

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

**APPLICATION FOR REVISION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 23 MAY 2008
IN THE CASE CONCERNING SOVEREIGNTY OVER
PEDRA BRANCA/PULAU BATU PUTEH, MIDDLE ROCKS AND
SOUTH LEDGE (MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE) (MALAYSIA v. SINGAPORE)**

**ADDITIONAL WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS
AND DOCUMENTATION OF
MALAYSIA**

**ANNEXURES
(Volume 1: Annexures A – C)**

11 December 2017

Annexure A

Additional newspaper clippings concerning the Labuan Haji incident:

“That gunboat: ‘I’m worried’ – Tengku”, *The Straits Times*, 27 February 1958;

“Kapal mengganggu di-laut Johor” [“Gunboat intrusion in the Johore waters”], *Berita Harian*, 26 February 1958 (with translation);

“Tengku mahu laporan fasal kapal meriam” [“Tengku wants report on gunboat”],
Berita Harian, 27 February 1958 (with translation).

That gunboat: Tin worried'—Tengku

The Straits Times, 27 February 1958, Page 1

Article also available on Microfilm Reel NL3308

That gunboat: 'I'm worried'—Tengku

KUALA LUMPUR, Wed.—
The Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, is calling for a full report on the incident in Johore territorial waters yesterday in which an Indonesian gunboat harassed a K.P.M. ship.

He told the Straits Times today: "We are very much concerned about this incident.

"This is the first time

I've heard that Indonesian gunboats had come into Johore waters."

The K.P.M. ship, the 250-ton Labuan Hadji, left Singapore yesterday morning for South Siam.

The Indonesian gunboat harassed it off Horsburgh lighthouse, 35 miles north-east of Singapore, but disappeared when the Dutch master of the ship signalled Singapore for help.

KAPAL MENGGANGGU DI-LAUT JOHOR

Berita Harian, 26 February 1958, Page 1

Article also available on Microfilm Reel NL2810

KAPAL MENGGANGGU DI-LAUT JOHOR

SINGAPURA, Thalatha — Sa-buah kapal meriam Indonesia hari ini telah mengganggu sa-buah kapal K.P.M. di-laut kawasan Johor tetapi kapal meriam itu telah ghaib sa-telah kaptan kapal itu mengutus ka-Singapura minta bantuan.

Kapal itu, Labuan Hadji berat 250 ton, yang telah belayar dari Singapura pada sa-belah pagi sedang meneruskan pelayaran-nya ka-Siam Selatan.

Suatu perutusan dari kapal itu pada tengah hari berkata bahawa sa-buah kapal meriam Indonesia sedang mengganggunya dekat dengan Rumah Api Horsburgh, 35 batu ditimor laut Singapura. Ia minta bantuan.

Suatu perutusan yang terkemudian berkata bahawa kapal meriam itu telah ghaib.

Angkatan Laut Belanda hari ini mendzahirkan bahawa satu pasokan orang2 Indonesia yang bersenjata diatas sa-buah kapal daftaran Belanda telah menembak sa-

buah kapal perang pembnasa Belanda yang telah menahannya di-Selat Macassar pada hari Khamis sudah.

Suatu berita Reuter dari The Hague berkata bahawa senjata orang2 Indonesia itu telah di-luchutkan dan kapal itu, Kasimbar berat 2,180 ton, telah di-bawa ka-Manokwari, New Guinea Belanda.

Kapal itu mengibarkan bendera Belanda. Angkatan Laut itu berkata bahawa kapal Masimbar itu ia-lah sa-buah dari kapal2 K.P.M. yang "di-rampas sa-chara haram" oleh Kerajaan Indonesia. Kapitan kapal itu ia-lah sa-orang Indonesia.

Nampak pergi

Sa-buah kapal terbang Sunderland dan sa-buah kapal launch Angkatan Laut Malaya telah menjawab rayuan minta bantuan yang di-hantar dengan radio oleh kapal Labuan Hadji itu.

Sa-orang juruchakap Angkatan Laut malam ini berkata bahawa di-masa kapal terbang Sunderland itu tiba di-tempat berlaku kejadian itu, kapal meriam Indonesia itu sudah pun pergi dan kapal Labuan Hadji itu di-nampak belayar dengan tidak di-ganggu menuju ka-utara.

Dia berkata lagi: "Sejak dari itu tidak-lah ada apa2 kejadian lagi yang di-beritakan."

NewspaperSG

Berita Harian, 26 February 1958, Page 1

GUNBOAT INTRUSION IN THE JOHORE WATERS

Singapore, Tuesday – An Indonesian gunboat today has intruded a ship Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij (K.P.M) in the Johor territorial waters but the gunboat had disappeared after the ship's captain had sent a message to Singapore for help.

The ship, Labuan Hadji weighing 250 tons, which sailed from Singapore in the morning was continuing its voyage to southern Siam.

A message from the ship at midday said that an Indonesian gunboat was intruding him near the Horsburgh Lighthouse 35 mile northeast of Singapore. He had asked for help.

The latest message stated that the gunboat had disappeared.

The Dutch Navy today disclosed that a team of Indonesians who were armed on a Dutch registered ship had fired a Dutch destroyer warship which had held them back in the Strait of Macassar last Thursday.

A Reuter news from The Hague said that the Indonesian men were stripped of their arms and the ship, Kasimbar weighing 2,180 tonnes, was taken to Manokwari, Netherlands New Guinea.

The ship waved the Netherlands flag. The Navy said that the ship Kasimbar is one of the K.P.M. ships which was "illegally seized" by the Government of Indonesia. The ship's captain is an Indonesian.

Seen sailed away

A Sunderland aeroplane and a launch boat of the Malayan Navy had responded to the appeal for help sent by radio by the Labuan Hadji.

A Navy spokesman said tonight that when the Sunderland aeroplane arrived at the site where the incident occurred, the Indonesian gunboat had already gone and the said Labuan Haji ship was seen sailing off without being intruded heading north.

He added: "Since then there has not been any other incidents being reported".



Tengku mahu laporan fasal kapal meriam

Berita Harian, 27 February 1958, Page 1

Article also available on Microfilm Reel NL2810

Tengku mahu laporan fasal kapal meriam

PERDANA Menteri, Tengku Abdul Rahman, akan meminta satu penyata penoh berkenaan dengan kejadian di-laut jajahan Johor pada hari Thalatha sudah dalam mana sa-buah kapal meriam Indonesia telah mengganggu sa-buah

kapal K.P.M.

Kelmarin dia telah memaalumkan kapada Berita Harian: "Kami sangat2 terharu berkenaan dengan kejadian ini.

"Ini-lah mula kali-nya saya mendengar yang kapal meriam Indonesia telah masok ka-luat Johor."

Kapal K.P.M. itu—Labuan Hadji berat 250 ton—telah belayar dari Singapura pada pagi hari Thalatha menju ka-Siam Selatan.

Kapal meriam Indonesia itu telah mengganggu-nya dekat dengan Rumah Api Horsburgh, 35 batu di-timor laut Singapura.

Kapal meriam itu telah ghaib apa bila kapten kapal itu, sa-orang Belanda, mengutus ka-Singapura meminta bantuan.

TRANSLATION

NewspaperSG

Berita Harian, 27 February 1958, Page 1

Tunku wants report on gunboat

The Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman will ask for a complete statement regarding the incident in the Johore territorial waters on Tuesday where an Indonesian gunboat had violated the Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij (KPM) ship.


Last night he had informed Berita Harian: "We are deeply perturbed by this incident."

"This is the first time I heard that an Indonesian gunboat had entered the Johor waters."

The KPM ship - Labuan Hadji weighing 250 tons - sailed from Singapore on Tuesday morning heading towards South Siam.

The Indonesian gunboat had violated it near the Horsburgh Lighthouse, 35 miles northeast of Singapore.

The gunboat had disappeared when the ship's captain, a Dutchman, had sent a message to Singapore for help.



Annexure B

File DEFE 69/539:

“Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 1964–66”.

SECRET

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Handwritten initials

RO
Registered file number *212/6 PART III*
Date opened *13-12-66*

1. ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE NOTES ON THE INSIDE FLAP
2. ENTER NOTES OF RELATED FILES ON PAGE 2 OF THIS JACKET
3. THIS FILE MUST BE CIRCULATED UNDER COVER, AND KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY WHEN NOT IN USE

DIVISION
DNTWP
FOR REGISTRY USE ONLY

SUBJECT

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE MALACCA STRAITS & SINGAPORE STRAITS 1964-66 PART III

Referred to	DATE	Referred to	DATE	Referred to	DATE	Referred to	DATE
	20 1966						
	10 JAN 1967						
	25 JAN 1967						
	16 FEB 1967						
	17 FEB 1967						
	23 MAR 1967						
	19 APR 1967						
	19 JUL 1967						

DELE 69/539
SECOND REVIEW
1992

Admin *S 1242/77*

POSAL or PA Action
See note on file flap
PAPR
19-3-70

DOWNGRADING
(to be completed when the file goes out of current use)

This file may be downgraded to:—

- * SECRET
- * CONFIDENTIAL
- * RESTRICTED
- * UNCLASSIFIED
- * ON (Insert DATE).....

on
Return for Review
* ON (Insert DATE).....

CERTIFYING OFFICER.....
APPOINTMENT AND BRANCH.....
DATE.....

SECRET

SECRET

Date: Minutes and Brief Details of Enclosure	Clas.	Encl. No.
<p><i>Cdr. Far East's report on operations against Indonesian Confrontation.</i> <i>+ Annexes A B C D E F G H.</i></p> <p>DGW(N) DGA(N) DG Ships DGNM DGNPS DGNT DGNR</p> <p>1. DNTWP has placed opposite the Commander Far East Fleet's report on operations against Indonesian confrontation.</p> <p>2. It is the intention to distill the information contained and to include it in the current rewrite of the Fighting Instructions Vols 1 and 2.</p> <p>3. Other copies have been distributed as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. DN Plans, DNOT, DDS Int(N), CGRM, DUSW(N), DSW(N), DNAW, DNTC(N), DNS, ACNS(O), ACNS(P), ACNS(W), DS5. b. DOA(RN), ACSA(OA), DOAE, CS(RN). c. RN Tactical School. d. Sec DCNS for Naval Historical Section. <p>4. DNTWP will co-ordinate remarks and the docket has been marked immediate due to the tight schedule for the production of the Fighting Instructions.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Quaba.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">for DIRECTOR OF NAVAL TACTICAL AND WEAPONS POLICY 15th December 1966</p> <p>MB Ext 2230</p> <p>/GP <i>Noted with interest.</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>H. J. ...</i> <i>for D.G.W. (N) 16.1.67.</i></p>	S	I

2230

ons,
s
hips.
port

SECRET

SECRET

Noted - particularly the reference to possible developments of Horewight for this type of operation

[Signature]

for DGA (N)

23rd January 1967

Noted.

[Signature]

14. ii. '67. for S.G. Ships

Noted.

[Signature]
for DGNH.

16/2/67

Noted.

[Signature]
for DGNPS
17.2.67.

DGNR
DNTWP

Noted. Copies of COMFEP's report have been sent to HM Ships DRYAD, VERNON, EXCELLENT, MERCURY and the NBCD School for information and any modification of training necessary in advance of the incorporation of this information into the Fighting Instructions.

[Signature]

for DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NAVAL TRAINING
(WHI: 9000; Ext. 1198)
17th March, 1967.

Noted.

[Signature]
for DGNPS
23 March '67

SECRET

13444/66

SECRET

FARLEY

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE MALACCA AND SINGAPORE STRAITS
1964-1966

INTRODUCTION

1. When the Indonesian Government started its policy of confrontation against Malaysia active operations were confined to the Borneo States; these were - and have remained - largely military in character. Although Naval patrols had been maintained in the Kuching and Tawau areas for the past three years, they were mainly of a deterrent nature; there is little evidence that any seaborne incursions had been planned.
2. In August 1964 however the Indonesians expanded the area of active confrontation to West Malaysia. As there is no direct land bridge between Indonesia and the Malay peninsula all incursions had to be made by sea or air. Only one attempt at an airborne operation was made, and this was so clearly a political and military failure that it was not repeated. A large number of various types of seaborne incursions were however mounted, so that the Navy - in contrast to its subsidiary role in Borneo - became the most active partner in the combined efforts by all services to deter and destroy such incursions. It is the aim of this paper to give an account of the Naval operations directed to this end.

THE THREAT

3. The Indonesians maintained a total of about 40,000 armed men in Sumatra and the Rhio Islands. Approximately threequarters of these were regular garrison troops employed on home defence and internal security duties and they had no connection with confrontation activities.
4. The remaining 10,000 formed part of SIAGA command, the overall command organisation for carrying out confrontation. Two infantry brigades were stationed along the North East coast of Sumatra, and one amphibious landing brigade in the Rhios. It is thought that these troops were unlikely to be used in fact, but were useful in that their presence as an overt military threat was a valuable political weapon. They were also available for immediate counter attack against Malaysia, should Indonesia be attacked.
5. In addition there were about 1,000 men organised into various units known collectively as Special Forces. These consisted of Indonesian "volunteers" (Sukarelawan), Malaysian traitors previously exfiltrated, and regular troops seconded to Special Forces.
6. These forces were stationed in the Rhios and islands off the Sumatran coast (see map Annex A). Their command and control structure changed several times from 1964 to 1966, but they finally wound up as subordinate units to the SIAGA brigade in whose area they were based.
7. It was these Special Forces who carried out the confrontation operations, which are discussed in more detail below. It has been a feature of all Indonesian activity in West Malaysia that the regular armed services have very seldom been engaged: the army only to the extent that seconded troops were employed in Special Forces; the Air Force only for the one abortive operation, and the Navy only for occasional patrols to confront our own ships. Customs launches (BT boats) were however used sometimes to escort and support craft on incursion operations.

/8.....

SECRET

FARLEY

SECRET

FARLEY

2.



Rare appearance of Indonesian Navy. One of three PT vessels which harassed HMS PUNCHESTON 10th February 1965. Both turrets were trained on HMS PUNCHESTON.

Types of Incursion Operations

- ✓ 8. Indonesian operations may be broadly divided into two categories:

a. Infiltration

These consisted of sections of about 12 men in a kumpit or other vessel (often a captured Malaysian fishing craft) coming across the Malacca or Singapore Straits, hoping to land undetected on the coast of Malaysia. The landings were generally timed for just before dawn. The party then hoped to strike inland and set up a base deep in the jungle, much as the Communist terrorists had done ten years earlier. One of the favourite objectives was a mountain, Gunong Blumut in Johore. The Indonesians apparently considered that they would be able to carry out guerilla operations from a camp in this area, and that air re-supply and reinforcement would be feasible.

b. Sabotage

Saboteurs came in smaller numbers. They were generally in plain clothes and often had no arms other than the explosives or bombs, which were to be placed at key points, power stations, oil storage depots etc. There were also psychological saboteurs, whose duty it was to stir up hatred between the Malays and Chinese. Singapore was of course the prime target for Sabotage operations, but a number of incidents also occurred in Malaya, particularly near Kuala Lumpur and Malacca.

- ✓ 9. Both types of operation were invariably mounted by night, as far as is

SECRET

FARLEY

/known.....

3.

known not one infiltration or sabotage attempt was made by day. In general the enemy appeared to prefer moonless nights to moonlit ones, though this was probably an erroneous tactic.

- ✓ 10. There was also a threat to security posed by armed Indonesian craft pillaging barter trade craft and Malaysian fishing boats. This was however not directly related to, or in support of, confrontation. It has not therefore been treated in the main body of the paper, but a brief description of the problem is set out in Annex C.
- ✓ 11. Looked at in an objective light it must be admitted that the Indonesian campaign was badly conducted. Their intelligence was poor, their training limited, most of the operations half-hearted in execution, and there was a general lack of that resolute overall direction that is essential if a campaign of this nature is to succeed. The paragraphs that follow contain an account of their operations and their shortcomings.

Indonesian Aim

- ✓ 12. The campaign of incursions into West Malaysia and Singapore was in support of the overall aim of confrontation policy which was of course the disintegration of Malaysia into its constituent parts. It is clear that the Indonesian authorities were considerably influenced by their own success in the West Irian campaign, and they were perhaps too ready to draw an unjustified parallel between the history of events there and the situation in Malaysia. In any event the Indonesians believed that by applying military, economic and political pressure to Malaysia it would fall without the necessity for a full scale war. The campaign of incursions into West Malaysia was part of that pressure.

Indonesian Intelligence

- ✓ 13. It would appear that the Indonesians were to some extent victims of their own propaganda. Having told the world so often that the peoples of the Malay Peninsula and Northern Borneo had no desire for Malaysia, they eventually believed it themselves. Certainly the personnel who took part in the incursions were briefed that the local people of the kampongs of Malaya would assist them. While it is true that a number of Malaysians - particularly Chinese - did betray their own country in one way or another, the great majority of the population proved themselves to be unswervingly loyal. In many cases it was largely due to information received from members of the public that those Indonesians who succeeded in landing were so quickly rounded up.

Conduct of Indonesian Operations

- ✓ 14. In the early stages of the campaign the enemy effort was largely concentrated on infiltration operations against South West Johore. Because at that time our own Naval patrols were few, badly organised and lacking intelligence, the greater part of these infiltration attempts were successful in landing on the Malaysian coast. They were however fairly quickly brought to action by the military, and none succeeded in remaining an effective fighting unit for more than a few days.
- ✓ 15. When it became obvious that the infiltrations were not only unsuccessful militarily, but were also tending to rally the Malaysians together, the Indonesian effort turned towards sabotage.
- ✓ 16. During the early months of 1965 a large number of sabotage attempts were made, particularly against Singapore. In most cases very little significant damage was done, indeed some of the bombs were exploded on the beach. However, the morale effect on the population of the island was marked, and it became

necessary to station a large number of Naval patrol ships in the Singapore Strait. This had an almost immediate effect, and the number of incidents dropped off sharply.

17. It is of interest to note that there was at no time any attempt by the Indonesians deliberately to attack Naval ships, although this could have been done with possibly disastrous effects. The bulk of the patrol ships were CM3 or other wooden-hulled vessels, and it is only too easy to imagine the effect on one of them of a night attack by three or four sampans armed with infantry-type rocket launchers. On a few occasions shore guns based on the Indonesian islands in the Singapore Strait fired at Naval patrol ships, but no hits were scored.



The end of an Indonesian operation. Prisoners and wounded on board HMS FISKERTON.

✓ 18. In fact the enemy operations were nearly all carried out in an irresolute and unco-ordinated manner, with inadequate preparation and training. It must be admitted that this largely contributed to the success of our own counter-incursion operations.

LIMITATIONS OF NAVAL SECURITY FORCES

? 19. Before considering the way in which our own counter-incursion operations were conducted, it is necessary to describe some of the limitations that were placed upon them, either by political directive or force of circumstances.

Defensive Policy

? 20. It was the considered policy of the Commonwealth Governments involved that our forces should resist all incursions, but that no form of counter attack was to be permitted, for fear of escalation: this meant that the bases from which incursions were launched would be immune from attack, indeed our forces were not even permitted to enter waters claimed by Indonesia as their territorial sea (there was one small exception to this rule which will be described later). As this claim involved a twelve mile stretch of water to seaward of straight

5.

base lines, it considerably reduced the area in which maritime security forces could operate (see map Annex A and comment Annex B).

Command and Control

21. The security forces involved were those of Britain, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand. Although the British were the predominant partners in this alliance it was of over-riding political importance that the anti-confrontation operations should not be able to be depicted as a British imperialist-colonialist war against Indonesia. For this reason the role of overseas Commonwealth forces had to be played down, while that of Malaysian forces had to be emphasised. This led to a situation in which - although the British were in fact in control of operations - it was necessary to portray to the outside world - particularly Afro-Asian opinion - that Malaysia was conducting her own defence, with some slight assistance from allies. In these circumstances the efficiency of the military command and control arrangements was bound to suffer.

Fishing Vessels.

22. It has already been explained that the Indonesian incursions were made by means of kumpits or other small craft. In the Malacca and Singapore Straits it is normal for large numbers of fishing craft to operate, both by day and night. In the South Malacca Strait there are over two thousand registered off shore fishing craft, besides many other small sampans, koleks etc.

23. It was a considerable problem for Naval patrols to operate effectively in areas where their radar screens were liable to be saturated by fishing fleets, and it was one that was never satisfactorily resolved. Coastal curfews could and were imposed at times of great threat, but they only extended to the limit of Malaysian Territorial Waters, which - unlike that of Indonesia - was of three miles only measured from the low water mark.

Types of Own Ships

24. The details of our own forces are given in a later section, but it should be here emphasised that very few of the ships employed were designed for the work of anti-incursion patrolling. In general their greatest defect was their lack of speed and lack of a detecting device with adequate range.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

25. The political implications of the command and control problem have been touched upon in paragraph 21. While it was necessary that Malaysia should be seen to have considerable representation in the command structure, it was also necessary that the structure should be effective. The arrangements that were eventually agreed upon proved adequate to the task, although it must be conceded that at no time were they severely tested.

26. Responsibility for the overall conduct of operations was vested in a Combined Operations Committee, which functioned through a permanent staff known as OPSCO. Under this were three co-ordinating headquarters, responsible for the conduct of land, air and sea operations. The authority for the latter was Commander Far East Fleet. In this capacity he was responsible for the deployment of all Naval and Police vessels assigned to anti-confrontation duties, and for assigned maritime air effort.

27. There was no special headquarters available from which COMFEEF could exercise this new responsibility, so a number of changes were made within the existing staff and headquarters structure. The Far East Fleet Operations

/Room.....

Room was in effect divided into two sections, one of which continued to operate the Fleet as before, while the other concentrated on the maritime co-ordinator function. A number of extra plotting and communication facilities were provided for this new section, which was staffed by one Lieutenant Commander, one Lieutenant (SD) and one AB (Nav. Yeo). A large scale wall map of the Malacca and Singapore Straits was displayed in the Operations Room, and the coastline divided into designated areas for ease of ordering patrols. These arrangements proved to be satisfactory.

28. On the question of local command and control at sea, it was agreed that where ships of different Navies were operating together, the senior officer present - regardless of nationality - would be OTC. In practice this meant that it was nearly always a British Officer who was in charge, but no difficulties were experienced when this was not the case.

FORCES AVAILABLE

29. The forces available to COMFLEF for his task were elements from three Navies and two Air Forces. The following paragraphs indicate the approximate numbers on patrol per night (as stated in paragraph 9 there was no significant threat by day).

30. Far East Fleet. Two frigates and about six CMS/SDB. SDBs were normally only employed in the Singapore Straits.

31. Royal Malaysian Navy. During the period 1964-66 the RMN was in the process of expansion but its average strength was one Loch Class frigate and some 25 smaller vessels, Vesper fast patrol craft, CMS, IMS, and some other miscellaneous types. Of these about six vessels per night were available for patrol in the West Malaysian area.

32. Marine Police. The Malaysian and Singapore Marine Police forces possess a large number of various types of launches. The largest and newest of these are the off-shore craft, known as PX craft. These are of SDML size, with an overlikon and radar, and a top speed of about 24 knots. They have proved to be very satisfactory vessels and much more reliable in operation than the equivalent RMN fast patrol craft. At present Malaysia has six craft and Singapore none, but it is understood that some are being built for Singapore.

33. All other types of police launches are classified as inshore patrol craft. They have jurisdiction only within the Malaysian/Singapore territorial sea (three miles from low water mark) and they are of limited range and based on specific ports from which they cannot be easily re-deployed.

34. On average the number of police vessels available for patrol each night was as follows:

2	offshore patrol craft (Malaysian)
20	inshore patrol craft (Malaysian)
12	inshore patrol craft (Singapore)

35. RAF LRMP aircraft. Shackletons based at Changi were employed on an average of five nights per week to fly patrols as required by COMFLEF. In general the aircraft was tasked for the area of the South Malacca Strait with an on-task time of six hours.

36. RMAF maritime air patrol. RMAF Doves based on Kuala Lumpur flew visual recce at last light in the North Malacca Strait. Aircraft availability was low and only about five patrols per month were flown.

37. Dawn Beach recce patrols. RAF Pioneers were used on occasions to fly beach recce patrols in areas where it was possible that Indonesians would land.

/38.....

7.

Summary of Forces Available

38. The following average totals were thus available to COMFEP each night for patrolling the coast of Malaysia and Singapore:

2	Frigates
6	CMS/SDB
6	RMN vessels
34	Police craft
1	LRMP aircraft

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

39. The total length of the coastline of the Malay peninsula is over 1000 miles. With only some 50 vessels available for patrol each night there could be no question of erecting a "watertight barrier" round the country. From the first it was decided that patrols must be concentrated in the most threatened areas, even though this would mean leaving long stretches of coastline largely unprotected.

Intelligence

40. It therefore became of vital importance to establish accurately which were the most threatened areas, and great efforts were made to gather and collate all the available intelligence. This was by no means an easy task.

41. Although intelligence derived from British sources could of course be readily obtained, this was not the case with Malaysian or Singaporean information. Each state runs its own special branch, whose operations are quite separate and concealed from those of the next state. In addition the Malaysians were aware that we, the British did not always make all our material available to them, so that there was a natural tendency to reciprocate in the same way.

42. Similar difficulties were experienced in connection with obtaining information derived from the interrogation of captured Indonesians. These interrogations were carried out by the Special Branch, who again tended to be reluctant to release the material obtained thereby. Furthermore, as the interrogators were always army or police officers, they very often failed to extract from the prisoners information of considerable naval significance.

43. These problems were eventually overcome to a large extent. A Naval intelligence officer was employed full time on duties connected with confrontation, and gradually liaison and mutual confidence improved. However, even at the end there lingered the suspicion that nobody had access to all the information that was available in Malaysia about the Indonesians, and that in some cases intelligence was being garnered for its own sake, rather than to be made use of.

44. However, a reasonably accurate picture of the Indonesian dispositions and intentions was built up, maintained and presented to the Operational Staff. Areas of threat were established, and it is interesting to note that they changed but little during the two years of operations.

Threatened Areas

45. As the location of the Indonesian bases became known, it became clear that the main areas of threat were:

- South Malacca Strait
- Singapore
- S.E. Johore.

/46.....


46. The particular problems associated with these areas are considered in the following paragraphs.

South Malacca Strait

47. The major Indonesian bases in this area were those at Sinaboi, Makroh, Kembong and Selat Panjang. Each was targetted for a particular stretch of Malaysian coastline opposite to it. When intelligence indicated that a particular base was likely to be about to launch an operation, a patrol group would be formed to patrol against that base. The OTC of the patrol group would be informed of the number of ships assigned to him and given all the available intelligence. He would then set up patrol lines across the most likely approach routes. The area in which he could effectively operate was limited by:

- a. Malaysian coast line
- b. Target area for the base
- c. I.C.W.

48. This shown diagrammatically:



49. Within this operating area the OTC was free to dispose his forces as he thought best, taking into account the following factors:

- a. Presence of merchant shipping
- b. Presence of fishing craft
- c. Weather

50. This was the standard method of organising patrols in the Malacca Strait. Patrol groups always consisted of between three and six ships.

51. Deterrent patrols. When intelligence indicated that two bases were likely to launch incursions, a different method would be used against the second base, if there were insufficient ships to form two patrol groups. COMFET was given dispensation to authorise a frigate to enter ICW for the purpose of shadowing and reconnaissance, providing that it did not approach closer than three miles

/to.....

9.

to the Indonesian coastline.

52. A frigate would thus be employed in close patrol off the base, without making any attempt to conceal its presence. By this means it was hoped to deter any incursion attempts. The frigate was not in fact allowed to take any positive action while within ICZ, but it was assumed that the Indonesians did not know this.

53. In this way an effective form of patrol could be carried out without using as many ships as for the standard method.

✓ 54. Submarines. On three occasions submarines were used in an advanced warning role. When intelligence was received of an impending incursion from a particular base, a submarine was stationed to carry out a night periscope and radar watch some four miles to seaward of the base. Unfortunately on each occasion that a submarine was used, the predicted incursion failed to materialise, but the mechanics of the operation worked well, and it is considered that the concept is a sound one.

Singapore Strait

55. There were particular problems associated with patrolling in the Singapore Strait. Singapore provided a large number of excellent targets for saboteurs, all of them only a few miles from Indonesian territory. The Singapore Straits are narrow, full of navigational hazards and heavily used by merchant shipping.

56. The Indonesians therefore concentrated a good deal of their effort on sabotage operations against Singapore, to the extent that early in 1965 it was found necessary to devote a large proportion of Naval patrol effort to defend it. At one period twelve ships were deployed for this duty each night.

57. A considerable organisation was built up to defend Singapore. This was based on the formation of three lines of defence:

- a. Naval offshore patrols.
- b. Police inshore patrols
- c. Shore lookouts, coastwatchers etc.

✓ 58. In addition a chain of four Naval shore radar stations was set up to improve the cover of the ship-borne naval radar. RAF and Army anti-aircraft radar stations also made reports of surface contacts when such were observed.

✓ 59. Some anti-sampan booms were also laid by the Fleet Boom Defence Depot. These were in effect, "floating fences" which could not be penetrated by an outboard-motor-driven sampan. These were constructed from light anti-Torpedo netting suspended from a jackstay, which was attached to 96 gallon floats. as shown in the photograph.

Anti Sampan Boom (1965)



60. Overall co-ordination of all these forces was achieved through a local maritime operations centre situated in the Singapore Police Headquarters. This operations room (known as "Coastguard") had direct command and control over the police inshore patrols, the radar stations and other forces, but the Naval ships remained under their own OTCs, who were responsible direct to COMFIF. A good information link with Coastguard on UHF was however maintained.

61. Once this organisation had been built up, it began to show results. By the middle of 1965, very few incursion attempts were succeeding in reaching Singapore. Our most successful night was perhaps that of 25/26 June, the Indonesians launched a co-ordinated attack by four sampans, each with a different objective. Three of these were intercepted, and the occupants killed or captured, and the fourth returned to its base, having failed to penetrate to its objective. Regrettably one midshipman was killed and seven ratings wounded during the actions on this night.

South East Johore

62. The Pengerang peninsula of S.E. Johore was considered by the Indonesians to be a most suitable landing area for infiltrators, because it is very sparsely inhabited, covered in swamp or jungle, and there are no roads connecting it to the rest of Malaya.

63. The Indonesians targetted for this area were a company of the police BRIMOB, who were specially trained for operations of this nature. The first attack came during a three-week period in March 1965, when approximately 100 attempted to cross. They came in Sampans each containing two boatmen and about 12 troops.

64. A total of 35 were either killed or captured at sea by the Naval patrols and the remainder succeeded in landing, where they caused a great deal of trouble to the military before they were eliminated.

65. It was during these operations that some of the fiercest sea fighting of the whole campaign took place. The BRIMOB sampans were well handled and they fought back against the CMS with vigour and determination right to the end. In one case a CMS had to retire temporarily from action as it had run out of ready use ammunition.



Indonesian BRIMOB Sampan captured by HMS MARYTON and INVERCHouston
25th March 1965

66. In these engagements the enemy used mortars and armalite rifles, and it is considered that we were particularly fortunate that no serious casualties were suffered by our ships.

Use of Helicopters

67. Patrolling frigates equipped with helicopters found them to be of great value both in Singapore and Malacca Straits. Although they could not be employed to any great effect at night, the Wasps proved to be invaluable for dusk and dawn patrols. The great success achieved by HMS AJAX on 24th December 1964 was largely due to the extended cover provided by her helicopter. Seven boatloads of infiltrators were arrested by HMS AJAX alone on that occasion.

TECHNIQUE OF PATROLLING

Patrol Groups

68. The boats used by the enemy for incursions were nearly all long low and narrow, thus being difficult to detect at night. Although trials with other forms of equipment were carried out, it was established that radar remained the best form of detecting device at night. Even so the average maximum detection range was found to be only a little over two miles.
69. Under these circumstances it is obvious that one ship can patrol only a relatively short line. In fact this was found to be between two and four miles. It was therefore necessary to maintain ships in groups of three or four in order to provide a reasonable spread of patrol effort across the likely lines of approach of Indonesian craft.

Patrol Speed

70. Scientific investigation had shown that it was more efficient to patrol at the maximum practicable speed, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the radar. Although CMS are very noisy at high speeds, this theory was borne out in practice. However, when the area to be covered was relatively small, and there were more than four ships available to patrol it, (conditions that seldom obtained unfortunately) a most efficient form of patrol could be set up by patrolling in the conventional manner with the main body, and having one ship at anchor or drifting in the middle of the area. The Commanding Officer of this ship was then able to concentrate all his attention on the radar; spurious contacts, fishing stakes etc., could be more quickly evaluated as such, and the course and speed of any intruder craft readily appreciated. The stationary ship could thus be used to vector the other patrol vessels on to suspicious contacts.

Use of Radar

71. It has already been stated that radar was found to be the best night detection device. It was also proved that its effectiveness was very sharply degraded if the set was not carefully tuned to maximum efficiency. A number of officers and operators did not at first appreciate that, whereas a set slightly off-tune would still detect a 15,000 ton tanker at a reasonable range, it would almost certainly not detect a 15 foot sampan at all.
72. Furthermore, the most perfectly tuned set is only of value if it is watched by an alert operator. At best the number of points from a sampan is likely to be small, and it is all too easy for the operator to miss them unless he is continuously vigilant.

73. The final link in the chain is of course the OOW. He must not disregard

/any.....

any contacts reported to him, unless he can positively identify them as of no interest. In one case where this was not done, a small floating radar contact was not investigated by the OOW. It subsequently transpired that this was a sampan containing 15 Indonesian infiltrators who then succeeded in landing on the coast of SE Johore. It took two battalions and six weeks before they were eliminated.

Illumination

74. Once a contact has been detected there remains the problem of identifying it, and if necessary firing at it. For these purposes light is required, and it is of course required out to the effective range of the weapons carried. In order to achieve this as far as possible it was found necessary to fit all patrol ships with 2 inch RFL, army 2 inch mortars with illuminating bombs, and Icarus flares. Searchlights and signalling projectors were found to be a most dangerous form of illumination, as they could and did provide an excellent point of aim for enemy fire.

75. The army 2 inch mortars were eventually discarded as they were found to be dangerous for shipboard firing. Icarus flares were used instead for short range illumination.

76. Infra Red. Trials with Infra Red equipment were carried out in 1965, full details of which are contained in COMFLEP 2078 REF.144/Policy/Part II dated 22nd November 1965. The IR searchlight has proved to be a most valuable classification device, particularly as it does not disclose the presence of own ship. The most suitable equipment was found to be the Phillips US 1900 lamp and US 1500 binocular; this combination gave an average classification range of 650 yards. Four CMS were fitted with this equipment in June and July 1966.

Fighting

77. Although various types of warships were employed on patrol duties, the most numerous were CMS, and they took part in nearly all the actions that were fought during the course of the campaign. From this a fund of experience has been built up which was not previously available. It is thought that CMS may well have to carry out a similar role in the future, and for this reason a brief account of the changes necessary to make a CMS into a fairly efficient small gunboat is given at Annex B.

Alertness

78. Like all patrolling anywhere in the world, there were many periods of inactivity. Night after night the ships would be maintaining their patrols and nothing would happen. Insensibly there was a tendency for precautions to be eased, vigilance to be relaxed. It was at this very stage that many small ships suddenly found themselves in the middle of a battle. Several Commanding Officers who experienced this have commented on the effect on their ships companies of the intensely sudden transition from, perhaps, routinely approaching their ninety-ninth sampan for investigation to suddenly being shot at. It is possible the hardest task of leadership under these conditions to maintain an efficient standard of training and alertness at all times throughout the patrol.

CONCLUSION

79. Despite the various difficulties and limitations with which the Naval forces were faced, it may be said that their operations were successful in catching and deterring Indonesian incursion attempts. However, in drawing

/lessons.....

lessons for the future it must be borne in mind that the enemy operated at a low level of intensity and often at a low level of efficiency. In particular no deliberate attacks were made against ships on patrol. As has been mentioned, the wooden-hulled minesweepers could be particularly vulnerable to certain forms of attack from small craft. Had the Indonesians adopted only a slightly more aggressive policy the result might have been very different.

- ✓ 80. A summary of those lessons learnt which it is thought might have applications in the future has been included as Annex B.

List of Annexes

- A. Map of operational area.
- B. Lessons learnt.
- C. The Barter Trade.
- D. Legal aspects of patrolling.
- E. Specimen Debrief Aide Memoire.
- F. Copy of "Orders for ships patrolling in Defence of Western Malaysia seaboard (Second Edition)" (MALPOS II)
- G. Copy of "Incident Reports from ships patrolling in defence of Western Malaysia Seaboard" (MALPOS II, Part II).
- H. Copies of relevant FOTIs.

SECRET

FARLEY

ANNEX B.

LESSONS LEARNT

Type of Patrol Vessel

- ✓ 1. None of the FEF ships employed on patrol duties were designed for the work. Although it is unlikely that specifically-designed patrol ships will be built, it is desirable to know what the requirements for such vessels are, so that they can as far as possible be built into future MCM or coastal force craft.
- ✓ 2. As a result of experience in the campaign it is suggested that a patrol craft should be:
 - ✓ a. mechanically reliable
 - ✓ b. fast, (at least 25 kts)
 - c. low silhouette
 - d. silent
 - ✓ e. good detection device (5 miles against small sampan)
 - ✓ f. non-self-disclosing classification device (infra-red or similar)
 - ✓ g. good all-round short range fire-power. Illumination ability to match.

Type of Patrol

- ✓ 3. Experience suggests that patrols should be carried out in accordance with the following principles:
 - ✓ a. Patrol as close to enemy base as circumstances allow.
 - ✓ b. Keep patrol lines short, detection ranges in practice tend to be much shorter than theoretical ones.
 - ✓ c. Concentrate forces in areas of threat. Do not spread effort thinly over large areas.

Maintenance of effort over a long period

4. The ships of the Inshore Flotilla were employed almost exclusively on patrolling in West or East Malaysia for over two years. Availability of ships for patrol averaged 60%. In the early stages of the campaign the upper limit to the numbers that could be maintained on patrol was set by the number serviceable. A large number of various types of breakdown was experienced, in addition to those ships undergoing planned maintenance.

5. For the last six months however, it became clear that the strain of patrolling was wearing down Commanding Officers and ships' companies, so that the limit to what was available was being set by considerations of man maintenance rather than material maintenance. Experience of this campaign suggests that in a protracted period of patrolling activity each ship should be:

- a. never employed for longer than 10 days consecutively on patrol, after which a minimum of two nights in harbour is required.
- b. apart from the rests from patrol provided by

/routine.....

SECRET

FARLEY

SECRET

FARLEY

2.

routine planned maintenance periods, ships should be given some form of break from patrolling at least once every three months. Even if this break can be no more exciting than taking part in an exercise, the change of employment has a very positive effect on morale.

Limitations of Naval Security Forces.

6. The limitations listed in paragraphs 19 to 24 of the main paper were generally supportable, and it is agreed that they were in the main unavoidable. However, it is considered that one limitation - the abolition of which would have greatly enhanced the efficiency of patrols - could reasonably have been dispensed with.

7. This is the rule that required all patrolling to be done outside ICW, (except in the special circumstances, deterrent patrolling, see paragraph 51 of main paper). This rule was introduced as it was feared that regular patrolling inside ICW might cause unnecessary provocation to the Indonesians. There is no evidence to suggest that this would have been the case. Deterrent patrols were often carried out by frigates who were clearly in sight of Indonesian authorities on many occasions, and they were also frequently observed by Indonesian warships.

8. No protest about the presence of our ships in ICW was ever received; it is therefore considered that we placed upon ourselves a heavy and unnecessary handicap by denying ICW to the great majority of Naval patrol ships.

Adapting CMS to patrol Gunboat.

9. The following action needs to be taken to make a CMS into a more efficient gunboat:-

- a. Fit RFL and short-range illuminating flares.
- b. Fit as much armour protection as possible for bridge and weather deck personnel.
- c. Fit "bowchaser" machine guns to mounting secured on top of bull ring.
- d. Fit machine guns to mountings on bulwarks each side abreast m/s winch, also bren mountings port and starboard side aft.
- e. Fit machine guns on bridge wings with maximum arc of fire.
- f. Fit infra-red classification outfit.
- g. Fit infra-red weapon sights to a selection of the armament.
- h. Provide extra ready use magazines for all small arms. A satisfactory organisation for replenishing magazines in action, is also required.

Operating Technique

10. Enemy craft are liable to be nearly as fast as patrolling ship, and to

/give.....

SECRET

FARLEY

3.

give a very small radar echo. Radar must be very well tuned and very alertly watched. Whenever possible all contacts however fleeting should be investigated. Voice communication between ships in patrol group must be fast and accurate and it was found to be best if the OOW or CO himself speaks on it.

Communications

- ✓ 11. The many different ships, craft and shore authorities posed a major problem of compatibility. Communication between FEF and RMN ships was in general satisfactory but the lack of flexibility in some of the RMN equipment and the lack of a common high-grade crypto system complicated matters.
- ✓ 12. Greatest difficulties were experienced in maintaining communication between Naval ships and police craft or police/army units ashore. The police and army used VHF equipment in different bands; the police in the Malacca Straits used a different band to the police in the Singapore Straits, and, although Naval ships were issued with VHF equipment for communication with the army and the police in the Malacca Straits satisfactory communication could never be relied upon. This was in part due to:
 - a. Army dispositions changing at short notice.
 - b. Poor range of Service VHF portables, combined with irregularity of requirement to communicate.
 - c. Poor watch kept by police stations and craft.
 - d. Pye VHF portables did not provide the ranges at times required by the escorts.

Security on Voice Circuits

13. The requirement to use UHF for co-ordination of patrols and conduct of operations resulted in considerable amounts of information being made available which could have been intercepted and used to advantage by a more determined enemy.

Prisoner Handling

✓ 14. It was learnt that it was difficult to predict the behaviour of infiltrators or saboteurs who were intercepted. Some would surrender as soon as the first contact was made, while others would fight back to the very end, even though their sampan might be on fire and sinking. Yet others would appear to surrender, come alongside the patrol vessel, and then start to lob grenades up on to the upper deck. Another Indonesian who surrendered came on board the capturing ship with his hands above his head and a hand grenade held between his knees.

✓ 15. As a result of these experiences explicit instructions were given to Commanding Officers to take no chances whatever, and that all suspicious persons were to be treated as hostile. A routine was devised in which the prisoners were brought on board one by one under guard, searched, stripped, blindfolded and bound or handcuffed.

SECRET

FARLEY

3.

give a very small radar echo. Radar must be very well tuned and very alertly watched. Whenever possible all contacts however fleeting should be investigated. Voice communication between ships in patrol group must be fast and accurate and it was found to be best if the OOW or CO himself speaks on it.

Communications

- ✓ 11. The many different ships, craft and shore authorities posed a major problem of compatibility. Communication between FFF and RMN ships was in general satisfactory but the lack of flexibility in some of the RMN equipment and the lack of a common high-grade crypto system complicated matters.
- ✓ 12. Greatest difficulties were experienced in maintaining communication between Naval ships and police craft or police/army units ashore. The police and army used VHF equipment in different bands; the police in the Malacca Straits used a different band to the police in the Singapore Straits, and, although Naval ships were issued with VHF equipment for communication with the army and the police in the Malacca Straits satisfactory communication could never be relied upon. This was in part due to:
 - a. Army dispositions changing at short notice.
 - b. Poor range of Service VHF portables, combined with irregularity of requirement to communicate.
 - c. Poor watch kept by police stations and craft.
 - d. Pye VHF portables did not provide the ranges at times required by the escorts.

Security on Voice Circuits

13. The requirement to use UHF for co-ordination of patrols and conduct of operations resulted in considerable amounts of information being made available which could have been intercepted and used to advantage by a more determined enemy.

Prisoner Handling

✓ 14. It was learnt that it was difficult to predict the behaviour of infiltrators or saboteurs who were intercepted. Some would surrender as soon as the first contact was made, while others would fight back to the very end, even though their sampan might be on fire and sinking. Yet others would appear to surrender, come alongside the patrol vessel, and then start to lob grenades up on to the upper deck. Another Indonesian who surrendered came on board the capturing ship with his hands above his head and a hand grenade held between his knees.

✓ 15. As a result of these experiences explicit instructions were given to Commanding Officers to take no chances whatever, and that all suspicious persons were to be treated as hostile. A routine was devised in which the prisoners were brought on board one by one under guard, searched, stripped, blindfolded and bound or handcuffed.

SECRET

FARLEY

SECRET

40

FARLEY



Recommended method for temporarily securing suspect Indonesian

Handling boats suspected of containing bombs

✓ 16. Some of the bombs brought over by saboteurs had already had their time fuses set, and others were equipped with booby trap devices. This made it dangerous for suspicious boats to be searched by Naval boarding parties. In one case a sampan exploded while alongside a CMS causing casualties and damage.



Damage to HMS WOOLASTON 26th June 1965 (see paragraph 16 above). The ship was rendered non-operational for 6 weeks. At that time HMS WOOLASTON was the subject of an experimental camouflage paint scheme. This was not successful, and **SECRET** continued.

FARLEY

✓ 17. In consequence instructions were given that if any craft was suspected of carrying bombs or explosives, it was not to be brought alongside for search, but was to be told to lie off, and the occupants ordered to swim to the ship. The craft was then to be sunk by gunfire. Since then there were no further casualties from booby traps or bombs, but the new order was somewhat cumbersome to execute. Some sampan crews were most reluctant to swim, even when a line was thrown to them, and even when "encouraged" by small arms fire directed close to them. Some large sampans proved particularly difficult to sink, and one or two Commanding Officers resorted to attempting to ram. This proved a mistaken policy, more likely to damage own ship than the sampan. A technique of sinking by the use of scare charges was subsequently evolved, which proved to be satisfactory.

Alertness

✓ 18. As stated in paragraph 78 of the main paper, one of the main problems of Commanding Officers was to maintain the standard of alertness through periods of inactivity. It was found to be most important not to keep a ship continuously on patrol for more than about ten days. Above this period staleness is likely to set in, despite all the measures to counter it that may be taken on board.

Rules of Engagement

19. The rules were somewhat complex and not exactly the same for FEF and RMN ships. An outline summary is however as follows:

- a. Ships may patrol in MTW/STW and on the high seas, but are not to enter ICW without specific authority to do so.
- b. Small craft may be stopped and searched. Any Indonesian craft in MTW is to be arrested, using such force as may be necessary. Indonesian craft on the high seas (outside ICW), if considered to be a threat to security, are to be arrested. Minimum force necessary to be used.
- c. Indonesian Naval and Government vessels are not to be interfered with on high seas, but are to be ejected if found in MTW/STW.
- d. Fire may be opened in self-defence on any Indonesian vessel that fires upon any of own ships, Malaysian/Singaporean ships and craft, or any vessels entitled to British protection.

? 20. In general these rules were found to be satisfactory, were understood by Commanding Officers, and there were no incidents of them being misinterpreted. The question of when and where opening fire was justified was one of the biggest worries facing Commanding Officers. The principle of setting the rules in fairly broad terms, as was done, and trusting to the discretion of the Commanding Officer was considered to be correct, but it required that the ship must be kept constantly well tuned to the higher command's mind at each development of the situation. This was achieved by careful verbal briefing by the Local Operations Officer before each patrol.

Standing Orders

✓ 21. It was found necessary to issue standing orders to Naval ships on patrol. These were issued jointly by the RMN and COMFEP, to cover all Naval ships engaged in anti-incursion patrols. The orders were known as MALPOS: extracts

/from.....

6.

from incident reports were issued as Part II to the orders, so that experience of each ship could be shared by all (Annexes F and G).

✓ 22. A special series of general signals (MALPOS GENERAL) was established to promulgate urgent amendments to MALPOS and other information or orders of an immediate nature.

✓ 23. A "Debrief Aide Memoire" form was produced, for ships to complete whilst on patrol (see Annex E). This was required in original only, and could be completed in pencil. It was appreciated that OOW's might not have time or opportunity to fill in all the details requested, particularly the Suspicious Contact Data Report on page 4 of the form.

✓ 24. A large number of completed aide-memoires were received from patrol ships, and it was clear that considerable efforts had been made to make the reports accurate and comprehensive. They were of great value, both to the Operational and Scientific Staff. All criticisms and recommendations were carefully investigated by the Fleet Staff; where a recommendation was not implemented, or a criticism shown to be invalid, the reporting ship was so informed. Great importance was attached to the maintenance of this dialogue between COMFEE staff and Commanding Officers of patrol ships.

✓ 25. Rules of engagement applicable to FEF ships only were promulgated in FOTIs Part IV (Annex H).

Hovercraft

✓ 26. A hovercraft was made available for a trial in the role of a patrolling vehicle. Regrettably it was removed for another task after only four nights trial patrolling in the Singapore Strait, so that no firm assessment of its potentialities could be made. However it does appear that, despite the disadvantages of noise and vulnerability, the hovercraft - if further developed - could be of great value as a patrol vessel because of its high speed. The current American trials of hovercraft in Vietnam should prove to be of great interest.

SECRET

FARLEY

ANNEX C

THE BARTER TRADE

1. Barter trade has been a feature of life in the Malacca and Singapore Straits for many years. Indonesian small craft from Sumatra and the Rhio Islands would cross the Straits bringing with them primary goods such as rubber, charcoal, copra, nutmeg, seaweed and crocodile skin. These would be traded either for cash, food, clothing or other manufactured goods. Although a certain amount of the trade was conducted through the minor ports of SW Malaya, Singapore was the main centre for it.
2. Because of the obvious risks of infiltration and sabotage that could be carried out under cover of the trade, it was prohibited in August 1964, and no Indonesian small craft were thereafter permitted to enter Malaysian Territorial Waters (MTW).
3. As a result of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965, Singapore became very anxious to increase its trade with other countries. In consequence political pressures for the resumption of the trade developed in Singapore, and also in Malaysia. Both Governments were aware of the risks to security inherent in a resumption, and various schemes were discussed in order to find a method by which trade could be conducted while reducing the risks to a minimum.
4. Eventually it was decided that trade should be conducted through merchant ships which were to be anchored to seaward of MTW/STW. Indonesian barter craft would be permitted to approach the ships by day to carry out trade, but they would not be allowed to trade by night nor to enter MTW/STW at any time.
5. The first ship to operate under this scheme started to trade to the south west of Singapore in early January 1966. At first it had very little success, but by the end of February trade had picked up, and as many as seventy boats were visiting the ship every day. The scheme was steadily enlarged until there were ten ships operating in four areas off the coast of Malaysia and Singapore.



Barter Trade ship RISA MEX with Indonesian craft alongside.

SECRET

FARLEY

SECRET

FARLEY

ANNEX D

LEGAL ASPECTS OF PATROLLING

Action on the High Seas

1. The major legal problem in the conduct of operations was to provide authority for ships to detain, and if necessary fire at, suspect craft on the high seas. This was overcome as shown in paragraph 2.
2. The inter-operation of S.73(6) of the Internal Security Act, 1960; the Visiting Forces Act, 1960 and the Visiting Forces (Internal Security Act, 1960) Order 1960, authorised the personnel of HM Ships on patrol in Singapore and Malaysian territorial waters to stop, detain and arrest any person who failed to satisfy them as to his identity or his purpose in being found there, or who is suspected of having acted, or being about to act in any manner which is prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or Singapore, in so doing such force may be used as is necessary, including the use of lethal weapons. The effect of FOTI 4104, paragraph 3, was to extend this right onto the high seas, but not into those areas which are within the limits of Indonesian Claimed Waters. The legal support for this extension is a proposition concerning the right of self defence set out in paragraph 337, page 290, Columbus "International Law of the Sea" (1962), which is strengthened by the principle that, since jurisdiction is concurrent with sovereignty and sovereignty depends on power to enforce law, if one can enforce one's law outside the confines of territorial waters, and needs to do so to defend the State, then such action is justifiable. It may be so that the Malaysians and Singaporeans were stretching their rights a little in order to empower us to defend them adequately, but the existence of this de facto situation without complaint for some considerable time inevitably strengthened the juridical argument in its support.

Indonesian Territorial Sea

3. Indonesia claims a territorial sea extending 12 miles from straight base lines; whilst this claim is disputed by GB and without according any de jure recognition or even de facto recognition, ships of the FEF were ordered not to enter the additionally claimed waters except in special circumstances, such as for shadowing or reporting, and then only when so ordered by COMFEF, FEF ships were ordered never to enter recognised ITW.

SECRET

FARLEY

SECRET

FARLEY

2.

6. There were three known cases of attempted sabotage through this trade. One bomb exploded on board one of the ships, one exploded in one of the barter trade craft, killing two Indonesians, and a third was discovered in a bale of rubber that had got as far as a factory in Singapore; it was defused before it could explode. The trade was however allowed to continue.

7. During the months of May and June the numbers of Indonesian craft taking part in the trade continued to increase, and not all of them followed the rules. They were subject to pillage by BT boats (Indonesian customs launches) on their return journeys and in order to evade this they took to making passage by night and remaining on the Malaysian/Singapore side of the Strait (and often inside MTW/STW) for as long as possible.

8. Although barter craft which entered Singapore waters were clearly breaking the law, the political situation at the time was such that the Singapore marine police were given instructions not to prosecute such offenders, but to escort them clear of STW and release them. As a result the barter craft tended more and more to come into STW, not only to avoid BT boats, but even to establish direct trading contacts with Singapore. In return the BT boats became bolder, and began entering STW also, to make sure of extracting their cut from the barter trade craft. Naturally enough the BT boats did not confine their depredations to Indonesian craft, but would also pillage any Malaysian or Singaporean fishing boat in the vicinity.


9. The whole effect of this was to make the task of Naval anti-incursion patrols very much harder. Not only were there a large number of Indonesian small craft to be investigated, both in and outside MTW/STW, but it became part of their duty to prevent the BT boat activities referred to above. As the BT boats were invariably faster than our own patrol ships, it became an almost impossible task.

10. Eventually it became necessary to inform the Malaysian and Singaporean Governments that patrolling under these conditions was not acceptable, and that Naval patrols would be withdrawn from areas in which barter trading was being conducted. This was in fact done in July 1966.

SECRET


FARLEY

ANNEX A TO REPORT
ON NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE
MALACCA AND SINGAPORE STRAITS
1964 - 1966



PORT

MAP OF OPERATIONAL AREA



MALAYA

JOHORE

2°

□ MUAR

◆ SUNGAI LIPUT

PENGERANG
PENINSULA

NAVAL
BASE

SINGAPORE


CHANGI

BAHRO

RHIO ISLANDS

BELAT PANJANG

LIMIT OF INDONESIAN CLAIMED WATERS



13444/66

ANNEX E

FAR EAST FLEET DEBRIEF AIDE-MEMOIRE

(To be completed in pencil)

SHIP	PERIOD	EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
SUBJECT	COMMANDING OFFICER'S NOTES	
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF INCIDENTS		

APPENDIX F

CONFIDENTIAL.

Copy No 039

**ORDERS FOR SHIPS PATROLLING
IN DEFENCE OF WESTERN
MALAYSIAN SEABOARD
(SECOND EDITION)
(MALPOS II)**

This is an Accountable Publication

When not in use it is to be kept locked up in a steel safe or cupboard.

W

CONFIDENTIAL

(~~SECRET~~ 077)

Page (i)

NAVAL OFFICER IN CHARGE
WEST MALAYSIA.

~~The Captain,~~
~~K.D. MALAYA.~~

Commander,
Far East Fleet,
Singapore, 27.

25th March, 1965.

WEST

ORDERS FOR SHIPS PATROLLING IN DEFENCE OF WESTERN
MALAYSIAN SEABOARD

(Short title:- MALPOS II)

1. Orders for ships patrolling in defence of the Western Malaysian Seaboard (2nd edition) are forwarded herewith. They apply to R.N., R.A.N., R.N.Z.N. and R.M.N. ships employed on these duties, except where specifically indicated.
2. Ships are to return them to the issuing authority on leaving the area.
3. In these orders the description "R.N. ships" includes R.A.N. and R.N.Z.N. ships of the strategic reserve, and R.A.N. and R.N.Z.N. CMS.
4. Urgent amendment to these orders will be promulgated in the MALPOS GENERAL series of signals. Other amendments will be promulgated by letter.

J.F.R. Weir for

(J.F.R. WEIR)
CAPTAIN.
~~K.D. MALAYA.~~

NAVAL OFFICER IN
CHARGE, WEST MALAYSIA.

F.B.P. Brayne-Nicholls

(F.B.P. BRAYNE-NICHOLLS)
REAR ADMIRAL
for COMMANDER, FAR EAST FLEET.

(~~SECRET~~)

Page (ii)
25th March, 1965.

DISTRIBUTION:

C-in-C.F.E.	(1)	
FO2FEF	(1)	
C.O. H.M.S. MANXMAN and all FEF Escorts	(2 copies each)	
C.O.'s all other IEF ships and submarines except 8 M.S.S.	(1 copy each)	
SM7	(1)	
Inspector General RMP	(50)	
(For Marine Police Malaya & Singapore)		
HQ FEAF	(1)	
HQ FARELF	(1)	
FEAFOC	(1)	
Marops Changi	(1)	
Mindef K.L. for Navy	(3)	
C.O. REP. MALAYA NOICWM.	(25)	- for R.M.N. ships.
Commander, 28 Bde.	(1)	
HQ 3 (Div.) F.E. R.A.S.C. L.C.T.		
Operations Room, R.N. HQ.	(2)	
Spare	(15)	
Commander, Singabase	(2)	
THE MASTERS FAR EAST FLEET RFA's	(1 copy each)	

MALPOS II

STATE OF AMENDMENTS

Amendment No.	Date	Date inserted	By whom inserted
AL3	—	29-10-65	J. Ash
MALPOS 661 129	18/10/65	24/11/65	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
6 2/4	21/9/65	24/11/65	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
C/L PLICATIONS APPECTIVE NOW	28/12/65	28/12/65	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
MALPOS 667 163	28/12/65	29/12/65	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
MALPOS 165	31-12-65	3-1-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
MALPOS 171	2007412	25-1-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
171 MALPOS	09-2-66	09-2-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
MALPOS 184	23/2/66	23/2/66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
MALPOS 185	16-3-66	24-3-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
AL6	18-4-66	28-4-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
MALPOS 203	28-4-66	5-5-66	M. Nicholson
MALPOS 171	20-1-66	6-5-66	J. Debb L Ro(G)
MALPOS 209	17-5-66	1-6-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
217	26-5-66	2-6-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
210	25-5-66	1-6-66	R. Kay Ro ² (G)
AL7	23-6-66	19-7-66	M. Nicholson

CONFIDENTIAL

Page (iii)

LIST OF CONTENTS

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>GENERAL</u>		
AIM the	4-5	1
ARREST OF CRAFT	18-20	5
AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES	6	1
COMMAND STRUCTURES	7	2
FISHING VESSELS - NETS AND EQUIPMENT	29	8
INCIDENT REPORTS	13-14	4
INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE	11-12	4
INTERPRETERS	17	5
INTRODUCTION	1-3	1
INDONESIAN CLAIMED WATERS, ENTRY INTO	21	6
LANDING PARTIES AND SHIPS BOATS	24	
MARITIME FORCES	8	3
PATROLLING - GENERAL PROBLEMS OF	10	4
RAF -AIR/SEA RESCUE LAUNCHES	27	
RFA's - ASSISTANCE TO PATROLS	9	3
SHIPS BOATS AND LANDING PARTIES	24	7
SHORE RADAR STATIONS	28	
SMALL ARMS PRACTICE	25	7
STATES OF READINESS - HM SHIPS	23	6
STATES OF READINESS - WESTERN MALAYSIA	22	6
SUSPICIOUS CONTACT DATA REPORT (SCDR)	15-16	4
TELOK AYER BASIN - TELEPHONE	26	7

ANNEX ALFA

Preparation and Conducting Patrols

Conduct of the Patrol	2	A2
Interception	3	A3
Preparations	1	A1
Search and Arrest	4	A4
Appendix I Prisoners Handling	-	A6
Appendix II Practical use of Radar to detect small craft.	--	A7

ANNEX BRAVO

Patrol Areas and Navigation

AA Fire - Sighting of	16	B10
Boat Booms - Anti Infiltration	15	B10
China Rock Range	7	B6
COMFEP Daily Sitrep	9	B7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page (iv)

LIST OF CONTENTS (continued)

Fishing Craft - control of	13	B9
Hostile Action from Indonesian Territory	14	B10
Malacca Straits - Scap Areas	2	B2
Malacca Straits - Rendezvous Positions	12	B9
Patrol Areas - West Malaysia	3(d)	B3
Patrolling - Scap Areas	-	B2
Malacca Straits	2	B2
Singapore Straits	3	B2a
Singapore Marine Police	17	B10a
South East Johore	3	B2a
Police Grid - Singapore Strait	5	B6
Reference Positions	1(c)	B1
Rendezvous Positions - Malacca Straits	12	B9
Restricted Area - Port of Singapore	-	B11
Restricted/Prohibited Areas - Singapore Territorial Waters	-	B12
Reporting	-	B7
Barter Trade Reports	10(b)	B8
Intention Reports	10(e)	B8
Nil Reports	10(c)	B8
Own Position Reports	10(d)	B8
Sighting Reports	10(a)	B7
Scap Areas Malacca/Singapore Straits	-	B2
Singapore Marine Police Patrols	17	B10a
Singapore Port Restricted Areas	6	B6
Singapore Straits Patrol - Organisation of	11	B9
Singapore Straits - Police Grid	5	B6
Singapore Territorial Waters - Restricted/Prohibited Areas	-	B12
Standard Combined Patrol Areas West Malaysia	1	B1
Territorial Waters - Recognised	8	B6
Appendix I Port of Singapore - Restricted Area for vessels under 100 net tons	-	B11
Appendix II Fishing Craft and Crew Passes	-	B14
Appendix III China Rock Range	-	B16

ANNEX CHARLIE

Legal Aspects of Patrolling

Action to be taken with Non-Government Craft	6	C1
Action to be taken with Indonesian Naval/ Government Vessels	3	C1
Introduction	1	C1
Opening Fire	7	C1
Tear Gas - Use of	8	C1

/Annex Delta

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page (v)

LIST OF CONTENTS (continued)

ANNEX DELTA Barter Trade Operations

Current Situation (April 1966)	2	D1
Singapore Government Scheme	2(a)	D1
Malaysian Government Scheme	2(b)	D1
Rules of Barter Trade	3	D2
Summary of Past Events	1	D1

ANNEX ECHO Intelligence

Deployment	2	E1
Dissemination of Intelligence	27	E4
Forces available for Infiltration (Indonesian Bases for Infiltration)	7 Appendix I	E2 E5
Infiltration	6	E2
Landing Places, Infiltration	13	E3
Saboteurs	22	E4
Strength	1	E1
Threat, the	3	E1
Vessels and Technicians	15	E3

ANNEX FOXTROT Sea Air Co-operation

Capabilities in Anti-infiltration Role	1(b)	F1
Contacts with Unidentified Aircraft	7	F2
Daily Patrols - details of	4	F2
General	1	F1
Limitations	1(c)	F1
LRMP Aircraft	3(a)	F2
Method of Operation	1(d)	F1
RM&F	2	F1
RMLF	3(b)	F2
Standard Patrols	3	F2
Tactical Command of Maritime A/C	5	F2

/Annex Golf

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST OF CONTENTS
(continued)

ANNEX GOLF

Naval Assistance with Air Defence

Air Defence Organisation	2	G1
AEW and Picket Stations	6	G3
Communications	7	G3
Execution	4	G1
Joint Air Defence in Malaya	1	G1
Naval Participation	3	G1
Reporting Procedures	5	G2

ANNEX HOTEL

Communications and Cryptography

Cryptography	13	H5
General Instructions and Information	15	H6
Radio Communications	-	H1
Air Defence Circuits	9	H4
Air Sea Rescue Launches	7	H4
Army Units	6	H3
Beach Reconnaissance Aircraft	10	H4
Coastal Common Net	1	H1
Land Forces, South East Johore	11	H4
Lighthouse Communications	12	H5
Police Craft Communications	3	H2
R.C.T. Launches	8	H4
RMN/RN Co-operation	2	H1
RMM/RMAF/RN Co-operation	5	H3
Sea/Air Co-operation	4	H3
Recognition	14	H6
Reporting	16	H6
Appendix I Callsigns - Scene of Action for use on Police VHF		H7
Appendix II Ships and Authorities concerned with MALPOS		H8
Appendix III VHF Channelisation of Police HQs		H9

/Annex India.

ANNEX INDIA
CHECK OFF LIST FOR SHIPS AND
CRAFT GOING ON PATROL

ANNEX JULIET
DETAILS OF PATROL CRAFT AVAILABLE

ROYAL NAVY	1	
Coastal Minesweepers	1(b)	J1
ROYAL MALAYSIAN NAVY	2	J2
Air Sea Rescue Launches	5	J5
Coastal Minesweepers	2(b)	J2
Despatch Vessel	2(e)	J3
Frigate	2(a)	J2
Inshore Minesweepers	2(c)	J2
Patrol Craft	2(d)	J2
Police Craft	3	J4
R.M.N.V.R. Seaward Defence Craft	2(f)	J3
R.A.S.C. Launches	4	J5
Royal Engineers Patrol Craft	6	J5

ANNEX KILO
LOCAL CRAFT

<u>INDONESIAN BOATS</u>	-	K1
Appearance	1	K2
Sailing Boats	3	K1
Speed Boats	2	K1
<u>INDONESIAN BOATMEN</u>		
Appearance	4	K1
Documents	5	K1
<u>MALAYSIAN CRAFT</u>		
Malaysian Boatmen	7(a)	K2
Boat and Licence Numbers	9	K4
Distinguishing letters - West Malaysian	7(b)	K2
Fishing craft and crew passes	7(c)	K3
<u>Local Fishing Craft -</u>		
Characteristics	8	K4
Disposition of Fleets	13	K4
Fishing Areas	12	K4
Habits	10	K4
Licence Numbers	9	K4
Methods	11	K4
Types of Craft	-	K8
APPENDIX I Indonesian Passes	-	K11
" II Indonesian Identity Card	-	K12
" III Malaysian Identity Card	-	K13
" IV Malaysian Crew List	-	K14
" V Stolen Fishing Craft	-	K15
" VI Restricted Area Permit - Singapore	-	K17

ANNEX MIKE
KINEMATICAL ASPECTS OF PATROLLING

ANNEX NOVEMBER
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SHIPS ON PATROL

FUEL	2	N1
CMS ISDB's	2(b)	N1
ESCORTS	2(a)	N1
MAIL	6	N1
PROVISIONS/NAVAL STORES	3	N1
SCOPE	1	N1

ANNEX PAPA
RECREATION

GENERAL	1	P1
FACILITIES	3	P1
East Coast	3(e)	P1
Lumut	3(c)	P1
Penang	3(d)	P1
Port Dickson	3(a)	P1
Terendak Camp Malacca	3(b)	P1
Water Islands	3(f)	P1

ORDERS FOR SHIPS PATROLLING IN DEFENCE OF WESTERN MALAYSIAN SEABOARD

INTRODUCTION.

1. When Malaysia came into being in the Autumn of 1963, President Soekarno of Indonesia announced a policy of 'confrontation' and began a campaign to "crush Malaysia". In the first phase, action took the form of propaganda, sabotage and fostering racial strife, the latter particularly in the susceptible areas of Singapore. The struggle entered a new phase in August, 1964 with the landing of infiltrators on the mainland of West Malaysia by sea at Pontian, by air in September at Labis and by subsequent landings.

2. Since December, 1964, it has become clear that patrolling ships have to counter two main threats:

(a) Infiltration.

(b) Sabotage.

3. These threats are considered in detail in Annex ECHO (Intelligence), but in general it may be said that all Indonesian activity takes place at night. It is therefore the intention that patrolling vessels should constantly be alert and vigilant during the hours of darkness. By day ships may - subject to specific local orders - anchor in their patrol areas, replenish, or carry out exercises as scheduled in the weekly practice programme.

THE AIM.

4. The aim of Commonwealth forces is to prevent Indonesian forces from entering Malaysian ^{OR SINGAPORE} Territorial Waters or landing on Malaysian ^{OR SINGAPORE} Territory.

5. To achieve this aim the following action is being taken:

(a) Naval and police vessels and maritime aircraft carry out patrols off the West Malaysian ~~coast~~, ^{AND SINGAPORE COASTS.}

(b) Night curfews on small craft are imposed in certain areas as necessary.

(c) Barter trading is banned (See Annex D)

(d) Investigations are being made into the feasibility of controlling the fishing craft in the Malacca Straits.

(e) A coast-watching organisation is being set up.

AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

6. OPSCO Responsible for overall coordination of all operations in West Malaysia.

/COMFEP

(b). Local Command and Control.

- (i) When no specific operation is in progress, naval patrol vessels are under the direct command of COMFEEF or MALAYA as appropriate.
- (ii) Should an incident develop the senior Officer present is authorised to take command and act as OTC of all naval vessels in his own and adjoining areas. Police vessels should not normally be taken under command without prior permission.
- (iii) When a specific operation is to be mounted, COMFEEF will organise a patrol group for the purpose and will nominate the OTC and ships to be placed under his command.
- (iv) In the Singapore Straits special considerations apply. The organisation for the Singapore Straits patrol is laid down in Annex B. para 11.
- (v) LRMP aircraft tasked for Malacca Straits patrol are always under the tactical command of the senior ship in the area assigned to the aircraft.

8. Maritime Forces available.

a. The number of patrolling ships and craft will vary with the state of the threat and other operational commitment. Daily Sitreps are signalled by COMFEEF and include details of Maritime Aircraft patrols arranged by MAROPS Changi and HQ RMAF.

b. ^{NOIC COM} ~~K. D. MALAYA~~ will signal the necessary extracts of the Sitrep to R.M.N. Ships.

c. As a rough guide the following forces are the average numbers maintained on patrol in West Malaysia.

- 2 Escorts (RN/RAN/RNZN/RMN)
- 70 CMS (RN/RAN/RNZN).
- 8 RMN Vessels (CMS, DMS or PC)
- 4 Offshore RMP craft
- 20 inshore RMP craft
- 1 LRMP Aircraft (2200GH to 0400GH)
- 1 RMAF Aircraft (Dusk patrol)
- Police craft in harbour patrols in Penang, PSW and SP.

(~~SECRET~~)

GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PATROLLING.

10. It will be appreciated that there can at present be no question of offensive action being taken against Indonesia, and our own forces are not permitted to enter Indonesian waters. In this situation our operations must be entirely defensive in character, and the initiative rests completely with the enemy. However, within these limitations Commanding Officers should make every effort to foster a vigorous and challenging outlook to the problems of patrolling. The state of mind of "a sentry on a beat" must at all costs be avoided. It must be made clear that the presence of a patrol vessel acting as a deterrent is not of itself enough. The intention must be to gain a clear moral ascendancy over the Indonesians. Tactics, courses and speed should be changed frequently, all personnel should maintain the utmost vigilance and alertness, in the knowledge that their aim is to capture and frustrate every Indonesian attempt that is undertaken.

11. Intelligence and Operational Experience.

a. R.N. Ships.

1. Before proceeding on patrol Commanding and/or Operations Officers should visit the MJOC and Naval Intelligence Offices for briefing.
2. While on patrol ship will be supplied with current intelligence by signal.
3. On return from patrol Commanding and/or Operations Officers should visit the MJOC for debriefing. See paras 12 to 15 for written reports required.

b. R.M.N. Ships.

Commanding Officers should visit SO(O), ^{NOICWM} ~~NOICWM~~ for briefing on up to date intelligence prior to sailing. On return, a call should be made on the Captain, ~~NOICWM~~ MALAYA and SO(O) for debriefing.
_{NOICWM}

12. Comments and suggestions for improving the efficiency of patrols will be welcomed and should be addressed to the Fleet Operations Officer or Captain, ^{NOICWM} MALAYA, as appropriate. ~~Comments and suggestions should be made during debriefing and forwarded to the Fleet Operations Officer or Captain, MALAYA, as appropriate.~~ *SKH REBETS*
WILL BE PROMULGATED AS MALPOS II - PART 11

Incident Reports.

13. Commanding Officers should forward written reports of any incidents to COMFEP (R.M.N. Craft to ^{NOICWM} ~~NOICWM~~ who is requested to forward copies to COMFEP). Reports should be brief and written in the third person and should include comments on any lessons learnt during the incident. Such reports will be promulgated in Annex L to MALPOS.

14. In this way experience gained by individual ships will be shared by all.

Suspicious Contact Data Report (SCDR)

15. In order that patrol vessels may be employed in the most efficient manner it is necessary to collect information about the ranges at which suspicious craft are detected, and the "time lost from patrol" used up in searching them. To this end all patrol ships are to render SCDR as shown in Annex M., figure 3.

16. It is fully appreciated that it may not be possible to complete the form on every occasion, but it is requested that as many as possible be completed and forwarded, in order that accurate data may be compiled. Report forms should be forwarded to the Commander, Far East Fleet on completion of each patrol.

Interpreters.

17. a. R.N. Ships engaged on patrol are to carry a Malaysian interpreter and should signal request to K.D. MALAYA at least 48 hours before sailing. Joining instructions should be included. K.D. MALAYA will supply a R.M.N. rating. He is to be returned to MALAYA as soon as possible after completing the patrol.
- b. To ease the Chinese language problem, when no L.E.P.'s are borne, ships are to request for "bi-lingual interpreters if available".
- c. When 48 hours notice cannot be given the request for an interpreter is to be made to COMFEEF giving reasons for the short notice.

Arrest of Craft.

18. a. Power of Arrest. Provisions of this paragraph apply to R.N. ships only. Ships may arrest any craft on suspicion as shown in Annex B to FOTI 4104. The following vessels may not be arrested in the high seas:
- (1) Naval vessels.
 - (2) Police or customs vessels.
(This includes BT boats)
- b. Barter Traders (See Annex D.). R.N. vessels have no power to arrest Barter Traders as such. All boats professing to be Barter Traders are to be dealt with under F.O.T.I. 4104 paragraph 5(c); this will allow H.M. Ships to stop, search and arrest without warrant.
19. Arrested personnel should be transferred to the custody of the Royal Malaysian Police. For ships patrolling in the Singapore Strait, request for a police craft may be made direct to Coastguard Operations Room Pearls Hill. In the Malacca Straits or East Coast ships should contact the nearest police launch on patrol in their area. (See Annex H. para 1 and 2). If unable to do so ship should signal to COMFEEF or NOICWM as appropriate. (For further details see Annex A).
20. Commanding Officers should bear in mind that it is most undesirable for them to leave their assigned patrol areas by night in order to hand over arrested personnel to the police. Consideration should be given to the following:
- (a) Arranging for police craft to come out to the ship's patrol area for the hand over.
 - (b) Retaining arrested personnel onboard and towing the boat until daylight.
 - (c) Sending the arrested boat in to the nearest police station in charge of a prize crew.

/Entry into Indonesian claimed waters.....

Entry into Indonesian claimed waters.

- 20. (a) R.N. Ships. Patrolling ships are to patrol so as to keep outside Indonesian claimed waters as shown on the tracings (See Annex B. para 8). In the Singapore Straits ships are to keep north of the median and middle lines as shown. Ships exercising by day are however permitted to use area Xray Xray. Any variation from this policy will be signalled.
- (b) R.M.N. Ships. ~~K.D. MALAYA~~ ^{NOICWM} will issue appropriate orders to R.M.N. Ships.

STATES OF READINESS IN WESTERN MALAYSIA.

21. Plan Cannon. The following is a summary of the States of Readiness covered by this plan:

<u>COLOUR</u>	<u>MEANING</u>	<u>ACTION REQUIRED.</u>
WHITE	In force throughout period of confrontation against Malaysia.	Collation of intelligence and general surveillance.
YELLOW	Specific threat(s) against particular areas of West Malaysia.	Reconnaissance intensified in areas concerned Forces and reserves required brought to appropriate states of readiness. COMFEEF redeploys and reinforces patrols as appropriate and establish Task Organisation if required.
BLUE	Confirmed indications that a landing is imminent in West Malaysia.	COMFEEF assigns forces for surface action against sea-borne infiltrations and re-deploys forces as necessary.
RED	Indonesian guerilla forces or infiltrators in strength have been detected within Malaysian air space, territorial waters or detected on West Malaysian territory.	OPSCO (Kuala Lumpur) coordinates allocation of forces to the area or areas in which landings have occurred or infiltrators have been detected.

Note. (i) Codeword may be qualified by a named area or state.
(ii) A colour may be ordered without the previous colours being in force.

STATE OF READINESS OF H.M. SHIPS.

23. Ammunition and Missiles on board. The following ammunition and missile readiness is to be maintained by all ships at sea or in Singapore:

/Seaslug.

Seaslug. Blast deflector plates may be removed.

Seacat. A proportion of outfit to be primed and kept in R.U. stowage.

Medium Range Guns Fifty percent of H.E. outfit to be fused V.T.

Close Range Guns R.U. Lockers to be full.

Note: N.M. and E.R. 0209 (1) and (2) are in abeyance.

24. Ship's Boats and Landing Parties

- a. Ship's Landing Parties are not to be put ashore in any operational area on the coast of West Malaysia without prior permission from COMFEE or the local Military Commander.
- b. If permission is obtained locally COMFEE is to be informed.
- c. In order to avoid the danger of own troops on land engaging naval vessels, no ship or boat is to approach within half a mile of the coastline in any operational area unless positive mutual identification of all friendly forces has been achieved.
- d. Army units are issued with C.M.R.T.

25. Small Arms Practice

Ships on patrol requiring to carry out small arms practice by day are

- A. to ensure they are sufficiently far from the coast for the sound not to alert ground forces.
- B. to inform shore authorities of their intentions in advance.

26. Telephone at Telok Ayer Basin

- a. A telephone has been installed at Telok Ayer Basin for the use of R.N. Ships. ~~R.N. ships may also use this telephone.~~ The number is Singapore 93122.
- b. A secure stowage has been provided to lock up the phone when not in use, and the key is to be lodged and drawn from the quartermaster K.D. SINGAPURA.
~~lodged and drawn from the quartermaster, K.D. Singapore.~~
- c. This telephone is for official calls only.

27 RAF Air/Sea Rescue Launches

These boats are being fitted with an all round red pulsating light, similar to a helicopter's Grimes light.

28 Shore Radar Stations

Four Coastal Radar Stations are now in operation and details of these are as follows:

Station	Location	Landing Points
SAKRA	West extremity of PUSAKRA (Singapore Grid ref. 4115.B)	1. JETTY. Ship's boats only. North extremity of SAKRA (Singapore Grid ref. 4117.D 4215.A.) 2. BEACH on SITE. Follow 500 yard path South West.
RAFFLES	On RAFFLES Light-house.	On East side of RAFFLES Light-house is a jetty for ship's boats. Much affected by on/off currents.
ST. JOHNS	Southern extremity of PULAU SAKIJANG BENDERA on Tanjong Lokos. (77ft)	Small concrete jetty accessible at High Tide for ship's boats. Follow the path to South to position 1° 12' 9" North, 103° 51' 43" East. (marked on Chart 3837)
BEDOK	01° 19' 5" N 103° 57' 9" E	(1) By road/rough track from Upper Changi Road down KOH SEK LIM Road. (2) From Seaward by ship's boat, as safe navigation permits.

The stations are manned by RMN and are in UHF contact with Coastguard who filter contact reports and pass on information to OTC's.

"29. Fishing Vessels - Nets and Equipment

Claims for damages to nets and equipment caused by ships on patrol or exercising in the vicinity of fishing boats are occasionally received from local fishermen.

Commanding Officers should ensure that an entry is made in the Deck Log whenever possible and particularly if the possibility of a claim arising exists."

MALPOS II

ANNEX A

PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF PATROLS

PREPARATIONS

1. The following notes are intended to be advisory:-
 - (a) The patrol areas are laid down in Annex B. The R.N. and R.M.N. weekly "Intentions for patrols" signal, orders which ships are to patrol the various areas. COMFEP's daily sitrep gives patrol areas of all vessels at 2100GH, gives a forecast of movements of ships, and indicates the air patrols intended. It is recommended that ships which are fitted to do so should keep a G.O.P. or State Board showing the above information, in addition to their L.O.P's.
 - (b) It is an advantage to have surveyed in daylight the area to be patrolled at night in order to mark on the chart the positions of radar echoes which may cause doubt, e.g. Kelongs, rocks, buoys, etc.. The position of Kampongs is worth noting as shore-side camp-fires have been known to cause confusion. The positions of beaches clear of reefs and rocks and suitable for landings, and river estuaries should be marked.
 - (c) When ships are permitted to anchor by day the places and times chosen should be varied. The presence of patrol craft has a beneficial effect on local morale.
 - (d) The assistance of an Interpreter is to be obtained from ~~K. D. MATA~~. This can be arranged by signal ~~on telephone~~ giving as much warning as possible and joining instructions (see para 17 of main order). Commanding Officers and Boarding Officers should make the acquaintance of the Interpreter on joining.
+ KD MALA YA
 - (e) If time permits a survey of the area to be patrolled carried out before last light enables the identification of craft which may already be underway within the area.
 - (f) As a result of daylight encounters individual ships should note their detection ranges of various craft by radars, sonars, E.W., etc.. (See Appendix II)
 - (g) Although ships should be domestically darkened against hostile encounter, navigation lights should be used when necessary to ensure the navigational safety of the ship.

(h) /

- (h) Consideration should be given to the formation of a standing Boarding Party if practicable and comprising 1 Officer, 1 Petty Officer plus 4 and the Interpreter. Clear of night watches, they should be highly trained in the use of their weapons, the habits of infiltrators, the construction of the various craft, and the normal documentation. The Watch-on-Deck should provide the fire-cover and alongside securing arrangements including where appropriate scrambling nets, floodlights, etc.
- (i) Consideration should be given to the handling of prisoners on deck, handcuffing, provision of sentries, etc.. (See Appendix I).

CONDUCT OF THE PATROL

- 2. (a) On all occasions of passing through areas patrolled by other ships, Commanding Officers must ensure that their intentions are made known in plenty of time and must be ready to identify themselves. If it has not proved possible to warn the patrolling craft they should burn navigation lights.
- (b) Ships fitted with helicopters should carry out dawn and dusk surveillance of their areas and adjacent beaches. Helicopters are not to be used in an offensive role.
- (c) The chances of a radar detection under varying conditions are shown in figs 1 and 1A in ANNEX M. (See also Appendix II).
- (d) In order to increase positive radar detection of sampans etc., ships are to sink or pick up crates and other potential radar contacts by day in the Singapore Straits.
- (e) Where the shape of the area permits careful consideration should be given to the method of its coverage: thus there is little point in being 20 miles off the shore at an hour before dawn. Known 'jumping-off' places and likely landing places should be borne in mind. Recent experience indicates that the infiltrators prefer river mouths and the hour before dawn, but the time of high water and the phase of the moon should also be borne on mind.
- (f) For Patrols in Singapore and Malacca Straits, see also ANNEX B, Paras 2 and 3.
- (g) Navigation lights. See PREPARATIONS 1. (g).
- (h) Frigates acting as OTC's are encouraged to use IFF whenever it will assist to clarify the surface picture. RN CMS's in the patrol group should be instructed to "Squawk" as required by the OTC. CMS's are fitted with basic MK X IFF transponders but cannot interrogate or display IFF responses and need to be informed whether or not their equipment is operating correctly. RN SDB's and all RMN ships have no IFF facilities. Attention is invited to FOTI 4439.

/INTERCEPTION.....

CONFIDENTIAL

Page A.3.

INTERCEPTION

- 3.
- (a) When a detection has been made course and speed must be adjusted to ensure interception bearing in mind that the contact may increase speed.
 - (b) Identification may be assisted by carefully watching the suspicious vessels movements, lights (if any), hydrophone effect, etc..
 - (c) Once a contact is firmly held it may be advisable to dim or switch off navigation lights.
 - (d) Unless the intruder is using high speed it may be advisable to let the plot develop until there can be no question of its illegal conduct, but see also sub para (o) below.
 - (e) If the contact is to be illuminated by searchlight it must be remembered that the light forms an excellent target. It is as well to remain outside the range of Sten-gun fire until after the contact has been illuminated, but note that there have been reports of infiltrators armed with bazookas.
 - (f) It is important to keep 'goofers' off the upper deck. The Boarding Party should be mustered remote from the boarding position until the Watch-on-Deck have secured the craft alongside.
 - (g) Whilst attention is focussed on identifying a contact and the process of getting it alongside etc., great care must be taken to ensure an all-round look-out for possible consorts.
 - (h) The circumstances in which fire may be opened are laid down in FOTIs Part IV. It is worth remembering that once fire has been opened with small-arms the noise level may rise to an extent to which it may be difficult to control.
 - (i) Ships with sufficient hands may be able to detail one as a sniper armed with a rifle.
 - (j) The Interpreter should be familiar with the use of the Loud Hailer or Megaphone. He should order the crew in the suspicious craft to put their hands on the top of their heads during the initial inspection.
 - (k) Small patrol vessels may elect to go alongside the craft: beware of towed explosives and hand thrown grenades.
 - (l) Larger ships may have to order the craft to come alongside their scrambling nets. Close scrutiny should be maintained whilst the crew are propelling their vessel alongside lest anything should be ditched or guns prepared etc. It is not advisable to send the Boarding Party away in ship's boats.

/(m).....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page No. 40

- (m) Indonesian sampans have been known to carry time bombs which may either have a preset time fuse or an ordinary initiating fuse; if the sampans are late on task, therefore, the bombs may explode without warning. Further, the construction of the fuse is such that it may be activated by shock or contact with water. Explosives and suspected time bombs should therefore only be handled by experts. A time bomb with anti-personnel fittings was recovered in October 1965. It consisted of approximately six kilos high explosive, electric detonator and watch timer all contained in crude wooden box measuring approximately 12 inches by 18 inches. Box not painted or varnished. Fitted with lid. Detonator circuit incorporated into box by means of spring and nail attachment. Should lid be lifted or box moved the bomb would explode.
- (n) Boats suspected of carrying these devices should not be brought alongside. They should be ordered to stop a suitable distance away and the crew ordered to abandon the boat and swim to the intercepting craft; the boat should then be sunk by gunfire.
- (o) If the suspicious craft has revealed itself as hostile it is important to remember that it may be one of a number in the vicinity, or part of a coordinated assault over a wider area. It is important that adjacent patrol craft should be warned, and that the Commander Far East Fleet and NOICWM be informed so that other ships and forces may be alerted. All incidents are to be reported by signal to AIG 1117.
- (p) It is possible that an initial detection may resolve itself into more than one suspicious craft: in fact several proceeding loosely in company. This problem requires particularly careful consideration since each craft may contain upwards of 20 armed men. It is recommended that the first task is to get the group under control by steaming around it whilst illuminating and ordering the craft to gather together: curtain fire may be necessary to hasten the process and show firmness of intentions. Slower patrol craft may have to manoeuvre on a line at right angles to the intruders' path whilst disciplining the group. Once under control the leader or largest craft should be called alongside and the normal search and arrest procedure should be followed. It is appreciated that the whole action may take a considerable time. Adjacent patrol craft should be called to assist as necessary. Merchant ships should be warned to keep clear of the scene.
- (q) Ordering "Approach Stations" may be a convenient method of bringing a ships armament to an appropriate degree of readiness.

SEARCH AND ARREST (See also Main Order, paragraph 15 et seq.)

4. Having considered the risks stated in paragraphs 3(m) and 3(n) above, if a search of the craft is decided upon, then the following rules should be observed:-

- (a) Once the craft is secured alongside the Master/Owner should be ordered onboard the patrol vessel, searched for arms, and questioned by the Boarding Officer and Interpreter.

/(b).....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page A.5.

- (b) The identity of the craft should be checked against the list of stolen craft.
- (c) If it is decided to search the craft it may be desirable to take off the crew first: they should embark one at a time, be searched for arms and put under the supervision of an armed sentry.
- (d) The search of the craft should include a bottom line search. However, all searches should be carried out with caution as intelligence sources indicate that Indonesians in the Malacca Straits may place booby traps in sampans containing barter trade goods.
- (e) If it is decided to release the craft and her crew Commanding Officers are advised to obtain a written or verbal indemnification against subsequent allegations of loss or damage.
- (f) If it is decided to make an arrest it is advisable to replace boat's crew by a prize crew.
- (g) If it is decided to take the craft in tow care should be taken that the strain does not damage the craft. Slow speeds must be used, while towing, as the towed craft can be very easily swamped.
- (h) No attempt at detailed interrogation of prisoners should be made. This is a specialised technique and amateur efforts may well jeopardise subsequent investigations (See appendix I).
- (i) In the Singapore Strait a Police launch can be arranged to take over arrested craft, at any of the following points on request to Coast Guard :-
- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| A. Angler Buoy | B. Outer Shoal Buoy |
| C. Sebarok Beacon | D. Ajax Shoal Buoy |
- (j) Far East Fleet Ships which capture Indonesians who are required to be landed at the Naval Base are to land them at R.N.A.D. in order to attract minimum attention. Prisoners should, as far as possible, be kept out of sight during passage of the Johore Strait and until handed over to the police.
- (k) If it is decided to sink the craft and the use of gunfire is impracticable because of the presence of shipping or land, demolition charges should be used. If time is available, charges should be placed as advised in paragraphs 415 and 416 of BR 1708 (Manual of Demolitions). If time is at a premium, two or more 1 lb scare charges made up as in paragraphs 50 and 53 of Chapter 2 of BR 1836 (Demolition Drill Book) and accurately thrown into the bow or stern of the craft should be sufficient to ensure destruction. ON NO ACCOUNT SHOULD AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO SINK THE CRAFT BY RAMMING.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(AL.1)

Page A.6.

ANNEX A. APPENDIX I

PRISONER HANDLING

Overall Principle

Any prisoners taken during Malaysian patrols will be of great value to the qualified interrogators ashore, and the success of the interrogators depends upon the mental state of the prisoners.

1. On being taken on board each prisoner must be completely stripped to be searched. Any item found on the prisoner (e.g. scraps of paper, cloth matches - anything) must be kept in a numbered bag, and the prisoner clearly marked with the same number in indelible ink. He may be given back the bare essentials of clothing on completion of the search. He should be kept separate from his fellows at all times and no talking allowed.
2. Throughout the time on board, the prisoners must be kept in a state of terror. The only food to be given to them should be bread and water, and they should be allowed no comfort at all. Prisoners should be blind-folded.
3. The prisoners should be kept in an enclosed space with more than one guard, and the guards must be firm, and correct in appearance etc.

Immediate Interrogation

Following the search the prisoners should be separately interrogated by an officer using the interpreter. The officer must put the questions to the prisoner, and the interpreter translate WORD FOR WORD.

E.G. Officer:- How many boats were there with you?
Interpreter:- How many boats were there with you?
(in Malay or Indonesian).

The interpreter must not use his own words, e.g. 'This man wants to know how many boats came with you?' and must be briefed carefully on this on his arrival at the beginning of the patrol.

Information received in this way must be signalled to the Operating Authority immediately where it can be assessed as true or false.

Final Disposal

The prisoner must be handed over to the proper authorities and they should be checked as they leave (and at intervals on board) that they have their correct numbers marked on them, and that the separate numbered bags of articles are handed over with them.

Conclusion

It is essential that the prisoners are handed over to the authorities ashore in the best possible condition for interrogation. They must have been severely dealt with, and have no idea where they are, where they are going or to whom they are going.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(AL.1)

Page A.7.

ANNEX A. APPENDIX II

THE PRACTICAL USE OF RADAR TO DETECT SMALL CRAFT.

INTRODUCTION

1. The radar reflecting area of a kumpit or kotak is small so that the radar echoes received from these craft will be comparable with the unwanted echoes so often observed. To ensure a reasonable chance of detection, it is very important that the radar set be used with considerable finesse.

AIM

2. To define the best operating procedure when using a radar to detect small targets.

FACTORS

3. What follows is a simple discussion of the physical factors involved when detecting small targets with radar. This will provide a basis for understanding the different operating procedures. No apology is made for the rather basic nature of the discussion, since experience has shown that the principles involved are sometimes overlooked due to the pressures of a sustained patrol effort.

4. Noise. All things in nature are in a state of motion, and this applies right through the scale of sizes. In the case of a radio receiver, interest centres on the random thermal motion of the electrons in different parts of the circuit. Any random electronic motion constitutes a current which will generate small voltages at various points within the receiver. This becomes apparent in the final stages of an output amplifier, where a signal may be observed, even though there is no input. The larger the noise level in a receiver the greater the magnitude of the output when there is no input.

5. Condition for detection of a signal in the presence of noise. There is a precise condition that has to be satisfied if any small signal is to be detected by a receiver, but this is somewhat involved, depending on the noise level in the receiver and its frequency characteristics. It suffices here to recognise that there is a lower limit to the magnitude of any input that may be detected by a given receiver, and that in general, the greater the magnitude of the input relative to the noise level, the better the chance of detection. A corollary to this is that if the input signal is smaller than the noise level, then no amount of amplification will make it possible to detect it.

6. Sources of Noise in a Radar. The ambient noise in any radar receiver comes from two sources:

- a. Internal, namely the thermal noise within the receiver

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(AL.1)

Page A.8.

- b. External, where noise may be defined as the signal produced by all unwanted echoes.
7. The problem of operating a radar to detect a small target amounts to manipulating the controls in such a way that the signal from the target is optimised relative to unwanted signals arising from either internal or external noise.

OPERATION OF THE RADAR

8. The basic controls. Broadly speaking, the following characteristics of the radar may be varied:

- a. Frequency of receiver
- b. Receiver gain
- c. Display Brightness
- d. Range Scale
- e. Pulse length.

9. Need for Careful Tuning. The frequency of the receiver is generally pre-set. Nevertheless, remember that if the receiver is off-tune, then the amplitude of received signals will be reduced relative to the noise level within the receiver. For this reason always tune with the aid of the meter; manual tuning by 'experts' is usually bad. Incidentally, another factor which may degrade the received signal is the state of the silica gel drying agent in the aerial. If this is provided, make certain that it is dry, otherwise an unnecessary attenuation will be introduced.

10. Receiver Gain and Display Brightness. The basic controls are:

- a. Receiver Gain which determines the level of amplification throughout the receiver, and
- b. Display Brightness, which adjusts the brilliance of the display relative to the ambient lighting.

11. If there is no signal at the input to the receiver, increasing the brightness control will simply enhance the level of the display of the signals generated by the internal noise. If the gain control is set at too low a level, then small signals at the input cannot be amplified to the point where they produce traces on the display which may be distinguished from those due to ambient noise.

12. Adjustment of Gain and Brightness. The aim in setting up the receiver must be to ensure that signals just above noise level may be resolved. This means that the display produced by the noise must be just visible. If the brightness is arbitrarily set at some lower level, then marginal detection opportunities will be lost. The first step must be to adjust the brightness so that the scan is visible. If the gain is then set so that receiver noise is just visible, that is, when the face of the display has a fine speckled appearance over areas where there are no obvious echoes then signals just in excess of noise level may be resolved.

13 /

CONFIDENTIAL

13. Effect of Rough Seas. If there is a rough sea, then the external noise level will be high because of reflections from the surface waves and a small target will not be resolved against this background. No control on the receiver can change this fact. Noise due to reflections from waves (sea clutter) generally extends over a small range. Some sets are provided with either a proportional gain control (swept gain) or a form of logarithmic amplification as an anti clutter device. Both systems depend on suppressing the gain at small range, relative to that at high range. If the aim is to get detections at low ranges, then the use of these controls cannot be recommended, since the effect will be to impose an arbitrary cut-off which will suppress both the wanted signals as well as the external noise. There may be some advantage at intermediate ranges, where the existence of a small echo might be masked by a light overspill from the inner regions of intense clutter. Since clutter arises from reflections at wave concavities, when searching an area, it is better to search from up wind, so as to reduce the interference due to clutter on the display. The snag about this is that boats of small freeboard will be shielded by the waves, and will not give rise to such a large echo, but it is felt that on balance there will be a small advantage.

14. Effect of rain. When it is raining the additional attenuation with increased range will lower the signal to noise ratio for distant targets. Operation of the anti-clutter device under these conditions will introduce a measure of amplification where it is needed, at the expense of enhancing the long range noise.

15. Pulse Length. The detection range for a kumpit or kotak is not expected to be more than three miles. Better discrimination at short ranges will be obtained by using short pulses.

PRACTICAL HINTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PATROL

16. The Watch-Keepers. The emphasis in operating the radar is to do everything to enhance the chance of detecting the fleeting contact. The last point in the detection chain is the watch-keeper. It is just as important to ensure that he is working under optimum conditions, try to arrange that:

- a. The watch-keeper has short spells of 30 minutes.
- b. The watch-keeper is left on his own where possible - be careful of the distractions of a crowded Ops Room or Bridge.

17. Visual Look Outs. It is clear from the foregoing that the radar is being used under marginal conditions because of the small target presented by the infiltrating boats. Do not overlook the contribution that may be made by the vigilant, well briefed visual look-out.

18. Patrol Paths. If committed to a patrol line remember the blind arcs which may be surprisingly large at close range, and dog-leg the course. Remember also that the chance of detection increases with increased patrol speed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page B.1

MALPOS II

ANNEX B

PATROL AREAS AND NAVIGATION.

STANDARD COMBINED AREAS FOR PATROLS WESTERN MALAYSIA.

1. To provide a simple means of reference to the sea areas off the coast of Malaya and Singapore (West Malaysia) to facilitate the rapid and flexible deployment of Naval and Air Forces on such patrol tasks as may from time to time be required, the waters adjacent to the coast of West Malaysia are divided into numbered areas, as shown in para 3(d) below.

(a) Numerical designation of Areas.

The basic designation of each area is by the numbers shown in sub para delta. These numbers are only to be used as the basis for reference to the alphabetical code letters promulgated periodically.

(b) Alphabetical designations of Areas.

To increase security each numbered area is allocated one or two letters for operational use. Areas off West Malaysia are allocated single letters (e.g. A,B,C.). Unlike the basic numbers, the actual distribution of letters will be random and will be changed at three monthly intervals or as required if compromised.

Letters and letter changes will be worked out by the NOICWM and promulgated by him to:-

MINDDEF KL
ALL RMN Ships
DOBOPS
COMNAVBOR
COMLANDBOR
COMAIRBOR
COMDEF.

COMDEF will in turn be responsible for promulgating this information to:-

CINCFE
HQ FARLEF
HQ FEAF
All ships of Far East Fleet.

The complete alphabetical designation is classified CONFIDENTIAL. References to an individual area by its alphabetical designation are classified RESTRICTED. However, where extreme urgency is required it is permissible to send short unclassified signals e.g. "Proceed forthwith to Romeo".

(c) REFERENCE POSITIONS.

(1) To facilitate plotting of positions by ships and LAMP aircraft the following reference positions are established.

<u>PATROL AREA.</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>
4	White Rock Light	TL
5	03°30' North 100° 30' East	IN

/6 One.....

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page B. 2

<u>PATROL AREA</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>
6	One Fathom Bank Lt.	AX
7	292 CAPE RACHADO Lt. 27.5	TO
7	258 CAPE RACHADO Lt. 21.8	FK
7/8	CAPE RACHADO Lt.	CP
8	163 CAPE RACHADO Lt. 12.5	JQ
8	262 P. UNLAN Lt. 20.3	ZR
9	157 P. UNLAN Lt. 9.0	YU
9	239 Tg. TOHOR Lt. 13.4	KR
9/10	Tg TOHOR Lt.	NG
10	165 Tg TOHOR Lt 15.5	BF
10	277 P. PISANG Lt 15.7	PS
11	167 P. PISANG Lt. 8.5	MT

All contact reports in the above patrol areas should be made relative to the nearest reference position. e.g. A contact obtained in area 6 would be reported as:-

310 AX 8.

- (ii) Reference positions in patrol areas not listed above are laid down in Annex B para 3 (d). Designators have not been allocated and positions are to be reported as e.g. :- 090 St. Johns 6.
- (iii) Standard Rendezvous positions in Malacca Straits are listed in Annex B para 12.
- (iv) Gannet aircraft use reference positions listed in Annex G para 5 (d).

(d) Singapore Straits

In the Singapore Straits, the Police Grid is in use. See para 5 below.

PATROLLING OF SCAP AREAS IN MALACCA AND SINGAPORE STRAITS.

2. MALACCA STRAITS.

(From 1800 GH to 0600 GH unless otherwise ordered)

(a) By night, ships are to patrol the seaward limits of their assigned areas so as to be as clear as possible from interference from shipping and local craft, or on patrol lines established by the OTC to cover a known threatened area (but see (c) below. When patrolling by day, ships should carry out a random patrol throughout their areas.

(b) When it is required to station ships more accurately than is possible by the designated SCAP areas the following system will be used.

The line marking the seaward limit of each area will be divided into 3 equal sections, each of which will be referred to as North, centre, or south. Thus for area '8' there will be 3 patrol lines, 8 North, 8 centre, 8 south.

CONFIDENTIAL

/In.....

In signals these will be referred to by the current letter code i.e. TANGO NORTH, TANGO CENTRE, TANGO SOUTH.

(c) In certain circumstances, temporary patrol lines will be established by the Commander, Far East Fleet and promulgated by MALTOS General Signal.

3. SINGAPORE STRAITS AND SOUTH EAST JOHORE

(a) In the Singapore Straits and South East Johore the following patrol lines have been permanently established.

Area 12

Patrol line	30	3313D to 3613C
	22	- 3315A to 3613A
	21	- 3613D to 3912D
	20	- 4011A to 4209A
	19	- 4309A to 4609C
	18	- 4709A to 4911D

17 - Vicinity 4510

31 TO TG PIAI TO 3213D

16 - 5011D to 5312A

30 3313D to 3613C.

(ii) Area 13

Patrol line.	15	- 5413C to 5614D
	14	- Vicinity OUTER SHOAL BUOY
	13	- 5814A to 0116D
	12	- JSB to 0216C

(iii) AREA 14

Patrol line	11	- JSB to TG STAPA
	9	- ANGLER BUOY to TG PENGELIH
	7	- TG STAPA to 104.15 EAST
	6	- HORSBURGH to 215 HORSBURGH 6
	5	- TG STAPA to TG AYAM
	4	- TG AYAM to 265 HORSBURGH 7
	2	- 270 HORSBURGH 5.5 to 335 HORSBURGH 3.0

(iv) Area 15

Patrol line	25	- Vicinity 090 TG PUNGGAI 2.0
	26	- 055 PUNGGAI 3.5 to 065 PUNGGAI 6.5
	27	- 055 PUNGGAI 7.0 to 060 PUNGGAI 10.0

(b) If other patrol lines are temporarily required for a specific operation they will be promulgated by COMFLEF, and NOICOM to the ships concerned. No patrol lines other than those set out in 3(a) above will have permanent validity.

(c) PATROL AREAS - WEST MALAYSIA.

AREA NO.	CO-ORDINATES	REFERENCE POSITION
1	05° 42.7' N; 100° 21.6' E - 05° 42.7' N; 98° 53.5' E - 06° 30.0' N; 98° 53.5' E - 06° 30.0' N; 100° 06.0' E	P. SAGANTANG 06° 01.0' N; 99° 55.0' E
2	05° 42.7' N; 100° 21.6' E - 05° 04.0' N 99° 09.9' E - 05° 42.7' N; 98° 53.5' E - Tg. Piandang Lt.	TG PIANDANG LT 05° 05.0' N; 100° 25.0' E
3	Tg. Piandang Lt. - 05° 04.0' N 99° 09.9' E - 04° 09.5' N; 99° 32.0' E - Kuala Jarum Mas.	As for Area 2.
4	Kuala Jarum Mas. - 04° 09.5' N; 99° 32.0' E - 03° 57.2' N; 99° 36.8' E - 03° 23.8' N; 100° 19.9' E - 03° 54.2' N; 100° 42.7' E	P. PIANDANG <i>See para.</i> 04° 09.5' N; 100° 32.0' E <i>1(c)(i)</i>
5	03° 54.2' N; 100° 42.7' E - 03° 23.8' N; 100° 19.9' E - 03° 04.1' N; 100° 45.2' E - 03° 30.6' N; 101° 05.0' E	TG BAIH <i>"</i> 03° 48.0' N; 100° 48.0' E
6	03° 30.6' N; 101° 05.0' E - 03° 04.1' N; 100° 45.2' E - 02° 43.3' N; 101° 12.5' E - 02° 50.1' N; 101° 17.3' E	ONE FATHOM BANK LT. 02° 55.0' N; 101° 30.0' E <i>"</i>
7	02° 50.1' N; 101° 17.3' E - 02° 43.3' N; 101° 12.5' E - 02° 17.2' N; 101° 46.3' E - 02° 25.0' N; 101° 51.8' E	ONE FATHOM BANK LT. 02° 24.0' N; 101° 51.8' E <i>"</i>
8	02° 25.0' N; 101° 51.8' E - 02° 17.2' N; 101° 46.3' E - 01° 55.8' N; 102° 15.3' E - 02° 07.9' N; 102° 23.8' E	<i>As for Area 7</i> <i>"</i>
9	02° 07.9' N; 102° 23.8' E - 01° 55.8' N; 102° 15.3' E - 01° 42.0' N; 102° 33.8' E - Tg. Tohor Lt.	TG TOHOR LT. 01° 42.0' N; 102° 33.8' E <i>"</i>
10	Tg. Tohor Lt. - 01° 42.0' N; 102° 33.8' E - 01° 15.1' N; 103° 07.0' E - 01° 38.2' N; 103° 10.1' E	<i>As for Area 9</i> <i>"</i>

01 42N 102 33.8E Site Para 1(c)(i)
 01 21.5N 103 00E
 01 19.0N 103 15.0E
 01 12.8N 103 28.5E
 01 12.8N 103 30.5E
 TG PAI

/11.

CONFIDENTIAL

(~~SECRET~~)

Page B.4
25th March, 1965.

AREA 11. 01 38.2N 103.10.1E
 01 19.6N 103 07.6E
 01 12.8N 103 15.0E
 01 12.8N 103 30.5E
 01 12.8 103 30.5E TG PAI

AREA	CO-ORDINATES	REFERENCE POSITION
11	01° 38.2' N; 103° 10.1' E - 01° 19.6' N; 103° 07.6' E - 01° 19.0' N; 103° 15.0' E - 01° 12.8' N; 103° 30.5' E Tg. Piai.	P. PIANG See para 01° 28.1' N; 103° 15.5' E (c)(i)
12	Tg. Piai - 01° 12.8' N; 103° 30.5' E - thence follow line of Indonesian territorial waters boundary - 01° 12.2' N; 103° 51.6' E - 01° 28.0' N; 103° 45.5' E -	RAFFLES LT 01° 09.6' N; 103° 44.5' E
13	01° 28.0' N; 103° 45.5' E - 01° 12.2' N; 103° 51.6' E - thence follow line of Indonesian territorial waters boundary - 01° 16.8' N; 104° 05.7' E - 01° 25.1' N; 104° 00.0' E	ST. JOHN IS. LT. 01° 13.3' N; 103° 51.3' E
14	01° 25.1' N; 104° 00.0' E - 01° 16.8' N; 104° 05.7' E thence follow line of Indonesian territorial waters boundary until it crosses line running 165° from Horsborough Lt. Hors. Lt. TG DATOK	TG AYAM 01° 20.3' N; 104° 12.0' E
15	Tg. Datok, Hors Lt, Tg Brakit, Coast to 01° 00.0' N; 105° 00.0' E - 02° 34.0' N; 104° 32.0' E - Tingaroh Pt.	TG SIANG 01° 39.0' N; 104° 15.0' E
16	Tingaroh Pt, 02° 34.0' N; 104° 32.0' E - 03° 32.0' N; 104° 00.0' E. Po. Syed Hassan	P. TIOMAN (Gunong Katjong) 02° 46.0' N; 104° 09.5' E
17	Po. Syed Hassan - 03° 32.0' N; 104° 00.0' E - 05° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E - Tg. Dungum.	TG. PENUNJOK 04° 19.5' N; 103° 29.5' E
18	Tg. Dungum, 05° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E - 05° 52.0' N; 103° 19.0' E - Br. Bidong	P. KAPAS LT 05° 12.9' N; 103° 16.0' E
19	Br. Bidong - 05° 52.0' N; 103° 19.0' E - 06° 40.0' N; 102° 28.0' E - 06° 15.0' N; 102° 04.0' E	P. RHU 05° 49.8' N; 102° 37.0' E
20	06° 40.0' N; 102° 28.0' E - 07° 00.0' N; 102° 49.0' E - 07° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 06° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 06° 00.0' N; 103° 11.0' E	

CONFIDENTIAL

(SECRET)

Page B.5
25th March, 1965.

AREA NO.	CO-ORDINATES	REFERENCE POSITION
21	06° 00.0' N; 103° 11.0' E - 06° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 05° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E 05° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E.	
22	05° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E - 05° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 04° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E 04° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E	
23	04° 00.0' N; 104° 00.0' E - 04° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 03° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E 03° 00.0' N; 104° 18.0' E	
24	03° 00.0' N; 104° 18.0' E - 03° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 02° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E 02° 00.0' N; 104° 42.0' E - 02° 34.0' N; 104° 32.0' E	
25	02° 00.0' N; 104° 42.0' E - 02° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E - 01° 00.0' N; 106° 00.0' E 01° 00.0' N; 105° 01.0' E	

/ANNEX 'B'

CONFIDENTIAL

(~~SECRET~~)

~~25th March, 1965~~

THE PARALLELOGRAM

4. A special area is allocated eastwards of Horsburgh Light as follows:

- S.W. corner - Horsburgh Light.
- South Edge - 070 degrees, 30 miles from Horsburgh Light.
- West Edge - 000 degrees, 20 miles from Horsburgh Light.

This area, if patrolled by a single ship at random at 15 knots, is computed to give a 30 percent chance of detection of a 15 knot infiltrator bound for East Coast of Malaya and routed east of Horsburgh.

SINGAPORE STRAIT - POLICE GRID.

5. (a) The Singapore Police use a grid system for reporting contacts in this area. This grid is required by R.N. Ships patrolling in the Singapore Strait and by all R.M.N. Ships. All ships should obtain copies from COMFEL or MALAYA before going on patrol. The grid is modified GEOREF, with the mile square subdivided into four, lettered A, B, C, D.

A	B
C	D

(b) Example. St. John Island is 5113c

(c) Coverage. This grid system is used in the Singapore Straits between KUKUP and HORSBURGH LIGHT

SINGAPORE PORT RESTRICTED AREAS.

6. In the waters South of Singapore Island, Restricted areas, night curfew areas and night fishing areas are in force. Details are given in Appendix One to this Annex.

CHINA ROCK RANGE ACTIVITY

7.a. China Rock Range (Area MS 3) is active as follows:-

MONDAYS	1000 to 1600
TUESDAYS to THURSDAYS	0845 to 1600
FRIDAYS	0845 to 1500

b. On TUESDAYS and THURSDAYS each week the China Rock Range is open for night firing practices from 1830 to 2200 and flares, etc., are likely to be sighted in this area at these times. Advance notice of such practices will normally be given in COMFEL daily sitrep.

c. Ships are not to enter the area without COMFEL approval when the range is active.

Ships may enter the area during active hours when operationally necessary, and all practice activity will automatically cease. The Range Safety Net is on 117.9 or 276.4 Mcs.

d. A detailed chartlet of the Range is in appendix IV to this Annex.

COMFEEF DAILY SITREP.

9.a. COMFEEF co-ordinates the allocation of patrolling craft and publishes a Situation Report (SITREP) daily at 1200 GH giving the forecast situation at 2100 GH on that day, and any after information affecting the immediate future.

Daily Sitrep Format (all times GH).

- Paragraph 1 Ships and craft patrolling each SCAP area
- Paragraph 2 Harbour Police Patrols.
- Paragraph 3 Details of LRMP patrols for next 24 hours
i.e. Times on and off Task. Callsign and
variations of standard patrols in Annex
India paragraph 4.
- Paragraph 4 RMAF Patrols and other information.

"(b) The short title "Patrol Sitrep" will be used as the address. Composition as follows:-

- Originator: COMFEEF
- Action: UK REP KL (for Defence Adviser).
- OPSCO
- MINDEF KL
- IGPOL MARINE
- CINCFE
- FEAF
- FARELF
- FEAFOC
- FO2FEF
- NOIC WM
- KD MALAYA
- RAF SELETAR
- 224 GP
- MAROPS CHANGI
- MAROPS BUTTERWORTH
- 28 BDE
- 32 RGT RCT
- 37 MAR SQDN RCT
- 1 RECCE REGT PORT DICKSON
- PATROL SHIPS AS DETAILED."

MINDEF KUALA LUMPUR

INFO CINCFE

HQ FARELF

"NOTE: When reporting incidents of tactical importance which take place on the coast of Johore, the J.C.C.C. JOHORE is to be included in the signal address in addition to AIG 1117.

Classification and Precedence of Reports.

Classification and precedence of sighting reports must depend on circumstances and state of political tension at the time. The normal initial sighting report should be made 'Unclassified' Operational Immediate to Action addresses and Priority to information addressees.

The precedence and classification of amplifying reports should be adjusted according to the urgency of the situation and the nature of the information.

/Example.....

CONFIDENTIAL

Page No. 11

Example of sighting report

TO AIG 1117

FROM NONSUCH

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED

SIGHTING REPORT

3 Fishing boats 190C. Rachado Lt 215 - 050 10

021030GH

2. Boats have large crews and turned away on sighting. Am investigating.

DTG

(b) Barter trader reports

- (i) On encountering a Barter Trader RN ships are to send an Operational Immediate unclassified ~~to NOICWM and COMFEE info MINDEN KL NAVY, IGPOB OPS,~~ ^{signal} giving details of the craft, number of crew, cargo, place, time and intentions. (See also para 1840f main order and Annex K para 9.)
- (ii) RMN Ships should act in accordance with Annex D.

(c) NIL Reports

Not required unless specifically ordered.

(d) Own position reports

- (i) Patrol vessels on passage through Areas.
There have been several incidents reported of patrol craft investigating each other as suspicious contacts. When a patrol vessel is transitting an area assigned to another vessel, it is the responsibility of the former to keep the latter informed of the situation. In the Singapore Straits the OTC should also be informed.
- (ii) Investigating contacts outside allocated area.
When proceeding out of the allocated area to investigate suspicious contacts patrol craft must report own position and intention together with position, course and speed of contact to adjacent patrol craft and to the OTC, where applicable.
It is important that these reports are made immediately on local circuits (T23 or Police nets) as well as making a sighting report to AIG 1117 on C.C.N. If this is done the Senior Officer in the area can co-ordinate investigation, help to avoid confusion and thus avoid any friendly clashes.

(e) Reporting Intentions for following day (RN Ships only)

- (i) By day patrolling ships have freedom to replenish or anchor in their assigned areas, and their orders sometimes include instructions to disperse. Experience has shown that there is an operational need for COMFEE to know ship's positions by day.
- (ii) Patrolling ships are to signal COMFEE at 1600GH daily their intentions for the following day. The signal

"(f) Reporting Availability (RMN Ships only).

- (i) In order to plan patrols, OTC's in Malacca Straits need to know when RMN ships require to replenish and the period they expect to remain in the area.

RMN Ships are to report this info. to the OTC. on joining, the
on change of OTC. and on change of // (ii) RMN ships..... y.
Signal Programme

CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANISATION OF SINGAPORE STRAITS PATROL

11. a. The Naval patrol vessels operating in the Singapore Straits are normally divided into two patrol groups:
- (i) West Patrol Group
Consists of all RMN and RN vessels on patrol between TANJONG PIAI and THE SISTERS. The Senior ship will be designated OTC and is to act as SRRCS.
 - (ii) East Patrol Group
Consists of vessels on patrol between THE SISTERS and JSB. The senior ship will be OTC and SRRCS.
 - (iii) On occasions when only a small number of ships are available for Singapore Straits Patrol, the East and West will be combined into one patrol group. When this is done the fact will be made clear in the signal ordering the patrols.
 - (iv) S.E. Johore Patrol Group
Consists of all RMN and RN vessels on patrol in the Singapore Straits East of JSB. The senior ship will be OTC and SRRCS.
- b. OTC's of groups are not to redeploy patrol vessels from their assigned area unless:
- (i) Authority to do so is delegated to them.
 - (ii) An immediate threat develops.
- c. All naval vessels are to report suspicious contacts to the SRRCS who alone will originate contact reports to AIG 1117 and to the Police/RMN Coastguard Operations Room at DEARLS HILL,
- "d. Duration of night patrols in the Singapore Straits and South East Johore is from 1800 GH to 0700 GH. The Senior OTC in the Singapore Straits is to ensure that two ships remain on patrol until relieved by assigned day patrol ships." uit

Patrol have been unable to establish communication with the OTC prior to commencement of the patrol.

b. If no orders have been received from the designated OTC ships are to proceed to a standard rendezvous position in their assigned area and are to remain in vicinity until communication is established with the OTC.

c. Standard rendezvous positions are to be as follows:

<u>AREA</u>	<u>STANDARD RENDEZVOUS POSITION</u>
11 W	167 PISANG LT 8.5
10 A	165 TOHOR LT 15.5
9 B	157 UNDAN LT 9.0
8 D	163 RACHADO LT 12.5
7 E	292 RACHADO LT 27.5

CONTROL OF FISHING CRAFT

13. a. Regulations have been made which will require all fishing craft to carry a Pass on which will be shown details of the boat and its crew. The issue of the pass obviates the need for fishermen to take their identity cards to sea. The regulations cover fishing craft operating from the States of Malaya only.
- b. A copy of the pass is at Appendix II. The regulations authorise inspecting officers to arrest any person in the boat whose particulars are not shown on the pass, regardless of whether the boat is within or without Malaysian Territorial Waters.
- c. The Malaysian Government has requested that spot checks be carried out on fishing craft from time to time, to assist in enforcing the regulations.

- d. Ships should make occasional checks on Malaysian fishing craft by day. Checks should also be carried out at night on all craft that are not obviously fishing, provided that this does not conflict with the aim of the patrol.
- e. RN ships should not arrest any Malaysian fishing craft whose pass is not in order, but should signal the relevant details by unclassified Priority signal to COMFEF, info NOICWM, MINDEF KL NAVY, IGPOL.
- f. RMN ships may arrest fishing craft whose passes are not in order, and should send them under a prize crew to the nearest port. Relevant details should be signalled to:

NOICWM
INFO MINDEF NAVY
COMFEF
IGPOL

14. HOSTILE ACTION FROM INDONESIAN TERRITORY

- a. In West Malaysian area if units of Far East Fleet are fired upon from Indonesian Territory, they are to withdraw out of enemy range and report incident to COMFEF by operational immediate classified Signal.
- b. On no account is fire to be returned unless essential to ensure a safe withdrawal.

"15. ANTI-INFILTRATION BOAT BOOMS

Unlit anti-infiltration boat booms (short title WABWO) have been laid as follows:-

- (a) WABWO 1. South East coast Singapore Island.
Position from 133° SIGLAR OBELISK 0.8 miles to
088 SIGLAR OBELISK 3.8 miles.
- (b) WABWO 2. Western Roads.
Position from 089 PULAU JONG BEACON 2.8 miles to
087 PULAU JONG BEACON 1.1 miles.
- (c) WABWO 3. ~~Not yet (December, 1965) laid. Intended position Western Roads.~~
~~Position from Beacon South East PULAU SEBAROK to PULAU BUSING via PULAU SEKENG, PULAU SOMBAU and PULAU HANTU.~~

16. SIGHTING OF AA FIRE

"Attention of RN Ships is drawn to FOTI 4432 paragraph 12."

CONFIDENTIAL

Page. B.10.a.

17. Singapore Inshore Marine Police Patrols.

(a) Police patrols cover the approaches to the Port of Singapore from Tg TERITIP in the west to Tg SENYONGKONG (P. TEKONG) in the east.

(b) Patrols are categorized as follows:-

<u>PATROL DESIGNATION</u>	<u>GRID LOCATION</u>	
F 1	3719B TO 3815D	S"
F 2	3614B TO 3911B	.
F 3	4011A TO 4409	ortant
F 4	4409 TO 4711B	.
F 5	4811A TO 5112A	.
F 6	5112B TO 5315B	.
F 7	5415C TO 5716B	as of
F 8	5315B TO 5217A	d keep a
F 9	5918C TO 0121D	small
F 10	0022C TO 0223A	

(c) Following Police patrol lines are established:-

<u>PATROL</u>	<u>GRID LOCATION</u>		<u>DAY COVERAGE/NIGHT COVERAGE.</u>	
	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>BY</u>	<u>BY</u>
FOXTROT I	3917 A	3914 A	Police	Police
FOXTROT II	3616 A	3813 B	Police	Police
FOXTROT III	3914 C	4211 D	Customs	Police
FOXTROT IV	4409 B	4712 D	Customs	Police
FOXTROT V	4712 D	5112 A	Police	Customs
FOXTROT VI	5112 A	5315 B	Police	Customs
FOXTROT VII	5415 C	5716 B	Marine Dept.	Police
FOXTROT VIII	5315 B	5817 A	Police	Customs
FOXTROT IX	5918 C	0121 D	Police	Police
FOXTROT X	0022 C	0223 A	Police	Police
TANGO I	Around Pulau Bukom.		Marine Dept.	Police
TANGO II	4616 C	4715 D	Nil	Marine Dept.
TANGO III	5117 D	5317 C	Nil	Police
TANGO IV	5317 C	5517 A	Nil	Police
TANGO V	5818 A	5920 C	Police	Nil
TANGO VI	5623 D	5524 A	Police	Nil
WALTZ I	4616 B (STATIC)		Nil	Police
WALTZ II	4517 A (STATIC)		Nil	Police

(d) Police launches are instructed not to leave their patrol lines unless:-

- (i) ordered to do so by Coastguard
- (ii) investigating or intercepting a sighting
- (iii) in emergency
- (iv) relieved.

(e) In the event of radio failure, police launches fire very light signals as follows:-

- (i) 1 white - small craft sighted. Investigating.
- (ii) 3 whites - craft is hostile.
- (iii) 1 or more red - require immediate assistance.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX B

Port of Singapore - Restricted Area for
vessels under 100 net tons

Date: With effect from 1900 hours on 29th January, 1965.

Details:

- (1) With the exception of vessels detailed at para. 2, no vessel of under 100 net tons shall enter the area bounded by lines joining the following positions:-

Outer Limit.

- (i) Beacon 28 (Tg. Merawang ~~1°19'43"N 103°37'40"E~~) STET.
1°14'23"N, 103°36'24"E
- (ii) Sultan Shoal Lighthouse (1°14'23"N 103°38'54"E)
- (iii) Raffles Lighthouse (1°09'36"N 103°44'26"E)
along Port Limit to 1°14'49"N 103°54'19"E
- (iv) thence in a 060° direction to
- (v) 1°17'39"N 104°01'07"E
- (vi) thence in a direction 310° to Si Mata Ikan Light,
(1°20'00"N 103°58'15"E)

Inner limit.

- (i) 1°19'05"N 103°38'35"E
- (ii) 1°15'28"N 103°37'46"E
- (iii) 1°15'12"N 103°39'32"E
- (iv) 1°10'48"N 103°44'40"E
- (v) Sg. Bakriang Pelapah Air Flash Red Lt. Beacon
(1°13'23"N 103°51'14"E)
- (vi) Outer Shoal Buoy (1°15'40"N 103°53'45"E)
- (vii) 1°18'04"N 103°59'45"E
thence in a direction 310° to Tg. Bedok,
(1°19'34"N 103°58'00"E)

- (2) This restriction shall not apply to:

- (a) vessels under 100 net tons arriving from a port outside Malaysia (other than vessels having on board Indonesian personnel or cargo originating from Indonesia) provided such vessels enter off Peak Island and proceed direct to the Immigration Anchorage;

/ (b)

CONFIDENTIAL

(~~SECRET~~ 071)

Page B.11

~~25th March, 1965~~

- (b) vessels under 100 net tons proceeding to a port outside Malaysia and having on board a Port Clearance from Singapore;
 - (c) vessels under 100 net tons proceeding to or returning from any port in Malaysia and having on board a Port Clearance from the Port of departure;
 - (d) vessels under 100 net tons owned by the Government or a Statutory Board; and
 - (e) vessels under 100 net tons having on board a pass issued by the Officer Commanding, Port Authority Police.
- (3) Mariners are reminded that Malaysian territorial waters surrounding the States of Malaya and the State of Singapore are a SECURITY AND CONTROL AREA and that all vessels must stop when ordered to do so by a security patrol.

Charts affected: 3833, 2403, 1995, 3836 and 3837.

Restricted and Prohibited Areas - Singapore Territorial Waters.

The Shipping and Fishing Community is advised that new night curfew arrangements for boats under oars, sails and outboard motors will come into force at 1900 hours (7 p.m.) Friday 29.1.65. Three areas where night fishing will be permitted have been designated. Boats must enter the areas before 1900 hours (7 p.m.) and remain in the area until 0530 hours (5.30 a.m.). Night movement of boats under oars, sails and outboard motors in all other parts of the territorial waters of Singapore between Tg. Changi and Tg. Kampong continues to be prohibited.

The prohibited day and night area for all vessels under 100 tons will with effect from 1900 hours (7 p.m.) 29.1.65 be extended to the East to a point off Tg. Mata Ikan and to the West off Sultan Shoal Lighthouse. Any vessel under 100 tons wanting to pass through the area by day or night must be in possession of a permit issued by the O.C. Port Authority or in possession of a Port Clearance. Passes are normally only issued for day-light passage through the prohibited area.

A plan showing:-


- (a) the night fishing areas and
- (b) the night curfew area for boats under oars, sails and outboard motors, and
- (c) the prohibited zones for all vessels under 100 tons during day and night,

is attached herewith.

CONFIDENTIAL

Write
across

				55
N ^o	126			60
	FISHING	AREAS	IN	65
		ABYANCE.		70
				75
PENGERANG	↳ PUNGGAI	1600 - 0600	G/H.	80
				85
PUNGGAI	↳ BULOH	24 hrs		90
				95
				100
				105
				110
				115
				120
				125
				130
				135
				140
				145
				150



Kawasan Penangkapan
 捕鱼区
 Kawasan Larangan
 禁止区
 Kawasan berkurung
 di-waktu Malam
 晚上个禁区

NOTE The night curfew
 arrangements described above are
 reviewed each month by Singapore Authorities and
 re-imposed as necessary. Currently (FEB 66) there is no
 change to that laid down above other than that the fishing
 areas are in abeyance

CONFIDENTIAL

(A.L.1)

Page B.13.

ANNEX B. APPENDIX II

Form 2.

KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN, MALAYSIA.
(Ministry of Defence, Malaysia)

SURAT KEBENYARAN PERAHU NELAYAN DAN ANAK2 PERAHU
(FISHING CRAFT AND CREW PASS)

Sah bagi tempoh.....
(Valid for the period)

5½ inches
Gambar Perahu (Photograph of Craft)
Pos Kad (Postcard)

3½ inches

Nombor Daftar:.....
(Registered Number):

Nombor Lesen:.....
(Licence Number)

Anak2 Perahu.....
(Crew):

1½"
Gambar Paspot (Passport Photograph)

1½"

1½"
Gambar Paspot (Passport Photograph)

1½"

Nama.....
(Name)

Nama.....
(Name)

Umur.....
(Age)

Umur.....
(Age)

Nombor Kad Pengenalan.....
(Identity Card No.)

Nombor Kad Pengenalan.....
(Identity Card No.)

1½"
Gambar Paspot (Passport Photograph)

1½"

1½"
Gambar Paspot (Passport Photograph)

1½"

Nama.....
(Name)

Nama.....
(Name)

Umur.....
(Age)

Umur.....
(Age)

Nombor Kad Pengenalan.....
(Identity Card No.)

Nombor Kad Pengenalan.....
(Identity Card No.)

Tarikh.....
(Date)

Pihak Berkuasa Yang Mengeluarkan
(Issuing Authority)

Panduan2 untuk menggunakan surat kebenaran ini ada di-muka sa-belah
(Instructions for the use of this pass are on the reverse)

CONFIDENTIAL

Reverse of Form 2.

Sharat2 bagi menggunakan Surat Kebenaran ini
(Instructions for use of this Pass)

1. Apabila Surat Kebenaran ini di-keluarkan, ada-lah satu kesalahan jila pergi keluar ka-laut dengan tiada membawa-nya. Tuan punya perahu mungkin di-luchutkan lesen-nya.

(When this Pass is issued it is an offence to proceed to sea without it. The owner of the craft is liable to forfeiture of his licence).

2. Apabila berjalan kuat-kuasa Surat Kebenaran ini, ada-lah satu kesalahan di-bawah Peratoran2 Keperluan (Surat Kebenaran Perahu Nelayan dan Anak2 Perahu) 1965, membawa Kad Pengenalan ka-laut.

(When this Pass is in force it is an offence under the Essential (Fishing Craft and Crew Pass) Regulation 1965 to take a National Registration Identity Card to sea).

3. Apabila sebarang anggota perahu nelayan tidak ada di-dalam perahu atau sa-saorang anggota nelayan tambahan di-masokkan, satu Surat Akuan Pertukaran Anak2 Perahu hendak-lah di-perolehi daripada Pehak Berkuasa yang mengeluarkan.

(When any member of the crew is not present on board or an additional number of the crew is enrolled a Certificate of Change in Crew is to be obtained from the Issuing Authority).

4. Ada-lah satu kesalahan pergi ka-laut jika ada beserta di-dalam perahu yang di-beri Surat Kebenaran ini orang2 yang tidak ada terchatet nama-nya di-dalam Surat Kebenaran ini atau pan di-dalam Surat Akuan Pertukaran Anak2 Perahu yang sah yang mesti di-simpan bersama2 Surat Kebenaran ini.

(It is an offence to proceed to sea with persons on board the craft for which this Pass is issued whose names are not on this Pass or a valid Certificate of Change in Crew which is to be kept with this pass.)

5. Kehilangan Surat Kebenaran ini hendak-lah di-laporkan dengan sertamerta ka-Balai Polis yang berhampiran dan kepada Pehak, Berkuasa yang mengeluarkan.

(The loss of this Pass is to be reported immediately to the nearest Police Station and the Issuing Authority.)

6. Surat Kebenaran ini hendak-lah di-tunjokkan jika di-minta oleh:

This pass is to be shown on demand to:

- a. Sebarang anggota Pasokan Keselamatan
(Any member of the Security Forces).
- b. Sebarang Pegawai Kastam
(Any officer of Customs)
- c. Sebarang Pegawai Perikanan Laut
(Any Maritime Fishery Officer)
- d. Sebarang Timbalan Pegawai Perikanan Laut
(Any Deputy Maritime Fishery Officer)
- e. Sebarang Pegawai Imigresen
(Any Immigration Officer)
- f. Sebarang Pegawai Jabatan Laut
(Any officer of the Marine Department).

7. Surat Kebenaran ini hendak-lah di-serahkan balek kepada Pehak Berkuasa yang mengeluarkan sa-telah satu Surat Kebenaran baharu untuk tempoh yang berikut-nya di-keluarkan.

(This Pass is to be surrendered to the Issuing Authority when a new Pass for the next period is issued).

CONFIDENTIAL


APPENDIX III to ANNEX B

CHINA ROCK

RANGE

MAY 1965

From portion of chart No 3839.



CONFIDENTIAL

MALPOS II

ANNEX C

THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF PATROLLING.

1. The provision of this Annex apply to R.N. ships only. The relevant orders for R.M.N. ships are contained in S.O.I.'s.
2. Indonesian Territorial Waters and additional waters to which they have laid claim are defined in FOTI 4102 paragraph 32 et seq., and are shown on the tracings (see Annex B para 8). The policy of H.M.G. towards these claims is also contained in the same FOTI.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH INDONESIAN NAVAL AND GOVERNMENT VESSELS.

3. It should be noted that all craft commissioned in the service of a Government are entitled to the same immunity as warships and hence bona fide customs vessels, BT boats, etc., must be treated in the same way as warships.
4. Patrolling ships encountering INDONESIAN Naval and Government vessels report them as in FOTI 4125 and act in accordance with the following instructions:

(a) On the high seas.

Indonesian Naval and Government vessels are to be regarded as immune from any direct action except when interfering with a ship entitled to British protection. Nevertheless, contact is to be held whilst the Indonesian vessel is passing through the patrolling vessel's assigned area.

(b) In Malaysian territorial sea.

The vessel is to be closed and required to explain her presence. Unless she can justify innocent passage, she should be required to leave. If her Commanding Officer refuses to do so, action is to be taken to eject her, by force, if necessary. Instructions issued must be firm and force is only to be used in the following circumstances:

- either (i) All appeals to reason have failed and H.M. Ship's intention to open fire is clearly indicated.
- or (ii) The Indonesian vessel clearly shows hostile intent.

5. There is no Indonesian Naval ensign as such. All Indonesian Naval, Government and Merchant ships fly the Indonesian National flag.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH NON-GOVERNMENT CRAFT.

6. The instructions contained in FOTI 4104 are to be followed.

OPENING FIRE.

7. The policy governing the conditions under which fire may be opened are contained in FOTI 4102 and 4104.

8. USE OF TEAR GAS.

Ships which carry tear gas are not under any circumstances to use such gas when dealing with infiltrators or saboteurs.

MALPOS II

ANNEX D

BARTER TRADE OPERATIONS

1. Summary of Past Events

a. At the onset of confrontation, Indonesia used barter trade craft plying between Indonesia and Malaysia to transport infiltrators and their arms and ammunition to Singapore and Malaya. It was soon realised that this traffic could not be stopped while barter trade between the two countries continued. In consequence, on 13th August, 1964 all barter trade between Malaysia and Indonesia was declared illegal by:

(1) Creating an Import Ban on all Indonesian goods brought into Malaysian Territorial Waters * (MTW's) by craft of under 200 NRT whether Malaysian or Indonesian * (This also applies now to STW though at this time, by reason of the Mutual Defence Pact, all waters retained their original designation).

(2) Cancelling all entry permits for Indonesians.

b. Subsequent to (1) and (2) above, MTW was declared a controlled area. Indonesians are not permitted to enter MTW and will be apprehended and charged under the Internal Security Act if they do so.

c. Upon implementation of the above restrictions, intensive patrolling by RMN ships, police patrol craft and Malaysian Government craft was carried out. At first numerous barter trade craft were turned away and persistent offenders arrested until barter trading was virtually suppressed. However, a small number of barter craft, either through ignorance of the ban or a determination to flout it occasionally attempted to enter MTW.

d. Towards the end of 1965 and early in 1966, both the Malaysian and Singapore Governments decided to resume barter trading with Indonesia to the limited and controlled extent described in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2. Current Situation (April, 1966)

a. Singapore Government Scheme

(1) An area of high seas exists in the triangle bounded by the following positions:

01° 12.6' North	103° 31.9' East
01° 14.6' North	103° 35.6' East
01° 13.0' North	103° 35.9' East

This triangle is clear of:

Malaysian territorial waters to the North
Singaporean territorial waters to the East
Indonesian claimed waters to the South.

Tracing of chart 2403 held by Far East Fleet ships is to be amended accordingly.

/ (2)

MALPOS II

ANNEX D

BARTER TRADE OPERATIONS

1. Summary of Past Events

a. At the onset of confrontation, Indonesia used barter trade craft plying between Indonesia and Malaysia to transport infiltrators and their arms and ammunition to Singapore and Malaya. It was soon realised that this traffic could not be stopped while barter trade between the two countries continued. In consequence, on 13th August, 1964 all barter trade between Malaysia and Indonesia was declared illegal by:

(1) Creating an Import Ban on all Indonesian goods brought into Malaysian Territorial Waters * (MTW's) by craft of under 200 NRT whether Malaysian or Indonesian * (This also applies now to STW though at this time, by reason of the Mutual Defence Pact, all waters retained their original designation).

(2) Cancelling all entry permits for Indonesians.

b. Subsequent to (1) and (2) above, MTW was declared a controlled area. Indonesians are not permitted to enter MTW and will be apprehended and charged under the Internal Security Act if they do so.

c. Upon implementation of the above restrictions, intensive patrolling by RMN ships, police patrol craft and Malaysian Government craft was carried out. At first numerous barter trade craft were turned away and persistent offenders arrested until barter trading was virtually suppressed. However, a small number of barter craft, either through ignorance of the ban or a determination to flout it occasionally attempted to enter MTW.

d. Towards the end of 1965 and early in 1966, both the Malaysian and Singapore Governments decided to resume barter trading with Indonesia to the limited and controlled extent described in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2. Current Situation (April, 1966)

a. Singapore Government Scheme

(1) An area of high seas exists in the triangle bounded by the following positions:

01° 12.6' North	103° 31.9' East
01° 14.6' North	103° 35.6' East
01° 13.0' North	103° 35.9' East

This triangle is clear of:

Malaysian territorial waters to the North
Singaporean territorial waters to the East
Indonesian claimed waters to the South.

Tracing of chart 2403 held by Far East Fleet ships is to be amended accordingly.

/ (2)

b. Craft which attempt to approach the barter trade positions outside the hours authorised in 3.a. above are to be treated as follows:

- (1) OUTSIDE MTW/SIW. Inform craft of authorised barter trading hours and instruct them to return to Indonesian claimed waters until those hours.
- (2) INSIDE MTW/SIW. If the Commanding Officer of the intercepting ship considers the craft to be a genuine barter trader or fishing boat, the craft should be arrested and turned over to the police. If, by virtue of suspicious behaviour on the part of the intercepted craft, the Commanding Officer of the intercepting ship considers the craft to be other than a genuine barter trader or fishing boat, the crew of the craft should be ordered to swim to the ship and the craft sunk by gunfire or scare charges (Page A3 paragraph 3 (M) and (N) is relevant).

c. All barter trade craft are required to be clear from alongside barter trade ships by 1800 GH daily. Any craft not clear by 1800 GH are to be reported by signal to:

- (a) Singapore Scheme - Coastguard INFO AIG 1117
- (b) Malaysian Scheme - COMFEEF INFO AIG 1117

d. No craft are permitted to ply between the Malaysian and/or Singapore shore and licenced barter trade ships except by daylight under police escort.

e. No barter trade craft are permitted to proceed from the barter trade ships into MTW or SIW. Any craft found doing so is to be treated in accordance with paragraph b.(2) above.

4. In the event of non-compliance with the restrictions laid down in paragraph 2.b.(3) above, Commanding Officers are to:

- (a) Signal COMFEEF INFO AIG 1117 stating nature of lack of compliance.
- (b) Inform the master of the offending ship that a report is being made.

5. In the event of Commanding Officers encountering ships conducting barter trade out of the permitted areas or in a permitted area but without an import licence, a report is to be signalled to COMFEEF INFO AIG 1117 and the ship is to be warned that Indonesian craft attempting to approach her will be treated as a threat to security of Malaysia and Singapore and may be sunk. Such craft are then to be treated in accordance with paragraph 3.b. above.

MALPOS II

ANNEX E - INTELLIGENCE

Strength.

1. The Indonesian Navy (ALRI) has approximately 30,000 personnel and some 200 vessels, most of which were supplied by the USSR. The main combatant units are:-

1. Sverdlov class cruiser.
7. Skory class destroyers.
2. Iman Bonjol class destroyer escorts (Italian built)
8. Riga class destroyer escorts.
12. 'W' class submarines.
1. Don class submarine depot ship.
1. Atrek class submarine depot ship.
16. Kronstadt class large submarine chasers.
12. Komar class PTC.
7. Jaguar class PT boats.
14. P6 Class PT boats.
6. T. 43 class fleet minesweepers.
2. Halmahera class attack transports.
1. Multatuli class headquarters ship.
6. "511" class L.S.T.

Deployment.

2. (a) Most ALRI ships are based on Java (Surabaya and Tandjong Priok). In the Rhio/Malacca Strait Area there are approximately 40 B.T. Boats which are primarily custom/anti-smuggling patrol craft but are frequently used in Infiltration Operations (e.g. transfer of personnel and arms between bases; capture of Malaysian fishing prahus; transferring infiltrators into boats on the high seas. B.T. Boats are 90 feet long and armed with a 20 mm. gun. The B.T. 400 series have a top speed of about 31 knots and are all equipped with surface warning radar. The 300 series are capable of about 25 knots and some of them have no radar.

(b) Other units which appear in the area from time to time, but are not based there, are Kronstadt class P.C., T.43 class MSF, P6 class PT and W class submarines. However, the Regular Indonesian Navy have up to ~~February~~ **AUGUST** 1965 taken very little part in infiltration or sabotage operations in the West Malaysia area.

THE THREAT.

3. As stated above, the ALRI has taken little part in operations in West Malaysia, and there is at present (~~Aug~~ **AUG** 65) no sign of any intention to do so. The main threats which patrolling ships have to counter are:

- (a) Infiltration.
- (b) Sabotage.

4. These threats are considered in detail in the following paragraphs, but in general it may be said that all Indonesian seaborne activity against West Malaysia takes place at night.

5. Apart from the initial air drop at LABIS in September, 1964, there has been little activity by the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) in support of anti West Malaysia operations.

/INFILTRATORS.....

INFILTRATORS.

6. (a) Bases. Bases for Infiltration of West Malaysia extend from Berakit (N.E. corner of Paulau Bintan) to Medan. The principal bases with their lettered designations and target areas are shown below.

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Target Area.</u>
Z	Tanjong Pinang (Pulau Bintan)	Johore River to Jason Bay.
X	Palau Sambu	Singapore Island.
Y	Tanjong Balai (Kariman)	Kukup to Pontian Kechil.
V	Selat Pandjong (Palau Tebingtinggi)	Muar/Malacca Area.
T	Makruh (Palau Rupert)	Cape Rachado.
S	Asopell MAKERAU and MAKROH Sinabou	Port Dickson to Pangkor.
	SUNGEI KEMBONG (Bengkalis)	Muar/Batu Pahat.

See map enclosed with this annex as Appendix I.

(b) Aims. The aim of Infiltrators is to carry out the "Crush Malaysia" policy. To attain this it is considered that they will try to land undetected in West Malaysia and set up jungle camps as bases for:

- (i) enlisting popular support for Indonesia.
- (ii) carrying out guerilla warfare operations against the Malaysian Government.

FORCES AVAILABLE FOR INFILTRATION.

7. The forces allocated to and deployed for "A" Operations currently **AUG** 1965) number about 900. Most of these are "volunteers" i.e., they are not regular troops and the only training they have had is in jungle survival the use of small arms and some very misleading political indoctrination. (most captured infiltrators arrived expecting to be welcomed as liberators by a dissident, down-trodden local population).

8. There, are however, regular army, marine and police troops available and these have been used to stiffen the determination of the volunteers.

9. Despite the large number of troops available, infiltration attempts by sea so far have been made by small groups of four to thirty men in small boats. The largest scale recent attempt was that intercepted by H.M.S. AJAX on Christmas Eve, 1964, when 22 men in 7 prahus were captured and a further 28 escaped in the B.T. boat which had brought the whole force to the rendezvous with the prahus.

10. Except in the unlikely event of Indonesia deliberately risking retaliation, the size of infiltration attempts will not increase but their frequency almost certainly will.

11. There is a possibility that Indonesian submarines could be used for landing small parties of infiltrators, particularly on the East Coast of West Malaysia.

12. Parties of infiltrators who have successfully landed may attempt to withdraw to Indonesia. Patrolling vessels should bear this in mind.

LIKELY LANDING PLACES FOR INFILTRATORS.

13. Previous infiltrations indicate that the selection of landing places is influenced by the following factors:-

- (a) Local knowledge of Malaysian Volunteers.
- (b) Degree of support expected from local inhabitants.
- (c) Access to jungle areas suitable for setting up bases.
- (d) Likelihood of detection.
- (e) Topography (Normally the mouth of a river is selected)

14. The mouths of the following rivers are assessed as high probability areas; landings have already been made or attempted at those marked with an asterisk.

	<u>River.</u>	<u>Approx. Co-Ordinates of Mouth.</u>				
	Sepang	2	35	North	101	43 East.
	Jiman	2	35		101	49
	Menyala	2	25		101	53
	Raya	2	24		101	57
	Linggi	2	23		101	58
*	Kesang	2	06		102	29
*	Serang Buaya	1	52		102	48
*	Sanglang	1	36		103	17
	Ayer Baloi	1	35		103	23
	Johore	1	23		104	05
*	Sedili Kechil	1	51		104	09
	Paloi	2	02		104	03
	Tenggaroh	2	14		103	57
	Jemaluang	2	23		103	53

VESSELS AND TECHNIQUES LIKELY TO BE USED FOR INFILTRATION.

15. Most infiltrators cross at night in unlit fishing boats, many of them stolen from Malaysian fishermen. Their speed is normally about 5 - 8 knots but some are fitted with powerful outboard motors enabling them to escape at high speed if intercepted.

16. Their navigation is primitive; whenever possible they like to run in on a lighthouse, then follow the coastline, close inshore, to their landing area. The routes between bases and lighthouses in likely landing areas therefore require particular attention.

17. The technique employed on 24th December of ferrying troops on a B.T. Boat for part of the crossing and then transferring to their fishing boats might well be used again in the wider sections of Malacca Strait.

18. The behaviour of intercepted boats has varied. Some have made no attempt to escape and others have been quickly discouraged by the use of illuminants and/or warning shots. More determined ones have attacked with small arms and hand grenades. Ships closing suspicious small craft should always be prepared for this form of attack.

19. Reports have been received that infiltrators may wear knives or pistols under their clothing at the back of the neck. Boarding and search parties should be warned accordingly.

20. Some captured infiltrators have been in possession of a card purporting to be an Identity card of the "Malayan National Army". The card has crossed rifles on the cover, and underneath the words "TANDA ANGGOTA TENTERA NASIONAL MALAYA". If any cards of this nature are found in a boat, the occupants should be arrested.

21. Indonesia is known to be building 30 foot hard-chine launches powered by two 100 H.P. outboard motors and capable of carrying 30 men. These are probably intended to carry infiltrators across Malacca Strait but they are not yet in the area.

SABOTEURS.

22. A number of Indonesian have been trained for sabotage or hit-and-run raids, rather than for infiltration. Targets for sabotage are likely to be ships at anchor, power stations and other key points. Saboteurs may be expected in smaller groups than infiltrators, and they may use any type of boat from high speed outboards to rowing sampans.

23. It is believed that most saboteurs are based at XRAY and YANKEE, and that their standard of training is not high. ~~The night attack on the merchant vessel training is not high.~~ The night attack on the merchant vessel "OCEANIC PRIDE" on 6th January, 1965 was not a sophisticated affair. Two men in a rowing boat went alongside the ship, which was at anchor in Singapore Roads, and placed some explosive in a over-board discharge about three feet above the waterline. The saboteurs then attempted to paddle their way back to the Rhio Islands, but were intercepted and arrested by a patrolling ship.

24. The damaged caused to the Oceanic Pride by the explosion was superficial and the ship was repaired within three days.

25. In areas where sabotage is likely, patrolling vessels should be alert to detect craft returning to Indonesia, as well as those proceeding towards Malaysian waters.

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE.

R.N. R.A.N. and R.N.Z.N. Ships.

27 ~~26~~. The normal means of keeping ships informed are:-

- (a) FEWIR (Far East Weekly Intelligence Reports).
- (b) Weekly Intelligence Summaries.
- (c) Intelligence Sitreps (Signalled as necessary to ships concerned)
- (d) Briefings. There is a Staff Officer (Intelligence) available in the Naval Base to brief ships. Commanding Officers are invited to make use of this facility (ext. 5781) before sailing for patrols.

R.M.N. Ships.

28 ~~27~~. Commanding Officers should contact SO (A)

26 Indonesian Saboteur boats attempting to reach Singapore
(A.L.2) ... are now employing the following

- a. A group of small fishing boats will put to sea on the Indonesian side of the Median line. The saboteur boat will be in the middle of this group and will wait until a large ship goes by; it will then attempt to cross the Straits under cover of the ship's radar shadow.


s. This happens and

- b. Ships entering Western or Eastern Roads are particularly likely to be used in this way."

(REF ID: A71171)

APPENDIX ONE TO ANNEX E

INDONESIAN BASES FOR INFILTRATION



SCALE 1:2,000,000

to
able
of
is to
st
...

MALPOS II

ANNEX F

SEA AIR COOPERATION.

R.A.F. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

1. (a) General.

The Strait of Malacca poses several problems for maritime air reconnaissance. The multiplicity of radar contacts caused by small craft, kelongs and flotsam combined with the difficulty of positively identifying small craft from the air, especially at night, make it impossible to achieve a secure search.

(b) Capabilities in Anti-Infiltration Role.

- (i) ASV 21 Radar, designed for anti submarine use, can pick up small wooden craft at ranges up to 10 n.m. and larger vessels up to 60 n.m.
- (ii) Usually 2 x 20 m.m. cannon are carried in the nose mounting. These are capable of harrassing fire and are not sufficiently accurate to guarantee hitting a small target by day, and are likely to have only a psychological effect at night.
- (iii) Flares are carried to illuminate contacts at night.
- (iv) Sonobuoys are carried in the bomb bay for tracking submerged submarines.
- (v) Cameras are carried to give a day/night photographic capability.

(c) Limitations.

- (i) Aircraft are not allowed to enter airspace above Indonesian Territorial Waters without prior clearance from the Senior Air Staff Officer HQFEAF.
- (ii) Aircraft are not allowed to take offensive action without prior clearance from HQFEAF.
- (iii) It is difficult to select significant contacts from the very cluttered radar picture usually gained in the area.
- (iv) Identification of small craft at night is difficult due to height restrictions, the intermittent nature of the illuminating flares, and the relatively short time available with a night closing speed.

(d) Method of Operation.

The aircraft will normally fly along the seaward limit of its assigned area, using its radar looking to the south west, so as to detect craft crossing the straits towards Malaysia.

R.M.A.F.

2. DOVE aircraft stationed at Kuala Lumpur sometimes assist with patrols. They have to rely entirely on visual detection and identification and therefore can only operate by day.

/3.

STANDARD PATROLS.

3. (a) LRMP Aircraft.

Marops Changi arranges for a Shackleton to patrol the Malacca Straits from Port Swettenham to Tg. Piai for about six hours every night between 2200 and 0400.

The aircraft remains under the operational control of MAROPS Changi but will establish communications with Ships and craft as necessary and is available for co-operation and investigation of contacts if required. The senior ship in the area may act as OTC, see para 6. The aircraft will operate IFF throughout the patrol.

(b) R.M.A.F.

Several days each week Doves carry out dusk patrols of the area from Port Swettenham to the Sembilan Islands, and to the westward as far as 12 miles off the coast of Sumatra.

DETAILS OF DAILY PATROLS.

4. Details of the night patrol giving times ON and OFF Task, Callsign and any variations to the patrol areas will be promulgated by Changi in FORM YELLOW and included in COMFEEF's daily sitrep to R.N. Ships and will also be passed to R.M.N. craft concerned by ~~K.D. MALAYA~~ NOICOM.

Details of R.M.A.F. patrols will be included in the sitrep.

TACTICAL COMMAND OF MARITIME AIRCRAFT.

5. LRMP aircraft are assigned patrol areas by COMFEEF through MAROPS Changi. The senior ship in the areas thus assigned may assume tactical command of the aircraft in the event of an incident, but is not to re-task it to a different area.

6. R.M.A.F. aircraft remain under tactical command of R.M.A.F. authorities at all times.

CONTACTS WITH UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT

7. (a) Incidents have occurred when patrolling Shackletons have obtained radar or visual contact with low-flying, unidentified aircraft at night in the Malacca Straits. Due to the time taken for a night fighter to be scrambled and arrive in the area, it has not been possible to intercept these intrusions.

(b) H.Q.F.E.A.F. has directed that crews of Shackletons

MALPOS II

ANNEX G

NAVAL ASSISTANCE WITH AIR DEFENCE

JOINT AIR DEFENCE IN MALAYA

1. H.M. Ships and aircraft may be required to augment the Royal Air Force shore-based air defence organisation. The provisions of this annex do not apply to R.M.N. Ships, nor to R.N. C.M.S. or S.D.B.s.

2. Air Defence Organisation

At present this organisation comprises :-

- (a) The Air Defence Commander situated at the Air Defence Operations Centre (A.D.O.C. - Tel: No.61170) Far East Air Force Headquarters, Changi. The A.D.O.C. is manned continuously.
- (b) Master Radar Station, Royal Air Force Bukit Gombak (Tel: No. 8295).
- (c) No. 114 Master Control and Reporting Unit, Royal Australian Air Force, Butterworth.
- (d) Mobile Reporting Post (Type UPS-1) at Terendak Barracks, Malacca.
- (e) MOBILE REPORTING POST (TYPE UPS-1) AT KUANTAN, PAWANG
- (f) The Air Defence Notification Centre at the Joint Air Traffic Control Centre, Paya Lebar. This unit provides notification of friendly and civil air movements.
- (g) RAF RADAR STATIONS (TYPE AAL-MK 7) ARE SITED

3. Naval Participation

H.M. Ships and A.E.W. Gannet aircraft may be ordered by Commander, Far East Fleet to carry out any of the following tasks :-

- (a) Extend the low air warning around Singapore, Butterworth, or along Malayan Coast.
- (b) Provide long range air surveillance in the area.
- (c) Provide Airborne Early Warning along the Malayan coast.
- (d) Control Royal Air Force and Naval fighters.

4. EXECUTION

- (a) On receipt of the Codeword "CUTTER LOW" ships are to carry out the task in paragraph 3(a). They are to set watch on Joint Raid Reporting net and report all contacts to Bukit Gombak or Butterworth as appropriate.
- (b) On receipt of the Codeword "CUTTER", ships that are Air Defence Control Units, are to carry out the task in 3(b), and report as in (a).

(c) /

- (c) Ships on passage to or from Singapore are to set watch on the Joint Raid Reporting Net (JS.35) and carry out "CUTTER"/"CUTTER LOW" duties as follows :-
 - (i) On arrival from the west at latitude 2° 30N and call Bukit Gombak.
 - (ii) On arrival from the east at latitude 3°N and/or longitude 106°E and call Bukit Gombak.
 - (iii) On departure from Singapore the appropriate R.A.F. station is to be called and they are to report until either the position lines in (i) or (ii) above are reached or they are ordered to cease reporting.

5. Reporting Procedures

- (a) Raid Reporting should be carried out in accordance with J.S.P.6, Chapter 5, Section 2 using the Georef Grid (Bukit Gombak position FB 4525).
- (b) Units detecting a contact assign it a four figure octal track number. Blocks of these track numbers have been allocated to Naval units in Appendix 1 to Annex Alfa of FOTI 4434.
- (c) If ships are not in touch with Bukit Gombak or Butterworth when unidentified or hostile aircraft are sighted or detected they should be reported by OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE unclassified signal as follows :-

Action addressee : FEAFOC

Info. addressee : OPSCO
 MINDEF K.L. (for JOC)
 CINCFE
 COMFEE

D.I.G. KAS

- Aircraft Sighting/Detection.
- A. Time and Date
 - B. Position (Lat. and long. or GEOREF).
 - C. Flight Direction.
 - D. Height (Thousands of feet or High/Medium/Low).
 - E. Identity or number of engines and other identification features.
 - F. Jet or Piston.
 - G. Navigation or other lights displayed.
 - H. Suspicious manoeuvres.
 - J. Other information.

Sections on which no information is available should be omitted.

(d) /

(d) Gannets use the following reference positions for reporting :-

Cape Rochado	CHARLIE PAPA
Tanjong Tohor	NOVEMBER GOLF
Horsburgh Light	WHISKY MIKE

6. A.E.W. and Picket Stations

(a) A.E.W. STATIONS

LIMA	PULAU PISANG TO MALACCA
MIKE	MALACCA TO PORT SWETTENHAM
NOVEMBER	PORT DICKSON TO KUALA SELANGOR
OSCAR	PORT SWETTENHAM TO SEMBILAN ISLANDS
PAPA	SEMBILAN ISLANDS TO PENANG ISLAND
QUEBEC	FULAU TIOMAN TO TANJONG GELANG

(b) RADAR PICKET AND CARRIER STATIONS

SIERRA	10 NM	SW BATU PAHAT	0140 N	102.45 E
TANGO	6 NM	SW PULAU UNDAI LIGHT	0158 N	102.18 E
UNIFORM	5 NM	SW CAPE RACHADO	0220 N	101.48 E
WHISKEY	8 NM	SE ONE FATHOM BANK	0248 N	100.54 E
ALFA	55 NM	WNW PORT SWETTENHAM	0320 N	100.30 E
BRAVO	75 NM	SW PENANG ISLAND	0430 N	99.30 E
CHARLIE	40 NM	EAST KUANTAN	0345 N	104.00 E
DELTA	50 NM	EAST TRENGGANU	0520 N	104.00 E

Note: To avoid confusion between these Air Defence Stations and other lettered surface patrol stations, ships are to be ordered to assume "Air Defence Station"

7. Communications

(a) Joint Inter Controllers Net - JS 36 - HF Voice

Manned by Bukit Gombak and Butterworth and any naval Air Defence Control Units (Carrier or picket with control ability). Frequencies as in Femeco 2302.

Componant JS 36/7 not yet available ashore.
Initial contact JS 36/11.

(4426.5) 4425 Kes.

Ships without SSB can contact Bukit Gombak or Butterworth on JS 36/2 (3325 Kes) by night (2300-0730GH) or on JS 36/4 (8002 Kes) by day (0730-2300GH).

(b) /

23rd June, 1965.

7. Communications

(a) JOINT INTERCONTROLLERS NET - JS 40 - HF VOICE

1. Manned by Bukit Gombak and Butterworth and any naval Air Defence Control Units (Carrier or picket with control ability).
2. Component JS.40/7 not yet available ashore.
3. Initial contact JS.40/11.

(b) JOINT RAID REPORTING NET - JS 37 - HF VOICE

1. Manned by Bukit Gombak, Butterworth, Terendak Mobile Radar and all ships with an Air Defence Capability (i.e. Any naval ship taking part in cutter or cutter low).
2. Components JS 37/6 and 10 not yet available ashore.
3. Initial contact JS 37/7.
4. In event SSB failure, ships are to join R.A.F. circuit FPH 9.

Channel L 2325 Kcs.

~~D 3325 Kcs.~~

R 4755 Kcs.

A 8002 Kcs.

(c) GROUND CONTROL INTERCEPTION - JS 48 - UHF VOICE

1. Manned by Bukit Gombak, Butterworth, Terendak Mobile Radar, all R.N. Ships on patrol, L.R.M.P. and A.E.W. Aircraft and Air Sea Rescue launches employed on Air Defence duties in the Singapore Straits.
2. This circuit is also used for Sea Air Co-operation (See Annex H).
3. Normal Channel JS 48/1, Alternate JS 48/3.
4. The L.R.M.P. Aircraft reports her position continuously on this circuit and can be used to relay raid reports if contact is lost on circuit JS 37.

(d) Callsigns

Air Defence callsigns are to be used by all ships when allocated an Air Defence Station (see paragraph 6(b)), if no station allocated Tactical callsigns are to be used.

STANDING CALLSIGNS

	<u>HF CIRCUITS</u>	<u>GROUND - AIR UHF CIRCUITS</u>
BUKIT GOMBAK	D C G	GOMBAK
114 MCRU BUTTERWORTH	D C K	BESAR
TERENDAK MOBILE RADAR	E	GRANITE PUPPET
: SHIP ACTING AS ARRCs	D C followed by Station Letter	Station Letter. Letter

(e) Codes

1. R.A.F. Stations on these nets hold Bis/02/10.
2. R.A.F. Stations and aircraft types are to be referred to by code names as promulgated to ships concerned.

MALPOS II
ANNEX H

COMMUNICATIONS AND CRYPTOGRAPHY

Radio Communications

1. In addition to the communications in FEMCO (RN) and MANCO (RMN), the following circuits are in use for ships and craft on patrol in West Malaysia.

Coastal Common Net (HF CW)

a. A combined RN/RMN CCN.

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Times of Radiation</u>	<u>Callsign</u>	<u>Circuit Designator</u>
2288 kc/s	1200Z - 2359Z	GYL	T 20
4304 kc/s	0001Z - 1200Z	GYL	T 08
6330 kc/s	Continuous	GYL	T 11

b. Patrolling craft man this circuit as follows:

Frigate and above	-	as required
RN CMS	-	constant watch
RMN Craft	-	DOP *
Marine Police Offshore Craft	-	SOP *

(* Note - But dependant upon number and capabilities of operators borne)

c. Single and double operator periods are as follows, all times local:

<u>SOP</u>	<u>DOP</u>
0100 *	0001 - 0200
0630 *	0500 - 0700
1000 - 1030	1000 - 1100
1600 - 1900	1500 - 2300
2100 - 2300	

(* Note - Until receipt of ZKL or similar operating signal)

d. When on patrol with a Frigate or larger ship acting as OTC, Minesweepers and smaller craft about to transmit a classified message on CCN of immediate interest to the OTC are to request on 279.4 mcs, the Frigate to set watch on CCN using the designators in a. above. This enables the Frigate to read the message directly instead of waiting for it to be broadcast, which, in deteriorating conditions, could mean a delay of several hours. If the only common system between the Frigate and Minesweepers is BRITEX, then the procedure laid down in paragraph 13 should be employed.

2. RN/RMN Co-operation (RMN Circuit T 23, 279.4 Mc/s, Voice)

a. All RN and RMN Ships and Craft on Patrol are to maintain constant loudspeaker watch on this circuit.

/ b.

b. Police craft are unable to man this circuit, but the circuit is manned at Pearls Hill Police Station, (Callsign "Coastguard") in Singapore. This enables signals to be relayed between Naval units and police craft operating in the Singapore Straits. A RMN Liaison Officer is normally available at nights and there are direct telephone lines to NOICWM Operations Room and NHQ Operations Room.

c. Sakra Radar Station also maintains watch on this circuit from 0600 GH until 1800 GH daily, as a link with the Coastguard for ships patrolling the Western end of the Singapore Straits.

d. LRMP Aircraft will co-operate with RMN units on this circuit as required. 277.0 Mc/s is also available when more than one Patrol Group is established. The OTC of the Patrol Group guarding 277.0 must also guard 279.4.

3. Police Craft Communications

a. Royal Malaysian Police communications employ duplex VHF Voice working.

b. All RN Ships sailing for Malacca Straits Patrol or passing through the Malacca Straits Patrol areas, for visits to Penang or Fort Swettenham, are to draw a Pye AM10P portable VHF radio from the Fleet Pool of Radio Equipment. (FLAECO 2109 refers). On completion of patrol or visit they are to be returned to the ship holding centre without delay.

c. Channellisation of Pye AM10P is as follows:

<u>Channel</u>	<u>Transmit Freq'y</u>	<u>Receive Freq'y</u>	<u>Allocation to State Force</u>
1	88.7 mcs	100 mcs	Negri Sembilan and Kedah.
2	88.6 mcs	99.9 mcs	Penang Island, Pahang and Johore Central
3	88.5.mcs	99.8 mcs	Klang Town, Perak, Trengannu and Johore North
4	88.4 mcs	99.7 mcs	Selangor, Kolantan and Malacca
5	88.3 mcs	99.6 mcs	Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur
6	88.2 mcs	99.5 mcs	Penang Town

d. The following instructions and information are applicable to HM Ships using the Police VHF equipment:

(1) Constant loudspeaker watch is to be maintained on the appropriate channel.

(2) Being duplex, all transmissions are re-radiated automatically by a shore beacon, which also serves to enhance the ranges possible between ranges and nets.

(3) Constant watch is maintained by the Area Control Station Police District HQ's, Police Craft and police cars. (Local Police Stations are on a separate net).

/ (4)

- (4) Callsigns for use on Police VHF nets are contained in Appendix I.
- (5) Names of stations, numbers of craft and cars are used as callsigns. HM Ships are to use Scene of Action callsigns, as shown in Appendix I.
- (6) The English language can be used to shore stations and offshore police craft only. Inshore Police Craft normally speak only Malay. It is therefore policy to employ the interpreter as operator on this net.
- (7) Army Tactical HQ's are normally co-located with Police Districts; thus it should be possible to relay traffic for the Army on this circuit.

e. A map showing Police district HQ's and their channellisation is shown in Appendix III.

f. Pye AM10P portable radio sets are not compatible with the Singapore Police. Traffic for Singapore Police Authorities is to be relayed as in 2.b and c. above.

4. Sea/Air Co-operation (LRMP Aircraft/HM Ships)

a. Used for Sea/Air co-operation between LRMP Aircraft and RN Ships on Patrol. It is also used between ALW Aircraft, LRMP Aircraft, Air Sea Rescue Launches, and Bukit Gombak for Air Defence purposes.

Primary	-	250.8 mcs	(RAF Circuit FAU 21)
Secondary	-	259.2 mcs	(RAF Circuit FAU 23)

b. For Co-operation with RMN units, the LRMP Aircraft will shift to Circuit T 23.

c. RAF Radar Station at Terendak, callsign GRANITE PUPPET, maintains watch on FAU 21 whenever LRMP Aircraft are airborne.

5. RMN/RMLF/RN Co-operation (RMN Circuit T 12 - 6835 kcs - Voice)

a. Constant watch on this circuit, employing the use of the Upper Side Band (6836.5 kcs), is maintained by RMN units for direct communication with KD Malaya.

b. When RMLF Aircraft are on patrol, this circuit is used for Sea/Air co-operation by RN and RMN Units using Double Side Band (6835 Kc/s), Voice.

6. Communication with Army Units

a. In the event of a requirement for direct communications with Army Units ashore, the following arrangements are currently effective:

- (1) 28 Brigade (Malacca Area)

Circuit JS 23/5 (frequency 4726 kc/s, CW) is available on request. Callsigns to be exchanged when circuits ordered to be opened.

/ (2)

(2) Malaysian Brigades

(a) Brigade Tactical HQ's are normally co-located with Police District HQ's. Messages can therefore be passed on Police VHF Net.

(b) Arrangements are in hand for Malaysian Brigades to have one station available to operate on Circuit T 12 (6835 kc/s, CW) with RN Ships (or 6836.5 (6835) HF SSB, Voice) with RMN Ships. Due to equipment and operator limitations the only direct co-operation that can be achieved is on SSB Voice between RMN Ships and the 2nd Federation Reconnaissance Regt. at Port Dickson.

b. Cryptographic Systems

A common system is available between HM Ships and 28 Brigade, and between RMN Ships and Malaysian units at Battalion level. No other common codes are held.

7. Communications with Air Sea Rescue Launches

When employed in Singapore Straits on Air Defence Duties, these launches can be contacted on Circuit PAU 21 (250.8).

8. Communications with RCT Launches

When employed on patrol in the West Singapore Straits they can be contacted through "Coastguard" as they are linked, via the Sultan Shoal Light, to a Police Circuit.

9. Air Defence Circuits

Applicable to HM Ships only. Details can be found in Annex 'G'.

10. Communications with Beach Reconnaissance Aircraft

a. Aircraft engaged on beach reconnaissance are controlled by HQ 224 Group, callsign QDIG, on JS 37/3, 4040 kc/s. They keep constant watch on this circuit. Ships will be informed when these aircraft are scheduled to fly and escorts on patrol duties are to guard this circuit during the period of the beach reconnaissance.

b. The aircraft will report all sightings to HQ 224 Group and to the ships if it is of direct interest. Ships are not to divert the aircraft from its primary task, namely beach reconnaissance. Aircraft reports will be processed through the RAN Control Authority. The aircraft will be briefed on the location of ships.

c. A requirement for UHF communications may arise, when communications with escorts on HF is poor, or only Coastal Minesweepers are in the area. The Aircraft is briefed that 279.4 Mc/s is kept by all units and if it has a report to make to the ships, and is unable to communicate on HF, it will call on this frequency. Ships on patrol on the East and West Coast of Malaya are to maintain watch on JS 37/3 and/or 279.4 Mc/s during times of aircraft patrols.

d. Callsigns are in accordance with JSP 2 FLS Supp. No. 2, Combined Scene of Action. Reconnaissance aircraft will use the callsign "JOYRIDE".

11. Communications with Land Forces, South East Johore

- a. Ships of the Far East Fleet on patrol off South East Johore are to communicate with deployed Land Forces on 47.0 Mc/s. (Channel 1, Type 625).
- b. Details of deployed forces, together with their location and callsigns, will be signalled as a Malpos General with references to this paragraph.
- c. Far East Fleet Ships are to use Naval Intra Force Tactical Callsigns. If ships callsigns are not known by land forces, Scene of Action callsigns from Appendix 1 will be used.
- d. The land forces Control Station maintains continuous watch, deployed platoons as follows:
- | | |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------|
| 1800 - 0700 GH | (Continuous) |
| 0800 - 1700 GH | (Hourly schedules unless otherwise ordered) |
- e. Continuous watch is not required during the hours of darkness by Far East Fleet Ships, but they are to call control or nearest outstation on start of patrol and then as required. The OTC should attempt to contact shore stations twice during the night. During daylight hours, ships are to maintain listening watch when in vicinity of a known troop location.

12. Communications with Lighthouses

- a. The Marine Department Offices at Port Swettenham and Malacca maintain a continuous listening watch on 82.9 mcs. Routine calls from lighthouses is as follows:

	<u>Calling Lighthouse</u>	<u>Times</u>
(1) Port Swettenham	One Fathom Bank Light and Pulau Angsa Light	0400 1200 2000
(2) Malacca	Cape Rachado Light and Pulau Undan Light	0400, 0800 1200, 1600 2000, 2359

- b. The Marine Department Office, Fullerton Building, Singapore maintains listening watch on Marine Department/Immigration Net, from 0800 to 1800 daily. (Frequencies: Transmit 163.3 Mc/s Receive 158.8 Mc/s).

(1) Singapore	Pulau Pisang Light and Horsburgh Light	0800, 1000 1200, 1400 1600, 1800
---------------	----------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------

- (2) At night the net is manned by Coastguard, Pearls Hill. Lighthouses will call Coastguard in an emergency only.

- c. Ships wishing to exchange information with lighthouses listed above, should signal details to COMFLEF who will telephone the appropriate office.

Telephone Numbers	Port Swettenham	6616
	Malacca	3552
	Singapore	92091

/ d.

d. It must be borne in mind that it is normally not possible for Marine Department Offices to contact Lighthouses outside the routine times listed above.

CRYPTOGRAPHY

13. Common System between RN and RMN Units

- a. At present the only High Grade common cryptographic system between HM and RMN Ships is BRITEX (BRN 29/1 series). Use of this system should be kept to a minimum, due to the time delays which are involved.
- b. Operational Messages of an urgent nature, between HM and RMN Ships should normally be unclassified or encoded in Naval and Maritime Air Tactical Code (BIS/02/36).
- c. Use of national cryptographic systems on signals routed to RN Comcen, for NOICOM, are invariably quicker than direct routing to NOICOM using the common system in a. above.

14. Recognition

- a. Combined Maritime Recognition Tables (CMRT) are to be used by all ships and aircraft employed in the defence of Singapore and Malaysia except Harbour Marine and Customs Craft.
- b. The instructions for use of CMRT are contained within the cover. The Tables are monthly changing and the edition and line/date scramble in force are signalled by COMPLEF.
- c. The procedure for Air co-operation with ships are also contained within the instructions. This procedure is to be used by aircraft to direct a ship towards a suspicious contact when ships and aircraft are not in radio contact.

d. Effectiveness of the system

It is vitally important for the system to work effectively. To this end Commanding Officers MUST:

- (1) Ensure CURRENT EXTRACTS of CMRT are at all times prominently displayed on the Bridge. The complete volume should not be used.
 - (2) Demand a high degree of vigilance from bridge personnel. A challenge is short and may be missed if a good lookout is not kept.
 - (3) Practice Challenge and Reply with KNOWN FRIENDLY SHIPS DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ONLY.
 - (4) Ships experiencing failures in recognition practices are to report monthly by letter to the Commander Far East Fleet. Copy to Administrative Authority. Nil reports are not required.
- e. Aircraft other than RAF Shackletons carry EXTRACTS ONLY of the Pyrotechnic Tables.

General Instructions and Information

15. Considerations by OTC

The OTC on ordering his patrols should consider the following:

- a. Taking Broadcast Guard for his patrol group. and
- b. Ensuring the Patrol Group is within UHF range of the OTC.

16. Reporting

Instructions for reporting are contained in Annex B, paragraph 10.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX H

CALLSIGNS

1. SCENE OF ACTION CALLSIGNS FOR USE ON POLICE VHF COMMUNICATIONS

<u>Type of Unit</u>	<u>Voice Callsign</u>
Warship (Frigate or above)	DEAF ZERO
Warship (CNS and Patrol Craft)	DEAF FIVE
Senior Naval Officer present afloat	TIFF ONE
Police HQ	POLO + location
Police craft	PAPA + side No.

NB Police HQ wishing to call a warship without previous contact will call DEAF ZERO DEAF FIVE.

2. OFFSHORE POLICE CRAFT CALLSIGNS

<u>Police Marine Craft Number</u>	<u>International Callsign</u>
PX 1	9 MP 37
PX 2	9 MP 38
PX 3	9 MP 39
PX 4	9 MP 40
PX 5	9 MP 41
P 11	-

Note: P1 to P10 are permanently deployed in East Malaysia.

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX H

SHIPS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED WITH MALPOS


1. AIG 1120 (Address Group YKPO) is allocated with the following addressees to COMFLEF for the rapid dissemination of information to all authorities concerned with MALPOS:

ORIGINATOR - COMFLEF.

ACTION ADDRESSEES - IGPOL MARINE
FVRLIF
MALROPS CHANGI
NOICWM
3 DIV RASC (LCT)
ALL DLGS ESCORTS SUBMARINES AND
SINGAPORE BASED CMSs AND SDBs OF
FAR EAST FLEET, AND Hqs MANXMAN.
IGPOL SINGAPORE
MID SINGAPORE

INFO ADDRESSEES - FEAF
MINDEF KL. (NAVY),
CINCFE
FEAF/OC
28 BDE
OPSCO
SINGAPORE
SM7
FO2FEF

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX H
VHF CHANNELLISATION OF POLICE HEADQUARTERS



MALPOS II

ANNEX I

CHECK OFF LIST FOR SHIPS AND CRAFT GOING ON PATROL

1. (a) Well prior to sailing
 - (i) Signal ~~on phone to D. MAINEA~~ ^{NOGLIM KAMALAYA} for interpreter (R.N. ships only) 48 hours warning + joining instructions required.
 - (ii) Ensure 3 mile limit and Indonesian 12 mile limits are on large scale charts. Tracings available from Operations Room, N.H.Q., or Malaya.
- (b) Ensure following publications etc. are held on board :-
 - (i) MALPOS - You are reading them now.
 - (ii) FOTIs Section 4 - (RMN SOAIs).
 - (iii) Combined Maritime Recognition Tables (CMRT).
 - (iv) Police Grid of Singapore Strait.
 - (v) Current allocation of SCAP area letters.
 - (vi) Current CMRT line/date scramble.
 - (vii) Current list of stolen fishing boats held by Indonesia (Annex K).
 - (viii) Current list of aircraft type codewords (R.N. ships only).
 - (ix) De-brief Aide Memoire (RN ships only - available from Ops. Room NHC).
- (c) Commanding Officers and/or Operations Officers of R.N. ships should visit the Naval Operations Centre and Naval Intelligence Office shortly before sailing to obtain the latest operational information. They should at the same time collect a De-Brief Aide Memoire (see 1-b (ix) above) which is to be completed as fully as possible during the patrol period. The form is self-explanatory.

MALPOS II

ANNEX J

DETAILS OF PATROL CRAFT AVAILABLE

1. Royal Navy

(a) Frigates and Destroyers as detailed from the Far East Fleet. For details see latest Far East Fleet Bridge Card.

(b) Coastal Minesweepers

	<u>NAME</u>	<u>Pt Nos</u>	<u>International Callsigns</u>
(i)	<u>6th Minesweeping Squadron (R.N.)</u>		
	H.M.S. HOUGHTON (MS 6)	M 1211	MXJN
	H.M.S. WOOLASTON	M 1194	GTXG
	H.M.S. PUNCHESTON	M 1174	GTDL
	H.M.S. FISKERTON	M 1206	GTSZ
	H.M.S. WILKIESTON	M 1192	GTXD
	H.M.S. MARYTON	M 1202	GVIN
	H.M.S. DARTINGTON	M 1203	GTSX
	H.M.S. CHAWTON	M 1209	MXJM

"(ii) 11th Minesweeping Squadron (R.N./R.N.Z.N.)

H.M.S. PICTON (M.S.11)	M.1170	MTYY
H.M.S. KILDARTON	M.1162	GSRS
H.M.S. INVERMORISTON	M.1150	GSCQ
H.M.S. HUBBERSTON	M.1147	GSRK
H.M.S. SHERATON	M.1181	GTGF
H.M.S. GREATFORD (SDB)	P.3109	MQQB
H.M.S. TILFORD (SDB)	P.3123	MXJV
H.M.S. ICKFORD (SDB)	P.3116	MQXJ
H.M.S. CAMBERFORD (SDB)	P.3107	MQPC
H.M.N.Z.S. SANTON	M.1178	ZMUP
H.M.N.Z.S. HICKLETON	M.1131	ZMUM "

(iii) 16th Minesweeping Squadron (R.A.N.)

H.M.A.S. HAWK (MS 16)	M 1139	VKMQ
H.M.A.S. GULL	M 1185	VKMR
H.M.A.S. TEAL	M 1152	VKMN
H.M.A.S. SNIPE	M 1102	VKML
H.M.A.S. CURLEW	M 1121	VKMM
H.M.A.S. IBIS	M 1183	VKMP

2. Royal Malaysian Navy

(a) Frigate - Loch class conversion with helicopter platform.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>Pt Nos</u>	<u>International Callsigns</u>
K.D. HANG TUAH	F 433	9 MMB

(b) Coastal Minesweepers

25th Minesweeping Squadron

K.D. LEDANG (MS 25)	M 1143	9 MNS
K.D. JERONG	M 2627	9 MNP
K.D. MAHAMIRU	M 1127	9 MNK
K.D. TODAK	M 2610	9 MME
K.D. JERAI	M 1168	9 MNU
K.D. TAHAN	M 1163	9 MLE
K.D. KINABALU	M 1134	9 MNV
K.D. BRINKHAN	M 1172	9 MLF

(c) Inshore Minesweepers

~~6th Patrol Craft Squadron~~
26th Minesweeping Squadron

K.D. SRI JOHOR (MS 26)	M 2602	9 MNA
K.D. SRI PERLIS	M 2604	9 MND
K.D. LANGKA SUKA	M 2606	9 MNB
K.D. TEMASEK	M 2612	9 MNC

(d) Patrol Craft

Length:	103'
Beam:	16'
Draught:	6'6"
Masthead Height:	29'
Speed:	21 Kts.
Armament:	2 x L70 Bofor
Complement:	3 officers + 20
Radar:	Decca 707
Communications:	2 HF, 1 UHF

(i) 1st Patrol Craft Squadron

K.D. SRI PERAK (PCS 1)	P 3140	9 MNO
K.D. SRI KEDAH	P 3138	9 MNM
K.D. SRI KELANTAN	P 3142	9 MNQ
K.D. SRI TRENGGANU	P 3143	9 MNR
K.D. SRI SELANGOR	P 3139	9 MNN
K.D. SRI PAHANG	P 3141	9 MNP

(ii) /

	<u>NAME</u>	<u>Pt Nos</u>	<u>International Callsigns</u>
(ii)	<u>2nd Patrol Craft Squadron</u>		
	K.D. SRI SABAH	P 3144	9 MNW
	K.D. SRI SARAWAK	P 3145	9 MNY
	K.D. SRI MELAKA	P 3147	9 MMA
	K.D. SRI NEGRI SEMBILAN	P 3146	9 MNG
(e)	<u>Despatch Vessel:</u>		
	K.D. MUTIARA	P 3504	9 MNL
	Length:	100'	
	Beam:	19'	
	Draught:	6'6"	
	Masthead Ht.	30'	
	Max Speed:	12	
	Armament:	1 x 20 mm Oerlikon	
	Complement:	2 officers + 17	
	Communications:	2 HF, 1 UHF.	
	<i>RADAR</i>	<i>DECCA 303</i>	
(f)	<u>RMNVR Seaward Defence Craft:</u>		
	K.D. PANGLIMA	P 48	9 MNT
	Length:	117'	
	Beam:	20'	
	Draught:	7'6"	
	Masthead Ht. (Radar Aerial)	28'	
	Speed:	14 kts.	
	Armament:	1 x 40/60 Bofor	
	Complement:	2 officers + 20	
	Radar:	Decca 45	
	Communications:	1 x 619, 1 x 691	
(g)	K.D. TANJONG MERANG (ex Yacht of Director of Marine)	P 3148	9MMC
	Length:	75'	
	Beam:	18'	
	Draught:	6'	
	Masthead Ht:	about 25'	
	Speed:	11 kts.	
	Armament:	1 single Oerlikon	
	Complement:	2 officers + 11	
	Radar:	Decca 303	
	Communications:	1 x 410, 1 x A43R	
(H)	L.C.T.		
	SRI LANKANI	24043	9mm

3. RM Police Craft /

Type	OFF SHORE CRAFT			INSHORE CRAFT	
	P	PX	PA	PB	PC
Numbers:					
Malaysia	-	5	10	13	9
Singapore	1	-	5	4	19
Length	72	87	45	45 - 50	25 - 36
Beam	12	15	9	9	8
Draught	5	5'6"	4	4	3
Max. Speed	12	27	19	14	3 Malay- sian 25 Kts. Remainder 12 Kts.
Communications	1 x HF 1 x VHF	1 x HF 1 x VHF	1 x VHF	1 x VHF	1 x VHF
Radar	Decca 303	Kelvin Hughes 14/9	Kelvin Hughes 17	Kelvin Hughes 17 (NOT Singapore Craft)	-
Armament	1 single Oerlikon	2 single Oerlikon	Small arms	Small arms	Small arms
Complement	1 officer + 12	1 officer + 12	7	7	5

Notes:

1. 19 Marine Department launches with Police personnel embarked are also employed on patrol duties. All are approximately 42 feet in length, speed 9 kts, some of which have VHF radio. None has radar.
2. All Police and Marine Craft have jurisdiction within Malaysian Territorial Waters only, and they are not empowered to effect arrest or search on the high seas. Inshore craft normally patrol in Malaysian Territorial Waters only. Off-shore craft patrol further out to sea. They may track, shadow and report suspicious vessels on the high seas but cannot detain them until they enter Malaysian Territorial Waters.

a. Off shore craft

Off shore police craft are operated directly by IG.OL Marine, Kuala Lumpur. They are more flexible than the in-shore craft and can carry out similar patrols to Inshore Minesweepers and S.D.L.s.

b./.....

b. In shore craft

Operational control of inshore police craft is delegated to Local Police District Commanders. These craft cannot normally be deployed to areas other than that in which they are based.

4. R.A.S.C. Launches

(a) FOWEY

(b) MINORU

Type	River Class fast launch	Fast launch (Senior Officer's Barge)
Colour	Grey	Blue
Speed	12 knots Twin Screw	16 knots Triple Screw
Length	45 ft.	48 ft.
Draught	3 - 4 ft.	3 - 4 ft.
Crew	Officer or S.N.C.O. plus 4	
Armament	2 Bren guns and personal arms	
Radar	NIL	
Communications	Police VHF set - unreliable Army 41 set - to Sultan Shoal Light for relay on Police circuit.	

Note: One R.A.S.C. launch is normally on patrol each night from 1800 - 0730 in the area enclosed by Sultan Shoal, Tg Teritip and Tg Piai.

5. Air Sea Rescue Launches

These launches do not carry out patrols but are sometimes employed on Air Defence Duties. When on the station they remain tied up to Ajax Shoal Buoy and Johore Shoal Buoy.

They can be contacted on circuit FAU 21 if required.

6. Royal Engineers Patrol Craft

Army assault boats are used for patrolling the approaches to SUNGAI BERIH, on the North West coast of Singapore island. The aim of these patrols is to protect the seaward approaches to R.A.F. TENGAH. Patrols are carried out at night at irregular intervals. The nickname for these patrols is MUDFISH.

MALPOS II

ANNEX K

CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL CRAFT

INDONESIAN BOATS.

APPEARANCE.

1. There are mainly two types of Indonesian boats operating in the Singapore Straits, the high speed craft and the sailing boat. The former is favoured by the 'big time' smugglers and for the landing of agents and the latter is normally the straight forward barter boat although Indonesia has taken advantage of their seeming innocence to land infiltrators.

Speed Boats.

2. These are between 15 and 20 feet in length normally powered by two Evinrude or Johnson 40 H.P. engines giving up to 30 knots depending on the weather. There is no particular shape to these boats, some have been reported as long and narrow and others as short and beamy. The normal crew is two or sometimes three. Judging by the reports they seem to favour the short dash between Pu. Sambu and St. John's and the Raffles Light and Tg. Piai areas.

Sailing Boats.

3. These operate from all along the coast of Indonesia facing Malaysia and from much further afield. They vary in size from 15 to 50 feet. They are invariably rough, locally made boats which leak badly and are rather fragile which can make towing them a tricky operation for fear of pulling the mast out or ripping away the fore deck. Their sailing rig could be described as a loose footed gunter rig, they sail quite well but their sails are normally in a very bad state of repair. The majority of them also have a low powered outboard motor.

INDONESIAN BOATMEN.

General Appearance.

4. They fall into three main races, Malay, Javanese and Chinese (Hokkien), there is also a sprinkling of Celebes Islanders. With the exception of the Chinese which are in the minority, the Indonesian barter boat men are invariably dirty and scruffy normally dressed in sarongs and shirt. Normally they appear under fed and in a low state of physical fitness. The speed boats, in the main, are operated by the Chinese. It is uncommon to find any one of them who can understand a word of English let alone speak it. It is difficult even for a Malaysian to understand their language; their brand of Malay is considerably different.

Documents.

5. All members of the crew should carry an Identity Card. (See Appendix II). The card can be buff or blue in colour similar in size to a U.K. Driving Licence, folded in half with a photograph on one side and facing it the man's personal details, all written in Indonesian. It should be stamped with the Indonesian crest, two eagles' heads facing in the opposite directions above a striped shield from behind which wings and legs protrude, all contained in a circular border which contains the name of the office where the card was issued. The card is normally contained in a plastic wallet which has written across it in large letters, 'KARTU PENDUDUK' meaning 'Identity Card'. The slang name of this card is 'Tingi'. If they hear this word they will know what is required.

(~~SECRET~~)

Page K.2
25th March, 1965.

The owner of the boat should have in his possession the boat's licence and log book. The licence is normally a blue covered document roughly foolscap size containing the boats particulars, again all in Indonesian and stamped with the Indonesian crest. The boats log can be a stiff backed exercise book and simply contains Indonesian port arrival and sailing certification. Each entry is stamped with the name of the port or kampong. This book may also contain a photograph and details of the owner.

MALAYSIAN CRAFT.

6. These consist mainly of fishing boats and small Johore trading boats. They are almost entirely run by the Chinese although some of the Johore fishing boats do have Malay crews. All boats have to be licenced and have their state distinguishing letters painted on the bow, Singapore SMF, ST, SF, or SFX; SMF being the usual one and Johore BMF, BPF, POF and JBF: BMF and JBF are the usual ones. All are motor driven. They must all have a boat's licence on board, this is written in Malay and English except some of those held by Johore boats. It has often been considered that an occasional boat has dealings with the Indonesians, either at sea or in Indonesia. The conditions for this sort of intrigue would seem to be rather more favourable in the Horsborough Light area.

Malaysian Boatmen.

7. (a) They should all be in possession of their Identity Cards (See Appendix III). These are 4" by 2 3/4" in size, contained inside a plastic sealed envelope. In the centre of the card is the owners photograph and on either side his thumb print. They come in three different colours, blue for Federal Citizen, red non Citizen (mainly Chinese) and brown. There are also green cards for certain Europeans. Each card has a number along the top, underneath which is printed 'KAD PENGENALAN' and underneath the photograph 'PERSEKUTUAN TANAH MELAYU'. On the reverse side is written the personal particulars.

(b)

DISTINGUISHING LETTERS FOR SMALL CRAFT
AND FISHING BOATS - WEST MALAYSIA.

The following are details of distinguishing letters for small craft and fishing boats registered in Malaya and Singapore :-

<u>STATE</u>	<u>FISHING CRAFT</u>	<u>CARGO BOATS</u>	<u>PASSENGER BOATS.</u>
Perlis	PSF	Ps. C	Ps. P
Kedah	KF	KC	KP
Penang	GT, BP, BH, NT	PC	PP
Perak	PK-F	PKC	PKP
Selangor	SLF	SLC	SLP
Negri Sembilan	NF	NSC	NSP
Malacca	MF	MC	MP
Johore	(BMF, BPF (POF, JBF	(TBC, BMC, BPC (OC, KTC, MGC	(JEP, BMP, KTP (BPP, POP, MGP
Singapore	(SMF, ST (SF, SFX.	SC	SP
Pahang	PAF	PHG.C.	PHG.P.

DISTINGUISHING LETTERS FOR SMALL CRAFT AND FISHING BOATS - WEST MALAYSIA (Cont'd)

<u>STATE</u>	<u>FISHING CRAFT</u>	<u>CARGO BOATS</u>	<u>PASSENGER BOATS</u>
Trenggamu	TF	TC	TP
Kelantan	KNF	KNC	KNP

(c) Fishing Craft and Crew Passes The Ministry of Defence Kuala Lumpur has decided to issue these passes (Forms 2) in a different colour each time. Thus from 1st. November 1965 all forms 2 will be issued with Red lettering, and any form purporting to be issued after this date, but still printed with green lettering, is invalid.

"Boat and Licence Numbers

9. Many fishing boats have one number on the hull and a different one on the canopy. The former is the boat number, and the latter the licence number, which changes from year to year. The number on the hull - the boat number - is, therefore, the number which should be quoted in signals or correspondence when identifying fishing craft. "

8. West Malaysian Fishing Boats vary in length from 10ft to 60ft, the smaller boats below 20ft use sails, or outboard motors, those from 25ft to 60ft are diesel powered with a fish hold forward and a canopy aft. They normally carry a crew of 2 to 4 (except Pangkor boats) and fly clan identification flags by day, and by night a bright white light and a smaller, weaker light at the end of the net or line. Confrontation has forced these boats not to display these lights at all times but when a vessel is heading towards them a light is usually shown and if the vessel is inadvertently heading for their nets the light will be flashed on and off.

Habits.

10. Most fishing fleets that fish in International and Malaysian Territorial waters leave for the fishing grounds at about 1600. By 1830 they reach the fishing grounds and cast their nets. Throughout the night they remain in the area, recovering nets and lines by 0700 the following morning and returning to harbour. There are a few boats that prefer to fish in Indonesian claimed waters, these boats stay out for about 6 days; and usually go out twice a month, within periods to coincide with the rising of the new and full moon. There is all year round fishing in Indonesian claimed waters, International and Malaysian Territorial waters but the monsoons do have an effect on the catch in International and Malaysian Territorial waters.

Methods.

11. Most forms of line and net fishing are employed, largely confined to specific areas. Generally, ring net fishings on the N.W. coast, drift and line, in the Southern Malacca Strait, and seine net on the east coast are most prevalent.

Fishing Areas.

12. (a) Malaysian Territorial and International Waters.

- (1) Pulau Pisang - Kukup.
- (2) Off Malacca Coast.
- (3) One fathom bank in North Sands Patch.
- (4) Off Pu Pangkor.

These are the General fishing areas of the Fleets, who largely keep together in an approximate area of 10 square miles with the occasional boat operating alone.

(b) Fishing areas in Indonesian Claimed Waters.

- (1) Waters surrounding the coast of Pu Rongsang, Pu Bengkalis and Pu Roepat.
- (2) Rob Roy Bank.
- (3) South Sands.
- (4) Aruah Eilanden Group.

Disposition of Fleets.

(a) Pangkor. Based here are the larger boats operating around Pu Pangkor, Sembilan Islands, extending as far North as Penang. Purse seines are used, with up to 15-20 men in each boat. Trawling is prevalent but at the present time, illegal.

/Craft:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(PERCD-074)

Page K.6
25th March, 1965.

(f) Continued.

- Craft:
- | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------|-----------|
| (1) | length: 40'-50' | beam: 15' |
| | inboard engine | crew: 4-6 |
| | Distinguishing letters: SMF, ST, SF and SFX. | |
| (2) | length: 10'-15' | beam: 3-4 |
| | sail, oars or outboard | |
| | crew: 1-2 | |

(g) East Coast - Johore.

The fleet is based at Mersing, and employs purse seines and lines. A number of bamboo fishing stakes, one anchored to the bottom are used in pairs. The second stake drifts and the stakes are joined by up to 100 fathoms of set lines. The boats are about 30' in length, similar in appearance to Malacca boats. Distinguishing letters: BMF, BPF, POF, JBF.

(h) East Coast - Kuantan.

Fishing stakes (moored to the bottom) are prevalent in the area, some with set lines, others with palm fronds (Unjangs) secured beneath the surface. These fronds provide shade for fish, which are then caught with seine like nets which are drifted down on to the stake. Distinguishing letters: PAF.

(i) East Coast - Trengganu.

The fleet is based in Kuala Trengganu and Kota Bahru. Seine nets, drift nets and line fishing are all used. Some of these boats operate well off the coast. Some set lines are also prevalent.

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
| (1) | <u>Powered.</u> | length: 40'-50' | beam: 10'-12' |
| | | inboard engine | crew: 8-10 |
| | | Distinguishing letters: TF. | |
| (2) | <u>Sail.</u> | length: 40'-50' | beam: 10'-12' |
| | | sail crew: 9-10 | |
| | | Distinguishing letters: TF. | |

(j) Squid Fishing.

In shallow water (3 fathoms) in both Singapore Strait and on the east coast, small boats fish for squid by night. The method is to attract the squid by a bright magnesium lamp, then scooping them up with nets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




MALAYSIAN
TERRITORIAL
WATERS

FISHING GROUNDS IN MALACCA STRAIT

LEGEND

- FISHING GROUNDS
- INDONESIAN CLAIMED WATERS - - - - -
- MALAYSIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS - - - - -



CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX K

TYPES OF TRADING CRAFT LIKELY TO BE ENCOUNTERED

(a) Sailing Craft

1. LAMBO Sloop and LAMBO Ketch.



Both types of vessel will be seen on the East of Coast of Malaya yearly in the months of October and early November. They come from the Celebes and make for Singapore along the S. Coast of Borneo, up to the Anambas, then due West to the Pahang coast, coasting down to Singapore. They are unlikely to be powered. Crew will be from 6 - 10, and are unlikely to be in possession of any identity documents or Ships papers.

THE LAMBO SLOOP



Fig. 116




Fig. 88

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX K (cont.)

(b) Motor driven craft

1. KUMPIT type

May be up to 75 ft in length (MFV size) and weight up to 70 tons.



2. KOTAK type

Approximately 20 to 30 ft in length.



(REF ID: A77)

ANNEX K (cont.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Page K.10
~~25th~~ March, 1965.

2. Chinese timber TONKANG



Fig. 109

These timber tonkangs generally coast from Thailand carrying timber often as a high deck cargo. Speed slow.

3. Malayan Prahu Bugis

MALAYA

THE MALAYAN PRAHU BUGIS



Fig. 125



The Malayan Prahu Bugis is very common round Singapore and South Malaya and should not be confused with vessels coming from the Celebes.

(REF ID: A771)

INDONESIAN PASSES ISSUED TO
MALAYSIAN CRAFT

Page K.11
~~25th March, 1965~~

The document shown below is a copy of a pass which has been issued by Indonesian authorities to some Malaysian Fishermen. This gives the Malaysian fishing craft permission to enter Indonesian Claimed Waters. Any boats in which a copy of this pass is found should be arrested and handed over to the police, as the pass is prima facie evidence of collusion with the enemy.

2. Underneath is shown a typewritten copy of this pass showing clearly the wording used.



KOMANDO OPERASI TERTINGGI

Surat Keterangan
 Menerangkan bahwa
 Nama
 Alamat Malaysia
 Pekerjaan Nilayan
 Bahwa orang tersebut adalah
 petugas khusus kami
 dan diperbolehkan menggunakan
 alat dan jaring ikan dan
 diharapkan dan pengertian
 sepenuhnya dari patroli
 laut R. I.

[Signature]
 Komandan

SURAT KETERANGAN

MENERANGKAN BAHWA

NAMA

ALAMAT MALAYSIA

PEKERJAAN NILAYAN

BAHWA ORANG TERSEBUT ADALAH PETUGAS KHUSUS KAMI DALAM MENDALAWKAN
KERJANYA BOLEH IA MENGGUNAKAN SAMPAH IKAN DAN DJARING.
HARAP BANTUHAN DAN PENERTIAN SA PENOH NYA DARI PATROLI PATROLI
LAUT REPUBLIK INDONESIA

INDONESIAN IDENTITY CARD.



No. 456/141/c
 Tahun 1964
 Nama Lengkap: Masyumi, H.
 R. Safo
 Jenis kelamin: laki-laki / Perempuan
 Tempat dan tanggal lahir (umur): Medan, 26/11/36
 Kewarganegaraan: Indonesia
 Pekerjaan: Kad. P. M. S.
 Agama/Kepercayaan: Islam
 Alamat: Sei Rengas
 Kampung: L. M. S.
 Dikeluarkan tanggal: 20 Juli 1964
 Berlaku hingga: 20 Juli 1965
 An. Bupati Kepala Daerah
 Kap. Riau
 Asisten W. B. S.
 Tg. Bala
 R. Safo

TARIF	Prakib ke dalam	
	Tempat	

TARIF	Prakib ke dalam	
	Tempat	

PERATURAN DAERAH SWATANTRA TINGKAT II KEPULAUAN RIAU TENTANG KARTU-PENDUDUK

Paragraf 1.
 Dengan tidak mengurangi ketentuan pasal 6, setiap penduduk Daerah Swatantra Tingkat II Kepulauan Riau yang sudah berusia 16 tahun atau yang sudah pernah kawin, wajib memiliki/memegang Kartu-penduduk yang diterbitkan oleh Pemerintah Daerah Swatantra Tingkat II Kepulauan Riau.

Paragraf 2.
 Bentuk dan ukuran Kartu-penduduk ditetapkan oleh Bupati Kepala Daerah Swatantra Tingkat II Kepulauan Riau.
 Kartu-penduduk harus memuat antara lain: nama lengkap, jenis kelamin, tempat dan tanggal lahir, umur, kewarganegaraan, pekerjaan, agama/kepercayaan, alamat serta dititipkan potret-potret dan dibubuhi stempel atau sidik jari pemilik.
 Setiap Kartu-penduduk diberi nomor yang akan ditanda-tangani satu huruf angka alfabed yang tidak dititipkan lagi ketuntasan masing-masing.

Paragraf 3.
 Kartu-penduduk berlaku untuk waktu 5 (lima) tahun dan jika rusak atau hilang setelah masa berlakunya berakhir dapat diberikan duplikatnya.

Paragraf 4.
 Kartu-penduduk dikeluarkan oleh Asisten Wedana/Kepala Kecamatan atau nama Bupati Kepala Daerah dan ditanda-tangani oleh pejabat serta harus ditanda-tangani oleh Kepala Kampung masing-masing.
 Ketentuan tersebut dalam ayat (1) diatas berlaku juga untuk Kartu-penduduk duplikat.
 Untuk setiap Kartu-penduduk dipotong uang ganti kerugian yang akan ditetapkan oleh Bupati Kepala Daerah.

Paragraf 5.
 Seworang penduduk yang pindah atau wajib memberitahukan selajunya dan sebelumnya kepada Kepala Kampung yang bersangkutan dan penduduk lama tersebut dijilang dalam Kartu-penduduknya.

Paragraf 2.
 Apabila dengan perubahan status atau meninggal penduduk tersebut dalam lingkungan satu kampung atau dalam lingkungan satu desa, maka ia wajib memberitahukan selajunya di tempat yang baru, mendahului/melaporkan pada Kepala Kampung baru ke agar perubahan status tersebut dijamin dalam Kartu-penduduknya.
 Dalam hal meninggal penduduk pindah dalam Daerah Swatantra Tingkat II Kepulauan Riau, pemegang Kartu-penduduk harus menyerahkan Kartu-penduduknya kepada Kepala Kampung yang bersangkutan sebelum berangkat pindah dan kemudian diberikan surat keterangan pindah.

Paragraf 6.
 Selambat-lambatnya dalam jangka waktu 14 (empat belas) hari sejak meninggal, a. menjadi penduduk Daerah Swatantra Tingkat II Kepulauan Riau atau b. meninggal atau c. kawin, yang bersangkutan sudah harus memiliki/memegang Kartu-penduduk.

Paragraf 7.
 Selambat-lambatnya dalam jangka waktu 3 (tiga) bulan sejak mulai berlakunya peraturan ini, setiap penduduk sudah harus memiliki/memegang Kartu-penduduk.

Paragraf 8.
 Ketentuan terhadap pasal 1 ayat (1) dan (2), pasal 5, pasal 6 dan pasal 7 dapat diberikan dengan hukuman kurungan selanjutnya lima bulan atau denda selanjutnya Rp.150,-

Paragraf 9.
 Pelaksanaan undang-undang dari ketentuan-ketentuan dalam Peraturan-Deerah ini ditetapkan oleh Bupati Kepala Daerah.

Paragraf 10.
 Peraturan-Deerah ini mulai berlaku pada hari diundangkannya.

STAMPED AREA WITH SIGNATURES AND OFFICIAL SEAL.

Stamp: KEPALA KAMPUNG, with signature and official seal.

APPENDIX III to ANNEX K

Specimen of Malaysian Identity Card

12345678
 14.11.1942
 ENGLAND
 BRITISH
 LUCY VALENTINE CRISTY
 11.2.39
 SEREMPAH

Nº 9549764



CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIMEN

SINGAPORE
THE IMMIGRATION ORDINANCE
(Chapter 102)
THE IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS, 1959

CREW LIST
(Regulation 28 (1))

Note:—This form is to be used for crew only.

Name of ship S 35-11989
Agents _____
Date of arrival _____
Date of proposed departure 24.9.64

Owners or charterers _____
Last port of call Kuala Lumpur
Next port of call _____

No.	Name	Chinese characters (if applicable)	Nationality	Seaman's Certificate of Nationality and I entity and/or Seaman's Identity Book	Duties on board	Port where engaged	Date of engagement
1	TANDJENG S/O HANZAH						
2	HANAPIN S/O MEDANG						
3	DYHAJJANG S/O HALING						
4	MOHA AMIR S/O BADEK						
5	MUSTAFA S/O ACHMAD						
6	DARMO S/O KASTAN						
7	LANUK @ LANUKAN						
8							
9							
10							
11	Out of Kuala Lumpur on 24.9.64						
12							
13							
14	at 18.2.65						
15							
16							
17							
18							
19							
20							
21							
22							
23							
24							
25							
26							
27							
28							
29							
30							
31							
32							



[Handwritten signature]
24/9

NOTE

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix V to Annex K.

STOLEN FISHING BOATS

The fishing vessels listed below have been reported stolen during 1963/1964/1965 and up to 1st April 1966. Additions to and deletions from the list will be advised as they become known.

<u>1963/1964</u>			<u>1965</u>			<u>1966</u>		
MF 619	SLF 70	SLF 2533	MF 1356	SLF 264	SMF 460			
MF 1960	SLF 92	SLF 2541	MF 1482	SLF 642	SLF 871			
MF 2017	SLF 152	SLF 2691	MF 1516	SLF 1034	SLF 4098			
MF 2235	SLF 230	SLF 2718	MF 1596	SLF 1250	SLF 4427			
M 2346	SLF 469	SLF 2719	MF 1867	SLF 1285	SLF 4829			
	SLF 603	SLF 2796	MF 1879	SLF 1296	SLF 5967			
	SLF 607	SLF 2920	MF 1926	SLF 1380	SLF 7071			
	SLF 651	SLF 3378	MF 2014	SLF 1393	POF 481			
	SLF 732	SLF 3470	MF 2080	SLF 2003	BPF 2016			
	SLF 787	SLF 3483	MF 2112	SLF 2772	MF 1			
	SLF 865	SLF 3567	MF 2117	SLF 3573	MF 52			
	SLF 946	SLF 3632	MF 2158	SLF 3711	MF 2255			
	SLF 998	SLF 3671	MF 2222	SLF 5413	SLF 6464			
	SLF 1051	SLF 3674	MF 2242	SLF 5984				
	SLF 1082	SLF 3784	MF 2246	SLF 7001				
	SLF 1191	SLF 3851	MF 2431	SLF 7004				
	SLF 1192	SLF 3865	MF 2439	SLF 642				
	SLF 1216	SLF 4066	BMF 372	SLF 1296				
	SLF 1258	SLF 4238	BMF 609	SLF 5967				
	SLF 1331	SLF 5607	BMF 774	SLF 4098				
	SLF 1702	SLF 5675	BMF 781	SLF 4427				
	SLF 1923	SLF 5701	BMF 1013	SLF 4829				
	SLF 1962	SLF 5786	BMF 1060	SLF 7071				
	SLF 1978	SLF 5858	BMF 1075					
	SLF 2195	SLF 5862	BMF 1355					
	SLF 2200	SLF 5899	BPF 2017					
	SLF 2446	SLF 5912	JBF 5152					
	SLF 2478	SLF 5996	POF 941					
	SLF 2505	SLF 6350	POF 3196					
		SLF 7229	POC 580					

CONFIDENTIAL

Page K.15.a.

APPENDIX V.A. TO ANNEX K.

STOLEN FISHING CREW PASSES.

The fishing crew passes listed below have been reported stolen during 1966 and up to 1st April 1966. Additions to and deletions from the list will be advised as they become known.

<u>PASS NO.</u>	<u>BOAT</u>	<u>DATE ISSUED</u>	<u>VALID UNTIL</u>	<u>CREW LISTED.</u>
20458	BPF 1239	1 Dec 65	30 April 66	THREE
23073	BPF 2016	29 Jan 66	30 June 66	THREE
18925	SLF 4427	23 Nov 65	22 May 66	TWO
17382	POF 481	6 Nov 65	5 May 66	THREE
19736	MF 1	2 Nov 65	30 April 66	THREE
19817	MF 52	30 Nov 65	30 April 66	THREE
18913	SLF 8464	18 May 66	10 July 66	4

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX K
SPECIMEN RESTRICTED AREA PERMIT - SINGAPORE.

PENGUASA PELABOHAN SINGAPURA
PORT OF SINGAPORE AUTHORITY

Pembawa Surat Izinan ini telah di-benarkan melalui kawasan pembatasan kapal² yang bawah dari-pada 100 ton net seperti yang telah di-istiharkan di-dalam "Pemberitahu Kapada Pelaut² No. 39/1964."

The holder of this Permit is permitted to pass through the restricted area for vessels under 100 tons net declared under Notice to Mariners No. 39 of 1964.

Nama _____ Kenyataan Kapal
Name: _____ Description of boat: _____

Card Pengenalan
Identity Card No: _____

Alamat
Address: _____

Kebangsaan
Nationality: _____

Officer Commanding,
Port of Singapore
Authority Police

Pembawa Surat izinan ini hendak-lah membawa Card Pengenalan-nya pada tiap² masa apabila melalui kawasan Pembatasan ini.

The holder of this Permit must carry his Identity Card at all times when passing through the restricted area.

PELABOHAN SINGAPURA
SURAT IZINAN
KAWASAN PEMBATASAN

PORT OF SINGAPORE
RESTRICTED AREA
PERMIT

MALPOS II

ANNEX M


SOME KINEMATICAL ASPECTS OF PATROLLING.

1. It is assumed that it is desired to patrol a rectangular zone. There are plainly many ways in which this may be done, ranging from sophisticated variants on the cross over patrol to the relatively simple straight line to and fro patrol. The proper choice of the pattern for maximum chance of detection depends upon the inter-relationship between the several variables involved, particularly the speed ratio, and the effective radar range. For the range of conditions expected from present intelligence, the simple to and fro line patrol will give the best result.

2. No patrol scheme can ensure a 100% chance of detection, especially bearing in mind the loss of patrol time that will occur in investigating suspicious contacts etc. The curves in figure 1 show how the probability of detection will vary as the speed ratio, length of patrol line and radar range change. Figure 2 gives a quick way of determining the ratio of radar range to the length of the patrol line. It is seen that the chance of detection is very sensitive to radar range. The moral of this is that every care should be taken to ensure that the ships radar is working at maximum efficiency during the course of a patrol. This involves paying careful attention to the method of setting up the system, especially under adverse conditions. This has not always been done in the past.

3. It is important that conclusions based on purely kinematical considerations should be monitored in the light of practical experience. To this end patrol ships are to record the outcome of their patrol activity on the pro-forma shown in figure 3 (S.C.D.R.). Supplies of these forms will be available from the Operations Room, R.N. H.Q. at any time prior to the patrol. Information accumulated from records of this type will ensure that ships are employed to full advantage.

$K = 1.5$
 $K = 1.0$
 $K = 0.75$
 $K = 0.5$



ANNEX M


FIGURE 1

CHANCE OF DETECTING A VESSEL MOVING
 PERPENDICULAR TO A SPECIFIED PATROL
 LINE

CHANCE OF DETECTION

SPEED RATIO, k = SPEED PATROL VESSEL
 SPEED INTRUDER

λ = radar range, R .
 L = length patrol line, L .
 (see figure 2 for quick estimate)




CONFIDENTIAL

K = 1.5
K = 1.0
K = 0.75
K = 0.5

ANNEX M
FIGURE 1

CHANCE OF DETECTING A VESSEL MOVING PERPENDICULAR TO A SPECIFIED PATROL LINE




SPEED RATIO, k = SPEED PATROL VESSEL SPEED INTRUDER
 λ = radar range, R.
length patrol line, L.
(see figure 2 for quick estimate)

ANNEX II (cont.)

RATIO OF RADAR RANGE TO
LENGTH OF PATROL LINE

FIGURE 2



(FEFCD 071)

Page M.4
25th March, 1985

DATE	
AREA	

FIGURE 3

SECRET (when completed)

MALPOS

SUSPICIOUS CONTACT DATA REPORT (S.C.D.R.)

REF: FEFCD-071

NAME OF SHIP

TIME	Type of Contact V (Visual) R (Radar)	Tick it Initial Report from Maritime Afr.	Range	If not investigated, reason why	IF INVESTIGATED				OUTCOME OF INVESTIGATION
					Time off patrol	Type of craft	Searched? Yes/No	Search Time	

SECRET (when completed)

Signed

MALPOS II

ANNEX N

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF SHIPS ON PATROL.

Scope.

1. The provisions of this Annex apply to R.N. ships only. Arrangements for logistic support of R.M.N. vessels are made separately by ~~R.M.N. Vessels~~
NOCUM

Fuel.

2. H.M.S. MANXMAN and Escorts.

- (a) An R.F.A. tanker is sent out to refuel patrol ships at intervals of three or four days.

CMS and SDB's.

- (b) (i) Malacca Straits. Ship will replenish from the R.F.A. tanker as for 2(a) above, or from H.M.S. MANXMAN.
(ii) Singapore Straits. Ship should return to the Naval Base by day as required to replenish.
(iii) East Coast. Individual arrangements will be made when required.

Provisions and Naval Stores.

3. Ships on patrol in the Malacca Straits will be provided with provisions and stores, as opportunity offers, by means of the tanker as at 2(a) above.
4. Urgent stores can be supplied from the Naval Base by road to Port Dickson or other ports on the West coast of Malaya.
5. Escorts in the Singapore Straits or East coast will be supplied by R.A.S. as in the W.P.P. C.M.S. will replenish with stores as in 2(b) above.

Mail.

6. Mail will be delivered to all ships on patrol as often as possible by relieving vessels and R.F.A.'s. Where necessary mail will be despatched by rail to Port Dickson, and by road to Batu Pahat, for collection by ship's boats. Ships will be informed by signal when, and by what means mail is being despatched to them.
7. Unless ships have any special requirements there is normally no necessity to make signals requesting for mails, as every effort is made by the B.F.M.O. to deliver mail to ships as often as possible.

13444/6 ANNEX H

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4102 APPENDIX 5

TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING INDONESIAN CLAIMED WATERS

1. The following instructions on the policy to be adopted in Indonesian-claimed waters, during the present period of tension with Indonesia are to be followed in lieu of those in Section 'C' of this order.

2. The instructions are designed to reduce to a minimum the possibility of exacerbating the present strained relations and cover only disputes occurring during the routine movements of British warships and merchant ships. They are not relevant to specific operations which may be ordered from time to time.

General Policy

3. Disputes between H.M. Ships and Indonesian vessels could be limited to argument over the extent of Indonesian territorial sea limits or over the arrest of British protected shipping; or they could involve actual interference, or attempts to interfere, with the freedom of lawful passage by H.M. Ships or British-protected vessels (for definition see paras. 32 and 33 of Section 'C' of this order).

4. In any of these circumstances, H.M. Ships are to behave with firmness and restraint. In general, incidents are to be avoided unless provocation (as set out below) has been initiated by the Indonesian vessels, and H.M. Ships should use all measures short of force until left with no other alternative. Any incident is to be reported immediately to COMNAV info. NOD (Navy) and CINCSEA by unclassified "Flash" signal.

5. If the dispute is confined to argument over the extent of Indonesian territorial sea limits, H.M. Ships should follow the policy in paragraphs 12 and 13 below; unless the Indonesians interfere forcibly, or threaten to interfere forcibly, with the lawful passage of H.M. Ships, any of H.M. Ships challenged by Indonesian vessels should normally try to maintain their course. In the last resort, they should withdraw from the disputed area if the only alternative is the use of force by either side.

6. If, however, Indonesian vessels use or threaten actual and wrongful violence against British-protected shipping, either within recognised Indonesian territorial sea limits (see para.11), in disputed waters, or on the high seas, and if H.M. Ships are left with no other alternative, they should use the minimum amount of force necessary to provide protection.

7. Whatever the circumstances, H.M. Ships are not to open fire on an Indonesian vessel unless:-

- a. all appeals to reason and other means of persuasion have failed;
- and b. H.M. Ships intention to open fire has been clearly indicated;
- and c. action is essential in self-defence or to counter a direct and serious danger to British shipping;
- and d. it has been established beyond doubt that the vessel under attack is entitled to British protection;

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4102 APPENDIX 5 (contd)

7.

and e. the Indonesian vessel has opened fire first.

Zone outside Indonesian Territorial Sea (as defined in paragraph 11 below)

8. The Indonesian Government claimed in Regulation No. 8 of 1962 the right to prohibit stopping, anchoring and/or hovering without justifiable cause on the high seas adjacent to the Indonesian territorial sea, "adjacent" being interpreted by an Indonesian Assistant for Shipping as meaning within a distance of 100 nautical miles outside the territorial sea. (para. 32(c) of Section B of this order refers).

9. H.M. Government have refused to accept this claim, and regard this area outside the Indonesian territorial sea as high seas, for which the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas identifies an international right of free navigation. Interference by Indonesian warships with British-protected shipping in this area (except in cases of hot pursuit) is therefore illegal, and when all other means have failed, H.M. Ships are authorized to use the minimum amount of force necessary to prevent an arrest or to provide protection subject to the reservations in paragraph 7 above.

Claimed Internal Seas

10. H.M.G. similarly are unable to accept the Indonesian Government's claim to control as internal waters large areas of the high seas such as the Java Sea, Banda Sea, Molucca Sea, the Strait of Macassar and internationally used Straits giving access to these waters. In these areas, waters beyond a 12 mile territorial sea (as shown in outline on the charts referred to in paragraph 97 of FOTI 4102) should be regarded as high seas, and action may be taken as in paragraph 9.

Claimed Territorial Sea

11. H.M.G. have recognised only a 3 mile Indonesian territorial sea, but can accept that the territorial sea should be drawn from straight base lines justifiable under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea. Nevertheless, they cannot accept and do not recognise that Indonesia can legally enclose her entire archipelago by a straight base line system. During the present period of tension, waters within 12 miles of base lines drawn round the Indonesian coast using the Indonesian method of drawing base lines (except as is set out in para. 10 above) should be treated as the Indonesian territorial sea, for all purposes including the commencement of hot pursuit.

12. If Indonesian warships attempt to arrest or otherwise interfere with British-protected shipping between 3 and 12 miles, and if assistance is both sought and available, H.M. Ship is to intervene and invite the C.O. of the Indonesian vessel to join him, and if necessary visit the merchant ship for joint investigation.

13. Whether the Indonesian allegations are well-founded or not, the C.O. of H.M. Ship should:-

a. attempt to establish an agreement on the precise geographical position of the incident;

b. state that H.M.G. have not accepted the Indonesian Government's claim to a 12 mile territorial sea and that the facts of the incident are being reported to H.M.G.:

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4102 APPENDIX 5 (contd)

13.

- c. use every reasonable means to persuade the Indonesians to release the British-protected vessel and allow the incident to be settled through diplomatic channels.

If this fails, he should in the last resort allow the British-protected ship to be arrested under protest, except that he should protect it against use of force by the Indonesian vessel. The above action should also be taken when a British-protected ship has been subjected to hot pursuit on the high seas which commenced from within Indonesian territorial sea, as defined in para. 11 above.

14. If, however, a British-protected ship has been fired upon before an H.M. Ship arrives, action should at once be taken to protect her from further violence, force being used if inevitable, but subject to the reservations in paragraph 7.

15. British-protected ships have been warned to avoid the Indonesian claimed 12 miles territorial sea (except as set out in paragraph 10 above) and to keep to established sea routes through the area during the present period of tension.

Indonesian inland waters and ports

16. H.M. Ships should intervene within the three mile territorial sea limit on behalf of British-protected shipping only if wrongful and actual violence has occurred and if all other measures have failed. Your action is to be confined to the protection of shipping unless other instructions are issued by the Ministry of Defence.

17. For the purposes of handling incidents the Straits giving access to Indonesian claimed "Inland Seas" are to be treated as High Seas.

Naval Aircraft

18. Naval aircraft are not to fly over Indonesian 12 mile territorial sea as defined in paragraph 11 above.

(11/271/6 Ops)

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4104. INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION - ACTION TO COUNTER INFILTRATION BY SEA

1. The aim of H.M. Ships on anti-infiltration duty is to prevent the landing in Malaysia of Indonesian troops and agents, and arms, munitions and supplies for them. H.M. Ships engaged on this duty are to be guided by the following paragraphs, which do not detract from their right to defend themselves at all times.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH NON NAVAL CRAFT.

On the High Seas.

2. Any craft whose identity is not clearly established may be boarded and her ship's papers inspected.

3. If the situation and conduct of any craft gives rise to grave suspicion that she is an immediate threat to the security of Malaysia or Brunei, she is to be arrested and sent into the nearest convenient port of these states or as ordered. Minimum force only is to be used, and fire should be opened only as a last resort.

In Malaysian Territorial Waters.

4. The Malaysian Government has declared that all her territorial sea is a Security Area under a proclamation issued under the authority of the Internal Security Act of Malaya, 1960.

5. H.M. Ships may stop, search and arrest, without warrant any craft or person whom they suspect of being concerned in any of the following offences:

- a. Unauthorised possession of arms, ammunition or explosive.
- b. Consorting with persons in unauthorised possession of arms, ammunition or explosives.
- c. Carrying supplies for Indonesian troops or agents.

6. Such force may be used as the circumstances require, including opening fire. Craft or persons arrested are to be taken to the nearest convenient port in Malaysia or as ordered.

7. H.M. Ships acting under paras. 5 and 6 above may exercise "hot pursuit" (See F.O.T.I. 4102, paras. 15 and 16) into international waters, but not into areas claimed by Indonesia as territorial waters, i.e. those within 12 n.m. of straight base lines drawn round the coast, or in the Indonesian side of median lines where these apply e.g. in the Singapore Strait.

In Brunei Territorial Waters.

8. H.M. Ships may stop, search and arrest, without a warrant, any craft or person whom they suspect of threatening the security of Brunei or Malaysia, using such force as the circumstances may require, including opening fire. Hot pursuit may be exercised as in para. 7 above. Craft or persons arrested are to be taken into the nearest convenient port in Brunei.

28th July, 1965.

SECRET

(A.T. 33)
(REFCD 041)

No. 4104

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4104. (Continued)

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH INDONESIA NAVAL AND GOVERNMENT VESSELS.

9. H.M. Ships encountering INDONESIA Naval or GOVERNMENT vessels on the High Seas are to report them in accordance with F.O.T.I. 4125. Unless specifically engaged on anti-infiltration duty they should not take any further action.

10. When engaged on anti-infiltration duty, H.M. Ships are to be guided by the following principles:

a. ON THE HIGH SEAS.

Indonesian Naval vessels are to be regarded as immune from any direct action except when interfering with a ship entitled to British protection, in which case minimum of force to make the vessel desist is to be used. Nevertheless, contact is to be held while the INDONESIA VESSEL is passing through the patrolling vessels assigned area.

b. IN MALAYSIAN TERRITORIAL SEA.

The vessel is to be closed and required to explain her presence. Unless she can justify innocent passage, she should be required to leave. If her Commanding Officer refuses to do so, action is to be taken to eject her, by force, if necessary. Instructions issued must be firm and force is only to be used in the following circumstances:

(1) All appeals to reason have failed and H.M. Ship's intention to open fire is clearly indicated.

or ~~xxxx~~ (2) The Indonesian vessel clearly shows hostile intent. Cease action when vessel has withdrawn outside Malaysian Territorial waters.

c. IN BRUNEI TERRITORIAL SEA.

As in b. above.

(11/66/2X)

SECRET

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

ANNEX A TO F.O.T.I. 4104

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PATROLLING INDONESIAN-
CLAIMED WATERS

1. When specifically authorised by the Commander Far East Fleet in the Malacca and Singapore, Straits, ships may patrol Indonesian-claimed territorial waters as defined in F.O.T.I. 4102, appendix 5, paragraph 11, last sentence, but they are not to enter Indonesia's internationally recognised territorial waters, i.e. within three miles of base lines drawn in accordance with F.O.T.I. 4102 paragraphs 5 to 9, or, if the straits are less than 6 miles across, south of the median line.
2. The purpose of the amendment to current instructions set out in paragraph 1 above is to gain information on infiltrators and to deter them. No attempt is to be made to stop, search and arrest infiltrators in Indonesian claimed territorial waters.
3. If challenged by Indonesian warships, H.M. Ships are to inform the Indonesian that they are in waters which they consider to be High Seas and if objections are made, say they will inform their authorities. Action by Indonesian Naval vessel(s) must not be provoked. If attacked the minimum force required to make the vessel(s) desist is to be used.

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS
ANNEX B

ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST NON-NAVAL CRAFT

AREA	TYPE OF PATROL	INVESTIGATION	ACTION	FINAL	INVESTIGATION	ACTION	FINAL
1.M.T.W.s	UNRESTRICTED	Stop, search & arrest any craft or person suspected of: a. being in unauthorised possession of arms, ammo. or explosives. b. consorting with persons in unauthorised possession of etc. c. carrying supplies for Indonesian troops or agents.	Use force including opening fire, as the circumstances require. Exercise hot pursuit as far as, but not into, ICWs.	Take craft or persons arrested to nearest convenient port in Malaysia.	Report presence of Indonesian naval vessel. Close and require vessel to explain her presence. Unless she can justify innocent passage, require her to leave.	If she refuses to leave, eject her by force if necessary. Give firm instructions and use force only if: a. all appeals to reason have failed and your own intention to open fire is clearly indicated, and b. the Indonesian vessel clearly shows hostile intent.	
		FOTI 4104 para. 5.	FOTI-4104 para. 5-7. FOTI 4102 para. 15-16.	FOTI 4104 para. 6.	FOTI 4125 FOTI 4104 para. 10(b).		FOTI 4101 para 10(b).

2.I.C.W.s	Only when specifically authorised. Applicable to Singapore Straits and Malacca Straits only.	Stop, search and arrest not permitted. Object of patrol is to gain information on infiltrators and to deter them.	Not permitted.	-	Object of patrol is to gain intelligence and deter infiltrators. If challenged say you are in waters you consider to be High Seas and if objections are made, say you will inform your authorities.		
-----------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------	---	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--	--

July, 1965.
104

SEC

(A.L. 33)
(FEFCD 041)

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

ANNEX B

ACTION TO BE TAKEN WITH INDONESIAN NAVAL & GOVERNMENT VESSELS

ACTION TO BE TAKEN AGAINST NON-NAVAL CRAFT

AREA	TYPE OF PATROL	INVESTIGATION	ACTION	FINAL	INVESTIGATION	ACTION	FINAL
3. I.T.W.s	NOT PERMITTED	NOT PERMITTED	NOT PERMITTED	-	NOT PERMITTED	NOT PERMITTED	FINAL
4. HIGH SEAS	UNRESTRICTED	Any Craft whose identity is not clearly established may be boarded and ships' papers inspected. Arrest craft if her situation and conduct give rise to grave suspicion that she is an immediate threat to the security of Malaysia.	Use minimum force, and open fire only as last resort to effect arrest.	-	Keep vessel under surveillance while passing through your assigned area.	No action except when interfering with a ship entitled to British protection.	FINAL

NOT PERMITTED

NOT PERMITTED

NOT PERMITTED

NOT PERMITTED

NOT PERMITTED

No action except when interfering with a ship entitled to British protection.

Keep vessel under surveillance while passing through your assigned area.

Use minimum force, and open fire only as last resort to effect arrest.

Any Craft whose identity is not clearly established may be boarded and ships' papers inspected.
Arrest craft if her situation and conduct give rise to grave suspicion that she is an immediate threat to the security of Malaysia.

FOTI 4104, Para. 10(a)
FOTI 4102 Appendix 5, para. 6.

FOTI 4104 para. 10(a)

FOTI 4104 para. 3.

FOTI 4104, para. 3.

FOTI 4104, para. 2-3.

28th July, 1965
No. 4104

(A.L. 33)
(FEFCD 041)

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

ANNEX C to F.O.T.L. A104RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERING
INDONESIAN INFILTRATION BY SEARules of Engagement

1. Aircraft encountering Indonesian or suspected Indonesian activity inside Malaysia or Singapore territorial waters or against Commonwealth shipping in international waters are to take action as follows:

a. Report the incident stating at least "What, Where, Whither, When" to:

(1) A Naval Officer in Tactical Command or Commonwealth naval ship in the area (if communication can immediately be established).

(2) The aircraft's ground control centre.

b. Maintain visual or radar contact with the enemy.

c. Open fire or release weapons or illuminants upon surface craft only:

(1) When so ordered by the relevant ground control centre on the authority of Headquarters Far East Air Force.

(2) When so ordered by a naval Officer in Tactical Command in the case of maritime or naval aircraft.

(3) When deliberately fired on within Malaysian or Singapore waters by shipping identified as Indonesian.

Note 1

Shackletons on Operation HAWKMOOTH and Borneo reconnaissance patrols shall have Headquarters Far East Air Force authority to illuminate targets at discretion of aircraft captain or an Officer in Tactical Command. Shackletons have also been authorised by Headquarters Far East Air Force to open fire (at Captain's discretion) on targets as and when instructed by an Officer in Tactical Command, in the event of an initial enemy attack. Fire may be aimed to warn, damage or sink enemy vessels in accordance with current rules of engagement for R.N. Ships, i.e. the aircraft is thus regarded as an extension of naval fire power.

Note 2

Aircraft are not deliberately to provoke surface craft into firing at them, and, unless over Malaysian or Singaporean Territorial waters, as provided in paragraph c.(3), are to evade rather than return the fire, unless otherwise authorised under paragraph c.(1) or (2).

Action by Operational Control Centres

2. The action by the aircraft's control authority receiving a report is to be as follows:

/a.

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

4135 continued

Part IV - Section I

2. a. West Malaysia and Singapore

(1) GCI Stations, Operations Centres, A C Flights and
Army units with light aircraft

(a) Pass telephone report to Far East Air Force
Operations Centre.

(b) Confirm by signal to AIG 1117.

(2) FAFMC

(a) Pass telephone report to Headquarters Far
East Command and Group Captain Operations,
Headquarters Far East Air Force.

(b) Confirm signal to AIG 1117 has been sent by
originator.

b. East Malaysia. Reports are to be passed to Brigade Headquarters,
Headquarters Director of Borneo Operations, Commander Naval Forces
Borneo, Commander Land Forces Borneo and Commander Air Forces Borneo,
in accordance with the Director of Borneo Operations standard
procedure for operational reporting.

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION I
ANNEX D. TO F.O.T.I. No. 4104

INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION - USE OF FORCE

- Reference: A. FOTI 4104 - Anti-Infiltration Operations
B. FOTI 4102 - Appendix 5 - Protection of Merchant Shipping.
C. FOTI 4102 - Hot Pursuit
D. FOTI 4104 - Rules of Engagement for Aircraft Encountering Indonesian Infiltration by Sea.
C.

(For the purpose of this order the term Commonwealth embraces United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia only.)

1. It will be appreciated that in conditions short of open war any force used may have political consequences. In the present climate of Indonesian confrontation operations, the following principles based on FOTIs should be used for guidance by Commanding Officers when exercising their discretion to open fire.

Fire in Self-Defence

2. a. H.M. Ships may engage "in self-defence" the source of Indonesian fire if it is directed at:-
(1) themselves
(2) any Commonwealth warship, or merchant ship or craft, or aircraft
(3) Commonwealth forces ashore.
- b. The above applies whether Indonesian fire is coming from:-
(1) Indonesian ships or craft
(2) Indonesian aircraft
(3) Indonesian shore guns or mortars.
- c. Fire may only be returned "in self-defence" if it is essential to ensure the safety of the forces in paragraph 2.a. above. Only the minimum fire necessary is to be used and civilian targets are to be avoided as far as possible.

Fire to Effect Arrest

3. Fire may be opened in Malaysian Territorial Waters and on the High Seas outside Indonesian Claimed Waters (12 miles) when carrying out anti-infiltration duties in order to effect arrest. The minimum amount of fire to stop, search and arrest should be used.

Offensive Fire

4. Unprovoked fire, i.e. that not covered by firing in "Self-defence" or to "effect arrest" is not to be opened on Indonesian Territory or Indonesian ships, craft, or aircraft, unless specifically authorised.

28th July, 1965.
No. 4104.

SECRET

(A.L.33)
(FEPCD 041)

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION I

ANNEX D. TO F.O.T.I. No. 4104. continued.

Engagement in Hot Pursuit

5. Ships and craft may be engaged in hot pursuit until they reach the limit of Indonesian Claimed Waters (12 miles). In the Singapore Strait, ships and craft may be pursued until they reach the median line, or mid-line Other Circumstances between ITW and MTW, as appropriate.

6. The Commanding Officer may not open fire in other circumstances except in situations in which he deems it necessary in order to preserve the safety of his ship in which case the minimum force to achieve the desired effect should be used.

Fire from Co-operating Aircraft

7. When acting as OTC, fire from certain co-operating aircraft may be used as an extension of naval fire power in accordance with current policies.

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4.125. INDONESIAN VESSELS AND SUSPICIOUS CRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF MALAYSIA - REPORTING PROCEDURE.

1. Reports of sightings of Indonesian warships operating anywhere in the Malaysian area and of all suspect craft in the waters close to Malaysia are required in the form What, Where, Wither, When.
2. Texts of Sighting Reports should start with the words 'Sighting Report' and should include any amplifying details (e.g. information to assist identification if the exact type of ship is not known) after the body of the report as paragraph 1.

3. Sighting reports are to be addressed as follows:-

Western Malaysia.	To. AIG 1117
Eastern Malaysia.	To. Sighting Units own operational

(except West and East Brigade Areas) Authority INFO. AIG 1118.

West and East Brigade.	Sighting reports in West Brigade and East Brigade areas are to be made in accordance with instructions in MRSMOPS and TOMP respectively.
------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Composition of AIG 1117, to which address group LZFI has been allocated, is:-

ACTION	OPSCO	INFO	IGPOL OPS.
	MINDEF KL		IGPOL MARINE
	FEAFOC		CINCFE
	COMFEF		
	RCCCHANGI		
	HQ FARELF		
	HQ FEAF		
	KD MALAYA		

(b) The composition of AIG 1118, to which the address group OGYD has been allocated, is:-

MINDEF KL	HQ FEAF
CINC FE	DOBOPS
COMFEF	COMNAVBOR
HQ FARELF	IGPOL OPS.

(c) Sighting Reports in the Singapore Straits are to be unclassified.

RESET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

continued.

PART IV - SECTION 1

5. OPSCO is the Operational Sub Committee of the National Operations Committee which has been established to coordinate action by the Anglo-Malaysian Joint Services and Police in combatting confrontation in West Malaysia.

6. Classification and precedence of sighting reports must depend on circumstances and state of political tension at the time. Unless the tactical situation justifies an UNCLASSIFIED signal and a high precedence, reports should normally be of precedence "OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE" to Action Addressees, "PRIORITY" to Information Addressees and classified "RESTRICTED".

7. Reports in accordance with current CB 04895 should continue to be made for sightings of Indonesian vessels which are not in the immediate vicinity of MALAYSIA but signalled reports are not required if a Sighting Report is made in accordance with this order. Any useful additional information, photographs or sketches, however, should continue to be forwarded.

(60/27B/2/INT)

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4130. H.M. SHIPS - STATES OF READINESS ENTERING AND LEAVING SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE AND ON PASSAGE IN THE SINGAPORE AND MALACCA STRAITS

1. A potential danger exists to ships entering and leaving the Naval Base at Singapore and to ships on passage in the Singapore and Malacca Straits, from the threat posed by Indonesian Naval Forces.
2. Pre-emptive Indonesian action is most likely to take the form of mine laying and attack by surface forces. The most dangerous threat from surface forces is that of the Komar missile-firing fast patrol boat.
3.
 - a. H.M. Ships entering and leaving the Naval Base at Singapore and transiting the Malacca Strait south of the one fathom bank (2° 53'N) or the Singapore Strait south of 1° 24'N and west of 104° 50'E are to assume the degrees of armament, aircraft and NBCD readiness laid down in the succeeding paragraphs of this instruction.
 - b. On entering or leaving Singapore Naval Base degrees of readiness are to be relaxed at or assumed, by the time of passing Changi buoy.
 - c. Ships on Anti Infiltration Patrol are to be governed by MALPOS orders.
4. Surface Weapons Assume the third degree of anti-ship and anti-aircraft (counter missile) readiness (A.T.P. 1 (A) Vol 1 - Arts. 1704, 1705)
 - a. Ammunition
 - (1) Medium range guns - 50% of H.E. outfit fused V.T. 20 rounds per gun in gunbays. Upper deck R.U. lockers full.
 - (2) Close range guns - R.U. lockers are to be full.
 - (3) Seacat - Minimum of four rounds to be primed and in R.U. stowage.
 - (4) Seaslug - Blast deflector plates to be removed.

NOTE

1. NM and ER 0209(1) and (2) are in abeyance
2. When entering and leaving harbour the armament is to be layed and trained in accordance with FEEO 203.
3. Close range weapons and Seacat launchers are not to be loaded.

5. Aircraft

- a. Strike. Strike carriers having aircraft disembarked to R.A.F. Changi are to have two amend aircraft at Alert 5 at Changi. If no strike aircraft are disembarked this commitment will be met by the R.A.F.

FLEET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS

PART IV - SECTION 1

4130. Continued.

Carriers concerned are to make arrangements direct with HQFEAF, keeping the Fleet Commander informed, and giving as much notice as possible.

b. Rotary Wing

- (1) A.S. Helicopters. When the Mark 11 (eleven) depth charge is available A.S. Helicopters are to be armed at condition 2, for use as strike aircraft against patrol craft, PT boats and the KOMAR fast patrol boat. Strike carriers and Commando ships with A.S. Helicopters are to maintain a minimum of two aircraft.
- (2) Commando Helicopters. Commando ships are to maintain a minimum of two helicopters armed for strike at condition 2.

c. Reconnaissance Aircraft

- (1) A Gannet or Helicopter may be launched for reconnaissance purposes at the discretion of the Senior Officer or Commanding Officer, of a single unit. FEAFOC, BUKIT GOMBAK and the COMFEF are to be informed of launch time and intended search plan. Aircraft are to comply with FOTI 4102 paragraph 18.

- NOTE:
1. The above aircraft readiness states may be relaxed in special circumstances, but aircraft are not to be at less than 30 minutes notice by day and one hour by night.
 2. The above aircraft may be flown on normal training missions.

6. A.I. Organisation

- a. The A.I.O. is to be manned to satisfy the requirements of the armament and aircraft states.
- b. Emcom Policy. No restriction. Passive ECM is to be operating.

7. Degaussing. The D.G. is to be switched on.

8. NBCD. Ships are to be in state 3 condition Yankee.

(139 Policy 0, Part V)

SECRET

53

Naval Force Headquarters,
Borneo,
BFPO 660

19th September, 1966

2/1

The Commander Far East Fleet

LESSONS LEARNED IN BORNEO

Introduction

1. The comments below are based on Naval experience in Borneo during confrontation. They cannot be described accurately as lessons, because nothing particularly novel emerged. The enemy was inept at sea. Our forces were severely limited in what action they could take by restrictions which were partly political, but which were mainly designed with the object of avoiding escalation into a hotter war. This inability to make use of our own full military capability seems likely to continue to be part of the pattern of future emergencies. It is likely to effect the design and armament of our ships and aircraft, and their tactical employment. There is room for improvement in our methods of cooperating with the Army in day to day minor operations.

Joint Command

2. Joint Command arrangements worked well. In 1965 the separate Land Forces Commander was withdrawn and his function combined with that of the Director of Borneo Operations. Concurrently the Naval Force Commander became third in the line of succession. This improved not only his and therefore the Navy's status (something to consider after the Defence Review), but his knowledge of Army and Air Force problems thus giving him more opportunity to make a contribution and present a Naval point of view. Similarly the reorganisation brought the three services closer together at staff level, although the more junior the officer the more 'single service' in approach he sometimes seemed.

Intelligence

3. Probably the most important factor in this campaign was good intelligence. This helped very small Naval forces to provide a high degree of protection to the Armies' flanks and rear areas and to avoid "wet hen" tactics.

Civil Administration

4. The system of war by committee brought the civil administration at all levels into a sphere of responsibility for military action and ensured that "the military" were fully aware of the administration problems. It also provided the Naval Force Commander with opportunity to draw attention to the total lack of security in the ports, where ships flying flags of convenience with Indonesian and Chinese crews arrived without warning and virtually no supervision. This resulted in the setting up of a Port Security organisation in Sarawak and Brunei although not without administrative opposition. Some improvement of the organisation in Sabah was also achieved. (A similar lack of security in ports existed in the Cyprus emergency.) Unless ports are properly controlled Naval patrols will be outflanked.

Naval Staff

5. The Naval Staff consisted of a Staff Officer Operations, who was also, after the reorganisation and amalgamation of Director of Borneo Operations and Commander Land Forces Borneo, C2 Naval Operations and Intelligence to Director of Operations, and a Staff Communications Officer, who was also Naval member of the Joint Signal Committee (Borneo).

SECRET

Because unlike the Army and Air Operations Staff they also had to deal with local Naval administration, their unclassified visitors sometimes caused security problems and distraction to other Staff Officers in the Joint Operations Centre. However the addition of another officer for administration only was not justified. The complement was adequate for the task and could have efficiently controlled a much larger Naval Force.

6. This economy in personnel however did make it difficult for officers to take any station leave, and was in contrast to the Army and RAF, who were complemented in sufficient numbers to allow many officers to take two periods of station leave in the year. The Joint Headquarters worked a seven day week with no mid-week half-day. Therefore the complementing policy of the other two services has something to commend it.

Naval Air

7. Even though Naval Air Operations were under the operational control of the Air Commander it is important that the Naval Commander retains personal single service responsibility as Senior Naval Officer present for ensuring that all is well with the operational performance, cooperation and administration of a disembarked Naval Air Commando helicopter detachment, when the Commando ship is absent. He must also ensure that the organisation for accepting and coordinating close air support from carrier borne aircraft is efficient. Experience in Borneo has shown that this widening of the Naval Commander's responsibility is welcomed by the Air Commander.

OPERATIONS

8. "Whiskey Galore" was the original plan for setting up Naval Patrols in Borneo. Some comments have been obtained from the first Naval Force Commander who was appointed in March, 1964.

"a. The targets were too ambitious. The Naval Force Commander organisation was set up too late and therefore inherited the problems produced by this.

b. The original Naval Special parties for inshore patrol work in dockyard and local boats were too spread along the coastline. They should have been concentrated at Kuching and Tawau.

c. It was fortunate that Hartland Point was in dock at the time and thus able to throw up men for the special parties.

d. We were slow in grasping the maintenance problem".

9. Looking back at the present time at the comment in paragraph 8b. above it is evident that although patrolling the coastline away from Kuching bay and Tawau proved in the event largely unnecessary this was almost entirely due to Indonesian inefficiency and lack of patrols at sea, factors which were not expected. Furthermore the effectiveness of patrols off Tawau and Kuching did result in attempts by the enemy to by-pass them. The inshore Naval parties, which were latterly replaced by the Royal Malaysian Marine Police, helped to create confidence among law-abiding and loyal sections of the remote coastal community and to discourage subversives. These special parties, which were hurriedly formed, demonstrated the ability of the modern rating to turn his hand to an off-beat but interesting independent duty with success, enterprise and considerable improvisation, without which nothing would have been achieved.

Tasks of Patrols

10. The main tasks of Naval Patrols throughout confrontation were:

a. To deter incursions into Malaysian Territorial Waters by Indonesian warships.

- b. To prevent infiltration by armed men in local trading boats behind the Army's flanks.
- c. To provide Naval Gunfire Support.
- d. To prevent piracy and coastal pillage.

(Note: of the above (a) and (c) were not indicated in plan "Whiskey Galore").

11. These tasks were successfully completed:-

- a. As far as is known no Indonesian warships entered Malaysian Territorial waters throughout the emergency.
- b. There is no positive evidence of any successful infiltration after January, 1964. There is evidence that an incursion party which did set out for Tawau in June 1966 turned back as a result of Naval patrol activity.
- c. Naval Gunfire support was constantly available, occasionally called for, and demonstrated actively on the border in the Sebatik/Wallace Bay area.
- d. There was a marked reduction in piracy and pillage. A contributing factor to this was the more lucrative trade of smuggling duty free cigarettes to the Philippines, an occupation considered legal in Malaysian Territorial Waters and carried out by erstwhile Sulu pirates. Smugglers together with Philippine Warships in pursuit and collaboration provided distractions to Naval patrols.
- e. 99.8% of all stores and equipment for the Army in Borneo came by sea. The Indonesians made no attempt to interfere with this line of communication.

Infiltration

12. Rather than using the sea for infiltration Indonesian military units, special forces and communist groups continually crossed the border by land. This although disappointing to Naval units was clearly a direct result of early successful interceptions at sea, together with the effect created by conscientious patrolling and boarding night after night throughout confrontation. Coupled with this must have been the knowledge of success by our ships in West Malaysia, where the only approach for Indonesian infiltrators was by sea or air. The very low radar coverage provided by only one CMS deployed off Kuching could never have been appreciated by the enemy. This must reflect his lack of professional Naval knowledge. It is also true that whereas a party of infiltrators contacted by our forces in primary jungle may be able to disperse and escape, a party intercepted at sea becomes a total loss. The effectiveness of each CMS and Patrol Craft deployed off Tawau was enhanced by the capability of the frigate or destroyer which was widely known to be deployed there as Guardship. Comments on capabilities of CMS, Vespers Patrol Craft, destroyers and frigates are made in paragraphs 27 - 33 below.

Cooperation with Army

13. The effectiveness of Naval patrols coupled with close knowledge of military actions in the jungle led some Army units to believe that the shore was a sort of touch line with the ball out of play at sea. Or at best that the role of the Navy was as a prophylactic or bonus. This attitude being a dangerous one, some effort was devoted to dispell it. Similarly ships were initially not aware of the nature of Army operations. Professional knowledge of the others' service is not remarkable among officers at Battalion/Naval unit level and sometimes even at Brigade Headquarters.

/Although.....

Although this is unfortunate either way, in this type of campaign, where the Navy is in support, it is the Army that dictates the plan. Therefore it is most important that the Army planner is aware of the many diverse capabilities of those warships that are available to his area. Although Brigade Headquarters were given Naval advice by Resident Naval Officers, the very nature of Borneo operations, (Cyprus was the same), dictated that the majority of operations were mounted at battalion or company level often at short notice. It is important that Officers appointed as Resident Naval Officers have understanding of Naval operations and ship capabilities.

14. By personal visits to Brigade Headquarters, Battalion and company positions headway was made in advertising how the Navy can act in support of the Army. Ships were given an Army operational and intelligence brief on arrival in addition to the Naval brief. Exchange of officers and men was encouraged. Ships were included in the battalion radio net and encouraged to remind their opposite numbers ashore that they were available for cooperation. Joint exercises were carried out, many on the initiative of the Commanding Officer of the Guardship. However probably the only effective way to have brought home this point would have been to have changed sides and taken over the conduct of Indonesian Maritime Operations.

15. An example of failure to make use of the Navy was a company operation aimed to cordon off a village at dawn in which intelligence had indicated the presence of communist couriers. The village was at the entrance to a river and not easy to approach by land unobtrusively. No information of this operation was given to the CMS which was on patrol in the area.

16. There were however many examples of successful cooperation including the movement of Army units and Police Field Force by CMS and in one instance by a Royal Fleet Auxiliary oiler. On two occasions when a party of Indonesian infiltrators were being searched for by Army units ashore, possible sea escape routes were blocked by the CMS. Naval Gunfire support was coordinated with operations ashore and employed on one occasion to bombard caves used by terrorists, which were inaccessible to Army artillery.

Tawau Assault Group

17. A successful example of cooperation was the somewhat inappropriately named Tawau Assault Group. This unit was formed in December, 1963 after a successful Indonesian infiltration and attack on a Malay infantry position at Kalabakan. The object of the Tawau Assault Group was to patrol the waterways through the mangrove swamps to the West of Wallace Bay, which provide a backdoor from Indonesia into the Tawau residency. A CMS can enter the larger waterways while the smallest can only be negotiated by an assault boat, or alternately at low water on foot. The group was commanded by a company commander from the British battalion in the Brigade area from a shore Headquarters and consisted of a number of Royal Malaysian Naval manned HID's (latterly replaced by mobile LCP's) from which the Army patrolled in pairs of assault boats.

18. Fire support was provided by Army artillery, although owing to the nature of the ground there were few hard standings for guns, therefore Naval gunfire support was provided by a CMS or Patrol Craft in close support assisted by an SDML, while the Guardship, a frigate or destroyer provided indirect fire. Also as part of the group two Boat Observation Posts were anchored on the sea border opposite the Indonesian town of Nunukan, which they closely surveyed through high powered binoculars. The CMS or Patrol Craft provided retributive close fire support when the Boat Observation Posts were engaged by Indonesian fire on a number of occasions.

19. The Tawau Assault Group was immediately successful. A number of the Indonesian incursion party finding their way home after the Kalabakan Raid were captured or killed. There is no evidence that the enemy ever tried to use this route again.

20. Company commanders acting as Senior Officer Tawau Assault Group reported on the high standard of interservice and inter Commonwealth cooperation within this unit. It was evident too that these Army officers had a good professional knowledge of the capability and employment of Naval units under their operational control or in support. From time to time there were failures in communications. This was mainly because portable radios (Type 1241) were handed over from ship to ship; Naval operators were inexperienced in their use and maintenances and that sets were often off frequency. Naval units employed in support of the Army should be allocated their individual radio sets and the operators should be properly trained in their operation. Unless communications are reliable it is impossible to plan on coordinated fire from both Army artillery and ships guns at short notice.

Engagement Rules

21. The Engagement Rules varied remarkably between all three services. These became absurd when the natural environment of each individual service merged. Thus in the Tawau Assault Group area an Indonesian aircraft crossing the border would be shot down immediately by our Air Force as soon as identified, but not by a ship unless attacking her. An Indonesian soldier on the Malaysian side of the border would be shot at sight by our Army whether on land or water-borne. In contrast, with the object of avoiding escalation, our Naval units were governed by National rules of engagement on the high seas and in territorial waters. This involved requests to leave and only the use of minimum force if all else failed. This could have produced problems in confined waters. Furthermore Royal Malaysian Naval orders were phrased differently to those in FOTIs.

22. To achieve some clarification and to avoid Commanding Officers becoming involved in legal reasoning in action, the orders were simplified within this command so that small units such as ICPs under the operational control of an Army commander obeyed Army rules. CMS and Patrol Craft in support obeyed Naval rules. A simplified version of when enemy fire should be returned was provided for the "Piquet" ship in support of the Boat Observation Posts anchored under the guns of Nunukan. Although none of this was entirely satisfactory, it left rather less confusion in the minds of Commanding Officers and at the same time provided a check against unnecessary escalation.

23. It was not always appreciated that the "piquet" ship was anchored by necessity within range and registered on by the enemy artillery with little room for manoeuvre on getting underway. She could not afford to have shots fired close to her deliberately or otherwise by the enemy since one deliberate mistake might mean severe casualties or the loss of the ship. Similarly the deployment of a small warship such as an SDML anchored in a confined waterway in a mangrove swamp on her own left her a sitting duck to a SBS type operation at night particularly as the noise of her generator drowned all water noises.

Inshore Reconnaissance

24. In 1964 the Royal Malaysian Marine Police received the Special Naval patrol set up by plan "Whiskey Galore". It became evident that in some remote areas police boat patrols were not effective mainly because of shortage and inexperience of crews. In October, 1965, because an intelligence appreciation suggested the possibility of large scale infiltration planned by the Indonesians in Darvel Bay in the Tawau Residency, patrols were reorganised to allow a ship to patrol in this area.

/This.....

SECRET

This CMS was instructed to reconnoitre the coastline by boat and send a landing party to visit isolated coastal villages. This reconnaissance was combined with some civil and medical aid and provided an opportunity to junior officers to take charge of a small independent party. It achieved the object of making Naval presence apparent to the local people who in most cases were at the time unaware of its existence, and this provided a deterrent to infiltration and subversive action.

Marine Police

25. The Naval Force Commander was responsible for the coordination of Marine Police with Naval patrols. Visits to a number of police boats showed that their oerlikons were never fired and some were defective; also that many crews had little professional knowledge and would have made a poor showing against a determined Indonesian armed party at sea. With the agreement of the Commissioners of Police naval assistance was provided to improve firing and maintenance of weapons and communications and a form of workup organisation was started.

Patrol by IRP Aircraft

26. IRP aircraft, although employed on patrols off both Kuching and Tawau as a deterrent and show of force, were of more value off Tawau where a shipping plot would be provided for the Guardship before dusk. The small size of the RAF detachment resulted in some inflexibility, because to meet their training requirement the crews had to fly a certain number of hours. Therefore the flying effort could not be reduced or increased easily as the situation demanded. This was disappointing when intelligence indicated a suitable employment for which extra sorties were needed. Because of the constant change of crews very careful briefing was required to avoid mistakes in reporting local craft. Cooperation between ships and aircraft was generally good.

SHIP CAPABILITIES

Coastal Minesweepers

27. The CMS proved herself yet again to be a most satisfactory gunboat with all round capability. Although her draught prevented her from operating in as shallow water as the Patrol Crafts which draw 3 feet less, their propellers suffered log damage less frequently.

28. Boat Her major defect in this role is the lack of a suitable ships boat capable of landing a small armed party at effective speed and able to beach and operate over sandbars and coral. The slow motor boat supplied is particularly useless. There is an urgent requirement to provide all ships likely to be operating on inshore and offshore patrols with a suitable boat, to allow for cooperation with the Army and to be able to reconnoitre inshore and up rivers.

29. In March 1966 the CMS in Borneo and the Guardship were issued by the Naval Force Commander with 16 foot Army aluminium assault boats, double hulls filled with polystyrene to provide flotation insurance. These boats designed for inland waters are unseaworthy except in calm weather, but nevertheless in the prevailing sea states throughout most of the year proved their worth in Borneo. They can be stowed inboard or hoisted across the stern on the minesweeping davits, from where they can be sent away rapidly. Alternatively they can be towed astern at short stay or on the beam.

30. It had been hoped to give the commercial "Boston Whaler", which could be a promising seaworthy replacement, a trial under operational conditions in Borneo. It is disappointing that one of these boats could not be obtained in time for this to be done.

/Armament of CMS.....

SECRET

31. Armament The combination of a single 40/60 with Oerlikon and machine guns provided the CMS with a suitable set of clubs in her bag. In spite of being outgunned by nearly every Indonesian warship in Borneo, this armament was sufficient to act as an effective deterrent. Two 40/60 guns mountings fitted in some ships at the expense of oerlikon provided too much over-kill and overshoot for the many occasions when very close range fire only was required for technical or clear range reasons.

Vospers Patrol Craft

32. Vospers Patrol craft operated by the RMN were employed interchangeably with CMS. They were effective. Technical trouble from which they suffered stemmed from the fact that the RMN appeared to believe that they could economise on maintenance staff at an advanced base.

Guardship

33. Almost every type of frigate and destroyer from four Commonwealth Navies acted at one time or another as Guardship at Tawau. This variety in capability affected each ships employment in the role to some extent.

a. Speed The principal deficiency in most ships was speed. This was not because of inability to make an interception, but because it was not possible to effect rapid deployment. For instance the requirement to provide Naval Gunfire support at short notice at one position would prevent the deployment of a frigate to investigate or prevent an incursion indicated by intelligence at another position at some distance because of the time involved on passage. Although Indonesian infiltrators did not use high speed craft, a number of the boats employed by Philippine cigarette smugglers by virtue of a bank of four or five 60 HP outboard motors, and sometimes an inboard engine as well developed high speeds in the neighbourhood of 30 knots. These boats being considered legal inside Malaysian Territorial waters rarely made any attempt to evade patrols. Had they done so, only a ship with an armed helicopter could have stopped them, and probably then only by day.

b. Radar These Guardships that mounted it provided the only Air Warning Radar on the Army's east flank except for a short period in 1966 when UPS 1 radar was deployed by the RAF for trial on a hill behind Tawau. The negative information on enemy air movements provided by the Guardship was of value to the Air Commander. Had the air war hotted up suddenly, the Guardships radar would have been invaluable, but such escalation would have changed the nature of confrontation and the forces deployed.

c. Ships Boats The comments in paragraph 28 above on the CMS boat also applies to destroyers and frigates boats. The Guardship was also eventually issued with an assault boat.

d. Helicopter Only two occasions occurred over the last year when Guardships were deployed with embarked helicopters. HMS DIDO filled a short gap in the patrol cycle, and KD HANG TUAN embarked an RMAF Alouette during her patrol. No enemy activity occurred during these periods. Ship borne helicopters would have been invaluable for reconnaissance and interception against a more enterprising enemy.

e. Endurance Although Type 12 frigates are very much tied to their tanker because of their short endurance this did not have any adverse effect because a resident RFA tanker was deployed at Tawau.

f. Technical support for small ships Throughout confrontation the Guardship has provided technical support for CMS and RMN Patrol Craft. These little ships have been absent from one to two or sometimes even three months from the bases from which they are designed to operate at very short intervals. The Guardship's complement was designed with a view to maintaining herself with outside base support. Yet she has been required on top of this to provide a great deal of support for other ships. This can only have been effected at the expense of her own material efficiency. It is essential, if CMS and Patrol Craft are to be operated for long periods away from their base that the necessary base support is provided at the advance base, if only by ensuring that a frigate in support has the necessary personnel embarked in addition to those required for her own maintenance.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

34. Naval Gunfire Support was used in two areas both different in geographical characteristics. They will be dealt with separately. The Forward Observation parties concerned in operational shoots did not make detailed analyses of the shoots at the time.

35. Tawau/Wallace Bay

a. General This is an area on the Indonesia/Malaysia border in Eastern Sabah of mangrove swamp where movement of troops and supporting weapons was difficult. The Guardship deployed in the area was responsible for providing Naval Gunfire Support for the Brigade.

b. Illumination This was used on occasions to aid patrols in the river complex and to light targets for field artillery. It was found to be satisfactory but was only used in small amounts due to ammunition expenditure limitations.

c. HE This was not used operationally during the time phase under review. (September 65 - August 66)

d. Deterrent Value Exercises were carried out at least once a week in the Tawau area using Naval Gunfire Support. As these were seen by the enemy to be effective they acted as considerable deterrent.

e. Comments The marshy country in the Tawau area reduced the effectiveness of indirect fire support. The use of VT shells, however, overcame this problem. In general Naval guns, being of heavier calibre than Artillery field guns, would have been the more effective.

f. CMS and PCs Indirect fire using L 70's of the RMN PC SRI PERAK was tried out. The limitations were:

(i) Break up range of HE.

(ii) Flat trajectory.

(iii) Elevation setting.

g. Exercises in direct fire were carried out by CMS and PCs in conjunction with in some cases Artillery and the Guardship. On one occasion the CMS acting as Piquet ship off Nunukan, when engaged by shore batteries, coordinated the return fire by her own weapons with our artillery.

h. Spotting was carried out from Air, shore and boat observation posts.

36. Lundu

a. General This is an area in the extreme west of Sarawak of primary jungle and high mountains. An operation using HMS CHICHESTER was carried out with the aim of engaging an area of caves where the enemy was known to operate. This area was out of Field Artillery range.

b. Operational Comments There was no ground follow-up. The comments are based on the experience of the Forward Observer, an Artillery officer.

- (i) The target area was effectively engaged by the ship.
- (ii) The enemy were engaged by weapons of a heavier calibre than they would have been used to up till that time.
- (iii) Areas of primary jungle that were engaged were observed to have had trees knocked down - the jungle canopy was penetrated.

37. General Comments The limitations of Field Artillery weapons in being able to pierce the jungle canopy are well known. Naval guns, as well as Artillery 5.5 inch, can pierce this canopy and in fact knock down large trees. The moral and physical effect on troops in the area must therefore be considerable. The advantage of NGS fire over Fighter Air Support was that politically it could be used. However, even if FGA support could have been used, the response time of NGS, normally two minutes, was much quicker than that of FGA.

38. Summary The procedures worked out between the Tawau Forward Observation party and successive Guardships ensured that Naval Gunfire Support if called for would have been responsive in speed and efficiency. This was of real deterrent value in the Tawau area. In the one case where Naval Gunfire Support was used in West Brigade no direct comparison can be made with Ground Artillery as the target area was outside Field Artillery range, which in this particular case demonstrated a value of NGS. The heavier weapon normally mounted on ships gives added support to the ground forces even when supported by their own artillery weapons. In general the 4.5 gun is preferred by ground forces to any larger calibre.

39. Types of Shoots fired Operationally

- a. Immediate Neutralization - Direct Action HE
- b. Illumination - VT
- c. Harrassing Fire - Direct Action HE

Ship Design

No difficulties were produced by one turret ships although obviously it was sometimes a little difficult for them to bombard in a narrow channel with the tide the wrong way. One turret ships provided good illumination for their own fall of shot by using one gun for starshell.

COMMUNICATIONS

40.

a. Appreciation of Signals

The import of Naval operational signals is not always understood by Army and RAF officers acting as Duty Officer in a Joint Operations Room. This is particularly the case where action is required although in the signal the Headquarters is only an information addressee. There is a "builtin" reluctance among Army and RAF officers to call anyone at night, which it is important to appreciate from the outset when setting up a Joint Operations Headquarters with Naval responsibility.

b. Equipment variety

The variety of communication fits provided by the gradual change over to COMIST/ICS required a series of different radio organisations for different ships particularly for air raid reporting. Thus the communications organisation changed with the Guardship which sometimes made for confusion ashore.

c. Compatibility of equipment

Lack of compatibility of equipment with the Army, Army Air Corps and Marine Police provided the main problem in communications, which were nearly all ultimately resolved by local organisation. Ships liable to operate with the Army should be issued with compatible radios and the operators trained in their use.

d. Cryptography

Considerable problems arose because the only compatible machine system with Malaysian forces was PORTEX, which ships found slow and unreliable. The effectiveness of the equipment deteriorated when transferred from ship to ship.

e. Callsigns

Callsigns were a problem until Naval intra Force callsigns were introduced for use with the Malaysians.

f. Orders

Ships sometimes failed to read their communication orders before operating in Borneo waters, and then blamed other services when things went wrong before checking their own organisation.

g. Routing

Careful routing of signals to a variety of addressees served by different systems was essential. Instructions to acknowledge were necessary on important action signals.

h. Joint Communications Unit Borneo

Naval Radio Operators worked alongside Army and RAF operators at the Joint Communication Centres in Labuan and Kuching. Although in a minority, they proved to be better qualified than the other services for employment within a joint comcen, by virtue of the fact that they have a crypto qualification.

j. Discipline

Discipline in the initial stages on setting up the unit became a problem because of differing service regulations. To overcome this all operators were placed under the Army Discipline Act.

j. Discipline (Cont)

It is important that an officer from each service is at hand to advise on single service regulations in a Joint Unit and that the ratings themselves are instructed in the differences. It was noticeable that the less disciplined Naval ratings took advantage of what at first seemed to them a less stringent scale of punishment for offences such as leave breaking and absence from place of duty.

COMMANDO SHIP

41. The Commando Ship has been employed on several occasions to change over units in Borneo. She has brought battalions to and from their permanent bases in the Far East and repositioned battalions in Borneo. This employment of HMS ALBION and BUDWARK, although not their primary function, has considerable advantages over other forms of roulement. The battalions can embark almost direct from their barracks and disembark close to the positions they are to take in the front line. Minimum port and transit facilities are required at either end. Battalions can bring most of their equipment with them in the move and helicopters and light aircraft can also be transported without having to be crated.

42. Although no requirement for the Commando Ship in her primary role in the assault has arisen, her availability has had considerable effect on contingency planning. The availability of a Commando Ship in the Far East Fleet has allowed the Army considerable flexibility and therefore saving in manpower. The wide range of tasks and other areas in which she has had to operate has however precluded fuller use in Borneo.

43. RMN Ships Capability

RMN ships showed a high standard of capability and smartness. The proportion of errors made by any of these ships was very low, and certainly no greater than those made by RN, RAN, and RNZN ships in this command. There was still a fair proportion of non Malaysian officers in command of RMN Ships

44. Civil Aid

A number of civil aid building projects carried out by Guardships over the last six months of confrontation, together with medical aid provided for remote communities, undoubtedly extended Naval influence and added sources of local intelligence without increasing the number of ships involved. They made Naval presence apparent in an agreeable manner to people whom it was designed to protect, and who otherwise might have been unaware of its existence. These, together with the assault boat reconnaissance carried out by CMS, provided experience for junior officers and gave ships companies a better understanding of the background to the reasons for our presence in East Malaysia.

45. Records

Existing records on Naval events in Borneo are sparse. It is important that a proper war diary is kept from the outset of an Emergency.

46. Visitors


There have been a remarkable number of inessential visitors to Borneo. The Navy however has a satisfactory record in that Naval visitors have come for good reason, and their numbers have been small. In a Joint Headquarters the damage created by the free-flying locust has to be borne equally and more so by the small Naval staff, because briefings are a joint responsibility.

SECRET

- 12 -

47. Public Relations

Ideally the Naval Public Relations Officer should be stationed at the Naval Headquarters although for several reasons this was not practicable in Borneo.



(R.D. Macdonald)
Captain, Royal Navy
Commander Naval Forces
Borneo

Annex: A. Historical Record of Naval Events in Borneo.

Copy to:

The Commander British Forces in Borneo.

SECRET

HISTORICAL RECORD OF NAVAL EVENTS IN BORNEO1962

8th to Brunei revolt.

13th December

1963March Regular Naval patrols commenced off Sarawak and Sabah.
Permanent Guardship at Tawau.April First Indonesian backed aggression on land against East
Malaysia.September 1st seaborne incursion into Paloh in Sarawak. Mixed party
Indonesians and Sarawak Chinese in one Kotak.29th December Kalabakan raid.
Tawau Assault Group formed. This resulted in successes
against raiders returning to Indonesia.Force level by end of year: Kuching 2 CMS, Tawau 1 DD/FF, 4 CMS/PC,
2 SDML1964January 2nd Seaborne incursion into Paloh in Sarawak. Kotak
intercepted by HMS PUNCHESTON on way out. This resulted
in mopping up of entire party.January Naval special patrols established to assist the Marine
Police with inshore and river patrols.22 February Indonesian boat containing explosives with 7 MKO and
volunteers who said they were on anti-smuggling patrol
intercepted and captured by police boat off Tinagat,
near Tawau.March First time guided missiles used in Borneo by 845 NACS who
8 SS41 missiles were fired against enemy positions in West
Brigade in support of land operations.

16 March COMNAVFOR established with headquarters in Brunei.

1 June COMNAVFOR moved to Joint Headquarters in Labuan with Force
Commanders.6 June Naval personnel relieved by Marine Police for inshore
coastal patrols off Sabah.21 June Arrangements for stricter control of barter traders in
Tawau completed.Force level by end of June: Kuching 5 CMS, Tawau 1DD/FF, 4 CMS/PC,
2 SDML

1964 (Cont)

August 2 CMS withdrawn from Kuching for operations in West Malaysia.

17th September After a period when the Indonesians frequently fired at Security force ships and craft on the sea border opposite Nunukan, HMS LANTON was hit aft by an HLANG shell and suffered slight damage. In self defence LANTON returned fire with her 40/60, silencing the enemy fire.

1965

March-October Joint Hovercraft Trials Unit operating 2 SRN 5's in Borneo.

22nd April Marine Police assumed responsibility for inshore patrols off Sarawak.

May Port Emergency Committee set up in Sabah.

June 1 CMS withdrawn from Kuching area for operations in East Malaysia.

July-November ICM's and ICP's arrived from Australia for RMN, replacing HD's in Tawau Assault Group

29th November 3 Indonesians (2 KKO and 1 guide) in small waterlogged fishing boat landed near Tawau and were arrested.

1 December Amalgamation of Director of Borneo Operations and Commander Land Forces Borneo. Naval Force Commander became third in succession in command.

5th December First searching of Merchant Ships by Port Emergency Committee in Sabah.

1966

January Rejang River Force formed to counter seaward threat to security in Rejang River delta.

22nd March 3 ship bombardment as a demonstration on East Sebatik Island border area by HMS DEVONSHIRE, HMS DERBENT and HMS TIRANAKI.

6-8th April Series of firings towards Boat Observation Post from Nunukan. On 8th HMS HENK and artillery returned fire silencing batteries.

26th April HMS CHICHESTER carried out operational firings into Guncang Gading area of Sarawak in conjunction with Army anti terrorist sweep.

June Royal Brunei Malay Regiment marine craft section set up with 3 patrol craft.

1 June Port Emergency Committee set up in Sarawak.

SECRET

Page 3 of Annex A to
Commander Naval Forces
Borneo's letter 2/1
dated 19th September, 1966

1966 (Cont)

July	Searching of Merchant ships by Port Emergency Committee in Sarawak commenced.
26 July	KD SRI SARAWAK fired on from Nunukan, returning fire silencing shore batteries.
11th August	Ratification of Bangkok treaty
14th August	1 CMS withdrawn from Tawau.
20th August	1 CMS withdrawn from Tawau.
3rd September	RN CMS relieved by RMN CMS at Kuching.
6th September	Guardship withdrawn from East Malaysia COMNAVFOR handed over responsibility to Naval Officer-in-Charge East Malaysia (RMN).
20th September	COMNAVFOR appointment lapsed and Naval Headquarters closed down.
6-10th October	Withdrawal of Naval Air Commando Squadron and operation by 845 Squadron, HMS BUD/ARK to backload army heavy equipment.

Note: Compiled from only records held by the Commander, Naval Forces, Borneo and is therefore not a comprehensive record of events.

SECRET

Annexure C

File WO 268/802:

“Indonesian Offensive Against West Malaysia (Excluding Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)”.

N
1061

WO 268 | 802

HARRY YOUNG
20 NOV 2007

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

INDONESIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST WEST MALAYSIA
(Excluding Sea Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)

PERIOD 17TH AUGUST 1964 - 31ST DECEMBER 1964

HARRY YOUNG
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ARMY REVIEW

20 NOV 2007

SECOND REVIEW

ANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

SERIAL (Number in brackets shows pro- gressive total of incidents)	DATE	PLACE (OP NICKNAME)	INCIDENT	NUMBERS INVOLVED		ENEMY KILLED	ENEMY CAPTURED/ SURRENDERED	ELIMINATION COMPLETE	ALLIED CASUALTIES		REMARKS
				PLANNED OR MOUNTED	ACTUALLY LANDED				MILITARY	CIVILIAN	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
1	1964 17 Aug	WEST JOHORE - PONTIAN - KUKUP - BENUT (LIVER)	Landing	108	108(a)	21	75(b)(c)	-	2K(d) 2W(d)	-	(a) 4 known to have escaped (b) Includes 3 on 22 Mar 65 (c) Excludes 1 on 17 May 1965 (Serial 51) (d) Malaysian Army Msn - estb base.
2	27 Aug	SINGAPORE SEBAROK/ BEDOK area	Seaborne rocket and SA attack	?	-	-	-	-	-	1K(a)	Bomb thrown from motor boat at group of oil storage tanks on P. SEBAROK. KD SRI PERAK engaged boat which escaped. (a) Chinese. Msn - probably sabotage/terrorism
3	2 Sep	JOHORE - LABIS area. (LILAC)	Paradrop	144	96(a)	32	62	-	4K(b) 3W(c)	-	(a) 2 unlocated (b) 1 British Army Officer, 2 GOR, 1 MOR, 1 Malaysian Army (c) Malaysian Army Msn - estb base.
4 A.	24 Sep	MALACCA - TERENDAK camp area	Bomb explosion	2?(a)	2?(a)	-	-	-	-	-	Bomb exploded under contractor's vehicle. No cas. (a) Believed Chinese exfiltrators. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
4 B. (5)	29 Sep	MALACCA - Capitol Cabaret area	Grenade explosion	27(a)	27(a)	-	-	-	-	2W(b)	2 grenades thrown into compound (a) Believed Chinese exfiltrators (b) One male Indian, one male Chinese <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism
4 C. (6)	6 Oct	MALACCA Motor Supply Co.	Grenade explosion	27(a)	27(a)	-	-	-	-	-	1 grenade thrown and exploded. No cas. (a) Believed Chinese exfiltrators, probably same group as in Serials 4 A and 4 B. <u>Msn</u> - sabotage/terrorism
5 (7)	29 Oct	WEST JOHORE- KESANG area. (FLOWER)	Landing	52	52	-	52(a)	21 Nov	-	-	(a) 50 captured by 30 Oct. Remainder on 21 Nov. <u>Msn</u> - estb base.
6 (8)	6 Nov	EAST JOHORE- SADILI Kechil area (BUAH NANGKA I)	Landing	10	10(a)	3(b)	1(c)	24 Nov	1W(d)	-	(a) 6 escaped (b) 24 Nov in a boat at 3g. Tg. BALAU by 8 RMR (c) 18 Nov (d) Pte 2 SIR <u>Msn</u> - estb base.
7 (9)	14 Nov	SINGAPORE- JURONG area	Landing/ Sea Inter- ception	10	7	3(a)	7(b)	16 Nov	-	-	(a) By HMS FISKERTON on 16 Nov whilst enroute to P.3EBAROK (b) On 16 Nov in JURONG/PASIR L.B.R area. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism
8 (10)	1 Dec	SINGAPORE- BLUDOK area	Sea Inter- ception (a)	9	-	6(b)	3	1 Dec	-	-	(a) KD SRI PALLING intercepted sampan, exchange of fire. (b) 1 Body recovered, 5 missing presumed drowned. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism

CONFIDENTIAL

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
9 (11)	6 Dec	SINGAPORE- Raffles Light area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	-	3	6 Dec	-	-	HMS TEAL intercepted sampan which attempted to escape. TEAL opened fire. Sampan stopped, occupants arrested. <u>Msn</u> - claim to have broken down and drifted into Malaysian water.
10 (12)	9 Dec	WEST JOHORE- Semerah area (HIGH SPEED I)	Landing	10	5	-	5	9 Jan	-	-	Boat found 9 Dec, 2 infiltrators captured 10 Dec, 3 captured 11 Dec. Second boat containing 5 believed to have returned to base. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism
11 (13)	9 Dec	WEST JOHORE- KUKUP area (HIGH SPEED II)	Landing	15	7	-	7	9 Dec	-	-	7 captured by P.F.F. 9 Dec, remaining 8 probably did not land but returned to base. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism
12 (14)	13 Dec	SINGAPORE- Raffles Light area	Sea Inter- ception	13+	-	4(a)	3	13 Dec	-	-	HMS TEAL contacted two boats. One escaped. Exchange of fire with second boat. (a) Includes 2 missing presumed drowned. <u>Msn</u> - claimed strayed off course.
13 (15)	15 Dec	SINGAPORE- P.SEKIJAN PALIPAH area	Attempted landing	6/7	-	-	-	15 Dec	-	-	Speed boat approached P.SEKIJAN PALIPAH, exchanged fire with sentry and withdrew. <u>Msn</u> - Probably Sabotage/terrorism.
14 (16)	23 Dec	WEST JOHORE- KUKUP area (BIRD SONG)	Landing	28	28	3(a)	25(b)	9 Jan	-	-	(a) By Malaysian Army 24 Dec (b) 11 on 25 Dec, 13 on 27 Dec, 1 on 29 Dec. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism. <u>Estb</u> base.

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQPS.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
15 (17)	24 Dec	SELANGOR- area 33 miles WEST PANGSA (HALAL)	Sea Inter- caption	50	-	-	22	9 Jan	-	-	HMS AJAX intercepted group of boats including BT Boat 504 and 14 fishing boats. 7 fishing boats containing 22 infiltrators captured. Remaining boats with 23 infiltrators escaped. <u>Msn</u> - estb base.
16 (13)	26 Dec	EAST JOHORE- SEDILI KUCHIL area (BUAH MANGKA II)	Landing	36	12	-	12	9 Jan	-	-	First located 9 Jan, 14 days after landing. Other two boats containing 24 did not land. <u>Msn</u> - estb base.
17 (19)	28 Dec	SINGAPORE- JURONG area	Landing	9	9	-	9	29 Dec	-	-	Boat located 28 Dec. Police captured 2 on 29 Dec. 7 surrendered 29 Dec. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

TOTAL as at 31 Dec 1964.

510+

340

72

286

K 6
J 6K 1
W 2

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

INDONESIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST WEST MALAYSIA
(Excluding Sea Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)

ANNEX C TO
HQFL 2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

PERIOD 1ST JANUARY, 1965 - 31ST MARCH, 1965

SERIAL (Number in brackets shows pro- gressive total of incidents)	DATE	PLACE (OP NICKNAME)	INCIDENT	NUMBERS INVOLVED		ENEMY KILLED	ENEMY CAPTURED/ SURRENDERED	ELIMINATION COMPLETE	KILLED CASUALTIES		REMARKS
				PLANNED OR MOUNTED	ACTUALLY LANDED				MILITARY	CIVILIAN	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
18 (20)	4 Jan	SINGAPORE- ST. JOHNS area	Sea Inter- ception	4	-	-	4	4 Jan	-	-	0050 GH. HMS WILKINSON intercepted sampan. 4 occupants arrested. Msn - Sabotage/subversion.
19 (21)	6 Jan	SINGAPORE Eastern anchorage area	Sabotage- Merchant ship SS OCEANIC PRIDE (Liberian)	2	-	1(a)	1	6 Jan	-	-	0430 GH. OCEANIC PRIDE reported damaged by explosion. No cas. 0610 GH. HMS WILKINSON inter- cepted sampan. Captured 1 Indon (a) Missing presumed drowned. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism
20 (22)	7 Jan	WEST JOHORE- Sg. BLUKING KECHIL area (PAPER CLIP)	Landing/ Sea inter- caption	24	24	-	13	9 Jan	-	-	Malaysian Forces captured 5 Indonesian 8 Jan and 4 Indons on 9 Jan. KD PANGLIM. inter- cepted sampan on 9 Jan, arrested 4 Indons. Remaining 11 Indons escaped by sea. Msn - estb base.
21 (25)	9 Jan	MALACCA- 12 m WEST of TERENAK	Sea Inter- caption	53	-	26(a)	16	9 Jan	-	2K(b)	0100 GH. KD SRI PERAK inter- cepted pirated tug. Exchange of fire, tug sunk. A second boat escaped. (a) or missing presumed drowned 6 bodies recovered from sea. (b) Malaysian crew of tug. Msn - estb base.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIALANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
22 (24)	15 Jan	SINGAPORE- P. SEMANG area.	Sea Inter- ception	2	2	-	2	15 Jan	-	-	0010 GH. HMS MARYTON inter- cepted sampan containing 2 Indons. Both arrested. <u>Msn</u> - Subversion.
23 (25)	1 Feb	PERAK - MATANG area.	Landing	2	2	-	-	-	-	1K(a)	Police intercepted 2 infil- trators who escaped. (a) Policeman. <u>Msn</u> - recce.
24 (26)	11 Feb	WEST JOHORE- KUKUP area.	Sea Inter- ception	10	-	-	10	11 Feb	-	-	0150 GH. KD SRI KEDAH inter- cepted sampan containing 10 Indons. All captured. Second boat escaped. <u>Msn</u> - Raid.
25 (27)	12 Feb	WEST JOHORE- PENGEROK area. (IRON ROD)	Landing/ Sea Inter- ception	15	13	1	12	15 Feb	-	-	0900 GH. Boat located. 1450 GH. Police contacted infil- trators, Killed 1 captured 9. 151850 GH. Marine Police inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons attempting escape. All captured. <u>Msn</u> - estb base.
26 (28)	22 Feb	PERAK - PANKOR area. (BRICK WALL)	Landing	6	6	2	4(a)	27 Feb	-	-	PFF contacted infiltrators 232315 GH Feb, 1 captured. 242005 GH Feb 1 killed. 250300 GH Feb 1 killed 1 captured. 262340 GH Feb 1 captured. 271930 GH Feb 1 captured. (a) Including infiltrator involved in killing Policeman 1 Feb (Serial 23) <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
27 (29)	23 Feb	MALACCA- 9 n SOUTH OF CAPE RACHADO	Sea Inter- ception	9	-	-	9	23 Feb	-	-	2205 GH. HMS TEAL inter- cepted sampan containing 9 Indons. All captured. Two other boats in area escaped. Msn - estb base/sabotage.
28 (30)	24/25 Feb	EAST JOHORE- TG PUNGGAI and TG PENANG area (OAK TREE I)	Landing	44	44	25(a)	21	26 Mar	10K(b) 6W(b)	-	Landing by 3 boats. 1 Boat recovered 25 Feb. (a) 262030 GH. Mar HMS LULLINGTON intercepted stolen sampan containing 2. 1 killed body recovered 31 Mar. 1 missing presumed drowned. Believed attempting escape. (b)Mal- aysian army. Msn - estb base.
29 (31)	27 Feb	SINGAPORE - EAST COAST Rd area	Bomb Explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Explosion on seafront approx 2345 GH. Damage caused broken windows. Second bomb located and destroyed at 260815 GH. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism
30 (32)	10 Mar	SINGAPORE - ORCHARD Rd area	Bomb Explosion	2	2	-	2(a)	13 Mar	-	3K(b) 32W	15-7 GH. Explosion at MacDONALD House. Extensive damage to building and nearby cars. (a) Captured 13 Mar off P. SARACK. Boat capsized whilst attempting escape. (b) 2 Chinese (female) 1 Malay (male). Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
31 (33)	16 Mar	PENANG-TAILOK BARUNG area.	Landing	3	3	-	2	-	-	-	20 Mar Police arrested 2 Indon. 1 Indon escaped. Msn - recce

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
32 (34)	17 Mar	SINGAPORE - LENG KEE Rd area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	0015 GH. Bomb exploded near HOCK LEE Bus Depot. Slight damage to fence. No cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
33 (35)	17 Mar	EAST JOHORE - TG SIANG area (OAK TREE II)	Landing	37+	13	7	4(a)	14 May	-	-	Attempted landing by 3 boats. 1 boat landed 2 returned to base. (a) Remaining 2 surrendered 14 May to civilians at KOTA TINGGI. Included in next Quarter totals. (Serial 33A) <u>Msn</u> - estb base.
34 (36)	25 Mar	EAST JOHORE - TG PUNGGAI area (OAK TREE III)	Sea Inter- ception	42	-	8(a)	19(b)	25 Mar	-	-	Attempted landing by 3 boats. 2 boats intercepted by HMS PUNCHESTON, MARYTON and INVERMORISTON. 3rd boat containing 15 infiltrators escaped. (a) 6 missing presumed drowned (b) 1 captured at HORSEBORO Lighthouse attempting escape. <u>Msn</u> - estb base.
35 (37)	25 Mar	SINGAPORE - MEYER Rd area	Bomb explosion	3	3	-	3(a)	25 Mar	-	-	2215 GH. explosion near GRANGE Hotel. Sea wall damaged. (a) 2135 GH Marine Police inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons attempting escape. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
36 (38)	26 Mar	MALACCA - CORONATION Park area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2120 GH. Bomb exploded near Police HQ. No cas. or damage. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQPL 2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
37 (35)	27 Mar	SINGAPORE - ST. LAWRENCE Rd area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2019 GH Bomb exploded damaging water main. No cas. Nsn - Sabotage/terrorism.
38 (40)	30 Mar	SINGAPORE - ST. JOHNS area	Sea Inter- ception	3	3	3	-	30 Mar	(a)	-	0030 GH H45 INVERCRISTON inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons. Exchange of fire. (a) INVERCRISTON midshipman killed accidentally by premature explosion of an illuminating mortar bomb. Not included in cas. figures. Nsn - Possibly infiltrators.

TOTALS for Period 1st January, 1965 -
31st March, 1965

259+	115	71	122	-	10 K	6 K
					6 W	32 W

TOTALS for Period 17th August, 1964 -
31st December, 1964

510+	340	72	286	-	6 K	1 K
					6 W	2 W

TOTALS for Period 17th August, 1964 -
31st March, 1965

769+	455	143	408	-	16 K	7 K
					12 W	34 W

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

INDONESIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST WEST MALAYSIA
(Excluding Sea Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)

ANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

PERIOD 1ST APRIL 1965 - 30TH JUNE 1965

SERIAL (Number in brackets shows pro- gressive total of incidents)	DATE	PLACE (OP NICKNAME)	INCIDENT	NUMBERS INVOLVED		ENEMY KILLED	ENEMY CAPTURED/ SURRENDERED	ELIMINATION COMPLETE	ALLIED CASUALTIES		REMARKS
				PLANNED OR MOUNTED	ACTUALLY LUNDED				MILITARY	CIVILIAN	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
39 (41)	1 Apr	SINGAPORE - NORTH BRIDGE Rd area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2146 GH - Bomb exploded outside ODLON Cinema. 4 cars damaged. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
40 (42)	2 Apr	SINGAPORE - MEYER Rd area	Explosive recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	0730 GH. 120 lb. explosive, 6 hand grenades and timing device recovered near sea wall, 61 MEYER Rd. Disarmed by expert. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
41 (43)	2 Apr	SELANGOR - KUALA LUMPUR area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	1W(a)	2136 GH. Bomb exploded under night train KL - PENANG at Kg KASIPILLAI. Coach damaged. (a) Malay (Male) slight injuries Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
42 (44)	7 Apr	SINGAPORE - St JOHNS Lighthouse area	Sea Inter- ception	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	2132 GH. HMS MARYTON inter- cepted sampan containing 1 Indon. Msn - Possible rocce
43 (45)	8 Apr	SELANGOR - KUALA LUMPUR area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	0030 GH. Explosion near AIA Building AMPANG Rd. No damage or cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFL.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
44 (45)	9 Apr	SINGAPORE - BLAKANG MATI area	Bomb explosion	?	?	?	-	-	-	-	2356 GH. Bomb exploded 70 yds from SOUTHERN beach. No damage or cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
45 (47)	14 Apr	SINGAPORE - KATONG PARK area	Landing/ Sea Inter- ception	6	3	-	5	14 Apr	2W(a)	2W(b)	2100 GH. Police intercepted 3 Indons landing from a boat. 2 Indones arrested 1 Indon escaped in boat. Two bombs recovered. 2205 GH sampans inter- cepted off KATONG PARK containing 5 Indons. All arrested. 2235 GH. Bomb on beach exploded whilst being examined. Houses in area damaged. (a) 1 British Army officer, 1 British Army NCO. (b) Police <u>Men</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
46 (48)	16 Apr	SINGAPORE - BLAKANG MATI area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	1700 GH. Two boxes containing explosives recovered on beach at SOUTHERN end of island. Destroyed by expert. No damage or cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
47 A (49)	17 Apr	SINGAPORE - St JOHNS/ SIGLAR/ SISTERS ISLE	Sea Inter- ception	11	-	-	8	18 Apr	-	-	4 Boats attempted infiltration. 1 intercepted by HMS INVERORRISTON at 2115 GH. 3 Indons captured. 1 intercepted by Police off SIGLAR, 3 Indons captured. 1 intercepted by Police off SISTERS ISLE, 2 Indons captured. 1 boat containing 3 Indons turned back and escaped. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQPL.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(e)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(n)
47 B (50)	27 Apr	MALACCA - JALAN MELANG DESAR area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2130 GH. Explosion occurred at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ ms. No damage or cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
47 C (51)	29 Apr	MALACCA - KG JAWA area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2245 GH. Explosion occurred near diesel oil storage tank. Tank supports slightly damaged. No cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
48 (52)	2 May	SINGAPORE - CHANGI area/ TELOK MATA IKAN area	Landing/ Sea inter- ception	3	3	-	3	2 May	-	-	0040 GH. Boat seen to land at WINDSOR DRIVE area. Departed soon afterwards. Two bombs recovered from beach. Destroyed by expert. No damage or cas. 0105 GH. HMS PUNCHSTON inter- cepted sampan off TELOK MATA IKAN containing 3 Indons. All arrested. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
49 (52)	12 May	SINGAPORE - St JOHNS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ceptions	3	-	-	3	12 May	-	-	2130 GH. HMS MARYTON inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons. All arrested. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
53 A	14 May	EAST JOHORE - KOTA TINGGI area	Surrender	-	-	-	2	14 May	-	-	Survivors of OP OAK TREE II (Serial 33)
50 (54)	14 May	SINGAPORE - RAFFLES LIGHT area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	-	3	14 May	-	-	2350 GH. HMS TILFORD inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons. All arrested. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFB.2154/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
51 (55)	17 May	WEST JONGER KUKUP area	Sea Inter- ception	-	-	-	1(a)	17 May	-	-	1730 GH. HMS WILKINSON inter- cepted sampan containing 1 Indon. (a) Survivor of OP LIVER attempting escape (Serial 1)
52 (56)	20 May	SINGAPORE - BLAKANG MATI area	Bomb explosion	?	-	-	-	-	-	-	2305 GH. Fast sampan attacked French ship "TOCONSA" whilst underway off SISTERS BUOY. 4 hand grenades thrown. 1 exploded. Slight damage. No cas. Sampan escaped. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
53 (57)	24 May	SELANGOR - KUALA LUMPUR area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2235 GH. Explosion occurred at 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ ms KL - KLPONG Rd, at bridge over Sg. LAJUT. Slight damage. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
54 (58)	26 May	SINGAPORE - St JOHNS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	2(a)	1	26 May	-	-	2200 GH. KD SRI PAHANG inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons. 1 Indon captured. (a) Bodies recovered on 29 and 30 May. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
55 (59)	26 May	SELANGOR - KUALA LUMPUR area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2225 GH. Explosion occurred at junction LORENIE Rd/BRICKFIELDS Rd, at bridge. Slight damage, no cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
56 (60)	26 May	SINGAPORE - BLAKANG MATI area	Sea Inter- ception	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2359 GH. Sampan sighted by Coast Guard, 270205 GH. Sampan recovered. Contained explosives and 3 hand grenades. No occupants. Msn - Probably sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C
HQPS.2157/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
57 (51)	27 May	SILANGOR - KLANG Rd area	Explosives recovered	.	?	-	-	-	-	-	1515 GH Police Patrol located two bombs under abridge at 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ ms OLD KLANG Rd. Dismantled by expert. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
58 (52)	30 May	EAST JOHORE - PENGKARANG area (TOP HAT)	Landing	25	25	1(a)	24(b)	12 Jun	-	1W(c)	0630 GH. two boats discovered (a) 310707 GH by RLR (b) 010645 GH June, 13 by PFF (c) 010730 GH Jun, 1 by Marine Police (b) 051530 GH Jun, 1 surrendered (b) 071430 GH Jun, 1 by RLR (b) 101500 GH Jun, 5 surrendered (b) 120130 GH Jun, 3 by PFF (c) 062030 GH Malay Male during contact with Indons. Msn - estb base.
59 (53)	31 May	WEST JOHORE - AYER BALOI area (MAY CHAIR)	Landing	10	10	5(a)	5(b)	12 Jun	-	1K(c)	1000 GH Boat discovered (a) 110815 GH Jun by 2 MIR (b) 050900 GH Jun 3 by 2 MIR (b) 110815 GH Jun 2 by 2 MIR (c) 012020 GH Jun elderly MALAY male kidnapped by Indons. 060900 GH. Found Murdered Msn - estb base.
60 (54)	10 Jun	MALACCA JALAN SIRENDAN area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2045 GH. Explosion occurred under a mango tree near 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ ms. Jalan SIRENDAN. No damage or cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
61 (55)	20 Jun	SILANGOR - KLANG Rd area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	0147 GH. Explosion occurred in area 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ ms KL/KLANG Rd. No damage or cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
62 (66)	20 Jun	MALACCA - HELAKA PINDAH area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2530 GH. Explosion occurred area HELAKA PINDAH, ALOR GAJAH. No damage or cas. <u>Men</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
63 (67)	24 Jun	SINGAPORE - P. SENANG/ST. JOHNS ISLAND areas	Sea Inter- ception	26	-	7(a)	9(b)	24 Jun	-	-	0025 GH. HMS MARYTON inter- cepted sampan off P. SENANG. Exchange of fire. 0040 GH HMS TILFORD intercepted two sampans off St. JOHNS ISLAND. Fourth sampan escaped containing 10 Indons. (a) 5 by HMS MARYTON (Missing presumed drowned) (a) 2 by HMS TILFORD (Missing presumed drowned) (b) 5 by HMS MARYTON (b) 4 by HMS TILFORD <u>Men</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
64 (68)	25 Jun	SINGAPORE - ST. JOHNS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ception	4	-	3(a)	1(b)	-	1K(c) 8W(d)	-	2045 GH. KD TEMASEK inter- cepted sampan, opened fire but lost contact. HMS WOOLASTON contacted and captured sampan which contained 1 wounded Indon. Whilst bringing aboard Indon, sampan exploded alongside. (a) 2 missing presumed drowned (a) Wounded Indon died in hospital. (b) 261400 GH Picked up by BRITISH merchant ship CANARA. (c) RN Midshipman (d) 5 RN ratings, 2 Chinese LEP ratings, 1 RMN (interpreter) <u>Men</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFB.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
65 (69)	23 Jun	SINGAPORE - KRANJI area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2330 GH Explosion occurred on reclaimed land. No damage or cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
TOTALS for Period 1st April 1965 - 30th June 1965				95	41	18	66	-	1K 107	1K 4W	
TOTALS for Period 17th August 1964 - 31st March 1965				769+	455	143	408	-	16K 12W	7K 34W	
TOTALS for Period 17th August 1964 - 30th June 1965				864+	496	161	474	-	17K 22W	8K 38W	

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

INDONESIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST WEST MALAYSIA
(excluding Sea Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)

ANNEX C TO
H.F. 2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

PERIOD 1ST JULY 1965 - 30TH SEPTEMBER 1965

SERIAL (Number in brackets shows pro- gressive total of incidents)	DATE	PLACE (OP NICKNAME)	INCIDENT	NUMBERS INVOLVED		ENEMY KILLED	ENEMY CAPTURED/ SURRENDERED	ELIMINATION COMPLETE	ALLIED CASUALTIES		REMARKS
				PLANNED OR MOUNTED	ACTUALLY LANDED				MILITARY	CIVILIAN	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
66 (70)	2 Jul	MALACCA - CENTRAL MARKET	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Two primed time bombs containing 18 slabs of TNT recovered by police. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
67 (71)	6 Jul	SINGAPORE - ST. JOHNS ISLAND	Sea Inter- ception	2	-	2(a)	-	6 Jul	-	-	0015 GH. Sampan with two occupants approached KD SRI KELANTAN and threw 2 hand grenades. KELANTAN opened fire. Sampan capsized and sank. (a) No bodies recovered, presumed killed/drowned Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
68 (72)	6 Jul	MALACCA - KG. HULU area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Unprimed time bomb containing 5½ lb explosives recovered. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
69 (73)	7 Jul	SINGAPORE - ROBINSON Rd	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	1642 GH. Package containing 8 hand grenades recovered from car park adjacent to C.I.D. building Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
70 (74)	7 Jul	SINGAPORE -- RIVER VALLEY Rd	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2304 GH. Package containing 7 hand grenades recovered from telephone booth, St. NICOLAS FLATS. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
71 (75)	7 Jul	SINGAPORE - NEWTON CIRCUS	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2336 GH. Package containing 7 hand grenades recovered from telephone booth. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
72 (76)	7 Jul	JOHORE - BATU PAHAT	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Approx 2045 GH. Explosion occurred on river bank opposite market at JALAN SHAHBANDAR. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
73 (77)	8 Jul	SINGAPORE - ST. JOHNS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ception	-	-	-	1	8 Jul	-	-	Approx 2332 GH. Oil tanker SS CALTEX KARACHI picked up TNI Sgt II TAMRIN s/o MAHMUD. Not involved in attempted incursion.
74 (78)	15 Jul	MALACCA	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	6 lb time bomb intercepted. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
75 (79)	18 Jul	SINGAPORE - ST. JOHNS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	1	2	18 Jul	-	-	182146 GH. HMS HAWK intercepted sampan containing 3 Indonesians. Captured 2. 190605 GH. Sampan recovered containing 1 body. <u>Msn</u> - Claimed to be on Patrol
76 (80)	23 Jul	MALACCA - KG JAVA area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	6 lb time bomb recovered. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
HQFL.2151/5
DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
77 (81)	31 Jul	SINGAPORE - USIS Bldg HILL Street	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Approx 1910 GH. Bicycle with 4½ lb time bomb discovered outside bldg. Failed to explode due to incorrect assembly. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
78 (82)	2 Aug	MALACCA	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2 lb time bomb intercepted. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
79 (83)	4 Aug	MALACCA	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	6 lb time bomb intercepted. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
80 (84)	10 Aug	MALACCA PENGKALAN RAMA area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2 lb explosives recovered. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
81 (85)	14 Aug	MALACCA TRANQUERAH area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2200 GH. 6 lb time bomb recovered. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
82 (86)	18 Aug	NEGERI SEMBALIN Rly at CHENGKAU	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	0630 GH. 12 lb time bomb discovered placed on railway track. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
83 (87)	18 Aug	SELANGOR P. KEPAN - area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	1500 Gi. 2 Hand grenades recovered. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
84 (88)	19 Aug	SELANGOR - P.KEPAN area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	60 lb. TNT recovered. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
85 (89)	22 Aug	MALACCA - SG. LERAN area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2345 GH. 6 lb explosives dis- covered at bridge over SG LERAN, 5½ ms. TG KLING Rd. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C IV
HQFE.2151/5

DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(L)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
86 (90)	24 Aug	MALACCA - GARDEN CITY area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2100 GH. 6 lb explosives recovered from sea wall, GARDEN CITY, MALACCA Town. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
87 (91)	1 Sep	SINGAPORE - P. SERAYA area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	-	3	1 Sep	-	-	Sampan intercepted by KD SRI PERAK. Contained 3 Indons, all arrested. Msn - Recce/Int/Subversion.
88 (92)	4 Sep	MALACCA - BUKIT CHINA area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2500 GH. 6 lb explosives recovered. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
89 (93)	6 Sep	S.LANGOR - PORT SWETTENHAM	Explosives recovered	1?	1?	-	-	-	-	-	1915 GH. Package containing 2 hand grenades recovered. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
90 (94)	6 Sep	SINGAPORE - ST. JOHNS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ception	4	-	-	4	6 Sep	-	-	Approx 0015 GH. HMS PICTON inter- cepted boat containing 4 unarmed Indons. Occupants arrested. Msn - Recce/Int/subversion.
91 (95)	6 Sep	SINGAPORE - P. SERKING area	Sea Inter- ception	4	-	-	4	6 Sep	-	-	Marine Police intercepted boat containing 4 Indons. Occupants arrested. Msn - Recce/Int/subversion.
92 (96)	6 Sep	SINGAPORE - P. PAWAI area	Sighting/ inter- ception	4	2?	-	2	-	-	-	Approx 061900 GH Sep. Vigilante sighted sampan containing 4 persons. Police investigated, sighted sampan, challenged but sampan escaped. Police opened fire results not known. 091820 GH Sep, 2 Indon arrested. Confirmed as occupants of boat. Msn - recce.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

 ANNEX C TO
 REF. 2151/5
 DATED 1ST NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
95 (97)	7 Sep	SINGAPORE - RAFFLES LIGHT	Sea Inter- ception	4	-	-	4	7 Sep	-	-	0425 GH. HMS HUBBERSFON inter- cepted sampan containing 4 unarmed Indons. Sampan sunk, occupants captured. <u>Msn</u> - recon/Int/subversion.
96 (98)	10 Sep	MALACCA	Explosives recovered	2?	2?	-	-	-	-	-	2530 GH. Two unidentified persons seen in the vicinity of bridge (WL 081858). Escaped. 6 lb bomb recovered. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
95 (99)	15 Sep	SINGAPORE - P. SERAYA KECHIL area	Surrender	5	5	-	5	15 Sep	-	-	0825 GH. 5 Indons in rowing boat surrendered to police. <u>Msn</u> - recon/Int
96 (100)	14 Sep	Selangor - TG SERAT KUALA LANGAT area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	1500 GH. 12 lb bomb recovered. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
97 (101)	20 Sep	SINGAPORE - RAFFLES LIGHT area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	-	3	20 Sep	-	-	2012 GH. HMS WOOLASTON inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons. All arrested. <u>Msn</u> - Int/subversion.
98 (102)	21 Sep	MALACCA - junction MOSQUE St/ PORTUGUESSE St	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	2W(a)	Between 2110 GH and 2115 GH explosion occurred. Bomb placed under civ car. (a) Chinese youths, one male, one female. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
99 (103)	22 Sep	MALACCA - Town area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2200 GH 4 lb HE time bomb recovered. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIALANNEX 3 3
HQFE.215/5
DATED 18 NOVEMBER, 1965

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
100 (104)	25 Sep	SINGAPORE - SIGLAP area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	1(a)	2	25 Sep	-	-	0605 GH. HMS FISHERTON inter- cepted sampan containing 3 Indons. 2 Indons arrested. (a) missing presumed drowned <u>Uss</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
TOTALS for Period 1st July 1965 - 30th September 1965				38	10	4	30			2W	
TOTALS for Period 17th August 1964 - 30th June 1965				864+	496	161	474	-	17K 22W	8K 38W	
TOTALS for Period 17th August 1964 - 30th September 1965				902+	506	165	504	-	17K 22W	8K 40W	

NOTES.

1. Serial number in brackets indicates total number of incidents since 17th August 1964.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A TC
HQFE.2151/5
DATED 5TH JANUARY 1966Previous sheets were distributed
as Annex C to HQFE.2151/5
dated 1st November, 1965.INDONESIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST WEST MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE
(Including Sea Piracies and Undetected Infiltrations)

1ST AUGUST - 31ST DECEMBER, 1965

SERIAL (Number in brackets shows pro- gressive total of incidents)	DATE	PLACE (OP NICKNAME)	INCIDENT	NUMBERS INVOLVED		ENEMY KILLED	ENEMY CAPTURED/ SURRENDERED	ELIMINATION COMPLETE	ALLIED CASUALTIES		REMARKS
				PLANNED OR MOUNTED	ACTUALLY LAUNDED				MILITARY	CIVILIAN	
(e)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
101 (105)	7 Oct	SINGAPORE - JALAN LEMBAH, BEDOK off CHANGI Rd.	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	1115 GH. Explosion occurred at a public utilities external transformer. Slight damage no cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
102 (106)	7 Oct	SINGAPORE - 7 $\frac{1}{4}$ ms, CHANGI Rd.	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Approx 1400 GH. Grenade with timing device recovered from a public telephone box. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.
103 (107)	7 Oct	MALACCA - Bridge over SG RAMBAU, LUBOK CHINA- PORT DICKSON Rd.	Explosives and Pamphlets recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Approx 2200 GH. 6 lb HE bomb with timing device and 3 types of subversive pamphlets recovered. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/subversion.
104 (108)	7 Oct	SINGAPORE - TAIPINES Rd, LORONG TECK KOCK Kampong area.	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Between 2350 GH and 2357 GH. Explosion occurred near sewage pipelines. Slight damage to concrete support and pipeline. No cas. <u>Msn</u> - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIALANNEX A TO
RQPL.2151/5
DATED 5TH JANUARY 1966

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
105 (109)	7 Oct	SINGAPORE - TAMPINES Rd LORONG TECK HOCK Kampong area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Between 2350 GH and 2357 GH. Explosion occurred near sewage pipelines approx 88 ft from Serial 104. Slight damage to concrete support. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
106 (110)	7 Oct	SINGAPORE - TAMPINES Rd, LORONG TECK HOCK Kampong area.	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	Between 2350 GH and 2357 GH. Explosion occurred near sewage pipelines, approx 58 ft from serial 105. Main sewage pipe broken. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
107 (111)	11 Oct	PERAK - LAU BIK CHING St, IPOH	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2130 GH. Explosion occurred under parked empty school bus. Bus completely destroyed. Slight damage to neighbouring house. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
108 (112)	14 Oct	PERAK - KOTA Rd, TAIPING	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	0100 GH. Explosion occurred in building under construction. Slight damage. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
109 (113)	14 Oct	SINGAPORE - St JOHNS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ception	3	-	1(a)	2	14 Oct	-	-	0413 GH. HMS FISKERTON inter- cepted oar propelled sampan which she sank. (a) Missing presumed drowned Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
110 (114)	22 Oct	Selangor - P KETAM area.	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	1400 GH. 27 lb explosives in wooden box recovered. Device booby trapped. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A TO
MOPE.2151/5
DATED 5TH JANUARY 1966

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
111 (115)	26 Oct	SINGAPORE - SISTERS ISLAND area	Sea Inter- ception	1	?	-	1	26 Oct	-	-	0250 GH. Custom boat inter- cepted sampan containing one Indon who had deserted from KKO forces in P. BATAL. Hsn - Desertion.
112 (116)	29 Oct	MALACCA - 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ ms Bt BIMARU - Dt BRUANG Rd area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	0050 GH. Police recovered time bomb contained in Biscuit tin. Bomb consisted of TNT, Hand Grenades, 9 mm and .303 ammo, detonator and timing device. Hsn - Sabotage/terrorism.
113 (117)	29 Oct	MALACCA - JALAN AYER LELEH area	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2050 GH. Police discovered time bomb contained in Biscuit tin, located in front of Yok Bin High School. Approx 12 lbs TNT. 2500 GH. Destroyed by bomb expert. Hsn - Sabotage/terrorism.
114 (118)	30 Oct	SINGAPORE - RAFFLES LIGHT area	Sea Inter- ception	1	-	-	1	30 Oct	-	-	0115 GH. HMS TILFORD inter- cepted sampan. One Indon arrested. Sampan sunk. Hsn - Recce/Int.
115 (119)	10 Nov	PERAK - 36 $\frac{1}{2}$ ms TAPAN/ BIDOR Rd	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	2(a)	2040 GH. Explosion occurred at bridge (VK 107255). Bridge and nearby house damaged. Estimated 10-20 lbs TNT used. (a) Chinese (Female) slightly injured. Hsn - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

 ANNEX A TO
 R.F. 2151/5
 DATED 5TH JANUARY 1966

(e)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(g)	(f)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
116 (120)	10 Nov	PERAK - BIDOR area	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2046 GH. Explosion occurred at bridge (VK 129142). Bridge damaged. Water pipeline destroyed. Estimated 10 lbs TNT used. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
117 (121)	14 Nov	SILANGOR - KUALA LANGAT area.	Explosives recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	1000 GH. Bomb containing 16 lbs explosives and two hand grenades recovered (VH 466375). All contained in wooden box and booby trapped. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
118 (122)	14 Nov	MALACCA - Town area.	Explosive recovered	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2020 GH. Time bomb with timing device recovered (VL 166668). Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
119 (123)	14 Nov	SILANGOR - SUNGAI WAY area.	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2030 GH. Explosion heard in vicinity PETALING Tin Mine SUNGAI WAY. Site of explosion near rly bridge (VU 515837). estimated 10 - 20 lbs TNT. No cas. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.
120 (124)	23 Nov	MALACCA - TERRANDAK Camp	Bomb explosion	?	?	-	-	-	-	-	2015 GH. Bomb exploded outside fence. No casualties. Estimated 20 lbs TNT used. Msn - Sabotage/terrorism.

CONFIDENTIAL