures produced by the prosecution show only some people in uniforms shooting somewhere. There is no video or photo footage showing that any Maidan activists were killed or injured after these particular persons' shots. Moreover, according to the suspects' lawyer Igor Varfolomeyev, who was acquainted with these photos and videos, the defendants do not bear the slightest resemblance to the people who the investigation claims them to be.

The official version of the prosecution says that Abroskin and Zinchenko were part of the so-called 'black company' made up of Berkut and Alfa officers and a group of the so-called 'titushki', who allegedly had stolen weapons in their units and began to shoot Maidan activists with them. The prosecutor's office affirms that the two main suspects, along with their fellow servicemen, allegedly killed at least 39 people.

You may ask: why such a strange version (stolen weapons!), and what could have been the motive of these young soldiers, who are far from big politics and altercations at the top? Why would they shoot the protesters, and why would they use weapons that had been stolen from the warehouse of their own unit? And then, after all the events, including the change of political power, why would they continue to serve in their unit, go on living in their places of residential registration, go to work as if nothing had happened!

Politicians and lawyers on the prosecution side can, of course, offer a lot of fancy formulas on the subject. However, over the past year and a half, neither the Prosecutor-General's Office nor the newly-appointed siloviki who are handling the case and have already searched all the archives of the Interior Ministry, SBU, Bankovaya, etc., have been able to provide the court with any documentary evidence that the order to shoot at the Maidan protesters with firearms ever existed. As suspects' lawyer Igor Varfolomeyev explained to us, the investigation has not a single document at all which would confirm that the order to use firearms against the protesters could have been given in writing or verbally by Yanukovich, the Interior Ministry or the Security Service of Ukraine.

Hence the whole bizarre version about the arrested Berkut servicemen. Moreover, there is no data in the official logs from the weapons depots that any weapons were handed over to these specific defendants on the days of the shootings. Non-lethal weapons (rubber bullet guns, noise and smoke grenades, etc.) these suspected Berkut servicemen may have had on the days of shootings, but the firearms (according to the documents) may have not.

This is probably why the investigation claims that the so-called Black Company stole weapons and ammunition from warehouses, then shot Maidan activists with them, and then somehow incomprehensibly disposed of the evidence.

Among the arguments of lawyer Varfolomeyev, who urges citizens and the court to exercise elementary logic, is this one: why has there been no comprehensive investigation into the murders of the officers of Berkut and other security forces so far? Neither lawyers nor the public have ever been given full access to the results of ballistics and other expert examinations, so that independent experts could have cross-checked them. Why and where have the trees with bullet holes disappeared, which, according to Varfolomeyev, would have made it possible to assert that sniper fire on both the siloviki and the protesters was carried out from the same positions? In particular, there is ample evidence that shots were fired for some time from the top floors of the Ukraine Hotel, the Philharmonic Hall and other locations that the security forces did not control during the shootouts on the Maidan. There is also a lot of video and other physical evidence that Maidan activists were injured and killed as a result of shots fired not only from the side where the siloviki were stationed.

And most importantly, if the so-called 'Black Company' was shooting at everyone, as the official version says, then why was it shooting at representatives of the security forces themselves? Pavel's and Sergey's relatives said that among the dead and seriously injured Berkut officers were many of their close friends and colleagues.

Here are excerpts from documents provided to us by Igor Varfolomeyev about the number of injured and dead law enforcers. From the Interior Ministry's latest response to the lawyer's request:

"In the period of from 21.11.2013 to 24.02.2014... due to injuries and wounds received in the course of protecting public order in Kiev during this period... medical assistance was sought by 1,270 law enforcers, of which 824 were hospitalized. Of this number, 140 policemen and servicemen suffered gunshot wounds and 13 people of this category died..."

And further from the Council of Europe's International Advisory Group (IAG) report of 31 March 2015 (these data are also published on the CoE website): "106. In a submission dated 9 December 2014, the Interior Ministry reports the death of 13 law enforcement officers in Kiev as a result of gunshot wounds. Other sources earlier reported 16 or 17 people killed, although this number could include people from other cities. According to reports from the organization 'Euro-Maidan SOS', 15 law enforcers were killed during protests in Kiev, two were killed in Lvov. As for bodily injuries, a list provided by the Kiev prosecutor's office to the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights of 15 June 2014 stated that 992 law enforcement officers sought medical assistance, of which 280 suffered gunshot wounds... In the most recent submissions to the Interior Ministry, 919 law enforcers were injured between 30 October 2013 and 23 February 2014.

We continue to collect evidence from both sides of the 2014 winter confrontation. Here, for example, is a commentary on the investigation of those events from a well-known Maidan activist with the call sign "Kremen", who was on Institutskaya Street during the most active shootings. "There is some kind of investigation going on, there are some actions that are allegedly being carried out. But I was directly involved there. And I'm not the only one. I survived. But no one contacted me so far... Now I am not interested in it, because I understand: the way we were set up there, it was a method, so that there would be victims..."

The special forces were there. I was there, in the front line... First, we were put down, then we were lifted up. Then there was an unspoken agreement. It wasn't our snipers and it wasn't our special forces... We filmed and photographed it, handed it over to the Maidan headquarters. Where is it all now? Where are these materials? Nowhere! Why? Because someone benefits from it.”

Mysterious snipers and other revolutions

In any convoluted political provocation (and the use of weapons on the Maidan and everything that followed is an obvious provocation) one should be guided by the old and forensically proven principle: who benefits? Who benefited politically from the mass shootings on the Maidan? How did it turn the political process in our country?

What did (or would) these shootings give Yanukovich, who was already in a state of complete panic and who had by then agreed to all concessions except (as we saw on the way out) a wave of accusations of crimes and the shedding of hundreds of people's blood? What but the legitimisation and moral justification for his overthrow, by the protesters themselves justified in that case of using weapons? If the authorities did disperse the Maidan, why did they use precision sniper fire? Why not large-calibre machine guns? After all, if that bloody and criminal government had decided to shoot the protesters, what difference would it have made whether a hundred or a thousand people were killed in the crackdown on the Maidan?

Mysterious snipers are by no means a unique case. Similar shooters have repeatedly appeared in many troubled regions of the world, just on the eve of a sharp deterioration in the political situation. After their "work" the situation would finally get out of control, the authorities would always be blamed for the shootings of peaceful demonstrators, and then they would be overthrown by armed people (demonstrators would receive a moral justification to act by force). If this did not work, a civil war would break out in the country. For example, the last such incident that finally radicalized the society's internal political split occurred in Syria, in the summer of 2011 in the city of Hama, where 67 peaceful demonstrators protesting against Bashar Assad's regime were killed by unknown snipers. The bloody civil war in that country continues.

The same thing happened in Libya in late February 2011, when the first dozen and a half people were killed by unidentified snipers on the so-called "Day of Rage". In Libya, Gaddafi, unlike Assad, was toppled relatively quickly, but there is no end in sight for the civil war that has erupted in what was once the richest country in Africa and which has already claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.

Mysterious snipers or provocative crowd shooting is a phenomenon that in its time proved to be a key step in coups or deep political crises in the former Yugoslavia (incl. Kosovo), Romania (1989), Moscow (1993), Vilnius (1991), Kyrgyzstan (2010), Yemen (2011), Egypt and Tunisia (2011), Iran (2009) and Thailand (2010). In general, it is not difficult to find variations on the same theme in many other countries and historical episodes.

The mystery shooters have never been found. It is true that in Iran and Syria, where regimes have somehow survived, it has subsequently been claimed that traces of mysterious snipers allegedly lead to foreign secret services supporting the local opposition. As for the events in Moscow in the autumn of 1993 or in Vilnius in 1991, there is still an occasional debate in the Russian media and in the expert community about the actual role of the deaths by unidentified snipers in further political processes.

To stop or disperse the gigantic masses of people who are taking to the squares to protest against the authorities, they must realise that the authorities are prepared to order the security forces to shoot at them to kill. If the authorities are really ready to disperse

people by force, it is much more effective to place open fire positions along the perimeter, from where it would be possible to make massive preventive shots in the air or at the buildings. The crowd will never stand under direct fire of large-calibre machine guns, it will simply disperse. The sooner the protesters realise the seriousness of the law enforcers' intentions, the fewer casualties there will probably be.

But individual sniper shots, on the other hand, are neither heard nor seen by the crowd. In the moments of sniper shots, nothing happens to them. Simply because they don't notice them. Someone stumbles somewhere, falls over. You never know what happens in large crowds of people! But bodies with bullets in their hearts, necks and heads will immediately be shown on every television channel in the world. And then it will be clear that... the regime has crossed the last line.

P. S. At the beginning of last week, 12 October, the flats of VO Freedom members, former deputy prime minister Alexander Sych and former MPs Oleg Pankevych and Igor Yankiv were suddenly searched in connection with their suspected involvement in the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred during the winter events of 2013-2014. This unexpected sensational event was announced on the same day by Alexander Aronets, a member of the Kyiv City Council from Svoboda Party, on his Twitter account, publishing the ruling of the Kiev Pechersky District Court authorizing the searches in the homes of his colleagues.

As noted in the document, the Prosecutor-General's Office asked the court to authorize a search of the former Freedom MPs due to the fact that during the pre-trial investigation a video was discovered shot by a British BBC journalist, which shows an open window in room 1132 of the Ukraine hotel on the 11th floor. It was from this window that snipers shot at citizens and law enforcers on the Maidan and Institutskaya Street on 20 February 2014.

"It was established that Oleg Igorevich Pankevich occupied room one thousand one hundred thirty-one during the period in question," the court ruling reads.

Annex 302

Gazeta.ru, *Unheroic justice* (11 January 2016)

(translation)

Translation

Gazeta.ru, *Unheroic justice* (11 January 2016), available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/01/11_a_8014691.shtml.

Unheroic justice - Gazeta.Ru

The investigation into the death of the so-called "Heavenly Hundred" during the events of February 2014 in Kiev has reached a deadlock. The masterminds and the real perpetrators have still not been found. The next court hearing of the two Berkut officers case will be held this week. The relatives of the victims are unhappy with the way the authorities are looking for the killers and those who gave the order to shoot at the demonstrators.

February will mark the second anniversary of the tragic events in central Kiev, when more than 100 people were killed on Institutuskaya Street, Independence Square and Grushevskogo Street. Firearms were used against the demonstrators, who were armed with wooden shields and sticks. There are still portraits, candles and flowers on Institutuskaya Street, while the masterminds and actual perpetrators of the killing of the protesters have not yet been found, according to those close to the victims.

For the relatives of those killed in those tragic days, the protracted search for those responsible is a sign of the authorities' failure. Some attend every hearing of the trial of Berkut riot police officers Pavel Abroskin and Sergey Zinchenko, who are charged with murdering nine Maidan activists. And they remain dissatisfied every time. First, the trial has been going on for more than a year and no results are in sight. Secondly, the two Berkut officers are the only suspects in the crime that Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have been able to find.

A new hearing of the Berkut case will be held this week. At the last one, the court left the defendants in custody until 25 February. The trial has been going on for more than a year and there are no signs yet of its completion or of a real investigation of the other cases related to the Maidan killings, including those of law enforcement officers.

Sergey Baidovsky, a 23-year-old resident of Novovolynsk, was killed on the Maidan by a sniper's bullet on 20 February 2014. His father Roman travels several hundred kilometres each time from Vinnitsa Oblast to attend the trial. He does not hide his dissatisfaction with the length of the trial. Apart from Roman Baidovsky, other relatives of the heroes of the "Heavenly Hundred" attend the hearings, but not all of them. Many of the victims were from different regions of Ukraine, so it is expensive and time-consuming for their relatives to travel to the capital to attend the trial. It is compulsory for them to come only to testify.

When they do come, they do not hold back their emotions and tears. However, it is not just the 39 families affected by the Abroskin and Zinchenko case that are feeling the pain and resentment.

According to the Ukrainian Health Ministry, 106 people died as a result of the Maidan events between 30 November 2013 and mid-April 2014. Almost 80 of them were killed in the period of 18-20 February, and ten more died under different circumstances during December and January. None of the murders have been solved so far.

During the last court hearing in the Abroskin and Zinchenko case, relatives of activist Roman Varenitsa, who was murdered on 20 February 2014, gave their testimonies. His mother Anna Ivanovna was particularly emotional. "My son, Roman Mikhailovich Varenitsa, who was only 35 years old, was a kind and vivacious man. He had a peaceful

profession, he was a teacher," she said. Being a teacher herself, she says her son surpassed her as a professional, although due to the existing conditions in the country he was unable to work in his profession, retraining as a construction worker.

As every person who lost a relative on the Maidan, she added that her son was unarmed. "He didn't even have a stick," the woman claimed.

Law-enforcement agencies are not particularly shy about admitting their failure. Last November, the head of the Special Investigation Department of the Ukrainian Prosecutor-General's Office, Sergey Gorbatyuk, said that the killers of the first victims - Ukrainian Armenian Sergey Nigoyan, the Belarusian Mikhail Zhiznevsky and the Ukrainian Roman Senyk - were still unknown. "Unfortunately, at this time, we have not identified the individuals who actually committed the murders," he said. And, as if trying to justify himself, he added that the circle of suspects had been considerably narrowed.

In November, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko attended a commemoration ceremony for the heroes of the "Heavenly Hundred" in Kiev and spoke to the families of the dead. Even official reports discreetly noted that relatives complained about the judicial system at the meeting. In personal conversations, the victims do not hide their indignation. The father of the deceased 19-year-old Roman Gurik, Igor, was unhappy that Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was not present at the meeting, although he, as other relatives of the victims, would have liked to talk to him. "We have many questions to Shokin regarding the investigation," he said.

Annex 303

RIA Novosti Ukraine, *Never-ending investigation. Four years later, killers of the 'Heavenly Hundred' still at large* (22 February 2018)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti Ukraine, *Never-ending investigation. Four years later, killers of the 'Heavenly Hundred' still at large* (22 February 2018), available at: <https://rian.com.ua/analytics/20180222/1032575774/beskonechnoe-sledstvie-nebesnoi-sotni.html>.

Never-ending investigation. Four years later, killers of the 'Heavenly Hundred' still at large

RIA Novosti Ukraine

Four years after the tragic events on Maidan in February, when over 100 people died, no one has been punished for their crimes.

The Prosecutor-General's Office accuses the former Ukrainian leadership, led by ex-President Viktor Yanukovich, and law-enforcement officers, in particular the former Berkut special police unit, of the crimes. Yanukovich and Berkut officers have denied their involvement in the murders, RIA Novosti reported.

Ukrainian authorities justify themselves by saying that to date, the investigation of the Maidan case has been hampered by its complexity and enormous scale, as well as resistance from the Ukrainian judicial system. Nevertheless, Prosecutor-General Yuriy Lutsenko is confident that the investigation will soon see a major shift as the main episode of the case accusing Yanukovich of organizing the shootings will go to trial.



A "quiet" rally was held in central Kiev in honour of the dead Maidan protesters

The official version of the investigation may be questioned by the testimony of a group of Georgian citizens, who earlier said that they witnessed the shooting of protesters and law enforcers by hired snipers, who had allegedly been hired by the opposition forces.

Step by tiny step

After coming to power, the opposition said it would quickly investigate the crimes, but so far this promise has not been fulfilled.

According to the head of the special investigation department of the Prosecutor-General's Office Sergey Gorbatyuk, a total of 78 Maidan protesters were killed and 278 injured during clashes on 18-20 February.

The largest number of people, around 50, died on 20 February on Institutskaya Street near Maidan. The investigation established their deaths were caused by gunshot wounds from automatic weapons. In addition, according to Gorbatyuk, 13 law enforcers were killed and 650 of them were injured during the two days of confrontations.



Kiev residents bring flowers to the alley of Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred

A total of 1,800 people are considered injured parties in the criminal cases related to offences during the Maidan. There are 412 suspects in these cases, against 250 of them the cases have been submitted to courts. As of today, 50 verdicts have been passed, but only one person is serving a real sentence!

The prosecutor said that these statistics refer to all the crimes during the protests. He also clarified that 60 people have the status of suspects in the Maidan deaths case, but there have been no verdicts in these cases yet.




"These figures refer to all crimes - from beatings to the drawing up of fake verdicts by law enforcers (about offences by protesters). If we talk about murders, we have more than 60 persons ranging from perpetrators to organizers, who have been notified of suspicion. Regarding the events of 18-20 February, the leadership of law-enforcement agencies and the state have been put on suspicion," Gorbatyuk said in a commentary to the 112 Ukraine TV channel.

At the same time, according to Aleksey Donskoy, a representative of the Prosecutor-General's Office, there is progress in the investigation into the death of law enforcers on Maidan, within the framework of which a group of persons has been served notice of criminal prosecution as suspects. *"As part of this proceeding, the circumstances of the illegal use of firearms against law enforcers by certain groups of individuals, that is, those facts ... where weapons were illegally used, are being investigated. Certain individuals were put on suspicion,"* he said.

International human rights organizations and the UN have repeatedly pointed out in their reports the lack of results in the criminal investigation into the Maidan deaths. According to human rights organizations, the authorities in Ukraine are not interested in finding those involved in the killings.

"The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is concerned that three years after the killings of protesters and law enforcement officers on the Maidan in Kiev, efforts to bring to justice have still not yielded tangible results," said the 18th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine by the Office of the UN High Commissioner, which was made public last summer. The organization noted that despite the efforts of the Prosecutor-General's Office to bring to justice those responsible for the deaths of protesters and others during the Maidan events, not a single former high-ranking official has been punished.

The delay in the investigation has also been acknowledged by the Ukrainian authorities themselves. On the current anniversary of the tragic events on the Maidan, President Poroshenko said that the Maidan case is very voluminous and complex, so it takes time to comply with all legal procedures.



"I share the public's dissatisfaction with the pace of the investigation. And even more so with the speed of the trials. They should have done more in four years. At the same time, I'm well aware of the scale of the crime, as well as the need for legally flawless evidence and strict adherence to all procedural rules. Evil must be punished," Poroshenko said.

He reminded that by law he could not interfere in the investigation and asked Prosecutor-General Lutsenko to analyse what else could be done to help the special investigation department of the Prosecutor-General's Office, which is in charge of the case, to speed up its investigation.

At the same time, according to Markiyan Galabala, a lawyer of the families of the Maidan victims, effective investigation into the Maidan case is hindered by the destruction of the evidence base, which, in his opinion, took place in 2014. *"The evidence base was largely destroyed immediately after the Maidan victory and destroyed by those individuals who are still in law enforcement agencies in their positions, we are talking about operational cases that were conducted by representatives of the Interior Ministry and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU),"* the lawyer said in a commentary to 112 Ukraine.

Opposition of courts

As of today, the Prosecutor-General's Office continues to investigate the Maidan deaths case; only individual episodes of the case have been sent to court. The most high-profile and public of those is the trial of 5 Berkut special unit officers, who have been on trial for almost two years since May 2016 in Kiev's Solomenskiy district court.

The defendants are accused of participating in the shootings of Maidan participants.

The main episode of the Maidan case concerns the organisers of the shootings.

Viktor Yanukovich, former Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko and former SBU chief Alexander Yakymenko are suspects in the case. In February, the Kiev Pecherskiy district court granted the investigators' request for permission to conduct a pre-trial investigation in absentia against the mentioned individuals.



At the same time, Lutsenko accused Ukrainian courts of blocking the consideration of episodes in the Maidan case, which, in particular, concern the prosecution of commanders of the Berkut special unit as well as the former leadership of the law-enforcement agencies and the Kiev prosecutor's office. *"I cannot help but mention the system's opposition, the reluctance of the judicial branch of power to recognize these cases as a priority. Suffice it to recall that since 2016, there have been no trials on the Prosecutor General's Office's recommendation regarding the commander of the second company of Berkut, the deputy commander of the first company of Berkut and the servicemen of this company, the Kiev prosecutor, the deputy head of the Dnepr Interior Ministry department in Kiev, the former SBU deputy head of Kiev Oblast. It is not clear why, since 2016, judges have still not found an opportunity to at least start these hearings,"* Lutsenko said.

Georgian trail

Immediately after the deaths on the Maidan in February 2014, opponents of the current Ukrainian authorities voiced the version that a certain third party acted on Maidan, which allegedly fired at radicals and law enforcers to provoke the conflict. The Ukrainian authorities have denied these allegations all along. However, at the end of 2017, a documentary aired on Italian Channel 5, with interviews of three Georgians who claimed to have been sent as snipers to Kiev by former Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili in 2014. One of them claimed that when the confrontations escalated, their squad was ordered to shoot at members of the Berkut unit and protesters, but the Georgian squad took it as a provocation and didn't shoot.

The Prosecutor-General's Office called the film a fake, but promised to check the facts presented in it.

Certain citizens of Georgia told RIA Novosti that they allegedly received weapons and an order to fire at people from the current head of Rada Committee on National Security and Defence Sergei Pashinsky, and were instructed by a former US military officer who was introduced to them by former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and his adviser Mamuka Mamulashvili. According to Revazishvili, Pashinskiy and Vladimir Parasyuk were personally involved in the killing of people on Maidan.



Opinion

Director of the Ukrainian Institute of Analysis and Policy Management Ruslan Bortnyk believes that the case of mass deaths on the Maidan will be brought to an end, but not under the current government.

"Now the government is full of people who were participants in the process on both sides: sat in the corridors of power and manipulated people on the Maidan, so they are interested in getting some political, not legal results. They are interested in speculating on this tragedy rather than seeking justice and legal correctness," Bortnik said.

The expert believes that this case, as well as the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the tragedy in Odessa on 2 May 2014, will be completed in the next political cycle, if the government changes in Ukraine.

"If the government does not change, nothing but political conclusions and political verdicts should be expected, and, unfortunately, there is no hope of justice," he said.

Annex 304

RIA Novosti Ukraine, *Investigation in all Maidan cases stalled* (21 February 2018)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti Ukraine, *Investigation in all Maidan cases stalled* (21 February 2018), available at: <https://rian.com.ua/analytics/20180221/1032544002/Ukraine-Maydan-delarasslelovanie.html>.

Investigation in all Maidan cases stalled

RIA Novosti



Evgeniy Strimov, RIA Novosti Ukraine

Ukraine is marking another - fourth - anniversary of the tragic events in central Kiev in February 2014: between 18 and 20 February, around a hundred people were killed, dozens went missing and over a thousand were injured. Four years after the Maidan shootings, there is still no answer to one of the main questions: who shot the protesters?



Old and new suspects

Investigators now have more than 60 suspects in the deaths, but the courts have not passed a single verdict in the cases. The Prosecutor-General's Office, headed by Yuriy **Lutsenko**, accuses the country's former leadership and Viktor **Yanukovich** personally, as well as law-enforcement officials, in particular the former Interior Ministry's special unit Berkut.


Yanukovich and Berkut servicemen deny any involvement in the killings.

The authorities say that today the investigation into the Maidan case is hampered by its great complexity and scale, as well as resistance from the judicial system.

Testimonies of a group of Georgian citizens about the so-called 'Georgian snipers', who allegedly shot at both protesters and law enforcers, and who were allegedly hired by the opposition at the time, could turn the process upside down.

'There is no statute of limitations'

The head of the Prosecutor-General's Office's special investigations department Sergey **Gorbatyuk** cited figures: a total of 1,800 people are considered victims/injured parties in the criminal cases related to the Maidan events. There are 412 suspects, and cases against 250 of them have been submitted to courts. Fifty verdicts have been passed, but only one person is serving a real sentence.



Caption: Anniversary of the Heavenly Hundred shooting in numbers.

Legend: (from top down)

(Title): Anniversary of the Heavenly Hundred shooting in numbers;

(Subtitle): On 18-20 February, Ukraine honours the memory of the Heavenly Hundred – people shot up on the Maidan in 2014. Prosecutor-General’s Office speaks of a progress in the investigation, but people who ordered the killings have not yet been punished – 4 years since.

The infographics of RIA Novosti-Ukraine illustrates the results of the investigation.

How it was.

Killed or died of wounds – 123 (104 Maidan activists, 17 law enforcers)

Injured parties – 2,500 people

(Boxes, left to right): 1) 18.02.2014 – fire in the House of Trade Unions, Globus Mall. Protesters burned down two water-throwers. Maidan barricades attacked.

2) 10 people killed in on Institutuskaya and Grushevskogo Streets, 509 injured (according to PGO of Ukraine)

3) night of 19 February – assault on the Maidan, 16 killed, 206 injured (PGO)

4) 2 people killed in a fire in the House of Trade Unions

5) 20 February 2014 – shooting of protesters on Institutuskaya, 43 killed 157 injured, 69 wounded by firearms (PGO)

Killed and injured journalists (acc. to NSJU), November 2013 through February 2014:

271 reporter beaten up; 9 arrests and detentions; 14 attacks on newspaper offices; 31 cases of threats of physical violence; 2 killed in Kiev (Vyacheslav Veremiy, Vesti newspaper, and Igor Kostenko, student and journalist, on the Maidan)

(bottom) When will Ukrainians learn the truth about the Maidan massacre?

Trials, punishments and investigations of Maidan crimes:

1 – serves time behind bars; 252 cases handed over to courts; 50 verdicts passed; 412 suspects; 100 criminal cases under investigation at PGO; 102 persons wanted; over 3,400 episodes of criminal cases under investigation.

In July 2017, Prosecutor-General Yuriy **Lutsenko** said during a speech

in parliament that the investigation into the Maidan events would be completed during the autumn of last year. But there are no results.

And President Petr **Poroshenko** expressed in February 2018 dissatisfaction with the pace and speed of investigations and court hearings into the 2014 shootings of Euromaidan activists. In his opinion, crimes against Maidan have no statute of limitations.

"The criminals have crossed the line beyond which comes a curse, and that curse, in the words of Miroslav Popovich, is 'stronger than courts and prisons.' And there is no hiding from it even in Russia," said the head of state.



Progress by Lutsenko

As of today, the Prosecutor-General's Office says it is investigating over 3,400 episodes of criminal proceedings in the Maidan cases. There are 412 suspects, 100 criminal cases are being investigated by the PGO, and the Prosecutor-General's Office is also searching for 102 people.

Prosecutor-General Lutsenko now says that the investigation cannot move forward quickly, otherwise it will not get fair verdicts. He also said that the court has allowed a special pre-trial investigation, and later it will allow conviction in absentia of those suspected of organizing the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred.

"Finally, the petitions have been satisfied, and Yanukovich, Zakharchenko, Yakimenko, Totskiy, Ratushnyak, Fedchuk and others will be handed over to court on the basis of the collected 300 volumes of evidence as soon as we complete Yanukovich's treason trial," Lutsenko said.

'They'll get them released on the statute of limitations in the end'

In four years we have not seen the results of the investigation at all, Vladimir **Golodnyuk**, a civic activist and volunteer, told RIA Novosti Ukraine. He is the father of Ustym **Golodnyuk**, who died on 20 February during the events on Maidan. *"No one has been jailed, no one has been punished.... It's been four years... such an investigation satisfies neither the families nor Ukrainians in general,"* Holodnyuk said.

The investigation as a whole, he is convinced, is in state of total collapse now.

"You know that these cases are handed over to the SBI (State Bureau of Investigation). The Prosecutor's Office has been dealing with them for four years. All said, they were already familiar with these cases. Because you have to understand that this is more than 500 volumes. It will take two years to even reread them ... The investigators who handled this at least already knew in which direction to proceed.... We'll wait until all the suspects are released on the statute of limitations. We will end up with a total inability of the state to punish the criminals who shot protesters in the centre of the capital, in broad daylight," the volunteer is disappointed.



The 'old' cadres get in the way

Many Maidan cases are in court, but things are moving very slowly in courts and will continue to do so for a very long time: the specifics of Ukraine's criminal procedure law do not allow for quick consideration of cases, Pavel **Dikan**, the lawyer of the relatives of the victims - the 'Heavenly Hundred' - said in an interview with RIA Novosti Ukraine.

"People believe and we believe that, after all, the authorities understand the importance of these investigations and will give them proper attention at some point. In terms of legislative regulation and legislative initiative, or any financial and organisational support. But in these four years we have not yet seen it," the lawyer notes.

He says that the real investigation is being obstructed.

"These obstacles are created both, in my view, by the leadership of the Prosecutor General's Office, no matter who is the prosecutors general, and by the legislator, who, as he says, are guided by the best of intentions, but make things worse. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. This is a prime example," Dikan said.



A huge number of people who worked under **Yanukovich** and were involved in organising a plan to suppress the protest movement remain today in the law-enforcement agencies, in the legislature and in the executive branch, the lawyer added. And there are big doubts that those people are interested in an objective and fair investigation.

'If they wanted to do it, they would have done it a long time ago.'

And according to a political scientist and director of the Information and Analysis Centre 'Perspective' Pavel **Rudyakov**, there is no investigation at all.

"What the prosecutor's office and the prosecutor general personally report should be treated, in my opinion, like a weather forecast that never has it right. About the investigation into all those events, Lutsenko said yesterday or the day before that we would now conduct new expert examinations. Or someone on his behalf said it - we will conduct new expert probes and then we will investigate it. These new expert examinations mean that the prosecutor's office intends to level out those previous examinations which were already less than ideal. The repetition of these statements is a revelation of irresponsibility, an absolutely militant deep existential irresponsibility of the prosecutor's office and other security agencies," the expert said.

And now, on another anniversary, the prosecutor general and his guys jump out like a bolt from the blue and start reassuring us that 'we are going to get down to it' now, says Rudyakov.

"It is unlikely they will get down to it. If they wanted to, they would have done it long ago," concluded the political analyst.

Annex 305

RusNext.ru, *No one came to commemorate. The Heavenly Hundred and their 'exploits' on Maidan devalued* (20 February 2018)

(translation)

Translation

RusNext.ru, *No one came to commemorate. The Heavenly Hundred and their 'exploits' on Maidan devalued* (20 February 2018), available at: https://rusnext.ru/recent_opinions/1519134530.

No one came to commemorate. The Heavenly Hundred and their 'exploits' on Maidan devalued

The fourth anniversary of the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred passes entirely unnoticed. There are no red rays of dignity, no rain of rose petals symbolising innocent blood, and even the top leaders of the state, who have got their hands on the "trough" with the help of the sotniks, are absent.

Poroshenko is recovering after the Munich conference, and Avakov's press secretary Artem Shevchenko has gone so far as to demand "honouring the memory of the law enforcers who died on the Maidan." On the Maidan itself, a bunch of relatives of those who "died as heroes" roam around dejectedly, along with activists from Galicia and veterans of the colour revolutions, who came on the legs shot through by the Berkut to remember the burning tyres and the Berkut four years back. One thing is abundantly clear: the authorities have ignored the anniversary.

Poroshenko, Avakov, Yatsenyuk and Klitschko no longer need to pretend, stand with a lamp and make a sad face. At the same time millions of those who demanded the overthrow of the "bloody Yanukovich gang" have disappeared somewhere. In their place have appeared disappointed hydnuks, spoiling the party with inappropriate questions, such as: "Walzman, where are the killers of the Heavenly Hundred?"

In general, the commemoration turned into a banal flash mob "I remember", in which relatives and friends of the deceased activists took part. Let me repeat again that it was not a mass event, with no more than 100 people walking through the centre and laying carnations on the Alley of the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred.

The participants of the event symbolically recreated a dramatic episode of the Euromaidan - the moment when activists of the revolution were shot up by 'siloviki' on Institutskaya Street on 20 February 2014. Essentially, the tragedy was turned into a Broadway show with lights, music and dancing. "A group of people walked up Institutskaya Street and after 'shots' mimicked by percussion musicians from a military band, fell to the pavement. Then 'medical volunteers' tried to help them, but the 'Maidan activists' were already 'dead' and their bodies were covered with sheets," eyewitnesses to the 'mourning' described.

After this theatre of the absurd, the flash mob participants moved up the alley, accompanied by a military band, which performed the Zaporozhsti March and the Ukrainian anthem. At the end of the event, relatives of the dead laid flowers at the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred memorial to the portraits of their loved ones.

"We, the closest relatives, have no right to forget what happened in 2014, we cannot forget what our loved ones went to certain death for," said Daria, a family member of Hero of Ukraine Vladimir Kulchytskiy, who had died on the Maidan, after the rally. Igor, the son of the "sotnik", this year for some reason declined to recollect the heroism, even though a year ago he willingly shared his experiences: "On Tuesday 18 February Vladimir Kulchytskiy and I came to Grushevskogo early in the morning to support the Euromaidan's peaceful offensive against the Verkhovna Rada. Within hours the rally turned into bloody street battles. He stood on one of the most powerful barricades - on Khreshchatyk on the side of

European Square. It was defended by one or even two companies of the Self-defence, and it was that barricade that was approached by a part of siloviki from the direction of Grushevskogo Street. The barricade was very powerful and well prepared for resistance. We repulsed the first attack and were waiting for the next one. My father and I were in the second line of defence - we were serving stones, Molotov cocktails and tyres," describes a completely peaceful attack on the VR the revolutionary who is now even embarrassed to attend memorial nights. According to the relatives of the "sotniks," "they wanted a better life for our country, they wanted their children, parents, and themselves to live in a European state." However, the relatives of Ukraine's heroes do not go further than those clichés... Instead, their Facebook buddies rage over total disregard of the anniversary by the nation and its leaders:

Leonid Dnepr: The people remember. But the authorities...

Eugene Perch: Of course Poroshenko and Avakov remember, that's why he's doing everything to make sure Maidan doesn't happen again.... As you can see, no one from the authorities came...;

Andrey Ilchuk: People have been reduced to the level of cattle. They still remember, but they still don't understand. Neither the idea of Maidan, nor the idea of their country Ukraine. How is it possible to really honour the victims and really appreciate the heroes? You can't. But it is happening in Ukraine. Just like the fact that fighting corruption they are trying to bribe the Maidan with a memorial to heroes against the background of the fact that their killers have not been identified and punished. Heroes do not die only when the idea of their feat is known and voiced. Otherwise, the heroes look like a sacrifice to be slaughtered in the name of unvoiced goals. And it is true. After all, it has only been FOUR YEARS, and already we are talking about «remember" or “don't remember”;

Anaboli Metanych: "Looking at the photos - a lump in my throat: dignified people, beautiful faces... God save their souls, and let them rest in peace! But what did they die for? So that these unscrupulous creatures could gain power? Thieves, 'reformers', next to whom Janek and Azarov look like altruists and philanthropists? It would be better for these poor people to stay alive, raise children and enjoy life! "The Heavenly Hundred, we remember..." Pathos - and in the end - pain and disappointment... The people are patient".

According to analyst Dmitriy Korneichuk, "the current government will do anything to prevent any real investigation into the events of 18 February 2014 on the Maidan, Institutskaya Street, the vicinity of the Verkhovnaya Rada. Years have passed, the investigation drags on, and the public has no answers. And today, most people are not as concerned about this topic as they were in 2014-2015, when the people's hatred for the 'evil panda' was at its peak," says the political analyst.

When emotions wore off, he noted, Ukrainians began to ask logical questions. For example, about who fired the shots and what provocateurs were working on February 18 outside parliament, when Yanukovich's government and the opposition were negotiating to normalize the situation. In this connection, he added that there was plenty of evidence that someone fired at both security forces and Maidan activists at the same time. But after the new authorities came in, trees were cut down at the site of the shooting, where the bullets got stuck and by which the trajectory of the shots could be traced. Korneichuk points out that the authorities do not want to look for the perpetrators, as the investigation may lead them to themselves. Or "at least come to the conclusion that Yanukovich, in general, had nothing to do with what happened on the Maidan." "So when our politicians are shedding tears and beating their chests, telling us what a tragedy the deaths of people on the Maidan was for them, that it is a matter of honour to find the culprits – all that is a travesty. The authorities, by throwing handouts to the Maidan victims in the form of compensations and benefits, have closed the subject," the expert summed up.

Annex 306

TASS, *How Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities* (20 March 2019)

(translation)

Translation

TASS, *How Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities (20 March 2019)*, available at: <https://tass.ru/info/6240919>.

How Ukraine imposed sanctions on Russian individuals and entities

TASS

TASS-DOSSIER.

On 20 March 2019, it became known that Ukraine **had imposed** sanctions on 294 legal entities and 848 individuals involved in the construction of the Crimean bridge, as well as elections in the proclaimed Donbas republics. The updated sanctions list also included those who, according to the Ukrainian authorities, were allegedly involved in the distribution of print materials with 'anti-Ukrainian content'.

Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko signed a decree to this effect on 19 March. TASS-DOSSIER prepared a briefing paper on the history of Ukraine's anti-Russian sanctions.

Legal grounds

Ukraine started imposing sanctions against Russia in the spring of 2014 in connection with the reunification of Crimea with Russia and the start of the conflict in Donbas. They were based on the Law on Sanctions signed by Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko on 10 September 2014. The document provides for the possibility of imposing restrictive measures against Russia: more than 20 types of sanctions, including suspension of transit of energy resources.

The law came into force on 12 September 2014 and was last amended on 17 December 2017.

According to the document, sanctions can be applied to "protect national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, counteract terrorist activity, as well as prevent violations, restore violated rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Ukrainian citizens, society and the state."

Decisions on sanctions are taken by the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) of Ukraine, a decision is enacted by a decree of the head of state.

Types of sanctions

Restrictive measures include, but are not limited to:

First sanctions

- blocking of assets (property and accounts of individuals and companies);
- restriction of trade transactions;
- restriction, partial or total cessation of transit of resources, flights and traffic through the territory of Ukraine;
- prevention of the transfer of capital out of Ukraine;
- termination of trade agreements, joint projects and industrial programmes in certain areas, in particular in security and defence;
- ban on the transfer of technologies, intellectual property rights;
- visa restrictions; and
- termination of international treaties.

Even before the adoption of the so-called sanctions law, Ukraine had introduced a number of restrictive measures against Russia. Also since 2014, official Kiev has repeatedly joined earlier anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the European Union, the G7, Switzerland and the US.

On 16 September 2015, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko signed the decree “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 2 September 2015 ‘On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)’”. The document came into force on 22 September 2015. Sanctions were imposed on 388 individuals and 105 legal entities of the Russian Federation and other countries for a period of one year. The list of individuals included Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu, State Duma Speaker Sergey Naryshkin, heads of the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Agriculture Nikolay Nikiforov and Alexander Tkachev, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, Just Russia leader Sergey Mironov, singer Iosif Kobzon and others. Besides, restrictive measures affected a number of employees of Russian media outlets: Dmitry Kiselev, CEO of Rossiya Segodnya news agency; employees of TASS, Rossiya Segodnya, Izvestiya and Rossiyskaya Gazeta, NTV television company and Channel One. DPR and LPR leaders Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, as well as more than 100 foreign observers of the Crimean referendum and elections in the DPR and LPR, were also sanctioned. The sanctioned companies include 27 banks, among them Gazprombank, Bank of Moscow (and its Ukrainian BM Bank), Rosselkhozbank, all major Russian carriers (Aeroflot, Transaero, Sibir, Rossiya, etc.), as well as First Cargo Company, Almaz-Antey, Channel One, NTV, VGTRK, Kaspersky Lab, etc. Individuals and legal entities on the list are banned from entering the country, their assets are blocked, and economic and financial obligations are suspended. The decree has been extended several times.

Savchenko-Sentsov list

On 29 March 2016, Petr Poroshenko put into force the 25 March 2016 decision of the NSDC to impose sanctions on individuals "involved in unlawful actions in respect of Nadezhda Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov and Alexander Kolchenko." The so-called Savchenko-Sentsov list comprised 84 names, including the head of the Russian Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, and the head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, who are banned from entering Ukraine. Restrictive measures also affected employees of the court and prosecutor's office who handled cases against the Ukrainian nationals, and two cameramen of Russian TV channels who were witnesses in the trials. The list was later expanded.

Sanctions on Russian media managers

On 27 May 2016, personal sanctions were imposed on 17 managers and key employees of a number of leading Russian media outlets who, according to the Ukrainian authorities, posed "real and potential threats to the national interests, national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine" (the presidential decree came into force on 31 May 2016). The restrictive list includes: general director of Channel One Konstantin Ernst, editor-in-chief of Moskovskiy Komsomolets Pavel Gusev, editor-in-chief of REGNUM news agency Vigen Akopyan, editor-in-chief of Novorus.info website Andrey Surkov, chairman of the board of the Pravda.ru online resource holding Vadim Gorshenin, editor-in-chief of Life.ru online portal Alexander Potapov, editor-in-chief of Rossiyskaya Gazeta Vladislav Fronin, editor-in-chief of Russian Reporter magazine Vitaly Leibin, general director of TASS news agency Sergey Mikhailov, head of the Society and Law Broadcasting Directorate of NTV Channel Andrey Kunitsyn, editor-in-chief of RT TV channel Margarita Simonyan; editor-in-chief of Komsomolskaya Pravda Vladimir Sungorkin, VGTRK general director Oleg Dobrodeyev, former NTV general director Vladimir Kulistikov, host of Sunday Vremya programme on Channel One Irada Zeinalova, general director of Life TV channel Ashot Gabrelianov, and general director of Russia 1 TV channel Anton Zlatopolsky.

Expansion of the sanctions list in 2016

On 17 October 2016, the Ukrainian president signed a decree adding 335 individuals and 167 legal entities to the sanctions list. The updated list includes Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin, former SVR head Mikhail Fradkov, LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskyy, Russian presidential envoys Oleg Belaventsev and Sergey Menyaylo, Council of Federation speaker Valentina Matviyenko, senators Elena Mizulina and Andrey Klishas, MPs Leonid Slutskiy and Sergey Neverov, and others.

Restrictive measures have also been imposed on the entire former and current command of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as on representatives of the Crimean authorities, including the head of the republic Sergey Aksyonov. The list of legal entities was expanded to include Rosoboronexport, Rostec, Izhmash, Kamaz, Rusal, the Ilyushin Aviation Complex, the United Aircraft Corporation, UTair and others. The National Research Centre "Kurchatov Institute" was also put under sanctions.

The same decree imposed restrictive measures on the Russian payment systems Zolotaya Korona, Kolibri (Sberbank), Leader, Unistream, Anelik and Blizko.

Sanctions on Russian banks

On 15 March 2017, Petr Poroshenko put into effect another decision of the National Security and Defence Council. Restrictive measures were imposed for one year on five banks with Russian state capital operating in Ukraine - Sberbank, VS Bank, Prominvestbank, VTB Bank and BM Bank. The sanctions involve, among other things, a ban on the withdrawal of funds out of Ukraine, as well as the payment of dividends, interest, repayment of interbank deposits and loans, funds from correspondent accounts of subordinated debt. The ban also concerns the distribution of profits and capital of those five banks. The sanctions were subsequently extended.

Expansion of the list and ban on Russian social networks in 2017

On 15 May 2017, the Ukrainian president approved a decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine to expand the sanctions list onto additional 1,228 individuals and 468 legal entities, including a number of State Duma deputies, journalists, and Constitutional Court judges. The Russian social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, Yandex and Yandex. Ukraine were banned in Ukraine. The document prescribed "to prohibit Internet providers to provide Internet users with access services" to these resources. The restrictive measures also affected 1C, which specializes in the development and supply of business software, and ABBYY, which develops text recognition and language software and electronic dictionaries.

Sanctions 2018

On 9 February 2018, Ukraine introduced additional measures to counter Russia's "information aggression". However, the presidential decree is classified and its contents have not been published.

On 14 May, Petr Poroshenko again signed a package of personal sanctions. The measures were imposed on individuals allegedly "involved in information and cyber aggression" against Ukraine, in "illegal actions against Ukrainian citizens that are illegally detained in Russia", as well as against members of the State Duma and members of the Council of Federation. According to the presidential decree, Internet providers have been ordered to restrict access to ria.ru, sputniknews.com, 1prime.ru, rsport.ria.ru, realty.ria.ru, rian.com.ua, rtr- planeta.com, russia.tv, vesti.ru, tvkultura.ru, and digitalrussia.tv.

Sanctions on Russian political parties

On 21 June 2018, six Russian political parties were added to Ukraine's sanctions lists, including United Russia, the CPRF, the LDPR, Rodina, the Democratic Party of Russia, and the Agrarian Party of Russia. The list also includes the Central Electoral Commission and its head, Ella Pamfilova, the Crimean election commission, and members of territorial commissions at various levels. Besides, under sanctions were put the Union of Russian pensioners and the Union of Afghanistan Veterans, the observer corps For Clean Elections, and the public organization Boyevoe Bratstvo (Combat Brotherhood).

Annex 307

RIA Novosti, *Cases of harassment of journalists in Ukraine in 2014-2017* (19 June 2017)

(translation)

Translation

RIA Novosti, *Cases of harassment of journalists in Ukraine in 2014-2017* (19 June 2017), available at: <https://ria.ru/20170619/1496819255.html>.

Cases of harassment of journalists in Ukraine in 2014-2017

2017

On 26 July, it became known that Russian journalist Maria Knyazeva, an employee of the Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 TV channels, was expelled from Ukraine and banned from entering the country for three years. According to the Security Service of Ukraine, Knyazeva was engaged in "destructive activities under the pseudonym of 'Saushkina'". It is alleged that Knyazeva, "using her connections with pro-Russian representatives of the Ukrainian media and experts", collected information on the situation in the country, the work of top authorities and security agencies. She then used these data "to provide biased coverage of the situation in Ukraine".

On 14 July, the Ukrainian media holding Vesti claimed that in its office in the Gulliver shopping mall in central Kiev the security services were conducting searches, and the work of the editorial office was blocked. Later, Ukraine's chief military prosecutor Anatoliy Matios said that law enforcers were conducting more than 180 searches in the premises located in Gulliver that belonged to former Revenues and Levies Minister Alexander Klymenko, including the editorial office of Radio Vesti. The Ukrainian Interior Minister assured that the actions of law enforcers were not related to the work of journalists. On 20 July, the Ukrainian media holding Vesti wrote an open letter to the executive and legislative authorities demanding to protect the publication from pressure from law-enforcement agencies and to prevent the allegedly planned attempt to block the work of the holding.

On 7 July, Nataliya Nagornaya, a journalist of the Ukrainian 1+1 TV channel, accused Ukrainian police officers of using force against her for filming police work at a checkpoint near Marinka in Donbas. According to the police, the journalists refused to undergo a standard document check and the camera crew allegedly did not have permission to film the checkpoint. As Nagornaya told the media, the car with the film crew was on its way to Donbas for filming following an agreement with the press officer of the Ukrainian military operation in Volnovakha, but they were stopped by the police near Marinka and their documents were taken away. Natalia was thrown face down on the ground, a submachine gun was reloaded over her head with foul language. One of the "interlocutors" snatched the phone from the journalists and threw it on the ground, trying to smash it. After the "interaction" with the police, the journalists recorded the beating in hospital.

On 22 June, Igor Guzhva, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian edition Strana.ua, was detained in Kiev on suspicion of extortion for non-posting compromising materials on a current politician. Guzhva considers the case against him a planned provocation. Court in Kiev arrested the journalist with possibility of hryvnya 544,000 bail (about 21,000 dollars), the editor-in-chief was bailed on 26 June and released from jail. The Kiev prosecutor's office then filed a complaint against the court ruling, demanding that the bail amount be increased to 123,000 dollars. The appeals court denied the prosecutor-general's office request to increase the bail.

On 3 July, Igor Guzhva said that the Security Service of Ukraine launched another criminal case against journalists of the Strana.ua website for "interference in the private life" of MP Anton Gerashchenko.

On 7 May, the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper said that two of its journalists, Maria Remizova and Elena Boduen, who were accredited for the Eurovision Song Contest, were not allowed into Ukraine. They were put off the train at the Konotop checkpoint by Ukrainian border guards.

On 6 May, the director of the Russia Today news agency's joint directorate for photo information, Alexander Shtol, said that the agency's photo correspondent Ramil Sitdikov accredited for the Eurovision song contest was not allowed to enter Ukraine. He was given an entrance denial document "due to an unconfirmed reason for entry".

2016

On 22 December, the Ukrainian government denied RIA Novosti journalists accreditation to its meetings due to the implementation of the relevant resolution of the Verkhovna Rada. Press service spokeswoman Iryna Konopatko referred to the available letter with the list of media outlets and said that media outlets with Russian registration could not be present at the meetings. According to her, the only exceptions are Interfax-Ukraine and RBC-Ukraine" as they are registered in Ukraine.

In July, the press centre of Kiev's military operation in Donbas asked the Security Service of Ukraine to suspend the accreditation of journalists of the Ukrainian TV channel Hromadske.TV Anastasia Stanko and Konstantin Revutskiy due to a story that allegedly reveals the positions of Ukrainian security forces. On 29 August, journalists Stanko and Revutskiy were given back their accreditation.

On 24 April, without any explanation, Ukrainian border guards banned VGTRK special correspondent Daria Grigorova from entering the country for five years, telling her about this decision at the airport.

On 30 April, German journalist Saadi Isakov, who travelled to Odessa, was not allowed into Ukraine, the SBU banned him from entering the country.

On 26 April, TV presenter Savik Shuster was denied the right to work in Ukraine.

On 14 April, four correspondents of MTRK Mir, Belarusian citizens, who planned to make a film in Pripyat to commemorate the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, were not allowed into Ukraine. After 4.5 hours of waiting at the border, they were given a refusal-of-entry document and escorted to the Belarusian side.

On 28 March, the Security Service of Ukraine banned Russian journalist Otar Kushanashvili from entering the country for three years.

2015

On 2 October, Radio Svoboda journalist Natalia Sedletskaia said on her Facebook page that journalist Mikhail Tkach and cameraman Kirill Lazarevich were detained by SBU officers near the SBU building in Kiev. According to the SBU representative, the journalists were not detained; they were invited to a public reception centre for identification, and the matter was resolved after they produced journalist IDs.

On the evening of September 24, Yekaterina Voronina, a correspondent of Central TV, was detained by a group of people who did not show any documents at the Ukrainian-Crimean border near the town of Kalanchak. She, together with a Ukrainian stringer, had been

filming a story about the Right Sector's blockade of the peninsula on an assignment from her editorial office. After many hours of interrogation at the SBU, the journalist was released. On 16 September, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko issued a decree approving the decision of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council on personal sanctions. The president's official website made public the relevant decree and annexes with full lists of individuals subject to sanctions and other restrictive measures for a period of one year. The list includes 400 individuals and 90 legal entities, among them 34 journalists and seven bloggers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Germany, Israel, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and other countries.

On 27 May 2016, Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko approved a decision of Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council that lifts the ban on entry into the country for 29 Russian and foreign journalists, including employees of Russia Today and six representatives of Russian media: Olga Kovalenko, head of RIA Novosti in Kazakhstan, Elena Palazhchenko, head of RIA Novosti in Turkey, Yakub Koreyba of Russia Today news agency (Poland), correspondent of the TASS agency South African bureau Alexander Nechaev, TASS correspondent in Washington Andrey Suzhanskiy and TASS station head in Washington Andrey Shytov. Amendments were introduced in the Annex to the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDCU) of 2 September 2015 "On the application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures sanctions".

At the same time, Poroshenko imposed sanctions on RT TV channel and international agency Rossiya Segodnya's editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, General Director of VGTRK Oleg Dobrodeyev, General Director of First Channel Konstantin Ernst, former head of LifeNews TV channel and Izvestia newspaper Alexander Potapov, director general of the TASS news agency Sergei Mikhailov, the editor-in-chief of Rossiyskaya Gazeta Vladislav Fronin, the former director general of NTV Vladimir Kulistikov, and the hostess of the Vremya Sunday programme of Channel One Irada Zeynalova.

On 16 May 2017, it became known that Kiev had expanded the sanctions list against foreign companies and citizens, which was published in an annex to President Petr Poroshenko's decree. The expanded version of the sanctions list includes 1,228 individuals and 468 legal entities. In particular, Ukraine imposed sanctions on a number of Russian media outlets, banned access to social networks VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, Yandex and Mail.ru. The list also includes Bulgarian journalist Tasheva Labova, Polish bloggers David Berezicki and David Hudzec, and Israeli political technologists Avigdor Eskin and David Eidelman, who are banned from entering Ukraine for a year.

On 1 July, Channel One correspondent Alexandra Cherepnina stopped coming into contact with the newsroom. The TV channel's cameraman did not find her or her belongings in her flat. Later, Cherepnina contacted the channel and said that she had been detained by the SBU and was accused of falsifying one of her videos. The SBU later said that Cherepnina was banned from entering Ukraine for three years. According to them, the Russian journalist "tried to shoot a fake video which would discredit the Ukrainian authorities".

On 2 June, journalists of the Rossiya 24 TV channel were detained on Maidan Nezalezhnosti. Cameraman Maxim Grinevich and journalist Kseniya Kolchina were handed over to SBU officers. After a check by the Security Service of Ukraine, the detainees were released.

On 19 March, it was reported that Russian Channel 5 correspondent Leonid Muravyov had been expelled by the SBU for propaganda materials on the conflict in the east of Ukraine. It was also reported that he was allegedly planning to take the post of the editor-in-chief of the programme "Podrobnosti Nedeli" on the Ukrainian TV channel Inter. The journalist is banned from entering Ukraine for five years.

On 26 February, it became known that journalists of the Russian TV channel LifeNews Zhanna Karpenko and Aleksandra Ulyanova were not allowed to leave the transit zone of Boryspol airport in Kiev and were forbidden to use the phone and Skype.

On 25 February, SBU officers detained journalists of Channel One Elena Makarova and Sergey Korenev and NTV correspondent Andrey Grygoriev without giving any reasons for their detention. On 26 February, it was reported that all the detainees returned to Moscow.

On 25 February, Inna Osipova, a correspondent of the Russian NTV channel's Segodnya programme, was not allowed to enter Ukraine.

The journalist arrived on a flight from Moscow at Kiev's Zhulyany airport, but problems immediately arose when she went through security.

The staff began to actively inquire about Inna Osipova's identity and eventually she was simply not allowed to leave the airport, claiming that she "could not prove the purpose of her planned stay on Ukrainian territory".

On 12 February, it became known that the Security Service of Ukraine detained Russian journalist with Ukrainian citizenship Andrei Zakharchuk in Nykolayev, who cooperated with the Nevskie Novosti news agency. According to Nevskie Vesti, Zakharchuk arrived in Ukraine on 2 February and was arrested by the SBU on 10 February for "improperly covering events in Ukraine". On 21 February, Andrey Zakharchuk was released in the course of a prisoner exchange in the territory of the self-proclaimed Lugansk people's republic.

On 8 February, Ukrainian journalist Ruslan Kotsaba was arrested for calling for a boycott of the next wave of mobilization in Ukraine, which took place due to the conflict in Donbas.

Court sentences Kotsaba to 3.5 years in prison, finding him guilty of obstructing the activity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. At the same time, the court acquitted the journalist of another article he was charged with - "high treason".

On 1 June 2017, the High Specialized Court of Ukraine overturned the acquittal verdict. The court ordered a new hearing of the criminal proceedings under the article "treason against the motherland".

On 30 January, LifeNews reporter Yelizaveta Khramtsova and cameraman Nataliya Kalysheva were detained by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) in Kiev. According to the channel, the special services said that they wanted to ask the journalists "several questions". On the night of 31 January, the LifeNews journalists were forcibly returned from the territory of Ukraine through the Sinkovka checkpoint on the Ukrainian-Russian border in Chernigov Oblast. They were subsequently banned from entering Ukraine for the next five years.

2014

On 19 November, a film crew of the Russian TV channel REN TV was not allowed into Ukraine. The reason for the deportation from Kiev's Boryspol airport was the fact that according to Ukrainian customs officers, the journalists, who had come to the country as tourists, could not prove that they would spend the entire trip in Kiev.

On 3 November, Yevgeniya Zmanovskaya, an employee of the LifeNews TV channel, was detained in Kiev after she was assigned by the editorial office to cover the Slavyanskyy march. While on the job, Zmanovskaya was surrounded by Ukrainian journalists who called a police officer to check her documents. She only had her journalist ID with her, but not her passport, which was the reason for her detention. It later became known that the cameraman of the TV channel brought the documents of her colleague, after which she was released.

On 23 October, Russian journalist Yevgeniy Kiselev, who has hosted political shows on the Ukrainian TV channel Inter for several years, said that he had been deported from Ukraine. According to Kiselev, he was not allowed to cross the border at Kiev's Boryspol international airport and was issued a deportation order. Later, the State Border Service of Ukraine allowed Yevgeniy Kiselev to enter the territory of Ukraine.

On 28 August, Novaya Gazeta photo correspondent Yevgeniy Feldman was detained but released after some time by representatives of the Ukrainian National Guard in Marinka (Donetsk Region).

On 25 August, Maxim Vasylenko, a freelance photo correspondent of Russia Today news agency and the French news agency Agence France-Presse, and his colleague Yevgeniya Koroleva, a correspondent of the Krymsky Telegraph newspaper, were detained by militants of the Ukrainian Right Sector* in Donetsk Region. On 26 August, it was reported that the journalists were released.

On 1 August, the RT TV channel said that Alina Yeprymyan, a journalist of the RT Ruptly video agency, had been deported from Ukraine after erasing all her materials. The official reason for the deportation was the lack of journalist accreditation.

On the night of 22-23 July, four journalists, including a freelance correspondent of Russia Today, British national Graham Phillips, and a cameraman of the Anna-News news agency Vadim Aksyonov, went missing in the war zone in eastern Ukraine. The Security Service of Ukraine later said that it had detained Phillips in Donetsk and, after questioning him, announced a decision to forcibly expel him and ban him from entering the country for three years. Aksyonov was released on 24 July.

On 22 July, CNN freelance photo correspondent Anton Skiba was detained in southeastern Ukraine. According to the TV company, armed men detained Skiba outside a hotel in Donetsk after he had worked for CNN for only one day. On 26 July, the journalist was released.

On 1 July, Ukrainian media reported that representatives of the self-proclaimed Lugansk people's republic had captured Hromadske TV journalist Anastasia Stanko and cameraman Ilya Beskorovayniy. The LPR authorities said that the journalists were detained for spying for the Ukrainian army. On 2 July, Stanko and Beskorovaynyy were released.

On 14 June, the Zvezda TV channel reported that its journalists had been detained in Ukraine. Correspondent Yevgeniy Davydov and sound engineer Nikita Konashenkov were detained in Dnepropetrovsk and held by Ukrainian Security Service officers. On 16 June, the journalists were released and took a flight to Moscow.

On 6 June, journalists of the Zvezda TV channel Andrey Sushenkov and Anton Malyshev were detained at a checkpoint near Slovyansk. They were accused of observing and collecting information about the checkpoint. The media representatives were handed over to SBU officers. On the night of 9 June, the journalists were released and handed over to the Russian side.

On 20 May, Ukrainian law enforcers detained British journalist Graham Phillips in Mariupol, who had collaborated with the Russian TV channel RT. On the night of 22 May, it became known that the journalist had been released.

On 18 May, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry said that Russian journalists of LifeNews Oleg Sidyakin and Marat Saichenko had been detained near Kramatorsk. The Ukrainian

authorities accused them of aiding "terrorism" in the east of the country. The journalists were released on 25 May and flew to Grozny, from where they later returned to Moscow.

On 16 April, a Rossiya 24 TV crew - correspondent Yevgeniy Reshetnev, cameraman Sergei Truskov and engineer Vadim Klyvanov - were detained near the town of Izyum without any explanation. The group was released on 17 April.

In April, Sergey Shapoval, a journalist with the Ukrainian publication VolinPost, disappeared in Donetsk Region of Ukraine; in May, the journalist was found in Donetsk and arrived in Kiev. Shapoval claimed to have spent three weeks in Donetsk, where he was held on the premises of the Donetsk regional state administration, and was released thanks to the intervention of certain politicians.

**Extremist organisation banned in Russia.*

Material prepared on the basis of RIA Novosti information

Annex 308

Telegram, *St. Petersburg Courts Unified Press Service, The Oktyabrsky District Court of St. Petersburg ruled in the suit of Igor Bezler against the Foundation Bellingcat*, (19 May 2021), available at: <https://t.me/SPbGS/8487>

(translation)

Translation

Telegram, St. Petersburg Courts Unified Press Service, *The Oktyabrsky District Court of St. Petersburg ruled in the suit of Igor Bezler against the Foundation Bellingcat (19 May 2021)*, available at: <https://t.me/SPbGS/8487>.

The Oktyabrsky District Court of St. Petersburg ruled in the suit of Igor Bezler against the Foundation Bellingcat, the private company Bellingcat, Eliot Higgins and Peter Van Huys to protect his honour, dignity and good name.

Bezler asked to recognise certain information in the article "Identification of separatists involved in shutdown of MH17" and the short article "A bird flew to you" as untrue, discrediting Bezler's honour and dignity (20 points in total). To oblige to publish a refutation. To recover 500,000 roubles in moral damages. The court granted the claims, reducing the moral damage to 340,000 roubles (150,000 from the Foundation, 150,000 from the company, 40,000 from Huys).

t.me/SPbGS/8487

Daria Lebedeva, May 19, 2021 at 18:24

Annex 309

RBC, *Three Russian soldiers killed in Syria* (25 March 2019)

(translation)

Translation

RBC, *Three Russian soldiers killed in Syria* (25 March 2019), available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/25/03/2019/5c9924cd9a79477f008a4a3e>.

Three Russian soldiers killed in Syria

A vehicle carrying Russian soldiers was attacked by militants in Syria, the Defence Ministry said. Three servicemen were killed in the attack.



Photo: Omar Sanadiki / Reuters

Three Russian servicemen were killed in an attack by terrorists in Syria, reports RIA Novosti citing the Russian Defence Ministry.

Three Russian servicemen went missing in Syria back in late February after a militant attack. According to the Ministry of Defence, the vehicle in which they were travelling was attacked by a group of terrorists, and the soldiers were killed on the spot. Their bodies were taken to Russia.



Russian Air Force planes and ground troops involved in the Syrian operation identified and eliminated a group of 30 militants involved in the deaths of the three servicemen. The Defence Ministry stressed that a continuous search had been carried out since the information about the disappearance of the servicemen was received. In early February, the death of 25-year-old Russian soldier Maxim Pletnev was announced. He died on 31 January while on a combat mission in Syria and was buried on 4 February. In January, the media reported the death of Staff Sergeant Andranik Arustamyan in Syria. The deaths had occurred back in November 2018, when the soldier overturned a mine barrier at a checkpoint in the town of al-Shula and four mines exploded. The Defence Ministry did not comment on the deaths of the two men. Last May, the Defence Ministry reported the death of four Russian soldiers and the wounding of three others in the Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor. During the night, militants attacked an artillery battery with the servicemen present - two were killed on the spot and two more died later in hospital from their wounds. The military conflict in Syria has been ongoing since 2011; Russia began fighting on the side of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces in 2015. In December 2017, President Vladimir Putin ordered the withdrawal of troops from Syria and a permanent military group is now stationed in the port of Tartus and at the Hmeimim airbase. In March this year, Sergei Shoigu, head of the Defence Ministry, visited Syria and met with Assad and gave him a message from Putin; the content of the document was not disclosed.

Annex 310

Rostec, *Rostec delivered almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat equipment* (10 December 2020)

(translation)

Translation

Rostec, Rostec delivered almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat equipment (10 December 2020), available at: <https://rostec.ru/news/rostekh-postavil-pochti-300-000-komplektov-boevoy-ekipirovki-ratnik/>.

Rostec delivered almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat equipment

Photo: CNIItchmash



The Central Research Institute of Precision Engineering (CNIItchmash) of Rostec State Corporation has supplied the troops with almost 300,000 sets of Ratnik combat equipment over eight years.

The main feature of Ratnik is the ability to adapt the kit to the physical characteristics of the soldier and the combat tasks performed. In addition to the basic kit, the Institute has developed a commander's version, kits for snipers, machine gunners and combat vehicle crews.

"Ratnik is an advanced outfit that enables the successful execution of a wide range of tasks on the battlefield. It combines more than 60 elements: weapons, sights, personal protective equipment, autonomous heat source kits, communications equipment and active hearing protection systems. Today, military specialists are developing the tactical and technical requirements for the soldier's outfit of the future - the fundamentally new Sotnik kit. We expect to receive technical specifications for its development as soon as 2021," said Bekhan Ozdoev, industrial director of Rostec State Corporation.

Ratnik was developed by CNIItchmash at the end of the noughties and underwent a full range of military tests, which showed the demand for the equipment and the correctness of the technical solutions used. After the tests were completed, pilot batches were sent to the

troops, and in 2015 annual serial deliveries of the new outfit began. In 2020, the production and delivery of the combat kits was completed ahead of schedule.

Annex 311

Magnolia-TV, *Nightmare in Kharkov. A chronicle of bloody events* (15 March 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Magnolia-TV, *Nightmare in Kharkov. A chronicle of bloody events* (15 March 2014), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20140321043922/http://magnolia-tv.com/text-news/2014-03-15/37376-n-chnii-koshmar-u-kharkov-khron-ka-krivavikh-pod-i>

NIGHTMARE IN KHARKOV. A CHRONICLE OF BLOODY EVENTS

6:41 15.03.2014

23:00 - 00:00:

Clashes with shooting occurred in Kharkov. According to unverified information, there are victims and wounded as a result of the clashes, local and foreign media report.

In particular, the ITAR-TASS agency reports that the clashes that took place on Rymarskaya Street are between pro-Russian Kharkov residents and activists of the alleged "Right Sector". There is information about the use of assault rifles, stun grenades and Molotov cocktails.

In turn, local media report that the clashes have already resulted in two deaths and several injuries.

00:00 - 01:00:

Kharkov Mayor Gennadiy Kernes confirms the media reports of the deaths during the riots on Rymarskaya Street near the office of the "Patriot of Ukraine" organization.

According to him, two police officers were killed there. He said this by phone to "Mediaport", referring to the fact that he was under house arrest.

However, at 23:53 he still arrived at the scene. By then, the clashes had already stopped.

"According to the information I have, there are two dead bodies and five injured," he said.

The dead, according to the mayor, are policemen. The injured are being taken to an emergency hospital.

The police have not yet officially commented on the situation. However, the street is already under the control of security forces with machine guns.

The head of the "Patriot of Ukraine" organisation and the Kharkov "Right Sector", Andrey Biletsky, told "Gromadskoye TV" that the attackers shot at the windows of the office. According to him, the "patriots" repelled two attacks on the building before law enforcement arrived. When asked whether the defenders of the building had weapons, Biletsky replied: "It doesn't matter now."

The governor of Kharkov region, Igor Baluta, considers the night's events in the center of the regional center to be a well-planned provocation by pro-Russian chauvinists.

The head of the Kharkov Regional State Administration said that the conflict area is now completely surrounded by law enforcement officers. The police are detaining separatists.

According to Baluta, it all started on Svoboda Square, when a group of pro-Russian protesters were provoked by people from a Volkswagen Transporter minibus.

This vehicle with Dnepropetrovsk license plates has been wanted since the previous provocation in Kharkov a few days ago. Passengers of the bus deliberately entered into a conflict with pro-Russian activists, after which they drove to Rymarskaya Street to the "Prosvita" office, where they parked the car in a deliberate, provocative and demonstrative manner.

They were followed by pro-Russian activists, who by that time had already called "Oplot" for help. The pro-Russian activists and "Oplot" members tried to storm the building, but were met with resistance from those inside.

01:00 - 02:00

Deputy Head of the Kharkov Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Nikolai Fomenko said that police are working to neutralise a gunman who is firing from one of the nearby yards where clashes between "Right Sector" activists and pro-Russian activists took place.

The "Right Sector" said its office was attacked by about 100 pro-Russian activists. A fight broke out between the parties. The pro-Russian activists accused the "Right Sector" of provocation and armed attack with Kalashnikovs.

The "Right Sector" called the incident an intervention by pro-Russian forces in an attempt to suppress the position of the Ukrainian patriotic forces and an armed assault on the office of the "Right Sector" ("Patriot of Ukraine").

02:00 - 03:00:

Kharkov law enforcement confirmed the death of two people during the riots on Rymarskaya Street.

However, they denied the information previously disseminated by the mayor Gennadiy Kernes that the victims were police officers.

"They are civilians," Natalia Zakharova, head of the press service of the regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, told "Mediaport".

Kharkov prosecutor Evgeniy Popovych confirmed the deaths. According to him, one policeman was wounded. Popovych said that criminal proceedings have been initiated on the facts of organising mass riots, attempted murder of a law enforcement officer and premeditated murder committed by a group of people.

Rymarskaya Street is currently blocked by law enforcement officers. Buses with special forces have been brought to the scene. According to Popovych, about 40 people barricaded themselves in the building where the "Patriot of Ukraine" office was located and attacked.

"Certain agreements have been reached with them. I hope that investigators will soon be able to start inspecting the scene," said the Kharkov prosecutor.

06:00:

In Kharkov, only in the morning, people who had barricaded themselves in the building at 18 Rymarskaya Street, where the "Patriot of Ukraine" office is located, began to leave the building after a bloody night and clashes with pro-Russian activists.

About thirty people came out of the building with their hands up. They were put on buses: a police PAZ bus and a green bus.

The negotiations, which lasted almost all night, were attended by Kharkov City Prosecutor Evgeniy Popovych, Head of the Kharkov Regional Police Department Anatoliy Dmitriev, Head of the Kharkov Regional State Administration Igor Baluta and Kharkov Mayor Gennadiy Kernes.

Lawyer Aleksandr Gunchenko explained the appearance of Kharkov Mayor Gennadiy Kernes on the street. As a reminder, according to the court's decision, the Kharkov mayor should be under house arrest at home from 9 p.m. to 7 a.m. The mayor's defence lawyer explained that Gennadiy Kernes had reported the bloody events in Kharkov to the investigator. The investigator took into account the urgency of the situation and allowed the mayor to leave the place that the court had assigned him for house arrest. Therefore, according to Aleksandr Gunchenko, Gennadiy Kernes is staying on Rymarskaya Street, where people had previously barricaded themselves, on a completely legal basis.

Based on materials from personal sources, as well as domestic and foreign media.

Annex 312

Censor.net, *14 March 2014 - Ukraine stands up for Kharkov* (14 March 2018)

(translation)

Translation

Censor.net, 14 March 2014 - Ukraine stands up for Kharkov (14 March 2018), available at: https://censor.net/ua/resonance/3055537/14_bereznaya_2014_ukrayina.

14 March 2014 - Ukraine stands up for Kharkov

Censor.NET

Four years after 14 March 2014, Ukrainian cinemas and lyceums are operating in Kharkov, Ukrainian police are patrolling the city, and Ukrainian academies of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are graduating Ukrainian cadets. The central square no longer has a statue of Lenin. As before, the city is run by Mayor Gennadiy Kernes. Kharkov residents Nikolai Kravchenko and Danila Yakovlev recall how Kharkov balanced over a civilizational abyss for several months.

Nikolai Kravchenko (Kruk)

4 years ago he was an activist of the Patriot of Ukraine NGO, co-founder of the "Azov" Regiment, and today he is a deputy of the "National Corps" political party and an assistant to people's deputy Andrey Biletskiy. His fellow Azov veteran is Danila Yakovlev (Danila).

- March 14 is the Day of the Ukrainian Volunteer. Is it related to the events in Kharkov?

Kruk: On this day, the first groups of volunteers went to form a battalion in Novye Petrovtsi. We have nothing to do with that formal occasion. But on 14 March 2014, we, the volunteers, fought our first battle on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov. The first battle when the enemy suffered losses. Then we showed that we would kill.

- How did the events in Kharkov develop?

Kruk: Two key events happened in Kharkov before Rymarskaya Street: the night of February 28 to March 1 the storming of "Oplot" and March 1, the storming of the RSA, which was actually a failed defence of the RSA on our part.

We came from Maidan in late February. About 100 people. We did not have black uniforms. We were not yet called the "Black Corps". I was on the Kiev Maidan with the "Patriot of Ukraine", and, accordingly, I belonged to the "Right Sector". The House of Trade Unions no longer existed. I was one of those who went in and set up shop on the seventh floor of the Kiev City State Administration.

Danila: On February 25 Andrey Biletskiy was released from prison.

Kruk: He served two years in prison under Yanukovich for the events that took place on Pervaya Rymarskaya Street on 23 August 2011.

- What is Pervaya Rymarskaya Street?

Kruk: It was on Rymarskaya Street in Kharkov that the main center of the nationalist movement was located. It was a building provided in the mid-2000s to the "Prosvita" Society for the Promotion of the Ukrainian Language. Since 2006, the office of the Patriot of Ukraine organisation, headed by Andrey Biletskiy, has been located here. In Kharkov, we had about two hundred activists.

On August 23, 2011, a healthy man of 100+ kilograms, about fifty years old, came to our office. He came in and just shot Igor Mikhaylenko, who was later the second commander of the "Azov" Regiment and is now the head of the National Militia, in the neck.

-Why?

-It was an unconscious "vatnik" who wanted to shoot at nationalists. As a result, our three guys were imprisoned, although Andrey Biletskiy and I arrived after everything had happened.

By the time of the Maidan, our entire organisational structure had fallen apart - most of the leaders had been in jail for two and a half years. I was on the national wanted list. I was taken off the wanted list after the "Azov" battalion.

On 25 February 2014, a Law on amnesty for political prisoners was passed. Andrey and other political prisoners were released.

Danila: I met Andrey Biletskiy near the detention center on Holodnaya Gora in Kharkov. He went home to change his clothes, and in the evening he came to us at the Kharkov Regional State Administration.

- Was it already controlled by Maidan activists?

Danila: We seized the RSA on February 23, after the separatists' congress was disrupted.

- How did it happen?

- The Palace of Sports. There was a tight circle of Anti-Maidan around it. But they were surrounded by an even bigger force - 30 thousand pro-Ukrainian activists. The congress was simply canceled. They were afraid!

There were clashes, but only local ones. There was some bottle-throwing between Maidan and Anti-Maidan. The police did not interfere.

- What happened next, why was the RSA seized?

-We came to Svoboda Square in a big march, Lenin was still there. The whole of Kharkov stood on its ears. I was with a stick. We occupied the whole square. But no one knew anyone. Just like on the Maidan.

I got a call saying that our guys were being beaten as they were going down to the subway. We take off running. We run to the subway and find that our activists have indeed been attacked by

"titushky". There are more than 50 of them, they have cars. I see five people with bats, sportsmen, beating three of them on the head with bats.

We start to attack, and the "titushky" are outnumbered. They run away. They are hiding in the RSA. We followed them, caught them. Eventually, the "titushky" fled through the back door. We went in and occupied the RSA. Gepa came and asked us to leave, but we refused.

On 24 March, we settled there. On 25 March, Biletskiy arrived, organised people and set a goal to seize the "Oplot" base.

- What is Oplot and how was it captured?

Kruk: This is a training base in the city center - Zhilin's sports club. He is no longer among the living. He was liquidated in Moscow. He was an ordinary criminal. We did not cross paths with him before these events. They started investing political money in them in 2013.

On February 27, we organised two buses from Kiev's Maidan to Kharkov. Nationalists, Right Sector, Patriot of Ukraine, Ultras. We arrived and marched from the regional state administration. About two hundred people, it's hard to count.

They knew that we were coming and that our forces were bigger. There were a few people who tried to shoot back. They left the building through the back door, but made shots in our direction. They fled through the Hippodrome. Some of us stayed at "Oplot", others returned to the RSA, including me and Danya.

- Did you spend the night in the RSA and stay there until the assault?

Danila: At five in the morning, we found a bomb with a clockwork mechanism in the RSA building. It was thrown into the trash. I asked: "Where is the bomb?" In the middle of the RSA! Among the things. I said: "Take it out!" And some people just take this package and take it out. "Where did you take it?" - "Behind a tree!" Two policemen were standing nearby. We called them. They simply and stupidly took the package in their hands and walked away!

Kruk: We had a conditional group of 100 people who had known each other for three to five days.

We made our first real, normal attempts to organise the structure of a full-fledged volunteer battalion. Danya and his brother were responsible for the security of the RSA - they were duty officers, sentries.

There was no coordination within the RSA. In general, some liberal characters from the Self-Defence were responsible for security. We were coordinated by Biletskiy, but it had nothing to do with the overall security of the RSA. Parubiy also had no coordination with the hundreds of Self-Defence members. There was no centralised state. The centralised state was Yanukovych, who was running away. Avakov was in the same situation as me - wanted, but in Italy.

The next day, thousands of pro-Russian people gathered near the regional state administration. The



entire city was blocked by buses from Belgorod and Voronezh with Russian license plates.

The notorious Russian militant Arsen Pavlov-Motorola led the Russian "landing party" of anti-Maidan activists in Kharkov


The assault began around 12 o'clock. We were just in the process of institutionalisation. You are asking who was in charge, how, and by whom. Just so you understand, no one and no way. Twenty minutes before the storming, I became the head of the "Right Sector" Kharkov. Andrey Biletskiy went to Yarosh. He said, "Well, now you're in charge of "Right Sector" East. But there was no structure. We started to assemble the structure from Kharkov. I've been in charge for twenty minutes, and then Danya comes running in and says: "We are actually under attack, why are you sitting here?»

- Did you surrender the RSA almost without resistance?

Kruk: What do you mean, without resistance? There was a fight. But it was short and in the building itself. There were weapons. There were Molotov cocktails. There were pistols, I don't know if they were firearms. Stun grenades and some other gas grenades were flying inside, and they made people sick.

Danila: The assault began at five-thirty. They pulled the fence - our metal shields. And then it was on! How many of us were in the RSA? Nobody knows. Well, 200-300. How many were there -

thousands? They did not know Kharkov, they asked: "Where is Sumskaya Street?", "Where is the Universytet metro station?"



The Russian flag over the Kharkov regional state administration, put up by collaborators on 1 March 2014

Kruk: We were "in the meat". Cherkas (Igor Mykhaylenko) and I, along with Andrey Biletskiy, came to the main entrance when the crowd started to tear down the shields. We retreated back to the RSA. The attackers broke the side windows. Someone started shooting at us through them. Cherkas was hit in the arm by something, a vein was opened, and a lot of blood poured out. I fired a traumatic pistol through the window. We tried the firewall, but the water was blocked. We rushed to the second floor. An SBU officer on the second floor tried to detain us. He said: "You'll break all the furniture there! What are you doing?" Someone was blocked on the first floor. Someone in a room, someone in the basement, someone hid in the toilet.



A pro-Russian crowd in front of the Kharkov regional state administration

On the second floor, we were squeezed into a large corridor on both sides. There are up to 15 of us - we closed ourselves with three shields. The only weapons we had were sticks. Cherkas, Biletskiy, Troyan were with us (Vadym Troyan - Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - author). Topaz came running, shouting: "Surrender!" We hit him with a stick.

We surrendered to the "Ukrainian" police and the Afghans. We were taken out of the RSA. Troyan managed to escape. He just stepped into the crowd and disappeared. Without the ribbon, you just blended in with the crowd. Andrey Biletskiy did the same. He slapped a guard in the face - an incomprehensible situation arose - and Andrey disappeared into the crowd.

Me, Galayda and Cherkas were the first to be taken out of the RSA. I dropped the knife, it was hanging on my chest. But some man noticed the knife, grabbed it and started shouting: "Look, he killed our children!" They tried to force us to our knees. But we resisted. We were led through the crowd. Afghans were driving us away: "They must be punished fairly!" Some women were beating us. Someone shouted: "Beat them!", someone shouted "Don't beat them!" The main thing is that we did not kneel down. Students were dragged after us. They were put on their knees, dragged along the asphalt, doused with mud and brilliant green.

We were handed over to the police. They shoved us into their booth. They began to draw up some reports for hooliganism. Cherkas already had a large blood loss. He started to lose consciousness. He was completely white. We called an ambulance, but he just ran away from it.

The policeman looked at Gal and me and said: "Here are St. George's ribbons - get out of here". So we did. That day we lost the RSA, and they put a Russian rag on it.

- But you still had "Oplot"?

Kruk: There was a "Vitus" and about two dozen people at "Oplot". All of them had one pump-action rifle. The guys seized the bus and retreated to Poltava in an organised manner. Danila and his brother were brought by a neighbour. "I came to my parents for the first time in two and a half years (I was wanted!), took off my bloody clothes and went to Poltava as well. At first we were at the regional state administration in Poltava, then we moved to a children's camp in the suburbs. This is the place of origin of the "men in black". After three days, we decided to return to Kharkov, to our home on Rymarskaya Street. And prepare for the war. We were minimally organised.

- Did you return to Rymarskaya Street for the first time since 2011?

Kruk: We returned there on March 6-7. The old ladies from "Prosvita" were there. And we started building a fortress from Rymarskaya Street. We covered the windows with sandbags and boarded up the back door. There were water barrels and a fire extinguisher in the rooms. We placed "cocktail bars" on the roof of our building on both sides. Imagine: the city center, the flag of the Russian Federation on the Kharkov regional state administration, and sandbags and the flag of Ukraine in our windows.

We were collecting weapons: traumatic, hunting, shovels, pickaxe handles, Molotov cocktails. Twenty people were on duty all the time.

We organised a mobilisation center, a mini-headquarters. I was the chief of staff. We started recruiting people. The first document flow appeared. We made a questionnaire: call sign - contact - skills.

-How did the storming of Rymarskaya by anti-Maidan activists begin?

Kruk: The main thing was reconnaissance! Our man was living in a tent in the Anti-Maidan. That's why we knew about the assault a few hours in advance. Rambo was supposed to drive up to Anti-Maidan and check whether the attack had begun. He was seen and chased by seven motorcyclists. They shot at him. He managed to barricade himself with us. It was after that that the assault began.

On 14 March, around eight in the evening. We were barricaded by 32 people.

Danila: There were some random people I brought in to fill out a questionnaire. And then the assault began. There were generally average Maidan activists among us, ready to sing the anthem when told and stand with a stick wherever they were told. There was a journalist who came to sympathise with us. We also put them on guard. 25 people were those we were sure of.

The girls had just gone to the store. Katya and Nastya. Katya is still serving in "Azov".

Kruk: Nastya didn't just come out. She took a bag of documents, our entire first "document flow". She took everything out and burned it. The girls then stood on the street corner and passed us information.

Danya was sitting on one of the "cocktail bars". Hal was running between us as a liaison officer, as there were no walkie-talkies. I was responsible for communications and fire safety. I told Gal where to run and what to say. He would run to Danya's side, and I would run to the other side of the roof. I had people in each room reporting to me. They clearly knew that if a cocktail came in, they had to put out the flames.

I think there were a couple hundred people on the other side. It was organised in a similar way to the storming of the RSA. A crowd, and an organised group inside. The crowd is a cover for this group. Someone inside the crowd does something, shoots, throws, and when necessary retreats and gets lost in the crowd, and the crowd then "rakes it up".

We had a glass wall near the stairs on one side. They broke it. First they threw stones, then stun grenades. There were explosions, but no serious damage.

Our guys immediately took up positions. Someone started shooting, and someone started throwing cocktails. Andrey Biletskiy was coordinating in the central room.

- What kind of weapons did they have?

Kruk: We don't know what kind of weapons they had, but it sounded like automatic weapons. They were shooting at us. One guy on the second floor, who was wearing a helmet, was hit by a bullet that went tangentially, tore the lining of his helmet, and left a characteristic mark along his head. The collection helmet is a "sphere", 8 kg. It saved his life.

- Did you start shooting right away or how did it go?

Kruk: Yes. We repelled the first attack, and they immediately received two 200s and five 300s. They retreated, and after that they just shot at us a little bit from the yard.

They saw that we could kill. To storm a building, you need a lot more people, some professional assault equipment, and you can still really die. So they took up positions at different ends of the



street and periodically fired automatic weapons. Some were hiding. Some were shooting openly.

One of the pro-Russian militants killed on Rymarskaya Street on the night of March 14, 2014

-Danya, what were you doing during the assault?

Danila: I was on the roof in a "cocktail bar". I didn't have many cocktails. But...

I remember holding two cocktails and a firecracker with nails.

I saw how the "vatniks" tried to attack us. We were walking on the neighbouring roof with shields. But it's hard to get through there. They were standing under the windows, and I threw cocktails at them. Then I threw a firecracker at their feet. It didn't really do anything. It had no serious explosive power. It could scratch you with a nail, but not more. But it was enough to scare them. They got scared. The frenzy started. I was sitting on the roof, looking out over the street. I heard the crowd roaring: "Topaz a f#\$@@t give me a command!"

A family man was sitting on the second "cocktail bar". He was throwing cocktails, streaming from his phone and shouting: "Valhala! Valhalla!" ("Paradise for Warriors" - an ancient Norse myth - ed.) He really thought that this was the "Last Words" section. By the way, on January 11, 2014, he was the one who used a firewall to drive a "Berkut" away from the Kiev City State Administration. Later he was wounded twice in the war. Now demobilised, he is building a subway.



Topaz, a pro-Russian militant who led Kharkov's Anti-Maidan at the time, already had automatic weapons

Kruk: They were severely disoriented. First of all, Topaz is an idiot. How can he know what to do? And secondly, don't you know what to do? Shoot, approach slowly. Approach through the roofs. Throw something at the cocktail bar. Our guys were throwing back cocktails only because of their strength of spirit. We had the will to fight.

There were also some of our people who joined us on the street. Maidan-AntiMaidan are largely spontaneous phenomena. People began to gather. For example, Cherkas didn't have time to come. He stood in the neighbouring yard and listened to the conversations of the "vatniks".

The police arrived. One of the wounded was a policeman. The "vatniks" were shooting at us, but hit him.

We were connected, and I was giving information to journalists at that time. I told them what was happening.

I finally had a phone! I exchanged phone numbers with my parents for the first time in two years. They started calling me: "How are you?" I said: "I'm fine. Normal situation". And then there were explosions: thump, thump, thump.

Danila: My mom calls me: "When are you going home? The last bus is coming soon!" - Did you eventually agree to negotiate?


Kruk: It ended up with negotiators coming to us. Gepa and the chief of the Kharkov police. We delayed the negotiations until the morning so that people could come to us for support. At dawn, we were given an ultimatum: either we surrender to the "Ukrainian police" or we would be stormed by a special unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We demanded that they take us to Poltava, because Poltava was not controlled by the vatniks.

Gepa was talking to Biletskiy inside the building. Gepa and the police chief came to us. We were running out of ammunition.

Then Pidzhak came in. He brings pancakes. He said that if we were going to surrender, we had to eat! We ate and thought. We also had a pot of pasta left - Pidzhak hid the gun there later.

We started packing. Andrey told us to take everything we might need. The cart driver, for example, tried to take a sack of potatoes with everything. I burned the documents that were left.

There were no wounded among us.



18 Rymarskaya Street, morning after the assault

The day before, there was unrest in Donetsk. We already had the first dead on our side. On 13 March, Dmitry Chernyavsky was killed. It is important for us that on 14 March in Kharkov we showed that people are killed for separatism here.

Danila: Leaving is the most terrifying moment. We get on the buses, and the whole street is packed with pro-Russian activists. We were afraid that they would overthrow the buses, slash the tires, set us on fire, that we would be tied up in a cage among those who had just wanted to kill us.

After Rymarskaya, we were taken to the Ordzhonikidze district police station. Vitus gets out of the police car and is immediately beaten by "Berkut" members. The cops launched Topaz to our detained guys. He hit Methan. Methan said to him: "You hit like a woman". Then Topaz hit him again. He came up to me, looked me in the eye, and left. Then he came to Family guy. He took me by the head and slammed me against the curb. At the same time, two "Berkut" guys were holding Family guy's hands. Topaz took him by the head and beat him against the curb.

Kruk: I was not beaten. They started punching me, and I had a whole letter against me: I'm wanted, I'm the founder, I'm a former police officer.

Andrey was taken to the SBU as an organiser. The police were aggressively wadded up, and the SBU was just confused. Half of their staff ran away, it was not clear where. They were burning documents, they had no time to deal with us. He was given the opportunity to go to the toilet, and he stupidly left the building. They let him escape. The SBU was weaker than the police.

When we were sitting in the police station, Stepa and Cherkas brought us a whole crowd to the walls. We thought it was the "vatniks" who came to tear us apart, but later it turned out that they were pro-Ukrainian activists.

-I know that there were trials against you...

- Yes, the courts were held at 5 a.m. urgently and the decisions were made "under a copy". We were given three to five days for "malicious disobedience to police officers". It was not a case against anyone specifically for murder. They didn't know what to do with us.

The police act only on orders. And there was no command. They had no contact with Kiev. Minister Zakharchenko fled. They did not know who to obey. Separatists stole money. They were not paid for any decision. There is no leadership. It seems that they did not care. The courts did not understand what to do either. The system was really falling apart.

Only Vitus was left under house arrest with an ankle bracelet, and we were taken to Poltava two days later to be dealt with there.

-Why Vitus?

Kruk: Vitus was shooting with his own registered gun. He probably killed those "vatniks" vatniks", he had combat experience. Then he took off his bracelet and fled to Kiev.

And two days later, the cops leaked all the information about us online. A neighbour, our supporter, came to my parents' house: "Your address is already on the Internet! Run away!" I was worried.

- Is this the first combat experience of the volunteers?

- Yes, it was actually the first battle against Russian mercenaries in this war, where they suffered serious losses. Later, we called ourselves the "men in black" and even recorded a video message to the Crimean "men in green".

On Rymarskaya Street, we already existed as a unit and were able to repel the enemy's first attack, inflicting real combat losses on them. Rymarskaya was followed by demoralisation and disorganisation of the separatists in Kharkov. Kiev finally made a strong-willed decision and declared the ATO. One of the first acts of the ATO was when a special forces unit from Vinnytsia raised the flag of Ukraine over the Kharkov Regional State Administration. Our last trip to Kharkov was on 1 May. Two buses and several cars - about a hundred people. The same uniforms in balaclavas, with rebar, several guns, injuries. In reality, we looked terrible. They simply canceled the march on 1 May. In Kharkov, the ultras were already walking in crowds and came up with the famous chant about Putin.

-How did the "Azov" battalion appear?

- In Kiev, Andrey began to create our unit, and "Azov" officially appeared on May 5. The Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an order to create our battalion. At first, they (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) called it "Azovia", after the place of deployment. Later we transformed it into "Azov". And we started to look further - to Mariupol.

Alena Stadnik-Stefurak, for "Censor.NET"

Annex 313

Euro.kharkiv.ua, *Day of the Volunteer. Anniversary of the defense of Rymarskaya*
(24 February 2023)

(translation)

Translation

Euro.kharkiv.ua, *Day of the Volunteer. Anniversary of the defense of Rymarskaya* (24 February 2023), available at: <https://euro.kharkiv.ua/den-dobrovolczya-richnyczya-oborony-rym/>.

Day of the Volunteer. Anniversary of the defence of Rymarskaya - Information and analytical center Euro Kharkov



Dear friends, we invite you to attend an event dedicated to the Volunteer Day and the anniversary of the Rymarskaya Defence this Wednesday, March 14, at 18:00. The event is organised by National Corps Kharkov. The battle on Rymarskaya Street on March 14 is, in fact, the first armed confrontation in the Russian-Ukrainian war. It was one of the few cases when Ukrainians did not act as "punching bags" but gave a worthy rebuff to separatism.

Therefore, for our Movement, this date is doubly important, because that day 4 years ago became a baptism of fire and gave impetus to the formation of the "Azov" volunteer unit.

In the program of the event:

- photo exhibition
- weapons exhibition
- official part
- awarding of soldiers
- fire show

Constitution Square (near the stele "Glory to Ukraine")

14.03

🕒 18:00


+380996863359

Come and honour the defenders of Ukrainian Kharkov!

The event: <https://www.facebook.com/events/225582251337040/?ti=cl>

The event took place. How was it?




 **Сурен Кочарян** додав 27 нових світлин. 3 год · Kharkov · 🌐

На святкуванні Дня Українського Добровольця та четвертої річниці оборони Римарської. Харків, 14.03.2018.

Разом до Перемоги!

Слава Україні!



Annex 314

SM News, *The Armed Forces of Ukraine use MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore on drones*
(24 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

SM News, *The Armed Forces of Ukraine use MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore on drones* (24 December 2022), available at: <https://sm.news/vs-ukrainy-nachali-ispolzovat-na-bespilotnikax-mon-50-mon-100-i-claymore-59590-u3t5/>.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine use MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore on drones

Ukrainian Armed Forces start using MON-50, MON-100 and Claymore drones.

December 24 - SM.News agency. According to the "Avia.PRO" news publication, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have started using drones and directional anti-personnel mines in an unusual way.

The Ukrainian army's large stock of MON-50 and MON-100 type anti-personnel mines and large supplies of American Claymore mines enable it to use unusual attack tactics. It has become known that anti-personnel mines are equipped with drones, which turn them into weapons with a kill zone of up to 160 metres. Such a crossing represents a particular danger. The only downside is the loss of the drone. It is worth noting that the heavy weight of such mines makes it difficult to use the weapon received.

Annex 315

Tyzhden.ua, *Donetsk region has the highest crime rate in Ukraine* (11 July 2013)

(translation)

Translation

Tyzhden.ua, *Donetsk region has the highest crime rate in Ukraine (11 July 2013)*, <https://tyzhden.ua/na-donechchyni-najvysshchyj-v-ukraini-riven-zlochynnosti/>.

Donetsk region has the highest crime rate in Ukraine - Ukrainskiy tyzhden

"We are facing new specific issues that require increased attention. First of all, it concerns crime in general and its individual types. The crime rate is higher than the national average and amounts to 91.2 criminal offences per 10 thousand people (90.8 in the country). The number of premeditated murders remained unchanged - 170 (the highest in the country), 11 were not solved," said the regional prosecutor.

Siusailo noted that the Prosecutor's office has already held a joint board meeting with the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Donetsk region and the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on Transport, during which measures were developed that have already contributed to reducing the level of certain types of crimes. In particular, there is currently a steady downward trend in the number of premeditated murders.

As a reminder, Gennadiy Moskal, First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada Committee on Combating Organised Crime and Corruption, said that 80% of crimes registered in 2013 remain unsolved by the police.

Annex 316

Tyzhden.ua, Moskal: *In the first half of the year, police managed to solve only one in five registered crimes (10 July 2013)*

(translation)

Translation

Tyzhden.ua, *Moskal: In the first half of the year, police managed to solve only one in five registered crimes* (10 July 2013), available at: <https://tyzhden.ua/moskal-za-pershe-pivrichchia-militsiia-spromohlas-rozkryty-lyshe-kozhen-p-iatyj-zariciestrovanyj-zlochyn/>.

Moskal: In the first half of the year, police managed to solve only one in five registered crimes - Ukrainskiy tyzhden

According to the Prosecutor General's Office, 413,413 criminal offenses were registered in the first half of 2013, compared to 254,66 in the same period last year.

Of these, notices of suspicion were served in 95,411 cases, which is 23%, and 83,492 cases were sent to court with indictments, which is 20%.

"This indicates that 80% of the crimes that have been registered have remained unsolved," Moskal said.

He notes that the situation is unhealthy with crimes against traffic safety and transport operation.

A total of 11,589 criminal proceedings have been opened, of which 2,667 (23%) have been served with notices of suspicion, and 2,175 (19%) have been sent to court.

"No decisions have been made at all in 9,137 criminal proceedings," the report says.

In the field of drug trafficking, 18,432 crimes were registered, compared to 25,911 in the same period last year.

There were 4,560 criminal proceedings opened over premeditated murders, notices of suspicion were served in 890 cases, which is 19%, and 535 of them were sent to court, which is 11.7%.

The number of crimes committed with the use of firearms was 422; with cold steel - 733; with explosives - 36.

In total, over the past six months, 4 facts of creating a criminal organisation and 10 facts of banditry were detected, and 2 terrorist acts were registered.

"However, no one has been served with a notice of suspicion and the materials have not been sent to court," Moskal said.

According to the international human rights center "La Strada-Ukraine", the Ukrainian police initiate cases on one third of rape reports: in 9 months of 2012 the police received 1584 reports, which resulted in 440 criminal cases under Article 152 of the Criminal Code.

Annex 317

Nv.ua, *"Bandera is our father". Torchlight procession to mark 113th anniversary of Ukrainian nationalist leader held in Kiev - photos, videos* (1 January 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Nv.ua, *"Bandera is our father". Torchlight procession to mark 113th anniversary of Ukrainian nationalist leader held in Kiev - photos, videos (1 January 2022)*, available at: <https://nv.ua/ukr/kiyv/den-narodzhennya-banderi-v-kiyevi-vidbulasya-smoloskipna-hoda-video-50206090.html>.

"Bandera is our father". Torchlight procession to mark 113th anniversary of Ukrainian nationalist leader held in Kiev - photos, videos

Editor: Kateryna Denisova

1 January 2022, 19:47

12255

On Saturday, January 1, Kiev hosted the traditional annual torchlight procession in honour of the 113th anniversary of the birth of the leader and ideologist of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Stepan Bandera.

The marchers were scheduled to gather at 17:00 in Taras Shevchenko Park. They marched along the following route: Volodymyrskaya Street - Taras Shevchenko Boulevard - Kreshchatyk Street - Independence Square. According to police estimates, 500-600 people took part in the rally.

They were holding torches, Ukrainian flags, revolutionary flags of the OUN and a cloth with Bandera's image on it. In the middle of the column, the participants carried banners with the image of the Ukrainian nationalist leader, inscriptions "Glory to Ukraine" and other slogans.

The marchers sang the song "Our Father Bandera, Ukraine is our Mother," which became a trending song thanks to a flash mob by Ukrainian users on TikTok.

According to "Interfax-Ukraine", on the bridge over Instytutskaya Street, the participants set fire to flares and chanted patriotic slogans. The convoy arrived at Bankovaya Street, but law enforcement officers did not allow it to enter the building of the Presidential Office because of the location of the New Year's fair.

The organisers of the march said that the participants had gathered to demand that the title of Hero of Ukraine be conferred on Myroslav Symchych, a leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and a centurion of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

The march lasted about two hours and ended with the national anthem. The event took place without conflict, under police control.

January 1, 2021 marks the 113th anniversary of the birth of Stepan Bandera, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, one of the leading ideologists and theorists of the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 20th century.

Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko were the authors of the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State, which was proclaimed on June 30, 1941. On July 5, 1941, Bandera was placed under house arrest, and on September 15, 1941, he was imprisoned in the central Berlin prison. From early 1942 to August 1944, he was held in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In September 1944, Bandera was released and offered to take part in the leadership of the anti-Soviet armed movement in the rear of the Red Army, but he rejected the offer and did not agree to cooperate. Stepan Bandera was killed by KGB agent Bondan Stashynskyi in Munich on October 15, 1959.

Annex 318

Gazeta Wyborcza, *Forget about Giedroyc: Poles, Ukrainians, IPN* (24 May 2008)

(translation)

Translation

Gazeta Wyborcza, *Forget about Giedroyc: Poles, Ukrainians, IPN* (24 May 2008), available at: <https://archive.is/R9ze1>.

Forget about Giedroyc: Poles, Ukrainians, IPN

In a letter dated 2 April 1976, Jerzy Giedroyc wrote to the Ukrainian politician and journalist Ivan Kedrin-Rudnytsky: "There are a lot of issues between Poles and Ukrainians - unpleasant or very heavy issues. However, I don't think it's right to use inaccurate information. It is probably in the interests of our peoples to normalise relations, which requires telling the whole truth - but only the truth - to each other's eyes".

Undoubtedly, Giedroyc had in mind above all the bloody conflict that divided Poles and Ukrainians in 1943-47.

From Volhynia to the "Vistula" action

Its course was heavily influenced by the Bandera faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and its subordinate units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At the turn of 1942/43, the OUN-B leadership decided, without waiting for the end of the war, to remove Poles from all lands considered Ukrainian. In Volhynia, the decision was made to physically liquidate the entire Polish population, and in Galicia to expel them under threat of death. This operation was described in Ukrainian reports as an "anti-Polish action".

On 9 February 1943, Grigoriy Pereginiak's UPA unit "Dowbeszki-Korobki" slaughtered the first village - Parośle (Sarny district). In March and April 1943, there were many attacks on Polish villages - for example, on the night of 22/23 April, around 600 Poles were murdered in Janowa Dolina. The attacks were most intense on 11 July 1943, when at least 99 villages were attacked simultaneously - including Kisielin and Poryck. Peasants from the surrounding villages, mobilised by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and armed only with axes and pitchforks, often took part in the attacks. Acts of degenerate cruelty were not uncommon.

The Home Army stepped in to defend the population, setting up self-defence bases. In the most famous of these, in Przebraż, several thousand Poles survived. Home Army partisan units cooperated with the self-defence bases, forming the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army in early 1944. A large group of the Polish population sought rescue in the cities under the protection of the Germans, 5-7 thousand ended up in the Soviet partisans.

The anti-Polish Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) campaign in Eastern Galicia began in the early spring of 1944. Here, too, villages were often destroyed with their entire populations. It was only after the entry of the Red Army that the UPA command abandoned the purges. The first order to cease attacks against the defenceless population was issued on 1 September 1944, but still at the turn of 1944/45 bloody attacks on several dozen Polish villages, including Ithrowica, were carried out in the Tarnopol Voivodeship.

In July 1944, at a congress of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council - a body conceived as a supra-party political platform of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army - UPA commander Roman Shuchevych "Taras Chuprynka" admitted that in Volhynia there had been a "liquidation of the Polish population ... which ended in the summer of 1943", and in Galicia "the UPA command gave the order to displace Poles if they did not resettle themselves. The attacks continue". And he added: "We are creating comfortable positions for ourselves, which cannot be achieved at the green tables [of talks]. We will not let ourselves be lied to. The Ukrainian masses in our hands".

Poles did not limit themselves to self-defence - there were also bloody reprisal actions. In Volhynia, actions against Ukrainian civilians were carried out primarily by Polish police in German service, created after the Ukrainian police deserted to the UPA. In the Lublin region, Polish partisan units took the offensive in March 1944, burning more than 20 Ukrainian villages, including Sahryń. In turn, between February and April 1945, a number of Ukrainian villages in the strip from Lubaczów to Sanok were burnt down. It was then that several hundred Ukrainians were killed in Pawłokom, where Presidents Lech Kaczyński and Viktor Yushchenko met in 2006 (earlier, in 2003, Presidents Aleksander Kwasniewski and Leonid Kuchma paid tribute to the Poles murdered in Poryck/Pawliwka).

A particularly painful event for Ukrainians was the 1947 Operation Vistula. In accordance with a resolution issued on 29 March 1947 by the Political Bureau of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), Ukrainians and Lemkos living in the south-east of Poland were forcibly deported to the western territories and resettled in such a way that they were quickly assimilated. Although this action was justified by the need to liquidate Ukrainian Insurgent Army units operating in Poland, there is no doubt that for thousands of people not connected to the Ukrainian underground, the deportations were undeserved repression.

In total, 80-100,000 Poles and 10-20,000 Ukrainians were killed in 1943-47. In Volhynia the account is striking - on the Polish side there were perhaps as many as 50-60 thousand victims, on the Ukrainian side no more than 2-3 thousand. More than a million Poles and around 630 thousand Ukrainians and Lemkos were expelled from their homeland.

What was genocide?

Such a huge tragedy cannot fail to arouse public emotion. Polish historians generally agree that the Ukrainian purges were barbaric in nature and cannot be justified. However, this does not mean that scholars do not differ profoundly in their assessment of the events. According to some historians supported by the so-called 'national borderland' circles, the actions of the Ukrainians must be contrasted with the crimes committed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. They were a "third genocide", which in fact "far surpasses the German and Soviet genocides", and can only be compared to the Holocaust.

It is difficult, in my opinion, to agree with such a radical opinion. The anti-Polish purges were undoubtedly one of the bloodiest Polish episodes of the Second War. However, no matter how one assesses the actions of the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, its members were citizens of

the Second Republic who acted against their Polish fellow citizens, and not invaders carrying out brutal external aggression.

The Third Reich and the USSR were subjects of international law, and the OUN a secret terrorist organisation. The aim of German and Soviet occupation policy was to enslave all of Poland, while Poles and Ukrainians were divided by a dispute over the future border. Finally, for the Ukrainian nationalists, the Poles were hated occupiers, while for the Nazis, they were racially inferior subhumans who had to be turned into a nation of slaves. For the Soviets, on the other hand, Polish society appeared to be the object of a gigantic social experiment in the course of which all 'class enemies' had to be destroyed. If one were to look for analogies, one should rather look at the relations between Croats and Serbs at the time - if only because the Croatian Ushtashe resembled members of the OUN in many respects.

And that the UPA's crimes did not bear the hallmarks of genocide. The majority of Polish historians today are inclined to this view. For there is no doubt that in the years 1943-45 the inhabitants of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were killed simply for being Poles. The problem is, however, that some of the actions of the Polish underground may also fulfil the characteristics of genocide. Such is the conclusion of the findings of the investigation by IPN prosecutors into the murder of several dozen Belorussians, committed by a branch of the national underground in 1946 in the Bielsk Podlaski district. And it was a crime similar to those that took place in some Ukrainian villages - for example, in Wierzchowiny, where a grouping of the National Armed Forces killed almost 200 Ukrainians in June 1945.

It is worth emphasising, however, that one cannot put an equal sign between the planned extermination of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia and the local reprisal actions in the Rzeszow and Lublin regions. For on the Ukrainian side, we were dealing with top-down directed ethnic cleansing, while on the Polish side, we were dealing with the initiatives of local commanders disobeying instructions coming from above. On the Ukrainian side, therefore, the entire anti-Polish operation was genocidal, on the Polish side - individual pacifications.

It is precisely the assessment of the retaliatory actions that divides Polish historians the most. Some scholars, fervently supported by national and borderland circles, consider the problem of Polish actions against the Ukrainians to be unimportant and try to reduce their scale to a minimum. On the other hand, they consider the forced displacement of Ukrainians to be, if not even normal, then at least fully justified. Interestingly, they use methods analogous to those used by some Ukrainian deniers. For example, the theory, popular in Ukraine at the time, that the first Polish villages were murdered by Soviet partisans disguised as Ukrainians (and that the Ukrainians only attacked the Poles when they started burning Ukrainian villages in revenge), is deceptively similar to the attempt to shift responsibility for the murder in Wierzchowiny from the NSZ to a "bogus unit" created by the Security Office.

What is striking in the voices of the borderland circles is the undisguised desire to force historians to present the past from a "merely correct" perspective, whereby any doubt or a simple hint of sympathy for the suffering of the Ukrainians is treated as a betrayal of the national interest.

Annex 319

OUN UPA, Personalities, *Slava Stetsko (14.05.20 - 12.03.03)* (1 January 2015)

(translation)

Translation

OUN-UPA, Personalities, *Slava Stetsko (14.05.20 - 12.03.03)* (1 January 2015), available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20150101141420/http://oun-upa.org.ua/personalities/>.



Slava Stetsko (14.05.20 - 12.03.03)

Anna Muzyka was born on May 14, 1920, in the village of Romanivka, Ternopol region. Higher education. Lviv Polytechnic, School of Political Science (Munich), conference interpreter. Specialised in translating from English, French and German. Native in Polish, English, German, French, Spanish, Italian, Slovak, and Belarusian. Specialisation: sociologist, psychologist, political scientist. Master's degree.

Member of the OUN since 1938. Co-organiser of the UPA Red Cross, the OUN Women's Network, and the OUN Youth. In 1943 she was imprisoned by the Germans in Lvov. Head of the OUN press bureau, editor of the Ukrainian Review quarterly, co-organiser of the European Council for Freedom (ECF). President of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples. After forced emigration, she returned to Ukraine. Honorary citizen of Lvov (1993).

2000 - Order of Princess Olga, III degree. Until 2001, she was the head of the OUN (b) leadership. From 1944 to 1991, she lived abroad, where she and her husband Yaroslav Stetsko conducted underground activities aimed at liberating Ukraine from Soviet occupation. After Ukraine gained independence, she returned to her homeland.

She has headed the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists since 1992. Member of the Verkhovnyaya Rada of Ukraine from the 89th electoral district of Ivano-Frankovsk region.

Yaroslava Stetsko went to be with the Lord on March 12, 2003, in Munich, where she was undergoing medical treatment.

Annex 320

Unian, Hero of Ukraine Yuriy Shukhevich dies (22 November 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Unian, *Hero of Ukraine Yuriy Shukhevich dies (22 November 2022)*, available at: <https://www.unian.net/society/umer-geroy-ukrainy-yuriy-shuhevich-novosti-lvova-12053652.html>.

Hero of Ukraine Yuriy Shukhevich dies

Irina Pogorelaya

Yuri Shukhevich was the son of the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Roman Shukhevich.



Yuriy Shukhevich dies \ UNIAN photo

Dissident, people's deputy of the 8th convocation, Hero of Ukraine, son of commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) Roman Shukhevich, Yuriy Shukhevich has died at the age of 89.

This was announced by Lvov mayor Andrey Sadovyy in Telegram.

"At the age of 89, Yuriy Shukhevich - Hero of Ukraine, dissident, member of Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Eternal memory to the great Ukrainian," he wrote.

According to media reports, Shukhevich died on the night of 22 November. He spent the last minutes of his life in Germany, where he was undergoing medical treatment.

Who is Yuri Shukhevich

Shukhevich was born on March 28, 1933 in the village of Oglyadov in Lvov region.

He was a well-known Ukrainian political figure, dissident, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and spent 28 years in prisons and camps of the USSR as a political prisoner.

In 1990 he organised and until 1994 headed UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian People's Self-Defence).

In August 2006 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko awarded Yuriy Shukhevich the title of Hero of Ukraine.

Annex 321

BBC News Ukraine, *National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from?*
(11 March 2019)

(translation)

Translation

BBC News Ukraine, *National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from?* (11 March 2019), available at: <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-47527045>.

National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from? - BBC News Ukraine

National Corps in Faces: Who are these people and where are they from?

11 March 2019



Photo by UNIAN

The "National Corps" party and its sister youth organisation, the "National Druzhyny", have been in the spotlight after clashes with police near the presidential administration and an attempt to break through to Petr Poroshenko's office in Cherkasy on March 9.

The nationalists, who are united by the so-called "Azov" movement (after the "Azov" National Guard Regiment), have in recent years formed a party and a civilian youth group that has declared its mission to "ensure order on the streets of Ukrainian cities."

Some support this movement, but many are now concerned about the National Militias' promise to use force at polling stations in the event of fraud.

Despite talks that the leaders of the "National Corps" may be connected to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, "Azov" activists have been clashing with the police.

Who are the people who lead the "Azov" movement, which is playing an increasingly important role in Ukrainian politics?

Andrey Biletskiy, leader of the "Azov" movement and head of the "National Corps" party, people's deputy

This politician was born and studied in Kharkov, and has a degree in history.



Photo by UNIAN

He spoke out against the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, participated in the "Ukraine Without Kuchma" action and Orange Revolution, founded the nationalist organisation "Patriot of Ukraine", and professed "social nationalist" views.

He was imprisoned during the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity.

Biletskiy was imprisoned in 2011. At that time, representatives of nationalist organisations, including the "Patriot of Ukraine", were arrested in Ukraine.

In August 2011, there was a shooting at the Patriot office in Kharkov. As a result, several nationalists were injured, including Sergey Kolesnyk, who had come to the right-wing to resolve the conflict.

Subsequently, law enforcement officers opened a case over the attack on Kolesnyk, and Andrey Biletskiy was arrested as part of the investigation.

He was released on 24 February 24 2014, when the Verkhovnaya Rada passed a resolution to release political prisoners of the time of Viktor Yanukovych.

In March and April, Andrey Biletskiy was one of the leaders of the movement against separatists in Kharkov.

On 14 March 2014, he was involved in an armed confrontation with pro-Russian activists near the "Patriot of Ukraine" office.

Subsequently, the Russian militant "Motorola" admitted that his unit first took part in a combat clash on 14 March 2014, in Kharkov.

In the spring of 2014, Andrey Biletskiy became one of the founders of the battalion, and later the "Azov" police Regiment, which participated in the ousting of militants from Mariupol and a number of other operations in Donbass.

During the fighting in the East, the Regiment's commander had a good relationship with the Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov.

In an interview, he admitted that Arsen Avakov was "a man who, despite all the disadvantages, really helped create volunteer battalions, who was not afraid to take responsibility for arming them. He proved to be the most adequate of the country's top leaders in times of war."

He insists that Avakov is not his political ally.



Photo by UNIAN

Photo caption,

In a few years, Andrey Biletskiy managed to create a political force with several thousand activists

In 2014, Andrey Biletskiy was elected to the Verkhovnaya Rada in the Kiev constituency as a self-nominated candidate. Although he had participated in the "People's Front" election congress the day before.

In recent years, Andrey Biletskiy has been accused of being coordinated by Arsen Avakov. However, he denies this and says that this information is being spread by the presidential administration.

He claims that their communication is actually "reduced to zero".

Some "Azov" fighters, such as Andrey Troyan, have been promoted to senior positions in the national police.

In the spring of 2015, Andrey Biletskiy founded the "Azov" Civil Corps and then the "National Corps" party.

Since pre-war times, Andrey Biletskiy was known for his extreme nationalist views, which were criticised by human rights activists.

Until 2011, Mr. Biletskiy spoke out in support of a certain confederation with Russia.

"We, social nationalists, have completely different views on this issue. We realise that separation from Russia and division is idiotic. Because our idea is a powerful pro-Ukrainian confederation with a center in Kiev. But by no means a single state," Mr. Biletskiy said in 2010.

Oleg Petrenko, MP, one of the leaders of the National Corps party

Oleg Petrenko, 45, is a member of parliament. He participated in clashes with police in Cherkasy on March 9.

Oleg Petrenko was born and raised in Cherkasy, where he was elected to the Verkhovnaya Rada in 2014 in a constituency from the Petr Poroshenko Bloc party.

Before the Revolution of Dignity, he was engaged in the tourism business and worked for several years in the Cherkasy City Council. He graduated from Kharkov with a degree in management and economics.

Oleg Petrenko participated in the Maidan protests and joined the "Azov" police battalion during the fighting in Donbass.

After being elected to the Parliament, he participated in the work of the "Azov" Civil Corps and later the "National Corps" party.

In the summer of 2017, Oleg Petrenko officially left the Petr Poroshenko Bloc faction in the Verkhovnaya Rada.

The reason for his departure was the delay in signing the law on amnesty for participants in the war in the East by the Ukrainian side.

He himself admitted that at that time he was already one of the leaders of the "National Corps" party and did not want to be associated with the presidential Petr Poroshenko Bloc party, which the nationalists criticised. According to him, the decision to leave was made by the "National Corps".

In an interview with "Censor", Mr. Petrenko recalled that he had twice wanted to leave the faction before, but was allegedly personally dissuaded by Petr Poroshenko.

Oleg Petrenko participates in the most important actions of the "National Corps" alongside Andrey Biletskiy. This was the case during the violent confrontation with the police near the "ATEK" plant in March 2018, as well as the recent events in Cherkasy.

Sergey Korotkikh, ex-commander of the "Azov" intelligence unit and one of the speakers of the "National Corps" party

He is one of the founders of the NGO "Protection and Reconstruction of the Country" (NGO "Zvezda"), which belongs to the "Azov" movement and is associated with the "National Druzhinas".

Sergey Korotkikh (known in the media as "Boatsman" and "Malyuta") was born in Russia, but later moved with his parents to Belarus.

He served in the army there and later studied at a KGB school, from where, according to his own words to the "Belarusian Partisan", he was "kicked out" in 1996 for participating in the opposition rally "Chernobyl Way" and clashes with the police.

Later, he participated in the activities of the Belarusian branch of the Russian right-wing radical movement "Russian National Unity".

In December 2014, Poroshenko made Belarusian Sergei Korotkikh a citizen of Ukraine.

He moved to Russia, where he was also involved in local right-wing radical movements, including co-founding the "National Socialist Society" organisation.

Korotkikh himself denied any commitment to neo-Nazi ideas and insisted that "we tried to create an organisation that would promote our vision of the world by absolutely civilised, acceptable methods, including parliamentary ones."

According to media reports, he worked for a private military company, but he does not confirm this information.

In April 2014, he moved to Ukraine - "from the first day in Azov".

He fought in Donbass, including commanding a company of scouts. He was near Ilovaisk, from where the "Azov" fighters retreated until the ATO forces surrounded them.

In late 2014, he received a Ukrainian passport from President Poroshenko.

Later he joined the police; according to his 2015 electronic declaration, he was "the head of the police department for the protection of strategic objects."

In August 2018, he was appointed vice president for security and development of the Ukrainian Combat Sambo Federation.

Sergey Korotkikh has gradually become one of the public faces of the "Azov" Movement, regularly appearing in the media on behalf of the "National Corps" party.

He criticises the government over the corruption scandal in the defence industry.

"The "National Corps" doesn't care who runs [for president]. We want the perpetrators to be imprisoned, and the Prosecutor General to finally make public the facts of theft in the defence industry and report on how he imprisons them every week," Sergey Korotkikh said on "ZIK" TV channel in early March.

Igor Mykhaylenko, commander of the "National Militia"

Igor Mykhaylenko, with the call sign "Cherkas," is an associate of Andrey Biletskiy.

Together with him, he was accused of attempted murder in Kharkov, was held in a pre-trial detention center, and was released in 2014 after the parliamentary resolution "On the release of political prisoners."

He fought in Donbass as part of the "Azov" battalion and then Regiment.

After Andrey Biletskiy became a member of parliament, it was Igor Mykhaylenko who took over the Regiment in the fall of 2014 and commanded it until the end of summer 2016.

Later, as part of a "rotation," he handed over command to another "Azov" member, Maksim Zhorin, and remained his deputy until 2017, when he resigned from the service.

At the same time, according to media reports, he became a defendant in a criminal case of armed robbery of cash collectors in Zaporozhye.

He denied this himself.

"I have never been under investigation in this case. No one has ever taken any explanations from me in this case. The only thing that can be tied to me is that ex-soldiers of the "Azov" regiment were involved in this case," he said in an interview with "Glavkom".

In 2018, he became the commander of the "National Druzhinas".

On the website of the Cherkasy movement, he is described as a "nationalist, veteran, family man, athlete".

In the above-mentioned interview, he said that the idea of creating the "druzhinas" belonged to him and Andrey Biletskiy: "I came to the cities and realised that not quite decent things were happening here in civilian life... In fact, this is a joint idea: mine and Andrey Biletskiy's. We talked about the problems on the streets, and we talked about how it would be better to create an organisation to solve these problems."

In a conversation with "the Babel", Igor Mykhailenko said that he is officially an entrepreneur and has "his own security company."

"I also have experience in creating volunteer formations and countering hybrid warfare, and I sometimes provide paid consultations. They are very expensive abroad. Soon I have to go to Poland to present my vision of the new territorial defence of Ukraine," Cherkas said.

Dmytriy Kukharchuk, head of the regional branch of the "National Corps" in Cherkasy, pro bono assistant to people's deputy Andrey Biletskiy

Dmytriy Kukharchuk was born in June 1990. He holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy from the Bogdan Khmelnytsky National University.

The website of the "National Corps" states that he is a member of the ultras movement, "the organiser of the storming of the Cherkasy Regional State Administration, the battles on Hrushevskogo and Instytutskaya streets," and participated in the battles in Donbass as part of the "Azov" regiment. He has the call sign "Slip".

Since February 2016, he was a member of the executive committee of the Cherkasy City Council "from the public", but was excluded from its membership by the decision of the city council deputies in February 2017. During this meeting, he had a conflict with the mayor of Cherkasy, Anatoliy Bondarenko.

In an interview with "Procherk" in 2017, Dmytriy Kukharchuk said that he had "many entries in his work record book about his service in the National Guard," worked as a freelance journalist for some time, and had a real estate business, but did not want to disclose details.

"I would like the things I do, where I get my income, to remain secret so that I cannot be influenced by it," explained Kukharchuk.

In July 2018, he took part in a fight with ATO veterans Aleksandr Borodienko and Oleg Kuznetsov in an entertainment venue in Cherkasy. In October 2018, he was served with a suspicion notice in this case.

In an interview with ZMI.ck.ua in December 2018, Dmytriy Kukharchuk said that he works as a regional head of the all-Ukrainian consulting company Foxtrot 13, and that his work is related to the protection and legal support of real estate.

"In addition, I am a private entrepreneur. I have a beauty salon where my mother works," he added.

After the interview, Dmytriy Kukharchuk underwent an unofficial polygraph test, which revealed that he may have given a false or incomplete answer to the question of whether he had unregistered weapons.

He took part in the clashes in Cherkasy on March 9, 2019, during which he and his supporters seized the stage where President Petr Poroshenko was speaking after he left the venue.

Detained on March 10, he and another member of the "National Corps" are suspected by the police of "organising citizens to commit hooliganism and inflict bodily harm on police officers who were protecting public order."

In an interview with ZMI.ck.ua in December 2018, Dmytriy Kukharchuk denied that the "National Corps" takes money for organising rallies. "No. There were no such things in Cherkasy and the region," he said.

Annex 322

LB.ua, *"Svoboda" members suspected of shooting at protesters on Maidan* (13 October 2015)

(translation)

Translation

LB.ua, "*Svoboda*" members suspected of shooting at protesters on Maidan (13 October 2015), available at: https://lb.ua/news/2015/10/13/318362_svobodovtsev_zapodozrili.html.

"Svoboda" members suspected of shooting at protesters on Maidan

Photo: [facebook.com/sych.olexander](https://www.facebook.com/sych.olexander)



Yesterday's searches of former "Svoboda" people's deputy Aleksandr Sych, Oleg Pankevych and Ihor Yankiv are related to the investigation of the facts presented in the BBC story, people's deputy Sergey Leshchenko wrote on his Facebook page.

According to him, the searches were conducted in the case of the Maidan shootings based on a BBC story published in late February 2014. The shots from the Ukraina Hotel were shown starting from the seventh minute.

"It has been established that at around 9:30 a.m. on February 20, 2014, BBC journalist Gabriel Gatehouse was at the entrance to the October Palace among the protesters. At that time, he noticed an open window of the Ukraina Hotel (No. 1132), from which a shot was fired at some point. He recorded this window on video, and when he pointed the camera at it again a few moments after the shot, it was already closed. At that moment, there were only protesters near the October Palace. Meanwhile, the "Berkut" was shooting from a snow barricade near the Kreshchatyk metro station, and at 9:30 it moved to concrete blocks," Leshchenko wrote.

According to him, Igor Yankiv, a "Svoboda" deputy, lived in No. 1132. Ex-deputy Yankiv's neighbors on the 11th floor of the Ukraina Hotel were then "Svoboda" people's deputies Pankevych and Sych.

"A detail that few people know about: former people's deputy Yankiv is a master of sports and a shooting instructor. For this reason, the three of them were searched," Leshchenko added.

On Monday morning, law enforcement officers searched the homes of three former people's deputies at once - Aleksandr Sych in Ivano-Frankovsk, Oleg Pankevych in Brody and Igor Yankiv in Lvov.

On Tuesday, Aleksandr Sych posted on his Facebook page the court's authorisation for the search.

The document confirms Leshchenko's information.



PECHERSKIY DISTRICT COURT OF KIEV

Case No. 757/35250/15-к

JUDGEMENT IN THE NAME OF UKRAINE

On September 24, 2015, the investigating judge of the Pecherskiy District Court of Kiev Karaban V.M., with the secretary Mayorenko Y.M., with the participation of the party to the criminal proceedings investigator Farinovich V.A., having considered in court the motion of the senior investigator in the Internal Affairs Department of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine Farinovich Vitaliy Adamovich for permission to conduct a search, -

HELD:

On 24.09.2015, the investigating judge of the Pecherskiy District Court of Kiev, Karaban V.M., received a motion from a party to the criminal proceedings, the senior investigator at the Internal Affairs Department of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, Farinovich V.A, in agreement with the prosecutor of the villa of procedural guidance in criminal proceedings of the investigators of the Special Investigations Department of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, Peiuk R.Y., to grant permission to conduct a search in the household at 149 Galitskaya St., apartment 50, Ivano-Frankovsk, where O.M. Sych actually lives.

At the court hearing, the investigator supported the motion and asked to satisfy it.

According to the norm of Part 1 of Article 107 of the CPC of Ukraine of 2012, the motion was not recorded by the investigating judge with the help of technical means.

As can be seen from the materials of the motion, the Main Investigation Department of the PGO is conducting a pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings under No. 2014100060000228, registered in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations on the grounds of criminal offences - crimes under Part 3 of Article 365, paragraphs 1, 5, 12 of Part 2 of Article 115, Article 340 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The investigator substantiates the motion by the fact that during the pre-trial investigation, a video was found on the website [https:// m.youtube.com/watch?v=0g3R_BS70Ce](https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=0g3R_BS70Ce), filmed by British BBC journalist Gabriel Gatehouse, which depicts the events that took place on February 20, 2014 in the central part of Kiev.

In particular, the video shows an open window in room 1132 on the 11th floor of the State Enterprise "Hotel Ukraine" at 4 Instytutskaya St., Kiev, from which shots were fired at the time when

at a time when civilians and law enforcement officers were being subjected to firearms were being used against civilians and law enforcement officers. In such circumstances, there are sufficient grounds to believe that the persons who lived in the rooms of the 11th floor of the State Enterprise "Hotel Ukraine" during the specified period may be involved in the illegal use of weapons.

It was established that in room 1130 during the specified period, Oleksandr Maksymovych Sych, born on 16.07.1964, registered at the address: 149 Galitskaya St., Ivano-Frankovsk, apartment 50, who may also be involved in the illegal use of weapons.

According to a letter from the Ivano-Frankovsk Regional Bureau of Technical Inventory dated 09.06.15, the premises located at 149 Galitskaya St., apartment 50, Ivano-Frankovsk, belong to Oleksandr Maksymovych Sych as private joint ownership. Sych Galina Viktorovna, Sych Bogdan Aleksandrovych and Sych Olvia Aleksandrivna.

According to Article 233 of the CPC of Ukraine, no one has the right to enter a person's home or other property for any purpose, except with the voluntary consent of the person who owns it or on the basis of a ruling by an investigating judge.

Pursuant to Article 234(1) of the CPC of Ukraine, a search is conducted to identify and record information about the circumstances of a criminal offence, find the instrument of a criminal offence or property obtained as a result of its commission, and establish the location of wanted persons.

Pursuant to Part 2 of Article 234 of the CPC of Ukraine, a search is conducted on the basis of a decision of the investigating judge.

The investigating judge, having heard the investigator's explanations, concluded that there were sufficient grounds to

Pecherskiyyi District Court
Kiev City Hall



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to consider that at the address: Ivano-Frankovsk, 149, Galitskaya St., apartment 50, where O.M. Sych resides, may be stored (correspondence, notebooks, diaries, personal notebooks, drafts, photos, video recordings, etc.), as well as computer equipment, laptops, flash memory drives, hard drives, portable storage devices, communication devices (mobile phones, tablets, etc.), firearms, ammunition, which may contain information that can be used as evidence in this criminal proceeding.

Based on the foregoing, guided by Articles 107, 167, 233-235, 309 of the CPC of Ukraine, the judge, -

HELD:

To satisfy the motion of the party to the criminal proceedings of Vitaliy Adamovych Farinovych, Senior Investigator at the Internal Affairs Department of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, for permission to conduct a search.

To grant permission to Vitaliy Farinovych, Senior Investigator at the Department of Internal Affairs of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, investigators of the Investigation Group of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and operatives of the Security Service of Ukraine to conduct a search in the household at the following address ul. 149, apartment 50, which belongs to Aleksandr Maksymovych Sych, Galina Viktorovna Sych, Bogdan Oleksandrovych Sych and Olvia Aleksandrivna Sych on the right of private joint ownership, to search for and seize items and documents, namely correspondence, notebooks, diaries, personal notebooks, drafts, photos, videos, etc., computer equipment, laptops, flash memory drives, hard drives, portable storage devices, communication devices (mobile phones, tablets, etc.), firearms, ammunition that may be used as evidence in this criminal proceeding.

Determine the validity period of the rulings, which may not exceed one month from the date of the ruling.

The judgement is not subject to appeal.

Investigating Judge of the
Pecherskiy District Court of Kiev

[signature] V.M. Karaban

The judgement was made in two copies.

Copy No. 1 is in the materials of the petition No. 757/35250/15-к.

Copy No. 2 was provided to investigator Farinovich V.A.

Investigating judge of the Pecherskiy
District Court of Kiev

[signature] V.M. Karaban



Annex 323

Unian, Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers hospitalised with gunshot wounds (20 February 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Unian, *Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers hospitalised with gunshot wounds* (20 February 2014), available at: <https://www.unian.ua/politics/887357-vje-130-pravoohorontsiv-dostavleni-do-medzakladiv-z-vognepalnimi-poranennyami-mvs.html>.

Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers hospitalised with gunshot wounds

UNIAN Editorial office



Ministry of Internal Affairs: 130 law enforcement officers have already been taken to medical institutions with gunshot wounds

The Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine told UNIAN that since February 18, a total of 565 law enforcement officers have sought medical assistance, 410 of whom have been hospitalised.

The number of law enforcement officers killed so far is 13.

As UNIAN reported, in the afternoon, the Ministry reported that 30 law enforcement officers had received gunshot wounds in Kiev today.

"During February 20, more than 50 law enforcement officers have already been taken to medical institutions, 30 of them have gunshot wounds, three law enforcement officers died," the Ministry reported.

As UNIAN reported, on February 18, armed clashes between protesters and security forces resumed in Kiev. According to preliminary data, about 30 people were killed, more than a thousand were injured, and hundreds were hospitalised.

This morning in Kiev, the confrontation between law enforcement and protesters escalated.

Earlier, the press service of "Svoboda" reported that snipers and machine gunners opened fire on people from Instytutskaya Street.

The Presidential Administration and opposition leaders accused each other of violating the ceasefire agreement.

According to preliminary data from the National Resistance Headquarters, more than 60 protesters were killed today.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that it had issued firearms to the police and that they had the right to use them.

The Health Department of the Kiev City State Administration informed that as of 15.00 dated 20 February, 551 participants of the mass events in the center of the capital had sought medical care since February 18. 332 people were hospitalised.

As of 15.00, 67 corpses were delivered to the Bureau of Forensic Medicine.

Annex 324

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 27 April 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 27 April 2018.

The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

Original text: "Sich" C14 members entered the centre, sprayed graffiti's on walls and broke some exhibition boards... Volunteer Movement "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN) announced days in advance on Facebook to attack the centre

Russian Cultural Center in Kiev, vandalized by C14 and OUN members on 17 and 18 February 2018



See also OSCE SMM Spot Report: Incidents at Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Kyiv. Available at: <https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/372656>

Annex 325

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 806/2014 “On the Day of Defender of Ukraine”,
14 October 2023

(translation)

Translation

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 806/2014 “On the Day of Defender of Ukraine”, 14 October 2023, available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/8062014-17816>.



PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY

Official web portal

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No. 806/2014

On the Day of Defender of Ukraine

In order to honor the courage and heroism of the defenders of the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and military traditions and victories of the Ukrainian people and to promote further strengthening of the patriotic spirit in society and in support of the public initiative, **I hereby decree that:**

1. A holiday be established in Ukraine, the Day of the Defender of Ukraine, which shall be celebrated annually on October 14.
2. Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 202 dated February 23, 1999 be declared no longer in force.

President of Ukraine P. POROSHENKO

October 14, 2014

Annex 326

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 15 June 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 15 June 2018.

The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

Original text: Ivano-Frankivsk Monitoring Team

Nationalists' outrages in Western Ukraine (*Carpathian Sich* symbolic on the lower photo), Kiev, the OSCE SMM Headquarters , 15 June 2018



Annex 327


The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 23 August 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 23 August 2018.

The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

Original text: Violence against Roma

Kiev, the OSCE SMM Headquarters, 23 August 2018



Annex 328

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 27 July 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 27 July 2018.

The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

OSCE SMM slide depicting certain nationalists outrages in Odessa, 2018



Annex 329

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 7 September 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 7 September 2018.

The picture was taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

Kharkov Deputy Mayor Rudenko thrown in a trash disposal by National Corps members, 20 June 2018



The information on the National Corps outrages in Kharkov of 18 June 2018 is also available at: <https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/sutichki-u-miskradi-harkova-zastupnika-mera-kinuli-v-smitnik-deputati-zabarikadualisya-v-zali-1174242.html>

Annex 330

Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No. 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019

(translation)

Translation

Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No. 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019, available at: <https://dostup.pravda.com.ua/request/51414/response/123805/attach/3/2281..pdf>.

**Presidential Administration of Ukraine
Main Department for Ensuring Access to Public Information**

16 July 2019 No. 12-09/2938

In reply to No. 2281 of 09 July 2019

to Mr. ANATOLY

Dear Mr. Anatoly,

In reply to your request of 9 July 2019, we are sending you Decrees of the President of Ukraine No. 965 “On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero of Ukraine” dated 12 October 2007 and No. 46 “On awarding S. Bandera the Title of Hero of Ukraine” dated 20 October 2010, which are still in force.

Attachment: 1 file.

Sincerely yours,

Head of the Main Department for Ensuring
Access to Public Information,
Presidential Administration of Ukraine

S. Kondzelya

Annex 331

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 46/2010 “On Awarding S. Bandera the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 20 January 2010

(translation)

Translation

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 46/2010 “On Awarding S. Bandera the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 20 January 2010, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/46/2010#Text>.



**DECREE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE**

On awarding S. Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine

*{For more details see Resolution of Donetsk District Administrative Court
No. 2a-1219/10/0570 ([v0570805-10](#)) dated 02.04.2010}*

To honour his unbreakable spirit in defending the national idea and his heroism and self-sacrifice in the struggle for an independent Ukrainian state, I **hereby decree that:**

The title of Hero of Ukraine be conferred upon and the Order of the State be awarded to Stepan Andriyovych BANDERA, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (posthumously).

President of Ukraine V. YUSHCHENKO

Kiev, January 20, 2010
No. 46/2010

Annex 332

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 965/2007 “On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 12 October 2007

(translation)

Translation

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 965/2007 “On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 12 October 2007, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/965/2007#Text>.



DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE

On Awarding R. Shukhevych the Title of Hero of Ukraine

To honour his outstanding personal contribution to the national liberation struggle for freedom and independence of Ukraine and on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of his birth and the 65th anniversary of the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, I hereby **decree that**:

The title of Hero of Ukraine be conferred upon and the Order of the State be awarded to Roman Yosypovych SHUKHEVYCH, Chief Commander of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1942-1950, General and Standard Bearer (posthumously).

President of Ukraine V. YUSHCHENKO

Kiev, October 12, 2007
No. 965/2007

Annex 333

Ukrainska Pravda, *"Right Sector" will not lay down arms until Yanukovich resigns*
(21 February 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Ukrainska Pravda, "*Right Sector*" will not lay down arms until Yanukovich resigns (21 February 2014), available at: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/21/7015612/>.

"Right Sector" will not lay down arms until Yanukovich resigns

Ukrainska Pravda

The "Right Sector" has announced that it will not lay down its arms until President Viktor Yanukovich resigns and is ready to take responsibility for the further development of the revolution in Ukraine.

The leader of the organisation, Dmitriy Yarosh, said this from the stage on Maidan Nezalezhnosti.

"Glory to the Ukrainian heroes who died in the battle for freedom, justice and prosperity of our Motherland, our Ukraine," he began.

"Brothers and sisters, the situation is difficult. Once again, as it has been the case many times before, the authorities have started to play games. The agreements that have been reached do not meet our aspirations. "Right Sector" will not lay down its arms. "Right Sector" will not lift the blockade of any state institutions until our most important demand is fulfilled - the resignation of Yanukovich," he said.

"Friends and colleagues, I emphasise that all those responsible - Zakharchenko, Berkut commanders, those who gave the order, the sniper - must be arrested. The "Right Sector" has always been in favour of the unity of the rebel movement," Yarosh said.

"The "Right Sector" calls on all Maidan participants to continue their joint struggle against the regime of internal occupation. We are ready to take responsibility for the further development of the Ukrainian revolution. Glory to Ukraine!" summarised the leader of the "Right Sector".

As you know, on February 21, the leaders of the three opposition factions signed a crisis resolution agreement with President Viktor Yanukovich, as they explained, to avoid a split in Ukraine and new bloodshed.

After that, the Verkhovna Rada quickly adopted a series of decisions that had been promoted by the opposition

The Parliament quickly adopted a series of decisions that had been promoted by the opposition: a return to the 2004 Constitution (with further reforms), the removal of Vitaliy Zakharchenko from the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the release of activists from punishment, and state aid to the injured and families of the killed protesters.

In addition, a law was passed that allows for the release of former Prime Minister and leader of the Batkivshchyna party, Yulia Tymoshenko, from prison.

At the same time, the protesters' demand for Yanukovich's immediate resignation from the presidency has not been met. Yanukovich has only agreed to hold early elections in December.

Annex 334

Channel One, *In Odessa, radicals chased protesters into building and set fire to it* (3 May 2014)

(translation)

Translation

Channel One, *In Odessa, radicals chased protesters into building and set fire to it* (3 May 2014), available at: https://www.1tv.ru/news/2014-05-03/40826-v_odesse_radicaly_zadnali_protestuyuschih_v_zdanie_i_podozhgli.

In Odessa, radicals chased protesters into building and set fire to it. News. Channel One.

Ilya Kostin

In Odessa, clashes provoked by radicals left more than 40 dead, around 200 injured, many in serious condition. The supporters of federalisation were first shot at, then chased into the building and set on fire, giving no chance to escape. The nationalists went inside afterwards. Not to help, but to videotape the whole thing.

The storming of the Odessa Trade Union House by "Right Sector" militants resembled a punitive operation. People who were begging for help were first barricaded outside. Then they threw Molotov cocktails at them. Those who tried to escape through the window were shot with firearms.

But the worst began later, when the fire had engulfed almost the entire building. The anti-fascist rally activists who had taken refuge inside, among them women and the elderly, were actually trapped in the flames.

"There are only pensioners and two deputies. One deputy is definitely injured. The building is on fire, they are trying to get out. They are being shot at with traumatisers, beaten up. We do not know how many people have been killed. But they are definitely killed," says Egor Khlyzniuk, coordinator of the "Kulikovo Pole" movement.

Journalists and bloggers are already calling what happened next a new Khatyn. Back then, during the Great Patriotic War, the Nazis burned the inhabitants of an entire village alive. History repeats itself with terrifying accuracy. The neo-Nazis, who surround the building, do not allow medics in.

The wounded who have escaped are beaten right in the street, kicking those who have been burned. Terrified, people are forced to jump out of windows to escape the fire and massacre. Many of those gathered below seem only to be enraged by the scene.

What is happening at night in Odessa was filmed by a local cameraman using a flying camera over the Trade Union House. The fire can be seen rising higher and higher from the lower floors. Smoke billows from the windows. An eyewitness, filming from a different angle with a mobile phone camera, can see people who had taken shelter inside climbing out onto the ledge in despair. A few seconds more and the burning people fall down again.

At the back of the building there are also people on the upper floors. Male and female voices can be heard. They ask for the fire brigade, which for some reason never arrives.

EuroMaidan @Dbnmjr: "Odessa, I'm proud of you! Tens of thousands of citizens are cleansing their land from the "colorads". Kiev and all Ukraine with you #Odessa".

Nikolay Zototarev @AdCoolAs: "In Zaporozhye they mixed a pie of separatists and in #Odessa they baked".

#EuroMaidan @Dbnmjr: "A wasps' nest... was... #Odessa #Ukraine".

Firefighters pouring the last pockets of flames. Bodies of suffocated and burned alive everywhere. Someone among those who had just seized the building is rummaging through the personal belongings and pockets of the dead. The way the bodies of the burnt people look is the subject of jokes to the invaders. Someone is trying to count the bodies of the dead, but keeps getting confused, and against this background one can hear the joyful shouts of the Maidan fighters: "Glory to Ukraine - glory to the heroes!" It is easy to guess who is behind this massacre-like special operation.

Ukrainian media published an official statement of the nationalist "Right Sector" dedicated to the events in Odessa: "In connection with the emergency situation in Odessa and Odessa Region, "Right Sector" has mobilised and will strictly suppress any destabilising actions by all available methods and means. We officially inform you that any attempt to undermine the situation or carry out any aggressive measures in Odessa that could harm the people of Odessa, the "Right Sector" will suppress according to the law of war".

After this bloody drama, the "witch hunt" in Odessa continues. The latest update is that Euromaidan activists have blocked supporters of federalisation in one of the shopping centres.


Annex 335

Telegram, *Denazification of UA. There is no shame in destroying residents of villages near Artemovsk/Bakhmut because they are all "separatists and katsaps"*
(13 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Telegram, *Denazification of UA. There is no shame in destroying residents of villages near Artemovsk/Bakhmut because they are all "separatists and katsaps"* (13 December 2022), available at: https://t.me/denazi_UA/30820.



There is no shame in destroying residents of villages near Artemovsk/Bakhmut because they are all "separatists and katsaps". This is the opinion of a creature in the Armed Forces of Ukraine uniform and she is not ashamed to say so in public.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces are occupiers for every town and village in Donbass, who behave and speak out as occupiers. And they will be expelled from the entire region, destroyed if they refuse to flee or surrender.

Annex 336

Focus.ua, *“We are trying to kill more”*: Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words about Russians (video) (23 August 2022)

(translation)

Translation

Focus.ua, *"We are trying to kill more": Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words about Russians (video)* (23 August 2022), available at: <https://focus.ua/uk/ukraine/526392-pytaemysya-ubit-bolshe-kazahstan-vyrazil-protest-poslu-ukrainy-za-slova-o-russkih-video>.

"We are trying to kill more": Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words about Russians (video)

FOCUS editorial office

"We are trying to kill more": Kazakhstan protests Ukraine's ambassador for words about Russians (video)

23 August 2022 at 12:38

10900



Photo: RIA Novosti | Ambassador of Ukraine to Kazakhstan Petr Vrublevskiy

The day before, Petr Vrublevskiy said that the more Russians are killed now, the fewer will have to be killed by future generations of Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian ambassador to Nur-Sultan, Petr Vrublevskiy, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan. He was protested for his words about the need to kill as many Russians as possible. This is reported by the website of the Kazakh government.

"The Kazakh side has expressed its position on the unacceptability and incompatibility of such statements with the activities of the ambassador of a foreign state. Such actions should not harm friendly relations between states," the Kazakh Foreign Ministry said in a statement.



Petr Vrublevskiy at a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan

What preceded this?

On August 22, Petr Vrublevskiy gave an interview to Kazakh blogger Dias Kuzairov. Answering a question about the situation in Ukraine, the diplomat said that they are trying to kill as many Russians as possible. He added that the more of them are killed now, the fewer will have to be killed by future generations of Ukrainians.

"We are trying to kill as many of them as possible. The more we kill Russians now, the less our children will have to kill. That's all," he said.

It should be noted that the fragment of this conversation was not saved on Dias Kuzairov's YouTube channel, but it went viral. The published video contains a dialog between the diplomat and the blogger about the event dedicated to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

On August 12, Ukraine's Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova called on Washington to recognise Russia as a terrorist state. According to her, all Russian banks should be subject to US sanctions.

Earlier, on July 20, Ukraine's former ambassador to Germany, Andrey Melnyk, suggested that Saxon Prime Minister Michael Kretschmer put his head in a freezer. Prior to that, the German politician proposed to "freeze" the war and supported the supply of Russian gas.

Annex 337

RBK Ukraine, *Igor Klymenko: There is more darkness in Ukraine, but also more police on the streets* (13 December 2022)

(translation)

Translation

RBK Ukraine, Igor Klymenko: There is more darkness in Ukraine, but also more police on the streets (13 December 2022) available at: <https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/igor-klimenko-zaraz-ukrayini-bilshe-temryavi-1670509562.html>.

Igor Klymenko: There is more darkness in Ukraine, but also more police on the streets

Yulia Akimova



Head of the National Police of Ukraine Igor Klymenko (all photos: Vitaliy Nosach/RBK-Ukraine)

The head of the National Police of Ukraine, Igor Klymenko, told RBC-Ukraine in an interview about the duties of a Ukrainian police officer, how the National Police establishes law and order in the de-occupied territories, and what problems it faces.

From the first days of Russia's full-scale offensive against Ukraine, the National Police, like any law enforcement agency, has been working in an enhanced mode. Some police officers went to the front, while others serve in the government-controlled and newly de-occupied territories of Ukraine.

Police officers enter the liberated settlements immediately after the military, establish law and order, and take stabilisation measures. Local residents who have seen the aggressors and what they bring with them greet the Ukrainian police with applause.

In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, the head of the National Police of Ukraine, Igor Klymenko, told how the work of the National Police looks like today, what they see on the liberated Ukrainian lands, how they catch collaborators among civilians and their own colleagues, and how they will work in the event of a blackout. Below is a shortened text version, watch the full conversation with the head of the National Police on RBC-Ukraine's YouTube channel.

- The first day of the war. For every Ukrainian, it has acquired such symbolism. How did you meet it and did you realise that this war would happen?

- We often return to February 24. Why do we return to it? Because we evaluate our actions and the actions of the entire National Police system, the actions of the state. Because everyone understood that war was possible, but everyone hoped that it would not happen.

The National Police has developed proactive plans for invasion and emergencies. Of course, we, like all citizens, did not expect that there would be an invasion in the direction of Kiev. This information that came to me, as the head of the National Police, at 4 a.m. on February 24, was, on the one hand, expected, and on the other hand, it was emotional: "Has it really started?". And immediately, for five seconds: "What to do?".

Of course, we immediately put all the personnel on alert, although the heads of the regional departments had been at work for about a week and our people were on high alert, but by 8 a.m. all the police forces were on the ground and on alert. Because the calls were coming in 24 hours a day. Somewhere we saw and heard that Russian troops were advancing in the Kherson region, and events unfolded very quickly. Of course, near Kiev, there's nothing to talk about, because our police, together with border guards, were on the border areas of the border between Belarus and Ukraine and they were the first to hear these shots from the enemy who had crossed our border.

The police retreated, first through Chernobyl to Ivankov, then they took the first battle in the Kiev region, and then the police retreated further. Then you already know - Bucha, Irpen and all the settlements around Kiev. Then there was Brovary district, then Chernigov region, and, of course, we were on duty here.

You can't work purely according to plans here, because we are a police structure and we are used to performing police functions, not military ones. But over time, we became semi-military, and some units became fully paramilitary.

- You said that you received messages in the first hours and in the first days of the war from different regions, including those regions where Russian troops were coming. What was it like? For example, Kherson, what kind of messages were they?

- I can parallel this question with Zaporozhye region. Very quickly, the troops came in and crossed the Crimean Isthmus and moved through the Kherson region, but the Kherson region is usually steppes. And the troops, I think, were moving through towns and villages quickly, at a speed of about 80 kilometers per hour. But when they started to enter Zaporozhye region, they started to quickly enter through Prymorskoe, entered Melitopol and went on to Berdiansk.

At the same time, our units in the Kherson region were in the city, waiting for the command of the head of the National Police to act. Yes, we were armed, but we were armed with light weapons, at most - assault rifles, ordinary pistols, and a few machine guns from the Special Forces.

It was only when the enemy crossed the Dnepr River and stood on the right bank of Kherson, almost to the city center, that the regional police leadership received the command to withdraw.

- From you?

- Yes, of course, from me. The column that was ready to move moved in the direction of Nikolayev and Dnepr regions.

- Did they take up their positions there or did they go to other regions?

- Yes, the Main Directorate of the National Police in Kherson region served in Nikolayev region and performed combat missions in Nikolayev region, along with the Nikolayev regional police. Some personnel were transferred to Dnepropetrovs'k and Kirovograd regions, where they served at checkpoints.

At that time, there were several days or several weeks of debate about what a police officer should do. Who is a police officer in a war? Is he a combatant or not?

- What is your opinion?

- Our police officer takes an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. Our policeman is on duty with a weapon. And our policeman, as we thought, could be the object of attacks by the occupation authorities. That is why we decided to leave the temporarily occupied territory. Those who did not leave, who did not obey the order, were dismissed from the National Police. And today I can say that none of these people who did not comply with the order will return to service.

- Do you admit that some police officers did not have the physical ability to leave the occupied territory?

- We gave enough time to those police officers who did not have the physical ability to leave. Some were in captivity. Some were hiding in the temporarily occupied territory.

- Hiding?

- Yes, they were hiding, unable to leave the temporarily occupied territory, for example, from the Kherson region, from the left bank of the Dnepr.

- Well, these are the circumstances. Was he also released?

- All those who did not fulfill the order for any reason were dismissed from the National Police. Some of these people, who were fired, who left, found the strength and ability to leave the temporarily occupied territory, they were checked by both the Security Service and the Department of Internal Security, including with the use of a polygraph.

Believe me, there are only a few of these people, and these people, as a rule, indicated where they kept their weapons and service IDs. Today we are checking the version of those who left these territories. Those caches that were left in the temporarily occupied territories by the police, we are now digging them all out and returning the weapons to the National Police.

- You have a doctorate in psychology. How do you think a police traitor differs from a civilian traitor?

- A law enforcement officer consciously took this step, knowing that he swore an oath to the people of Ukraine, swore an oath to the state. This person consciously made a decision to work for the occupier. He probably realized that he may have been underestimated by the National Police or the

Security Service of Ukraine. Perhaps this is a person with a sense of inferiority and underestimation.

These are flawed people, people who didn't work much or had no professional talent, but wanted to hold some kind of position. An example I've already given is when a woman who used to clean the premises of the Kherson Regional TV and Radio Company was made the administrator of the entire company.

Similarly, some police officers who held ordinary positions were appointed heads of cities or law enforcement agencies. But such people are few and far between, and thank God that such people had no professional talent or work experience in the first place. And they probably pursued criminal or even mercantile low goals in life, they were not even able to organise the work of their units.

That mess and what was done by the occupiers, including the police, the Russian Guard, our collaborators in the police units... They (the units - ed.) are broken and practically destroyed from the inside, how could anyone work in such units... That is, these are people of low culture, people who did not understand the essence and principles of work organisation. They were driven only by the desire to annoy the former leadership, to annoy the people and the Ukrainian authorities. We have identified all these people for the most part, and they will definitely be held accountable before the law.

- Is the fact that there were such people in the system at all a flaw in the system? Or was it just that someone on the ground did not quite understand who they were hiring?

- It is very difficult to determine whether a person is mentally ill or not mentally ill. If there are no external signs.

- Doesn't the police check a person's mental state when they hire them?

- No, we do, but when we hire, for example, a district police officer, we check him/her for the position of a district police officer. With limited functionality. If this person is going to be a manager, they are checked for compliance with the position of a manager. That is, if an employee worked as a police sergeant or inspector and wanted to quickly become the head of a law enforcement unit, then... We write in the psychological characteristics, in the service characteristics, what this person is capable of.

We have a lot of people who do not want to make a career. They want to be in these positions. Or there are people who want to make a career, but they don't want to do anything for it, they make a lot of mistakes in their work. They have a lot of violations and lack of discipline, among other things. We check such people for possible violations of the law. 217 policemen out of a staff of 130,000 is such a small number, but we had to get rid of this small number as well.

- Since the beginning of the war, some police officers decided to go to the front line, to the ranks of the Armed Forces. How many of them and was it their mass decision, or did their superiors do the work?

- One of the first to join the Armed Forces of Ukraine was a pilot. From the police aviation. They worked on helicopters of the National Police, but in the past they were military pilots. And on February 26, we had our first casualty - one of the pilots was killed in a military helicopter near Irpen, shot down by an enemy missile, and the president awarded him the title of Hero of Ukraine.

These were the first such victims. Of course, there were victims on the street in Bucha and Irpen, our police officers were shot because they were in uniform. And in other regions of the country, our cars were shot at.

And those people who knew how to shoot with machine guns are now shooting with mortars and more serious equipment that they learned to use during the war and became experts in.

- Before the war, you talked about a certain "staff shortage" in the police. This was also discussed in the cities. Now there is a war, as you say, many police officers have gone to the front, and it takes a lot of effort to enter the de-occupied territories and establish order. How much has this problem become bigger and what are you doing about it?

- Today we have resumed recruitment to the National Police. First of all, it concerns inspector positions. I can say that we need patrol police officers, officers of our special unit, we have a need big enough to recruit staff. Approximately, today we want to recruit about 8-10 thousand people within the shortage of staff in the National Police of Ukraine.

- It seems to me that this is not a very large figure on the scale of Ukraine.

- I want to give you the figures we have calculated. For example, if we take an ordinary settlement in Central or Western Ukraine, the number of police officers per 10,000 people is 23. In Kiev, this number is 41. In Kherson or Kharkov regions, there are 136 police officers per 10,000 people. Large territories mean complicated communication and a lot of people without communication. Therefore, it is necessary to saturate the settlements with police officers as much as possible so that people can find them.

For example, Kherson, which was without power for several weeks and only recently got electricity. And then the enemy shelled the city again and the light disappeared for some time as well. There should be police patrols on the streets so that every citizen who has lost contact can go out, find a police officer and ask for help.

A sense of security - the sooner it returns to citizens, the sooner we will restore order in our cities, the sooner citizens will return to a more or less peaceful existence. This is our first and foremost goal, so our employees from Central and Western Ukraine are also working in these de-occupied regions as part of combined units to help their colleagues from the de-occupied regions to restore order and help local authorities bring peaceful life to the area as soon as possible.

- I saw you wearing an "Azovstal" bracelet. Is it a symbolic support for your colleagues who are at the front?

- This is a symbolic support of our colleagues who were held captive and fought at "Azovstal" together with the military. We kept in touch, as long as it was still possible to do so, with our employees who are at "Azovstal". And when ten of our police officers were released from captivity, the entire police force exhaled. But we still have five people who are in captivity, and we hope they will return home as soon as possible.

- Those who have returned, what is their condition?

- Now they are in good condition, they have been undergoing treatment for a long time, some of them were injured at "Azovstal", and today they will undergo rehabilitation in Ukraine and outside our country.

- Did they get to "Azovstal" as employees of the National Police?

- Yes, as employees of the National Police. We are only talking about the National Police.

- And what were they doing there?

- They defended "Azovstal" with arms in hand, together with units of the National Guard of Ukraine, the Armed Forces and border guards.

- And how many of your colleagues from the National Police are currently in captivity or have been in captivity?

- There were 219 people in captivity, and now there are 26 active police officers.

- What do you see in the de-occupied territories? You are among the first to enter and see what the Russian troops have done. What do you see there?

- The first settlement after Irpen and Bucha that we entered, I was there personally, was the village of Andreyevka, Makarov district, on the road to Borodyanka from Makarov. We went there on April 2, the weather was similar, but without snow, and we saw people who had left their homes, usually elderly people. 80% of the residential sector in the village was destroyed. We drove to the bridge, where there was a huge amount of ammunition scattered by the Russians, we saw the Russian positions, the state of their positions, and this picture, it stands before our eyes - of villages, not cities, because cities are a separate category. We have all been to Irpen and Bucha, and we saw what happened there, and in Kharkov, and in Northern Saltovka.

We saw what can happen to a city when 10,000 people are left homeless. We are talking about villages in the Kherson region or the de-occupied territory of the Kharkov region. These are villages that have been completely destroyed. If you drive along the highway from Izyum to Lyman, you will see that the villages in the lowlands have been destroyed forever. They cannot be restored.

I remember Sviatogorsk, we arrived on the second or third day after the liberation, about 2,500 people lived in the town, and 400 remained. 400 people who were under constant enemy fire. I talked to these people. They are usually elderly people or women who were hiding in basements. Fear completely consumed our people. You talk to them... You have to work a lot with these people. They need time to get over these horrors.

- And when you talk to them, what do you get?

- You talk to them and you feel how afraid they are, they don't know what will happen tomorrow. Because they feel in danger. I remember the Kherson region, Kiev region, when we were driving through the settlements in the early days, people would come out, either applauding or trying to talk.

- When you enter the de-occupied territory, what is your algorithm of actions?

- First, the Special Forces enter, and we start stabilisation measures. Together with the military, we start setting up checkpoints and immediately drive around the entire territory of the settlements to talk to the citizens. This is being done in parallel with the work of explosive experts. Citizens are reporting that certain objects, either apartments or private buildings, are mined.

First of all, we clear those objects that affect the operation of critical infrastructure so that people can get gas, electricity and so on. At the same time, investigative task forces consisting of investigators, forensic experts and operational unit staff arrive. And we immediately start working, including on collaborators. We interview every person who is in the occupied territory.

- Do people themselves point out collaborators?

- Of course they do.

- How does this happen? Simply, while you are interviewing a person, collecting data, he or she may be physically present in that locality, or are there fears that there may be a lynching?

- For all these 9 months, as for the Kherson or Kharkov regions, we have been collecting information on collaborators remotely.

- So you come in and you already know who needs to be detained?

- We know most of them, but, as Kherson shows, such serious, "fat" collaborators went with the occupation forces to the left side of the Dnepr. Smaller collaborators, for example, teachers or ordinary law enforcement officers or occupation authorities, are on the ground, people point them out, we process them, and some of them are handed over to the Security Service of Ukraine.

This is the case with Kharkov region and larger areas of Kherson region. People are also different, but we knew very well in Kherson region who organised the so-called referendum. We knew these people very well, and now we are preparing suspicions in absentia for those who left. And for those who stayed in place, of course, they will not escape responsibility for what they did on the territory of our state.

- You mentioned mining. Please tell us more, because as far as we know, the Russians do not neglect to mine everything they can. Where do you find mines?

- In Kherson region, everywhere. In the literal sense of the word. There has never been such a massive and "smart" mining as in the Kherson region in any de-occupied place in our country. Because you can simply lift a flowerpot and the entire building will explode. Or those bookmarks that the occupier made, they are designed for 140-310 hours of operation.

That is, for example, they set the timer for two weeks after the de-occupation, at 10 o'clock in the morning. This is, for example, a building of a district or city administration, and it will explode. It is extremely difficult to find these explosive devices, because these explosive devices are hidden either in the basement or between the wall and the room.

You can open the door and the opposite part of the building will explode. This was the case with the National Police building in the Kherson region. A small box of TNT was just sitting in the basement. Following the safety rules, it was not picked up, it was pulled away 20-30 meters away and we lost several floors of the building.

- Was there a mine under it?

- Not under him. They were all around, and he acted as a detonator, mines were everywhere. In the walls. For example, a table. A table and a chair next to it, where you sit, maybe a slightly thicker seat. A hole is cut out, a mine is placed there and a regular printer is placed on top. What is the desire of a citizen or a military or a police officer? To take this printer and put it on the table. And sit down. At that moment, the explosion occurs. That's why the briefing for all law enforcement agencies, for everyone who enters (the liberated territories - ed.), is at the top of the list.

We lost three explosive experts and 14 were wounded. Almost every day, our explosives experts, as well as the State Emergency Service, explosives experts, sappers, face mortal danger. We are not demining so quickly in order to thoroughly examine the buildings that need to be demined first.

December 7 In the Kherson region, police officers explode on a cascade of enemy mines during stabilisation activities, killing 4 people. Doctors are fighting for the lives of four more people.

- You mentioned the mess the occupiers left behind. Is this their business card? Because it is everywhere.

- There was never more garbage than in the police or prosecutor's offices.

- Why is that?

- As a rule, in our premises, there are often temporary detention centres downstairs. And in these places, places of illegal detention of our citizens, including torture chambers, were created. And it's very convenient when you "work" on the 1-3 floor in the basement or in the neighbouring room, you keep our citizens who are accused of working with the Ukrainian army, or simply our patriotic citizens. They were simply detained and kept there for several days or weeks. There was not a single unit, either in Kherson or in the Kharkov region, that was in a more or less acceptable condition. That is, it is uncultured and piggish.

There are rooms where they worked, there are rooms where they lived. There is no difference, everything was thrown into one pile. There is no difference. You realise that in March, April, May, June, July, August, September, you could have removed it in the summer, right? No. The main thing is to write "Police of the Russian Federation" in Russian and that's it. That's all they brought with them. In such conditions, there is no question of any law and order in these regions.

- And what did people themselves say about the work of the so-called police under occupation?

- They said nothing. Look, we found journals or notebooks in which some crimes were registered. They were registered, and that was it. A district police officer and a traitor cannot solve a crime, let alone investigate it.

- And what kind of crimes were there?

- There was murder, for example. There was a theft. These were crimes that were registered, but for so many months they only documented themselves and did nothing else.

A huge amount of equipment was destroyed. About 1,500 cars. Of course, this is a blow for the police in technical terms, but we will survive this. But they didn't even use this equipment, they took the wheels off the vehicles, whether they were newer or older, it didn't matter. And vehicle units. So, if you go directly to the police station, for example, to the yard, to the motor pool, you will see dozens of cars without wheels, even bald wheels were removed and sent to Russia.

- Back home, back to the house.

- Back home, back to the house. I don't know what they will do with them, perhaps it is such a curiosity for them that such police cars are beautiful and have appropriate inscriptions. They took off everything that was on the car - mirrors, everything. In other words, they completely dismantled it and sent it home, probably. If it was a civilian car, they often smashed it, and if it was a police car, they dismantled it.

In Kupyansk, we also found several cans of fermented beer. Apparently, they cooked it right away and drank it to boost their morale.

- How do you think the de-occupation of the territories that have been occupied since the beginning of the full-scale invasion and the de-occupation that awaits us all, the territories that were occupied 8.5 years ago, how different will it be?

- Children have already started second grade (in the territories occupied for a long time - ed.). Those who were born in 14-15 years. People are poisoned by Russian propaganda. Large territories that have not heard the Ukrainian language for 8.5 years. In which hatred of everything Ukrainian, of Ukraine, was brought up and propagated. Therefore, the main problem is people.

We will all have to show the citizens who did not participate in illegal armed groups that our government is legitimate, real and really the best. And the main thing is that this is the territory of our state - not the Russian Federation, not some "union state", but Ukraine. Therefore, I think that many people who live there will probably go looking for the "Russian world" on the territory of the Russian Federation.

- Back to everyday problems. How are the police currently dealing with these blackouts and do you think the curfew should be reduced?

- The police work in a single mode, both during and after the curfew. Curfews are the prerogative of the military. They set it, and the military administration understands from what time it should be set. As for the police, our task is to put police forces on the street in a blackout throughout our country without losing communication. If it's in the evening, it will be very difficult to gather the personnel. That is why we have already conducted a number of exercises that allow us to gather all the personnel on the territory of the unit within a short period of time, and these people will be deployed to the appropriate unit.

Before the war, we had 1,100 units on duty in the cities. Today, during the blackout period, we are ready to deploy 5,500 vehicle patrols and 2,500 foot patrols. But this is on the condition that we will work almost without rest. That is why we are preparing for any scenario.

We even have so-called "anti-looting" groups of criminal police officers who usually work in civilian clothes to minimise the possibility of burglaries during blackouts. You do realise that when a person enters a dark entrance, what can they expect?

Moreover, we have to respond to such everyday issues as, for example, a person getting stuck in an elevator. 21st floor, 25th, 9th or 8th. And the police should also come to the rescue. The police have received instructions on how to find a specialist or a representative of the condominium and rescue the person. Of course, we need a lot of effort. We are working with other agencies, with the State Emergency Service, so that people can find those who will help them.

- The crime situation during the blackout. How much has it changed? It is logical that it could have become worse. More darkness, more people who want to do something bad in this darkness.

- More darkness, but more police on the streets. The crime rate in Ukraine today has decreased by 13%, and just during the blackout period, Wednesday-Thursday, the crime rate decreased by 16%. The presence of police officers, interaction with the population and unification of communities has yielded results. We understand that we have a lot of challenges ahead of us, and it is the task of the National Police to keep the country safe in terms of crime.

This also applies to fraud, which has increased in our country since the beginning of hostilities, as well as property and apartment thefts. We understand how many people have fled their homes and how many reports we have received that these homes have been destroyed by the enemy. In the same Kharkov or Kherson region. Or robbed by the enemy.

- Did wartime give the police the opportunity to somewhat accelerate their actions in dealing with crime?

- Of course, we talked tough enough with the criminals, and for the most part, the criminals heard us and calmed down a bit. We control all our local groups that existed before the war so that they do not raise their heads. First of all, I mean organised crime, which poses a danger to our citizens and to our country.

- Was there organised crime in the occupied territories that joined the Russians?

- We will establish this over time, but as a rule, no. It was the kind of petty crime that takes place in any society.

- Can your stations be used as so-called "invincibility points" during the blackout? Can people come to you and ask for help?

- As of today, we have 903 police stations ready to receive citizens. We are trying to bring this number up to a thousand in a week. People can come here at any time. We mean the premises themselves, the lobby, where chairs will be placed, where water will be available, where people will be able to charge their gadgets, where a generator will work, fuel for the generator, and, of course, people can contact the police. And if there is no connection, the police will be able to help. Or take a sick person to the hospital. For example, if a woman gives birth, we will also come to the rescue. Of course, we will help all citizens who contact us if such a time comes.

As for communications, I can say right away that out of these 903 police units, 200 are equipped with "Starlink" satellite communications. I hope that in the next week we will receive enough of this equipment to cover the entire country with Internet connection.

- How do police officers deal with those who do not want to evacuate from areas where it is dangerous to stay?

- First, any conversation with a citizen is recorded on a body camera. As a rule, there are several categories of people. The first one wants to leave, they are ready, they do not need to be persuaded. There is a category of elderly people who are in hospices, in the so-called nursing homes. Here, we work together with the authorities. And there are elderly people who do not want to leave under any circumstances, as they say: "I was born here, I will die here. I have everything here, I have a garden, a house, an apartment," and so on.

There are people who don't want to leave because they have nowhere to go and no reason to. And they are satisfied with any government. Unfortunately, there is a category of people we saw in Lysychansk and Severodonetsk who have remained in these areas. I will not characterize who these people are. Among them are sick people who stayed and do not want to leave - 70-80 years old. But there are also young people who lead an antisocial lifestyle who also wanted to stay.

But we are talking about those people whom we have to take out at any cost. These are the people who have nowhere to go, no relatives in other parts of our country or in other countries. They need to be persuaded and told where they will live, where we will take them.

- Do the police do this? By persuasion?

- Yes, we say that shops will not work here, everything will be broken or already broken. It's not safe here. We have managed to get 20,000 people out of Donetsk region alone in recent months with such persuasion. Very often the police take these people out in their vehicles.

We have a unit called the White Angel, which consists of a doctor, a policeman and a representative of the State Emergency Service. And under fire, this unit takes people directly to the settlements. This applies today to the Donetsk region, Bakhmut district and the city of Bakhmut, where there are about 20 thousand people left, and we understand that every day the enemy shells the city, every day we have victims.

Moreover, the Bakhmut police unit has already been destroyed, so this affects the deployment of our personnel. Today, it is very dangerous for our population there, and our employees, no matter what, take these people out of their homes, put them in cars and take them to a safe city. It is such a psychological job to persuade a person to leave. It is also dangerous - many of our employees were injured during such evacuations.

- What do you think will happen to Russia after our victory?

- I think it will be very difficult for this country to recover from what it has done to us. And what we will do to it.

- What will happen to Ukraine?

- We will be rebuilt, we will return everyone from abroad, our people will believe in the state. We will bring back our children, we will improve the education system, we will improve the infrastructure, we will be more tolerant of each other. We will value our independence, our state and our rights in this state more. We will be strong and we will not allow the enemy to step on our land anymore.

Annex 338

Volynonline.com, *Uncensored and "Bez Obmezhen": the third day of "Bandershtat 2021"*
in photos (9 August 2021)

(translation)

Translation

Volynonline.com, *Uncensored and "Bez Obmezhen": the third day of "Bandershtat-2021" in photos* (9 August 2021), available at: <https://volynonline.com/bez-cenzury-ta-bez-obmezhen-tretij-den-bandershtatu-2021-u-foto/>.

Uncensored and "Bez Obmezhen": the third day of "Bandershtat-2021" in photos - Volyn Online

August heat, Zhadan without censorship, a military band, Polozhynsky and "Bez Obmezhen" on the music stage: this was the final day of the 15th "Bandershtat" Festival of Ukrainian Spirit.

The third day of the festival, August 8, was the hottest. To escape the scorching August sun, "Bandershtat" residents swam in the Styr River and enjoyed kayaking. Meanwhile, on the literary and humorous stage, they were waiting for conversations with the longtime mayor of Lvov, **Andrey Sadovyi**, civic activist **Sergey Sternenko**, and the most popular professional fitness trainer in Ukraine, **Viktor Mandzyak**. Crowds of "Bandershtat" residents gathered for poetry readings with **Sergey Zhadan**.

The music scene on the third day of the festival was rocked by "Tsvyakh", "Flyzzza", and **Sasha Chemerov**, and the band "Mad Heads", a band that was born on the same day as Ukraine's Independence, performed for the first time at the festival.

The band "Zhadan and the Dogs", as announced by Sergey Zhadan, performed uncensored out of respect for the audience who bought tickets, despite the fact that the performance was broadcast live on television and the band was asked to censor some of their songs.

Aleksandr Polozhynsky performed both old "Tartak" songs and songs from his two other former projects, "Buv'ye" and "Ol'Iv'ye". The highlight of his program was the performance of several songs together with the brass band of the 6th Volyn border guard detachment and the video recording of a greeting to the military serving in Mariupol together with the audience.

The headliners of the music scene on the third day of the "Bez Obmezhen" festival performed well-known hits, as well as the song "To the Heroes", part of which was translated into Belarusian to support the protests in Belarus.

On the night of August 9, charismatic members of the freak cabaret "Dakh Daughters" performed on the "Bandershtat" stage.

Annex 339

Unian, *The 4-day sports and patriotic game “Gurby Antonivtsi” has started in Ternopol region*
(5 May 2016)

(translation)

Translation

Unian, *The 4-day sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" has started in Ternopol region (5 May 2016), available at: <https://www.unian.ua/ternopil/1337687-na-ternopilschini-rozpochalasya-4-denna-sportivno-patriotichna-gra-gurbi-antonivtsi.html>.*

UNIAN Editorial office



A sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" has started in Ternopol region / youtube.com

The event organisers told "UNIAN" that it is dedicated to Vladymyr Garmatiy, a mortar platoon commander of the 51st Brigade, a member of the "Gurby-Antonivtsi" who died in July 2014 in the ATO zone in Lugansk region, and Roman Atamaniuk, a longtime member of the "Gurby-Antonivtsi" who fought with the 93rd Brigade and died in May 2015 near Donetsk airport as a result of mortar fire.

As part of the competition, a memorial plaque will be unveiled on the facade of Ternopol Economic University, where Garmatiy studied.

Afterward, the participants will demonstrate a demonstration battle. Also today, there will be a lecture on the historic battle of the UPA against the NKVD near "Gurby", which took place in April 1944, and a tour of the "Volyn-South" UPA Headquarters Museum, restored the day before by volunteers participating in the game, and the graves of Ukrainian insurgents.

Tomorrow the teams will start fighting for the flag.

UNIAN's note. The "Gurby-Antonivtsi" i game has been held since 2003 by the All-Ukrainian Youth Nationalist Congress, a youth public organisation, to promote patriotism, healthy lifestyles, sports, and national unity.

Each year, the game takes place in a 25-square-kilometer forest near the "Gurby" tract, the site of the largest battle between the UPA and NKVD units. The game lasts continuously for 60 hours.

The game involves 2 kurens (teams) and a squad of saboteurs. The winner is the kuren that manages to capture the enemy's flag and get the most points - the enemy's "lives".

Annex 340

Chas.cv.ua, *Ukraine's largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby Antonivtsi" will bring together young people from all regions of Ukraine* (2 March 2016)

(translation)

Translation

Chas.cv.ua, Ukraine's largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" will bring together young people from all regions of Ukraine (2 March 2016), available at: <https://chas.cv.ua/inform/31224-nayblsha-v-ukrayin-sportivno-patroichna-gra-gurbi-antonvc-obyednaye-molod-z-ush-regonv-ukrayini.html>.

Ukraine's largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" will bring together young people from all regions of Ukraine - Ukrainian Newspaper "Chas"

On May 5-8, young people from all over Ukraine will gather in the forest on the border of Ternopol and Rovno regions at the site of a historic event - the UPA's battle against the NKVD that took place in April 1944. It is there that the fourteenth largest sports and patriotic game "Gurby-Antonivtsi" will take place, bringing together more than 400 young people every year.



In the month since the start of registration, 300 applications have already been submitted, and 130 people have been approved.

"Traditionally, most participants come from Ternopol, Sumy, Lvov and Kiev regions. But we want to see representatives of every region at the game, we want to expand the geography: it is not for nothing that one of the tasks is to unite the country at "Gurby-Antonivtsi", says Ivan Kizyuk, project manager.

Therefore, the organiser of the event, the "Youth Nationalist Congress", offers the first ten approved participants from each region a minimum organisational fee.

In addition, residents of the frontline zone (Crimea, Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Dnepr, Zaporozhye, Kherson) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea have an even smaller fee of 50 grivnas.

It is also important that participants from the Left Bank and Southern Ukraine are reimbursed for their travel expenses. According to Ivan Kizyuk, this will further encourage young people to come to "Gurby-Antonivtsi".

Annex 341

TASS, *Attempt to “give Ukraine time”*: Merkel on Minsk agreements (7 December 2022)



RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCY

UKRAINE CRISIS 7 DEC 2022, 16:18

Attempt to 'give Ukraine time': Merkel on Minsk agreements

She expressed doubt that at that time NATO states would have been able to support Kiev to the extent that they do now



Angela Merkel
© Jochen Zick/Pool/Getty Images

BERLIN, December 7. /TASS/. The Minsk accords were signed in order to "give Ukraine time" to make the country stronger, ex-German Chancellor Angela Merkel (in office from 2005 to 2021) said in an interview with the Zeit newspaper published on Wednesday.

"The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give time to Ukraine. It also used this time to become stronger as can be seen today. The Ukraine of 2014-2015 is not the modern Ukraine," the politician said.

According to her, "it was clear to everyone" that the conflict had stalled and the problem had not been resolved "yet this was precisely what gave Ukraine invaluable time." She expressed doubt that at that time NATO states would have been able to support Kiev to the extent that they do now.

Merkel was the German chancellor when the 2014 state coup occurred in Ukraine and the Minsk agreements on settling the Donbass conflict were concluded with her participation.

On February 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that following the recognition of the DPR and LPR, the Minsk accords did not exist anymore yet this was not Russia's fault. According to him, the agreements were killed by the current Kiev regime long before the recognition of the Donbass republics.

TAGS[Ukraine crisis](#)

Annex 342

The President of Ukraine. Decree No. 699/2022 “On Awarding M. Simchich the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 14 October 2022

(translation)

Translation

The President of Ukraine. Decree No. 699/2022 “On Awarding M. Simchich the Title of Hero of Ukraine”, 14 October 2022, available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/6992022-44385>.



PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY
Official Internet Portal

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No. 699/2022

On Awarding M. Simchich the Title of Hero of Ukraine

To honour his heroism displayed in the struggle for Ukraine's independence, his outstanding personal merits in the formation of Ukrainian statehood, and many years of his fruitful public activity, **I hereby decree that:**

The title of Hero of Ukraine be conferred upon and the Order of the Gold Star be awarded to Myroslav Vasylyovych Simchych, Ukrainian military and public figure, a centurion of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and political prisoner of Soviet concentration camps.

President of Ukraine V. ZELENSKY

14 October 2022

Annex 343

Gazeta.ru, *“Do Not Make Tragedy of This”. How Ukraine Shot Down Russian Aircraft*
(4 October 2021)

(translation)

Translation

Gazeta.ru, “Do Not Make Tragedy of This”. How Ukraine Shot Down Russian Aircraft (4 October 2021), available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2021/10/03_a_14047363.shtml

“Do Not Make Tragedy of This”. How Ukraine Shot Down Russian Aircraft

20 years ago, a Russian Tu-154 plane crashed near Crimea

By Maxim Borisov



© AP/Reuters

On the 4th of October 2001, a Siberia Airlines Tu-154 aircraft flying from Tel Aviv to Novosibirsk was shot down over the Black Sea. All 78 people on board were killed. The plane was hit by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile launched from an S-200V SAM system during the Russian-Ukrainian exercises in Crimea.

A Siberia Airlines Tu-154M aircraft performing flight SBI-1812 from Tel Aviv to Novosibirsk crashed over the Black Sea at 12:44 (Kiev time) less than 200 km from Sochi. Subsequently, luggage fragments, aircraft interior decoration parts, dead bodies and oil stains were found in the sea. All 12 crew members and 66 passengers, including 15 Russians and 51 Israeli citizens, were killed.

The disaster occurred during combat missile launches as part of joint Russian-Ukrainian air-defence exercises in Crimea. One launched missile was then lost, and that coincidence immediately seemed suspicious, but it was difficult to believe in a weird tragedy.

On the day of the crash, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “the weapons used at that time could not reach the air corridors our aircraft flew in due to their [poor] tactical and technical characteristics”.

Vladimir Rushailo, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, who was appointed the head of the commission investigating the Tu-154 crash, also noted that he thought “the Ukrainian

version of the disaster was unlikely”. A terrorist attack was considered as the main version. When the plane disappeared from radars, it flew at an altitude of 11 km. The pilot of the Armenian Airlines An-24 aircraft flying at that time in about the same area saw a kind of flash.

The investigation of the crash by the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) resulted in a revision of the main version. The depth of the Black Sea was over 2000 m at the crash site, the sea bottom was trawled and examined by an echo sounder, and fragments of the floor covering were raised, which were found to contain hundreds of shrapnel holes. Mr. Rushailo said items not related to the aircraft’s structure were also found at the site, and “the plane was destroyed as a result of an explosive impact”. Not a single flight recorder was found. After those details had been published, Russian officials and press stopped calling the exercises joint and called them solely Ukrainian.

Less than one month later, before the official completion of the investigation, authorities announced that the crash had been caused by an unintentional hit by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile into the aircraft’s body. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma acknowledged those findings and ordered to pay monetary compensations to the relatives of the victims. However, he sharply commended on the accident in late October by saying, “Look at what is happening around in the world and in Europe. We are not the first and not the last ones, you should not make a tragedy of this. Mistakes happen everywhere, and some of them are of a much larger – planetary – scale”.

Ukrainian Defence Minister Aleksandr Kuzmuk and several other high-ranking military officers apologised to the relatives of the victims and resigned, but no one was put on trial.

“We have drawn a preliminary conclusion that the crash of this aircraft could have been caused by an unintentional hit by an S-200 missile launched during the exercises of the Ukrainian Air Defence Forces. This tragic accident could have occurred as a result of a failure of the anti-aircraft missile system. As a citizen of Ukraine, it pains me to say this. But there is a lot of information supporting this version”, said Yevhen Marchuk, Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security Council.

Missile launches at the 31st Test Site at Cape Opuk near Kerch, which was controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence, began to be considered as the main version. The Tu-154 could have found itself in the centre of the intended firing sector for a training target. Tu-143 “Reis” unmanned aircraft were used as such targets. The Tu-154 had a suitable radial speed and was in a “suitable” place, which resulted in the operator of the S-200B system mistaking it for the main target. The mistake could result from the shortage of time and the increased nervousness caused by the presence of high commanders and foreign guests (the exercises were observed by delegations of seven countries). Like a “Buk” system, an S-200 SAMS uses a guidance system that “illuminates” targets by a powerful ground-based radar so that a missile responds to a signal reflected from the target. Thus, the disaster could be caused not by a miss against a training target located 30-60 km away but by the initially erroneous guidance of the missile by the operator “illuminating” the Tu-154 passenger aircraft at a distance of 250-300 km. Serious troubles arose in determining whose radar – Russian or Ukrainian – could guide the missile to an inappropriate target.

When the lawsuit brought by Siberia Airlines in 2010 was heard in the court, forensic experts also called the hit of the aircraft by a Russian air defence system as a possible cause of the crash. During the work of the commission investigating the disaster near Sochi, the Russian military did not refute the information that a Russian air defence system on the Black Sea coast could hit the Tu-154M as a violator of the Russian state border due to a malfunction of the IFF transponder. In any case, no additional mark confirming the response by the aircraft to radar requests was seen. In line with this version, President Kuchma could even deliberately take the blame for the crash on himself for some time upon request of the Russian side.

As a result of all these legal conflicts, Ukraine has never been legally found guilty of the crash and no claims have been made against it at the international level, and a Ukrainian court later concluded that no Ukrainian missile could get into the Russian plane at all, despite the IAC's conclusions. One of the arguments against the Ukrainian trace was that no reliable radar data with missile marks in the vicinity of the aircraft had been submitted.

In 2012, the Kiev Commercial Appeal Court dismissed the Russian complaint against the award of the trial court, and the Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine upheld that award. The attorneys for Siberia Airlines (now renamed to S7 Airlines) announced their intent to appeal before the European Court of Human Rights but did not take that opportunity.

In accordance with the treaty signed by Russia and Ukraine on 26 December 2003, the Ukrainian government paid \$7.8 mln to the relatives of the deceased Russian passengers without recognising its legal liability "for humanitarian considerations". The Ukrainian authorities also paid \$7.5 mln to the relatives of the killed Israeli passengers.

Annex 344

Law of Ukraine No. 3551-XII “On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection”, 22 October 1993

(excerpt, translation)

**Excerpt
Translation**

Law of Ukraine No. 3551-XII “On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection”, 22 October 1993, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/3551-12#Text>.

***LAW OF UKRAINE*****On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of their Social Protection**

(Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (BVR), 1993, No. 45, p. 425)

{Enacted by Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 3552-XII of 22.10.93, BVR, 1993, No. 45, p. 426}

[...]

Article 6. Persons Considered to Be Combatants

The following persons shall be recognised as combatants:

[...]

16) persons who participated in any form of armed struggle for the independence of Ukraine in the XX century as part of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of Ataman Taras Borovets (Bulba) "Polissya Sich", the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army (UNRA), the People's Defence Organisation "Carpathian Sich", the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO), or armed units of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Status and Commemoration of Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the XX Century", have been recognised as fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the XX century. The procedure for granting the status of a combatant to such persons is established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;

{Clause 16 of part one of Article 6 as amended by Law No. 2325-VIII of 13.03.2018; as amended by Law No. 2640-VIII of 06.12.2018}


Annex 345

YouTube, Oleg Tyagnibok, *UPA's March of Glory: Oleg Tyagnibok's speech / October 14 / Protection / Day of Defenders of Ukraine* (17 October 2021)

(excerpt, translation)

**Transcript
Translation**

YouTube, Oleg Tyagnibok, *UPA's March of Glory: Oleg Tyagnibok's speech / October 14 / Protection / Day of Defenders of Ukraine (17 October 2021)*, available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=2kCzI6wa4U0>.



[...]

[08:45-10:15]

[Oleg Tyagnibok]: Everywhere in Ukraine today, on the occasion of the national liberation struggle, local authorities are raising red and black flags on the initiative of the Svoboda faction. Our solutions are about 350 across Ukraine.

Today, on October 14, Bandera's revolutionary red and black flags fly next to the national flags. This is our ideological victory. Our ideological victory is that there is no Moskovskyi Avenue in our capital, Kyiv, but rather a Bandera Avenue and a Shukhevych Avenue, initiated and achieved by the Svoboda faction in Kyiv City Council and then defended in the courts. These are our collective ideological victories.

And when the first marches of the UIA took place, I remember that it was in a way a defense, because the authorities were obstructing them, sending communists with Moscow flags, with their stupid Leninist slogans.

Later, when the UIA marches became more and more massive year after year, the authorities tried to ban us through the courts, stopping buses and preventing us from traveling.

But now it's all a stage of the offensive, the Ukrainian offensive. This is our land. These are our heroes. And we will fight for it. And we will, even if it takes another 30 years. Even if it takes 300 years, we will definitely do it.

[...]

Annex 346

Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Resolution No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014

(translation)

Translation

Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. Resolution No. 802-VII “On Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”, 27 February 2014, available at: <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/802-VII>.

RESOLUTION of
Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine
On the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
(Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada (BVR), 2014, No. 12, p.204)

{For more information, see VR Resolutions

No. 1526-VII of 19.06.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 32, p.1149

No. 1660-VII of 02.09.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 40, p. 2022

No. 10-VIII of 02.12.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 52, p.2063

No. 11-VIII of 02.12.2014, BVR, 2014, No. 52, p. 2064}

In accordance with [clause 12 of part one of Article 85](#), [part four of Article 114 of the Constitution of Ukraine](#), the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine **resolves**:

{For dismissal of members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, see VR Resolution No. 11-VIII dated 02.12.2014}

1. Appoint:

{Vitaliy Yarema was dismissed from the post by the Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 1526-VII of 19.06.2014;

{ Volodymyr Borysovich Groysman was dismissed from office as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine - Minister of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine by Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 10-VIII of 02.12.2014};

Aleksandr Maksymovich Sych as Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine;

Arsen Borysovich Avakov as Minister of Internal Affairs;

Dmitry Sergeyeovich Bulatov as Minister of Youth and Sports of Ukraine;

Maksym Yuriyevich Burbak as Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine;

Lyudmyla Leontyevna Denisova as Minister of Social Policy of Ukraine;

Sergey Myronovich Kvit as Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine;

Andrey Vladimirovich Mokhnyk as Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine;

Oleg Stepanovich Musiy as Minister of Healthcare of Ukraine;

Yevgeniy Mikhailovich Nyshchuk as Minister of Culture of Ukraine;

Pavel Petrenko as Minister of Justice of Ukraine;

Yuriy Vasylyevich Prodan, Minister of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine;

Ostap Mikhailovich Semerak, Minister of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine;

Ihor Aleksandrovich Shvayka as the Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine;

{The resignation of Sheremet Pavlo Mykhailovich as the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine was accepted in accordance with the Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine No. 1660-VII dated 02.09.2014};

Aleksandr Shlapak as Minister of Finance of Ukraine.

2. This Resolution shall enter into force upon its adoption.

**Chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine
O. TURCHINOV**

Kiev

27 February 2014

No. 802-VII

On the Formation of the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of
Ukraine of 27.02.2014 No. 802-VII **Wording** of
02.12.2014, grounds - **10-VIII, 11-VIII**

Permanent address:

<https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/802-18>

Legislation of Ukraine as of 08.03.2023 in force

Publications of the document

- **The Voice of Ukraine** of 01.03.2014 - No. 39, / Special Issue /.
- **Bulletin of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine** of 21.03.2014 - 2014, no. 12, pp. 807, Article 204


Annex 347

YouTube, Group of 2nd May, 14.40/02.05.2014. *Arrest on Alexandrovsky Prospect in Odessa.*
(15 July 2015)

(translation)

**Transcript
Translation**

YouTube, Group of 2nd May, 14.40/02.05.2014. Arrest on Alexandrovsky Prospect in Odessa. (15 July 2015), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLlqixAtTQ&list=PL1VsJWkUn2D4c8_U3FffAUJV_XPjPpt4Z&index=2.



[00:03]

[Voice-over]: Hello, we are located on Alexandrovsky Avenue in Odessa, where pro-Russian activists gather to prevent a march for Ukrainian unity, scheduled for today. Yeah, I see police officers taking some of the activists away.

[00:20]

[Voice-over]: You see many people are with helmets, many are with bats.

[0:31]

[Voice-over]: The police officers have detained one man and are taking him to the city police station next door, follow them.

[...]

[Voice-over]: [0:53]

[Voice-over]: We are by the city police station, we'll have a try to shoot from here.

Annex 348

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 80/2023 “On awarding the honorary name to the 10th separate mountain assault brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, 14 February 2023

(translation)

Translation

The President of Ukraine, Decree No. 80/2023 “On awarding the honorary name to the 10th separate mountain assault brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, 14 February 2023, available at: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/802023-45805>.

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE No. 80/2023

**On awarding the honorary name to the 10th separate mountain assault
brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine**

Taking into account the exemplary performance of assigned tasks while protecting the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine by the personnel of the 10th separate mountain assault brigade of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, **I hereby decree:**

1. To award the 10th separate mountain assault brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine the honorary name "Edelweiss" and hereinafter it shall be referred to as the 10th separate mountain assault brigade "Edelweiss" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
2. This Decree comes into force from the day of its publication.

President of Ukraine V. ZELENSKY

14 February 2023


Annex 349

YouTube, Channel “Facts ICTV”, “*Turchinov announced anti-terrorist measures against armed separatists*”, 7 April 2014

(translation)

Translation

YouTube, Channel “Facts ICTV”, “Turchinov announced anti-terrorist measures against armed separatists”, 7 April 2014, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myjnfelp_V0.



(1) Турчинов объявил антитеррористические меры против сепаратистов с оружием

youtube.com/watch?v=myjnfelp_V0

Введите запрос

Турчинов объявил антитеррористические меры против сепаратистов с оружием

Факти ICTV
2,1 млн подписчиков

Подписаться

107

Поделиться

11 883 просмотра 7 апр. 2014 г. Все главные новости мира и Украины здесь: <http://fakty.ictv.ua/ua> ...ещё

Комментарии 709

Введите текст комментария

Video Transcript (translated from Ukrainian)

[00:03]

[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Compatriots! Yesterday the second wave of the special operation of the Russian Federation against Ukraine started; its purpose is to destabilize the situation in the country, to overthrow the Ukrainian authorities, to disrupt the elections and to tear apart our country.

[00:21]

[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Separatist groups that are coordinated by Russian security services seized the building of the Kharkov Regional State Administration, the building of the Regional Administration and Security Services in Donetsk, as well as the SBU building in Lugansk, and what is especially dangerous, took up weapons. All of this is happening in the context of presence of Russian troops near our border.

[00:46]

[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Enemies of Ukraine are trying to play the Crimean scenario, but we will not let that happen. This night anti-crisis headquarters was formed, and antiterrorist measures will be held against those who took up arms.

[01:01]

[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: We have strengthened protection of the Eastern border of our country. Taking into account the passive behavior of some local law enforcement agencies, they will be also additionally completed at the expense of the departments from other regions.

[01:14]

[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: For coordination of legal structures, we sent to Kharkov the Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, to Donetsk - the First Vice Prime Minister General Vitaly Yarema, to Lugansk - the Secretary of Council of State Security and Defense Andriy Parubiy, and the Head the Security Service of Ukraine Valentyn Nalyvaichenko.

[01:36]

[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: Tomorrow one of the first issues on the agenda in the Verkhovnaya Rada will be the law on harsher punishment for separatism and other crimes against the state. According to Ukrainian legislation, the question will be raised regarding ban of the activities of political parties and public organizations standing on the separatist positions and working for the aggressor country against its own state and its people.

[02:04]

[Head of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Aleksandr Turchinov]: I respect various political views including those of our opponents, but separatism and use of weapons against our own country, which has a direct threat to the security and the lives of our citizens, is not politics, it is a serious crime, and we will act adequately and decisively against criminals.

Annex 350

Irina Berezhnaya Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection, REPORT: INFRINGEMENT OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN UKRAINE (2018)



The «**INSTITUTE OF LEGAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
NAMED IN HONOR
OF IRYNA BEREZHNA**»

Nongovernmental organization
«**ANTIFASCIST HUMAN RIGHTS
LEGAL LEAGUE**»



Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2018

Europe's largest annual human rights and democracy conference, organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), is taking place in Warsaw, Poland, from 10 to 21 September 2018.

REPORT

Violation of Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine

Ukraine as a Source of Neo-Nazism in Europe

OSCE, Warsaw, 2018

Violation of Human Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine

Ukraine as a Source of Neo-Nazism in Europe

1. Introduction
2. Description of mainstream political parties and organizations that promote Neo-Nazi ideology with the support of Ukraine's authorities
3. Factual briefing on extremist activity:
 - a) Attacks on peaceful socio-political events (actions conducted by the LGBT-community, International Women's Day and Victory Day rallies and other events)
 - b) Anti-Semitic, racist and xenophobic manifestations
 - c) Religious persecution
4. Fusion and merger of Neo-Nazi groups with the state agencies of Ukraine
5. A danger of export of extremism from Ukraine to EU countries
6. Conclusion



Iryna BEREZHNA:

Elected representative to the 6th and 7th Sessions of the Ukrainian Parliament, Honored Jurist of the Ukraine, PhD in Philosophy within the field of Jurisprudence, Founder of the Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, Founder of the Anti-Fascist Human Rights League. Tragically died on August 5, 2017.

cross”, “Tiwaz” runes – symbols of Hitlerjugend,. “C14” members organized attacks at journalists, at Roma camps in Kiev and Lvov in 2018, conducted acts of vandalism and other similar actions. One of the “C14” activists – Andrey Medvedko – is accused of murdering of the opposition publicist and journalist Oles Buzina on April 16, 2015.

An example of military unit of Ukrainian armed forces (its members embrace Neo-Nazi viewpoints) is “Aidar Battalion”: officially its name sounds as “the 24th detached assault battalion of the armed forces of Ukraine”. It was established by the Member of Ukrainian Parliament Sergey Melnichuk and members of “Maidan’s Self-Defense” and “The Right Sector” joined its ranks.

The blazon of the riot battalion “Kiev-2” subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs contains Nazi symbols – the so-called “Totenkopf” (a human skull with bare teeth) with runic symbols and aquiline wings similar to wings on the cap insignia of officers of SS Totenkopf Division.

In 2017 “Svoboda”, “The Right Sector”, “Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists” (CUN), OUN, “C14” and other rightwing radical structures endorsed the “National Manifesto” prepared by Andrey Biletsky’ “National Corps” party. It represents a program of uniting all Neo-Nazi forces together for the sake of gaining power in Ukraine.

3.

Ukrainian national radicals closely intertwined with the state agencies incite interethnic discord and hatred in Ukraine, imposing OUN-UPA leaders and other Nazi collaborators as national heroes.

Life in modern Ukraine features permanent impunity of constant attacks conducted by the organized groups made up of Neo-Nazi parties’ and organizations’ members and targeted against

participants of various peaceful actions (including actions of the LGBT community), against representatives of ethnic minorities (Roma camps bashing, Anti-Semitic manifestations, including demolition of Holocaust victims’ memorials and so on). Representatives of the abovementioned and other similar nationalistic units overtly promote Nazi symbols, conduct multiple rallies and marches where one can hear Anti-Semitic, Russophobe and Nazi slogans accompanied with Nazi salutes.

a) Starting since early 2018 ultra-right extremist units of “C14”, “The Rights Sector”, “Carpathian Sich” and other groups conducted multiple attacks in various cities of Ukraine: attack on Roma communities, on antifascist rallies, on events organized by international organization Amnesty International, on public events of the LGBT community as well as on other peaceful actions, including actions dedicated to human rights protection. Only under extremely rare circumstances police attempted to thwart those attacks: sometimes it even apprehended peaceful demonstrators instead of violent extremists who attacked them.

A very typical event in the form of extremely violent attack occurred in Kiev on June 16, 2017: more than a hundred national radicals armed with clubs attacked unarmed participants of peaceful protest against renaming of General Vatutin Avenue (this general liberated Kiev during WWII) into Shukhevych Avenue. Practically all rally participants were elder people: Neo-Nazis brutally beat them inflicting serious bodily harm.

As a result, more than people were hospitalized. Members of the “National Corps” party headed by the deputy of its leader – Nazar Kravchenko – were among the attackers.

Events of May 9, 2018 in Kiev represent an example of total impunity for illegal actions undertaken by Neo-Nazi rightwing radicals with the absolute connivance of the authorities’ representatives.

The Institute of Legal Politics and Social Protection named after Irina Berezhnaya organized a peaceful march dedicated to

the WWII Victory Day. More than a dozen thugs decorated with Nazi symbols encircled human rights activist Elena Berezhnaya: they knocked her down to the ground and started beating her. Police officers (instead of apprehending the thugs) twisted the woman's arms when she was unconscious and dragged her to the patrol car, continuing to inflict her a bodily harm. As a result, she spent two weeks in the hospital.

Similar case happened on June 1, 2018 (it was the International Day for Children Protection): in presence of police officers, rightwing radicals doused human rights activist Elena Berezhnaya with green disinfectant solution. Their goal was to prevent the charitable performance for kids and to thwart conduction of peaceful action dubbed "Stop the War! Ukraine Needs Peace!". In case of all Marches for Equality (conducted in 2014-2017) Neo-Nazi groups' members conducted multiple attacks on representatives of the LGBT community.

Ultra-right radicals' crackdown of the "Festival of Equality" in Lvov on March 17-20, 2016 represents the most sweeping violent action. Multiple cameras taped people dressed in neck-face masks and flashing Nazi salutes (some 200 people), who threw stones in the building that should host the festival. The rightwing radicals disrupted the festival. City police committed acts of offence to human dignity instead of providing the festival's participants with protection.

On June 12, 2016 in Kiev near the "Exhibition Center" subway station a dozen of people beat up participants of the "March for Equality" organized by the LGBT community. One of the victims was hospitalized.

Starting since January 2017, members of rightwing radical organizations tried to thwart or prevent some 70 events organized by the LGBT community.

b) Starting since early 2014 and up to date Ukraine enjoys the drastic increase of the number of committed xenophobic (and in particular, anti-Semitic) crimes. According to the data

provided by Israel Diaspora Affairs Ministry, only in 2017 Ukraine demonstrated the twofold increase in number of Anti-Semitic manifestations that occurred on the background of the campaign aimed at glorification of individuals responsible for persecution and mass murder of Jews in Ukraine in course of the 20th century.

Starting since February 2014, we have more than 170 registered ostentatious acts of vandalism, of desecration of synagogues, Jewish cemeteries and Holocaust Victims memorials, monuments to other WWII victims and soldiers who liberated Ukraine from Nazis' occupation.

Ukraine has multiple officially registered cases of attacks with infliction of the grave bodily harm – the overtly anti-Semitic attacks against Jewish citizens of Ukraine. Among examples are the brutal beating of Alexander Dukovsky, Ukraine's chief pediatric neurosurgeon that occurred on March 17, 2015 in Kiev and violent murder of Israeli Rabbi Mendel Deitsch on October 7, 2016 in Zhitomir: rabbi died because of the inflicted wounds.

On December 21, 2016 night – on the eve of the great Jewish holiday Hanukkah – a group of Neo-Nazis organized a violent "pogrom" in Uman city synagogue, located near Rabbi Nachman grave – a sacred place for pilgrimage of thousands of Hasids. A group of extremists in neck-face masks broke into the synagogue in course of a prayer: they chanted Anti-Semitic slogans, doused the congregation with tear-gas, covered floor and walls with the red paint and left there a pig's head with a Nazi swastika carved on it.

On June 30, 2017 during Shukhevych-Fest festival, some rightwing radicals threw a "Molotov cocktail" into the building of Lvov's main synagogue located at 4 Brothers Mikhnovsky Street.

On September 21, 2017 morning in Uman city celebration of Jewish New Year or Rosh Hashanah was marred by the explosion

organized at the location of mass gathering of Hasids by rightwing radicals. The 13-year-old Israeli citizen was wounded.

The number of such cases amounts to many thousands.

In May 2018 it was established that Ukrainian diplomat Vasyi Marushinets, Consul of Ukraine in Hamburg (Germany), regularly promoted overtly Nazi and anti-Semitic viewpoints using his own Facebook account starting from 2013. One of the photos shows how his colleagues presented him a gift at his 60th birthday anniversary – a cake resembling the folio of “Mein Kampf” book. Marushinets indicated that this photo was made at the premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on February 10, 2016. Besides that, Marushinets published this photo in his book that was distributed among Ministry employees, including Pavel Klimkin, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister. In the mentioned book dubbed “My Springs” and published in 2016 Marushinets criticized “the Magyars” for take-over of Ukrainian lands. In his book he calls Poles “historical enemies” of Ukraine. At least 4 Ukrainian diplomats enjoyed the “Mein Kampf” photo putting “likes” under it. Only some users (with a status of “friends”) could review his Facebook page content: his viewpoints never embarrassed many of his colleagues, including Ukrainian ambassadors. Marushinets is among friends of Boris Tarasyuk, former MFA of Ukraine minister. Oksana – Tarasyuk’s daughter – is a Consul General of Ukraine in Hamburg: in other words, she is a boss of Marushinets. Marushinets’ post about Prince Svyatoslav’s fight against “Jewish yoke” was liked by the ambassador of Ukraine in Portugal Inna Ognivets. An employee of the Diplomatic academy of Ukraine also “liked” Murishinets’ arguments on “worthlessness” of Hungary and Romania.

Here is another extremely indicative fact – the National Opera of Ukraine building is decorated with memorial plaque in the honor of Dmitry Miron (alias “Orlik”), an ideologist and promoter of Ukrainian nationalism and one of OUN leaders.

Thus, the promotion and propaganda of OUN-UPA (and their leaders) glorification conducted by Ukrainian authorities is directly associated with the abovementioned and other Anti-Semitic actions.

No doubt, that glorification of collaborators and the state sponsored backing of the Neo-Nazi ideology in Ukraine causes resentment and condemnation of the international community. For instance, on September 27, 2016 Israel President Reuven Rivlin (he arrived to Ukraine with official visit) in his speech in Ukrainian Parliament accused Ukrainian nationalists in participation in Holocaust, stating that they victimized Jews, murdered them or hand them out to Germans during the WWII.

In early 2017 Efraim Zuroff, the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center office in Jerusalem, forwarded an official letter to Gennady Nadolenko, the Ambassador of Ukraine in Israel, in relation to conduction of rally in Bandera’s honor in Kiev. Participants of this rally chanted Anti-Semitic slogans. Zuroff emphasized in his letter that Bandera’s adepts took part in massacre of Jews during the WWII.

c) Representative of national-radical parties, organizations and volunteer battalions systematically conduct illegal actions against religious communities of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).

In 2014-2018 the UOC parishes (especially located in Rovno, Ternopol and Volyn regions) sustained widespread attacks initiated by national-radicals with a purpose of take-over of religious buildings and structures. Besides incitement of hatred towards the UOC (both by representatives of authorities and of governmentally controlled mass media outlets), facts of systematic violence against the UOC representatives and acts of vandalism against religious buildings and structures were registered in Ukraine in 2014-2018.

There were 7 attempts (the last one is dated by March 2018) on

April 13 – Kiev city: radical extremists publicly desecrated the monument to Nikolai Vatutin – General who liberated Kiev from fascists. Extremists came to the monument to disrupt floral tribute procedure dedicated to General's death anniversary.


A group of thugs encircled the monument, flood it with paint and insulted Kiev residents who brought flowers to the monument.



May 14 – Vasylyl Marushinets, Consul of Ukraine in Hamburg, promoted Nazi and anti-Semitic viewpoints using his own Facebook account. For instance, he wrote «Good Lord, scourge the kikes and Russians!» as early as September 23, 2013 and he never betrayed his rhetoric. «Walking by

Party of Regions follower – spit in his face and kick him with your boot, walking by the Zionist – punch him into his head with a bayonet and a buttstock with all your might» – he posted this phrase in February 2014. Some other “observations” made by Marushinets — «Kikes declared war to Germany in 1934 », «Good Lord, do justice upon kikes», «Babi Yar: not kikes in 1941, Ukrainians were murdered here in 1918-1941!», «Kikes are crap».

Marushinets made selfies – at such photos he can be seen wearing Nazi helmet – and distributed these selfies via social media.



At his milestone birthday consul of Ukraine got a gift – a cake made in the form of the book with inscription in German – «60. Mein Kampf».

Reviewing the conflict over the “language law” that erupted between Ukraine and Hungary. Marushinets called “Magyars” the “blood brothers of Russians” and “Bashkir kins”. The consul found some “Russian Kikes” in the ranks of Ukrainian authorities. Besides that, he heard “stories about Pakis” on TV.

In 2013 Marushinets begged God to scourge “kikes and Russians, to give a thump on the heads of Poles, Maguays and Roma”. He distributed a hyperlink to the article dedicated to revision of viewpoints on Holocaust, accompanying it with the phrase “Kikes declared war to Germany as early as March 1934”. The consul is dead sure: if you meet Zionist, you must punch his face with a bayonet and a buttstock. He repeatedly denies Holocaust, produces abusive and offensive comments about several nations. He glorifies SS might, he wishes death to antifascists.

The list of his Facebook friends includes Boris Tarasyuk (former MFA of Ukraine chief and Ukrainian MP representing “Batkivshina” Party). Oksana – Tarasyuk’s daughter – is a Consul General of Ukraine in Hamburg: in other words, she is a boss of Marishinets.

Among other friends of Marushinets are current and former employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Former ambassador of Ukraine in India Valentin Adomaitis “liked” his post about “our swastika” and the link to the article telling about the fight of Prince Svyatoslav against “Jewish yoke”. An employee of the Diplomatic academy of Ukraine also “liked” Marushinets’ arguments on “worthlessness” of Hungary and Romania.

When Marushinets posted a hyperlink to the article dubbed “Ukraine is a cradle of the white race”, Ukraine’s ambassador-at-large wondered, whether Hitler knew about the Arian descent of Ukrainians.

Besides that, at least 4 Ukrainian diplomats enjoyed the photo of the gift Murishinets got at his 60th birthday as they “liked” it at his Facebook account.

Marushinets’ piost about Prince Svyatoslav’s fight against “Jewish yoke” was liked by the ambassador of Ukraine in Portugal Inna Ognivets. At the same time the embassy failed to comment such behavior.



Ukrainian diplomat stated that Ukraine can “iberate” some bordering territories that currently belong to Hungary, Poland and other countries. At one photo Consul poses in Nazi helmet of the Third Reich period, at the other photo he promotes an idea of changing Ukrainian national flag into a new one that features swastika image. In his posts Ukrainian consul declared “Death to Antifascists!” and explained that “Being a Nazi is an honor”.

Inna Ognivets and an employee of Ukraine's embassy in Portugal "liked" the following posts – "Ukraine is for patriots" and "Go away from Ukraine to Moscow Patriarchate". In one of her public comments Ambassador Ognivets called Russia's President "the F***ing scumbag".

Marushinets posted his comments in such public groups as "Frankfurt am Main Community", "Let's Stop the Party of Regions", "The Maidan of the Foreign Affairs" and "Historic Truth". He – among other things – argues that "Tatar" nationality does not exist. He uses obscene words in discussion with the member of Ukrainian parliament who does not agree with his viewpoints ("to move away to the other bank of Danube River" and "to slaughter Russians").

Marushinets is the author of the "My Springs" book that was distributed, in particular, among MFA employees. In his novel he criticizes "Magyars" for take-over of Ukrainian territories. He describes Poles as "historic enemies" of Ukraine. He informs that his father served in a Hungarian army unit during WWII and states that German training officers treated their subordinates better than "arrogant Magyars". The book contains Marushinets's deliberations on unfairness of scientists who do not want to identify a specific Arian race.

German mass media outlets – Junge Welt and Focus – published articles about Marushinets' notorious disgrace. The NRZ publication asked Ukraine's MFA and Ukrainian embassy for comments on Marushinets' posts and "likes" made by Ukrainian diplomats, but got no replies.

This story in Poland was covered by online publication Gazeta.pl. Online publications RMF24, RadioZet, Fakt24, Kresy, GloriaTV, TVP Info posted similar articles.

Israeli newspaper The Jerusalem Post paid attention to this controversy as well. The published article about Marushinets contains information about Vladimir Moskal, Major of Skole city: this person made statements on "Moscovite-Jewish authorities" of Ukraine.

The New York Times and Daily Mail reprinted an article prepared by Pavel Polytyuk for Reuters: the article contained German MFA's comment.

April 18 – Odessa city: "C14" (aka SICH) nationalists desecrated graves of heroes located at Odessa cemetery's Walk of Fame. "C14 Odessa" nationalist movement replaced names of Hero Cities of the WWII by names of cities of Eastern Ukraine where Anti-Terroristic Operation is conducted.



April 20 – Lviv city: Marjana Batyuk (deputy director of school No 100, responsible for educational upbringing of kids, history teacher and Lviv city council deputy, «Svoboda» party representative) posted the following at her Facebook page: «The great man, no matter which way you look at him ... The Nation and Motherland – this is the only truly important doctrine for me and for all genuine national-socialists» beneath Adolf Hitler's photo. This is how she marked a significant date for her – 129th birthday of Hitler. Besides such lofty acknowledgement of Hitler's personality significance, Batyuk accompanied her post by Mein Kampf quotations.



April 21 – Kiev city: fascist-minded thugs from “C14” movement dispersed Roma camp that was set up at Lysa Hora in Kiev and destroyed their tents. Sergey Mazur, “C14” movement coordinator, publicly disclosed this information via Facebook. Before that Mazur posted a comment stating that “C14” together with the municipal guard and representatives of Goloseevo District State Administration (sic.) delivered an ultimatum to Roma, demanding to leave the camp. Mazur also informed that “C14” plans ne “raids against illegal Roma encampments”.



April 22 – Poltava city: vandals covered the Monument of Mourning Mother and Monument to Nazi Victims with Nazi inscriptions gorode Полтава вандалы разрисовали монумент Скорбящей матери и памятник жертвам нацизма. One can see two slogans now at the memorial slabs – “Heil Hitler” and “Death to kikes”



April 24 – Odessa city: extremists representing “Civil Security Council” staged a protest action demanding closure of Russian consulate in Odessa.



April 25 – Lviv city: department of science and education of Lviv Regional State Administration allocated money bonuses to winners of Contest of drawings dedicated to Ukrainian 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician) which was a part of Nazi German troops in 1943-1945.



April 26 – Kiev city: thugs from "C14" movement doused Natalia Vitrenko, PSPU party leader, with kefir at the entrance to the building of Kiev District Court.

"C14" activists posted video account of this attack at their Facebook page:
 «...Vitrenko... does not like how patriots harass them "without punishment" and do not let them wave their red rags. So, they got a "hello" from "C14". Vitrenko and her company will have no peace and

rest at the Ukrainian soil», – extremists threatened in comments to the above-mentioned video.




April 26 – Kiev city: "C14" thugs had beaten up Lukiyaniuk, the chairman of the Orthodox Brotherhoods Union.

They attacked him with crowbars – there were 5 attackers and two more thugs waited for them in a minibus – there were 5 attackers and two more neighbors managed to fight back and save Lukiyaniuk. They also told that some suspicious guys spent three days walking around their house.



April 26 – Kiev city: the Eternal Flame monument desecrated in Kiev.



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April 27 – Ostrog city: vandals under cover of night desecrated Rabbi Magarsho's (1555-1631) grave and chapel located in Ostrog city (Rovno region). All windows were smashed and holy books were scattered around.



April 28 – Lviv city: local radical nationalists held the so-called "spirit grandeur parade" in honor of Waffen SS "Galicia" Division formed during WWII by Nazi Germans.

Nearly a thousand people took part in the parade commemorating in such a manner the 75th anniversary of formation of the Third Reich military unit – Waffen SS "Galicia" division. Parade participants chanted the following slogans: "Galicia is heroes' division" and "Ukraine is above all".



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April 29 – Civka-Voimilovska village (Kalush district, Ivano-Frankovsk region): local authorities installed a commemorative plaque in honor of Lubomir Makarushka, Obersturmführer of 14th Waffen SS “Galicia” Division, who was born in Civka-Voimilovska village.



May 2 – Odessa city: Tatiana Soikina, Odessa’s “Right Sector” leader, in the course of rally organized by extremists called on to purging “Odessa and Ukraine from kikes”. She said the following at the rally: «We are sure that we will instill a genuine Ukrainian order in Odessa. Ukraine will belong to Ukrainians – not to kikes and not to oligarchs. Glory to Ukraine!»

While Odessa resident brought flowers to the Trade Union House to mark another anniversary of the May 2 tragedy, radical nationalists chanted “Slaughter Russians by knives”. They beat up one of Odessa residents who went to Kulikovo Field with flowers in his hands.

May 4 – Kiev city: nightclub “Bingo” held a rock music concert of ultra-nationalist metal band Sokyra Peruna: neo-Nazi minded people decorated with the Third Reich symbols were among the audience. Many of them were dressed up and tatted up with Nazi-themed symbols and T-shirts with swastikas.



From time to time music performance was interrupted by recollections about Duce – Italian fascists’ leader Mussolini. Concert organizers called him only as “grandfather Benito Mussolini”.

May 5 – Kiev city: “C14” right-wing extremists broke into The Holy Protection of Theotokos Goloseevo Monastery and attacked Ukrainian Orthodox Church monks accompanying their actions with obscene words.


Commenting the attack on Goloseevo Monastery, “C14” leader Eugene Karas threatened publicly: «there will be no fighting here anymore, but I need at least to harass and intimidate them”. Extremists threatened monks – in case of their disobedience – with new “visits”.

May 6 – Kharkov city: Vandals – under cover of the night – demolished George Zhukov’s portrait sculpture.



May 8 – Kiev city: ultra-right radicals voiced multiple threats in address of Inter TV Channel and two presenters of the TV concert dedicated to Victory Day and broadcasted by Inter. Such strong reaction was provoked by a call to respect veterans and those who fought against Nazis, as well as calls to reserve from idea of renaming streets previously named in honor of WWII heroes.

May 9 – Kiev city: a group of rebellious nationalists blocked an entrance to Inter TV Channel’s premises in order to disrupt broadcast of the gala concert dedicated to Victory Day.



May 9 – Kiev city: thugs attacked Konstantin Vorobiev – the head of “Rosstrudnichestvo” representative office in Kiev. The diplomat was doused with green disinfectant and sewage disposal at the moment of coming out of his house (he was going to visit the Eternal Flame monument for laying flowers ceremony).




May 9 – Kiev city: at the solemn rally dedicated to the Victory Day, right-wing extremists in a company with National Police officers inflicted bodily harm to Olena Berezhna, director of Irina Berezhna’s Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, only because she was dressed in ZARA™ T-shirt with “Freedom Is My Mood”

inscription! ZARA designers decorated this garment with print and stripes of orange and blue colors. Both police and right-wing radicals equated this decoration to wearing of the St. George ribbon.

The same day these extremists – making no secret of the fact that shameless battering of Olena Berezhna was a revenge for many years of her honest human rights activities – posted a comment at the Facebook account of OUN volunteer movement alleging that she “got off cheaply”.

Police's actions were overtly unlawful: instead of protecting the woman from her attackers, police officers dragged the beaten human rights advocate along the road, and failed to provide her with the first aid. The latter action – according to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – equals a torture. As a result, Olena Berezhna was hospitalized and forced to spend 2 weeks at the hospital.



May 9 – Lviv city: a group of neo-Nazis attacked the Roma tent camp. The attackers burnt down the tents and other Roma belongings. Extremists used pepper gas spray against representatives of Roma people (including kids).



May 10 – Kovel city outskirts: vandals destroyed the monument to Liberating Soldier and doused the monument's pedestal with paint. This had happened in the outskirts of Kovel (Volyn region).



May 10 – Kremenchug city: another case of desecration of grave of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov's daughter in Kremenchug: the tombstone is destroyed.



May 17 – Pologi District (Zaporozhze region): radical extremist dwelling in Berezovka village desecrated (while trying to dismantle the monument) the mass grave of soldiers killed during WWII.



May 18 – Odessa city: vandals – under cover of night – desecrated the monument to Soldiers who died fighting for the Soviet power. Vandals doused initial inscription on the monument with red paint and wrote the word “Invader”.



May 20 – Polonnoe village (Khmelnitsk region): vandals destroyed a concrete fence of one of the mass graves of representatives of the Jewish nation – victims of a massacre organized by fascists in 1941.



May 23 – Kiev city: American journalist of Arab descent Tariq Panja deeply shocked by Ukrainians who invited him with the Nazi greeting “Sieg Heil”. The New York Times reporter was stunned: nationalists in Ukraine are real thing!

“Friends in Kiev, yelling “sieg heil” at those who don’t look like you isn’t the best way to make visitors to your country feel very welcome. Please stop”, – he wrote in his Twitter.




May 26 – Kiev city: the joint forces of right-wing extremists (approximately up to 100 people) destroyed the market at “Lesnaya” subway station, where guests from the North Caucasus traded.

Nationalists smashed sales counters and turned them upside down, chanting in unison – “Glory to the nation, death to the enemies”, “Ukraine is above all” and other familiar chants.

The debacle was advertised beforehand – as it is customary for modern Ukraine. The corresponding announcement was distributed by Telegram channel of “Nemesis” group notoriously well-known due to arson of Roma’s house (with people inside it) located at Rusanovskie Gardens (former summer cottages at the Dnepr River bank).

“Black-assed freaks went f**ingly nuts: these scumbags need a f**ing good lesson. They will remember what they did as the last crime they committed at our land. This will happen tomorrow. With us. Do you want to take part? Write us”, – the following post extremists left in Telegram.

The next morning “Nemesis” reported in Telegram, using their familiar racist lexicon: “Punishment of the black-assed id complete”. After that other – more well-known and bigger – right-wing extremists’ movements started distributing this post.



June 1 – an outrageous and blatant violation of human rights and dignity of human rights advocate Olena Berezhna occurred on June 1, 2018: at 6:50 AM, eight unidentified individuals started blocking entrance to Berezhna’s apartment and knocking on her door. They told they were “the patriots of Ukraine”. Olena Berezhna refused to open her door and called police. After the third call to police (when the “patriots” promised to send Berezhna “to the place where her deceased daughter rests”) an officer arrived and identified himself. He asked Berezhna to come out of the apartment and clarify the situation. When she opened the door a crack, two right-wing extremists using violence – in presence of a police officer and a TV camera operator – profusely doused the world-renowned human rights advocate Olena Berezhna with green disinfectant solution (an antiseptic dye) right at the doorway to her apartment. The extremists threatened to inflict her a bodily harm: the goal of their actions was to disrupt the “Kids for Peace – Stop the War!” protest action with participation of children. After the incident the police officer merely left her and went away...



June 4 – Vinnytsia city: Local soccer club “Niva” fans came out to the city streets dressed in T-shirts decorated with fascist swastikas. Law enforcement agencies merely ignored their walk-out protest.



June 7 – Kiev city: The “National Militia” group members at their Facebook page published an ultimatum addressed to Roma people: to free the territory of Golosevo Park in 24 hours. In case of disobedience, they threatened Roma with bodily harm. Several hours later that very day they demolished Roma camp using sledgehammers and axes.

June 11 – Chernovtsy city: 12 officers of Regional Department of State Security Service of Ukraine in Chernovtsy Region raided and searched Romanian cultural center “Eudoxia Gurmuzaki”. The State Security Service representatives committed multiple misconducts in course of these searches. A framed-up accusation in separatist activities served as a ground for the searches. The cultural center representatives complained that such actions undertaken by law enforcement agencies insulted ethnic minorities’ representatives.

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June 20 – Zolochiv city (Lvov region): vandals destroyed Alexander Pushkin monument. The monument’s demolition supposedly was conducted in the context of “de-communization” – the popular trend among radically thinking citizens of Ukraine. None of radical groups claimed responsibility for this act of vandalism.



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June 21 – Lvov city: obscene and insulting inscriptions found at the Hill of Glory in Lvov – they were located at the tombstone of reconnaissance officer Nikolai Kuznetsov, a fighter against fascism and WWII hero. The vandals draw the Trident – Ukrainian national symbol – near the insulting inscriptions.



June 23 – Lvov city: late at night a group of aggressively behaving young thugs (16-20 year-old guys) attacked Roma camp erected in the woodland. In course of debacle young Roma man died. Several Roma people sustained bodily harm and knife wounds (including a woman and underage child). Roma people property damaged and scattered, their houses destroyed.



June 25 – Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó officially announced that Ukrainian diplomats distributed anti-Hungarian rumors due to quarrel between Kiev and Budapest on the issue of Ukrainian Law “On Education”. Before that Mr. Péter Szijjártó emphasized: «We think it is a disgrace that the amendments (to the Law of Ukraine “On education”) bluntly violate rights of Hungarian minorities. It is a shame that a country striving to develop increasingly closer relations with the EU adopted decision that absolutely contradicts European values. It is impermissible when Ukraine deprives Hungarians of their right for studying in their native language at kindergartens and primary schools». He also emphasized that Hungarian authorities are alarmed by the plight of Hungarian ethnic minority in Ukraine. Besides that, many Hungarian officials consider raid of the Hungarian cultural center as an insult and think that such actions are illegal ones.



June 25 – Uzhgorod city: more than a hundred of Ukrainian Roma people gathered together in Uzhgorod near the building of city state. They came to demonstrate their protest against the increase of frequency of acts of violence and racism committed in Ukraine. The rally was provoked by demolition of Roma camp in Lvov that occurred on June 23.


June 25 – Beregovo city (Zakarpacie region): the biggest symbol of solidarity of Ukrainians and Hungarians -- the Cross on Mount Kerek – vandalized by thugs belonging to “Ukrainian Insurgent Army” (UPA) – an ultra-right radical organization. They “decorated” the walls of the monument with UPA salute «Glory to Ukraine – Glory to the Heroes!»: The red-black UPA banner “decorates” the very basement of the Cross.



June 26 – The Council of Europe General Secretary Thorbjørn Jagland wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of Ukraine Vladimir Groysman urging Ukrainian authorities to sort out situation with attacks on Roma people in Ukraine.

He expressed his disapproval of the attack on Roma camps in Kiev at Lysa Hora. A situation with the attack in Lvov outraged him by the fact that police supposedly knew about the planned attack but failed to address the emerging problem.

«It is of great importance that all relevant actors at the highest political level, as well as local authorities and police forces, mobilize in response to this situation, which seems to have spread throughout Ukraine. The Council of Europe, as well as its member states, have a duty to uphold the European Convention on Human Rights, including its provisions regarding the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment (Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention)», – the letter states.



The «INSTITUTE OF LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION NAMED IN HONOR OF IRYNA BEREZHNA» (hereinafter “the Institute”) is a public, non-profit human rights organization which has collaborated effectively in Ukraine with the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine since they came into being. Since 2014 associates of the Institute have been rendering legal assistance to victims in Donbass, representing their interests in the Ukrainian national courts and as well as the in the European Court of Human Rights regarding issues related to deviation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine from international obligations, illegal suspension of pensions and social subsidies, as well as unwarranted bombings of peaceful citizens by Ukrainian Armed Forces and volunteer battalions, and other facts of violations of civil rights and freedoms.

The Institute carries out systematic monitoring of violations of human rights and freedom of speech in Ukraine and forwards corresponding materials to the UN and OSCE Missions. Facts provided by the Institute relating to violations of international law are reflected in the corresponding Mission Reports.

The Institute likewise works closely with Amnesty International Ukraine, the Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada on Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other bodies and organizations.

The “ANTIFASCIST HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE” (hereinafter “the League”) is a public organization that defends rights and freedoms, and legal interests of Ukrainian citizens and other individuals on both national and international levels, promotes renovation of legal education in the field of anti-fascist activities and prevents manifestation of neo-Nazism and neo-Fascism in Ukraine. Working within the framework of its’ charter activity and defending territorial communities, the League has worked within the legal process to appeal the decisions of governing bodies to illegally rename cities and avenues, including those by the Kyiv City Council to change the name of Moscow Avenue to Stepan Bandera Avenue (a key WWII Nazi collaborationist leader, today a “glorious leader”) and Nikolay Vatutin Avenue to Roman Shukevich Avenue (another Nazi collaborationist leader, today a “glorious leader”).

Annex 351

Iryna Berezhnaya Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, REPORT: INFRINGEMENT OF
RIGHT AND FREEDOMS IN UKRAINE (2019)

(excerpt)



**the «INSTITUTE OF LEGAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
NAMED IN HONOR
OF IRYNA BEREZHNA»**

**Nongovernmental organization
«ANTIFASCIST HUMAN RIGHTS
LEGAL LEAGUE»**



Human Dimension Implementation Meeting 2019

Europe's largest annual human rights and democracy conference, organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), is taking place in Warsaw, Poland, from 16 to 27 September 2019.

REPORT

Infringement of Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine

Manifestation of Discrimination
Incitement of Ethnic Hatred,
Hate Crimes and Extremism
As a Source of Neo-Nazism in Ukraine

REPORT
**Infringement of Rights
and Freedoms in Ukraine**

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Iryna BEREZHNA:

Elected representative to the 6th and 7th Sessions of the Ukrainian Parliament, Honored Jurist of the Ukraine, PhD in Philosophy within the field of Jurisprudence, Founder of the Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, Founder of the Anti-Fascist Human Rights League. Tragically died on August 5, 2017.

The «INSTITUTE OF LEGAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
NAMED IN HONOR
OF IRYNA BEREZHNA»

Nongovernmental organization
«ANTIFASCIST HUMAN RIGHTS
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Infringement of Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine

Manifestation of Discrimination Incitement of Ethnic Hatred, Hate Crimes and Extremism As a Source of Neo-Nazism in Ukraine

1. Racial discrimination, infringement of national minorities' rights:
 - 1.1. Discrimination on language basis. Restriction of non-Ukrainian-speaking citizens' rights.
 - 1.2. Discrimination based on ethnicity. Manifestation of anti-Semitism and other forms of xenophobia.
2. Issues of freedom of religion and discrimination based on religion.
3. Restrictions of the right of access to information. Discrimination based on belief and other forms of discrimination.
4. Territorial discrimination – social inequality.
5. Incitement of ethnic hatred, hate crimes and extremism as a source of Neo-Nazism in Ukraine:
 - 5.1. Description of the main parties and organizations promoting the Neo-Nazi ideology;
 - 5.2. Extremist activity in facts:
 - a) Attacks on peaceful socio-political events;
 - b) Anti-Semitic, racist and other xenophobic manifestations;
 - c) Participation of Neo-Nazis in incitement of religious hatred;
 - 5.3. Merger of Neo-Nazi groups with governmental structures of Ukraine.
6. Conclusion.
7. Recommendations.

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ethnic Hungarians, Romanians, Gagauz and representatives of other national minorities of Ukraine.

This Law stipulates mandatory use of Ukrainian language throughout the country in government agencies and local self-governments, as well as in all public spheres of life of the society.

It should be noted, that OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Lamberto Zannier on July 29, 2019 officially announced that language law adopted in Ukraine says nothing about protection of national minorities' languages. That means Ukraine must provide the law's compliance with the best international practices. In particular, he stated: "One of current problems is associated with implementation of recommendations of the Council of Europe. For instance, this refers to distinction between languages of the EU and all other languages. Such a classification suggests application of unequal policies to different national minorities, and this means introduction of elements of discrimination. First, the law says nothing about protection of languages of national minorities. We work with Ministry of Culture [of Ukraine] on certain changes that should appear in the document to take into account the role of Russian language, in particular. Second, all questions about usage of the state language are resolved rather strictly – not via a system of incentives and rewards that we would like to see, but via punishment. Third, the law adopted without consultations with representatives of national minorities".

Discriminatory nature of some norms of this law:

- a ban on secondary and higher education in Russian language and in languages of national minorities, forfeiture of Russian-language books, a complete ban on commercial distribution of software in Russian-language, and ban on Russian-language mass media;
- infringement on the rights of patients of medical institutions who do not speak the state language;
- Evident discrimination in the service industry, where a mandatory usage of Ukrainian language only is stipulated;
- conduction of all public events, including cultural events, exclusively in Ukrainian language.

According to the already valid law, the newly created body endowed with repressive powers – the Commissioner for Protection of the State Language – ensures observance of the above-described norms. And this

happens in the country, where, according to 2018-19 opinion polls, some 65% – 77% of population use Russian language in everyday life.

1.2. Discrimination based on ethnicity. Manifestation of anti-Semitism and other forms of xenophobia

In 2018-2019, number of various right-wing organizations attacks on Roma and representatives of other nationalities significantly increased.

On April 21, 2018, the neo-Nazis from "C14" group destroyed and burned down a Roma camp located on Lysaya Gora in Kiev.

On May 9, 2018, nationalists burned a Roma camp in Rudnoye village near city of Lviv.

In the evening of May 22, 2018, right-wing radicals attacked a tent Roma camp near the city of Ternopol. Right-wing radicals used firearms in course of the attack.

On May 27, 2018, in Kiev, activists representing various ultra-right organizations in staged a betting of Caucasian and Turkish delis at one of Kiev markets located near Lesnaya subway station.

On June 7, 2018, young men from the "National Militia" not only destroyed Roma homes in the Golosevsky Park in Kiev, but invited Kiev's mass media outlets to witness this action.

On the night of June 23-24, 2018, a group of Nazis attacked a Roma village located at the outskirts of Lviv: one of its residents, a 23-year-old native of the Transcarpathian region – stabbed to death, another 4-year-old boy, two 19-year-old boys and a 30-year-old woman hospitalized with severe injuries.

In August 2019, the Peremyshlyansky District Court of Lviv region found guilty, but waived punishment and released two detainees who took part in attack on Transcarpathian Roma camp in the city of Lviv in June 2018.

On October 23, 2018, nationalists dispersed Roma camp located near Kiev railway station.

The year of 2019 witnesses continuation of similar unlawful acts against Roma and representatives of other nationalities.

On August 29, 2018, vandals desecrated Hungarian flag in the village of Sotovino (Transcarpathian region) in a process of a church robbery.

On September 19, 2018 in the city of Poltava vandals once again desecrated the Memorial to the Grieving Mother: vandals poured paint on it, leaving a call to kill Jews on the monument.

On September 26, 2018, representatives of the "National Corps" conducted a protest action near Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kiev, demanding to expel Hungarian consul from Ukraine.

On the night of October 14, 2018, in the city of Kamenez-Podolsky (Khmelnitsky region), neo-Nazis desecrated a memorial dedicated to Holocaust victims.

On January 30, 2019, in the city of Lutsk, the Regional State Administration spearheaded conduction of the Solemn Academy in the regional theater – the event was dedicated to the 110th anniversary of Stepan Bandera's birthday.

In February 2019, a memorial plaque in honor of the Nazi collaborator – Hauptsturmführer of SS Galicia Division of the Third Reich Averkyy Goncharenko installed in the settlement of an urban-type Varva, Chernihiv Region.

On February 1, 2019, the 6th Forum "Bandera Readings" was held in Kiev in the pillared hall of the Kiev City Council.

On February 18, 2019, in the city of Kiev, the right-wing group "C14" held a rally "Bandera, get up!"

On February 24, 2019, in the Volyn region, with local authorities' participation, the memory of a Nazi police officer – the murderer and UPA officer Grigory Perejnyak (sentenced to life imprisonment by Polish court) – was honored solemnly.

On March 18, 2019, in the urban-type settlement of Bogorodchany, Ivano-Frankivsk Region, local authorities unveiled a monument to Nazi collaborators, war criminals and murderers of Jews – Oleksa Khymency and Ivan Shimansky – who served in the SS Nahtigal battalion.

On March 25, 2019, children from the Ukrainian scout organization "Plast" (from "Kurin 107" squad named after Pyotr Voynovsky) from the city of Chernivitsi paid tribute to the commander of Bukovinsky Kuren – Pyotr Voynovsky. He is a war criminal, a Nazi collaborator, an organizer and performer of Jewish Pogroms in Bukovina, a participant of mass killings of Jews in Babi Yar, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr and other cities.

On April 2, 2019, in the city of Truskavets, Lviv region, the local authorities erected a monument to an executioner of Jews – the head of Ukrainian auxiliary police of the city of Truskavets Roman Riznyak. He

was an OUN activist who personally participated in the Jewish Pogroms of July 1941 and in extermination of about 3,000 Jews of Truskavets and the nearby region in 1942.

On April 30, 2019, the city of Ivano-Frankivsk conducted a competition for the regional "Hortling Cup" (Cossack martial art) in honor of the 76th anniversary of formation of the Galichina SS division of the Third Reich.

On May 5, 2019, in the village of Nizhny Bereзов (Ivano-Frankivsk Region), local authorities erected a monument to the war criminal Mykola Arsenych. He was the head of the OUN security service, one of organizers and executors of Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine of summer of 1941 and the Volyn Massacre of Poles.

On May 22, 2019, in Kiev, at the initiative of the Kiev City Council, the solemn inauguration of a mural in honor of Simon Petlyura (the organizer of Jewish Pogroms) was held.

On July 4-6, 2019, the city of Melitopol hold a festive event, dedicated to rampant anti-Semite and Nazi collaborator Dmytry Dontsov. The Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine organized and financed the festive event.

On July 17, 2019, the Ministry of Education of Ukraine recommended usage of board games books in Ukrainian schools: the books distort history of the OUN-UPA – the guerilla squads that fought against Nazis of the Third Reich are named enemies, while collaborators and accomplices of fascist Germany are presented as heroes.

On July 29, 2019, under the sound of the national anthem in the Zolochivsky district of the Lviv region, a solemn memorial service and reburial of remains of Nazi collaborators of SS "Galichina" division took place. The ceremony dedicated to the 75th anniversary of defeat of the division near Brody (Lviv region).

The state-sponsored event was attended by the Guard of Honor Company of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, members of "Reserve of the Galician fraternity of former soldiers of 1st Ukrainian division "Galicia" of Ukrainian National Army" (they spotted the Nazi uniform), priests, representatives of authorities and public organizations. The state-sponsored event ended with a military salute.

On July 31, 2019, local authorities of the city of Kamenez-Podolsky opened the mural dedicated to Simon Petlyura – the anti-Semite and instigator of Jewish Pogroms.

On August 28, 2019, local authorities of the city of Ternopol conducted sports and patriotic contest for the Shukhevych Cup – a war criminal, Nazi collaborator and Hauptsturmführer SS.

On September 2, 2019, during a school assembly dedicated to Day of Knowledge, some neo-Nazis in Lviv threw stones at school #24 (with instruction in Polish language). One stone hit a representative of Polish consulate.

2. Issues of freedom of religion and discrimination based on religion

Starting since 2014 the State of Ukraine grossly violated norms of Ukraine's Constitution regarding to freedom of religion and separation of church from the state, as well as provisions of Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations".

So, in April 2018, the authorities represented by President Poroshenko (and later by MPs of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) sent letters to Patriarch of Constantinople requesting creation of Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Ukraine (hereinafter PCU) on the basis of non-canonical, non-recognized by other Orthodox churches and religious organizations – Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate (hereinafter UOC-KP) and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (hereinafter UAOC).

In course of preparations to the unification council for creation of a new church authorities exerted pressure on priests of the canonically recognized Ukrainian Orthodox Church (hereinafter referred to as the UOC) demanding to change their affiliation in favor of the newly created church.

For example, in November 2018, the right-wing radicals threatened Bartholomew, the Metropolitan of Rivne and Ostroh Rivne dioceses of the UOC, demanding his participation in creation of the CEC.

In November 2018, supporters of the new church tried to take by storm the residence of Efreim, the Metropolitan of Kryvyi Rih and Nikolopol UOC in Dnipropetrovsk region.

Law enforcement agencies had never reacted to the above-described offenses.

On December 15, 2018, at the Boryspil Airport (Kiev), State Border Guard officers detained Metropolitan Bartholomew of the Rivne and Ostroh UOC, obliging him to attend the unification council dedicated to creation of the PCU.

On the eve of unification council in November 2018 many senior hierarchs of the UOC were repeatedly called to the Security Service of Ukraine (hereinafter SBU) for "preventive conversations", where officers actively tried to persuade them to participate in this event.

At mentioned interrogations Bishop Pimen, the Vicar of Rivne diocese of the UOC, and Luka, the Metropolitan of Zaporizhia and Melitopol (as well as other clergymen) sustained psychological pressure.

Both central and local authorities openly hindered conduction of the Procession of the Cross, initiated by the UOC in July 2018 and dedicated to the 1030th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia

Also on August 14, 2018, on the day of the Depreciation of the Honored Trees of the Holy Life-Giving Cross, the congregation and the clergy of Odessa diocese of the UOC were not allowed to worship in Temple in honor of Saints Cyril and Methodius located at Odessa Military Academy.

On December 15, 2018, in the city of Kiev, some clergy together with President of Ukraine Poroshenko held a unification council dedicated to creation of PCU church.

Meanwhile, in December 2018, the canonical UOC won a legal dispute: Ukrainian court rejected Ministry of Culture of Ukraine's claim on registering each diocese and monastery of the UOC on basis of a separate charter.

Deputies of regional councils of three regions of Western Ukraine at the end of 2018, in their turn, forwarded official appeals to the SBU requesting to check the "anti-Ukrainian activities of the UOC" (that is, not activities of specific clergy, but of the church itself – the centuries-old canonical church, which has more than 20 million followers in Ukraine).

Also in December 2018, MPS of Verkhovna Rada adopted amendments to Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations", stipulating mandatory change of the canonical UOC's name. This is an unacceptable interference of authorities in religious matters.

However, on April 22, 2019, the Kiev District Administrative Court decided to suspend the process of mandatory renaming of Ukrainian Orthodox Church until proper consideration of the case.

On January 6, 2019, in Istanbul (Turkey), at the Fener in the Church of St. George, Patriarch Bartholomew, with participation of President

According to the norms of Article 1 of the Law, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) are recognized as fighters for the independence of Ukraine. Their leaders are: Hitler's military intelligence agency "Abver" agent Stepan Bandera, SS Hauptsturmführer Roman Shukhevych (former deputy commander of the Nahtigall battalion and deputy commander of the 201st security (schutzmannschaft) battalion of the Third Reich army), one of the organizers of genocide of civilian population of Ukraine – Jews, Poles and representatives of other nationalities.

The law prescribes criminal liability for a negative assessment of activities of the abovementioned organizations and their leaders. According to Law provisions, on January 30, 2018, deputies of Lviv Regional Council decided to use the OUN-UPA flag on an equal footing with the state flag (Lviv region includes 44 cities, 34 urban-type villages and 1850 villages.). Deputies of Volyn Regional Council, Ternopil City Council, Kiev City Council and many other councils adopted similar decisions.

By decision of the local authorities of Kiev, Lviv, Ternopol, Zhytomyr and other cities, avenues and streets were renamed in honor of the aforementioned collaborators. State authorities issue orders on conduction of official propaganda actions aimed at glorification of their activities in secondary schools and even in kindergartens.

For example, the city of Lviv every year (starting from 2017) – from June 30 to July 2 – conducts a festival in honor of Shukhevych ("Shukhevych-fest"). The timing of the festival coincides with dates of the Lviv Pogroms of 1941, when 4,000 Jews were murdered.

Besides that, on March 26, 2019, Law of Ukraine on Amending the Law "On Status of War Veterans, and Guarantees of Their Social Protection" entered into force: collaborators and militants – a part of the Third Reich's agencies – were recognized as combatants "for independence" of Ukraine in the 20th century".

In 2007 Ukraine issued a postage stamp dedicated to the 100th anniversary of Shukhevych's birth, and in 2018 – a series of stamps glorifying the personnel of the SS "Galichina" division (formed in 1943, and consisted of members of the OUN). Solemn events in honor of Ukrainian collaborators who served Nazis, in particular in the 14th SS Galicia Division, are regularly held at the state level in Western Ukraine. Reburial of

soldiers and officers of this Nazi Germany division is solemnly carried out by people dressed in military uniform of the Third Reich.

Resolution of the European Parliament of December 13, 2012 with condemnation of election of the neo-Nazi party "Freedom" to Verkhovna Rada is still valid. The resolution stated: "... racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views of this political force contradict the fundamental values and principles of the EU ...". It remains relevant, as in Ukraine, along with this political force a number of other political parties and organizations (the presenters of nationalistic radical ideology) operate freely and openly. A number of their leaders and members were MPs of the previous convocation of Verkhovna Rada, existing regional and city councils, and among employees of executive branch agencies, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine, and other state structures and institutions of Ukraine. These proponents of national radicals, openly propagating neo-fascism, formed "volunteer battalions", which became part of the Armed Forces and National Guard of Ukraine.

5.1. Description of the main parties and organizations promoting the Neo-Nazi ideology

Among the most prominent neo-Nazi political parties and public organizations in Ukraine are:

Political party "All-Ukrainian Association "Freedom"" is a radical nationalist political party (its original name is Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine – SNPU). One of its founders is a former Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and now the MP Andrei Paruby. On September 4, 2018, he publicly expressed his admiration for Hitler as the greatest representative of "direct democracy". The party program documents of the "Freedom" are aimed at glorification of the OUN-UPA members. The anti-Semitic and xenophobic statements of leaders and members of this party characterize it as a neo-Nazi one.

The political party "National Corps" is an ultra-right nationalistic party created on the grounds of "Azov Civil Corps" public group. The leader of the party is Andrei Biletsky (nicknamed "The White Leader"), a Lieutenant Colonel and former MP of Verkhovna Rada (8th convocation), commander of the volunteer battalion (later regiment) "Azov", well known for his neo-Nazi, racist and anti-Semitic beliefs and statements. Since September 17, 2014, the Azov regiment is officially a part of the National Guard of Ukraine.

This party uses the “Wolfsangel” (Wolf Hook) emblem – a symbol of the Nazi political party and units of the criminal SS structure. This emblem is a mirror copy of the emblem of Nazi SS division “Das Reich” (“Empire”) and is officially approved by Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine as the ensign of the “Azov” regiment. The “National Corps” is actively engaged in promotion and propaganda among children, adolescents and youth with the aim of upbringing them in a paramilitary aggressive nationalistic spirit. For this purpose, they use, in particular, the specially organized summer camps for children and youth – “Azovets” and other structures.

The Right Sector political party (headed by Andriy Tarasenko) and its paramilitary wing – the “Volunteer Ukrainian Corps” (leader Andriy Stempitsky) does not obey official state structures and promotes the neo-Nazi ideology of Ukrainian nationalism. The official emblem of the party is the OUN-UPA banner.

“OUN Volunteer Movement” is a right-wing group formed in August 2015 after the OUN split. Its head is the commander of the “Volunteer Battalion of the OUN” Nikolai Kokhanivsky, a person repeatedly prosecuted for violent extremist actions. The organization’s program describes establishment of a temporary nationalistic dictatorship in Ukraine and construction of a corporate-syndicalist state. In other words, it fully corresponds with the ideological component of Italian fascism.

“C14” or “Sich” (headed by Eugene Karas) is a nationalistic right-wing radical social group created in 2009. Its neo-Nazi nature is confirmed by usage of Nazi symbols: the “Celtic cross”, the runes “Taivaz” (“Tür”) – the symbol of the Hitler’s Youth Movement. “C14” members are among organizers and participants of attacks on journalists, Roma camps in cities of Kiev and Lviv in 2018, acts of vandalism, etc.

“C14” activist Andrei Medvedko is accused of killing of an opposition writer and journalist Oles Buzina on April 16, 2015.

An example of a unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, whose members promote neo-Nazi views, is “Aidar” battalion (its official name is the “24th separate “Aidar” assault battalion), formed by former MP Sergei Melnichuk. It is staffed with members of the “Maidan Self-Defense” organizations and “The Right sector”.

The emblem of a special forces battalion of Ministry of Internal Affairs “Kiev-2” reproduces Nazi symbols – the so-called “Adam’s head”

(a grinning skull) with runic symbols and eagle wings, similar to the cap insignia of officers of the SS division “Totenkopf” (“Dead Head”). In 2017, the “Freedom”, “The Right Sector”, “Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN)”, “OUN”, “C14” and other right-wing radical organizations supported the National Manifesto of the National Corps party of Andriy Biletsky – a program calling for unity of neo-Nazi political forces with a purpose of their advent to power in Ukraine.

In July 2019, candidates for MPs from this union formed under the auspices of the “Freedom” party failed to pass the prescribed 5% threshold for entering the parliament.

5.2. Extremist activity in facts

Ukrainian radical nationalists, closely intertwined with the state structures, incite ethnic hatred in Ukraine, imposing leaders of the OUN-UPA and other Nazi collaborators on Ukrainian society as national heroes.

Attacks characterized with impunity constantly occur in the modern Ukraine. Organized groups, consisting of members of neo-Nazi parties and organizations, carry out attacks on participants of various peaceful events, including representatives of LGBT communities, of ethnic minorities (Roma Pogroms, anti-Semitic protests, in particular, destruction of Holocaust victims’ memorials, etc.). Representatives of the above-mentioned and similar nationalistic groups openly promote Nazi symbolic, conduct numerous marches and rallies, where they chant anti-Semitic, Russo-phobic and Nazi slogans and greetings.

In 2014 – 2019, ultra-right extremist groups “C14”, “Right Sector”, “Carpathian Sich” and others repeatedly launched multiple attacks in different cities of Ukraine: against Roma communities, against anti-fascist demonstrations, against events organized by Amnesty International, against public actions of LGBT communities, as well as other peaceful actions, including human rights protests.

From January 2017 and up to 2019, radical organizations members tried to disrupt or disrupted more than 37 events organized by the LGBT community.

On March 8, 2018, in the city of Uzhgorod neo-Nazis attacked a rally held for the rights of women, dousing its participants with paint.

On June 18, 2019, a rally dubbed “Anniversary of a gay pride parade on blood” was held on Bankova Street (Kiev) near the building of Presi-

dential Administration of Ukraine: participants demanded from President of Ukraine to cancel the March for Equality.

On June 19, 2019, four balaclava-clad neo-Nazis attacked guests of the film screening conducted as a part of Kiev Pride 2019.

On June 23, 2019, right-wing radicals brutally attacked the column of participants of March for Equality in Kiev (former European parliament MP Rebecca Harms took part in this march).

Since the beginning of 2014, a number of xenophobic incidents and crimes, in particular, anti-Semitic ones, has drastically increased in Ukraine. According to Ministry of Diaspora Affairs of the State of Israel, the number of anti-Semitic incidents is growing annually in Ukraine. This happens amidst the full-blown campaign of glorification of individuals responsible for persecution and mass murdering of Jews in Ukraine in the 20th century.

518 acts of demonstratively overt vandalism, of desecration of synagogues, Jewish cemeteries and memorials to victims of Holocaust, other victims of the Second World War, and soldiers who liberated Ukraine from Nazi occupation with Nazi and anti-Semitic slogans and symbols were registered since February 2014.

There are numerous cases of attacks on citizens of Jewish nationality associated with inflection of especially severe bodily harm with a clearly expressed anti-Semitic implication.

The church named in honor of the icon of the Mother of God "Joy of All Who Sorrow" located near the Holocaust victims monument in Babi Yar in Kiev survived 11 arson attempts since 2014.

On October 22, 2018, Israeli Cuisine café premises burnt down in Odessa.

On November 18, 2018, in the city of Kiev on Mikhailovskaya Square, a people's assembly was held. Those present condemned the "scabby Kikes, Jewish gang, Masons, Habad", protested against the "Khazar Kaganate and the new Israel in Ukraine".

On January 20, 2019, in the city of Uman, an anti-Semitic rally was held: "Kikes discredit our faith and our country."

On June 3, 2019, militants of the National Corps (a division of the "Azov" battalion) attacked Ukrainian Jewish Committee office in Kharkov. The Israeli Cultural Center and Consular office of the State of Israel is in the same building.

On June 22, 2019, the day Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the neo-Nazi music festival Fortress Europe was held in Ukraine at the Bingo Club in Kiev. Neo-Nazi groups performed at the festival, shouting Nazi greeting "Zig Heil!" For instance, the "Sokira Peruna" band performed at the festival and presented the song "Kikes invented six million words of lies" (about Holocaust denial). The band's drummer was previously convicted for attacking Brodsky's synagogue in Kiev.

On June 30, 2019 in Lviv, on the 78th anniversary of Pogrom and massacre of Jews, the "National Corps", the "Freedom" Party, and "The Right Sector" held the "Millennium March of Ukrainian State", desecrating the memory of the 100,000 exterminated Jews of Lviv.

Authorities use right-wing radicals to seize temples, to apply pressure and intimidate citizens and clergymen. Law enforcement officers in most cases do not interfere and do not prevent such criminal actions.

Representatives of national radical parties and organizations, as well as of volunteer battalions, systematically commit illegal actions against the canonical UOC religious communities.

In 2018-2019, the right-wing radicals committed numerous registered illegal actions (threats, beatings of the UOC parishioners, blockade of Kiev-Pechersk Lavra (featured in UNESCO World Heritage List), and acts of vandalism at the territory of the ancient Tithe Church in Kiev.

The UOC parishioners and priests are systematically subjected not only to violent attacks, but also to discriminatory attacks initiated by the authorities.

In 2014-2019 the UOC communities (in particular, in the Rivne, Ternopol, Volyn regions) suffered massive attacks initiated by radical nationalists in order to seize religious buildings. In 2014-2019 at a time of incitement to hatred towards the UOC (both from authorities and from some mass media controlled by the authorities) multiple facts of systematic violence against the UOC representatives were registered as well as acts of vandalism targeted at religious buildings and temples.

In January-February 2018, right-wing radicals representing "C14" organization and a number of other groups tried to demolish the Tithe Monastery in Kiev, owned by the UOC.

In February 2018, in Lviv, some neo-Nazis with connivance of the authorities burnt down the UOC church.

Thus, Arsen Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine is the patron of “Azov”, “National Corps” and “National squads”. It was his idea to merge “Azov” with the National Guard of Ukraine.

Currently, the newly elected parliament in August 2019 saved ministerial job for Avakov, despite President Zelensky’s promise to dismiss all ministers of the previous government.

It was found in May 2018 that Ukrainian diplomat Vasily Marushchynets, who worked as a consul in Hamburg (Germany) starting since 2013, regularly posted openly anti-Semitic and Nazi comments on his Facebook page. One of his photographs shows how colleagues congratulated him with his 60th birthday — they handed him a cake in the shape of Hitler’s book “Mein Kampf”. Marushchynets emphasized that this picture was taken at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on February 10, 2016. In addition, this photo was published by Marushchynets in his book, that was distributed among Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ employees, including former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavel Klimkin. In the mentioned book titled “My Springs” and published in 2016, Marushchynets criticizes the “Magyars” for the occupation of Ukrainian lands and calls Poles the “historical enemies” of Ukraine, etc.

On March 8, 2019, Viktor Muzhenko, the Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, approved the new symbols of combat brigades of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The approved sleeve insignia depicts a skull and the motto “Ukraine or death” — it looks like an emblem of the SS 3rd Panzer Division “Dead Head”.

In 2018, Kiev City Council signed an agreement with the organization “C14”, allowing this group to create a “municipal guard” to patrol the streets: three of such patrols are registered in Kiev, and 21 — in other cities. The “C14” leader Evgeny Karas overtly admits collaboration with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

On June 8, 2018, Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine provided “C14” with an amount of money equal to approximately \$ 17,000 for setting up a children’s camp in order to promote “national projects of patriotic education” in the country. The ministry also allocated funds to following public groups: the “Golosevsky Crypt” (Golosevsky Krivivka), founded by Freedom Party members (700,000 UAH), and the “Educational Assembly”, that have links with ultra-right movements. In addition, government obliges teachers to promote an ideology of radical nationalism in preschool and school institutions.

Taking this into account, the report of the international organization Amnesty International states: “Ukraine is plunging into the chaos of uncontrolled violence created by radical groups enjoying complete impunity. Almost no one in the country can feel safe under these conditions”. Amnesty International, as well as other authoritative international organizations — Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and Front Line Defenders — stated that radical groups in Ukraine under disguise of patriotic rhetoric about traditional values can act in an atmosphere of almost total impunity, and this fact only encourages them for even greater violence.

Order of the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine No. 853 dated February 20, 2019 allocated funding to camps:

— All-Ukrainian youth military-patriotic camp “Khorunzhiy” named after the founder of “Poleskaya Sich” Taras Bulba-Borovets (organizer of Holocaust in Volyn region and Nazi accomplice); named after commander of the first UPA “hundred” G. Pereginyak (officer of Ukrainian auxiliary police of the Third Reich occupation administration in Ukraine); named after the first UPA commander in Volyn, V. Ivakhiv (organizer of the Jewish pogroms of 1941 in Western Ukraine, as well as massacres of Polish population of Volyn during German occupation of Ukraine).

Children in the last camp were trained throughout June and the first decade of July 2019 thanks to additional funding provided by Volyn Regional State Administration.

In August 2019 the Zhytomyr Regional State Administration together with the Ministry organized the All-Ukrainian festival in honor of “fighters for independence and territorial integrity” of “Olevskaya Republic”, dedicated to activities of Bulba-Borovets collaborator.

The Ministry has additionally allocated more than 10 million UAH for patriotic “educational” camps and rallies.

Glorification of collaborators and state-sponsored support of neo-Nazi ideology in Ukraine, including its promotion among minors, causes outrage and condemnation of the international community.


6. Conclusion

In addition to the abovementioned resolutions of the European Parliament of February 25, 2010 and December 13, 2012, the state policy of Ukraine on the glorification of OUN and UPA and infiltration of neo-Nazis in Ukrainian government was condemned by parliaments and

Annex 352

Irina Berezhnaya Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection, ONLINE ENVIRONMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INFRINGEMENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN UKRAINE (2022)

PUBLIC ORGANIZATION “IRINA BEREZHNYAYA INSTITUTE
FOR LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION”



ONLINE ENVIRONMENT

AS A TOOL FOR VIOLATION
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
IN UKRAINE



UKRAINE
2022

PUBLIC ORGANIZATION "IRINA BEREZHNAVA INSTITUTE
FOR LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION"



BEREZHNAVA Irina

is a well-known human rights activist, Ukrainian political and public figure, deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 6th and 7th convocation, First Deputy Head of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for European integration, author of many laws, honored lawyer of Ukraine, PhD in Law, founder of the Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection, founder of the Antifascist Human Rights League. Tragically died on August 5, 2017.

ONLINE ENVIRONMENT

AS A TOOL FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN UKRAINE



UKRAINE
2022


«МИРОВОРЕЦЬ»
 ШІТРАДЖА ДІЯЧІВІСТЬ: пошуки протидіяльності на злагоді між, і між-людськи і технологічною реформаю
 Center for Research of Digital Security of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine, also the first national lab
 Information for the education of Ukrainians and Jews: lessons about religious hatred, xenophobia, incitement, and various manifestations

Українська антимілітарна фундація

Поиск

Савенкова Файна Володимирівна / Savenkova Fayna Vladimirovna

Дата народження: 31.10.2008
 Страна: Украина
 Адрес:



Життя в екстремальних умовах і в умовах етнічної ворожобі.
 Членство в ультранационалистичній організації.
 Використання пропагандистських методик.
 Систематичне використання російської пропаганди і терористичними організаціями в політичних провадженнях шляху з сильною розбіжністю між Україною і в Україні і в її громадян.
 Називає себе прозаїком, драматургом, і ФАКТИСТОМ. На сайті деле розпространяє фейкфоту інформацію і, власне, доводить, «Чити їх» «слова писателів» і «участники во всевозможных конкурсах мистецтв і др. Указывает местом проживания «наборщосно».

Страница в соцсети (Украина) до 31.10.2008: <https://vk.com/id407802340>, https://prorok.org/ukr/finya5_walter-site-biznesvetova
<https://finyazavetova.wordpress.com/>, <http://finyazavetova.blogspot.com/>

Источники: http://dobra.ua/savenkova_1, <https://ukraina.eu.int/en/en/20200623/1028350412.html>

Council of Ukraine L. Denisova indirectly supported the functioning of the murderer Myrotvorets, since she, unlike the European Parliament, international organizations and the previous Commissioner for Human Rights, did not demand the website be shut down, but only that the information about the girl be deleted from its database.

On **March 14, 2021**, Roman Zaitsev, the executive director of Myrotvorets, said in an interview with the Ukrainian newspaper Fakty that this Internet resource is supported by the Ukrainian authorities (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Security Service of Ukraine and State Border Guard Service) as well as foreign (Western) special services. Roman Zaitsev confirmed that Myrotvorets database includes data of more than 240 thousand people, of which about 160 thousand are citizens of Ukraine.

It is obvious that the functioning of the «murder» Myrotvorets promotes discrimination against many thousands of citizens and poses a direct threat to their security.

3. INTERETHNIC, RACIAL INTOLERANCE. PROSECUTION OF ANY IDENTIFIABLE GROUP OR COMMUNITY FOR NATIONAL, ETHNIC OR OTHER REASONS

3.1. Manifestations of anti-Semitism

Incitement to hatred is deeply rooted, complex and multifaceted phenomenon that takes many detrimental forms and has a disastrous influence on individuals, communities and society at a whole. This phenomenon is spreading especially actively and effectively with the use of the digital technologies and the Internet.

Over the past seven years, following the unconstitutional transition of power in February 2014, the level of anti-Semitism in Ukraine has grown significantly. Today the level of anti-Semitism in Ukraine is one of the highest in Europe.

Members of the Executive Committee of the World Jewish Congress and the Ambassador of the State of Israel to Ukraine have repeatedly stated that anti-Semitism level is growing in Ukraine.

However, the Ukrainian government, instead of opposing any manifestation of xenophobia and anti-Semitism, honours the participants in the massacres of Jews, including in Babi Yar (Kiev), at the state level

Thus, on **December 3, 2019**, the deputies of the highest legislative body – the Verkhovna Rada (the Supreme Council) of Ukraine, adopted Resolution No. 2364 on the celebration in 2020 of memorable dates and anniversaries of the organizers of anti-Semitic outrages and massacres of Jews. Moreover, this resolution allocated significant funds for commemorative events, and the Ministry of Education is obliged to conduct lessons and educational classes to honour the accomplices of the Third Reich, as well as organizers and participants in the massacres of Jews. In addition, it is planned to issue commemorative coins and postage stamps in honour of these persons.

On the lists of heroes of the day there are Vasil Levkovich – a Nazi collaborator, war criminal from the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Dubno, organizer and participant in the massacres of 5 thousand Dubno Jews and many thousands of Rivne Jews, convicted in 1947 by the Military Tribunal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kiev region;

Ulas Samchuk – editor-in-chief of the Rivne Nazi anti-Semitic newspaper Volyn, who published anti-Semitic articles calling for the killing of Jews;

Maksim Zheleznyak – the leader of the Koliivshchyna, organizer of anti-Semitic outrages and massacres of Jews in Uman (Uman massacre) in the 18th century;

Vladimir Kubiiovich – an accomplice of the Third Reich, initiator of the creation of the SS Galicia division;

Ivan Poltavets-Ostryanitsa – participant in the massacres of Jews in Volyn, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa and Belaya Tserkov;

Yaroslav Starukh – a member of the OUN management, organizer of anti-Semitic outrages;

Vasyl Sidor – a member of the OUN and UPA, the commander of a hundred in the Nachtigall Battalion, which took part, together with German soldiers, in punitive operations;

Vasyl Galasa – one of the leaders of the OUN, organizer of anti-Semitic outrages in the Ternopil Region and the massacres of Poles;

Andrey Melnik – the head of the OUN, a Nazi collaborator and war criminal, organizer of the massacres of Jews in Babi Yar.

The Ambassador of the State of Israel to Ukraine Yoel Lyon expressed indignation after the adoption of the above Resolution **on December 6, 2019**, pointing out that «*honouring those who voluntarily decided to cooperate with the Nazi regime is an insult to the memory of the six million Jews killed by the Nazis.*»

Soon, on **February 27, 2020**, the deputies of the Kiev City Council adopted a resolution on the celebration in Kiev of memorable dates and anniversaries in honor of the same collaborators – V. Kubiiovich, I. Poltavets-Ostryanitsa, V. Levkovich, U. Samchuk, V. Sidor, Yu. Lipa, V. Galasy, A. Melnik and others. By the decision of the Administrative Court of Kiev dated **January 19, 2021**, this resolution on the celebration of memorable dates of persons involved

in the Holocaust and war crimes who collaborated with the Nazis was cancelled.

Nevertheless, despite the adoption of the court's decision, the People's Deputies of Ukraine did not cancel their resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine concerning the celebration of the same persons involved in the Holocaust and collaborated with the Nazis. Evgeny Boyko, director of the Lviv mayor's administration department, deputy of the Lviv City Council, wrote on his Facebook page: «*Now we will talk about them even more often: Ulas Samchuk, Yury Lipa, Andrey Melnik, Vladimir Kubiiovich will never disappear from the public space of Lviv. The next week, all schools in Lviv will hold open educational lessons about these outstanding Ukrainians.*» Thus, civil servants, despite injunctions, openly promote anti-Semitism and honour those involved in the Holocaust and collaborated with the Nazis.

Likewise, ignoring the court decision, the deputies of the Supreme Council again adopted Resolution No. 1092-IX dated **December 16, 2020** on the celebration in **2021** of memorable dates and anniversaries of Nazi accomplices – participants of anti-Semitic outrages and massacres of Jews. For example, celebration of Vladimir Shchigelsky, a Nazi war criminal, commandant of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, a participant in punitive operations to exterminate Jews and Poles, who was executed in 1949 for crimes against civilians in accordance with the Polish court decision; Dmytro (Roman) Kiyachkivsky – the organizer of the Volyn massacre – the mass extermination of peaceful Poles, including women and children, by the UPA in 1943-1944; Ivan Litvinenko – a participant in the massacres of Jews and the Volyn massacre, who was executed as a Nazi criminal in Kiev in 1947 on the basis of the decision of the Ukrainian court; Rostislav Voloshin – a Nazi collaborator, head of the regional council in Rivne, a participant in the extermination of more than 20 thousand Jews in Rivne and a thousand of Poles; Nikolay Kapustyansky – an accomplice of the Third Reich, organizer of the auxiliary police in Kiev, an accomplice in the extermination of Jews in Kiev, organizer of the Schutzmannschaft battalions.

At present, the Committee of the Supreme Council is preparing another draft resolution on the celebration in **2022** of memorable dates for the same

Nazi accomplices, participants in anti-Semitic outrages and massacres of Jews.

With the development of the Internet, anti-Semitism as propaganda, anti-Semitism as an ideology and everyday anti-Semitism have been transferred to social networks. However, in Ukraine, law enforcement and other state bodies do not carry out anti-Semitic monitoring; such analytical studies are carried out by some public organizations and human rights activists.

Thus, on **January 16, 2020**, on the Internet, including social networks, an advertisement of the Ternopil NUSHO.SHOP store selling T-shirts with the inscription «*Holy shit, are you a Jew?*» was published.

In October 2020, the management of the American Internet concern Facebook (since 2021 – Meta) decided to remove any content about Holocaust denial and distorted information about the genocide of Jews from the social network. Despite this, anti-Semitic propaganda is constantly being published in the Ukrainian segment of the social network Facebook.

Moreover, from **2014 to November 2021**, over 600 cases of desecration of synagogues, Jewish cemeteries and memorials to the victims of the Holocaust, vandalism of monuments and memorials in honour of the soldiers who liberated the territory of Ukraine from the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War were recorded in Ukraine. The vandals who have committed desecrations proudly share their «exploits» on the Internet and social networks.

2019

1. On September 16, 2019, neo-Nazis desecrated with a fascist swastika the memorial to the victims of the Holocaust at the site of the massacre of 54 thousand Jews in Bogdanovka settlement, Domanevsky district, Nikolayev region, and left the following note: «*Come to your senses, Jews. Stop! For the sale of Ukrainian land will quickly lead you to the Holocaust.*»



2. On October 1, 2019, neo-Nazis made the inscription «Death to the Jews» on the Stele at the entrance to the Novomirgorodsky district of the Kirovograd region.



3. On October 3, 2019, the grandniece of the commander of the battalion of the Ukrainian auxiliary Schutzmannschaft police Fyodor Melnychuk, a collaborator and organizer of anti-Semitic outrages and massacres of Jews in the city of Kremenets, Ternopil region, was awarded her grandfather's Golden Cross of Combat Merit award.



4. On October 10, 2019, the official anti-Semitic advertisement from the Kilimovy Yarmarok chain and the Novus shopping centre was placed in the Kiev underground.



5. On October 14, 2019, anti-Semites in camouflage left a scarecrow doused with red paint on the steps of the Brodsky Choral Synagogue in Kiev with a photograph of Igor Kolomoisky, President of the United Jewish Community of Ukraine.



6. On October 17, 2019, vandals damaged and desecrated the memorial to the victims of the Holocaust in the town of Yavoriv, Lviv region. About 4,500 people were shot in the territory of the Sand Mountain where the memorial stands, most of them were Jews.



7. On October 22, 2019, members of the National Scout Organization of Ukraine «Plast» stood guard at the grave of Vasil Ivakhiv, a murderer and sadist, the commander of the Ukrainian occupation police responsible for anti-Semitic outrage in Peremyshliany in July 1941. During the outrage, by the order of Vasyi Ivakhiv, a synagogue was burnt down, where ten people were burnt alive, and then dozens more citizens were killed in the streets. In addition, Ivakhiv is the organizer and leader of the massacres of peaceful Poles in Volyn.



8. On October 27, 2019, Neo-Nazis put the anti-Semitic inscription «Das ist Jude! Whack the Jews!» on the citylight advertising structure on Kosmonavtov square in Kiev with a poster for the concert of the Russian satirist Mikhail Zhvanetsky




9. On November 13, 2019, in Stary Ugrinov settlement, Ivano-Frankivsk region, they solemnly celebrated the 100th anniversary of the birth of Mikhailo Olenyuk – a collaborator, a militant of the Ukrainian auxiliary police of the Third Reich, who participated in the extermination of more than ten thousand Jews in Kalush and the surrounding area.



10. On November 25, 2019, in Kiev, neo-Nazis desecrated a monument to the world famous Jewish writer Sholem Aleichem with Nazi swastikas.



11. On December 8, 2019, in the Museum of Local Lore of Slavyansk, Donetsk region, with the participation of representatives of state authorities and local self-government, the exhibition «Defenders of Ukraine of 20-21 centuries» was opened. The exhibition presents the military uniform and weapons of the soldiers of the division of the German Waffen Division of the SS «Galicia» – Nazi collaborators who swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. An archival photograph is exhibited, in which Nazi criminal, organizer of the Holocaust and murderer of millions of Ukrainians, SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler greets the defenders of Ukraine – soldiers of Division of the SS «Galicia».




12. On December 10, 2019, in Volyn, the centenary of Aleksey (Oleksa) Shum, a Nazi collaborator and war criminal, was solemnly celebrated. A. Shum served in the auxiliary police for the Nazis and participated in the massacres of thousands of Jews in Kovel. Then he joined the UPA where he participated in the ethnic cleansing of Poles.



2020

13. On January 10, 2020, a group of about 30 Ukrainian radicals attacked a group of pilgrims near the grave of Rabbi Nakhman in the city of Uman, Cherkasy region. Four Jewish pilgrims were beaten at the grave of Rabbi Nakhman during the Shabbat.



14. On January 14, 2020, an inscription appeared on the wall of a house on Lavrskaya Street in Kiev: «We just have nothing to do / What about fighting the Jews?»



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15. On January 16, 2020, an advertisement of the Ternopil NUSHO.SHOP store for selling T-shirts with the inscription «Holy shit, are you a Jew?» was published on the Internet.



16. On January 19, 2020, in Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk region, neo-Nazis desecrated the Memorial Sign in memory of 15 thousand Jews killed in the Holocaust.






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17. On February 22, 2020, Facebook user Dmytro Bakai published a call for the murder of Jews as an «idea of the nation».

18. On February 25, 2020, in Vinnytsia, an anti-Semite in camouflage burst into the synagogue on Grushevsky street and attacked one of the community members while shouting «Beat the Jews».

19. On May 8, 2020, the director of the Ostrovsky and Partners law firm, Yury Ostrovsky, published a post on the Facebook social network with the following content: «*The Jews and the Muscovites have been destroying us from the 17th to the present day, and Hitler from the 41st to the 45th. Not a victory, but sorrow.*»

20. On June 15, 2020, the following announcement was published on the Internet, including the social network Facebook: «The First All-Ukrainian Competition Festival of Contemporary Ukrainian Music «Gonta-Fest» will take place on September 12, 2020, in Uman.» This festival is named after the organizer of the massacre of Jews – the Uman massacre – Ivan Gonta. The advertising poster has a sign that resembles a stylized swastika.



21. On September 12, 2020, anti-Semites put up a sign at the entrance to a grocery store in Uman with the text: «Hasidim are not served», then the text in Hebrew: «Hasidim are not allowed to enter.» Facebook user Mikhail Tkach reported this with indignation.



22. On November 4, 2020, at the old Jewish cemetery in Skole, Lviv region, the vandals desecrated the monument to the Jews executed by shooting. During the Nazi occupation, punitive forces from SS units, gendarmerie and auxiliary police shot more than 2,500 men, women and children of Jewish nationality at that place.



2021

23. On February 7, 2021, the publishing house «Centre for Educational Literature» published the book «Jews or Judes» by Nazi collaborator Zinoviy Knysh. Z. Knysh was directly involved in the Holocaust as an activist of OUN of A. Melnik, was an organizer of anti-Semitic outrages and head of the anti-Semitic Ukrainian Central Committee.


24. On October 6, 2021, Jewish poster at Kontraktova square in Kiev was painted with a Nazi swastika and the word «Jews».



25. On November 4, 2020, on the eve of the 78th anniversary of the liberation of the heroic city of Kiev from the Nazis, the deputies of the Kiev City Council decided to rename the street named after the heroic anti-fascist scout Nikolay Kuznetsov to the name of Nazi collaborator, anti-Semite and Holocaust accomplice Oles Babiy. The initiators of the renaming, deputies of the European Solidarity party fraction, celebrated that decision by performing the song «Our Batko Bandera» in the session hall.



26. On November 15, 2020, in the central park of the city of Korostyshev, Zhytomyr region, a monument to the rioters and mass murderers – members of the family of the Sokolovsky atamans, who in 1919 robbed and killed thousands of people, mostly Jews – was unveiled.



On September 22, 2021, the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine No. 1770-IX «On preventing and countering anti-Semitism in Ukraine», which came into force **on October 7, 2021**, and established the following: «*The manifestations of anti-Semitism include, in particular, a call to killing Jews, concealing or justifying their murder, providing false information, hate statements about persons of Jewish origin, denying the mass extermination of Jews during World War II, making and distributing any materials with anti-Semitic statements. The definition of anti-Semitism also includes the wilful damage, destruction or desecration of religious buildings and other structures belonging to persons of Jewish origin, Jewish communities and public Jewish organizations.*»

However, despite the entry into force of this law, anti-Semitic actions in Ukraine continue.

Thus, **on October 6, 2021**, the head of the pagan community of Chernigov, a graduate of the Technological University Anatoly Yaroshenko (Yaroved), published the following post on his Facebook account on the anniversary of Babi Yar:

«*Something about Babi Yar and the so-called tragedy.*

- 1) *There is not a single proof that mass executions took place in Babi Yar. Everything that this myth is built on is solely the stories of so-called witnesses.*
- 2) *There is not a single document that would record the number of people allegedly shot there. All numbers of victims are purely guesses and fictions. There is not a list of even 10 people, which would contain the names of those who were killed there.*
- 3) *There is not a single proof, testimony, memory or confirmation of the executions in Babi Yar among the soldiers of the Wehrmacht.»*

The law enforcement agencies of Ukraine did not take any measures in accordance with the already existing above-mentioned law for denying the mass extermination of Jews during the Second World War.

Анатолій Яровед ▶ СТАРИЙ ЧЕРНІГІВ

6 октября, 18:00 · 🌐

Дещо про Бабин яр та так звану трагедію, яка там начебто сталась.

Тільки факти і нічого окрім фактів:

1. Нема жодного матеріального доказу, що у Бабиному яру відбувались масові розстріли. Все, на чому побудований цей міф – виключно розповіді так званих свідків.
2. Нема жодного документу, який би фіксував бодай якусь кількість начебто там розстріляних людей. Всі цифри жертв – виключно здогадки та вигадки. Нема списку навіть з 10 осіб, який би містив прізвища тих, хто там загинув.
3. Нема жодних свідчень, показань, згадок та підтверджень розстрілів у Бабиному яру серед вояків вермахту.

28. On October 14, 2021, before the rally of Ukrainian nationalists near the Kiev monument to Taras Shevchenko, one of the participants in the uniform of an officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine greeted those around him with the words «For a Ukrainian Ukraine without the damned Yids and Muscovites.» Despite numerous publications of videos and information about the public expression of clearly hateful statements about persons of Jewish (and Russian) origin in the Internet media and social networks, law enforcement agencies did not react in any way to what was happening.



29. On October 27, 2021, on the building along Vesiolaya street, 5 in Lviv, vandals destroyed the miraculously spared pre-war Yiddish advertising inscription.


Despite the adopted law, a criminal case was not initiated for this act of vandalism, and there was no reaction from law enforcement agencies.



30. On November 3, 2021, during a rally in Odessa, a speaker insulted Jews, stating: «*Vaccination is Jewish fascism. Jews are destroying our citizens. This is their revenge for the Holocaust.*» The officers of the National Police Directorate who were nearby did not stop the speech and did not react in any way to what was happening.



31. On November 13, 2021, the Podolsk District Administration of Kiev and the Rivne Museum of Local Lore presented an archive photo of the deportation of Jews from Lodz to extermination camps during the Second World War as a forced resettlement of Ukrainians from Poland to Ukraine. Not a single state body of Ukraine responded to this violation, although the current law provides for liability for expressing false information about the Holocaust.




До 60-річчя депортації українців з етнічних земель Холмищини, Поділля, Надсяння, Лемківщини у Рівному встановлено пам'ятний знак.



32. On November 10, 2021, the Ukrainian poet, writer and translator Aleksandr Ivanets presented to the public his last lyrical and publicist creation dedicated to the President of Ukraine. Ivanets is a vivid representative of Ukrainian degradation; he boldly uses vocabulary that a rare writer would dare to use when describing the head of state: «a petty, worthless, hoarse evil.» «Lyricist» feels free about epithets: «shit», «bullshit» and the verb «jerk off». As a result, the poet comes to the main conclusion – the Ukrainian people have chosen the «Zaches-Untermensch», focusing on the ethnic origin of «evil»:

*«Has the majority really not realized yet
That they have chosen Zaches-Untermensch?
Will we still endure evil?
Will we become a minority?»*




Further, the author calls on Ukrainians not to tolerate evil, as the ashes of the Maidan knock on his heart.
(For reference: Untermensch or subhuman is a concept from the racial theory of the German National Socialists.) Law enforcement agencies also did not react to the above publication.

 **Олександр Іванець**
10 November, 10:12

...

Осінній день. Осіннє число.
Осічні мари й думки осінні:
Дрібне, нікчемне, хрипате зло
Бенкетує сьогодні в моїй країні.
Бо так воно одне на одне лягло:
Польмарення мізків, зневага, втомла,
І зло законно на трон запровазло
В костюмі вєдмедика Гаддінгтона.
Тепер он доквур; бенкетує воно,
Себе показати всіляко пнеться,
І перегоріє на лайно
Усе, до чого лиш доторчнеться.
Творить падаюцтва шораз напоказ,
Підорує є'го своє рукою,
Ще й погляда вилявно на нас
І гикає ширється: "А що таке?!"

До хати без стуків воно увійшло,
Усе пристойне учить німіє,
І зло являє своє ремісло,
На щастя воно нічого не вміє.
Зло каже в змани вам прнєсло!
Аби ж то було щось добре і гурне,
А зло тільки впарює нам фуфло,
І похорак наше майбутнє.
Невже до більшості ще не дійшло,
Що вибрали Цахєсл-унтермєнша?
Невже ми й надалі терпимо зло?
Невже ми й дали стовимю меншсть?
Та ми ще живи, й це ще наша земля,
І наша слава, і наша слава,
І на місцє сєржанта Ярослава Журавля
У лави стає Журавель Ярослава!
Хай завлич мій прозвучить невопад,
Та може досить терпи усе це?
В обличчя дикає листопад,
І попи Майдану стукє в серцє!

   689

Коментарі: 11 Поділились 157

33. On November 14, 2021, a Facebook user, an activist of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the head of the pagan community «Fern Flower» Vyacheslav Tolpyga (Priest Spas) published a post «*Why do we live so badly? Because «we are led by the Jews.»* Then Tolpyga reports that he «*does not like the fact that Ukrainians go to Jewish churches, give their children Jewish names, choose Jews as chiefs and have turned into Jews themselves.*»

Despite the law, which provides for responsibility for making hateful statements about persons of Jewish origin, law enforcement agencies did not react at all to that publication, although many users of the social network reposted that publication with indignation.




 **Жрець Спас**
14 November, 13:07

Чому ми так живемо, бо нами керують ж2, збагачуючись за наш рахунок.
Порох, Юля, Авак, Луцик, Зеля, Стеф, Разум, Ахмет, Коломой та інш Ж2.
Націонал партії очолює Ж2.
Ми увесь час на керівні посади чублячись один з іншим обираємо ж2.
Наш Народ в 95% відношенні ходить до реформованих ж2 церков, наш Народ в 95% відношенні дітей називає ж2 іменами.
Так що ми хочемо, щоб ми краще жили, якщо Народ Наш перетворився на ж2, і намагається стати гвинтиком в Системі Кабали

 8

Коментарі: 2

  Нравится  Поделиться

Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that the adopted law against anti-Semitism is just a «window dressing» and a formality in the report for foreign states and international organizations, and in fact, it is an inoperative legislative act.

3.2. Discrimination against national minorities

Since 2014, unfortunately, the Ukrainian Government has been violating the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992, and does not resist manifestations of discrimination against national minorities, including those on the Internet.

The Ukrainian Government has been discriminating national minorities in Ukraine at the legislative level for the past seven years.

Thus, the Law of Ukraine «On Education» adopted on September 5, 2017, contradicts the Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, pursuant to which the State is obliged to ensure the right of national minorities to study in their native language. However, Article 7 of this Law provides for the education for all categories of citizens in all secondary schools exclusively in the Ukrainian language all over the territory of Ukraine, except for children of indigenous peoples.

This legal provision has caused dissatisfaction in many countries, including the countries of the European Union. On December 8, 2017, the European Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice Commission, issued an expert opinion on the language provisions of the Ukrainian Law on Education. One of the findings of this opinion states that Article 7 of this Law does not ensure compliance with the key principles required for the implementation of the framework law in the context of the State's international and constitutional obligations.

The members of the Venice Commission concluded: «It is difficult to justify a less favourable attitude towards minority languages, and therefore it demonstrates the discriminatory nature of the rule. Taking these considerations into account, it would be a correct solution to amend Article 7, which would replace this provision with a more harmonious and explicitly worded one. The problem of discrimination against the languages of other minorities that

are not official languages in the EU should also be resolved during such a review.» However, the recommendations of the Venice Commission on Educational Reform have not been fully implemented by Ukraine within four years to date.

The Ukrainian Law «On Complete General Secondary Education» adopted by the Supreme Council on January 16, 2020, which is even more discriminatory against national minorities, became a dissonance to the above-mentioned conclusions of the Venice Commission. Thus, the right to study in their native language from 1st to 12th

grade with compulsory study of the Ukrainian language is reserved only for students from indigenous people. Moreover, the adopted law divides national minorities into two categories, which is a clear discrimination: the minorities of the States of the European Union (hereinafter the EU) and all the other ones.

The right to study the relevant languages is provided for persons from among national minorities whose languages are the official languages of the European Union, with compulsory education in the State language in the amount of at least 20% of the annual volume of learning time from 5th grade, with an annual increase in this volume (at least 40% – in 9th grade). The education in the state language is provided in the senior classes in the volume of at least 60% of the annual study time volume. Those who belong to other Ukrainian national minorities receive secondary education in state, municipal or private educational institutions in the state language in the volume of at least 80% of the annual volume of study time. The discrimination of this law against different groups and communities of national minorities is obvious.

Moreover, on April 25, 2019, the Supreme Council adopted the Law of Ukraine «On Ensuring the Ukrainian Language as the State One» (valid from July 16, 2019), aimed at the total dominance of the Ukrainian language in all life spheres and completely ignoring the rights of national minorities. The Law stipulates the complete education of citizens in the Ukrainian language, starting from preschool institutions to higher educational institutions. The exception is provided only for those from among national minorities whose languages are the official languages of the European Union – they are allowed to partially study in their native language until 2023.

In addition, on June 15, 2021, during the meeting of the 40th session of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Russian Senator Svetlana Goryacheva drew the attention of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the meeting participants to the bias of the Law on Indigenous Nationalities and discrimination against the Russian-speaking people in Ukraine, explaining: «*This is completely inconsistent with the legal decisions of the Council of Europe on the protection of indigenous nationalities. Maybe this is the case when the Council of Europe, instead of incantations about human rights, needs to really protect from discrimination in Ukraine everyone whom the state refuses to protect? How does the Council of Europe intend to react to this draft law and the long-term discrimination against the Russian and Russian-speaking population?*»

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe Maria Peichinovich-Burich replied that Ukraine has problems with ensuring the rights of national minorities and said that this issue is under the close attention of the organization, including the mission of the Council of Europe in Ukraine.

The non-governmental organization «Irina Berezhnaya Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection» has also repeatedly officially submitted appeals and prepared monitoring studies to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe Maria Peichinovich-Burich and the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities.

However, despite the official appeals of the Russian Federation – a member of the Council of Europe, as well as human rights organizations, there has been no concrete reaction from the Council of Europe to date.

Moreover, during an official visit to Ukraine on September 27-30, 2021, the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov, unfortunately, did not meet with representatives of Russian communities and leaders of human rights organizations defending the rights of the multimillion Russian-speaking population of Ukraine.

Likewise, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Maria Peichinovich-Burich, did not meet with representatives of national minorities during her official visit to Ukraine on November 3-5, 2021. In addition, during a joint press conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Ms. M. Peichinovich-Burich did not even mention the violation of the rights

and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens and the total discrimination against national minorities.

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe met only with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Minister of Justice, Speaker of the Supreme Council and members of the Ukrainian delegation to PACE.

Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that ethnocide is being committed in Ukraine against the Russian and Russian-speaking population.

3.4. Racism and other types of discrimination. Xenophobia and related intolerance

As the Ukrainian political regime has been actively supporting and promoting the ideology of Ukrainian nationalist fundamentalism since February 2014, an integral part of which is racial intolerance towards representatives of national and ethnic minorities, Ukrainian national radicals openly discriminate different groups of citizens without any punishment.

The Ukrainian society, unfortunately, does not perceive tolerance as a conscious abstinence from violence and resentment. Actions aimed at incitement to hatred and cruelty against national, ethnic or other group representatives still exist in the country.

Ukrainian nationalists have a particular prejudice against Gypsies (Roma). Due to historical prejudices against Roma in western Ukraine, their communities are constantly discriminated, including acts of violence leading to physical attacks and murders of their representatives. Moreover, local self-government bodies in some regions support such discriminatory actions of extreme right nationalist organizations. However, law enforcement agencies, as a rule, do not take any measures to respond to the Gypsies' persecution.

For example, on April 22, 2020, the Mayor of Ivano-Frankovsk, Ruslan Martsinkiv, officially ordered to take all the Roma representatives out of the city to the Transcarpathian region.

1. **On May 8, 2020**, in Izmail, Odessa region, thirty nationalists destroyed the house of a Gypsy family.

INTERETHNIC, RACIAL INTOLERANCE



2. On August 29, 2020, Ukrainian nationalists tried to arrange a «gypsy destruction» in Andreyevka settlement of the Balakleya district of the Kharkov region, however, the police managed to evacuate the Gypsy residents. Their house was bombarded with stones and eggs.

RACISM AND OTHER TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION



3. On October 17, 2021, militants of the extreme right Ukrainian organization «S-14» and «Municipal Guards» attacked a camp of Gypsies in Irpen, Kiev region. Andrey Medvedko, the defendant in the criminal case of the murder of Oles Buzina, a well-known author and journalist, was one of the organizers of this attack. During the march to the camp of Gypsies, the extreme right radicals put up their hands, representing the Nazi salute.



4. On **October 25, 2021**, in the afternoon, one nationalist beat Gypsy women in public and cynical manner at Khreshchatyk in Kiev, in plain sight of eyewitnesses.

5. On **November 17, 2021**, Ukrainian neo-Nazis lynched Gypsy girls in the centre of Kiev again. They caught their victims at Khreshchatyk, in a crowded place near the underground. They mocked them and damaged the girls' faces and clothes. The neo-Nazis filmed their hate-motivated bullying, broadcasted the beatings and later published this video on the Internet.



Hate-motivated persecution of Roma is not limited to physical violence. The extreme right organizations regularly harass them on the Internet by publishing offensive texts, cartoons, memes and collages. As a result, such publications in some cases were considered as calls for violence on the part of nationalists.

For example, in November 2020, a number of information publications in Ivano-Frankovsk published articles describing the Roma using negative ethnic stereotypes, which caused a wave of hate speech and calls for violence on social networks.

As a rule, the police do not take into account the motives of the attacks in the qualification of hate crimes, which are based on the victim's identity.

As an exception, on June 22, 2021, National Police investigator initiated a criminal case against the mayor of Rivne, Aleksandr Tretyak, for his numerous discriminatory statements against Roma citizens. The mayor was suspected under Part 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine concerning the violation of equal rights of citizens depending on their race, nationality. However, a court decision on this fact has not yet been issued.

The low level of demand for tolerance in Ukrainian society leads to the lack of response by the authorities to the manifestation of hatred towards an identifiable group or community, as well as to the appearance of radical organizations in Ukraine that publicly demonstrate homophobia and declare it as one of their key program principles.

Thus, in **June 2021**, the Committee of the Supreme Council suspended the promotion of a draft law on strengthening responsibility for hate-

Ukrainian nationalists openly publish calls for reprisals against representatives of LGBT communities on the Internet, as well as memes, collages and slurs.



The inability of the Ukrainian authorities to prevent hate-motivated violence encourages the extreme right groups' activity and the incitement to hate speech, including on the Internet.

4. REHABILITATION AND PROPAGANDA OF NAZI IDEOLOGY

After the unconstitutional transfer of power in February 2014 in Ukraine, neo-Nazism has been revived in the country with the support of the authorities, and a state-level policy of whitewashing and glorifying World War II Nazi accomplices, who were declared criminals by the Nuremberg Trials, has been carried on.

The European Parliament resolution «On the situation in Ukraine» dated 25/02/2010 (Clause 19), which condemned the Ukrainian Nazi organisation «Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists» (OUN) along with the annulled award of the Hero of Ukraine title to Stepan Bandera, the OUN leader (b) in 1938–1959, remains fully relevant at the present time. Nonetheless, contrary to the Resolution of the European Parliament Requirements, which is binding on the State of Ukraine, the deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine No. 314-VIII «On the Legal Status and Honouring the Memory of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence in the Twentieth Century» on 9 April 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the Law).

Under the first article of the Law, the Ukrainian Nationalist Organisation (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), both of which were collaborators with the Third Reich, are recognised as fighters for Ukrainian independence. Those organisations' leaders included Stepan Bandera, the agent of Hitler's Abwehr Military Intelligence Service, and SS Hauptsturmführer Roman Shukhevich (former deputy commander of the Nachtigall Battalion and deputy commander of the 201st Security (Schutzmannschaft) Battalion of the Third Reich army), one of the Ukrainian civilians genocide leaders – Jews, Poles and members of other nationalities were genocide victims. In addition, this law justifies members of the OUN and UPA despite the crimes they did in 1940–1950.

In December 2018, MPs passed a law amending Law of Ukraine No 2640-VIII «On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection», which equalised all rights of Nazi collaborators as «fighters for Ukraine's independence in the twentieth century» with World War II veterans who were the allies of the Anti-Hitler Coalition.

With the support of state authorities and local government, exhibitions and events devoted to the activities of Nazi collaborators, S. Bandera, Ya. Stetsko, R. Shukhevich, E. Konovalets and many others, leaders and members of the OUN and the UPA, are regularly held.

The Ukrainian authorities keep funding right-wing radical and ultra-nationalist organisations, entrusting them with so-called «patriotic work» with young people.

Despite the fact that in July 2019 the international group «Bellingcat» pursued an investigation whose results were grounds for accusing the Ukrainian government of secretly funding far-right extremist groups under the guise of educational programmes, the Ukrainian authorities has not ceased funding Nazi ideological organisations through their affiliated entities.

Besides, the government allocates public funds to justify Third Reich accomplices and organise summer camps and festivals dedicated to Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. This is usually done with the financial support of the Ukrainian State through the Ministry of Youth and Sport in cooperation with local administrations.

That is to say, in 2021 the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport of Ukraine allocated 8 million hryvnias for a number of «military and patriotic youth education» projects in its decree No 829 dated 17/03/2021. Of that amount, 350 thousand hryvnias were allocated for the All-Ukrainian «Zashkiv» Festival in Lviv Oblast, where Yevhen Konovalets, the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists and the founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), who collaborated with Gestapo, the secret police of the Nazi Germany, will be honoured; 185 thousand hryvnias were allocated for the Horunzhy All-Ukrainian Camp in Volyn Oblast, where the OUN-UPA Bandera members are held as examples for children. Besides, 1 million 200 thousand hryvnias were allocated «to commemorate Ukrainian heroes of the struggle for independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine», and 3 million 655 thousand hryvnias were given for educational purposes, where the main sums are received by nationalist organisations or their affiliates.

In addition, in 2018, the Kyiv City Council signed an agreement with the S14 group, subsequently registered as the public organisation «Society of the Future», to create the «Municipal Guards» to patrol the city's streets and ensure order. Members of this recreated municipal structure are far-

right nationalists, former S14 members, and representatives of the youth branch of the All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom». The structure is financed from the city budget and is still in operation this day.

Throughout 2020–2021, using outdoor advertising and citylights, the Ukrainian authorities continued the «Act of restoration of the Ukrainian state» promotion, adopted by Hitler's collaborators in Lviv on 30 June 1941. Its third article reads: «*The reconstituted Ukrainian state will work closely with National Socialist German Workers' Party, which, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, is creating a new order in Europe and the world and helping the Ukrainian people to free themselves from Moscow's occupation*».




Local authorities in many towns in western Ukraine annually celebrate the signing of the aforementioned Act – the oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany.

On 30 June 2021 at a special session of the Ternopil Oblast Council, its deputies unanimously adopted an appeal to the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to celebrate 30 June as a national state holiday.

On the initiative of Ukrainian nationalists and with the direct support of Kyiv Mayor Volodymyr Klitschko, annual «Bandera readings» are held in the premises of the Kyiv City Council, where the Third Reich's accomplices' activities are disseminated and promoted.

Moreover, Nazi ideology and the associated cult of cruelty are invading the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter the ZSU) and the National Guard of Ukraine, where a large number of right-wing radicals are serving and who have taken part in the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Donbass.

Thus, on 14 October 2021, the press service of the 61st Detached Infantry Ranger Brigade stationed near the border with Belarus said on its official Facebook page that the brigade's servicemen would eliminate all migrants on the border and that not a single migrant would enter Ukrainian territory.



61 окрема піхотна єгерська бригада
14 November, 00:05 · 📍

Шановні представники українських ЗМІ.
Нахаль, на цей час прес-служба 61 опебр не може вам надати відповідей на ваші чисельні запити щодо дій підрозділів нашої бригадр. біля кордону з Республікою Білорусь.

Разом з тим, повідомляємо вам, що на цей час, підрозділи 61 опебр виконують свої завдання вздовж ділянки державного кордону з Республікою Білорусь і жодний, так званий мігрант, а також інші особи, які можуть маскуватися під мігрантів, не потраплять на територію України. Вони просто будуть знищені нашими підрозділами.

Прес-служба 61 опебр

👍 335 💬 145 📄 Поділились: 100

In the Armed Forces of Ukraine, many servicemen openly use Nazi symbols (swastikas, chevrons, emblems), and Nazi-like symbols are being introduced officially.



ЗАТВЕРДЖУЮ
Начальник Генерального штабу –
Головнокомандувач Збройних Сил
України
генерал армії України
В.В.МУЖЕНКО
" 1 " 05 2019 року

МАЛЮНОК
нарукавного знаку 72 окремої механізованої бригади
імені Черних Запорожців
Сухопутних військ Збройних Сил України



повикольоровий

захисний

РОЗРОБЛЕНО
Начальник Генерального штабу з розвитку та супроводження
матеріально-технічного забезпечення Збройних Сил України
полковник
Д.О.МАРЧЕНКО

In April 2020, an exhibition of stamps and postcards dedicated to the Halychyna SS Division, a part of Nazi Germany during World War II, was held at the Lviv Central Post Office.

The Government of Ukraine keeps erecting monuments and memorials in name of OUN-UPA militants, id est Nazi collaborators, as well honouring those of them who have survived to this day.



2019

1. On 18 October a monument was erected in honour of Grigory Shkiyanka, a Nazi collaborator and war criminal who was the part of the Auxiliary Police Battalion. A street in his native village of Potorytsya, Sokal District, Lviv Oblast, is also named after him.



2. On 26 October, a memorial to Danylo Rudak, a war criminal and Nazi collaborator, member of the Nachtigall Battalion, participant in punitive operations against civilians and murders of Jews in Belarus, was opened in the Nadvirna Raion of the Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast. From the end of 1942, Rudak served in the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police in Ivano-Frankivsk, where he was involved in the murder of over 100,000 Jews in the region.



3. On 5 November, a memorial plaque was unveiled in Kalush, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, in honour of Dmytr Paliiev, Hauptsturmführer of Galicia SS Division.



2020

4. On 22 March in the city of Zaporizhzhia, Konstantin Slipetsky, a graduate of a German reconnaissance and sabotage school, OUN member and former German occupation policeman previously convicted by a court for collaborating with the Nazis, was solemnly presented with a World War II Veterans Recognition Certificate.

5. On 22 March, the local authorities of Lviv Oblast officially celebrated the 95th birthday of Roman Matsuk, the Unterschärführer of Galicia SS Division, and gave him a gift: portrait of him as a young man in a Nazi uniform.



6. On 5 October 2020, Oleksandr Derkach, a 95-year-old UPA veteran and the mass exterminator of the Polish and Jewish population of Rivne Oblast participant, was buried with military honours and the Armed Forces of Ukraine honour guard in the village of Dubrovka in Zhytomyr Oblast.



2021

7. On 30 August, a monument to the Nazi collaborator and war criminal Kuzma Brychko was unveiled in the village of Karpilovka, Chernihiv Oblast. Brychko was involved in the massacres of Polish civilians and Jews. He also was a part of Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army and UPA.



The Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, a state body, systematically initiates and obliges state structures and local authorities to honour Nazi henchmen – fighters of collaborationist units. For example, the Institute produced a board game for propaganda purposes, glorifying members of the Bandera organizations. In July 2019, the game was recommended by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine for schools.

The Institute recreates the so-called «insurgent awards» given to Nazi collaborators as to «participants of the Ukrainian liberation» as well as to the relatives of deceased «liberators». Such Nazi Germany accomplices are also buried with military honours and an honour guard of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

8. On 17 February 2021, a 97-year-old Unterscharführer of Galicia SS Division, Ivan Fialka, was solemnly buried in Stryi, Lviv Oblast, with the mayor attending.



9. On 13 June 2021, a solemn funeral ceremony was held for Nazi collaborator Orest Vaskul, Galicia SS Division and Beyersdorf Group veteran, at St Michael's Cathedral in Kyiv. For the first time in the history of Ukraine, the Guard of Honour of the Presidential Regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine paid its last respects to an SS member.



Ukrainian national-radicals, who now are closely allied to state structures, stoke ethnic tensions in Ukraine by imposing OUN-UPA leaders and other Nazi collaborators as national heroes.

Aforementioned nationalist formations' representatives openly propagandise Nazi symbols and hold numerous marches and rallies where one can hear Nazi slogans and salutes.

On 22 June 2019, the Fortress Europe neo-Nazi music festival was held in Kyiv on the anniversary of Nazi Germany invasion of the Soviet Union, with participants performing the Nazi salute and chanting Nazi slogans. The festival featured Ukrainian performers like Sokira Peruna and Evil Barber, as well as Finnish skinheads Mistreat and American Blue Eyed Devils. Evil Barber is notorious for writing the Holocaust-denying anthem «Six Million Soaps». **10:**





On 13 October 2019, Prime Minister of Ukraine Oleksiy Honcharuk attended the show given by the Ukrainian band Sekira Perun, praising Hitler, Hess and the SS troops, using Nazi symbols. The audience was Ukrainian neo-Nazis who performed the Nazi salute and shouted Nazi slogans during the concert.

The concert was held by Medvedko, who is a defendant in the murder case of prominent writer and journalist Oles Buzina. It was the man with whom the Prime Minister of Ukraine Honcharuk greeted the saluting concert «spectators» from the stage. Yevhen Karas, leader of the neo-Nazi group C-14, was the first to announce Honcharuk's arrival in Twitter and Telegram. **10.1:**

Since 2014, every year on 1 January, the birthday of S. Bandera, a Nazi collaborator and the leader of the OUN, as well as on 14 October, the day the

Евген Карас



UPA was established, radical nationalist groups as the All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom», C-14, the Right Sector, OUN and others have held Nazi torchlight processions across the country.

State support for right-wing radical groups espousing neo-Nazi ideology is confirmed by a statement given by the press secretary of Ukrainian president Zelensky in January 2020. Thus, after holding regular torchlight processions in honour of S. Bandera on 1 January 2020 in Kyiv, Lviv, Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk, she officially stated that those events corresponded to one of «the revival and preservation of national memory» policy priorities.

11. On 1 January 2020, a torchlight procession was held in Kyiv and other cities to mark the 11th anniversary of the birth of Stepan Bandera. Between 1,500 and 2,000 people took to the streets in Kyiv. The crowd shouted slogans as «Glory to Ukraine!», «Glory to the Nation, Death to the Enemy!», «Ukraine is above all!» and «We are the Banderites, we are coming!» Some participants performed the Nazi salute. A banner with Bandera's portrait was hung out on the Kyiv City State Administration building.



12. On 14 October 2020, a united UPA Rally was held in Kyiv. The rally was organised by National Corps Party, All-Ukrainian Union «Freedom» and Right Sector, as well as a number of other nationalist organisations. Participants drove a cannon through the centre of the capital in an off-road vehicle. The rally ended outside the Office of the President with right-wing radical demands on the authorities.



13. On 1 January 2021, torchlight processions with representatives of various nationalist organisations took place in Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities with the support of authorities. A «Public Veche» and a number of official events were held in Lviv to mark the 112th anniversary of the birth of Stepan Bandera, with high-ranking officials from the Lviv Oblast State Administration, the Lviv Oblast Council, and the City Council attending.



In the city of Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast, the arrived nationalists held a thin procession and rally under the protection of National Guard gunmen, fearing a negative reaction from the local population.



14. On 28 April 2021, a procession in honour of the Galicia SS Division using Nazi symbols was held in Kyiv for the first time. Participants carried emblems of the Galicia Division, flags of the Cossack Sich and Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, flags depicting the sun and the inscription «Solaris», with a cross inside the «O» letter. Some performed the Nazi salute in front of the camera, calling themselves «the force that will run the country.»



Nationalist and neo-Nazi organisations spread their ideology online. For example, a photo of the civil servant Alexander Nakonechny, who is the city mayor of Karlovka, Poltava Oblast, performing the Nazi salute in a German Nazi army uniform was published on Facebook on **3 May 2019**.



To date, the law-enforcement agencies have not considered it to be a violation of the Ukrainian Law of Ukraine «On the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Regimes in Ukraine and Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Symbols». **15:**

16. On 20 March 2021, right-wing radical groups (approximately 400 people) held a rally in support of the criminal neo-Nazi Serhii Sternenko. The rally took place close by the Office of the President; they broke its windows, burned a doorplate saying «Office of the President of Ukraine» and covered the facade with drawings, including a swastika, the symbol of Nazi Germany.



17. On 22 October 2021, the deputies of the Supreme Council adopted a resolution on an appeal to the President to confer the title of Hero of Ukraine upon 98-year-old Miroslav Simchich, a war criminal, organiser and participant of the mass murder of Polish civilians. After World War II, Simchich, a Nazi collaborator and head of the UPA sotnia, was convicted



by a Polish court for annihilation of the Polish population of Pistyn village in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, including women, children, elderly people and their homes. The appeal was initiated by deputies of the Lviv Oblast Council.

The state campaign to laud Ukrainian ultra-nationalists, Germany Nazis' accomplices, resulted in ultra-nationalist groups and organisations destroying and defacing monuments to Soviet Army soldiers and terror victims of World War II. Vandals post photos and videos on social media and news sites to promote their evil deeds.


For example, **on 20 November 2019** in Kharkiv, neo-Nazis defaced a monument to Marshal Zhukov, who saved Ukraine from the Nazi invaders, by pouring red paint over it. The bust of Georgy Zhukov in Kharkiv was thrown off its pedestal several times, and **on 20 May 2020**, red paint was spilled on it again. **18:**



19. On 4 February 2020 in Odessa, neo-Nazis pointedly removed and broke a memorial plate with a bas-relief of Marshal Zhukov from the wall of the student hostel at Odessa I. I. Mechnikov National University. The neo-Nazis stomped on the plate with their feet, but the police officers standing nearby did not do anything.



20. On 10 February 2020, Kyiv ultra-nationalists defaced a monument to General Nikolai Vatutin, the liberator of hero city Kyiv from the Nazi invaders. A monument to Vatutin had been erected over his grave in Mariinskyi Park, near the office of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and was repeatedly attacked by ultra-rightists.



21. On 30 March 2020, neo-Nazis of Nyrkiv, Ternopil Oblast, defaced and damaged a monument to the Unknown Soldier of the Great Patriotic War: they broke off its head and arm.



22. On 13 January 2021 at a memorial park in Kherson, neo-Nazis defaced and destroyed 17 tombstones over the graves of Soviet soldiers who heroically fought to liberate Kherson from the Nazi invaders.



23. On 13 January 2021, ultra-rightists defaced a monument to Soviet soldiers who died in World War II in Yareski village, Snyshaky Raion, Poltava Oblast, and used combustible mixture to damage its pedestal.



24. On 23 March 2021 in Cherkasy, nationalists defaced and damaged the memorial to peacekeepers erected on Shevchenko Boulevard.




25. On 19 October 2021, ultra-nationalists of Vladimir, Volyn Oblast, defaced and damaged a monument over the collective grave of Soviet soldiers, who died in World War II, in the central lane of the Lodomirskoye cemetery. Previously, in the same lane, vandals defaced a monument erected over a collective grave of soldiers fallen in World War I; they broke off both arms and a sword of the statue and destroyed the commemorative inscription «To the Russian soldiers of Borodino who died defending the city on 03/08/1914».



26. On the night of **26 October 2021**, neo-Nazis cruelly destroyed two monuments in Poltava Oblast; one more monument was defaced. In Lubny, a monument to Chapayev, erected in honour of the 25th Chapayev Rifle Division, which liberated Ukraine from the Nazi invaders, was beheaded and broken. A monument to the Youth of the 1920s–1960s was demolished in Lohvitsia. In Khorol, they tried to demolish a monument to General Ivan Tretyak, the liberator of Ukraine and Europe from the Nazi occupiers; the monument survived, but they defaced it putting a rope around its neck and writing «murderer» in paint.

The Gonor nationalist organisation took credit for the destruction of these monuments. The neo-Nazi Serhii Sternenko, the former head of the Odessa regional branch of the «Right Sector», who is accused of murdering a man, made a delightful post on this in his Facebook and Telegram accounts. He published photos of the destroyed monuments and a photo of Serhii Filimonov, head of the Gonor organisation, holding the head of the Chapayev statue in his hands.

«*This night, thanks to known and unknown patriots of the Gonor movement and passer-bys, Ukraine (Poltava Oblast) was cleared of monuments glorifying the Soviet occupiers.*» Sternenko wrote.



Сергій Стерненко
26 October, 15:03 · 🌐

Дивіться, яка краса!

Цієї ночі завдали відомим та невідомим патріотам із руху **Гонор** та випадковим перекожим Україна (на Полтавщині) очистились від пам'ятників, що прославляли совєцьких окупантів.

У Лубнах раптово втрапив голову Чапаєв, а у Лохвиці комсомольці

на жаль, вистояв у Хоролі пам'ятник Івану Третяку, совєцькому генералу, який у 1983 видав наказ знищити пасажирський «Бойг 747» південнокорейської авіакомпанії Korean Air Lines, який відплився від курсу. Загинули 269 людей.

Але, певен, він ще впаде.

Усі ці об'єкти вже давно мали бути знесені на вимогу закону про декомунізацію, але місцева влада нічого не робила.

Тож її роботу довелось виконати невідомим патріотам та випадковим перекожим, за що їм велика подяка!

Я чув, що поліція вже відкрила кримінальне провадження за виконання вимог закону. Закликаю поліціантів одуматись та випустити хлопцям нагороду за очищення української землі від залишків окупаційного минулого.

Далі буде 🙏



In Ukraine, monuments bearing any symbols of the Soviet era are often demolished or defaced. In fact, since the start of decommunisation, such actions have become quite regular and are performed not only by vandals: organised demolitions are also initiated by local authorities.

Neo-Nazis regularly attack churches of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church (hereinafter the UOC), covering them with Nazi symbols, using force against its clergy and laity and intimidating them.


27. On the night of **February**

5 to 6, 2019 in Zaporizhzhia, neo-Nazis marred a UOC church dedicated to Schema-archimandrite Alexy with SS symbols and then set it on fire.

28. On the night of **February 10 to 11, 2019**, ultra-rightists of Zaporizhzhia marred a UOC church dedicated to Saint Olga of Kiev with the Nazi symbols, trying to set it on fire.

29. On **15 February 2019**, on Candlemas, a group of neo-Nazis brutally vandalised a UOC Ascension Church in Kryvyi Rih: they wrote the «14/88» figures, which are neo-Nazis' symbol, on it and bombarded it with Molotov cocktails.

30. On **23 June 2021**, during a large-scale Crucession in the city of Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast, militants of the radical right-wing Right Sector group, armed with knives and waving a US state flag, obstructed the prayer service by beating priests and participants of the icon-bearing procession. Clergymen and laypeople were insulted, abused and doused with a malodorous liquid. Many people were injured.



Among the active Ukrainian right-wing radical organisations and groups, the most numerous is the Azov unit, which includes the Azov Regiment (military wing), the National Corps Party (political wing), the far-right paramilitary organisation National Druzhyny (street wing), Veteran Brotherhood and others.

The leader of this organisation is Andriy Biletsky (nicknamed «White Leader»), notorious for his neo-Nazi, racist and anti-Semitic beliefs and statements.

The organisation's emblem is «Wolfsangel» («wolf traps»), the symbol of Nazi NSDAP and units of the SS criminal organisation. This is a mirror image of the SS Division Das Reich («Empire») emblem. It is officially approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine as the emblem of the Azov Regiment.

The National Corps Party is actively engaged in campaigning and propaganda among children, teenagers and young people to educate them in a militarised aggressive-nationalist manner. In particular, special summer camps for children and young people are being organised for this purpose, like Azovets and others.

Many members of the above-mentioned organisations and veterans of the Azov Regiment work in state institutions like ministries and law enforcement agencies. As a result, the organisation has had political and military support for seven years and has used public funds to support its youth national-



patriotic activities and training programmes. The Azov Regiment, part of the National Guard of Ukraine, has artillery and other weapons, as well as numerous training grounds and camps.



It should be noted that Ukrainian right-wing and neo-Nazi groups are directly associated with right-wing and extremist groups in Europe and America.

Militants of The Base and Attonwaffen Division terrorist organisations have established links with the Azov Regiment leaders, as well as with neo-Nazis from the Misanthropic Division and the Right Sector organisations. Terrorists all over the world keep coming to Ukraine, where they are

trained at the Azov Regiment training grounds and at combat positions in Donbass.

For example, the notorious terrorist Brenton Tarrant was killing residents of Donbass like it was a safari hunting during his training in Ukraine before committing the massacre of fifty Muslims in two New Zealand mosques in Christchurch on 15 March 2019. The bulletproof vest he wore to kill Muslims had a black sun symbol of the Azov Regiment.

The Soufan Center report «White Supremacy Extremism: The Transnational Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement», published in September 2019, indicated that 3,879 foreigners had already been trained as part of Ukrainian units during the Donbas military operations. It stressed: «*Just as jihadists have used conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Balkans, Iraq and Syria to improve tactics and techniques and to strengthen international ties, so too have right-wing extremists used Ukraine.*» The report also states that the Azov Regiment has turned into a large-scale right-wing radical movement, creating an inner state and spreading its tentacles throughout Europe, forming a Ukrainian right-wing foreign legion, whose militants are participating in Donbas military operations.

In addition, the US Department of Justice is investigating a group of US far-right activists who committed war crimes in Donbas, including murders, kidnappings and torture. The case originally involved the notorious US citizen Craig Lang, who had been fighting as part of a nationalist volunteer battalion since 2015 and then robbed and shot dead a married couple in his home country with an accomplice. As it turned out later, he had committed the same crimes in Ukraine. Materials of the investigation depict seven Americans with far-right views who went to Donbass to defend the «white Aryan cause» by joining the Right Sector.

According to BuzzFeed News, more than 40 US citizens have fought on the Ukrainian side in the War in Donbas. US journalists of BuzzFeed News stated that post-Maidan Ukraine is a global training ground and an organisational training centre for neo-Nazis and racists from all over the world who come to Donbass to take part in «safari huntings» and gain «combat» experience.

For this purpose, social networks and other online platforms are used and special groups are created, such as the Intermarium Support Group on Facebook, affiliated to the Azov organisation.



As a result, the Azov Regiment officially became an honorary member of the Francopan Veterans Organisation, collaborating with the French Foreign Legion. Despite the fact that in May 2020 Bogdan Khodakovsky, the leader of the neo-Nazi Ukrainian Tradition and Order organisation, who is allied to Azov Regiment, declared live on Instagram that the European Union must be destroyed.

«We are gathering forces in Europe. We are ready to set up a safe base there and to crusade against Brussels, liberals and immigrants.» Khodakovsky said, stressing that *«they are well entrenched in Ukraine and can conduct any kind of exercises».*

Although back in 2018, a law was passed in the US Congress banning the supply of weapons to the Azov Regiment. However, this regulation is not respected as the Azov Regiment is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and has access to the US military aid as its part.

In addition, on 16 October 2019, 40 US congressmen wrote an official letter to the Department of State, calling the Azov Regiment, *«a well-known Ukrainian ultranationalist paramilitary organisation that openly accepts neo-*

Nazis into its ranks» and demanding an explanation as to why the unit has not yet been listed as a «foreign terrorist organisation.» However, no such decision has yet been taken by the Department of State.

It should be noted that the government of the Federal Republic of Germany informed its MPs about the international ties between German neo-Nazis and radical right groups in Ukraine, focusing on the links with the Azov Regiment.

However, the Ukrainian authorities, as well as the governments of other countries, do not take response measures to stop the spread of Nazi ideology in the world.




Annex 353

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 30 March 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 30 March 2018.

The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

Civilian properties occupied by UAF in Travnevoye, Donetsk region,
29 March 2018



Annex 354

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 14 May 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 14 May 2018.

The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

2 UAF BMP-1 IFV within Zolotoye (Disengagement Area-2), Lugansk region



Annex 355

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo №2, 14 May 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo №2, 14 May 2018.

The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

UAF-occupied Civilian house in Zolotoye (Disengagement Area-2), Lugansk region, 24 April 2018




Annex 356

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 21 May 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 21 May 2018.

The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

UAF command bunker and headquarters within the public school building in Teploye, Lugansk region




Annex 357

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Mark Eterington's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 18 January 2019

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Mark Eterington's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 18 January 2019.

The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

UAF Surface to Air system close to a civilian house occupied by UAF in Klinovoye, Donetsk region, 4 December 2018




Annex 358

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps,
Photo, 1 June 2018

The OSCE SMM Deputy Chief Monitor Alexander Hug's briefing for the Diplomatic corps, Photo, 1 June 2018.

The picture taken by the Second Secretary of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (SMM Headquarters, Kiev).

UAF Surface to Air missiles 52 meters from public school in Tarasovka, Donetsk region, 22 May 2018



Annex 359

Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019

(translation)

Translation

Administration of the President of Ukraine, Letter No 12-09/2938, 16 July 2019, available at: <https://dostup.pravda.com.ua/request/51414/response/123805/attach/3/2281..pdf>.

Presidential Administration of Ukraine
Main Department for Ensuring Access to
Public Information

16 July 2019 No. 12-09/2938

In reply to No. 2281 of 09 July 2019

to Mr. ANATOLY

Dear Mr. Anatoly,

In reply to your request of 9 July 2019, we are sending you Decrees of the President of Ukraine No. 965 "On conferring the title of Hero of Ukraine upon R. Shukhevych" dated 12 October 2007 and No. 46 "On conferring the title of Hero of Ukraine upon S. Bandera" dated 20 October 2010, which are still in force.

Attachment: 1 file.

Sincerely yours,

Head of the Main Department for Ensuring
Access to Public Information,
Presidential Administration of Ukraine

S. Kondzelya

Annex 360

Australian Federal Police, Report in the Matter of AFR Case Reference No. 5667342 (Operation AVENELLA), July 2015



IMAGE REPORT

Report in the matter of AFP Case Reference No. 5667342 (Operation AVENELLA)

This is a joint report by Imagery Specialist Shaun ELLIS and Geospatial Specialist Tim JOHNS on the examinations conducted in relation to AFP Case Reference No. 5667342 (Operation AVENELLA) between the 22 April 2015 and 2 July 2015.

If required, a full report can be provided detailing continuity of items, general examinations, methods and results obtained.

Section 1: Refers to the examination of the metadata of four images provided for camera and Global Positioning System (GPS) information. The Image file names provided were:

- Donetsk01.jpg
- Donetsk02.jpg
- Snizhne01.jpg
- Torez.jpeg

No visual observations were conducted on the image files to identify their location they were taken. Adobe Bridge was the software package used to display the image thumbnails and metadata below.

Section 2: Refers to the extraction of embedded data within the images from section 1 and two images and two movie files provided by Geoffrey **BIGGS**, AFP Audio Video Technician. The analysis of this data and verification of objects in the imagery to identify the locations where it was captured.

Coordinates in this report may appear in the form Degrees, Minutes and Seconds; Degrees, Decimal Minutes; or Decimal Degrees depending upon their source.

Signed:

Two handwritten signatures are present. The first is in blue ink and appears to be 'SE' (Shaun Ellis). The second is in black ink and appears to be 'Timothy Johns' (Tim Johns).


Signature witnessed by:

A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to a witness, is written over a light blue rectangular background.

Report in the matter of AFP Case Reference No. 5667342 (**Operation AVENELLA**)
 Report of Shaun **ELLIS** and Timothy **JOHNS** continued

NOTE: Metadata contains "General; Image, Video and Audio" information. Metadata should only be used as a guide as data fields can be altered manually. The following extraction has been selected for this report.

- Donetsk01.jpg



Metadata* extracted:

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FILE TYPE	JPEG file
FILE SIZE	470kb
IMAGE DIMENSIONS	1380 x 946
DATE CREATED	24/07/2014, 1:41:30PM
DATE MODIFIED	24/07/2014, 7:42:38PM
XYZ/LONGITUDE/LATITUDE COORDINATES(GPS)	NOT AVAILABLE

Signed:


Timothy Johns

Signature witnessed by:

[Signature]

Report in the matter of AFP Case Reference No. 5667342 (**Operation AVENELLA**)
 Report of Shaun **ELLIS** and Timothy **JOHNS** continued

- Donetsk02.jpg



Metadata* extracted:

FILE NAME	Donetsk02.jpg
FILE TYPE	JPEG file
FILE SIZE	303kb
IMAGE DIMENSIONS	940 x 626
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DATE MODIFIED	19/08/2014, 10:41:42PM
XYZ/LONGITUDE/LATITUDE COORDINATES(GPS)	NOT AVAILABLE

Signed:

Timothy Johns

Signature witnessed by:

[Signature]

Report in the matter of AFP Case Reference No. 5667342 (**Operation AVENELLA**)
 Report of Shaun **ELLIS** and Timothy **JOHNS** continued

- Snizhne01.jpg



Metadata* extracted:

FILE NAME	Snizhne01.jpg
FILE TYPE	JPEG file
FILE SIZE	157kb
IMAGE DIMENSIONS	800 x 1423
DATE CREATED	30/06/2015, 10:54:09AM
DATE MODIFIED	20/08/2014, 12:09:08AM
XYZ/LONGITUDE/LATITUDE COORDINATES(GPS)	NOT AVAILABLE

Signed:


 Timothy Johns

Signature witnessed by:



Report in the matter of AFP Case Reference No. 5667342 (**Operation AVENELLA**)
 Report of Shaun **ELLIS** and Timothy **JOHNS** continued

- Torez.jpeg



Metadata* extracted:

FILE NAME	Torez.jpeg
FILE TYPE	JPEG file
FILE SIZE	130kb
IMAGE DIMENSIONS	1024 x 768
DATE CREATED	30/06/2015, 10:54:09AM
DATE MODIFIED	18/07/2014, 5:52:04PM
XYZ/LONGITUDE/LATITUDE COORDINATES(GPS)	NOT AVAILABLE

The extracted metadata from these four files appears to have been manipulated. For example; the date modified is prior to the date the file was created. Various reasons could explain why this is so, none can

Signed:

TJ Timothy Johns


Signature witnessed by:

SE

Report in the matter of AFP Case Reference No. 5667342 (**Operation AVENELLA**)
Report of Shaun **ELLIS** and Timothy **JOHNS** continued

be proved without additional information. The image dimensions vary suggesting that the images have been cropped. The image files are small also suggesting the files have been resaved to be smaller and are not primary images that were taken.

Signed:  Timothy Johns

Signature witnessed by: 

Annex 361

Expert Report Analyzing Videos from Social Media

Report

We received for analysis a USB flash drive with videos from social media, including original links from which they were downloaded.


The files with videos were downloaded from social media and are not original videos.

We analysed five videos available through the links set out below.

We used the web browser Internet Explorer 11 for analysing the content of the links.

To obtain extensive data on all files available through the YouTube link, we used the software **youtube-dl**, version 2019.09.28 (<https://ytdl-org.github.io/youtube-dl/index.html>)

1) “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014” («Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014»)



Орудие убийства мала

https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182910/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqhnodT70&gl=US&hl=en

NET ARCHIVE
achMachine
1 capture
17 Jul 2014

Go JUN JUL AUG
17
2013 2014 2015

Орудие убийства малайзийцев. Снежное 17.07.2014

Балодя Фамильев
Subscribe 0

301+ views
30 4

Like

About Share Add to

Published on Jul 17, 2014
No description available.

Show more

<https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182910/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIOqhno dT70&gl=US&hl=en>

Uploaded by the user "Balodya Familyev"

Published date: 17 July 2014

It is impossible to use the youtube-dl programme here since this link is an archive and a mirror. We extracted a link to the video file from the page's source code:

https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182911oe_/http://r4---sn-jc47eu7r.googlevideo.com/videoplayback?source=youtube&ratebypass=yes&ipbits=0&key=cms1&ip=207.241.237.109&sver=3&expire=1405645200&signature=1ED048BC6D3F6C25759EE327C6FC1517009105DC.7DE8CBD5D9E79BA8D787EBD557BDFACE20033448&itag=22&id=o-APHyJEk_j_4LJ366fT0YvQ5m5p6ZsBmyTpsc4Nkbqzvw&upn=2oOfsu1kfbM&fexp=901803%2C902408%2C908584%2C910118%2C913430%2C924213%2C924217%2C924222%2C927622%2C930008%2C931975%2C934024%2C934030%2C941366%2C948110&sparams=expire,id,initcwndbps,ip,ipbits,itag,ratebypass,source,upn&signature=&redirect_counter=1&req_id=93d58e95421a03e4&cms_redirect=yes&ms=tsu&mt=1405621710&mv=m&mws=yes

through which the following video file was uploaded:

The file size is 4,716,676 bytes, the SHA1 hash sum is "AE8045E87EBDC8BC46228F32BC1AC37A5D9F9DE3".

Information concerning the media file:

General	
Complete name	: videoplayback.mp4
Format	: MPEG-4
Format profile	: Base Media / Version 2
Codec ID	: mp42 (isom/mp42)
File size	: 4.50 MiB
Duration	: 35 s 270 ms
Overall bit rate mode	: Variable
Overall bit rate	: 1 070 kb/s
Encoded date	: UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05
Tagged date	: UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05
gsst	: 0
gstd	: 35548
gssd	: B4A7DD4E4HH1405621750567424
gshh	: r4---sn-jc47eu7r.googlevideo.com
Video	
ID	: 1
Format	: AVC
Format/Info	: Advanced Video Codec

Format profile	: High@L2.2
Format settings	: CABAC / 1 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC	: Yes
Format settings, Reference frames	: 1 frame
Codec ID	: avc1
Codec ID/Info	: Advanced Video Coding
Duration	: 35 s 267 ms
Bit rate	: 875 kb/s
Maximum bit rate	: 2 192 kb/s
Width	: 408 pixels
Height	: 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio	: 0.567
Frame rate mode	: Constant
Frame rate	: 15.000 FPS
Color space	: YUV
Chroma subsampling	: 4:2:0
Bit depth	: 8 bits
Scan type	: Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame)	: 0.199
Stream size	: 3.68 MiB (82%)
Tagged date	: UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05
Codec configuration box	: avcC
Audio	
ID	: 2
Format	: AAC LC
Format/Info	: Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID	: mp4a-40-2
Duration	: 35 s 270 ms
Bit rate mode	: Variable
Bit rate	: 192 kb/s
Maximum bit rate	: 202 kb/s
Channel(s)	: 2 channels
Channel layout	: L R
Sampling rate	: 44.1 kHz
Frame rate	: 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode	: Lossy
Stream size	: 827 KiB (18%)
Title	: IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011
Encoded date	: UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05
Tagged date	: UTC 2014-07-16 16:42:05

The encoded date (**16 July 2014**) is not consistent with the published date (**17 July 2014**).

The date shown on a Youtube page as being the “published date” is the date on which a video is made public by a user. I have done some experiments with uploading videos and if a video is uploaded as a “private” video and subsequently made public then Youtube displays the latter date as being the “published date”. It is therefore possible for a video to have been uploaded to Youtube before its stated date of publication.

As for the “encoded date”, videos on Youtube are encoded as part of the process of uploading by a user. It is possible that some videos are re-encoded at some later point by Youtube. Therefore, there is no sensible explanation for the encoding date being before the point of uploading (and obviously the video cannot be encoded before it the relevant events are filmed).

I have seen a thesis entitled “Youtube : Recompression Effects” by Cole Michael Whitecotton¹ which explains the relevant data as follows:

"The metadata of all video files (including DASH, mp4, etc.) downloaded with youtube-dl also contain date and time information that is related to the date and time each file was originally uploaded and encoded. The new formats that appear after the initial upload have a different time associated with them as they are encoded at a later time”.

Every video uploaded to Youtube, regardless of the format of the video which the user has created or converted, will be encoded by Youtube as part of the upload process. The date of encoding therefore indicates when uploading has occurred or some later re-encoding. The encoding date on videos stored on Youtube cannot be before that video was uploaded to Youtube.

Turning to the images seen in this video, there are some suspicious artefacts.

For example, there are a number of frames (approximately frames 155 to 170) in which the Buk appears to reach a streetlamp and its horizontal dimensions decrease (i.e. the Buk gets shorter). In my view, this is completely unconnected to any potential compression problem or any perspective issue.

Compression problems can arise since social media compress images, lower their resolutions and generally reduce their quality. Compression leads to losses (lossy). This compression blurs the boundaries of objects, makes some characteristics of combined images uniform in appearance, and makes such objects unfit for any definitive digital image computer analysis. Such compression artifacts are discussed in the article below:

<https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:833137/FULLTEXT01.pdf>

The shortening of the Buk does not appear to be connected with any compression issues because this version of the video has a relatively high quality. Also, any compression artifacts would also affect

¹ https://www1.ucdenver.edu/docs/librariesprovider27/ncmf-docs/theses/whitecotton_thesis_fall2017.pdf?sfvrsn=484e97b8_2

all moving objects in the video, whereas the issue in relation to the Buk does not affect another vehicle that can be seen moving in the video. This looks very strange to me.

I also find it suspicious that the video ends just as the Buk reaches a horizontal line at the beginning of an incline. The horizontal line involves a noticeable shifting in the image, which is not consistent with a compression artefact because compression artifacts generally affect moving objects and furthermore this horizontal is not merely visible in a single frame but is instead a consistent feature throughout the video. This is suspicious. That suspicion is heightened in my mind due to the fact that the video ends just as the Buk is about to cross that horizontal line.

If the Buk had crossed the horizontal and continued up the incline, the perspective would have changed.



2) “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014” («Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014»).

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mil9s-zWLS4>

Uploaded by the user “Brown Moses”

Published date: 17 July 2014

Using the Youtube DataViewer (citizenevidence.amnestyusa.org) we identified Upload Date and Time

Video ID: Mil9s-zWLS4

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17

Upload Time (UTC): 18:41:13

youtube.com/watch?v=Mt9s-zWLS4

Орудие убийства малайзи...

Введите запрос

Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014

Brown Moses

Подписаться 1,41 тыс.

62 665 просмотров

Добавить в Поделиться Ещё

54 13

Опубликовано: 17 июл. 2014 г.
Original link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqh...>

Категория: Новости и политика

СВЕРНУТЬ

Information concerning media files available through the link:

format code	extension	resolution	format	TBR	Note
249	webm	audio only	tiny	45k	opus @ 50k (48000Hz), 192.34KiB
250	webm	audio only	tiny	61k	opus @ 70k (48000Hz), 257.29KiB
251	webm	audio only	tiny	122k	opus @160k (48000Hz), 518.90KiB
140	m4a	audio only	tiny	127k	m4a_dash container, mp4a.40.2@128k (44100Hz), 548.79KiB

278	webm	82x144	144p	23k	webm container, vp9, 15fps, video only, 88.34KiB
242	webm	136x240	144p	34k	vp9, 15fps, video only, 109.83KiB
160	mp4	82x144	144p	36k	avc1.4d500b, 15fps, video only, 156.29KiB
243	webm	204x360	240p	72k	vp9, 15fps, video only, 213.49KiB
133	mp4	136x240	144p	81k	avc1.4d400b, 15fps, video only, 342.54KiB
244	webm	272x480	240p	108k	vp9, 15fps, video only, 319.85KiB
134	mp4	204x360	240p	113k	avc1.4d400c, 15fps, video only, 428.72KiB
247	webm	408x720	360p	223k	vp9, 15fps, video only, 648.33KiB
135	mp4	272x480	240p	237k	avc1.4d4015, 15fps, video only, 910.35KiB
136	mp4	408x720	360p	576k	avc1.4d4016, 15fps, video only, 1.91MiB
43	webm	640x360	360p	vp8.0	vorbis@128k, 1.04MiB
18	mp4	204x360	240p	292k	avc1.42001E, mp4a.40.2@ 96k (44100Hz), 1.23MiB
22	mp4	408x720	360p	581k	avc1.64001F, mp4a.40.2@192k (44100Hz) (best)

TBR = Average bitrate of audio and video in KBit/s

There was uploaded the file with format code 22 tagged as having the highest resolution.

The file size is 2,564,815 bytes. The SHA1 hash sum is "B6C18307E57CF946FFE72B8256A8339725C103EA".

To obtain information concerning the downloaded file, we used the software **MediaInfo**, v. 19.09 (<https://mediaarea.net/en/MediaInfo/Download>).

Information concerning the media file:

General	
Complete name	: Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014-Mil9s-zWls4.mp4
Format	: MPEG-4
Format profile	: Base Media / Version 2
Codec ID	: mp42 (isom/mp42)
File size	: 2.45 MiB
Duration	: 35 s 271 ms
Overall bit rate mode	: Variable
Overall bit rate	: 582 kb/s
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49
gsst	: 0
gstd	: 35317
Video	
ID	: 1

Format	: AVC
Format/Info	: Advanced Video Codec
Format profile	: Main@L2.2
Format settings	: CABAC / 3 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC	: Yes
Format settings, Reference frames	: 3 frames
Codec ID	: avc1
Codec ID/Info	: Advanced Video Coding
Duration	: 35 s 267 ms
Bit rate	: 453 kb/s
Width	: 408 pixels
Height	: 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio	: 0.567
Frame rate mode	: Constant
Frame rate	: 15.000 FPS
Color space	: YUV
Chroma subsampling	: 4:2:0
Bit depth	: 8 bits
Scan type	: Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame)	: 0.103
Stream size	: 1.91 MiB (78%)
Title	: ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49
Codec configuration box	: avcC
Audio	
ID	: 2
Format	: AAC LC
Format/Info	: Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID	: mp4a-40-2
Duration	: 35 s 271 ms
Bit rate mode	: Variable
Bit rate	: 126 kb/s
Channel(s)	: 2 channels
Channel layout	: L R
Sampling rate	: 44.1 kHz
Frame rate	: 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode	: Lossy
Stream size	: 541 KiB (22%)
Title	: ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-08-14 20:30:49

The encoded date (**14 August 2017**) is not the same as the stated published date (**17 July 2014**). However, as noted above, a video can be reencoded after upload. I am not aware of any explanation by Youtube as to when or why a video may be reencoded. During November 2019, I have found other videos from 2014 which have not been reencoded i.e. they still show an encoding date in 2014.

The video's description has the original link – "<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIQhnodT70>". No video is available through this link.

The website <http://www.military-az.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=1289&start=3920> has the following post with a link to the video and a part of the title




Having searched by the title "The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014" («Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014») and sorted videos by date, we can see that the first available video was uploaded by the user "Brown Moses".

Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014
🔍

🔧 ФИЛЬТРЫ


Возможно, вы имели в виду Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17.07 2014



Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014


Ukraine@War • 2,2 тыс. просмотров • 4 года назад

Original MH17 BUK video taken by a phone in high resolution, with it's original title. All (or most?) other videos where cropped ...




Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17.07.2014

Богдан Колес • 21 просмотр • 5 лет назад



Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014

Дмитрий Суханов • 178 просмотров • 5 лет назад



Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014

Brown Moses • 62 тыс. просмотров • 5 лет назад

Original link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIQhnodT70>.

Больше нет результатов

This video also includes some noticeable features. In particular, there are apparent vertical lines when the Buk passes a tree. As noted above, compression can give rise to compression artifacts and it is possible that this is an example of that. Given the other suspicious features of this video, it is possible that this not merely a compression artifact. Due to the compression of this video, it is not possible to state a definitive opinion as to the cause of this vertical line.

Image compression (with the image resolution lowered) may be used as a method for hiding indications of tampering with videos. This is especially true when compression is performed multiple times. Video files with a high compression ratio and with a small number of anchor frames for coding and, as a result, with a large number of compression artifacts render it impossible to conclude whether the video was edited or not.

Thus, having no originals of a video, it is impossible to give a definitive opinion on the authenticity or modification of videos taken from social media because they were repeatedly compressed.

3) Title: “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”. Uploaded by the user “EuroMaydan”.


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkgwxxhJlk4>

Published date: 17 July 2014.

Video ID: wkgwxxhJlk4

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17

Upload Time (UTC): 18:44:55



The screenshot shows a YouTube video player interface. The browser address bar displays the URL [youtube.com/watch?v=wkgwxxhJlk4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkgwxxhJlk4). The video player shows an aerial view of a residential area with a road. The video title is "AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne". The channel name is "EuroMaydan" with a "Подписаться" (Subscribe) button. The video has 215 307 views. The video player controls show a progress bar at 0:04 / 0:35. Below the video player, there are options to "Добавить в" (Add to), "Поделиться" (Share), and "Ещё" (More). The publication date is "Опубликовано: 17 июл. 2014 г." and the description is "Установка Бук террористов перемещается с Тореза в Снежное. AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne". The category is "Новости и политика".

Information concerning media files available through the link:

format code	extension	resolution	format	TBR	note
251	webm	audio only	tiny	122k	opus @160k (48000Hz), 519.91KiB
140	m4a	audio only	tiny	129k	m4a_dash container, mp4a.40.2@128k (44100Hz), 554.32KiB
160	mp4	256x144	144p	111k	avc1.4d400c, 15fps, video only, 473.06KiB
133	mp4	426x240	240p	246k	avc1.4d4015, 30fps, video only, 1.03MiB
134	mp4	640x360	360p	256k	avc1.4d401e, 30fps, video only, 1009.12KiB
135	mp4	854x480	480p	550k	avc1.4d401f, 30fps, video only, 1.97MiB
136	mp4	1280x720	720p	1094k	avc1.4d401f, 30fps, video only, 3.99MiB
43	webm	640x360	360p	vp8.0	vorbis@128k, 1.80MiB
18	mp4	640x360	360p	367k	avc1.42001E, mp4a.40.2@ 96k (44100Hz), 1.54MiB
22	mp4	1280x720	720p	1075k	avc1.64001F, mp4a.40.2@192k (44100Hz) (best)

TBR = Average bitrate of audio and video in KBit/s

There was uploaded the file with format code 22 tagged as having the highest resolution.

The file size is 4,738,344 bytes. The SHA1 hash sum is "F59F41B94CDD080ED061035AB621218607C0AB3C".


Information concerning the media file:

General	
Complete name	:AA 'BUK' vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne-wkgwxxhJlk4.mp4
Format	: MPEG-4
Format profile	: Base Media / Version 2
Codec ID	: mp42 (isom/mp42)
File size	: 4.52 MiB
Duration	: 35 s 248 ms
Overall bit rate mode	: Variable
Overall bit rate	: 1 075 kb/s
Encoded date	: UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
Tagged date	: UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
gsst	: 0
gstd	: 35294
Video	
ID	: 1
Format	: AVC
Format/Info	: Advanced Video Codec

Format profile	: Main@L3.1
Format settings	: CABAC / 3 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC	: Yes
Format settings, Reference frames	: 3 frames
Codec ID	: avc1
Codec ID/Info	: Advanced Video Coding
Duration	: 35 s 235 ms
Bit rate	: 946 kb/s
Width	: 1 280 pixels
Height	: 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio	: 16:9
Frame rate mode	: Constant
Frame rate	: 29.970 (30000/1001) FPS
Color space	: YUV
Chroma subsampling	: 4:2:0
Bit depth	: 8 bits
Scan type	: Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame)	: 0.034
Stream size	: 3.97 MiB (88%)
Title	: ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.
Encoded date	: UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
Tagged date	: UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
Codec configuration box	: avcC
Audio	
ID	: 2
Format	: AAC LC
Format/Info	: Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID	: mp4a-40-2
Duration	: 35 s 248 ms
Bit rate mode	: Variable
Bit rate	: 126 kb/s
Channel(s)	: 2 channels
Channel layout	: L R
Sampling rate	: 44.1 kHz
Frame rate	: 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode	: Lossy
Stream size	: 541 KiB (12%)
Title	: ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.
Encoded date	: UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42
Tagged date	: UTC 2016-08-26 11:59:42

The encoded date (**26 August 2016**) is not consistent with the published date (**17 July 2014**) which is presumably attributable to the features of YouTube video hosting since the field Title states that “ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.”.

Having searched by the title “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne” and sorted videos by date, we can see that the first available video was uploaded by the user “EuroMaydan”.



4) Title: “AA BUK vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”. Uploaded by the user “ANON EVOL”.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxZhjyZILgU>

Published date: 14 October 2015.

Video ID: YxZhjyZILgU

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2015-10-14

Upload Time (UTC): 22:30:45

Information concerning media files available through the link:

format code	extension	Resolution	format	TBR	note
249	webm	audio only	tiny	50k	opus @ 50k (48000Hz), 211.92KiB
250	webm	audio only	tiny	62k	opus @ 70k (48000Hz), 266.92KiB
251	webm	audio only	tiny	124k	opus @160k (48000Hz), 529.17KiB
140	m4a	audio only	tiny	127k	m4a_dash container, mp4a.40.2@128k (44100Hz), 547.71KiB
278	webm	256x144	144p	90k	webm container, vp9, 15fps, video only, 322.15KiB
160	mp4	256x144	144p	110k	avc1.42c00c, 15fps, video only, 469.85KiB
242	webm	426x240	240p	149k	vp9, 30fps, video only, 369.59KiB
133	mp4	426x240	240p	244k	avc1.4d4015, 30fps, video only, 1.02MiB
243	webm	640x360	360p	289k	vp9, 30fps, video only, 710.61KiB
134	mp4	640x360	360p	308k	avc1.4d401e, 30fps, video only, 1.07MiB
43	webm	640x360	360p	vp8.0	vorbis@128k, 2.36MiB
18	mp4	640x360	360p	398k	avc1.42001E, mp4a.40.2@ 96k (44100Hz), 1.67MiB (best)

TBR = Average bitrate of audio and video in KBit/s

There was uploaded the file with format code 18 tagged as having the highest resolution.

The file size is 1,751,606 bytes. The SHA1 hash sum is "47C357826743F81DFD743955470903A0F479A020".

Information concerning the media file:

General	
Complete name	:AA BUK vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne-YxZhjyZILgU.mp4
Format	: MPEG-4
Format profile	: Base Media / Version 2
Codec ID	: mp42 (isom/mp42)
File size	: 1.67 MiB

Duration : 35 s 270 ms
 Overall bit rate mode : Variable
 Overall bit rate : 397 kb/s
 Encoded date : **UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51**
 Tagged date : UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51

Video

ID : 1
 Format : AVC
 Format/Info : Advanced Video Codec
 Format profile : Baseline@L3
 Format settings : 1 Ref Frames
 Format settings, CABAC : No
 Format settings, Reference frames : 1 frame
 Format settings, GOP : M=1, N=60
 Codec ID : avc1
 Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding
 Duration : 35 s 202 ms
 Bit rate : 299 kb/s
 Maximum bit rate : 584 kb/s
 Width : 640 pixels
 Height : 360 pixels
 Display aspect ratio : 16:9
 Frame rate mode : Constant
 Frame rate : 29.970 (30000/1001) FPS
 Color space : YUV
 Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0
 Bit depth : 8 bits
 Scan type : Progressive
 Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.043
 Stream size : 1.25 MiB (75%)
 Tagged date : UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51
 Codec configuration box : avcC

Audio

ID : 2
 Format : AAC LC
 Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
 Codec ID : mp4a-40-2
 Duration : 35 s 270 ms
 Bit rate mode : Variable
 Bit rate : 96.0 kb/s
 Maximum bit rate : 105 kb/s
 Channel(s) : 2 channels
 Channel layout : L R
 Sampling rate : 44.1 kHz
 Frame rate : 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)

Compression mode	: Lossy
Stream size	: 413 KiB (24%)
Title	: IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011
Encoded date	: UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51
Tagged date	: UTC 2015-10-14 22:33:51

The published date is consistent with the encoded date. However, the title states “IsoMedia File Produced by Google, **5-11-2011**”. This file has coding settings with 1 frame (“1 Ref Frames”) which explains a very low resolution of coding of the moving objects.

Having searched by the title “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne” and sorted videos by date, we can see that the last available video was uploaded by the user “**ANON EVOL**”.

AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne

ФИЛЬТРЫ

Возможно, вы имели в виду AA "UK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne

AA BUK vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne
ANON EVOL • 721 просмотр • 3 года назад

AA BUK vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne
Андрій Буртик • 13 просмотров • 5 лет назад
Stop terrorRussia!

AA 'BUK' vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne
rimlian • 8 просмотров • 5 лет назад
Запрещенное видео. Перемещение БУК.

AA 'BUK' vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne.
Oleksii Kudriakov • 40 просмотров • 5 лет назад
Malaysian Airlines Boing777 Shot Down Установка Бук террористов перемещается с Тореза в Снежное. AA "BUK" vehicle ...

AA BUK vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne
Marco Schoolenberg • 27 просмотров • 5 лет назад
Re-uploading from original poster: EuroMaydan.

- 5) Title: “Rebels are Driving the Buk to the Russian Border” («Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ»). Uploaded by the user “Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine”.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4HJmev5xg0>

Published date: 18 July 2014.

Video ID: L4HJmev5xg0


Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-18

Upload Time (UTC): 10:21:11

youtube.com/watch?v=L4HJmev5xg0

Бойовики вивозять ракетн...

RU Введите запрос



0:00 / 0:13

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ

МВС УКРАЇНИ

Подписаться 13,4 тыс.

2 142 305 просмотров

+ Добавить в Поделиться ... Ещё

Опубликовано: 18 июл. 2014 г.

Категория: Новости и политика

Information concerning media files available through the link:

format code	extension	Resolution	format	TBR	note
249	webm	audio only	tiny	42k	opus @ 50k (48000Hz), 66.92KiB
250	webm	audio only	tiny	58k	opus @ 70k (48000Hz), 92.14KiB
251	webm	audio only	tiny	119k	opus @160k (48000Hz), 187.47KiB
140	m4a	audio only	tiny	127k	m4a_dash container, mp4a.40.2@128k (44100Hz),
160	mp4	256x144	144p	44k	avc1.4d400c, 25fps, video only, 61.81KiB
133	mp4	426x240	240p	86k	avc1.4d4015, 25fps, video only, 120.26KiB
278	webm	256x144	144p	89k	webm container, vp9, 25fps, video only, 128.8
242	webm	426x240	240p	130k	vp9, 25fps, video only, 183.97KiB
243	webm	640x360	360p	233k	vp9, 25fps, video only, 341.80KiB
134	mp4	640x360	360p	238k	avc1.4d401e, 25fps, video only, 344.09KiB
244	webm	854x480	480p	405k	vp9, 25fps, video only, 613.42KiB

135	mp4	854x480	480p	558k	avc1.4d401e, 25fps, video only, 836.39KiB
247	webm	1280x720	720p	932k	vp9, 25fps, video only, 1.40MiB
136	mp4	1280x720	720p	1288k	avc1.4d401f, 25fps, video only, 1.91MiB
302	webm	1280x720	720p50	1645k	vp9, 50fps, video only, 2.42MiB
298	mp4	1280x720	720p50	2832k	avc1.4d4020, 50fps, video only, 4.22MiB
43	webm	640x360	360p	vp8.0	vorbis@128k, 1.16MiB
18	mp4	640x360	360p	452k	avc1.42001E, mp4a.40.2@ 96k (44100Hz), 718.80
22	mp4	1280x720	720p	1362k	avc1.64001F, mp4a.40.2@192k (44100Hz) (best)

TBR = Average bitrate of audio and video in KBit/s

There was uploaded the file with format code 22 tagged as having the highest resolution, and there was uploaded the file with format code 298 tagged as having the highest TBR.

The file size is 2,213,672 bytes. The SHA1 hash sum is "61E9B1A6C17847D0672D4661A0F00B494293CF39". The file with format code 22.

Information concerning the media file:

General	
Complete name	: Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс 'БУК' до кордону із РФ-L4HJmev5xg0_code22.mp4
Format	: MPEG-4
Format profile	: Base Media / Version 2
Codec ID	: mp42 (isom/mp42)
File size	: 2.11 MiB
Duration	: 13 s 3 ms
Overall bit rate mode	: Variable
Overall bit rate	: 1 362 kb/s
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
gsst	: 0
gstd	: 13049
Video	
ID	: 1
Format	: AVC
Format/Info	: Advanced Video Codec
Format profile	: Main@L3.1
Format settings	: CABAC / 3 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC	: Yes
Format settings, Reference frames	: 3 frames

Codec ID	: avc1
Codec ID/Info	: Advanced Video Coding
Duration	: 13 s 0 ms
Bit rate	: 1 232 kb/s
Width	: 1 280 pixels
Height	: 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio	: 16:9
Frame rate mode	: Constant
Frame rate	: 25.000 FPS
Color space	: YUV
Chroma subsampling	: 4:2:0
Bit depth	: 8 bits
Scan type	: Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame)	: 0.053
Stream size	: 1.91 MiB (90%)
Title	: ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 10/10/2017.
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
Color range	: Limited
Color primaries	: BT.709
Transfer characteristics	: BT.709
Matrix coefficients	: BT.709
Codec configuration box	: avcC
Audio	
ID	: 2
Format	: AAC LC
Format/Info	: Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
Codec ID	: mp4a-40-2
Duration	: 13 s 3 ms
Bit rate mode	: Variable
Bit rate	: 126 kb/s
Channel(s)	: 2 channels
Channel layout	: L R
Sampling rate	: 44.1 kHz
Frame rate	: 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode	: Lossy
Stream size	: 200 KiB (9%)
Title	: ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 10/10/2017.
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:33:26

The file size is 4,426,320 bytes. The SHA1 hash sum is "F3F5A141EFCA3B5E394AECAE02EAC4FD71B49411". The file with format code **298**.

Information concerning the media file:

General	
Complete name	: Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс 'БУК' до кордону із РФ-L4HJmev5xg0_code298.mp4
Format	: dash
Codec ID	: dash (iso6/avc1/mp41)
File size	: 4.22 MiB
Duration	: 13 s 0 ms
Overall bit rate	: 2 724 kb/s
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01
Video	
ID	: 1
Format	: AVC
Format/Info	: Advanced Video Codec
Format profile	: Main@L3.2
Format settings	: CABAC / 3 Ref Frames
Format settings, CABAC	: Yes
Format settings, Reference frames	: 3 frames
Codec ID	: avc1
Codec ID/Info	: Advanced Video Coding
Duration	: 13 s 0 ms
Bit rate	: 2 718 kb/s
Width	: 1 280 pixels
Height	: 720 pixels
Display aspect ratio	: 16:9
Frame rate mode	: Constant
Frame rate	: 50.000 FPS
Color space	: YUV
Chroma subsampling	: 4:2:0
Bit depth	: 8 bits
Scan type	: Progressive
Bits/(Pixel*Frame)	: 0.059
Stream size	: 4.21 MiB (100%)
Encoded date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01
Tagged date	: UTC 2017-10-11 05:30:01
Color range	: Limited
Color primaries	: BT.709
Transfer characteristics	: BT.709
Matrix coefficients	: BT.709
Codec configuration box	: avcC

The encoded date (**11 October 2017**) is not the same as the published date (**18 July 2014**). As discussed above, this could be due to reencoding for some reason after the initial upload.

The file shown by default and tagged as “Best” has a lower TBR than the file with format code 298.

Having searched by the title “Rebels are Driving the Buk to the Russian Border” («Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ») and sorted videos by date, we can see that the first available video was uploaded by the user “Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine”. There are two earlier videos with the identical title but a completely different content.

ером? [Да, установить в качестве браузера по умолчанию](#) [Как я могу это сделать?](#)

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ
ful4n9 · 3,5 тыс. просмотров · 5 лет назад
На видео хорошо видно, что минимум одной ракеты не хватает.

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ
Редакция ЮА · 2,6 тыс. просмотров · 5 лет назад

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ
сигизмод кошкин · 185 просмотров · 5 лет назад
ОДНОЙ РАКЕТЫ НЕ ХВАТАЕТ.

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ
МВС УКРАЇНИ · 2,1 млн просмотров · 5 лет назад

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ
max vegeev · 158 просмотров · 5 лет назад
Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ.

Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ
max vegeev · 92 просмотра · 5 лет назад
Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ.

Больше нет результатов

I obtained an archived copy of this video from the link below, with an archiving date of 18 July 2014:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20140718111528/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4HJmev5xg0>

I obtained the following video link from the source code for that archived page:

https://web.archive.org/web/20140718111529oe_/http://r3---sn-nwj7knek.googlevideo.com/videoplayback?itag=22&mws=yes&expire=1405706400&ratebypass=yes&signature=7969540F3CF50C841CDB641AF158C352AA70630D.2959749ED53ABACE6D985E35D03F458632166F74&sver=3&fexp=902408%2C922521%2C924222%2C927622%2C927896%2C930008%2C934024%2C934030%2C938645%2C946008&id=o-AI03D7_D2XaRQBLyJ9zQFMljPBil6WsCo0IE_ywnR_4n&mv=m&ipbits=0&key=yt5&sparams=id%2Cinitcwndbps%2Cip%2Cipbits%2Citag%2Cratebypass%2Csource%2Cupn%2Cexpire&ms=au&upn=89eVRxf8GOW&source=youtube&mt=1405682050&initcwndbps=964750&ip=207.241.237.141&signature=

The SHA1 hash sum is “E7F6BA155F08BABE3DFBFFAAE95F8CC99443BDF8”.

The data associated with that archived video is set out below.

General	
Complete name	: videoplayback (3).mp4
Format	: MPEG-4
Format profile	: Base Media / Version 2
Codec ID	: mp42 (isom/mp42)
File size	: 3.42 MiB
Duration	: 13 s 48 ms
Overall bit rate mode	: Variable
Overall bit rate	: 2 198 kb/s
Encoded date	: UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09
Tagged date	: UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09
gsst	: 0
gstd	: 13095
gssd	: B4A7DAAC1HH1405682128843655
gshh	: r3---sn-nwj7knek.googlevideo.com
Video	
ID	: 1
Format	: AVC

Format/Info : Advanced Video Codec
 Format profile : High@L3.1
 Format settings : CABAC / 1 Ref Frames
 Format settings, CABAC : Yes
 Format settings, Reference frames : 1 frame
 Format settings, GOP : M=1, N=60
 Codec ID : avc1
 Codec ID/Info : Advanced Video Coding
 Duration : 13 s 40 ms
 Bit rate : 2 003 kb/s
 Maximum bit rate : 2 919 kb/s
 Width : 1 280 pixels
 Height : 720 pixels
 Display aspect ratio : 16:9
 Frame rate mode : Constant
 Frame rate : 25.000 FPS
 Color space : YUV
 Chroma subsampling : 4:2:0
 Bit depth : 8 bits
 Scan type : Progressive
 Bits/(Pixel*Frame) : 0.087
 Stream size : 3.11 MiB (91%)
 Tagged date : UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09
 Codec configuration box : avcC

Audio

ID : 2
 Format : AAC LC
 Format/Info : Advanced Audio Codec Low Complexity
 Codec ID : mp4a-40-2
 Duration : 13 s 48 ms
 Bit rate mode : Variable
 Bit rate : 192 kb/s
 Maximum bit rate : 202 kb/s
 Channel(s) : 2 channels

Channel layout	: L R
Sampling rate	: 44.1 kHz
Frame rate	: 43.066 FPS (1024 SPF)
Compression mode	: Lossy
Stream size	: 306 KiB (9%)
Title	: IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011
Encoded date	: UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09
Tagged date	: UTC 2014-07-17 10:02:09

The encoding date for the video is 17th July 2014. I understand that there have been suggestions that the video was filmed on 18th July 2014. However, those suggestions are not consistent with the encoding date – as explained above.

In the archived version of this video (which is the oldest version available), as the Buk passes a lamppost in this video, a vertical line on the lamppost seems to disappear. After the Buk has passed that lamppost, a bird appears to be visible on both sides of that lamppost. It is possible that these are compression artifacts, but it is also possible that they are due to mistakes made when editing or creating the video. These features are absent from one of the later copies of the video.

In each version of this video, the vegetation in the foreground is static.

Conclusions

1) The video files submitted for analysis:

1.1) The first video above was obtained through the link from the archive https://web.archive.org/web/20140717182910/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIQ_hnodT70&gl=US&hl=en. The video was encoded on 16 July 2014, 16:42:05 UTC, however,

- the video was published only on 17 July 2014, with its metadata having the title that states “IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011”. This video has a fairly high bit rate, and certain issues with the video do not appear to be due to compression artifacts.
- 1.2) The next video from this list is titled “The Weapon that Killed the Malaysians, Snizhne, 17 July 2014” («Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014»). It was uploaded by the user “Brown Moses” and its description contains a link to a certain “original” video which has already been deleted. Despite the fact that this video is presented as a “repost”, it is of far worse quality with its average TBR being 453 kbps as compared with 875 kbps, and its encoded date is 14 August 2017, 20:30:49 UTC. Besides, the video’s published date is also “17 July 2014”. Further, metadata show that the video’s title is “ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.”
 - 1.3) The next video from this list is titled “AA "BUK" vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”. It was published by the user “EuroMaydan” on 17 July 2014. This video is cropped and encoded with its resolution (from 408*720 to 1,280*720) and frame rate (from 15 to 29.9) increased. However, it is obvious that optical image stabilisation tools were applied to the video presumably for the purpose of increasing its quality. The video was encoded on “14 October 2015, 22:33:51 UTC”. Further, metadata show that the video’s title is “ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.”
 - 1.4) The next video from this list was published on 14 October 2015 and titled “AA BUK vehicle Pro Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne”. It was uploaded by the user “ANON EVOL”. The video was encoded on “14 October 2015, 22:33:51 UTC” and its title in metadata reads “IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011”. This video also appears to be cropped as compared with the first one, but it has not undergone optical image stabilisation and has the worst quality (397 kbps, 640*360 pixels).
 - 1.5) The video published on 18 July 2014 and titled “Rebels are Driving the Buk to the Russian Border” («Бойовики вивозять ракетний комплекс "БУК" до кордону із РФ») by the user “Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine” is peculiar in terms of its encoded date (11 October 2017) being inconsistent with its published date (18 July 2014); besides, by default, preference is given to the video of lower quality (1,232 kbps, 25 FPS as compared with 2,718 kbps, 50 FPS), but this video of lower quality has an audio track. The field Title states that “ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.”
- 2) In the videos considered above, I found there to be repeated problems when objects are passing in front of posts etc. This may be suspicious. In particular, the shortening of the Buk in the first video discussed above appears to be very strange and not consistent merely with compression artifacts. I cannot give a reasonable explanation of that appearance.
 - 3) Social media cannot constitute a source of digital evidence in the form of photographs and videos since social media change and encode them on their own, particularly by lowering their resolution and even changing and encoding them with the passage of time since publication. Further, if photographs and videos have already been compressed at the time of publication

and are repeatedly compressed by social media (in the case of YouTube, this means that they had been compressed at least three times by 2017), then they cannot be analysed for any traces of computer editing.

Annex 362

Report on Expert Examination of a Video File for Any Signs of Falsification, 7 December 2020

Report on Expert Examination of a Video File for Any Signs of Falsification

Moscow
2020

Abstract

This expert report was prepared on instructions from the attorneys of Ivanyan and Partners Law Firm, members of the St Petersburg Bar Association and the Moscow Bar Association.

This report is made to be further submitted to the European Court of Human Rights in the proceedings brought by Ukraine against the Russian Federation.

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1. Experts involved in the examination

This report was prepared by a group of experts specializing in the following fields:

- special effects;
- integral image generation using overlay methods;
- online fraud prevention;
- development of software for text and video information analysis;
- big data and digital image processing.

The experts have higher education and between 5 and 15 years of work experience in the relevant fields.

2. Terms and Definitions

The following terms and definitions are used in the report:

- **Computer Graphics (CG)** – graphics or visual elements generated using the computer equipment/digital algorithms.
- **Digital Video** – a sequence of raster digital images presented in a special computer format.
- **Digitally Enhanced Video (DEV)** – manipulations with digital video using the methods of digital image processing.
- **Principal Component Analysis (PCA)** – method of analysis based on data clustering.
- **Wavelet Transformations (WA)** – method of analysis based on signal decomposition.
- **Luminance Gradient (LG)** – method of analysis based on the intensity of luminous flux in a digital image or digital video.

3. Objectives

To examine the video material submitted and answer the following questions:

- Is the video real, CG-ed or created by digital manipulations?
- If the video is real, where and when was it made?
- If the video was created by digital manipulations, what did the manipulations involve and how could they be created?
- If the video is CG-ed, how was it created?

4. Methods of Analysis of Digital Videos

1. **Aggregated Analysis.** Preliminary analysis of the video material submitted, search for basic signs of digital manipulation, search for original video and copies online.
2. **Analysis of the digital video's format.** Analysis of the container and streams of the video materials submitted and copies thereof in the Internet.
3. **Domain analysis of the digital video.** Analysis of the video in search of the following potential signs of digital manipulation:
 - uneven and artificial blurring;
 - areas of the objects studied where the contrast does not match;
 - areas of the objects studied where shadows do not match;
 - signs of additional superimposed layers (image decomposition);
 - unnatural camera movement pattern;
 - disappearance of objects.

5. Aggregated Analysis

Prior to commencement of the work, we received the video material showing two moving objects identified by their contours as vehicles, presumably military equipment. The video is characterized by the following:

- the camera, with which the video was supposedly made, is very shaky;
- unusual defocusing of the image;
- change of the image exposure (change of brightness and contrast).

5.1 Online search for the video or similar parts of the video

The search was conducted in search indexes of the following websites:

- Youtube.com;
- Google.com;
- Yandex.ru;
- Duckduck.com.

The following text queries were entered in each of the indices:

- «Бук снежное» (“Buk snezhnoye”);
- «Бук торез» (“Buk torez”);
- «Орудие убийства Малазийского боинга» (“Weapon of destruction of the Malaysian boeing”).

It should be noted that we found the mention of the video recording in question on Bellingcat.com where it is referred to as a video material under study

(<https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/03/10/a-post-mortem-of-russias-claim-that-crucial-mh17-video-evidence-was-falsified/>).

As at the date of this report, the following video materials were found online:

5.1.1 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqhnodT70> – Bolodya Familyev, 17 July 2014

5.1.2 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mil9s-zWLS4> – Brown Moses

(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_rpr10vOZDoa3usiwEFfwQ), 17 July 2014



Youtube Data Viewer

Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014

Original link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlOqhnodT70>

Video ID: Mil9s-zWLS4

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17

Upload Time (UTC): 18:41:13 (convert to local time)

[Weapon that killed the Malaysians Snezhnoye 17 07 2014]

5.1.3 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iE7wEhvYFos> - [Ukraine@War](#)

(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7dpS3kPo0NGF6CBIJKNNMw>), 14.07.2015



Youtube Data Viewer

Орудие убийства малайзийцев Снежное 17 07 2014

Original MH17 BUK video taken by a phone in high resolution, with it's original title.
All (or most?) other videos where cropped from this one to landscape format to fit screens. <http://ukraineatwar.blogspot.com>

Video ID: iE7wEhvYFos
Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2015-07-14
Upload Time (UTC): 18:25:36 (convert to local time)

[Weapon that killed the Malaysians Snezhnoye 17 07 2014]

5.1.4 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtHkZZnGTlc> - Alexander Glasnaroda
(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9xm2psH5ctnGpkf0dRTwJA>), 17.07.2014



Youtube Data Viewer

Торез Снежное Появились первые кадры виновника смерти
300 пассажиров гражданского самолета
смотрите все! весь мир долже знать кто главный его враг! Путину не уйти от ответа!

Video ID: qtHkZZnGTlc
Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17
Upload Time (UTC): 19:18:43 (convert to local time)

[Torez Snezhnoye First footage of the culprit of the death of 300 civilian aircraft passengers appears watch all! The whole world should know who its prime enemy is! Putin will not escape the answer!]

5.1.5. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdfEL5yWE7w> - Mrachny Molochnik
(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCj2XA67QC8HgI-7wb3ugg9w>), 17 July 2014



Youtube DataViewer

Торез - Снежное. ЗРК "Бук" едет в район из которого был сбил пассажирский самолет Боинг 17.07.2014

ЗРК Бук выдвигается на позиции на позиции по направлению к Саур-Могиле. 17.07.2014 Подборка фактов по падению Боинга: <http://evilmilker.livejournal.com/4379.html> Eugene Logvinov: Видео снималось на ул. Гагарина в Снежном. Скоро туда на место приедут украинские, малайзийские и западные представители. И исследуют следы гусениц, массу движущегося объекта и многое другое. Попали вы. Точное место на карте крупным планом, где двигался "Бук", если интересно, - вот источники: Гугловская карта: <https://maps.google.com/maps?q=%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0,+%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F+%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C,+%D0%A1%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5&hl=en-US&ie=UTF8&ll=48.014308,38.762673&spn=0.005792,0.009645&sl=50.045235,36.260719&sspn=0.044261,0.077162&gl=US&hnear=Snizhne,+Donetsk+Oblast,+Ukraine&t=h&z=17&lci=com.panoramio.all> Российская карта: <http://maps.yandex.ua/-/CVroINZQ> Вот для наглядности фотка, прикрепленная на Яндекс карте с того места. http://img-fotki.yandex.ru/get/6410/135035860.5/0_86498_90c89751_L "Бук" едет мимо елей, посаженных у дороги, которые хорошо видны на приведенных картах. antistentor: <http://static.panoramio.com/photos/1920x1280/50150301.jpg> дорога Снежное-Саур-могила 48.00.41.85 38.45.46.81 Dan Walker Судя по ракурсу, съемка произведена из высоты по адресу город Снежное, улица Гагарина, 43 Съемка велась в южном направлении в сторону Первомайского. Там терриконов не видно. Проверьте сами по карте - <http://maps.yandex.ua/?text=%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%2C%20%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C%2C%20%D0%A1%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5%2C%20%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B0%20%D0%93%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%2C%2043&sl=38.762358%2C48.01507&ll=38.762358%2C48.015070&spn=0.033903%2C0.011388&z=16&l=sat%2Csat>

Video ID: VdfEL5yWE7w

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17

Upload Time (UTC): 21:21:20 ([convert to local time](#))

[Torez – Snezhnoye. “Buk” Surface-to-Air Missile System moving to the area from which passenger Boeing was downed 17.07.2014

Buk Surface-to-Air Missile System moving towards the positions towards the positions in the direction of Saur-Mogila. 17.07.2014 Compilation of facts related to downing of the Boeing. [...]

Video was shot on Gagarin street in Snezhnoye. The Ukrainian, Malaysian and foreign representatives are soon to arrive there. And they will investigate the caterpillar tread marks, weight of the moving object and much more. You are in trouble. There's a close up of the exact place where "Buk" drove through on the map; here are the sources if you are interested: Google map: [...] Russian map: [...] To illustrate, here is a pic from that place attached to a Yandex map [...] "Buk" is driving past fir trees planted along the road, which can be seen quite well on the maps shown. [...] the Snezhnoye - Saur-Mogila road [...] Given the angle, the video was shot from the multi-story building on 43 Gagarin Street, Snezhnoye The filming was made southwards, in the direction of Pervomayskoye. No slag heaps can be seen there. Check it out on the map [...].]

5.1.6. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OAxpT5AikhQ> – torezinfo

(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMG5WlxPXlvzjdZttraCgNg>), 17 July 2014



Youtube DataViewer

**Торез Снежное Появились первые кадры виновника смерти
300 пассажиров гражданского самолета**
Утановка БУК в Торез Комментарии отключаю. С тупоголовой ватой - только в
 коментах срач

Video ID: OAxpT5AikhQ
Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17
Upload Time (UTC): 18:45:58 (convert to local time)

[Torez Snezhnoye First footage of the culprit of the death of 300 civilian aircraft passengers appears Buk system in Torez Disabling comments. Dumbhead pro-Russians only shitstorming the comments.]

5.1.7. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCcjD_SYISw – Andrey Mipto

(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPhbkbgRbqGPpjOitiFTENg>), 22 November 2014



Youtube Data Viewer

Торез Снежное ЗРК 'Бук' едет в район из которого был сбил
пассажирский самолет Боинг 17 07 2014

Video ID: KCcjD_SYISw
Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-11-22
Upload Time (UTC): 08:48:06 (convert to local time)

[Torez Snezhnoye “Buk” Surface-to-Air Missile System moving to the area from which passenger
Boeing was downed 17 07 2014]

5.1.8. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9nc8TniujU> – DIVAN ONLINE

(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHZJtiXS09_-52IV5hNw0xA), 18 July 2014



Youtube Data Viewer

17.07.2014, Установка БУК уезжает из Тореза

ПОДПИШИСЬ на новости: <http://goo.gl/nHicDg> Ставь ЛАЙК и ДЕЛИСЬ видео, мир должен знать ПРАВДУ! ----- По вопросам АВТОРСКОГО ПРАВА писать на divanonlinenews@gmail.com, прошу не слать СТРАЙК без предупредительного письма. ----- | В Н И М А Н И Е | ----- Наш новостной канал не придерживается точки зрения ни одной из сторон конфликта. Мы освещаем новости аполитичным взглядом, стараясь не задеть чувства приверженников той и или иной стороны.

Video ID: R9nc8TniujU

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-18

Upload Time (UTC): 08:10:54 (**convert to local time**)

[17.07.2014, BUK system leaving Torez

SUBSCRIBE to the news: <http://goo.gl/nHicDg> LIKE and SHARE the videos, the world must know the TRUTH! ----- For COPYRIGHT issues contact divanonlinenews@gmail.com, please do not send a STRIKE without notice. ----- | A T T E N T I O N | ----- Our news channel does not share the point of view of any party to the conflict. We cover the news from an apolitical standpoint and avoid hurting the feelings of either side.]

5.1.9. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpDUbnqRATM> – Dimitri Palagniouk
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC0EjT-tH178_mvfiARKyqQ), 17 July 2014



Youtube Data Viewer

**Ракетная установка "Бук" после уничтожения Боинга 777
покидает посёлок Снежное. 17/07/2014**

Расстрел российскими террористами малайзийского Боинга над Украиной с
установки "Бук"

Video ID: zpDUbnqRATM

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17

Upload Time (UTC): 22:51:47 (convert to local time)

["Buk" missile system leaves Snezhnoye village after downing Boeing 777. 17/07/2014

The shooting of the Malaysian Boeing over Ukraine by the Russian terrorists using "Buk" system]

5.1.10. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xO3FiAXTTG4> - Dyadya Petya

(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZ8IGrKrnZPjt_V_W0f4aBA), 17 July 2014



Youtube DataViewer

БУК едет по дороге в Снежном 17.07.2014

БУК едет по дороге в Снежном 17.07.2014

Video ID: xO3FiAXTTG4

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17

Upload Time (UTC): 18:01:43 (convert to local time)

[BUK driving on the road in Snezhnoye 17.07.2014

BUK driving on the road in Snezhnoye 17.07.2014]

5.1.11 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wx1yQLgpHYM> – Georgy Semenets

(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2Hx1H0rGR-dcL5rfA2Z71A>),

18 July 2014



Youtube Data Viewer

**Самоходный зенитный ракетный комплекс «Бук-М1»
зафиксирован в день гибели Боинга в Тореze**

Торез, предположительно проспект Гагарина. ЗРК БУК движется по дороге в
сопровождении боевиков. Аматорское видео жителя города.

Video ID: wx1yQLgpHYM

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-18

Upload Time (UTC): 09:19:58 ([convert to local time](#))

[“Buk-M1” self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system filmed in Torez on the Boeing downing day
in Torez

Torez, presumably, the Gagarin Avenue. BUK Surface-to-Air Missile System moving along the
road accompanied by the rebels. Amateur video shot by a town resident.]

5.1.12 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUKMGHXSq4Q> - alina bar

(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXnbamqmCqxjFn-9kDvjw>), 18 July 2014



Youtube DataViewer

Торез кадры как система БУК движется по городу

Торез кадры как система БУК движется по городу

Video ID: IUKMGHXSq4Q

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-18

Upload Time (UTC): 08:45:22 (convert to local time)

[Torez footage of BUK system moving across the city

Torez footage of BUK system moving across the city]

5.1.13 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pz2XwDYkHsM> - Kyopu

Osaka, (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCBsMma4O2N9cbjETTIU_7TQ), 17 July 2014



Youtube DataViewer

ЗРК "БУК" переправляют российские террористы из Тореза в Снежное

Видео снятое очевидцами о перегоне зенитно-ракетного комплекса "Бук" прокремлевскими террористами (т.н. ДНР) из Тореза в Снежное. Есть версия о том, что именно из неё был сбит пассажирский авиалайнер Боинг 777 Амстердам - Куала-Лумпур.

Video ID: pz2XwDYkHsM

Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-17

Upload Time (UTC): 21:12:35 (convert to local time)

[Russian terrorists transporting BUK Surface-to-Air Missile System from Torez to Snezhnoye
A video shot by witnesses of the transfer of BUK Surface-to-Air Missile System by pro-Kremlin terrorists (the so-called DPR) from Torez to Snezhnoye. One line of enquiry suggests that it was used to down the Boeing 777 passenger plane flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur.]

5.1.14 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLNS8F-zBwU> – Andryukha Larionov
(<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCVIAwv1avPnNZzRjV5hTwuw>), 17 July 2014



Youtube Data Viewer

Установка Бук сепаратистов перемещается с Тореза в
Снежное

Video ID: oLNS8F-zBwU
Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-18
Upload Time (UTC): 02:03:08 (convert to local time)

[Rebels' Buk system moving from Torez to Snezhnoye]

5.1.15 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ri2zWEnM5jE> – Hromadska Informatsiynna Merezha
(https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCGXHw6EoJ_o2sL5aL-FM3GQ), 18 July 2014



Youtube Data Viewer

Пророссийские боевики перевозят зенитно ракетный комплекс Бук г. Снежное Донецкая обл. HD

На видео показано, как пророссийские боевики перевозят зенитно-ракетный комплекс Бук из Тореца в Снежное Донецкой области. 17 июля 2014 года вблизи Тореца в Донецкой области пророссийские террористы сбили пассажирский авиалайнер Boeing-777 «Боинг 777» авиакомпании Malaysia Airlines Малазийские авиалинии. Все пассажиры и члены экипажа самолета погибли. Жертвами этого чудовищного теракта стали 295 человек среди которых 85 детей. Обломки авиалайнера и погибших тел были разбросаны на протяжении нескольких километров. Авиалайнер совершал рейс Амстердам - Куала-Лумпур. Самолет был сбит на высоте 10 000 метров.

Video ID: ri2zWEnM5jE
Upload Date (YYYY/MM/DD): 2014-07-18
Upload Time (UTC): 17:20:40 ([convert to local time](#))

[Pro-Russian rebels transporting Buk Surface-to-Air Missile System Snezhnoye town, Donetsk Region. HD

The video shows the pro-Russian rebels transporting Buk Surface-to-Air Missile System from Torez to Snezhnoye in Donetsk Region. On 17 July 2014, the pro-Russian rebels downed a Malaysian Airlines Boeing-777 passenger aircraft near Torez in Donetsk Region. All passengers and aircraft crew died. 295 people, including 85 children were killed by that atrocious terrorist attack. Debris of the aircraft and parts of the bodies were scattered across several kilometers. The aircraft was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. It was shot at 10 000 m.]

5.2 Characteristics of the distinctly similar video materials found

Vid eo No.	Youtube channel	Date of publica tion, accordi ng to the data shown on the page with the video,	Numb er of video contai ners found	Resolut ion corresp onds to the widest side of the video	Conta iner forma t	Au dio	Date and time of uploadi ng of the video accordi ng to Amnes ty Intern ation (GMT)	Date and time of coding of the video, accordi ng to ffprob (GMT)	Comme nts	Codec Copyrigh t (accordi ng to ffprobe)	Num ber of fram es

1	Bolodya Familyev (Болодя Фамилье в)	17.07.2014	1	720	mp4	Yes	-	16.07.2014 16:42:05	Contain er tag contains an error, actual date of publicat ion is 17.07.2014 16:42:09 (accordi ng to Webarc hive)	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	529
2	Brown Moses	17.07.2014	3	240	mp4	yes	17.07.2014 18:41:13	14.08.2017 20:21:30	-	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	529
				360	mp4	yes		14.08.2017 20:39:49	-	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.	529
				720	mp4	yes		N/a	-	-	562
3	Ukraine@War	14.07.2015	8	240	mp4	yes	14.07.2015 18:25:36	25.02.2016 10:03:10	-	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	529
				360	mp4	yes		20.08.2016 01:17:51	-	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.	529
				480	mp4	No		25.02.2016	-	Google	529

								10:03:29					
				480	webm	no		N/a	-	-	577		
				720	mp4	no		25.02.201	-	-	529		
								10:04:06					
				720	webm	no		N/a	-	Google	581		
				720	webm	yes		N/a	-	Lavf56.40.101	577		
				1080	webm	yes		N/a	The best quality copy of the video, presumably, the original video	Google	584		
4	Alexander Glasnaroda	14.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	14.07.2014	14.03.2018	19:18:43	17:32:10	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 03/04/2018.	1056
				720	mp4	yes		14.03.2018	17:32:10		The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 03/04/2018.	1056
5	Mrachny Molochnik	14.07.2014	2	360	mp4	yes	14.07.2014	25.08.2016	21:21:20	05:26:50	The margins are cropped as compar	ISO Media file produced by	1054

									ed with the original video	Google Inc.	
				720	mp4	Yes		25.08.2016 05:26:50	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.	1054
6	torezinfo	14.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	14.07.2014 18:45:28	11.11.2019 01:39:09	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 11/10/2019.	1056
				720	mp4	Yes		11.11.2019 01:39:09	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 11/10/2019.	1056
7	Andrey Mipto (Андрей Мипто)	22.11.2014	2	360 720	mp4	Yes	22.11.2014 08.48.06	21.11.2014 21:02:12	The time tag of the container of the video is older	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	1054
					mp4	Yes		21.11.2014 21:00:23	than the time tag of the publication.	IsoMedia File Produced by Google,	1054

									The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	5-11-2011	
8	DIVAN ONLINE (ДИВАН ОНЛАЙН)	18.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	18.07.2014 08:10:54	26.01.2020 10:52:38	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video, also the video has been rotated horizontally	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 01/26/2020.	1060
				480	mp4	Yes		26.01.2020 11:10:07	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video, also the video has been rotated horizontally	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.	1060
9	Dimitri Palagniouk	17.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	17.07.2014 22:51:47	14.08.2016 22:01:35	The margins are cropped as	ISO Media file produced by	1174

									compar ed with the original video and text has been added	Google Inc	
				720	mp4	Yes		14.08.2016 22:01:35	The margins are cropped as compar ed with the original video and text has been added.	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.	1174
10	Дуадуа Ретуа (Дядя Петя)	17.07.2014	2	240	mp4	Yes	17.07.2014 18:01:43	27.01.2014 14:12:35	The earliest video preserve d	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 01/27/2020.	529
				360	mp4	Yes		27.01.2014 14:12:35		ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 01/27/2020.	529
11	Georgy Semenets	18.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	18.07.2014	21.07.2014	The margins are	IsoMedia File Produced	1054

	(Георгий Семенов)						09:19:58	09:32:58	cropped as compared with the original video	by Google, 5-11-2011	
				720	mp4	Yes		07.03.2018 02:16:12	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 03/06/2018.	1055
12	alina bar	18.07.2014	1	360	mp4	Yes	18.07.2014 08:45:22	17.07.2014 08:47:15	The time tag of the container of the video is older than the time tag of the publication. The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	1055
13	Курорты Осак	17.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	17.07.2014 21:12:35	16.07.2014 21:10:08	The time tag of the container of the video is older than the time tag	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	1056

									of the publication. The margins are cropped as compared with the original video		
				720	mp4	Yes		14.08.2016 07:05:14		ISO Media file produced by Google Inc.	1056
14	Andryukha Larionov (Андрюха Ларионов)	17.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	18.07.2014 02:03:08	21.07.2014 09:32:58	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	1054
				720	mp4	Yes		07.03.2018 02:16:12	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on: 03/06/2018.	1055
15	Hromadskaya Informatsiya	18.07.2014	2	360	mp4	Yes	18.07.2014 17:20:40	17.07.2014 02:02:45	The margins are cropped as compared with	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	1056

(Громадська Інформаційна)								the original video		
	720	mp4	Yes	17.07.2014 02:02:59	The margins are cropped as compared with the original video	IsoMedia File Produced by Google, 5-11-2011	1056			


5.4 Summary

- As at the date of this report, the earliest video preserved dated 16 July 2014 16:42:05 was found as a result of online analysis. The video was published on “Bolodya Familyev” channel. The link to the said video was subsequently saved with the Webarchive tool. The best quality version of the said video (with the highest resolution) was found on [Ukraine@War](#) channel and published on 14 July 2015 18:25:36, almost one year after the date of the first online publication of the said video material.
- Further, it should be noted that despite the apparent resemblance of all the videos found, there are several versions thereof that differ in respect of the following characteristics:
 - image orientation (landscape/portrait);
 - number of frames;
 - duration of the video;
 - resolution (quality);
 - date of coding;
 - date of uploading.
- In our view, the differences detected by us appear to be quite strange, which raises doubts as to whether such filming really took place.

The strangest thing is that the coding date of the earliest video is 16 July 2014, whilst the page saved in Webarchive indices tells us that the video was uploaded on Youtube on 17 July 2014. It would be more correct to assume that the date of video uploading to Youtube is the date set out in the mp4 meta-data at the time of its coding. No bug reports in Youtube systems have been found

as a result of online search for such information. We have found a potential explanation of the discrepancy between the dates published on Bellingcat.com. Having analyzed Bellingcat's explanations of the error in the Youtube algorithm, we find them to be unconvincing for the following reasons:

- The Bellingcat article states that there is an error in the implementation of standard ISO/IEC 14496-5 libraries, which results in the difference of 86,400 seconds (or one day) between the date of uploading and the date of coding. This statement is not accurate, since we found video files uploaded at different times and having different dates and dates of coding, such difference being more than 86,400 seconds, items Nos. 14, 15, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 3.
- The Bellingcat publication claims that Google recoded all videos after the error (bug) had been discovered in 2019. This statement is also inaccurate because there are many videos with the coding date earlier than 2019, items Nos. 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 7, 5, 4, 3, 2.
- Within the framework of preparation of this report, we raised the question as to whether the difference between the above dates is normal practice before other experts in the relevant fields who were not aware of Bellingcat's publication and explanations. These experts also noted the fluctuating difference in the timing of all copies of the video found, which they consider to be very unusual and rather strange.
- It is also worth noting that the Bellingcat publication contains a screenshot allegedly proving that one Christo Grozev (one of Bellingcat authors) had a video recording with approximately the same date as that of the original video from Bolodya Familyev channel. In support of this fact, Bellingcat rely on the time set out in item 1 of image A (the field that can be manually adjusted at any time if the person carrying out such a manipulation with the data so desires), even though Youtube only gives the actual date of the publication in item 2 of Image A, which shows that Bellingcat are trying to persuade their readers that the said piece of evidence is authentic. To actually find out the date and time of uploading of the video, one has to use the Youtube Video Manager tool in item 3 of Image A. The actual view of Youtube Video Manager with the publication date is shown on Image B.



Screenshot from YouTube's Video Manager, dated 18 July 2014, 12:55

Image A – Screenshot from Bellingcat publication showing the exact date and time of the publication.




Image B – Screenshot of the classic Youtube Video Manager (in 2020, Youtube switched to a new Youtube Studio tool, which has completely replaced the Video Manager).

4. The highest quality (resolution) video is the material published by Ukraine@war channel. It should be noted that the said video was published one year after the publication of the first videos, which confirms that the representatives of the said channel must have the original copy, assuming the original copy has existed at all.

6 Domain analysis of the digital video

The webm file downloaded from Ukraine@War with the characteristics set out below was taken as the main video material analyzed:

Metadata:

encoder : google

Duration: 00:00:35.20, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 4077 kb/s

Stream #0:0(eng): Video: vp9 (Profile 0), yuv420p(tv), 1088x1920, SAR 1:1 DAR 17:30, 15 fps, 15 tbr, 1k tbn, 1k tbc (default)

The analysis of the video was carried out in relation to the following items:

Item	Name	Comments
6.1	Uneven and artificial blurring	Blurring is used in digital manipulation of the video to create the effect of naturalness of what is happening in the frame. Currently, there is a wide range of tools available to create such an effect and the signs of blurring can include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • tilt varies from frame to frame; • varying intensity; • intensity profile varies from frame to frame (one frame has more and another one has less blurring and the combinations can vary);
6.2	Areas of the objects studied where the contrast does not match	In case of a paste-in (superimposition of the layer with the object from another video) the contrast and histogram of such object do not always match
6.3	Areas of items studied where shadows do not match	In case of a paste-in (superimposition of the layer with the object from another video) the shadows, their direction and intensity do not always match those of the objects from the original video.
6.4	Signs of additional superimposed layers (image decomposition)	In case of a paste-in (superimposition of the layer with the object from another video), there may be compression artefacts from another source. Compression algorithms used in the digital video have their unique digital fingerprint which does not correspond with the fingerprint pattern from another digital video.
6.5	Differences between objects in various versions of the video	In digital manipulation, there may be errors that erase objects from or add minor objects to the digital video.

6.1 Checking for uneven artificial blurring

The following frames with the blurring were found in the digital video under study and in many other similar videos:

- 01:06 (second 1 frame 6) — 01:14 (second 1 frame 14) — duration 8 frames (Image 1).
- 13:00 (second 13 frame 0) – 13:08 (second 13 frame 8) – duration 8 frames (Image 2).

Both of these fragments are blurs with a duration of 8 frames but with a different blurring profile. In Image 1, you can clearly see the blurring in the left part of the fragment. Image 1.1. illustrates the blurring gradient, with the maximum blurring shown in white and absence of blurring shown in black, which could have been superimposed to create the blur effect.




Image 1. – fragment of the digital video with the blur in the left part.



Image 1.1 - the white colour shows the maximum blur whilst the black colour shows the absence of blurring.



Image 2. – fragment of the video where the blur is used for the entire frame

6.2 Checking for areas of the objects under study where the contrast does not match



Image 3a – a fragment of the digital video where the area with the same depth is highlighted (frame No. 1)




Image 3b – Presumed location of “Buk” Surface-to-Air-Missile System in the frame shown on Image 3a.



Image 3c – Comparison of objects in the frame with the potential place of movement of “Buk” Surface-to-Air-Missile System shown on Image 3b.

The object in question is a vehicle presumably identified as a “Buk” Surface-to-Air-Missile System and it is clear that the contrast in the highlighted area on Image 3 is even. In other words, the transition from the darkest to the lightest area is quite even and there is high contrast between the lit and shadowed areas. The highlighted area is located at the same depth as confirmed by the presumed place of movement of “Buk” Surface-to-Air-Missile System and the surrounding objects shown on Images 3b and 3c.

The “Buk” object in the said fragment looks unnatural, since the transitions between the shadowed areas on the rear side of “Buk” are rather light-coloured in comparison with the building located at the same depth that has a completely different histogram profile.



Images 4a and 4b – the image of “Buk” and the image of the Building in the same light conditions and at the same depth





Image 5a – histogram of “Buk”

Image 5b – histogram of the building



It is clear from the illustration (Images 4a and 4b) that the image of the building has a lot more contrast (a larger dynamic range) than the image of “Buk”, which is confirmed by the histograms of the said objects on Images 5a and 5b accordingly. The histogram of the building has a much larger range of contrast and brightness than the “Buk” histogram. These discrepancies with high probability indicate that the “Buk” video was layered on a base (premade background).

6.3 Checking for areas of objects under study where the shadows do not match

In the submitted video fragment there are electric poles along the trajectory of movement of objects (the automobile and “Buk”) as well as trees along the road in the direction of movement of the automobile and “Buk”. The sunlight in the upper right part (as evidenced by the shadows from the trees) is characteristic of this video.

However, the domain analysis of the video in question revealed some major discrepancies between the shadows cast by the objects in the video. In particular:

- the shadows from homogenous objects have varying intensity;
- the shadows that the poles on the right-hand side of the road should cast are missing (Image 6);
- there are no shadows from the poles on the side of “Buk” missile system when it passes by these poles (Image 6a).




Image 6 – the shadows from the poles are missing from the frame. The areas in question are highlighted with question marks.

All discrepancies found with high probability indicate that the video was subject to deliberate manipulations. These signs look unusual and strange.



Image 6a – the shadows from the poles in the frame are missing, the profile of the shadows should have been visible both on the hull-side and on the ground.

6.4 Checking for traces of additional layers superimposed (decomposition of the image)

The artefacts that may indicate the places of paste-ins and superimposition of layers that are not authentic to the background were found in the video in question. The characteristic signs that indicate digital manipulations include:

- perfectly straight lines of the shadows on the road that end exactly where the video recording is cut off. – Image 10.





Image 7 – frame 194 of the video fragment with the typical blur on the left-hand side of “Buk”.

Image 8 – frame 276 of the video fragment with the typical blur on the left-hand side of “Buk”.




Image 9 – frame 428 with the typical blur on the left-hand side of “Buk”.



Image 10 – frame 428 with the potential place of paste-in of layers.

Further, the following characteristics indicating the lack of authenticity of this video material have been revealed:

- the video ends exactly where “Buk” was to almost completely turn around and face the camera (Image 11)



Image 11 – the last frame 527 in which “Buk” is moving towards the visible line (that we marked with red arrows) where it is to make an almost full turn for its rear to face the camera.

6.6 Unnatural disappearance of objects from frame to frame

The following discrepancies have been found in the versions of the video materials under study: in the end of the original version of the video (item 1 Bolodya Familyev) there are objects (birds) which are missing from the video material (item 2 BrownMoses), Image 12a and Image 12b.



Image 12a - Frame 523 from the original video (item 1 Bolodya Familyev) – where the bird is highlighted



Image 12b - Frame 523 from video item 2 Brown Moses – where there the same spot has no bird



Image 13a - Frame 527 from the original video (item 1 Bolodya Familyev) – where the birds are highlighted



Image 13b - Frame 527 from the video item 2 Brown Moses – where the birds are highlighted and the place where there is no bird is marked with a red circle.

These facts look strange. We carry on the verification of the said facts and our research of the video materials and will further advise when any new artefacts are found.

7. Conclusions

Item	Name	Assessment
------	------	------------

7.1	Uneven and artificial blurring	There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probability that the video is fake.
7.2	Areas of objects under study where the contrast does not match	There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probability that the video is fake.
7.3	Areas of objects under study where shadows do not match	There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probability that the video is fake.
7.4	Signs of superimposition of additional layers (decomposition of the image)	There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probability that the video is fake.
7.5	Differences between the objects in various versions of the video	There are characteristic signs, which suggest with high probability that the video is fake.

Declaration of the experts

The group of experts confirms that all matters in relation to which their opinion is expressed are within their competence and expertise.

The experts confirm that the information and conclusions set out in this expert report are unbiased, objective and impartial and that these were not influenced by the judicial proceedings or any party thereto.

7 December 2020

Annex 363

The Dutch Public Prosecution Service, Opening statement and context of the investigation
(8 June 2020)

Opening statement and context of the investigation

Over the next few days the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service will be presenting the investigation that has been carried out over the past years. The purpose of this explanation is to enable the court to decide whether or not the investigation has been completed and whether the case is now ready to be heard. In order to answer that question, the court file is decisive, but a presentation – including a clarification of that court file - from the Public Prosecution Service can be helpful. Moreover, such a public explanation is the way in which the Public Prosecution Service publicly render an account with respect to the investigation so far and the decisions we took in the course of the investigation.

This is a summary of the speaking notes of the prosecutor. The full presentation can be watched in the video.

Video Player

We would like to make clear the goal of this explanation is explicitly not to provide an overview of the available evidence in this case. Furthermore, we shall not draw any conclusions on what can or cannot be proven. A public overview of the evidence can only be made when the defence has been given the opportunity to supplement the court file and when the court is ready for the substantive hearings. Our explanation will, however, provide an insight in the various types of evidence that have been collected in the investigation. Furthermore, we will address why the Public Prosecution Service believes that several parts of the investigation have been completed. In doing so, we refer to findings that have been made publicly by the JIT in the past and which have been addressed at the previous hearings on 9 and 10 March 2020.

We fully realize that the next of kin and other interested parties have been waiting for a long time and are eager to learn the findings of the investigation, what conclusions can be drawn and who is responsible. At this point these questions will not be answered because this criminal trial should be done in an accurate and precise way. The Public Prosecution Service may however provide limited information which is needed to address the public call for clarity. This has been similarly done by the JIT in the past. However, a full and comprehensive overview of the relevant evidence will only be presented during the substantive court hearing later in this trial.

Today and over the next few days we will provide an explanation on the course of the investigation. We will start with an outline of the situation in the area where MH17 has crashed and the parties involved in that situation. This will be followed by a clarification on the investigation of the various types of evidential sources:

- forensic evidence
- telecommunication
- witnesses
- photographs and videos
- digital sources
- radar data
- satellite images

After this we will explain how, on the basis of these types of evidence, the investigation into the cause of the crash of MH17 has been conducted. In doing so, several scenarios have been investigated:

- an explosion from within the aircraft;
- an attack by a fighter jet;

- the use of ground-to-air missile other than a Buk-missile; and
- the use of a Buk-missile

With regard to the final scenario we have investigated several possible launch locations. We have also investigated both Ukrainian and Russian Buk-systems. The research done with respect to these different scenarios will be presented in the following days.

Subsequently we will explain what has been done to provide insight into the operation of the Buk-system. Afterwards we will discuss what has been done regarding the investigation of the suspects. In this respect, we will explain what has been done to distinguish the individual roles the suspects may or may not have had in the commission of the alleged offences. We will then describe what has been done to answer the question whether any legal obstacles exist to prosecute them. In the meantime we will explain why we believe that separate parts of the investigation have been completed. Finally we will go into the question which further investigation should be done.

Annex 364

OG IT Forensic Services, International Platform Global Right Of Peaceful People, Report, 3
March 2020

OGIT Forensic Services

www.ogitforensics.com

INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM GLOBAL RIGHT OF PEACEFUL PEOPLE MH17

3rd March 2020

Conway Hall, London

An Independent Digital Forensic Investigative

Confidential

OGIT Forensic Services 1

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- I confirm the correctness of my expert report and understand that in giving my report my overriding duty is to the court and that I have complied with that duty.

DIGITAL AUDIO ACCEPTANCE AS DIGITAL EVIDENCE

Any digital audio submission as digital evidence to court of law can only be accepted with below requirement;



- i. The source of origin media where the digital audio was recorded (Authenticity)
- ii. The source of origin where digital audio was stored (storage of media) (Authenticity)
- iii. The audio recording metadata (Details of when audio was recorded) (Authenticity)
- iv. The acquisition of the audio must be done from the media / storage of the media (Must be preserved)
- v. The part of audio track can be extracted but it has to be clearly showing the source of origin media, storage and audio details.

ISO/IEC 27037.. Digital Forensics standards for good practice methods and processes for forensic capture and investigation of digital evidence.


CAN THE PART OF AUDIO TRACK EXPORTED FROM VIDEO?

- The part of audio track can be extracted from video's audio stream. The audio stream does maintain the sound waves, spectrogram and the noise floor which can be used to analyse for tampering. This is regardless what codec has been converted.
- A spectrogram is a visual representation of the spectrum of frequencies of a signal as it varies with time. When applied to an audio signal, spectrograms/waveform are sometimes called sonographs, voiceprints, or voicegrams
- It is important to have the source of origin media, storage and audio details as verification of the audio tracks.

“The Video - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash” (source from uploaded YouTube videos) analysis was focused more on the audio streams as the audio aired in the video was the intercepted recorded audio conversations.



VIDEO FILES: VIDEO & AUDIO STREAM



Input #0, mov.mp4,m4a,3gp,3g2,mj2, from 'SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4':

Duration: 00:02:23.77, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 190 kb/s

Stream #0.0(und): Video: h264, yuv420p, 480x360, 25 tbr, 25 tbn, 50 tbc

Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16

For the audio analysis, the audio stream - Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16 was taken for analysis into the forensic tool.

The audio channel is stereo, 44Khz and the audio code is AAC (Advance Audios Coding).

WHERE IS THE SOURCE OF THE AUDIO TRACK COMING FROM ?

- It is intercepted by some agencies....
- This is using special audio interception devices by agencies..
- There are special device used to intercept live phone calls or any radio transmission.
- Agencies may have the vast intercept in the air where all the signal can be captured.
- From my view on these intercepted audio track, I am seeing may background noise of people talking...
- So this clearly showing that these intercept calls were recorded, stored in a storage and then the specific audio track were filtered with special filtration.
- The filtration can capture the specific speaker, but it does leave some overlapping voices..
- So, the reporting of how the source of audio track was obtain must be shown/documentated & presented.

AGENCY BASE AUDIO RECORDING

- The audio recording format may be different from the source of interception and recording media.. .raw, . mov, .mp4, other formats..
- Law enforcement agencies do intercept calls , so they have many recordings stored
- So with many source of audio files, it can be merged & edited and then share/upload into YouTube ... In this case of the Video, we see Text Transcription in the video, no voice over the intercepted audio tracks was seen. This makes the audio tracks can be used for tampering analysis.


Facts:

- Exporting files does not change the content, as it compresses the audio
- Exporting files does not change the spectrum, noise floor, etc.. It can be used for analysis.

USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA – YOUTUBE

YouTube is a Great platform of Video Sharing - but fact check, and video genuine must be validated.

- i. Audio Stream of SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014
- <https://youtu.be/MVAOTWpMM4>



VIDEO PROPERTIES

Detail/Videos Label	Video 1
Source Video Name	SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014
Source Video URL	https://youtu.be/MVAOTWPmMM4
Uploaded By	Служба безпеки України (Verified Youtube Channel of Security Service of Ukraine)
Date Published	18th Jul 2014 - Shown in YouTube
Channel URL:	https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCRxyjhmVBewJIRb2yku5EuQ
Original Type Format	WeBM - audiovisual media file format
Main URL Cloud	www.youtube.com
Downloaded File Name	y2mate.com - ssu_boeing_777_plane_crash_buk_m1_17072014_MVAOTWPmMM4_360p.mp4
Checksum MD5	E8C01B5E991832332C5623AF98E0BE4B

SSU, "BOEING-777" PLANE CRASH, "BUK-M1", 17.07.2014 PUBLISHED 18/7/2014

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, X

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MVAOTWPmMM4&feature=youtu.be

Search

YouTube GB

July 17, 2014

SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014

467,046 views 804 272 SHARE SAVE ...

Служба безпеки України
43.6K subscribers

Category People & Blogs

SUBSCRIBE

ID is verified

Genuine

THE VIDEO PROPERTIES LAST MODIFIED 9TH NOV 2018

Video 1 Details – Content Format
audio/webm
Добро пожаловать в Украину, Last modified – 9th Nov 2018

Time	Method	Domain	File	Status	Size	Content
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13.6s	GET	fonts.gstatic.com	css?family=Roboto:400,300,200&ic=400,300,200&ic=700&ic=400,300,200&ic=700&ic=400,300,200	200	1.34 KB	css
13.7s	GET	www.youtube.com	frame.html	200	7.44 KB	html
13.8s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
13.9s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
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14.7s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
14.8s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
14.9s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
15.0s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
15.1s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
15.2s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
15.3s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
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15.5s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
15.6s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
15.7s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
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16.1s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.2s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.3s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.4s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.5s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.6s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.7s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.8s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
16.9s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js
17.0s	GET	www.youtube.com	videojs-1.44.0-f61648b.js	200	1.51 MB	js

Raw Headers

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Accept: */*
Accept-Charset: utf-8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://www.youtube.com
Access-Control-Expose-Headers: Date, Pragma, Expires, Cache-Control, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection
Cache-Control: private, max-age=21299
Content-Length: 65596
Content-Type: video/webm
Expires: Sat, 29 Feb 2002 05:13:34 GMT
Last-Modified: Fri, 09 Nov 2018 10:31:33 GMT
Server: gns 1.0
Timing-Allow-Origin: https://www.youtube.com
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-Frame-Options: deny
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
```

Figure 2.2.2: Video Source 1: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014
URL: <https://youtu.be/MVAOTWPM4M4>

LAST MODIFIED METADATA ..



~ 6 DIFFERENT AUDIO TRACKS ADDED

2.2.1 Audio Tracks – SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014




Figure 2.2.2: Video Source 1: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Spectrogram level in left and right channels

VIDEO 1- AUDIO TRACKS

No	Audio Stream Name	Tracks	From	To	Duration	Speakers
1	SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014	Track A	0:00.02	0:42.9	0:42.7	News Anchor
		Track 1	0:46.6	0:59.45	0:12.8	Oleg and Oreon - Militants
		Track B	1:00.4	1:27.6	0:27.2	News Anchor
		Track 2	1:34.85	2:07.90	0:33.5	Khmuryi and Buryat - Militants
		Track 3	2:12.15	2:40.65	0:28.5	Khmuryi and Buryat - Militants
		Track 4	2:45.38	3:04.10	0:19.2	Khmuryi and Sanych - Militants
		Track 5	3:08.95	3:53.5	0:45.4	Khmuryi and DNR - Militants
		Track C	3:53.79	4:15.80	0:12	News Anchor
		Track 6	4:20.45	5:25.08	1:05	Khmuryi and Botsman - Militants



AUDIO STREAM IN THE VIDEO: SIX AUDIO TRACKS WERE ADDED

2.2.1 Audio Tracks - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014

-No original source of the audio tracks!
-Parts of audio which had been filtered!

Adobe Audition
File Edit Multitrack Clip Effects Favorites View Window Help
Waveform Multitrack
Name: y2mate-14_MAVO1WmMAM_360.mp4 Duration: 5:58:00
y2mate-Jones_0414g15z_1080.mp4 1:13:55
Effects Rack Markers Properties
Info
y2mate-ml_17072014_MAVO1WmMAM_360.mp4
Duration: 5:58:00
Dimensions: 480x360 (Square Pixels (1.0))
Frame Rate: 25 fps
Sample Rate: 44100 Hz
Channels: Stereo
Bit Depth: 32-bit (Float)
Format: H.264 AVC (AVC1), VVU420 MPEG4 FF...
File Path: D:\Prog_72014_MAVO1WmMAM_360.mp4
Time Display
History Video
Levels
TrackA Track1 Track8 Track2 Track3 Track4 Track5 Track6 TrackC
Selection View
Start: 0:00:00
Selection: 5:29:00
End: 5:29:00
View: 0:00:00
44100 Hz • 32-bit (Float) • Stereo • 110.69 dB
Duration: 0:00:00
Start: 5:29:00
Selection: 5:29:00
End: 5:29:00
View: 0:00:00

Figure 2.2.2: Video Source 1: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Spectrogram level in left and right channels

VIDEO1 – 6 AUDIO TRACKS DETAILS

Using the spectral formant – the source wave The channel - mono or stereo

Audio	Start	End	Duration	Speakers
i. Track 1	00:46.6	00:59.5	~00:12.8	Oleg and Oreon - Militants
Shown: Jul 14, 2014 19:12				
ii. Track 2	01:34.9	02:07.9	~00:33.5	Khmyuri and Buryat - Militants
Shown: Date: 14.07.2014 09:08				
iii. Track 3	02:12.2	02:40.7	~00:28.5	Khmyuri and Buryat - Militants
Shown: July 17, 2014 09:22				
iv. Track 4	02:45.4	03:04.1	~00:19.2	Khmyuri and Sanych - Militants
Shown: July 17, 2014 09:23				
v. Track 5	03:08.9	03:53.5	~00:45.4	Khmyuri and DNR - Militants
Shown: July 17, 2014 09:54				
vi. Track 6	04:20.4	05:25.1	~1:05	Khmyuri and Botsman - Militants
Shown: July 17, 2014 9:08				



VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK1 - SPECTROGRAM

2.2.1.1 Video1 - AudioTrack-1




Figure 2.2.1.1: Track-1 - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014, conversation between Oleg and Oregon - Militants audio duration between 0:46.6 – 0:59.45

VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK2

2.2.1.2 Video1 - AudioTrack-2




Figure 2.2.1.2.: Track-2 - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014, conversation between Khmuryi and Buryat - Militants audio duration between 1:34.85 – 2:07.90.

VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK3

2.2.1.3 Video1 - AudioTrack-3





Figure 2.2.1.3: Track-3 - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014, conversation between Khmuryi and Buryat - Miitants audio duration between 2:12:15 – 2:40:65.

VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK4

2.2.1.4 Video1 - AudioTrack-4



Left Channel

Right Channel

Figure 2.2.6: Track-4 - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014, conversation between Khmuryi and Buryat - Militants audio duration between 2:45:38 – 3:04:10.

VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK5

2.2.1.5 Video1 - AudioTrack-5




Figure 2.2.1.5: Track-5 - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014, conversation between Khmuryi and Buryat - Militants audio duration between 3:08.95 – 3:53.5.

VIDEO1-AUDIO TRACK6

2.2.1.6 Video1 - AudioTrack-6




Figure 2.2.1.6: Track-6 - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014, conversation between Khmuryi and Botzman - Militants audio duration between 4:20.5 – 5:25.08

FINDINGS – TAMPERING DETECTED

All audio recordings was taken from multiple sources, no metadata of the audio.. It can be coming from multiple sources. It is basically not genuine.

No	Video Name	Tracks	Time Frame - Tampered	Findings
1	SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 (Analysis In Progress)	Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Track 4 Track 5 Track 6	0.51.475 & 0.55.33 2.07.756 - 02:15 - 02:21 NA NA - 04:34.8 - 04:35.0 - 04:35.2 - 04:36.0 - 05:19.0 - 05:20.0	i. Suspicious merging seen, analysis in progress ii. Cut audio, analysis in progress i. Different Left and Right channel audio ii Spectral Analysis shows the edits of cut and overlaying seen at the minute 02:15 iii. Spectral Analysis shows voice over lapping and cut seen at the minute 2:21:0 Suspicious merging at 2:50.2 – 2:52.2 Suspicious, analysis in progress i. Voice was cut down at minute 4:34.8 – 4:35.0 ii. Voice overlapping is clearly seen between time frame 4:35.2 – 4:36.0 iii. Voice overlapping is clearly seen at time frame 5:19.0 – 5:20.0

~7 DIFFERENCE SOURCE OF TRACKS WERE ADDED

2.2.1 Audio Tracks - SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014




Figure 2.2.2: Video Source 1: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Spectrogram level in left and right channels

FACTS:

- The audio tracks in the video are in tact – meaning it can be used to identify of the audio was tampered!
- Using the spectral formant – the source wave for analysis
- The noise floor for any abnormality
- The channel - mono or stereo
- It is showing 8kHz audio, it is telephone or conference call conversation recording normally.

VIDEO1-TRACK1- SUSPICIOUS OVERLAY

The screenshot displays the Adobe Audition interface. The top menu bar includes File, Edit, Multitrack, Clip, Effects, Favorites, View, Window, and Help. The main workspace is divided into several panels:

- Files:** Shows a project named 'y2mate.com - ssu_boeing_777_plane_crash_buk_m1_17072014_MVAOTWpmmMM4_360p.mp4' with a duration of 5:58.095.
- Media Browser:** Shows the source file 'File: y2mate.com - ssu_boeing_777_plane_crash_buk_m...'.
- Mixer:** Shows the audio clip 'Editor: y2mate.com - ssu_boeing_777_plane_crash_buk_m1_17072014_MVAOTWpmmMM4_360p.mp4' with a volume level of +0 dB.
- Waveform:** Shows a green waveform of the audio clip with a time scale from 0:50.0 to 0:57.0.
- Spectrogram:** Shows a frequency spectrum from 10k Hz to 18k Hz. Two dashed white boxes with arrows point to specific areas of the spectrogram, indicating suspicious overlays. The first box is located between 0:51.0 and 0:52.0, and the second is between 0:55.0 and 0:56.0.
- Levels:** Shows the current level at 0:55.195.
- Selection/View:** Shows a selection from 0:55.195 to 0:57.677 with a duration of 0:08.074.
- History:** Shows the current state as 'Stopped'.

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VIDEO 1 – TRACK 2 – CONVERSATION CUT!!

The screenshot displays the Adobe Audition interface. At the top, the menu bar includes File, Edit, Multitrack, Clip, Effects, Favorites, View, Window, and Help. Below the menu bar is a toolbar with icons for various editing functions. The main workspace is divided into several panels:

- Waveform:** Shows the audio signal over time. The time axis ranges from 2:02.0 to 2:11.0. A dashed white box highlights a segment between approximately 2:07.0 and 2:08.0. A white arrow points to a sharp drop in the waveform within this segment.
- Spectrogram:** Shows the frequency spectrum of the audio. The frequency axis ranges from 1k Hz to 18k Hz. The spectrogram shows a complex pattern of frequencies, with a prominent horizontal line around 4k Hz. A dashed white box highlights the same time segment as the waveform.
- Levels:** Shows the input and output levels. The input level is +0 dB and the output level is +0 dB. The meters show a sharp drop in level corresponding to the highlighted segment.
- Selection/View:** Shows the start and end times of the selection. The selection start is 2:08.796 and the selection end is 2:12.018. The view start is 2:01.279 and the view end is 2:12.018.

The status bar at the bottom of the interface shows the current track name, "y2mate.com - ssu_boeing_777_plane_crash_buk_m3_17072014_MVAOTWpmmM4_360p.mp4", and the current time, 2:08.796. The status bar also indicates that the audio is stopped.

VIDEO1-TRACK3- TAMPERED – DIFFERENT NOISE FLOOR – 2 DIFFERENCE LEFT AND RIGHT CHANNEL




Figure 3.1.2: Video Source 1 Track- 3: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Suspicious Voice cut and overlaying seen at the 02:15 time frame

VIDEO1 - TRACK3- VOICE OVERLAY




Figure 3.1.3: Video Source 1 Track- 3: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Voice overlapping is clearly seen at time frame 2:21:0

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VIDEO1-TRACK4- SUSPICIOUS MERGING

The screenshot displays the Adobe Audition interface. At the top, the menu bar includes File, Edit, Multitrack, Clip, Effects, Favorites, View, Window, and Help. The main workspace is divided into several panels:

- Files Panel:** Shows a list of audio files, including 'y2mate_MM4_360p.mp4' with a duration of 5:58.095.
- Media Browser:** Displays a list of files with a search filter set to '(Default)'. The file 'y2mate.com - ssu_boeing_777_plane_crash_b...' is selected.
- Multitrack:** Shows a single track with a green waveform. A dashed white box highlights a specific segment between 2:50.0 and 2:52.2.
- Waveform:** Provides a detailed view of the audio signal within the highlighted segment, showing amplitude in dB and time in hours:minutes:seconds.
- Spectrogram:** A frequency-time plot below the waveform, showing energy across various frequencies (1k to 16k Hz). A vertical dashed line is drawn at 2:50.430, and a horizontal dashed line is drawn at approximately -10 dB. The spectrogram shows a distinct vertical spike at the 2:50.430 mark, indicating a sudden change in the audio signal.
- Levels Panel:** Shows the current level at +0 dB.
- Selection/View Panel:** Displays the current selection (2:50.430 to 2:52.335) and view (44100 Hz, 32-bit float, Stereo).
- History Panel:** Shows a list of actions, including '17.07.2014' and a description: '- Samyeh, where should I... the thing is that my BUKA4 will go together with yours. It is on the vehicle. Where column?'. Below this, there are two small thumbnail images of a person in a military uniform.

The status bar at the bottom indicates 'Stopped' and '80.27 GB free'.

2:50.2 -2:52.2 – Merging sign seen

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VIDEO1- AUDIO TRACK 6 – CUT AND MERGE SEEN




Figure 3.1.5: Video Source 1 Track- 6: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Voice was cut down at minute 4:34.8 – 4:35.0

VIDEO1- AUDIO TRACK 6 – SUSPICIOUS OVERLAPPING




Figure 3.1.6: Video Source 1 Track- 6: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Voice overlapping is clearly seen between time frame 4:35.2 – 4:36.0

VIDEO1- AUDIO TRACK 6- SUSPICIOUS OVERLAPPING (DISTORTION) HEARD




Figure 2.2.12: Video Source 1 Track- 6: SSU, "Boeing-777" plane crash, "Buk-M1", 17.07.2014 – Voice overlapping is clearly seen at time frame 5:19.0 – 5:20.0 (upon hearing suspicious)

FACTS: THE FINDINGS OF AUDIO TAMPERING

- By default, if no source of recording provided and no source origin details, it is a suspicious / bogus conversation Until at least the source is provided.

SUMMARY

The audio track is still not genuine as audio tracks were seen tampered (merge, difference noise floor, cut, overlay of audios), multiple source seen.

The Source of Audio track has no authenticity and it is clear showing multiple editing.

Export audio just need to mention the raw audio file

- The source of recording
- The date and time
- Chain of Custody
- The interception process (high level)

~ END~

Annex 365

CBC News, *Malaysia Airlines MH17: Michael Bociurkiw talks about being first at the crash site*
(29 July 2014)

'We've seen horrific things': Canadian MH17 crash site monitor describes grisly scene | CBC News

CBC News · Posted: Jul 29, 2014 12:13 AM EDT | Last Updated: July 30, 2014

[World](#) · Video

Malaysia Airlines MH17: Michael Bociurkiw talks about being first at the crash site

Ukrainian-Canadian OSCE monitor Michael Bociurkiw talks to CBC News about his emotional experiences at the grisly crash site of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine.

Michael Bociurkiw was among the very first people to reach the Malaysian jet's wreckage



OSCE monitor on MH17 disaster

'I don't think there's ever been a crash like this,' says Michael Bociurkiw. 'And it's just something that will always stay with us.'

A personal handwritten note penned by a passenger reminding themselves to stay on budget during their vacation. Scientific literature belonging to a passenger en route to a major international AIDS conference in Australia.

[Fighting intensifies near MH17 crash site in eastern Ukraine](#)

Data recovered from MH17's cockpit voice recorder

These are just a few of the things that Michael Bociurkiw, a Ukrainian-Canadian monitor with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has seen up close at the crash site of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17.

Bociurkiw and one other colleague were the first international monitors to reach the wreckage after the jet was shot down over a rebel-held region of eastern Ukraine July 17.

With no other oversight on scene, the two men became the *de facto* eyes and ears of all those who watched in horror from around the world. More than ten days later, he's still one of a select group of individuals who has been to crash site almost daily.

"Under the hot sun, we've seen horrific things," he told CBC's Susan Ormiston in an emotional interview Monday. "Things that we'll never talk about to anyone else."

"One of the things that's powered us through this is knowing that we are doing it for the families. In a conflict zone – where there's no security, where anything could happen – anything we can do to provide some semblance of order and process ... that was really important to us," Bociurkiw said.

Although he's only been on the job with the OSCE for three months, Bociurkiw has been unexpectedly thrust into an international crisis that has no satisfying conclusion within sight.

Watch the video above for more of CBC's in-depth interview with Bociurkiw from Ukraine.

Annex 366

ABC News, IMAGE: MH17 crash site, Ukrainian State Emergency Service employees search for bodies amongst the wreckage of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (21 July 2014)

NEWS**IMAGE: MH17 crash site**

AFP: Bulent Kilic


Posted Mon 21 Jul 2014 at 10:01 am



Ukrainian State Emergency Service employees search for bodies amongst the wreckage of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. (AFP: Bulent Kilic)


Annex 367

Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR), Presentation “Damage Investigation MH17”



Annex 368

Getty images, *Image “Ukraine Russia crisis Malaysia aviation crash”* (25 July 2014)

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UKRAINE-RUSSIA-CRISIS-MALAYSIA-AVIATION-CRASH

A picture shows a piece of debris of the fuselage at the crash site of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 near the village of Hrabove (Grabovo), some 80km east of Donetsk, on July 25, 2014. Ukraine sought on July 25 to avoid a political crisis after the shock resignation of its prime minister, as fighting between the army and rebels close to the Malaysian airliner crash site claimed over a dozen more lives. The Netherlands and Australia, the two countries that lost the most citizens when the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 was shot down, are seeking a mandate to deploy troops on the ground, possibly through a United Nations Security Council resolution. AFP PHOTO/ BULENT KILIC (Photo by Bulent KILIC / AFP) (Photo by BULENT KILIC/AFP via Getty Images)



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Annex 369

Witness Statement of Mikhail Vadimovich Malyshevskiy

(translation)

Жалоба № 8019/16 (кас. юго-востока Украины)

В ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА

УКРАИНА

Заявитель

-против-

РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Ответчик

**СВИДЕТЕЛЬСКИЕ ПОКАЗАНИЯ
МАЛЫШЕВСКОГО МИХАИЛА ВАДИМОВИЧА**

Я, МАЛЫШЕВСКИЙ МИХАИЛ ВАДИМОВИЧ, сотрудник АО «Концерн ВКО «Алмаз-Антей», ЗАЯВЛЯЮ СЛЕДУЮЩЕЕ:

Введение

1. Я занимаю должность руководителя аппарата генерального конструктора в АО «Концерн ВКО «Алмаз-Антей» («Алмаз-Антей»).

2. Обстоятельства, изложенные в настоящих свидетельских показаниях, известны мне лично, если не указано иное. Обстоятельства, известные мне лично, соответствуют действительности, а в отношении обстоятельств, которые не известны мне лично, я указываю источник этих сведений, и такие сведения соответствуют действительности в меру моих знаний и убеждений.

Личная информация

3. В 1990 году я закончил военную академию Министерства обороны СССР, получив высшее образование по специальности «Инженер противовоздушной обороны».
4. Я работаю в «Алмаз-Антей» с 2011 года. «Алмаз-Антей» является производителем ракет ЗРК «Бук». Я занимаюсь аналитической работой, связанной с оборудованием, производимым Концерном, в том числе ЗРК «Бук». У меня имеется большой опыт в области испытания ЗРК «Бук».

Февраль 2015 года

5. Где-то в феврале 2015 года представитель «Алмаз-Антей» был приглашен принять участие в обсуждениях с Советом по безопасности Нидерландов и получил от него некоторые материалы. Получив эти материалы, «Алмаз-Антей» пришел к выводу, что Совет по безопасности Нидерландов использовал ненадежную информацию о ЗРК «Бук», взятую из Интернета. Поскольку я являюсь экспертом в области моделирования использования данного вида оружия, а также имею опыт в области разъяснения работы данной системы, «Алмаз-Антей» выбрал меня в качестве человека, который будет участвовать в контактах с Советом по безопасности Нидерландов. Вскоре я обнаружил, что соответствующая информация являлась секретной и в первую очередь начал работать над снятием с нее грифа секретности, что мне успешно удалось сделать.
6. Впоследствии я работал с представителем Концерна (Круш Михаил Кондратьевич), который присутствовал на первой встрече в феврале 2015

года, и обсудил с ним эту встречу. Он сказал мне, что в ходе данной встречи обсуждали место обнаружения поражающего элемента в форме «двутавра», и представитель Совета по безопасности Нидерландов в устной форме сообщил ему о том, что данный осколок был найден в термоизоляции правого борта кабины пилотов. Однако после того как были высказаны сомнения в отношении реалистичности такого объяснения, ему сообщили, что осколок был найден в технических руководствах, находившихся в кабине пилотов. Мой коллега спросил, был ли найден всего лишь один подобный осколок. Представитель Совета по безопасности Нидерландов сказал ему, что было найдено большое количество таких осколков. Вышеупомянутый осколок был взвешен в ходе встреч в присутствии моего коллеги, и его масса составила 5,5 г. Моего коллегу также удивило то обстоятельство, что осколок был очень ржавым.

7. Я должен сказать, что боевая часть 9Н314М снаряжается тремя типами готовых поражающих элементов. Они включают элементы в форме «двутавра» и имеют массу 8,1 г. В боевой части находится около 1800 поражающих элементов в форме «двутавра» и, как я объясню дальше, их следы после поражения цели очень хорошо заметны.

Май 2015 года

8. В мае 2015 года состоялась вторая встреча с представителями Совета по безопасности Нидерландов. Я присутствовал на этой встрече и представил технические характеристики ЗРК «Бук», в том числе такие важные «отпечатки пальцев» ракеты, как тип, количество и распределение плотности поражающих элементов в области разлета осколков (и пробивная способность поражающих элементов) после подрыва ракеты. Я посетил авиабазу, где представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов выложили обломки МН17 на конструктивной схеме, предоставленной компанией «Boeing». Я заметил, что некоторые фрагменты МН17 не были выложены на данную схему, а вместо этого находились в отдельных помещениях. Мне удалось сфотографировать и измерить некоторые фрагменты, выложенные на схему и хранившиеся

отдельно, однако некоторые из них были накрыты, и представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов запретили мне касаться или переворачивать их. Потом я узнал, что там были еще и другие фрагменты, которые мне вообще не показали в тот день.

9. В ходе встреч с представителями Совета по безопасности Нидерландов в мае 2015 года я также посетил лабораторию судебной экспертизы в Гааге, которую использовал Совет по безопасности Нидерландов. Там я увидел около 20 осколков поражающих элементов. Мне сказали, что они были найдены в обломках МН17, при этом на данные осколки имелись документы, в которых, как мне сказали, было указано место обнаружения осколков. В то же время я не увидел там осколков в форме «двугавра». Мне так и не предоставили никаких документов на какие-либо осколки в форме «двугавра», равно как и не предоставили доступ к таким документам.
10. В ходе последующих встреч в мае 2015 года заместитель руководителя Росавиации спросил представителей Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, почему они считали, что причиной крушения самолета рейса МН17 стало попадание ракеты, выпущенной из ЗРК «Бук». Представитель Совета по безопасности Нидерландов ответил, что им удалось найти большое количество осколков в форме «двугавра» и отверстий в форме «бабочки». Мы попросили показать их нам. Однако они отказывались продемонстрировать нам вышеупомянутые осколки и отверстия. Они сказали, что все осколки и отверстия будут представлены в проекте отчета. В ходе встречи я также поднял вопрос небольшого веса предполагаемого осколка в форме «двугавра», который был показан на встрече в феврале 2015 года.
11. На данном этапе я также участвовал в подготовке математических моделей взрыва. Эта работа включала моделирование, и сделанные на основании него выводы были переданы Совету по безопасности Нидерландов и представлены на открытой пресс-конференции представителями «Алмаз-Антей». Многие из характеристик, использованных представителями Совета по безопасности Нидерландов,

были неверными, что повлияло на математическую модель распределения поражающих элементов. Например:

- 1) Взрыватель боевой части находится в передней ее части, тогда как представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов исходили из того, что он находится в задней ее части.
 - 2) Боевая часть 9Н314М имеет форму как у бочки с веретенообразным изгибом (см. представленные мной фотографии боевой части), тогда как представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов исходили из того, что боевая часть имеет цилиндрическую форму.
12. В июне 2015 года Российская Федерация получила от Совета по безопасности Нидерландов проект отчета. Я изучил данный проект отчета и был удивлен тем обстоятельством, что данные, предоставленные «Алмаз-Антей», не были учтены. Представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов использовали только предоставленную нами фотографию внешнего вида боевой части и правильное ее наименование, но не наши данные. В проекте отчета использовались изображения осколков, которые, как было указано, имели форму «двутавра», а также были приведены их размеры.
13. В июле 2015 года в «Алмаз-Антей» поступил запрос от Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, в котором они просили «Алмаз-Антей» предоставить техническую документацию с характеристиками ракет для того, чтобы наши данные могли быть приняты. 27 июля 2015 года «Алмаз-Антей» направил письмо Совету по безопасности Нидерландов, в котором содержались следующие выдержки из документации:
- 1) Технические характеристики, запрашиваемые Советом по безопасности Нидерландов;
 - 2) Результаты нескольких сотен испытаний, проведенных в период с 1986 по 1991 годы, а также приглашение представителей Совета


по безопасности Нидерландов посетить предприятие «Алмаз-Антей», чтобы изучить подробную документацию по всем вышеупомянутым испытаниям. Представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов не приняли данное приглашение.

Пресс-конференция «Алмаз-Антей» (2 июня 2015 года)

14. 2 июня 2015 года «Алмаз-Антей» провел пресс-конференцию, на которой я выступил с презентацией. Что касается осколков в форме «двутавра», я ссылаясь в своей презентации на информацию, полученную мной от экспертов и из открытых источников, о том, что были найдены осколки в форме «двутавра». Под экспертами я имел в виду представителей Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, а под открытыми источниками информации – сообщение г-на Аккерманса, опубликованное 19 марта 2015 года, в котором он утверждает, что обнаружил осколок в форме «двутавра» в обломках МН17 (и в своей презентации я использовал фотографию осколка, взятую из статьи г-на Аккерманса). В то время, руководствуясь информацией, полученной от Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, а также информацией из статьи г-на Аккерманса, я действительно верил в то, что было найдено много осколков в форме «двутавра», и по этой причине заключил, что речь идет о боевой части 9Н314М.

Эксперимент в щитовой мишенной обстановке (июль 2015 года)

15. В июле 2015 года я также координировал проведение эксперимента в щитовой мишенной обстановке. В рамках эксперимента было подготовлено несколько мишеней (5 дюралюминиевых листов с ловушкой в конце, сделанной из алюминия, дерева и пластика). Данный эксперимент позволил проверить плотность, количество, формы отверстий, а также распределение отверстий и пробивное действие поражающих элементов боевой части 9Н314М. В результате эксперимента на щитах остались многочисленные отверстия в форме «бабочки». Далее я прилагаю две фотографии в качестве примера. Кроме того, после эксперимента из мишеней извлекли, измерили и взвесили 71 осколок (порожающий элемент). 39 из них имели форму «двутавра», а их вес составлял от 6,5 до 7,9 грамм. Снижение веса данных осколков по сравнению с исходными 8,1 граммами объясняется подрывом боевой части и их столкновением с мишенью / прохождением через мишень. Я полагаю, что эти экспериментальные данные представляют собой гораздо более надежную информацию о диапазоне весов осколков, чем теоретические расчеты, проведенные Национальной аэрокосмической лабораторией Нидерландов. Тем более, что результаты, полученные в ходе эксперимента в щитовой мишенной обстановке, полностью соответствовали архивным данным по испытаниям, которые были переданы экспертам Совета по безопасности Нидерландов в официальном письме.



16. В рамках следующей встречи с представителями Совета по безопасности Нидерландов в августе 2015 года я представил результаты данного эксперимента в щитовой мишенной обстановке, продемонстрировал обстановку, продемонстрировал видеозапись эксперимента, а также показал фотографии щитов. Я пригласил присутствовавших на встрече представителей приехать и ознакомиться с необработанными данными и понаблюдать за повторно организованным экспериментом, если необходимо. Я задал вопрос, почему в обломках МН17 не наблюдаются отверстия в форме «бабочки», если причиной крушения самолета стал взрыв ракеты того же типа. На

следующий день представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов выразили свои сомнения относительно того, что образование отверстий в форме «бабочки» в щитовых мишенях отражает то, как отверстия выглядели бы в корпусе самолета, ввиду того, что самолет имеет другую форму.


17. В ходе данных встреч в августе мы обсуждали вес и форму осколков в форме «двугавра» после столкновения с щитовыми мишенями в ходе экспериментов. Мы также обсудили результаты других испытаний на предмет деформации осколков в форме «двугавра» в рамках других экспериментов. Готовые поражающие элементы в форме «двугавра» в боевых частях 9Н314М имеют размер 13х13х8 мм. Мы обсудили осколок в форме «двугавра», который, согласно проекту итогового отчета (см. п. 2.16.1), был извлечен из тела члена экипажа. Нам показали презентацию, в которой было сказано, что данный осколок имеет размеры 12х12х5 мм и вес 5,7 г. В ходе проведенных нами различных экспериментов было установлено, что если один размер уменьшался в результате столкновения, то другие размеры увеличивались, т.е. они были бы больше 13 мм. (Несмотря на то, что осколки могут разрушаться, они не могут расслоиться вдоль лицевой поверхности). Кроме того, в ходе наших испытаний было установлено, что сумма линейных размеров (т.е. сумма длин разных сторон) после взрыва обычно превышает изначальные размеры «двугавра».
18. Я также попросил показать мне результаты химической экспертизы состава соответствующих готовых поражающих элементов, на основании которых представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов заключили, что они принадлежат боевой части 9Н314М. Представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов сообщили мне, что они не проводили химических экспертиз, поскольку считали, что элементы могли быть сделаны из низкокачественных металлов самого разнообразного происхождения и в разное время. Они также добавили, что не могут проводить разрушающий анализ осколков из обломков МН17. Мы отметили, что данный анализ необходим для определения типа использованной боевой части, в частности для того, чтобы провести


различие между готовыми поражающими элементами боевой части 9Н314М и готовыми поражающими элементами боевой части 9Н314.

19. В ходе той встречи в августе 2015 года мы также обсудили количество отверстий в щитовых мишенях. До этого представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов провели математическое моделирование, которое показало, что количество отверстий в обломках МН17 должно было быть больше по сравнению с фактически обнаруженным количеством (при условии, что их модель в остальной части была верной). Я обратил внимание представителей Совета по безопасности Нидерландов на это несоответствие, на что они ответили, что, возможно, это объясняется тем, что некоторые поражающие элементы могли срикошетировать, а не пробить поверхность. Однако результаты экспериментов в щитовой мишенной обстановке показали, что осколки имеют значительную пробивную способность, и, если бы ракета взорвалась согласно условиям, представленным в материалах Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, то количество отверстий было бы намного больше. Представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов в очередной раз выдвинули предположение о том, что результат мог бы быть другим, если бы был использован самолет, поскольку он имеет другую форму.
20. В связи с позицией, которую заняли представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов относительно формы соответствующих щитовых мишеней, использованных «Алмаз-Антей» в ходе эксперимента, представители «Алмаз-Антей» приняли решение провести эксперимент с самолетом.
21. В ходе данных встреч я сообщил представителям Совета по безопасности Нидерландов о планируемом эксперименте и приглашал их принять участие как в организации данного эксперимента, так и в изучении его результатов. Они сказали, что рассмотрят наше приглашение и отказались обсуждать данный вопрос, не предоставив никаких объяснений.

Эксперимент с самолетом-мишенью «ИЛ-86» (октябрь 2015 года)

22. Тем не менее, представители «Алмаз-Антей» продолжили подготовку к данному эксперименту, который был проведен 7 октября 2015 года. Мы использовали самолет «ИЛ-86», поскольку он имеет практически такой же диаметр, что и МН17 (т.е. «Боинг 777-200»), кроме того, оба борта самолета в районе кабины имеют более высокую прочность, чем у «Боинг 777-200», с точки зрения сдерживания проникающих поражающих элементов, что обусловлено наличием дополнительных металлических шкафов с аппаратурой вдоль левого и правого бортов за сиденьями командира экипажа и второго пилота. Эксперимент был проведен строго в соответствии с моделью, выдвинутой Советом по безопасности Нидерландов.
23. Результаты эксперимента с самолетом-мишенью «ИЛ-86» показали следующее:
- 1) Как и в случае с экспериментом с мишенной обстановкой, было обнаружено большое количество отверстий в форме «бабочки». Я насчитал более 30 таких отверстий с четкими очертаниями. Далее я прилагаю несколько фотографий в качестве примера.





- 2) В результате нашего эксперимента было получено намного больше отверстий, чем присутствует на обломках МН17. Количество отверстий, полученных в ходе эксперимента, превышает количество отверстий, обнаруженных на обломках МН17, примерно в 2 раза.
- 3) Размер зоны повреждения, полученной в результате нашего эксперимента, отличается от размера зоны повреждения МН17: размер зоны повреждения самолета-мишени «ИЛ-86», полученный в ходе эксперимента, превышает размер зоны повреждения, наблюдаемой на обломках МН17, в 3–4 раза.
- 4) Представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов отметили, что в случае с МН17 не было обнаружено сквозных проникающих отверстий позади окна командира воздушного судна, при этом все повреждения, находящиеся позади данной точки, появились в результате рикошета. В ходе нашего эксперимента с «ИЛ-86» отверстия были обнаружены на расстоянии 4 метров от окна командира воздушного судна в направлении хвоста самолета, в том числе и на пассажирской двери. Далее я прилагаю фотографию с испытания самолета-

мишени «ИЛ-86», где видны примеры проникающих повреждений, в том числе и на пассажирской двери. Это говорит о том, что любая боевая часть, взорвавшаяся рядом с МН17, была снаряжена поражающими элементами с меньшим пробивным действием, чем у боевой части 9Н314М и/или о том, что версия Совета по безопасности Нидерландов о месте и обстоятельствах взрыва является неверной.




- 5) Многие поражающие элементы пробили корпус «ИЛ-86» насквозь, т.е. в корпусе осталось большое количество выходных отверстий. При этом такое количество выходных отверстий образовалось даже несмотря на то, что в кабине пилотов «ИЛ-86» находится больше различных препятствий (по сравнению с «Боингом 777-200»), которые, как ожидается, могут затруднить прохождение поражающих элементов, в частности металлические

шкафы, расположенные вдоль стен кабины «ИЛ-86» за креслами командира воздушного судна и второго пилота. На фотографиях обломков МН17 я обнаружил только одно отверстие, которое может быть выходным (п. 2.4 на стр. 13 из отчета Национальной аэрокосмической лаборатории Нидерландов, который прилагается к отчету Совета по безопасности Нидерландов). Я не обнаружил ни одного выходного отверстия в обломках МН17, которые я видел. (Еще в ходе нашей встречи в мае 2015 года я сообщил представителям Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, что, если их гипотеза верна, то было бы много таких выходных отверстий, однако мои комментарии остались без внимания). Опять же, это говорит о том, что или любая боевая часть, взорвавшаяся рядом с МН17, была снаряжена поражающими элементами с меньшим пробивным действием, чем у боевой части 9Н314М, и/или о том, что версия Совета по безопасности Нидерландов о месте и обстоятельствах взрыва является неверной.

- б) Повреждения самолета-мишени «ИЛ-86» не свидетельствуют о том, что какие-либо из поражающих элементов пробиты шпангоуты «ИЛ-86» по траектории параллельной фюзеляжу самолета, тогда как в случае с МН17 повреждения свидетельствуют о том, что осколки пробиты шпангоуты, двигаясь параллельно вдоль левого борта и верхней части фюзеляжа МН17. При этом количество и плотность проникающих повреждений шпангоутов сопоставимо с количеством фактически наблюдаемых повреждений на внешней обшивке МН17. Незначительные повреждения шпангоутов в эксперименте с самолетом-мишенью «ИЛ-86» наглядно свидетельствуют о том, что любая боевая часть, взорвавшаяся рядом с МН17, находилась в положении, не соответствующем версии Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, которой мы руководствовались при проведении нашего эксперимента. Таким образом, мы пришли к выводу о том, что Совет по безопасности Нидерландов неверным образом смоделировал данное положение

боевой части. В качестве примера таких сквозных повреждений на шпангоутах прилагаю несколько фотографий. Это фотографии МН17, которые показывают, что общее количество пробоин в поперечных силовых элементах (шпангоутах и балках пола кабины пилотов), сопоставимо с количеством фактически наблюдаемых пробоин на внешней обшивке. Такой характер повреждений полностью противоречит гипотезе связывающей «встречный курс» и «боевую часть 9Н314М». Другими словами: если причиной поражения МН17 является ракета «Бук», то это произошло не на встречном курсе как заявлено в версии DSB, а на пересекающихся курсах или причиной поражения самолета является совершенно другая боевая часть, поражающие элементы которой обладают другими характеристиками проникающей способности.



24. Мы начали планировать эксперимент, руководствуясь компьютерной моделью ракеты, подготовленной Советом по безопасности Нидерландов. В нашем случае мы внесли корректировки в расположение ракеты вследствие того, что «ИЛ-86» и ракета находились в статичном положении в нашем эксперименте, рассчитав для этого необходимые компенсационные поправки на скорости самолета и ракеты. В рамках эксперимента мы также учли потенциальную значимость того факта, что наш эксперимент будет проводится не на той же высоте, на которой произошла катастрофа рейса МН17. Однако разница в давлении воздуха не играет серьезной роли из-за близкого расположения места взрыва к самолету, следовавшему рейсом МН17, согласно компьютерной модели Совета по безопасности Нидерландов.
25. Совет по безопасности Нидерландов представил свой итоговый отчет 13 октября 2015 года. Таким образом, у нас не было возможности передать представителям Совета по безопасности Нидерландов результаты дополнительного эксперимента до того, как они сделали свои окончательные выводы.
26. Изучив итоговый отчет Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, мы передали результаты нашего эксперимента в Федеральное агентство воздушного транспорта Российской Федерации («Росавиация»). 14 января 2016 года представитель Росавиации Олег Сторчевой направил письмо в Совет по безопасности Нидерландов с кратким изложением выводов нашего эксперимента.
27. На основании нескольких сотен вышеупомянутых экспериментов представители «Алмаз-Антей» смогли установить характер («отпечатки пальцев») распределения плотности повреждений, оставляемых боевой частью 9Н314М. У всех боеприпасов есть свой характер распределения плотности повреждений. Характер повреждений на обломках МН17 не соответствует имеющимся у нас данным о боевой части 9Н314М при рассмотрении гипотезы Совета по безопасности Нидерландов о поражении самолета ракетой на встречном курсе.

Источник фрагментов, предположительно принадлежащих ракете


28. После встречи в мае 2015 года представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов сообщили экспертам (в том числе представителям «Алмаз-Антей») последнюю информацию о ходе расследования. Где-то в [июне] 2015 года Совет по безопасности Нидерландов разослал проект отчета для комментариев. Спустя около одного месяца российские эксперты предоставили свои комментарии. После этого в августе состоялась встреча для обсуждения итогового отчета. Встреча прошла, при этом на ней никаких данных не обсуждалось. Затем вдруг сообщили о существовании фрагментов, якобы принадлежавших ракете. Были представлены выполненные в низком качестве фотографии фрагментов ракеты. Никто не объяснил, когда, где или кем они были найдены. Единственное, что представители Совета по безопасности Нидерландов сообщили, было то, что фрагменты ракеты были найдены в районе катастрофы. Они показали только фотографии, сами фрагменты ракеты продемонстрированы не были. Как было сказано ранее, фотографии были плохого качества, и на них была видна лишь часть номера на сопле. Мы сообщили им, что если бы нам удалось установить номера, то мы могли бы предоставить информацию о самой ракете. Мы, безусловно, попросили продемонстрировать нам фрагменты ракеты. Нам сообщили, что они находятся в сфере ответственности уголовного следствия, и не позволили изучить их.
29. В конечном счете, представители Совместной следственной группы показали фрагменты ракеты, в частности часть двигателя и сопло с заводскими номерами, которые, согласно их заявлениям, были найдены в районе катастрофы МН17, на пресс-конференции, состоявшейся 24 мая 2018 г.
30. Я участвовал в проводимой «Алмаз-Антей» работе по изучению и поиску формуляров и других документов, имеющих отношение к вышеуказанным фрагментам, предположительно принадлежавшим ракете. Я и два сотрудника нашего архива провели почти пять дней в поисках производственных архивов. По показанным заводским номерам мы нашли

документы, свидетельствующие о том, что вышеупомянутые фрагменты ракеты использовались для производства конкретной ракеты 9М38 в 1986 году.¹ Я видел документы из Минобороны России о том, что указанную ракету поставили в воинскую часть², которая, насколько я понимаю из объяснений представителей Минобороны России, находилась на территории Украины. Соответствующие страницы из документов, которые я обнаружил, в частности, формуляра и иной технической документации, а также документы, подтверждающие поставку ракеты в декабре 1986 года, были продемонстрированы в ходе Брифинга Минобороны России по новым деталям катастрофы Boeing 777 в Донецкой области.

31. Боевая часть 9Н314М может устанавливаться на ракеты 9М38, произведенные в 1985–1986 годах, и на ее более современную модификацию 9М38М1. Найденные мной документы на соответствующие фрагменты ракеты, относились к одной из таких ракет 9М38.
32. Таким образом, с технической точки зрения, если подрыв именно боевой части 9Н314М привел к крушению самолета рейса МН17, то она могла быть установлена на ракету 9М38. Однако есть несколько несоответствий. Во-первых, повреждения на обломках МН17 не соответствуют характеру повреждений от боевой части 9Н314М, о чем я говорил ранее. Кроме того, фрагмент двигателя ракеты, который, как утверждается, был найден среди обломков самолета, имеет удивительно незначительные повреждения для использованного двигателя. Далее я привожу две фотографии двигателей ракеты после экспериментов, проведенных «Алмаз-Антей», которые можно сравнить с итоговой фотографией фрагмента ракеты, который предположительно был найден в районе крушения МН17.

¹ Формуляр 9Д131.00.000 ФО изделия 9Д 131 заводской номер 8869032, с. 4 - 6; Сводная ведомость комплектации сборки и досборки изделия 9М28 серийный номер 8868720, с. 7; Описи технической документации на изделие 9М38 №8868720 (Annex XX);

² Журнал учета принятой продукции по изделию 9М38, с. 52 - 53 (Annex XX).



Предположительно найденные следы взрывчатого вещества


33. В боевой части 9Н314М содержится около 24% тротила (TNT) и 76% гексогена (RDX), суммарным весом приблизительно 33,5 кг, при этом в боевой части и в топливе 9Н314М пентрит (PETN) отсутствует.
34. В мае 2015 года представители Института судебной экспертизы Нидерландов сообщили о взятии проб с обломков MH17 и осколков поражающих элементов. Они сказали, что им удалось найти следы взрывчатых веществ – тротила (TNT) и гексогена (RDX). На этой стадии они не говорили ни о пентрите (PETN), ни о каких-либо тестах, проведенных с фрагментами ракеты, ни о количестве взятых проб.
35. В последующем проекте итогового отчета Совета по безопасности Нидерландов, разосланном в июне 2015 года, в п. 2.16.3 говорится о том, что было взято 500 проб, тогда как в самом итоговом отчете указано, что количество взятых проб составило 126.
36. Совет по безопасности Нидерландов отметил в своем итоговом отчете (п. 2.16.3 на стр. 93), что ему удалось найти следы гексогена (RDX) на якобы обнаруженных фрагментах ракеты, при этом следов тротила (TNT) на

данных фрагментах обнаружено не было. (В проекте итогового отчета нет упоминаний том, что с данными фрагментами ракеты проводились какие-либо тесты).

37. Совет по безопасности Нидерландов отметил в своем итоговом отчете (п. 2.16.3 на стр. 93), что ему удалось найти следы пентрита (PETN) в нескольких пробах, которые они взяли.

Я убежден, что факты, изложенные в настоящих свидетельских показаниях, соответствуют действительности.

Подпись:

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke, written over a dotted line.

Дата:

07. ноября 2019 г.

Application No. 8019/16 (*re* Eastern Ukraine)

IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

UKRAINE

Applicant

-and-

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Respondent

WITNESS STATEMENT OF
MALYSHEVSKIY MIKHAIL VADIMOVICH

I, MALYSHEVSKIY MIKHAIL VADIMOVICH of JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey, WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:

Introduction

1. I am Chief of Staff for the lead engineer at JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey (“Almaz Antey”).
2. The matters set out in this witness statement are within my knowledge save where otherwise appears. Where matters are within my knowledge they are true; where

matters are not within my knowledge the source of my information is identified and such information is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Personal Background


3. I obtained a degree in air defence (as “Air-defence engineer”) from the Military academy of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR in 1990.
4. I have worked for Almaz Antey since 2011. Almaz Antey is the manufacturer of BUK missiles. I have worked on analytical work regarding the equipment produced by the company, including the BUK system. I have substantial experience of testing of the BUK system.

February 2015

5. From about February 2015, a representative of Almaz Antey was invited to participate in discussions with the Dutch Safety Board and obtained material from it. Once that material was provided, Almaz Antey became aware that the Dutch Safety Board was using unreliable information from the Internet about the BUK system. Since I have expertise in modelling the usage of this munition and also have experience in explaining the relevant system, I was chosen by Almaz Antey to become involved in liaison with the Dutch Safety Board. I soon realised that the relevant data was classified and first worked (successfully) on declassifying that data.
6. I subsequently worked with the representative of Almaz Antey (Krush Mikhail Kondratievich) that had attended the initial meeting in February 2015 and discussed that meeting with him. He told me that the issues discussed included where a bow-tie shaped fragment had been found and he was told orally by a representative of the Dutch Safety Board that it had been found in the thermal insulation in the right side of the cockpit but when doubts about the feasibility of that explanations were expressed he was told then that it had been found in official documentation in the cockpit. My colleague questioned whether that was the only bowtie fragment found. He was told by a representative of the Dutch Safety Board that many such fragments had been found. The relevant fragment

was weighed during those meetings in the presence of my colleague and had a mass of 5.5g. My colleague was also surprised it was so rusty.

7. I should explain that the 9N314M warhead, it contains three types of pre-formed fragments. These include some which are bow-tie shaped, with a mass of 8.1 g. The warhead contains about 1,800 bow-tie pieces, and as I explain below, their



impact is very obvious when they strike a target.

May 2015

8. In May 2015, there was a second meeting with the Dutch Safety Board. I attended that meeting and provided technical characteristics of the BUK system, including such important fingerprints of the missile such as types, number and density of the projectiles (as well as the penetrating force of the projectiles) after the missile explodes. I attended the aviation base at which the Dutch Safety Board had laid out pieces of MH17 on a paper scheme provided by Boeing. I observed that some pieces of MH17 were not laid out on that scheme but were instead in storage in separate rooms. I was able to photograph and measure some of the items laid out on the scheme and in storage, but there were some remnants that I was told by representatives of the Dutch Safety Board that I could not touch or turn over and were covered. I subsequently learnt that there were further pieces that were not shown to me at all that day.
9. During the meetings with the Dutch Safety Board representatives in May 2015, I also visited a forensic laboratory used by the Dutch Safety Board in The Hague. I saw about 20 fragments of projectiles. I was told that they had been found in MH17, and they were accompanied by paperwork which was I told indicated where the fragments had been found. However, I saw no bow-tie shaped

fragments there. I have never been provided with such paperwork for any bow-tie shaped fragment or had access to any such paperwork.

10. During subsequent meetings in May 2015 the deputy head of the Russian aviation agency asked the Dutch Safety Board representatives why they believed that the MH17 incident had been caused by a BUK missile. A representative of the DSB responded that they had found many bow-tie shaped fragments and holes. We asked to see them. However, they refused to show us any such fragments or any such holes. They said all the fragments and holes would be presented in a draft report. I also raised a question at this meeting as to the low weight of the alleged bow-tie fragment that had been presented at the meeting in February 2015.
11. I was also involved at this stage in preparing mathematical models of the explosion. This involved modelling, and the conclusions drawn from that modelling were provided to the Dutch Safety Board and presented publicly in a press conference by Almaz Antey. Many of the characteristics used by the Dutch Safety Board had been incorrect, which influenced the mathematical model of the dispersal of projectiles. For example:
 - 1) The detonator of the warhead is located in the front section. However, the Dutch Safety Board proceeded on the basis that it is in the rear section.
 - 2) A 9N314M warhead has a shape like a barrel with a convex curved shape (as can be seen in the photographs of the warhead I provided). However, the Dutch Safety Board proceeded on the basis that it is cylindrical.
12. In June 2015, the Russian Federation received a draft report by the Dutch Safety Board. I studied that draft report and was surprised that data provided by Almaz Antey had not been taken into account. The Dutch Safety Board was only using a picture of the exterior of the warhead that we provided and its correct designation, but not our data. The draft report included images of fragments described as having a bow-tie shape and indicated their sizes.

13. In July 2015, Almaz Antey received a request from the Dutch Safety Board indicating that they required technical documentation from Almaz Antey with specifications of the missiles before our data could be accepted. On 27 July 2015, a letter was sent by Almaz Antey to the Dutch Safety Board conveying extracts from the following documentation:

- 1) Technical characteristics requested by the Dutch Safety Board;
- 2) The outcome of the results of hundreds tests carried out from 1986 to 1991, together with an invitation to the Dutch Safety Board to visit Almaz Antey to see the comprehensive documentation in relation to all of these individual tests. The Dutch Safety Board did not accept that invitation.


Almaz Antey Press Conference (2 June 2015)


14. Almaz Antey gave a press conference on 2 June 2015, during which I gave a presentation. In relation to bow-tie fragments, my presentation referred to information from experts and public sources indicating the presence of bow-tie fragments. The experts I had in mind were the Dutch Safety Board. The public source was a report by Mr Akkermans published on 19 March 2015 in which he claimed to have found a bow-tie shaped fragment in the MH17 wreckage (and my presentation used a photograph of the fragment from Mr Akkermans' article). At that time, relying upon the information from the Dutch Safety Board and Mr Akkermans' article, I believed that there were numerous bow-tie shaped fragments in existence and based on that I concluded that the relevant warhead was a 9N314M.

Shield target test (July 2015)

15. In July 2015, I also coordinated a test on a shield target. This involved constructing a series of several targets (being 5 aluminium sheets and a trap at the end containing aluminium, wood and plastic). This allowed testing of the density, number, shapes of holes and distribution of holes and the penetration force of the projectiles produced by a 9N314M warhead. These results included

numerous bow-tie shaped holes in the shields. I include two sample photographs below. Furthermore, 71 fragments (projectiles) were collected from the shield target experiment and they were measured and weighed. 39 of them were of the bow-tie shaped fragments, with weights between 6.5 to 7.9 grams. The weight of these fragments reduces from their initial 8.1 grams because of the explosion of the warhead and their impact with/passage through the target. I believe that this experimental data is a much more reliable indication of the range of weights than the theoretical calculations done by the National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands. All the more so that the results of the shield target test were fully consistent with the archival tests data that was officially communicated to the Dutch Safety Board.





16. At the next meeting with the Dutch Safety Board in August 2015, I presented the results of this shield testing, a video recording of the test and photographs of the shield. I invited the representatives at the meeting to come to see the raw data and if necessary a repeat of the test. I posed the question of why bow-tie shaped holes were not seen in the remnants of MH17 if the incident had been caused by the same type of missile. The next day, the Dutch representatives expressed doubts about whether the appearance of bow-tie shaped holes on the shield targets reflected what would be seen on an aircraft, due to an aircraft having a different shape.


17. At those meetings in August, we discussed the weight and shape of the bow-tie shaped fragments after the impacts in the shield target tests. We also discussed the results of other testing of the deformation of bow-tie shaped fragments in other experiments. The bow-tie shaped pre-formed fragments in 9N314M warheads have dimensions of 13x13x8 millimetres. We discussed a bow-tie shaped fragment which the draft final report stated (at Paragraph 2.16.1) had been recovered from a flight crew member. We were given a presentation in which it was stated that this fragment had dimensions of 12x12x5 and a weight of 5.7g. Our various tests conducted indicated that if one dimension was reduced due to impact then the other dimensions increased, i.e. would be greater than 13 mm. (While fragments could break, they would not split along their shortest side).


Furthermore, the results of our tests indicated that the sum of linear dimensions (i.e. the sum of the various sides) after an impact normally exceeds the original dimensions of the bowtie.

18. I also asked for the results of chemical testing of the composition of relevant pre-formed fragments which caused the Dutch Safety Board to conclude that they were from a 9N314M warhead. The Dutch Safety Board representatives indicated that there had been no chemical tests because they believed that the fragments could be made from low grade metals originating from different sources over different periods of time. They also said they could not perform a destructive analysis on the fragments from MH17. We indicated that such testing was necessary in order to identify the type of warhead used, e.g. to differentiate between pre-formed fragments from a 9N314M warhead and from a 9N314 warhead).
19. At that meeting in August 2015, we also discussed the number of holes in the shield target tests. The Dutch Safety Board had previously conducted mathematical modelling which indicated that there should have been more holes than were in fact found in the MH17 wreckage if their model was otherwise correct. I raised that discrepancy with representatives of the Dutch Safety Board and was told that they thought it may have been because some of the projectiles may have ricocheted rather than penetrating. However, the results of the shield target tests indicated that the fragments had considerable penetrating force and would have produced many more holes if a missile had exploded as described by the Dutch Safety Board. The representatives of the Dutch Safety Board again suggested that the effect may be different on an aircraft because of its shape.
20. Due to the position adopted by representatives of the Dutch Safety Board about the shape of the relevant targets in the shield test that had been conducted by Almaz Antey, Almaz Antey decided to perform a test using an aircraft.
21. During those meetings, I informed the representatives of the Dutch Safety Board about the planned test and invited them both to participate in the design of the test and to observe the results. They said they would consider that invitation and refused to discuss the matter, without giving reasons.


IL86 target test (October 2015)

22. Almaz Antey nonetheless proceeded with this further test, which was performed on 7 October 2015. We used a IL86 aircraft because the IL86 has a diameter which is practically identical to that of MH17 (a Boeing 777-200) and, besides, both sides of the aircraft cockpit have higher ability to resist penetrating fragments than Boeing 777-200 has because of the presence of metal cabinets holding equipment along both sides behind the seats of the captain and the first officer. The test was conducted strictly in accordance with the model put forward by the Dutch Safety Board.
23. The results of the testing on the IL86 included the following:
- 1) As with the shield targeting testing, the results involved numerous bow-tie shaped holes. I counted over 30 such holes with sharply defined edges. I include a sample photograph below.






- 2) There were many more holes in our test than were found in the MH17 wreckage. There were approximately 2 times as many holes in the testing we conducted than were found in the MH17 remnants.
- 3) The size of the area of impact in our test was different to that on MH17, in that the area of impact in our IL86 test was 3 to 4 times larger than could be seen on MH17.
- 4) The Dutch Safety Board had indicated that there were no penetrating holes on MH17 behind the captain's window with any damage to the rear of that point being due to ricochet. In our IL86 test, there were holes as far as 4 metres further to the rear of the aircraft than the captain window, including on the passenger door. I include below a photograph from IL86 test showing penetrating holes, including on the passenger door. This suggests that any warhead that exploded near MH17 had pre-formed fragments with less penetrating force than the 9N314M warhead and/or the model put forward by the Dutch Safety Board as to the position and circumstances of the explosion was incorrect.



- 5) Many fragments went through the entire body of the IL86, i.e. with many exit holes. This was the case despite the IL86 cockpit including more obstacles than in a Boeing 777-200 cockpit that might be expected to hinder the passage of projectiles, including metal cases along the interior of the IL86 behind the seats of the pilot and co-pilot. I have only seen one hole that might be an exit hole in photographs of MH17 (in para 2.4 on page 13 of the NLR report annexed to Dutch Safety Board report). I did not observe any exit holes in the remnants of MH17 that I saw. (As early as the meeting in May 2015 I had raised with representatives of the Dutch Safety Board the fact that if their hypothesis was correct, there would be many such exit holes but my comments were ignored). Again, this indicates that either any warhead that exploded near MH17 had pre-formed fragments with less penetrating force than the 9N314M warhead and/or the model put

forward by the Dutch Safety Board as to the position and circumstances of the explosion were incorrect.

- 6) The damage in the IL86 test did not include any indication of fragments travelling through the bulkheads of the IL86 parallel to the exterior of the aircraft, whereas there were indications of fragments travelling through the bulkheads on such a parallel path along the left and top of MH17. The amount and density of penetrating damage caused to the MH17 bulkhead were consistent with the number of actual damage caused to the outer skin of MH17. The lack of damage to the bulkheads in the IL86 test clearly indicates any warhead that exploded near MH17 had a different position to that assumed by the Dutch Safety Board which we replicated in our test. Thus, we concluded that the modelling of that position by the Dutch Safety Board was incorrect. I attach several images illustrating these through holes in the bulkheads. These are photographs of the MH17 which show that the overall number of holes in transverse load-bearing elements (bulkheads, cockpit subfloor beams) is comparable to that of the visible holes in the outer skin. Damage of such character is entirely inconsistent with the hypothesis joining “head-on course” and “the 9N314M warhead”. In other words, if the MH17 was hit by a “Buk” missile, then it didn’t happen at head-on course as DSB claims, but at crossing courses, or, alternatively, the plane was hit by a completely different warhead whose projectiles have different penetrating force.



24. We started our design of the experiment by adopting the modelling of the missile calculated by the Dutch Safety Board. We made adjustments to the orientation of the missile in our test due to the fact that the IL86 and missile in our test were not moving, having calculated the compensatory changes necessary due to those velocities. As part of the design of the experiment, we also considered the potential significance of the fact that our test would not be at the same altitude as the MH17 incident. However, the difference in air pressure involved would not be significant due to the proximity in the Dutch Safety Board's model of the explosion to MH17.
25. The Dutch Safety Board presented its final report on 13 October 2015. There was therefore no opportunity to present the results of this further test to the Dutch Safety Board before they produced their final conclusions.
26. Having read the final report of the Dutch Safety Board, we provided the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency ("FATA") with the results of our test. The FATA

wrote to the Dutch Safety Board with a summary of those results in a letter from Oleg Storchevoy to the DSB dated 14th January 2016.

27. From the hundreds of tests that I mentioned above, Almaz Antey had derived a pattern or fingerprint of the distribution and density of impacts from the 9N314M warhead. Different munitions have different patterns of distribution of density. Assuming a warhead exploded as in the Dutch Safety Board's model (head-on course), the pattern on MH17 does not correspond to our data for the 9N314M.

Source of alleged missile parts


28. After the meeting in May 2015 the Dutch Safety Board updated experts (including Almaz Antey) on progress. In or around [June] 2015 the Dutch Safety Board circulated a draft report for comment. Approximately a month later, comments were provided by the Russian experts. There followed a meeting in August for consideration of the final report. The meeting proceeded and no data was discussed. Then, all of a sudden the supposed existence of missile parts was revealed. Poor quality pictures of missile parts were provided. There was no explanation of when or where they were taken or by whom. The only thing the representatives of the Dutch Safety Board said was that they had been found in the area of the crash. Only pictures were produced, not the items themselves. As mentioned above, the pictures were of poor quality and only had part of a number visible on the nozzle. We told them that if we had numbers, we could supply details of the missile. Of course, we asked to see the missile pieces. We were told that they were in the domain of the criminal investigation and we were not permitted to examine them.
29. The JIT eventually produced missile parts (including a part of a missile engine and a nozzle, with manufacturer's numbers on them) that they claimed had been found in the MH-17 debris area, at the press-conference held on 24 May 2018.
30. I was involved in the efforts within Almaz Antey to research and identify the log-books and paperwork associated with the alleged missile parts. I spent nearly five days searching production archives with the assistance of two colleagues in our archival department. Using the manufacturer's numbers on

the relevant missile parts, we located records that show that those parts were used in the manufacture of a specific 9M38 missile at the end of 1986.¹ I have seen records from the Russian Ministry of Defence in relation to that missile² showing that it was sent to a military unit which (I understand from comments by the Russian Ministry of Defence) was based in Ukraine. The relevant pages from the documents I have found, including the logbook and other technical documents, as well as documents confirming that the missile was delivered in December 1986, were demonstrated at the briefing of the Russian Ministry of Defence following the discovery of new data concerning the crash of Boeing 777 in the Donetsk Region.

31. A 9N314M warhead can be carried on the 9M38 missiles manufactured in 1985-1986 and on its more modern development, the 9M38M1. The records I found in relation to the relevant missile parts were for one of those 9M38 missiles.
32. It was therefore technically possible that if a 9N314M warhead had struck MH17, it could have been carried by a 9M38 missile. However, there are oddities. First, the damage to MH17 does not correspond to the impact pattern of a 9N314M warhead as I have explained above. Also the missile engine fragment that was reported to be found in the wreckage had surprisingly little damage for one that has been used. I include below two photographs of missile engines from tests performed by Almaz Antey, which can be contrasted with the final photo of the missile part below which is said to be from the MH17 debris area.

¹ Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the item 9D 131, manufacturing number 8869032, p. 4 - 6; Summary list of component parts and a further assembly certification for the item 9M38 No. 8868720); List of technical documents for the item 9M38 No. 8868720 (Annex XX);

² Accepted product record book for the item 9M38, p. 52 - 53 (Annex XX).



Explosive traces reportedly found

33. The 9N314M warhead contains 24% TNT and 76% RDX, amounting to approximately 33,5 kilogrammes. There is no PETN in the 9N314M warhead or propellant.
34. In May 2015, the NFI indicated that swab samples has been taken from the wreckage of MH17 and the fragments of shrapnel. They stated that traces of explosives had been found, being TNT and RDX. At that point, they did not refer to PETN, any testing of missile parts or indicate the number of swab samples taken.
35. The subsequent draft of the Dutch Safety Board's final report circulated in June 2015 stated in Paragraph 2.16.3 that 500 swab samples had been taken. (The final report said that 126 swab samples had been taken).
36. The Dutch Safety Board stated in its final report (in paragraph 2.16.3 on page 93) that it found traces of RDX on the purported missile parts, with no trace of TNT

being found on those parts. (The draft of the final report did not refer to testing on any alleged missile parts).

37. The Dutch Safety Board stated in its final report (again in paragraph 2.16.3 on page 93) that it had found traces of PETN on a few of the samples they tested.

I believe that the facts stated in this Witness Statement are true.

Signed:[Signature].....


Dated:[07 November 2019].....

Annex 370

Documents Regarding BUK Missile Delivered to Ukraine in the 1980s

(translation)

**Копия титульного листа папки №1 технической документации
на изделие №8868720**



ельв

Часть II

ЗКЗМ

ПАПКА №1

ТЕХ. ДОКУМЕНТАЦИЯ

НА ИЗДМ 8868720

ГОД

УДНИТЬ

лет

Copy of the Title Page of Folder No. 1 of Technical Documentation for Item No. 8868720

Part II
Counterpart No.
FOLDER No. 1
TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
FOR ITEM No. 8868720

**Копия описи технической документации
на изделие 9М38 №8868720**

Прокл. №
ИЗД. 11.130

О П И С Ь
Техдокументации на изделие
9М38 8868720 (покупное изделие)

№ п/п	НАИМЕНОВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТОВ	№ изделия	К-во докум.	Примечание
1.	Паспорт на 9Э129.....	К01862322	1	
2.	Паспорт на 9Б155 М1.....	К110613341	1	
3.	Паспорт на 9Я266.9810.000.....	8606080369	1	
4.	Сводная ведомость комплектации сборки и досборки изделия.....	8868720	1	
5.	Формуляр на изделие 9Х172.....	4и 07-86М	-	явл. № 6171
6.	Формуляр на изделие 9Х253.....	М 8603	-	явл. № 5699

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: Документация по п. 5, 6 хранится в отд. 201.
Сводная ведомость комплектации сборки и досборки изделия
в банку не подшивается и хранится отдельно.

Заполнил к/д цеха 130: И. Нудиско 25.12.86
(фамилия, подпись, дата)

"ПРОВЕРЕНО"

Представитель БТК цеха 130: 27.12.86
(фамилия, подпись, дата)

Представитель заказчика: 27.12.86
(фамилия, подпись, дата)

891.835-800

Copy of the List of Technical Documentation for Item No. 8868720

LIST

of

Technical Documentation for the Item


9M38 **8868720** (*purchased items*)

Ser. No.	DOCUMENT NAME	Item No.	Quantity of documents	Note
	[...]			
4.	Summary list of component parts and a further assembly certification for the item	8868720	1	
	[...]			

Filled in by [κ/δ] of Shop 130: /Signature/ *Trubina* **25 December 1986**

(family name, signature, date)

**Копия титульного листа сводной ведомости комплектации сборки
и досборки изделия 9М38 серийный номер 8868720**



Всего листов 9

**Copy of the Title Page of the Summary List of Component Parts and a Further Assembly
Certification for the Item 9M38, Serial Number 8868720**

*Summary List
of Component Parts and a Further Assembly
Certification for the Item 9M38
Serial Number 8868720*

Копия листа 7 сводной ведомости комплектации сборки и доборки изделия 9M28 серийный номер 8868720

5. Комплектующая ведомость на доборку изделия № 8868720

№№ пп.	Наименование	Измеряемые чертёжные №	Поз.	Номер	Дата выпуска	Номер сводного паспорта	Примечание
1.	Изделие	ЭН314(ЭН130) М	-	4-9-86	30.06.86	5914	
2.	Изделие	ЭЭ129	П	К01862322	31.05.86	410	
3.	Изделие	ЭД151.00.000	-	8869032	24.12.86	"	
4.	Изделие	ЭБ156 5543.000	-	44499	23.12.86	"	
5.	Изделие	ЭХ272	-	4-86М	22.02.86	4	В кон.те
6.	Изделие	ЭХ53	-	138, 4-86	10.10.86	4	ЭБ156
7.	Изделие	ЭХ54	-	351, 4-86М	01.09.86	4	
8.	Изделие	ЭП4-3М	-	2532385	30.04.85	16518	
9.	Изделие	ЭХ34М1	-	1160, 7-86М	25.10.86	4	
10.	Изделие	ЭХ265	-	1-86М	10.07.86	1	
11.	Изделие	ЭХ95	-	1-86Е	21.03.86	17947	
12.	Изделие	ЭП4-1М	-	2530285	31.01.85	0285	В кон.те
13.	Изделие	ЭП4-1М	-	"	"	"	ЭБ156
14.	Изделие	ЭБХ341	-	5-86	09.07.86	3077	

Лист 7


Translation

**Copy of Page 7 of the Summary List of Component Parts and a Further Assembly
Certification for the Item 9M38, Serial Number 8868720**

5. List of Component Parts for the Further Assembly of Item No. 8868720

<i>Ser. No.</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Index or drafting number</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Date of issue</i>	<i>Summary certificate number</i>	<i>Note</i>
	[...]	M					
3.	Section 3	9D 131.00000	-	8869032	24 December 1986	same	

**Копия титульного листа папки №2 технической документации
на изделие №8868720**



Translation

Copy of the Title Page of Folder No. 2 of Technical Documentation for Item No. 8868720

Counterpart No.
FOLDER No. 2
TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION
FOR ITEM No. 8868720

Копия описи технической документации на изделие 9М38 № 8868720

ПА П К А №2

Цех 130

О П И С Ь

техдокументации на изделие
9М38 № 8868720

(Сооруды высокого давления)

№ п.п.	НАИМЕНОВАНИЕ ДОКУМЕНТАЦИИ	№ изделий	К-во докум.	Примеч.
1.	Паспорт на обечайку 9Д131.03.000.....	833120	1	
2.	Паспорт на агрегат 9Д131.00.010.....	830140	1	
3.	Паспорт на агрегат 9Д131.00.060.....	830133	1	
4.	Паспорт на агрегат 9Д131.05.000.....	830113	1	
5.	ордер на агр 90181	8868052		

Заполнил к/д цеха 130: М. КАНУНИКОВА 24.12.86
(фамилия, подпись, дата)

"ПРОВЕРЕНО"
Предст. БТК ц. 130

24.12.86
(фамилия, подпись, дата)

Предст. заказчика

24.12.86
(фамилия, подпись, дата)

*Translation***Copy of the List of Technical Documentation for the Item 9M38 No. 8868720**FOLDER No. 2
Shop 130

LIST No.

of

Technical Documentation for the Item


9M38 No. **8868720**

Ser. No.	DOCUMENT NAME	Item No.	Quantity of documents	Note
	[...]			
4.	Certificate for Unit 9D131.05.000	830113	1	
5.	Logbook for Unit 9D131	8869032		

Filled in by [κ/θ] of Shop 130: /Signature/ **KANUNNIKOVA** **24 December 1986**

(family name, signature, date)

Копия титульного листа формуляра 9Д131.00.000 ФО изделия 9Д 131
заводской номер 8869032



Translation

Copy of the Title Page of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131

Manufacturing Number 8869032

**Item 9D131
LOGBOOK
9D131.00.000 FO
Item 9D131
Manufacturing number 8869032**

**Копия страницы 4 формуляра 9Д131.00.000 ФО изделия 9Д 131
заводской номер 8869032**

Восстановленный подлинник №1

2. КОМПЛЕКТАЦИЯ ИЗДЕЛИЯ 9Д131 Заводской номер *8869032*

номер строки	обозначение	наименование	Кол.	ЗаводскойПрим. номер
<u>Сборочные единицы</u>				
I.	9Х172 с обечайкой 9Д131.03.000 № <i>833120</i>	Изделие 9Х172	I	№ <i>4407-86М</i>
2.	9Д131.00.010	Днище переднее	I	№ <i>830140</i>
3.	9Д131.00.060	Днище заднее	I	№ <i>830189</i>
4.	9Д131.05.000	Блок С	I	№ <i>830113</i>
5.	9Х253	Изделие 9Х253	I	№ <i>178603</i>
<u>Детали</u>				
6.	9Д131.00.001	Болт	100	Партия № <i>13086</i>
7.	9Д131.00.004	Шпилька	34	Партия № <i>01086</i>
8.	9Д131.00.009	Замок	I	б/н
9.	352-4,2 Д4Г02.6442	Кольцо	2	Партия № <i>4567</i>
10.	155-2,5 Д4Г02.15452	Кольцо	I	Партия № <i>1251</i>
11.	0,8-Т-12Х18Н10Т ГОСТ 18143-72	Проволока	I, 5м	б/н
12.	ОСТ1.10067-71	Пломба	I	б/н
13.	9Д131.00.003	Шайба	I	б/н
14.	13-1-ОСТ1 10291-71	Кольцо	I	б/н
<u>Документация</u>				
15.	9Д131.00.000 ФО	Формуляр	I	
16.	9Х172 ФО	Формуляр изд. 9Х172	I	Инв. № <i>6171</i>
17.	9Х253 ФО	Формуляр изд. 9Х253 на партии	I	Инв. № <i>5699</i>
18.		Паспорт днища перед- него	I	
19.		Паспорт днища заднего	I	
20.		Паспорт блока С	I	
21.		Паспорт на комплект крепежа	I	
22.		Паспорт-выписка на партии колец Д4Г02.6442	I	
23.		Паспорт-выписка на партии колец Д4Г02.15452	I	

Восстановлен с подлинника 9Д131.00.000 ФО

294 *34 зам. 3 9Д131.134* *30294* *9Д131.00.000 ФО* *4*

*Translation***Copy of Page 4 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131****Manufacturing Number 8869032**2. COMPONENT PARTS OF THE ITEM 9D131 Manufacturing number: **8869032**

Line number	Reference	Name	Quantity	Manufacturing number / note
	[...]			
4.	9D131.05.000	Block S	1	No. 830113

Копия страницы 5 формуляра 9Д131.00.000 ФО изделия 9Д 131 заводской номер 8869032

Восстановленный подлинник № 1

3. СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО О СБОРКЕ ИЗДЕЛИЯ 9Д131

Предприятие: п/я А-7144 произведена сборка изделия 9Д131 заводской № 8869032 в соответствии с требованиями чертежа 9Д131.00.000 СБ и технических условий 9Д131.00.000 ТУ.

Размер между плоскостью заднего стыка и торцем узла 9Д131.05.000 по чертежу 950,5±2, фактический 952,4

Сборка опломбирована пломбами

30		
19		

 (оттиски пломб)

Руководитель предприятия Иванов А.И. (подпись, фамилия)

Главный контролер Беленский (подпись, фамилия)

Представитель заказчика Маслюк В.И. (подпись, фамилия)

24.12.86. (дата)

Восстановлен с подлинника. Верно. (подпись)

34 3042 9Д131 134 27 4664

9Д131.00.000 5

Translation

Copy of Page 5 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131

Manufacturing Number 8869032

3. ITEM 9D131 ASSEMBLY CERTIFICATE

The enterprise (PO Box *A-7144*) assembled the item 9D131, manufacturing number **8869032**, as per the drawing requirements (9D131.00.000 SB) and technical specifications (9D131.00.000 TU).

24 December 1986

(date)

Копия страницы 6 формуляра 9Д131.00.000 ФО изделия 9Д 131 заводской номер 8869032

Восстановленной подлинник №1

4. СВЕДЕНИЯ ОБ ОКОНЧАТЕЛЬНОЙ СБОРКЕ ИЗДЕЛИЯ 9Д131

Изделие 9Д131 заводской № 8869032 окончательно собрано в составе изделия 9М38 № 8868720 в соответствии с требованиями чертежей 9Д131.00.000 СБ, 9М38.000.0000 СБ и технических условий 9Д131.00.000 ТУ, инструкции на сборку 9М38.000000 ДЗЗ.

Изделие 9Д131 после окончательной установки блока "С" 9Д131.05.000 проверено на герметичность.

Руководитель предприятия *Иванов*
(подпись, фамилия)

Главный контролер *Венесев*
(подпись, фамилия)

Представитель заказчика *Маслов*
(подпись, фамилия)
24.12.86
(дата)

Восстановлен с подлинника. Версия 2/19/86 (Иванов)

Формы: 9Д131.00.000	Изм. № 000	Исполн. в	Изм. № дубл.	Подпись и дата
294	34	Зач. 2	9Д131.К34	<i>Иванов</i>
Изм.	Лист	№ докум.	Изм.	Дата
				20.864

9Д131.00.000 ФО

Translation

Copy of Page 6 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131

Manufacturing Number 8869032

4. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE FINAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ITEM 9D131

The item 9D131, manufacturing number **8869032**, underwent the final assembly as part of the item 9M38, No. **8868720**, as per the drawing requirements (9D131.00.000 SB, 9M38.000.0000 SB) and technical specifications (9D131.00.000 TU), the final assembly instruction (9M38.0000000 DZZ).

After Block S (9D131.05.000) was underwent the final installation, the item 9D131 was tested for leakage.

24 December 1986

(date)

Копия страницы 7 формуляра 9Д131.00.000 ФО изделия 9Д 131 заводской номер 8869032

Восстановленный подлинник №

5. СВЕДЕНИЯ О КОНСЕРВАЦИИ, РАСКОНСЕРВАЦИИ И УПАКОВКЕ

Дата консервации или расконсервации	Указывается метод консервации или расконсервации	Дата упаковки	Наименование предприятия, производящего операцию	Должность, фамилия, подпись, ответственного лица за операцию

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: Упаковку производить при хранении изделия 9Д131 в помещении более 30 суток.

294

Подпись в ...

Вкладчик № ...

Подпись и дата

9Д131.00.000 ФО

Лист


7

Translation

Copy of Page 7 of Logbook 9D131.00.000 FO of the Item 9D 131

Manufacturing Number 8869032

**Копия титульного листа паспорта на блок «С» 9Д131.05.000 №830113
ведомости комплектации сборки и досборки изделия 9М38 серийный
номер 8868720**



Translation

**Copy of the Title Page of the Certificate for Block S 9D131.05.000 No. 830113
of the List of Component Parts and a Further Assembly Certification for the Item 9M38,
Serial Number 8868720**


CERTIFICATE

for

Block S 9D131.05.000

in 830113

Копия титульного листа журнала учета принятой продукции по изделию 9М38



Translation

Copy of the Title Page of the Accepted Product Record Book for the Item 9M38

172 1701

HIGHLY CLASSIFIED

**ACCEPTED PRODUCT RECORD BOOK
FOR THE ITEM 9M38**

START DATE:

END DATE:

№ п. п.	СВЕДЕНИЯ ОБ ИЗДЕЛИИ					СВЕДЕНИЯ ОБ ОПЛАТЕ					СВЕДЕНИЯ О КОМПЛЕКТАЦИИ					Сведения о конструктивных изменениях	№ и дата разрядки (наряд)	дата отправки	куда отправлен
	номер изделия	вариант	комплект.	дата изготовления	дата сдачи	№ и дата сдачи	№ и дата изготовления	№ и дата	счета	процент по счету									
65	8711	847	271			359	221	697с							551/4201029	10.1.84	8/2	41688	
66	8712	847	283			28.12.86	28.12.86	114050							27.12.86				
67	8713	847	295			359	221	"											
68	8714	847	217			383	232	716с											
69	8715	847	229			361	223	698с											
70	8716	847	331			28.12.86	28.12.86	291286								29.12.86	8/2	20152	
71	8717	847	343			383	232	716с											
72	8718	847	355			31.12.86	31.12.86	"											
73	8719	847	367			359	221	697с											
74	8720	847	379			28.12.86	28.12.86	114050											
75	8721	847	481			361	223	698с											
76	8722	847	493			28.12.86	28.12.86	"											
77	8723	847	415			383	232	716с											
78	8724	847	427			31.12.86	31.12.86	114050											
79	8725	847	439			"	"	"											
80	8726	847	541			"	"	"											

Сенобор

647-581

Annex 371

Georgia v. Russia (II), Application No. 38263/08, Open Exhibit for Oral Submissions of the
Russian Federation on 23 May 2018

(translation)

Georgia v Russia (II)

Open Exhibit for Oral Submissions of
the Russian Federation on

23 May 2018

[Please have available at the Hearing]

Court Question 1: “Did the alleged violations...”

Who Started the Conflict?

- Georgia says Russia

See Georgia
Application
6/02/2009 at para 82
and footnote 65


- Based on an alleged “intercept”
- But – intercept or invention?

Who started it?

See RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at paras 243-244
and

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY>

BBC Newsnight:



See RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at paras 243-
244 and

[https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY)

BBC Newsnight

- Reporter to Shota Utiashvili: [At 9.06]

“But despite this apparent evidence, Georgia didn’t mention any Russian invasion when it went to war at the end of that day - the 7th. It didn’t mention any proof until weeks later because, it says now, it mislaid the tape...”

See RF submissions
15/06/2011 at Annex

24

The Reality: President Saakashvili's Promise


“I admire and respect Ossetian history and culture. Every ethnic Ossetian has been an inseparable part of Georgian history for centuries. We are proud of you and our unity. Georgia is strong for its diversity. Georgia has never been and will never be a mono-ethnic country. Georgia belongs to all of us regardless of our ethnicity. ***Let's take care of our country together. Let's together avoid the violence.*** Let's work together for a better future....”

Georgia is undertaking an immediate, unilateral cease fire. We do not have the will to respond to violence with yet more violence.”

Georgia's Massive Attack on Tskhinval /Russian Peacekeepers

Georgia's Attack on Tskhinval

See RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at para 57 et
seq. and
[https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY)



Georgia's Attack on Tskhinval

See RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at at para 57 et
seq. and
[https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY)




Georgia's Attack on Tskhinval

See RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at at para 57
et seq. and
[https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY)



Georgia's Attack on Tskhinval

See RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at para 57 et
seq. and
[https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY)




Georgia's Attack on Tskhinval

See RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at para 57 et
seq. and
[https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-ALvCYIZvY)



See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at para
55

Georgia's War Plans with NATO symbols (2007)



A substantial Russian response took time...

RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at para 71,
Annex 68 and e.g.
Annex 27 (HRW) at
page 23 et seq.

HRW:

“During the day on August 8, regular Russian ground forces moved through the Roki tunnel toward Tskhinvali...

By the evening of August 8, Russian authorities declared that units of the 58th Army were deployed in the outskirts of Tskhinvali...

Over the next two days, Russian forces continued to move into South Ossetia...”

International Independent Fact- Finding Mission Vol 1 para 20:

RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at
Annex 11-1, p. 23

“[A]n additional legal question is whether the Georgian use of force against Russian peacekeeping forces on Georgian territory, i.e. in South Ossetia, might have been justified. Again the answer is in the negative. *There was no ongoing armed attack by Russia before the start of the Georgian operation. Georgian claims of a large-scale presence of Russian armed forces in South Ossetia prior to the Georgian offensive on 7/8 August could not be substantiated by the Mission. It could also not be verified that Russia was on the verge of such a major attack, in spite of certain elements and equipment having been made readily available. There is also no evidence to support any claims that Russian peacekeeping units in South Ossetia were in flagrant breach of their obligations under relevant international agreements such as the Sochi Agreement and thus may have forfeited their international legal status.* Consequently, the use of force by Georgia against Russian peacekeeping forces in Tskhinvali in the night of 7/8 August 2008 was contrary to international law.”

Conflict Allegations

(1) ... that Russian aircraft bombed Georgian villages [with cluster bombs].

RF Responses 19/02/2016
at Annex 5

Purported Corroboration by Human Rights Watch:

HRW, August 15, 2008

“[HRW] researchers have uncovered evidence that Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in populated areas in Georgia...

“Cluster bombs are indiscriminate killers...
said **Marc Garlasco**, senior military analyst at [HRW]...”

RF Responses 19/02/2016
at Annex 5

HRW Webpage with Missing Picture
(this and the following five slides)



AUGUST 15, 2008

Georgia: Russian Cluster Bombs Kill Civilians

Stop Using Weapon Banned by 107 Nations

RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5

Human Rights Watch researchers have uncovered evidence that Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in populated areas in Georgia, killing at least 11 civilians and injuring dozens, Human Rights Watch said today. Human Rights Watch called upon Russia to immediately stop using cluster bombs, weapons so dangerous to civilians that more than 100 nations have agreed to ban their use.

“Cluster bombs are indiscriminate killers that most nations have agreed to outlaw,” said Marc Garlasco, senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch. “Russia’s use of this weapon is not only deadly to civilians, but also an insult to international efforts to avoid a global humanitarian disaster of the kind caused by landmines.”

Human Rights Watch said Russian aircraft dropped RBK-250 cluster bombs, each containing 30 PTAB 2.5M submunitions, on the town of Ruisi in the Kareli district of Georgia on August 12, 2008. Three civilians were killed and five wounded in the attack. On the same day, a cluster strike in the center of the town of Gori killed at least eight civilians and injured dozens, Human Rights Watch said. Dutch journalist Stan Storimans was among the dead. Israeli journalist

RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5

Georgia: Russian Cluster Bombs Kill Civilians | Human Rights Watch

30/05/2016 10:30

Zadok Yehezkel was seriously wounded and evacuated to Israel for treatment after surgery in Tbilisi. An armored vehicle from the Reuters news agency was perforated with shrapnel from the attack.

This is the **first known use of cluster munitions since 2006**, during Israel's war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Cluster munitions contain dozens or hundreds of smaller submunitions or bomblets. They cause unacceptable humanitarian harm in two ways. First, their broad-area effect kills and injures civilians indiscriminately during strikes. Second, many submunitions do not explode, becoming de facto landmines that cause civilian casualties for months or years to come. In May 2008, 107 nations agreed to a total ban on cluster munitions, but Russia did not participate in the talks.



Georgians look at the remnants of an RBK-250 cluster bomb dropped by Russian aircraft on the village of Ruisi, near South Ossetia, Tuesday, Aug. 12, 2008. Human Rights Watch has identified the weapon as a RBK-250 cluster bomb.

Human Rights Watch researchers interviewed numerous victims, doctors, and military personnel in Georgia. They examined photos of craters and video footage of the August 12 attack on Gori. Human Rights Watch has also seen a photo of the submunition carrier assembly and nose cone of an RBK-250 bomb in Gori. The Gori video showed more than two dozen simultaneous explosions during the attack, which is characteristic of cluster bombs. Two persons wounded in Gori described multiple simultaneous explosions at the time of the attack. Craters in Gori were also consistent with a cluster strike.

Doctors at the two main hospitals in Tbilisi described numerous injuries to civilians hurt in the attack on Gori they believed were consistent with cluster bombs. Human Rights Watch researchers saw a submunition fragment extracted from one victim's head.

Human Rights Watch interviewed several hospitalized victims of the attack in Gori. Twenty-five-year-old Ketii Javakhishvili suffered massive trauma to her liver, stomach, and intestines, as well as hemorrhagic shock. Two other victims sustained fragment wounds to their legs and abdominal regions. All the wounds were consistent with those caused by submunitions from cluster bombs.

RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5 30/05/2016 10:3

rgia: Russian Cluster Bombs Kill Civilians | Human Rights Watch

Photographic evidence on file with Human Rights Watch shows a civilian in Ruisi holding a PTAB submunition without realizing it could explode at the slightest touch. This incident highlights the dire need to educate immediately the population of Georgia about the dangers of these submunition “duds.”

Human Rights Watch called on Russia to provide precise strike data on its cluster attacks in order to facilitate clean up of the inevitable lingering contamination from cluster bomb submunitions that failed to explode on contact but remain deadly.

Human Rights Watch also called on Georgia, which is known to have RBK-500 cluster bombs in its stockpiles, to join the international move to ban the use of cluster munitions and publicly to undertake not to use such weapons in this conflict.

Russia was not part of the Oslo Process launched in February 2007 to develop a new international treaty banning cluster munitions. In May 2008, 107 nations adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which comprehensively bans the use, production, **trade and stockpiling** of the weapon. It will be open for signature in Oslo on December 3, 2008.

“Russia should never have fired cluster munitions against a town in Georgia and now it should help in the clean-up to avoid any more deaths,” Garlasco said.

Region / Country Europe/Central Asia, Georgia, Russia
Tags Cluster Munitions, Civilian Casualties

More Reading

MAY 30, 2008 | News Release

Cluster Bomb Treaty Breaks New Ground

RF Responses 19/02/2016
at Annex 5

The Missing Picture

?

“Georgians look at the remnants of an RBK-250 cluster bomb dropped by Russian aircraft on the village of Ruisi, near South Ossetia, Tuesday, Aug. 12, 2008. Human Rights Watch has identified the weapon as a RBK-250 cluster bomb.”

HRW = Marc Garlasco

- He said that remnants of what appears to be a missile came from a Russian RBK 250 cluster bomb.

HRW: The Missing Picture

RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5

See the picture available at

<https://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2009/04/21/23660>

9



Clearly a missile, not a bomb

RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5

See the picture available at

<https://www.hrw.org/ja/news/2009/04/21/23660>

9



RF Submissions
31/03/2016 at Annex 6

Some context – Mr Garlasco’s CV:

- Pentagon - Defense Intelligence Agency (6 years)
- Human Rights Watch (senior military analyst in Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) Emergencies Division)
- Resigned from HRW in February 2010 after emergence of his interest in Nazi memorabilia:

“That is so cool! The leather SS jacket makes my blood go cold it is so COOL!”

Georgia Struck Georgian Villages with Cluster weapons

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex 2D
(p. 77 et seq.)
RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 27
(p. 64 et seq.)

- Georgia bought cluster missiles carrying M85 cluster bomblets from Israel
- M85 bomblets were found in (at least) Brotsleti, Ditsi, Kvemo Khviti, Meghvrekisi, Pkhvenisi, Shindisi, Tirdznisi, Zemo Khviti, and Zemo Nikozi
- Georgia blamed Russia for these cluster strikes and supported the claim with false witness evidence

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex 2D
(p. 77 et seq.)

False Witnesses

HRW: A Dying Practice, April 2009, page 57 fn

140:

“In initial reports, Human Rights Watch attributed the M85 attacks around Pkhvenisi and Shindisi to Russia, *based upon the accounts of nearly a dozen witnesses, interviewed separately*, who said that Russian air strikes on Georgian armored units in the area were followed by extensive cluster munition strikes ... Further investigations led Human Rights Watch to change that original attribution.”

HRW – A Dying Practice

At page 57:

“Through these sources, researchers gathered evidence of M85s in or near a band of nine villages in the north of the Gori District: Brotsleti, Ditsi, Kvemo Khviti, Meghvrekisi, Pkhvenisi, Shindisi, Tirdznisi, Zemo Khviti, and Zemo Nikozi.”

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex 2D
(p. 77 et seq.)

HRW – A Dying Practice

At page 57:

“A villager also showed them a Mk.-4 160mm rocket and red M85 ribbon in Variani, but because the town is further south and does not fit the geographic pattern, Human Rights Watch has not determined for certain if it landed in that location.”

Georgia Admits Using Cluster Weapons

HRW – Up in Flames at page 64:

“In a letter to Human Rights Watch on August 31, 2008, the Georgian Ministry of Defense acknowledged that it had used cluster munitions against Russian military equipment and armaments as they were moving south from the Roki tunnel.”

RF Submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 27

Accident?

HRW – Up in Flames, page 11:

“...*Due to either malfunction or human error*, Georgian cluster munitions landed in undisputed Georgian territory on days prior to the arrival of Russian forces there, killing at least one civilian and wounding two others... at least three people were killed and six wounded by cluster duds that exploded upon contact in three villages in undisputed Georgian territory.”

Or Intent ?

HRW – Up in Flames at page 65:

“First Deputy Minister of Defense Batu Kutelia told Human Rights Watch that these weapons, bought from Israel, are the only cluster munitions in Georgia’s possession....


Notwithstanding the cluster munition hits in Gori district, ***Kutelia expressed satisfaction with how the munitions performed and said that they delayed Russian troop advances by several days...***”

Georgia's Bombing Allegations now...

- Re witness problems, see Confidential Exhibit.
- Alleged radar logs showing Russian bombing runs are fabricated
- Aircraft flying at impossible speeds
- Radar purports to see through Caucasus mountains
- The data shows aeroplanes crossing the mountains at a constant height lower than the mountains, and therefore flying through rock!

Flight records showing 'bombing' are fabricated

RF Submissions
24/11/2017 at
Annex 3, para 16



Moreover, not only cannot the aircraft be tracked in the area behind the Caucasian range but they also cross the range at the same constant altitude of 1,000 m (see aircraft path No. 144 in the video recording 'Gori – Tortiza – 3.3 – Standard option' and aircraft path No. 64 in the video recording 'Gori – Tortiza – 3.2 – Standard option' (Annex 7 to the submissions of the Georgian authorities from 31 January 2017)). Given the height of the ridge, such conduct of the aircraft is impossible.

(2) ... that Russia attacked the central square in Gori with an Iskander missile, killing the Dutch journalist, Stan Storimans

RF Responses 19/02/2016
at Annex 7

The death of Stan Storimans

RF Responses 19/02/2016
at Annex 5

Georgia Submissions

5/03/2015 at Annex 292

- Initial Press: Mr Storimans was killed in Gori in a mortar attack.
- HRW (Garlasco) 1st version: RBK bomb
- HRW (Garlasco) 2nd version: Iskander missile
- Dutch Investigative Mission (“DIM”): Iskander missile

Initial Press Reports

- Reuters, 12 August 2008

“Explosions in the Georgian town of Gori on Tuesday killed at least five civilians, including a journalist, and injured several others....

A study of television footage from the scene showed that the explosions were probably caused by mortar fire and not by bombs dropped from aircraft, as witnesses initially thought...”

RBK -250

HRW, August 15, 2008:

“[HRW] has also seen a photo of the submunition carrier assembly and nose cone of an RBK-250 bomb in Gori. The Gori video showed more than two dozen simultaneous explosions during the attack, which is characteristic of cluster bombs. ... Craters in Gori were also consistent with a cluster strike.”

Semble: Marc Garlasco, again.

Dutch Investigative Mission (“DIM”)

- *Visit to Gori: 29 August 2008 to 3 September 2008*
- *Report: The Hague, 20 October 2008 – Iskander Missile*

The Iskander Chronology

See: references in
body of slide

- 11-12 August 2008, Georgian forces withdrew from Gori (See *Georgia Combat Reports submitted 19/02/2016*; *Georgia Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II at 21:50 et seq.*)
- 12 August 2008, alleged attack by Russia on square in Gori (*RF Responses 19/02/2016 at para 79*)
- 15 August 2008 – HRW (Garlasco) said it was an RBK bomb (*RF Responses 19/02/2016 at Annex 5*)
- 17-20 August 2008 - Russian withdrawal
- Deployment of US State Department mission with photographers.
- 25 August 2008 – the Hoefft Sofa Photograph (See *RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 3 and p. 15)*)
- 25-27 August 2008 – the Hoefft Visit Photograph with Adobe metadata (See *RF Submissions 24/11/2017 at Annex 13, p. 7*)
- 27 August 2008 – new evidence of “little holes” (See *RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 25)*)
- 29 August 2008 – 3 September 2008 – visit by Dutch Investigative Mission (“DIM”) (See *Georgia Submissions 5/03/2015 at Annex 292*)
- 20 October 2008 - Dutch Findings of an Iskander attack based on photographs, video, “little holes”, indeterminate “little bullets” and interaction with Marc Garlasco. No inspection of missile parts. (See *Georgia Submissions 5/03/2015 at Annex 292*)

Georgia Submissions 5/03/2015
at Annex 292
RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 15)

The DIM Report

- The DIM investigators did not see the missile parts;
- They were shown pictures and video, including one picture of a missile section on a sofa, said (in their report) to have come from the HALO trust.
- In fact, the most current “sofa picture” was taken by a US Navy photographer on a State Department mission.

Fake Pictures: The “Sofa” Picture

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 3)



RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 15)

The US Navy

Navy.mil - View Image

http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=630

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060825-N-0629H-021

GORI, Georgia (Aug. 25, 2008) A Russian missile lies largely intact in the master bedroom of a home in Gori. Residents of the embattled city have begun to return and have commenced the work of cleaning up their city following the recent conflict between Russia and Georgia. The Department of Defense deployment is part of a larger United States response to the government of Georgia request for humanitarian assistance. This effort is being coordinated by the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jim Hoelt/Released)

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The Caption says ..

GORI, Georgia (Aug. 25, 2008) A Russian missile lies largely intact in the master bedroom of a home in Gori... ***The Department of Defense deployment is part of a larger United States response*** to the government of Georgia request for humanitarian assistance. ***This effort is being coordinated by the US Department of State*** and the U.S. Agency for International Development. (***U.S. Navy photo by Lt Jim Hoeft/Released***).

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at para
16 et seq.

Physical Impossibility

- Momentum:
 - The tail section has a mass of several hundred kilograms
 - It descends vertically at several times the speed of a bullet
- It could not enter on one side of a top-floor room and land gently on a sofa on the other side.
- It would smash down vertically through the entire building.

Cf RTL Documentary/German Missile Scientist – “Investigation in Gori”

Georgia
Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 8 Part II



Georgia Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex
8 Part II

Missile Pieces outside: The “Floating” Missile Piece



Transparent metal ...

Georgia
Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 8 Part II



See Georgia Submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex 8.1
(0:40 et seq.)

Cf a “Reuters” quality video?



Other internet pictures at this quality
show differences – the silver seam

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 9)



RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 13)

A Dimple in the Tarmac/Cf Momentum:



The Ballast Piece

<http://forums.airbase.ru/2010/06/t70301--iskander-v-gori-voprosy-i-otvety-foto-i-videomaterial.html>



Iskander has air-burst sub-munitions, so no Craters:

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 27)



The DIM Report:

Georgia Submissions
5/03/2015 at Annex 292

No consideration of:

- The alleged missile pieces;
- The mass of missile pieces;
- The velocity of missile pieces;
- Their momentum;
- The inevitable damage when they strike a building or the ground;
- The fact that the sub-munitions explode in the air and not on the ground;
- The inconsistency of craters etc.

Alleged Iskander “Bullets”

- The only alleged physical evidence
- The same kind of “little bullet” was allegedly found in walls and in the body of Mr Storimans.

Chronology – early pictures and video:

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 27)

Conventional mortar crater and no “little holes”



Georgia Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex
8 Part II (timing
02:44 et seq.)

Mr Akkermans' Taxi (1) – Supposedly sprayed with “little bullets”



No holes in the Taxi (2)

Georgia
Submissions
24/11/2017 at
Annex 8.2



No holes in the Taxi (3)

Georgia
Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 8 Part II



No holes in the Taxi (4)

Georgia
Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 8 Part II



A Rash of Little Holes Later

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 25)

Video of 27 August 2008



The Autopsy
19 August 2008 (one week
later)

RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 4 (p. 52)
RF Submissions
24/11/2017 at
Annex 9

“There were various open skin injuries which were *sutured and fixed while embalming*. That is why it was impossible to effectively assess the open injuries and make pictures of them.”

Georgia’s New Offer on Missile Parts:

Georgia
Submissions
24/11/2017 at para
12

“The Government also informs the Court that these Iskander missile pieces (as depicted in the recent photographs and videos which are enclosed with this submission) are in the custody of the Georgian authorities and they can be accessed by the Court ...”

Reference is to Annex 14 – only 3 pieces.

Georgia's Picture of Part N1

Georgia
Submissions
24/11/2017 at
Annex 14



Different from the RTL Video

Georgia Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex 8 Part II
(timing 13:29 et seq.)



And hand-painted !

Georgia
Submissions
24/11/2017 at
Annex 14 (picture
GEO_0181)




Cf RF Position:

- The numbers on the alleged missile parts do not correspond to any missile ever in the Russian inventory.
- The pieces fall at great speed: friction would burn off any paint.
- The painting presented does not reflect factory production.


RTL Documentary: “Investigation in Gori”

Georgia Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex 8
Part II (timing 12:57 et
seq.)



Georgia Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex 8
Part II (timing 12:57 et
seq.)

RTL Documentary: Too many parts !



The Americans have any supposed ‘Missile Parts’

Georgia Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex 8
Part II (timing 11:48 et seq.)



Georgia Submissions
31/01/2017 at Annex
8 Part II (timing
11:48 et seq.)

RTL Documentary: Where? Why?



RF Investigative Committee

Report:

“The Dutch side separately states that photo and video materials, eyewitness accounts and other materials used to prepare the report of the Dutch mission of October 20, 2008 to investigate the circumstances of the death of S. Storimans, will not be provided to the Russian side due to the fact that this data concerns the sovereignty of Georgia. At the same time, the Dutch side declares that the relevant materials have already been handed over to Russia (to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The [Investigative Committee] of Russia draws attention to the apparent inconsistency of the position of the Dutch side and is surprised by the refusal of the Dutch side to transmit the materials ...”

Human Rights Center at the UC Berkeley School of Law

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior_cover2.pdf, p. 5

“Digital information, such as photos and videos, must be verified and authenticated and chain of custody must be established. Because online sites such as YouTube strip the metadata – e.g., information about when and where a video was filed – it is often difficult to establish probative value”.

The Snowden Disclosures

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 57 et
seq.) and Annex 2M
(p. 16 et seq.)



- Definition: having an impact in the real world
- Key deliverers: JTRIG and CNE
- Now major part of business – 5% of Operations
- Across all target types
- Continuous innovation of new tools and techniques

Snowden (2)

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 57 et
seq.) and Annex 2M
(p. 16 et seq.)

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1

CNIO

Computer Network Information Operations

- Propaganda
- Deception
- Mass messaging
- Pushing stories
- Alias development
- Psychology

twitter

flickr



The information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]

Snowden (3)

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 57 et
seq.) and Annex 2M
(p. 16 et seq.)

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1

Information Operations: The Social Web



Deliver messages and multimedia content across Web 2.0

Crafting messaging campaigns to go 'viral'

This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 57 et
seq.) and Annex 2M
(p. 16 et seq.)


Snowden (4)

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1

Human Systems Analysis

Foreign News Agencies:

- Credential Harvesting
- Employee Analysis




Social not technological solution

This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

Snowden (5)

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 57 et
seq.) and Annex 2M
(p. 16 et seq.)

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY




SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 57 et
seq.) and Annex 2M
(p. 16 et seq.)

Snowden (6)

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY




SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

Snowden (7)

See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2D (p. 57 et seq.) and Annex 2M (p. 16 et seq.)




Snowden (8)

SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2D (p. 57 et
seq.) and Annex 2M
(p. 16 et seq.)

Annex 371



SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

Alleged Attacks on Civilians

For problems with the evidence of alleged civilian witnesses see RF Submissions of 30 December 2014 at para 291 et seq. and the Confidential Exhibit.

Unreliability of satellite imagery (I)

See RF Submissions 31/01/2017 at Annex 2J p. 26 and p. 62

- AAAS analysis based on Digital Globe data.
- Digital Globe’s main customer is the US government and it provides services to the US military.



Unreliability of satellite imagery (II)

London institute of
space policy and law
workshop paper, quoted
in part at p. 55-58 of
Annex 2JRF
Submissions 31/01/2017

“6. VERIFICATION, VALIDATION AND CERTIFICATION

The technical community in particular regard verification, validation and certification as key to establishing reliability of information. This is particularly relevant in less transparent cases such as radar, where the meaning of the information is not immediately clear.

The need to interpret the data poses other questions. For example, whether there is need for several data sets, or for additional means of verification. **Ease of manipulation and change of data need to be examined. Accuracy and timing may be important, as may be time stamping data. The need for ground truth to compare satellite data is a further aspect of verification and validation that must be considered. It may also be desirable to have a certification process or standard qualifications for experts.**

There continues to be a strong argument for investigation of alternative methods of certification, verification and data standards, outlining merits and drawbacks. Any standards or certification systems need to be at an international level, not least to facilitate use of data from different systems for validation purposes.”

Unreliability of satellite imagery (III)

RF Submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex
12

- On the ground verification is vital
- ‘Hot spot analysis’ leads to large numbers of false positives
- An example from Europe, in Sloka in Latvia, with validation of ground conditions, shows that a single fire produced three false positives elsewhere.
- Moreover, even when the algorithm accurately discerns fire, it cannot pinpoint the fire with a resolution less than the area covered by a single pixel, which is 1km x 1km.

Alleged Mistreatment of POWs

For problems with the POW evidence, see Annex 2 to the RF Submissions of 24 November 2017 and the Confidential Exhibit.

See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at
para 325 et seq.

See RF submissions 31/03/2016 at
para 34 et seq.

RF Submissions 24/11/2017 at
Annex 2

No Reliable Evidence of Involvement of Russian forces in Mistreatment of Civilians (or their property) or POWs.

Professionalism of Russian soldiers (I)

See RF
submissions
30/12/2014 at
Annex 38 (AI
Report), p. 31

Amnesty International

Eye-witnesses to the activities of Russian soldiers and Ossetian forces and militia groups contrasted the disciplined conduct of the Russian infantry with accounts of looting and pillaging by Ossetian fighters and militia groups. Amnesty International was widely informed by Georgians displaced from South Ossetia that Russian soldiers had, on the whole, conducted themselves in a disciplined and orderly fashion with regard to Georgian civilians.

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 34
(ODIHR Report), pp. 26
and 36

Professionalism of Russian soldiers (II)

- A villager in Zemo Nikozi told the ODIHR investigators that Russian forces prevented Ossetians from detaining the 11 elderly people who remained in the village, escorted them to an apartment and provided protection for them until the Russian withdrawal from the village. During the day, Russians accompanied them to their houses to allow them to feed the chickens.
- Another villager in Zemo Nikozi mentioned to the ODIHR investigator that a Russian general gave a telephone number where he could be contacted if the Ossetians should start to harm the villagers or their property.
- Another villager in Zemo Nikozi told the ODIHR investigators that Russian troops brought food to a church. She said it was the Ossetians who were responsible for the looting and burning that took place.

Professionalism of Russian soldiers (III)

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 34
(ODIHR Report), p. 36

- Deputy Director of the Gori military hospital told the ODIHR investigators that the Russians treated hospital staff fairly and that Russians transported injured Georgian civilians to the hospital.
- A woman from Tamarasheni recounted to the ODIHR investigators how Russian soldiers asked if she needed food and brought her three day's supply of bread, butter, and canned meat.
- A woman in Eredvi told the ODIHR investigators that she was harassed by an Ossetian, and that a Russian soldier nearby intervened, hit the Ossetian man with the butt of his gun and made him go away.
- The ODIHR report recounts how in Charebi, Russian soldiers came and removed an unexploded bomb from a villager's garden.

Professionalism of Russian Soldiers (IV)

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 27
(HRW Report “Up in
Flames”), pp. 8, 123 and
125

- Several local residents told Human Rights Watch that many of the Russian servicemen in Georgian territories behaved in a disciplined manner and in some cases even protected the civilian population from Ossetian forces, militia members, or looters.
- Human Rights Watch documented one occasion when Russian forces intervened to help a civilian who was the victim of a crime in progress, and two distinct occasions when Russian forces temporarily set up roadblocks to prevent looting.
- Several people told Human Rights Watch that Russian ground forces in general did not attack local residents and in some cases tried to protect the civilian population from Ossetian forces, militia members, or criminal elements.

General Kulakhmetov (Head of the Peace Keepers)

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 23
(para 80)

“Despite the extremely difficult situation the Russian army did make substantial efforts to prevent criminal activity and apprehend criminals.”

Including:

- (1) Orders being issued to the troops to prevent lawlessness.
- (2) Organising patrols and arresting wrongdoers.
- (3) Setting up checkpoints manned with over 350 men.

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex
23 (para 79)

The Circumstances (1)

This in circumstances where:

- (1) The affected area was not small and included about 150 villages, which meant that criminals were able to evade checkpoints and patrols easily.
- (2) The Russian army had also to prioritise securing supply lines in the safety area and eliminating a large number of munitions dropped and equipment left behind by the Georgian troops.

(Kulakhmetov statement, paragraph 79 of Annex 23 to Russia's December 2014 submission)

The Circumstances (2)

Mr Sanakoyev:

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 13

40. When the fighting subsided, many police officers returned home to tend to their families to see who was alive and the state of their houses. Thus, for a while there was no one to maintain law and order.
41. The Georgian attacks on Tskhinval caused significant destruction of the city's infrastructure. The Interior Ministry building was severely damaged, and many police vehicles were burnt. There was no electricity in town until 20 August. Communications were also disrupted. Although the mobile network continued to function, it was extremely hard to charge mobile devices because of the lack of electricity. Conduit damage also resulted in widespread flooding. Because of these problems the police, and the other government agencies responsible for law enforcement and security, were only able to resume their proper functioning by the end of August.
42. It is quite obvious that the Georgian side did as much as it could do destroy the infrastructure of civil society in South Ossetia.

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex

13

The Circumstances (3)

Mr Sanakoyev on revenge attacks:

50. I wish to make clear that this is a matter of deep regret to my government. I also regret that it was impossible to prevent, for the reasons described above. It is important to understand that the villages and communities involved often lived next to and amongst each other, with virtually no geographic separation between Ossetian households and Georgian ones. As a rule, the neighbouring villages in the central part of Tskhinval region are not widely separated and beside the main roads there are many routes of approach connecting them.

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex
27 (HRW Report “Up
in Flames”), p. 147

The Circumstances (4) HRW on criminal attacks:

“The looters come every day. They took everything valuable that was in my house. Nothing is left. I keep telling them I’m Ossetian and so is my husband, but what do they care?”

“Elizaveta Dzhioeva described to Human Rights Watch that the looters were “completely ruthless” and her own and her husband’s Ossetian ethnicity did not protect them from looting” .

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 27
(HRW Report “Up in
Flames”), p. 193

POWs: Medical treatment (I)

“The Russian forces questioned the three men and then placed them in a basement together with five or six Georgian soldiers who had been detained separately. **The Russian forces did not physically ill-treat the three. They allowed the Georgian soldiers to wash, shave, and rinse their uniforms and gave them food, water and some basic medical treatment**” .

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 38
(AI “Civilians in the
Line of Fire”), p. 46

POWs: Medical treatment (II)

“... a private, “Malkhaz”, alleged that he had been taken captive on 8 August in Tskhinvali and was held together with five other soldiers for nine days by **Ossetian militia before being transferred to Russian custody and exchanged**. ... At one stage, two other captives were also brought in, one of whom he maintained was shot in a next door room and left to lie there for two days before he and his fellow captives were forced to clean the room and bury him. **“Malkhaz” reported being transferred to Russian custody, where he was given medical treatment before being hand (sic) over to the Georgian authorities**”.

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 38
(AI “Civilians in the
Line of Fire”), p. 46

POWs: Medical Treatment (III)

“Amnesty International representatives met with one of the Georgian former POWs recovering in hospital in Tbilisi from injuries sustained in the course of the conflict, who stated that he had been taken captive by Russian forces and well treated during his captivity.”

Q1. No Effective Control

No Effective Control Troop numbers (I)

See RF responses 19/02/2016 and the Russia's letter to the Court
dated 29 September 2017

Troop numbers (II)

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at paras 50 to 56
See RF submissions
19/02/2016 at para 138

- By 8 August Georgia already had around 17,000 personnel, up to 100 tanks, around 70 armoured fighting vehicles, around 30 GRAD-type artillery systems and 280 other items of artillery, up to 9 SU-25 aircraft, up to 12 helicopters and up to 210 air-defence systems
- During the course of the conflict, Georgia brought up substantial additional reserves including the 2nd Infantry Brigade from Senaki.
- Georgia tried to regroup and remained a threat for a considerable time. 2,000 of Georgia's best troops were also repatriated from Iraq on US aircraft. Georgia attempted full mobilisation of its general reserve of 45,000 men.

Troop numbers (III)

<https://sputniknews.com/world/2008081115956220/>

MOSCOW, August 11 (RIA Novosti) - U.S. military aircraft have flown 800 Georgian troops and a number of armored vehicles back home from Iraq amid an armed conflict in breakaway South Ossetia, a senior Russian military official said on Monday.

NBC reported on Monday that U.S. military transport planes had started to bring all the Georgian troops deployed in Iraq back home.


"U.S. aircraft have made eight flights to bring Georgian troops home from Iraq," Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn said.

Allegedly Subordinate Local Administration

See RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 159 et seq., RF submissions 19/02/2016 at para 100 et seq.

New Red Roofs show destruction in Tskhinval

See RF Submissions
31/01/2017 at
Annex 2L (p. 65
and p. 67)



Allegedly Subordinate Local Administration

See the attack on Tskhinval, above and RF submissions RF submissions 30/12/2014 at para 159 et seq., RF submissions 19/02/2016 at para 100 et seq.

Q3. No Administrative Practice re Civilians

No Administrative practice (I)

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at para
291 et seq.

- Russian forces made genuine efforts to prevent attacks on Georgians where they could.
- The problem was inflamed tensions near Tskhinval where the conflict has developed for many years of aggressive policies of Georgian government against the Ossetian population. That and the ruthless attack on Tskhinval led to revenge attacks by Ossetians and criminal attacks and looting
- Russian forces went beyond the Tskhinval region in South Ossetia, in particular to the boundary of the Leningori region with Georgia.
- Burning and looting attacks did not extend to the large Eastern region of Leningori and many other areas of South Ossetia.

No Administrative practice (II)

Mr Sanakoyev:

See RF
submissions
30/12/2014 at
Annex 13

53. The following three important points must also be made:
- (1) The first is that no destruction of Georgian homes, which occurred as a result of any hostile action by the Ossetian people was in any way organised or authorised by the government of South Ossetia. I would know of such a policy if it existed, and it was not the case.
 - (2) The second is that Russian forces were not involved, so far as I am aware. On the contrary, I do know that Russian forces where it was possible arrested troublemakers and looters and handed them over to the South Ossetian authorities. Further, so far as I am aware, any damage to Georgian homes mentioned above occurred after the Russian forces had passed through and after the front line had moved beyond the relevant areas.
 - (3) The third is that a significant proportion of the damage to Georgian homes resulted (a) from the fighting, (b) from the conduct of Georgian forces, which I describe below.

No Administrative practice (III)

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex
13 (paragraphs 54-56)

Leningori:

- *“Russian forces pressed all the way through the Leningor district to protect their flank.”*
- *“There has been no destruction of Georgian property in this district (likewise in many other areas of South Ossetia).”*
- *“This again shows that the situation around Tskhinval was the result of an outburst of anger from those living in the city and in the surrounding villages. The effects were not felt further away, even though the Russian military advance went beyond these territories and no Georgian forces were left there after the conflict was over. There was certainly no anti-Georgian policy or expulsion of Georgians on the territory of South Ossetia.”*

No Administrative practice (IV)

See RF
submissions
30/12/2014 at para
291 et seq.

- There is no reliable identification of Russian forces as involved in or condoning looting and arson (above).
- Where evidence could be tested at the Evidential Hearing, Georgia’s witnesses collapsed. [See Confidential Exhibit]

The Situation Now (I)

RF submissions
30/12/2014 at para 115 et
seq. and para 341 et seq.
RF Responses 19/02/2016
at para 103 et seq.

- Borders remain
- Georgia has not relinquished force
- Georgia refuses to engage on the situation of Ossetian people displaced in the 1990s
- A political solution is needed
- Meanwhile, some alleviation of border issues has been achieved.

The Situation Now (II)

RF submissions
30/12/2014 at para 117
RF submissions
30/12/2014 at para 341 et
seq.
RF submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex 14

- The Governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have established some simplified procedures for regions densely populated by Georgians. Abkhazia has introduced a convenient visa regime for most Georgians.
- Border crossings are frequent (including by students).

The Situation Now (III). South Ossetia

RF submissions
30/12/2014 at Annex 13-1
(p. 40)

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA

DECREE

No. 21 of February 26, 2014

On certain measures for arranging the crossing of the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia with Georgia under a simplified procedure

In order to exercise an effective control, maintain records of crossing of the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia under a simplified procedure by citizens and ensure the state security of the Republic of South Ossetia, the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia rules:

1. To amend and restate the Statute on crossing of the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia with Georgia under the simplified procedure, approved by the Decree of the Government of the Republic of South Ossetia No 26 of February 15, 2011 "On arranging the crossing of the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia with Georgia under the simplified procedure", in accordance with Annex 1.
2. To render statements allowing crossing of the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia with Georgia under the simplified procedure ineffective since 1 May 2014.
3. To approve the form of the permit entitling to cross the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia with Georgia under the simplified procedure in accordance with Annex 2.

The Situation Now (IV). South Ossetia

RF submissions
31/03/2016 at Annex 8-1

Annex 8-1 (Translation)

[Information in Ossetian language]

**COMMITTEE FOR STATE
SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH OSSETIA**

March 9, 2016
No 481

The city of Tskhinval, 1 Khetagurova
street

Tel.: 8 (9974) 45-43-43

In response to Letter No. 18 dated 1
March 2016

To the Representative
of the President of the RSO
M.K.Dzhiyoyev

Dear Murat Kuzmich,

We hereby inform you of statistics on crossing of the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia by individuals and vehicles through the checkpoints of a simplified crossing:

- In 2014, Sinagur-Karmzan checkpoint of a simplified crossing was passed by 16,105 persons; Razdakhan checkpoint of a simplified crossing – by 134,012 persons; Khelchua checkpoint of a simplified crossing – by 2,358 persons;
- In 2015, Sinagur-Karmzan checkpoint of a simplified crossing was passed by 31,820 persons; Razdakhan checkpoint of a simplified crossing – by 135,691 persons; Khelchua checkpoint of a simplified crossing – by 1,535 persons;
- In 2016, Sinagur-Karmzan checkpoint of a simplified crossing was passed by 4,222 persons, 641 vehicles; Razdakhan checkpoint of a simplified crossing – by 24,085 persons, 7,125 vehicles; Khelchua checkpoint of a simplified crossing – by 250 persons;

The number of persons detained for violation of the state border of the Republic of South Ossetia was estimated at 216 in 2010, 286 in 2011, 233 in 2012, 443 in 2014, 580 in 2015, 64 in 2016.

The Situation Now (V). Abkhazia

RF submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex 14
(pp. 2-3)

Quotation from the Statement of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Abkhazia No. 2221 dated 8 December 2017:

“Under the Ordinance of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Abkhazia of 10 July 2012 No. 87 ‘On establishing the checkpoints on the state border between the Republic of Abkhazia and Georgia’, the checkpoints on the state border between the Republic of Abkhazia and Georgia have been established’ ...

“To ensure the right of movement across the state border between the Republic of Abkhazia and Georgia, the Ordinance of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Abkhazia of 25 September 2012 No. 125 ‘On approval of the ‘Provisional List of Documents Authorizing Entry in and Exit from the Republic of Abkhazia Across the State Border Between the Republic of Abkhazia and Georgia’ established the list of valid documents allowing the right to cross the State border between the Republic of Abkhazia and Georgia...”.

The above documents include passport of a citizen of USSR with registration in the Gal district prior to 14 August 1992, an equivalent identity document (Form No. 9) issued by the authorities of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Abkhazia, and **(for foreign citizens) passport or birth certificate together with residence permit, visa or special permit.** To ensure the rights of the foreign nationals born in the Gal district and residing in the Gal district, the Law of Republic of Abkhazia of 30 December 2016 No. 4319-c-V amplified the grounds for the issue of residence permits of the Republic of Abkhazia. In accordance with the above Law, residence permits are also issued to foreign nationals born in the Gal district of the Abkhaz ASSR who have permanently resided in the Republic of Abkhazia for at least 10 years since 12 October 1999 and their family members (spouse, minor children).

The Situation Now (VI). Abkhazia

RF submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex 14
(pp. 4)

Quotation from the Statement of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Abkhazia No. 2221
dated 8 December 2017:

“In 2016, 1,085,426 cases of lawful crossing of the state border between the Republic of Abkhazia and Georgia were registered. From January 2017 to 31 May 2017, 534,326 crossings were recorded. In 2016, 129 individuals were prevented from crossing the state border between Abkhazia and Georgia. This number is significantly lower than the number of lawful crossings.”

Q4. No Exhaustion of Local Remedies

Local Remedies (I).

Absence of claims in 2008

See
RF submissions
26/10/2011
RF submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex 9

Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)

“No complaints about crimes committed by Russian servicemen were submitted to the investigators of the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation in the period from 11 to 25 August 2008 while the investigators were in South Ossetia.

According to the information from the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation, the competent bodies of Georgia (which is a party to the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters of 22 January 1993) did not apply to the Russian military prosecutor’s offices with requests to investigate any illegal actions of Russian servicemen in August 2008”.

Local Remedies (II). Claims of 2009 and 2010 and initial responses given

See
RF submissions
26/10/2011
RF submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex 9

Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)

“Only in 2009 and 2010, after the hostilities had ended, did the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation receive 88 applications from various human rights organizations representing the interests of 557 Georgian citizens in relation to alleged crimes committed by Russian servicemen against civilians during the fulfillment by the servicemen of tasks relating to enforcement of the safety and protection of Russian citizens residing in the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. Since those complaints lacked information sufficient to establish the competence of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation to conduct a preliminary investigation into the facts specified in the complaints, the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation initially forwarded appropriate responses to the applicants indicating the lack of competence of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation to conduct a preliminary investigation”.

Local Remedies (III). Refusal of the Georgian authorities to cooperate

See
RF submissions
26/10/2011
RF submissions
24/11/2017 at Annex 9

Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)

“However, having received numerous complaints, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation made a decision to turn to the competent authorities of Georgia with requests for legal assistance in respect of the circumstances of the filed complaints with the object of verifying the arguments set forth in these complaints. However, as appears from the response received from the Prosecutor General's Office of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia No. 04/10/2010/53, the Georgian competent authorities refused to provide legal assistance to the Russian side in the criminal case on far-fetched grounds”.

See
 RF submissions
 26/10/2011
 RF submissions
 24/11/2017 at Annex 9

Local Remedies (IV). Invitations sent to the applicants

Quotation from the Information Memo of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the course and results of investigation of criminal case No. 201/374108-08 (emphasis added)

“Since further cooperation within the framework of legal assistance was impossible, in order to verify the arguments set forth in the complaints of Georgian citizens the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation forwarded letters to the applicants inviting them to come to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation as witnesses for their interrogation and for their recognition as victims and civil plaintiffs in the criminal case, if there were such legal grounds. Despite such guarantees as compensation for the full costs associated with their appearance, accommodation and loss of wages for the period of time spent in connection with their appearance before an investigator, as well as the necessary assurances regarding the use of any information and materials obtained during the interrogation solely for the establishment of the truth in the criminal case, none of the applicants has so far arrived at the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation to give testimony”.

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at

Annexes 126.1, 127.1

Local Remedies (V): RF Investigative Committee seeks help from Georgia.

■ Letters of 23/7/10 and 1/10/10

- what kind of damage was sustained by the applicant as a result of theft or destruction of the property specified in the complaint (pecuniary loss, psychological damage, physical injury)?;
- who, when and in what circumstances stole or destroyed the applicant's property? Who witnessed that?

See RF submissions
30/12/2014 at
Annexes 128.1

Local Remedies (VI) Georgian Prosecutor Refuses to Cooperate

4/10/10

Taking into account that the mentioned investigation undertaken by the Investigation Committee of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation is a reason of great concern, given its lack of objectivity and comprehensiveness of the examined facts, and there is a real threat that such investigation may result in serious international crimes being left unpunished and the persons within the focus of the investigation made subject to the breach of the basic human rights and freedoms.

Moreover, under Georgia's reservation clause to the 1959 European Convention On mutual assistance in criminal matters Georgia reserves its right to deny legal assistance in relation to the crime in connection with which such help is sought, if criminal proceedings in that matter were commenced by the relevant Georgian authorities.

Based on the above, the Chief Prosecutor's Office of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia in accordance with the above reservation made by Georgia to the 1959 European Convention On mutual assistance in criminal matters believes it is unreasonable to assist the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation in its pending proceedings in case No.201/374108-08.

Your sincerely,

(Signature)

Annex 372

Expert Report on the Applicability of the Triangulation Method of Oleg Rudenko, Boris
Goncharenko and Andrei Shurup, 18 May 2021

(translation)

IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS**APPLICATION NUMBER 8019/16****UKRAINE****Applicant****-and-****RUSSIA****Respondent**

**EXPERT REPORT ON
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TRIANGULATION METHOD
OF OLEG VLADIMIROVICH RUDENKO, BORIS IVANOVICH
GONCHARENKO, ANDREI SERGEEVICH SHURUP**

Introduction

1. This expert report was prepared by Oleg Vladimirovich Rudenko, Boris Ivanovich Goncharenko and Andrei Sergeevich Shurup.
2. Oleg Vladimirovich Rudenko is the head of the Acoustics Department at the Lomonosov Moscow State University (since 1987), Full member (Academician) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, the Head of the Expert council in physics of Russian Foundation for Basic Research (1997-2003), the Head of the Expert council in physics of Supreme Qualification Committee of Russia (2003-2015). During his professional career, he has been engaged in the studies of, *inter alia*, nonlinear wave physics, high-intensity underwater acoustics, sonic booms from supersonic aircrafts, laser acoustics, ultrasonic medical devices, seismic and volcanic natural disasters. State prize of USSR (1985) and Russian Federation (1997) awardee. He has 52 years of experience in acoustics.
3. Boris Ivanovich Goncharenko is a PhD and a senior research associate of the Acoustics Department at the Lomonosov Moscow State University. He is one of the creators of vector-phase acoustics and has developed devices for localization of the sources of sound. He has 39 years of experience in acoustics.
4. Shurup Andrei Sergeevich is a PhD and an associate professor of the Acoustics Department at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, laureate of the Academy of Sciences award for young scientists, expert in solving inverse problems of acoustics and signal processing. He has 13 years of experience in acoustics.

5. In April 2021, "Ivanyan & Partners" Saint Petersburg Law Office, asked us to provide our expert opinion on the triangulation method used by the Dutch Safety Board (hereinafter referred to as "DSB") in the Final Report "Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014" (hereinafter referred to as "Final Report").
6. The following opinion is provided in response to the request by Ivanyan & Partners and for presentation to the European Court of human rights:

Methodology and conclusions of DSB

7. DSB made the following conclusion in the Final Report:

"Signal triangulation was used to determine the origin of the second sound peak recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. <...>.

The time difference between the first and the second sound peak was determined to be 2.3 milliseconds. The second peak had a duration of 2.3 milliseconds and was recorded by all four channels. However, the recordings of the second peak were not simultaneous on all channels; some of the recordings had a different timestamp. The wave spectrum is representative for a sound wave. The time difference between the channels showed that the sound was recorded by the cockpit area microphone (CAM) and pilot 1 (P1) microphones first, followed by the pilot 2 (P2) microphone and, lastly, the observer (OBS) microphone. This difference in time showed: that the sound wave originated outside the aeroplane starting from a position above the left hand side of the cockpit, propagating from front to aft. <...>

Therefore it is likely that the origin of the sound peak recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder is a high frequency sound wave from outside the cockpit. "

8. It follows from the Final Report that the DSB examined the order in which a sound peak was recorded by various microphones inside the cockpit. Based on this data, the DSB established approximate area where the missile detonated – left-hand side of the cockpit – as well as the direction of the sound wave propagation – from the front to the aft.
9. We strongly disagree with the methodology applied by the DSB. First, the DSB failed to distinguish between a shockwave and a sound wave. Second, the DSB did not take into account the fact that both the shockwave and shrapnel of the explosive device have supersonic speeds, and signals they create when destroying the fuselage are different in magnitude, different in directions of propagation, different in speed of propagation. Therefore, the microphones must have recorded the signals of the fuselage tearing apart and breaking down, which come from big area of fuselage with random amplitudes and not

exactly determinable propagation speeds. In these ambiguous circumstances, it is meaningless to use the triangulation method.

10. In any event, it is unclear how the DSB experts could attempt triangulation method for reliable conclusions without sufficient understanding of the speed parameters of the signal and conditions of its propagation. Even if the shockwave could have been used for triangulation – which is not the case here, since the DSB experts consider the sound waves – it would have been necessary to understand its dynamics affected not only by the energy of the explosion, but also by the obstacles in the way of its propagation.

Description of the conditions when triangulation method can be applied

11. The triangulation method allows to locate the signal source by analysing the sequence in which signals are recorded by a number of receiving devices. The triangulation method can be used under certain conditions. In particular, there must be one clearly prevailing source of signal, and the signals picked up by the receiving devices must propagate directly from the source without refraction, or this refraction must be known. Moreover, the source of the signal should be small, i.e. signals propagating from different parts of the source must be received at the same time by the same microphone; the distance between the microphones should be significant and the speed parameters of the signal propagation should be known to estimate reliably the direction of the signal propagation. As will be demonstrated below, the DSB did not take into account these factors when attempting their triangulation to the explosion site.

Description of physical characteristics of a shockwave and sound

12. An explosion forms a high-pressure area. This high-pressure area starts to expand and form a shockwave. The air pressure ahead of the shockwave's front is equal to the atmospheric pressure. When the front comes to a point in space, the air pressure increases sharply and reaches its maximum. As the front of the shockwave moves away, the air pressure decreases and stabilizes. The following graph describes the phenomenon.




Fig. 1. Change in the shape of the shockwave at short distances from the explosion (several meters). There is a very steep leading front. The pressure jump reaches several atmospheres and has a strong destructive effect on the obstacle (in this case – the aircraft)

13. A sharp change in pressure that a shockwave carries forward may damage or destroy obstacles. In this case it must have produced a strong mechanical effect on the aircraft.
14. A shockwave is not an acoustic wave. There are a number of differences between them:
 - a) The speed of sound is 330 m/s. At an altitude of 10 km, the speed of sound is 299.6 m/s. The speed of a shockwave resulting from an explosion depends on the energy of the latter. However, this speed always significantly exceeds the speed of sound and equals 1-2 km/s.
 - b) At a certain distance from the explosion the shockwave transforms into sound. When an explosion is powerful, nonlinear sound is formed at a distance of no less than tens of meters from the explosion's epicenter. Therefore, at a smaller distance (even in a hypothetical environment with no obstacles) it would only be possible to triangulate the explosion on the basis of its shockwave (but not on the basis of a sound wave).
 - c) Microphones can record impact of the shockwave, including shaking and vibration, but this is not to be seen as a sound recording. For instance, the wind impacts microphones in the same way. Microphones do not record the sound of the wind but rather the wind's mechanical impact on the microphones' sensors.
15. The DSB has made a conclusion that the microphones picked up "the sound peaks" the wave spectrum of which was "representative for a sound wave". However, one cannot use such terms as, for instance, "sound propagation", "sound wave" or "sound peaks", and such phrases as "the wave spectrum is representative for a sound wave" when describing the effects caused by a shockwave. Using this terminology, the DSB suggested that the

microphones registered not a shockwave but a sound wave (or a collection of the same). We will explain below the most probable origin of the sound waves that the microphones could have picked up along with various kinds of mechanical impact.

Impact of the shockwave on the body of the aircraft and on the microphones in the cockpit.

16. As explained above, a shockwave must have formed due to the explosion near the aircraft. The front of the shockwave, carrying a sharply increased air pressure would impact the aircraft's body. Shrapnel from the explosive device also impacts the aircraft by deforming and potentially tearing apart the fuselage and affecting the interior of the cockpit. When a 9M38M1 missile explodes (and we understand that to be the basis of the DSB analysis), the speed of shrapnel can vary from 1,430 to 2,480 m/s (according to the information published by Almaz-Antey Corporation).¹ Pieces of shrapnel projected in the direction of the aircraft hit random locations inside and/or outside the aircraft, at various moments in time around the same time as the shockwave.
17. The impact from the shockwave and the shrapnel impact would inevitably produce various signals (including sounds). The signals that the microphones could pick up may have come from the breaks in the aircraft's body, from the shrapnel hitting the aircraft's fuselage. Moreover, vibration would propagate through the fuselage after the encounter with the shockwave, and that on its own could create mechanical impact registered by the microphones. It may be that the shockwave could retain some energy to reach the microphones directly, but that would happen at the same time as the other effects described above.
18. Given that the shockwave and the shrapnel move at a supersonic speed and hit a wide variety of objects, a broad variety of signal sources would develop around the microphones so that such signals would not be traceable to the point of explosion. It is even possible that a microphone could first record a sound generated further from the point of explosion (for instance, of a piece of shrapnel hitting in close proximity from the microphone) and only then an impact generated closer to the point of explosion. Thus, it is impossible to reliably model or analyse all impact on the microphones created by the explosion. We should note, that although we can clearly see isolated peaks in signals measured by microphones OBS and CAM and presented in figures of the Final Report of DSB, the nature and source of these peaks cannot be established reliably from our point of view.

¹ <https://tass.ru/boeing-presentation/tip-rakety/2023205>

19. In other words, the signals come from a large number of randomly located sources. Signals coming from various sources concurrently overlap and modify each other, which creates a complex mixed impact that cannot be analysed and traced back to the original sources. The following graph describes this phenomenon:




Fig. 2. Even if the shockwave propagated inside the cabin, the detection of its source by the triangulation method (according to different signal delays on different receivers) would still be impossible, since there are many overlapping signals and it would not be clear where each of them is coming from

20. Since it is impossible to identify from which source the microphones recorded the signal, the Cockpit Voice Recorder’s data does not provide any useful information.
21. We would like to draw attention again to the fact that it is impossible to detect the *sound* of a missile explosion at a distance of 5 to 10 meters from the microphones. A sound wave does not form at such a small distance. This reason alone suffices to conclude that the microphones could not have recorded the sound of the explosion proper. Rather, they could pick up mechanical impact of the shockwave, but it is impossible to identify it properly in the complex mixture of signals created by the explosion and the resulting destruction.

Other factors that can complicate the application of the triangulation method

22. When an explosion occurs, microphones may also perceive changes in the electromagnetic field, in the temperature, and other processes accompanying the explosion. These processes only complicate the application of the triangulation method. However, it is not necessary to assess the whole range of these additional factors to conclude that the triangulation of the explosion site in these circumstances is unreliable.

Summary of the factors that prevent triangulation

23. As indicated in paragraph 7 of this expert report, there is a list of factors that one must consider using the triangulation method to establish the source of the signal. The DSB did not seem to consider the following factors:
- a) There must be one strongly prevailing signal source. The existence of multiple signal sources that impact the microphones at around the same time renders the triangulation impossible. In this case, the microphones must have received signals from multiple sources created by the shockwave, the shrapnel and vibration and destruction of the body of the aircraft. We cannot assume that the shockwave was strongly prevailing over the other potential sources of signal. The location of the explosion site cannot be deduced reliably from a mixture of recorded sounds.
 - b) It must be apparent with sufficient clarity that the microphones have picked up the same signal (the same wave). Differences in the characteristics of the recorded signal could indicate that different microphones detected different signals. It is impossible to conclude from the graphs of the Cockpit Voice Recorder presented by the DSB that all the four microphones detected the same signal (which indeed would be extremely unlikely in the described circumstances from the physical point of view).
24. Moreover, the DSB did not consider factors that significantly complicate the triangulation task and diminish its accuracy:
- a) Even in a hypothetical situation where the microphones would have only picked up the signals emanating from the explosion, ignoring the sounds caused by the shockwave and the shrapnel, it would be important for an accurate triangulation that the source of the signal is small (ideally a point source) relative to the distance between the source and the receiving devices. The microphones should be at a significant distance from each other and from the signal source. If the microphones are too close to each other and to the signal source, this substantially reduces the accuracy of triangulation. In the present case, the distance between the microphones is 1-2 meters and between the microphones and the point of detonation is no more than 10 meters, which extremely complicates the triangulation of the signal given the magnitude of the explosion.
 - b) To determine the location of the signal source reliably by using triangulation, it is necessary to know the speed of the signal propagation in the air. If the DSB had attempted to triangulate the shockwave, it would have had to calculate the propagation

speed of the shockwave both outside the aircraft's body and inside the cockpit after the shockwave went through the aircraft's body. We should note that it is possible to apply triangulation reliably if there is one prevailing point-like source located in the homogeneous medium (speed of signal propagation is constant, there are no obstacles), which is not the case here. If the medium is inhomogeneous it is necessary to know the speed of the signal propagation to apply triangulation reliably. If the space distribution of the propagation speed is unknown and there are obstacles – the accuracy of triangulation task is compromised.

25. For all these reasons triangulation of the explosion site under the circumstances suggested by the DSB could not be implemented reliably.

Expert's declaration

We confirm that all the matters we have expressed our opinion on fall within our competence and professional knowledge.

We understand that our duty is to assist the Court in resolving the matters addressed in this Expert Report. We have performed our duty and will continue to do so in the future.


We confirm that information we have provided and conclusions we have made in this Expert Report are unbiased, objective and impartial, and that they were influenced neither by the court proceedings nor by either litigant.

The examination was conducted by:

Oleg Vladimirovich Rudenko

Boris Ivanovich Goncharenko

Andrei Sergeevich Shurup



18 May 2021

Annex 373

Dutch National Police, Official Report Concerning the Transport Route, on the Basis of Open Sources, 16 May 2018

ANNEXE 1 TO APPENDIX 4

OFFICIAL REPORT CONCERNING THE
TRANSPORT ROUTE, ON THE BASIS
OF OPEN SOURCES

Central Unit, National Crime Squad (DLR)

OFFICIAL REPORT CONCERNING THE TRANSPORT ROUTE, ON THE BASIS OF OPEN SOURCES

My name is Gerardus Wilhelmus Christiaan THIRY, chief inspector with the National Crime Squad of the Dutch National Police. I have been working as coordinating team leader of the criminal investigation since the start of the investigation into the downing of MH17.

I have over 42 years' experience with combating organised and international crime, gathering criminal intelligence, infiltration, and murder investigations. In addition I have been stationed abroad on several occasions as a liaison officer.

The investigation team I lead consists of investigators and experts with specific skills or knowledge, such as aviation experts, high-tech crime specialists and analysts. In addition, as and when necessary, use was made of experts sworn in by the examining magistrate. On the basis of the findings of the investigation and my knowledge of the facts, I declare as follows:

Introduction

Detectives in my team have examined online images and posts that relate to the events of 17 July 2014 in eastern Ukraine. Based on this material they established the route in eastern Ukraine travelled on that date by a convoy that included a Buk TELAR. Most of the posts are in Russian or Ukrainian and have been translated into English and Dutch by interpreters and/or Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking staff who work for my team.

1. Donetsk

On 17 July 2014 posts on social media mentioned an anti-aircraft system which was stationary between around 09:15 and 09:45 near the intersection of Illicha Avenue and Shakhtobudivnykiv Boulevard in Donetsk. There was also a post saying that a semi-trailer carrying something under a tarpaulin with caterpillar tracks and one gun was seen further away. The anti-aircraft system was referred to by different names in the various social media posts: Smerch, Strela ADMS, Buk and BukM1-M2.

1.1 Post: 'Donetsk is Ukraine'

One of the first social media posts to mention a Buk TELAR in Donetsk appeared on the social media platform Vkontakte 'Donetsk is Ukraine' on 17 July 2014 at 9:40 local Ukrainian time.¹

Donetsk is Ukraine! Bad news.

At around 9 o'clock a trailer was seen driving from Makeevka [Makiivka] towards Donetsk on the Makeevskoye schosse [national highway] with a platform [semi-trailer] carrying a ZRK BUKM1-M2? The ZRK [missile launching complex] in question was driven to the intersection with Shakhtostroiteley Boulevard. It was accompanied by the convoy including 1 grey RAV4 'parketnik' [off-road vehicle], a camouflaged UAZ car and a blue Hyundai minibus with tinted (windows). At 09:15 the installation was at the intersection of Shakhtostroiteley [Shakhtobudivnykiv] and Illicha. The rebels got out of the cars and occupied the two leftmost lanes. Apparently to await logistics instructions.

1.2 Tweets by NECRO MANCER @666_mancer

An individual using the name NECRO MANCER @666_mancer tweeted several times on 17 July 2014 about an anti-aircraft system that was seen on 17 July 2014 around 9:40 in Donetsk. This person

¹ "Vk.com/wall-67445695_68330"

was probably basing their tweets on information from others. At 10:11 local Ukrainian time @666_mancer tweeted the following:²

*#Donetsk 30 minutes ago on prospekt Ilicha near the dairy factory something like a ZRK Strela was being transported on a platform under a tarpaulin, accompanied by 10 passenger cars #Stopterror.*³

Investigation by a member of my team confirmed that there is a bus stop called 'Dairy factory' at 103 Illicha Avenue in Donetsk. This is just before the avenue intersects with Shakhtobudi[v]nykiv Boulevard.

Two minutes later, at 10:13 local Ukrainian time, @666_mancer tweeted the following:⁴

#Donetsk 25-30 minutes ago somewhere around the Gruzia [Georgia] rayon [district] something was seen that looked like a Smerch. It was not moving. But it is probably being transported somewhere. #Stopterror.

Then at 10.31 local Ukrainian time @666_mancer tweeted this:⁵

#Donetsk < Isn't a Smerch. 1. Caterpillar tracks. 2. There are no long launch tubes. Visually, it looks a lot like a Buk. But there were no missiles on it. #Stopterror

1.3 Tweet by @KsistovKosinski

On 17 July 2014 at 10:34 local Ukrainian time, the user @KsistovKosinski tweeted the following:⁶

@ostro_v In Donetsk, at the intersection of Ilyich Avenue at 9:15, there was a "Buk" on a tractor, surrounded by militiamen.

1.4 Tweet by @Buzzing_Rook

On 17 July 2014 at 12:32 local Ukrainian time, a person with the user name @Buzzing_Rook tweeted the following:⁷

@Anti_DNR @Citizen_UKR @WowihaY this morning someone wrote that it was on b.Shakhtostroiteley [Shakhtobudivnykiv] at the intersection with Ilyicha [Illicha] facing the direction of Makeevka [Makiivka]. By the look of it, they were waiting there...

1.5 Tweet by @lucasfb

On 17 July 2014 at 17:14 local Ukrainian time @lucasfb tweeted the following:⁹

ZELLO: In Donetsk in the vicinity of Ilyicha – "I saw a big long thing". The Buk is probably already in Donetsk. Or is this a dis[information]... #ATO max RT

1.6 Tweet by NECRO MANCER @666_mancer

² "twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489668680398438400"

³ Interpreter's note:

- I understand the word 'platform' to mean a semitrailer.
- ZRK is a missile launch complex known as a 'Strela'.

⁴ "twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489669167352922112"

⁵ "twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489673636849401856"

⁶ "twitter.com/KosistovKosinski/status/489674597441105922"

⁷ "twitter.com/Buzzing_Rook/status/489704260045910016"

⁹ "twitter.com/lucasfb/status/489775236267905024"

On 17 July 2014 at 10:44 local Ukrainian time @666_mancer tweeted again:¹⁰

#Donetsk eyewitnesses: the nose [front] of the vehicle looks like it, but further on there was a semi-trailer carrying something under a tarpaulin on caterpillar tracks with 1 gun. #Stopterror.

2. Makeevka

The publication discussed below posits, on the basis of a video, that the Buk TELAR on a low-loader was localised on a satellite image in Makeevka.

2.1 Stratfor Global Intelligence

On 13 May 2016 a member of my investigation team saw a publication on the website <https://stratfor.com>.¹¹ Stratfor Global Intelligence, a US organisation, makes use of analysts who previously worked for, *inter alia*, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US State Department.

This publication from 13 May 2016 said that a video had been posted online, showing a Buk system which had reportedly been spotted in the vicinity of Donetsk in Ukraine. The footage was said to have been taken on 17 July 2014, a few hours before MH17 was shot down by a military missile installation on the ground. Stratfor and its partner AllSource Analysis were prompted by the release of this video to examine satellite images to pinpoint the location of the Buk TELAR that was being transported on a low-loader in the town of Makeevka. According to the publication the footage was used to identify the exact time and place where the Buk in question was located five hours before MH17 would be shot down. According to the publication Stratfor worked with AllSource Analysis, presumably using satellite images from the company DigitalGlobe. According to Stratfor the above-mentioned Buk TELAR can be seen in the satellite photo reproduced below.

Image Stratfor publication



¹⁰ "twitter.com/666_mancer/status/489677010261008384"

¹¹ 'Examining the Evidence of Russia's Involvement in a Malaysia Airlines Crash'.

3. Shakhtarsk

It can be inferred from the tweet below that a Buk drove through Shak[h]tarsk on 17 July 2014.

3.1 Tweet by @spice4russia

On 17 July 2014 at 12:51 local Ukrainian time, the user @spice4russia tweeted the following:¹²

Shakhtersk [Shakhtarsk], KAMAZ of terrorists, 3 tanks. Before that, a Buk, probably, drove by covered by a tarpaulin #ATO

4. Torez

It can be inferred from the social media posts below that a missile installation, possibly a Buk, was observed in Torez around noon on 17 July 2014.

4.1 Tweets by @WowihaY

On 17 July 2014 at 12:07 local Ukrainian time @WowihaY tweeted the following:¹³

A PVO installation drove past us, going towards the town centre. 4 missiles, they say it's a Buk. #stopterror #torez [Torez] heading for #snezhnoe [Snizhne]

On 17 July 2014 at 12:16 local Ukrainian time @Wowiya tweeted:¹⁴

A Buk is heading via #torez [Torez] to #snezhnoe [Snizhne]. #stopterror.

4.2 Tweets by @MOR2537

On 17 July 2014 at 12:26 local Ukrainian time the user @MOR2537 tweeted the following:¹⁵

A missile installation was transported on a lorry, + two escort [protection] vehicles, via Torez to Snezhnoe [Snizhne] at 12:10.

On 17 July 2014 at 12:53 local Ukrainian time @MOR2537 posted a photo of a Buk TELAR M1 from a Russian-language Wikipedia page with the following text:¹⁶

It looks like a Buk, the upper part was covered.

4.3 Tweet by @dacoromania

On 17 July 2014 at 13:08 local Ukrainian time, a person with the user name @dacoromania tweeted:¹⁷

Given that Russian missiles are already being transported on lorries in Torez, it seems like something has gone wrong....

4.4 Tweet by @EuroMaydan

On 17 July 2014 at 13:15 local Ukrainian time the user @EuroMaydan tweeted the following:¹⁸

In Torez, a "Buk" missile installation is heading in the direction of Snezhnoe [Snizhne]. This information comes from local residents.

¹² "twitter.com/spice4russia/status/489706440899432449"

¹³ "twitter.com/WowihaY/status/489698009148837888"

¹⁴ "twitter.com/WowihaY/status/489700047215685632"

¹⁵ "twitter.com/MOR2537/status/489702736766586880"

¹⁶ "twitter.com/MOR2537/status/489709431467171841"

¹⁷ "twitter.com/dacoromania/status/489713300599746561"

¹⁸ "twitter.com/EuroMaidan/status/489715009325658112"

4.5 Tweet by @bazashem

On 17 July 2014 at 15:30 local Ukrainian time the user @bazashem tweeted:¹⁹

In Torez a «Buk» missile installation is being transported in the direction of Snezhnoe [Snizhne]. It is being escorted by cars carrying local terrorists #stopterror

4.6 Post on VK by Toma Gurbanova

On 17 July 2014 at 17:21 local Ukrainian time a person with the user name Toma Gurbanova posted the following message on the social media platform Vkontakte, in response to a report that an aircraft had just been downed in the vicinity of Torez:²⁰

An hour ago I was called and told that a missile was being transported in the direction of Torez, later on there was an explosion, but again these are rumours.

4.7 Torez photo

On 17 July 2014 at 20:55 local Ukrainian time, the following photo was posted on the social media platform Vkontakte 'overheard in Snizhne' under the user name Nikolay Yakovlev, with the following text:²¹

Aleksey, here's the Buk.

Photo 1 posted on Vkontakte



Around two hours later, at 22:56 local Ukrainian time, another photo of the Buk TELAR on the red low-loader was posted on the same Vkontakte page, but taken from a greater distance and in better quality.²²

¹⁹ "twitter.com/WowihaY/status/489749063588257792"

²⁰ "https://archive.is/uF4fj"

²¹ Post: https://vk.com/wall-5698635_18352?reply=18525


Original: <http://cs620219.vk.me/v620219040/f284/eVIMVZ1ZhHU.jpg>

²² Post: https://vk.com/wall-5698635_18352?reply=18524

Photo page: https://vk.com/wall-5698635_18352?reply=18524&z=photo-5698635_333285379%2Fwall-5698635_18524

Original: <https://pp.vk.me/c616730/v616730703/1a0b0DenEwU0sIM0.jpg>

Photo 2 posted on Vkontakte



4.8 Facebook page of Anton GERASHENKO

The above photo was also posted on the Facebook page of Anton GERASHENKO on 17 July 2014 at 19:59 (Facebook timestamp).²³ Earlier, at 18:20 (Facebook timestamp), the following message was posted:

The anti-aircraft system BUK as just shot down the civilian plane on route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur and the system has been provided by Putin. This morning a local patriot had spotted the transportation of this system from Torez towards Snizhne. The plane was flying at an altitude of 10.000 meters. 280 passengers and 15 members of the crew were killed. There is no limit to cynicism of Putin and his terrorists. Europe, USA, Canada and all the civilized world please open your eyes. Help us with anything you can. This is the war of evil and good. And here is the video from the crash site. Some bastards were yelling: "How beautiful, it is burning just beautiful". They're not people.

5. Snizhne

The following messages and articles were posted on social media. They show that a Buk TELAR was observed in Snizhne in the afternoon of 17 July 2014.

6.1 Tweet by @HallaHupS

On 17 July 2014 at 12:53 local Ukrainian time the user @HallaHupS tweeted the following:²⁴

And in the meantime a ZWK "Buk" has appeared in Snezhnoe [Snizhne].

²³ facebook.com/anton.geraschenko.7.

²⁴ "twitter.com/HallaHupS/status/489709368427167744"

6.2 Post to OK by Olga Panchenko

On 17 July 2014 at an unknown time Olga Panchenko (Rudenko) replied to a post on the social media site OK that an aircraft had been shot down.

I live next to the highway, today a very crazy installation was transported in the direction of Snezhnoye [Snizhne], self-aiming...that's what it was shot from.

6.3. Snizhne photo

On 17 July 2014 at around 14:27 (Twitter timestamp) the photo below was posted on Twitter by @GirkinGirkin with the following text:²⁵

#Snezhnoye [Snizhne] About Russian artillerists and about the 'Buk' in Snezhnoye [Snizhne]; 'this is the house on 50 Years October (street) in it is a "pirka"²⁶ [possibly: 'pyrotechnics'], not far away are charcoal and the Furshet [supermarket chain].

Photo of Buk TELAR in Snizhne



The author of the website <http://www.koreandefense.com/how-to-find-the-missing-buk-system> has examined the above photo and the tweet by @GirkinGirkin and concluded that the photo shows the Buk at 13 Karapetyan Street in Snizhne.

²⁵ twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/489884062577094656

²⁶ Note by reporting officer: the interpreter said that there is actually no such word as *pirka*. It is an expression which relates to pyrotechnics. Possibly it is a reference to fireworks.

6.4 Associated Press article

On 25 July 2014 an article was published by Peter Leonard and Yuras Karmanau entitled 'What happened? The Day Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 Was Downed'.²⁷ According to the article, on Thursday 17 July 2014, before flight MH17 was shot down, an AP journalist saw seven tanks parked at a petrol station outside Snizhne. The journalist then also saw a Buk driving through Snizhne. The article goes on to say that AP journalists saw a Buk with four missiles driving in a convoy in Snizhne, accompanied by two civilian vehicles around 13:05. The convoy stopped, and the journalists were approached by a man in a sand-coloured uniform, different from the green-coloured uniform the rebels wore. The man, who spoke with a Russian accent, checked that the journalists had not taken any photos or videos. Then the convoy continued on its way. The journalists also talked to a number of local residents who said the Buk had driven into Snizhne around lunchtime. A local resident pointed to the marks on the asphalt where he had seen a Buk on 'Karapetyan Street' in Snizhne. This person said that the installation was later moved, but he did not know where to.

It is clear from the following tweets that two AP journalists and a driver observed a Buk in Snizhne and also talked to the crew. On 2 June 2015, nearly a year after the crash of flight MH17, AP journalist Peter Leonard tweeted:²⁸

*Some of my inept note-taking when an AP colleague called me just after midday from near Snizhne on *JULY* 17#BUK'.*

Along with this tweet he posted a photo of handwritten notes (in pen), which read as follows:²⁹

Buk anti-aircraft missiles. Clear sound & Grad. Snizhne – 11 am. Going [illegible] south.

Peter Leonard tweeted a third time on 2 June 2015 at 8:02:³⁰

*@hdevreij They *saw* Buk, *heard* Grad. Two different things. Sound of Grad pretty easy to recognize.*

Note by reporting officer: it is not clear from this tweet what time zone the journalist was using. At 11:00 local time the Buk was probably still in the vicinity of Donetsk.

At 17 July 2015 James Miller tweeted the following, under the user name @Millermena:³¹

MH17 reminded that field reporters matter a lot. @pete_leonard & AP team saw Buk & quickly reported it, interviewed residents. HUGE (1/2).

On 17 July 2015 at 10:53, Peter Leonard replied to this as follows, under the user name @Peter_Leonard:³²

*@Millermena to be exact, *two* AP reporters (and our driver) saw Buk and spoke to its crew, who stopped to ensure no photos were taken.*

6. Buk TELAR driving south

After the white lorry with the Buk TELAR arrived in Snizhne, the Buk was offloaded from the low-loader and drove, under its own power, to the launch site near Pervomaiskyi. This conclusion is supported by

²⁷ <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/what-happened-day-flight-17-was-downed>

²⁸ <http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/>

²⁹ https://twitter.com/Peter_leonard/status/605701062226550781

³⁰ https://twitter.com/Peter_leonard/status/605751880757690308

³¹ <http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/>

³² <http://www.whathappenedtoflightmh17.com/what-you-see-is-all-there-is/>

the video discussed below of the Buk TELAR driving under its own power on a provincial road south of Snizhne and by a social media post.

7.1. Snizhne video

On 23 July 2014 a video with the file name 'wkgwxxhJlk4 AA 'BUK' vehicle Pro-Kremlin fighters going from Torez to Snizhne.mp4' was secured from the website ukraineatwar.blogspot.com³³ by a member of my investigation team. This video captured a Buk TELAR driving under its own power in a southerly direction. A smaller, dark-coloured vehicle is seen driving in front of the Buk. When the video was secured, the file displayed the following time: 17 July 2014, 18:44:04 UTC, or 21:44:04 local Ukrainian summer time. This may be the date and time when the video was posted on the website in question. On 4 July 2016 a member of my investigation team secured a higher-quality version of the same video from YouTube.³⁴ Below is a screenshot from this video.

Screenshot of the video showing a Buk driving under its own power on a provincial road in Snizhne




Below this image as it appears on the website ukraineatwar.blogspot.com is a satellite photo. The presumed location of the vehicle and the camera with which the video was shot are noted on the photo: provincial road T0522 (Gagarina Street) in Snizhne and a building that overlooks this road. According to the Russian search engine Yandex the building where Ukraine@war claims the video was shot is located at 43 Gagarina Street in Snizhne. The photo in question is reproduced below.


³³ <http://ukraineatwar.blogspot.com>

³⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iE7wEhvYFos>

Image from Ukraine@war



The website also includes the text 'Link to Google maps', which clicks through to the following URL: <https://www.google.nl/maps/@48.0133916,38.7620665,640m/data=!3m1!1e3>. These GPS coordinates refer to the following location:



This location is approximately the same as the location shown in the image from the website ukraineatwar.blogspot.com. The location is around 140 metres south, as the crow flies, of the building designated by Ukraine@war as the building where the video is presumed to have been recorded (red square) and approximately 50 metres west of the provincial road (Gagarina Street) in Snizhne (red arrow).

7.2 Post on the VK site ‘heard in Snezhnoye’

On 17 July 2014, on the social media platform V Kontakte ‘heard in Snezhnoye’, Nikolay Yakovlev responded to a message posted on 17 July 2014 at 12:04 that concerned a transport of military materiel before the crash of MH17, with the following message:³⁵

TODAY I personally saw ZRK “Buk” heading toward Saurivka. Stop lying to people!

The town of Saurivka (Saurovka) is approximately 16.5 kilometres southwest of Snizhne, as shown below.

7.3 Facebook post by Dmitry TYMCHUK

The following (translated) message was posted to the Facebook account of Dmitry TYMCHUK on 17 July 2014 at 19:19 local Ukrainian time:³⁶

According to the operational information from the group ‘Information Resistance’, today around 13:30 a column of terrorists was observed in the vicinity of the town of Snezhnoye [Snizhne]. The column consisted of 3 tanks, 2 BTR [armoured vehicles], a lorry carrying rebels and a lorry with a large-calibre machine gun mounted on it. There was also a tractor unit with a gun carriage,³⁷ carrying a ZRK “Buk”. The column was heading in the direction of the town of Dmitrovka.

He is likely referring to the town of Dmitrovka in the province of Donetsk, which is around 27 kilometres southeast of Snizhne. According to the Russian search engine Yandex, the quickest route from Snizhne to Dmitrovka runs via the main road T0522 past the towns of Pervomaiske and Pervomaiskyi. For clarification these towns have been highlighted on the map below.

Towns of Saurivka and Dmitrovka



³⁵ http://vk.com/wall-5698635_18352

³⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/dmitry.tymchuk/posts/529275897201070>


³⁷ A mount that supports the gun barrel of an artillery piece

8. Satellite photo from the American Embassy in Kyiv

On 22 July 2014 a message was posted on the Facebook page of the US embassy in Kyiv (Ukraine) along with a satellite image³⁸ with the heading 'SA-11 Surface-to-Air Missile Shoots Down Malaysian Airliner MH17'. The accompanying text refers to a pdf document entitled 'United States Assessment of the Downing of Flight MH17 and its Aftermath'. This document, which was published on 19 July 2014, describes why the US embassy in Ukraine believes it is plausible that flight MH17 was brought down by an SA-11 anti-aircraft missile from separatist-controlled territory in eastern Ukraine.

The image depicts the area where the Buk installation that fired a missile at flight MH17 may have been located. It also depicts the possible point of detonation and the location where the flight crashed. Three lines have been drawn on the satellite photo: one (yellow) for the flight path of MH17 and one (green) for the suspected path of the Buk missile. The point of origin of the green line is the possible launch site. There is also a straight black line which seems to have been drawn from the possible launch site, the meaning of which is not explained.

US satellite photo



The Facebook page contains a URL for the website of the US embassy in Kyiv. That site states, among other things, that the moment when contact was lost with MH17, a launch was observed of a surface-to-air missile. Nothing is said about the image that was posted on Facebook.

9. Investigation by Bellingcat

The investigative collective Bellingcat also analysed the above satellite photo, and on the basis of their analysis, it localised the suspected launch site.³⁹ Bellingcat notes that although Snizhne is marked on the satellite photo as the launch site of the Buk missile, the exact location is not immediately clear due to the quality of the satellite image. In order to better pinpoint the launch site, Bellingcat performed a more in-depth analysis of the satellite photo on the basis of visible, recognisable landmarks. On this basis Bellingcat arrived at an area south of Snizhne. The intersection of the lines drawn by Bellingcat is a very short distance southwest of the agricultural field that my investigation identified as the launch

³⁸ uk-ua.facebook.com/usdos.ukraine

³⁹ <https://www.bellingcat.com/new/uk-andeurope-/2015/01/27/is-this-the-launch-site-of-the-missile-that-shot-down-flight-mh17/>

site on the basis of telecommunications, witness statements and satellite photos. The photo below shows this location.

Image from the location investigation by Bellingcat



'Uitkomst onderzoek Bellingcat' = Result of Bellingcat investigation

10. Investigative journalist Roland OLIPHANT

In a video recorded on 22 July 2014 *Telegraph* journalist Roland OLIPHANT says that he may have found the launch site of the Buk TELAR on the basis of a scorch mark in a wheat field south of Snizhne.⁴⁰

Screenshot from the video by Roland OLIPHANT




⁴⁰ <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10984530/MH17-the-clues-which-may-lead-to-missile-launch-site.html>

In the video OLIPHANT says the following:

We decided to follow a link we found on the internet where somebody had tried to work out using photographs where that missile might have come from. That led us here, which is as you can see a weedfield somewhere south of the town of Snizhnoye (fon.), just over there. That's north. South, that way, if you take a look down there, you should see a big [inaudible] monument on the hill. [...] We were looking for some kind of burnt ground that might suggest the blowback from a rocket. We found a patch of burnt land next to a corn field. It's burnt quite strange. It doesn't quite look like it's part of the routine spring burning of a field, which usually happens in spring, not at this time of year.

On the basis of information from the landscape as seen in the video, the blogpost on Ukraine@war determined the probable geolocation of the scorch mark referred to in the video. This geolocation is approximately: 47.9731238, 38.7593106. A member of my investigation team then entered these coordinates into both Google Maps and Yandex. (The Yandex map is reproduced below.) The location of the coordinates is west of Pervomaiskyi, south of Snizhne and north of the Saur Mogila monument. This is consistent with what OLIPHANT says in the video with regard to the location: 'That led us here which is as you can see a wheat field somewhere south of the town of Snezhnoye, just over there. That's north. South, that way, you can take a look down there, you should see a big tall monument on the hill.'

Image of geolocation from Ukraine@war



11. Investigation by NEO


The investigation by the Dutch Safety Board (OVV) and my own investigation showed that flight MH17 was shot down on 17 July 2014 at 16:20 by a Buk missile. Shortly thereafter photos appeared online of a smoke trail probably left by the Buk missile.

Netherlands Geomatics & Earth Observation BV (NEO) was commissioned by the Dutch TV station Radio Television Luxembourg (RTL) to analyse the smoke trail, and on 22 December 2014 it released a report on the subject. The purpose of the analysis was to determine where the smoke trail originated from. NEO did this on the basis of landmarks (P1 to P4 = telephone poles and L1 = possible launch location) that can be seen on photos of the smoke trail and satellite images as shown in the following image from their report.

Image from NEO report



Photo of smoke trail



Worldview2 shot from 4 August

On this basis NEO plotted out a line of sight to the base of the smoke trail. NEO concluded the following:

Given that the lower part of the smoke plume itself is not visible, the exact location of the possible launch site cannot be determined on the basis of the analysis. The line of sight does however transverse a field that is suspected to be the place from where the Buk could have been launched.

Image from the NEO report



Figure 12. Line of sight from telephone poles P1 to P4 to the field L1, ©NEO bv, Amersfoort, Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe

12. Findings of the investigation

On the basis of the above findings, it has been concluded that on 17 July 2014 the Buk TELAR was transported from Sukhodilsk via Donetsk to Snizhne on a red low-loader pulled by a white Volvo lorry. In Snizhne the Buk TELAR was offloaded and then drove on, under its own power, to a field west of Pervomaiskyi. This route was confirmed by recorded phone conversations, cell tower locations and witnesses. The investigation also ascertained that the Buk TELAR that brought down flight MH17 launched a missile from an agricultural field south of Snizhne and west of Pervomaiskyi.

Done as an official report, drawn up under oath of office and concluded and signed by me in Driebergen on Thursday 16 May 2018.

[signature]

G.W.Chr. Thiry [handwritten]