

**INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE**

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**Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and  
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide  
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation)**

**WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS OF IRELAND**

5 July 2023

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 5 June 2023, the International Court of Justice ('the Court') decided that the declarations of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute of the Court ('the Statute') submitted by, amongst others, Ireland ('Order on Admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention') in the case concerning *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)* ('the Proceedings') were admissible<sup>1</sup>. The Court fixed 5 July 2023 as the time-limit for the filing of the Written Observations referred to in Article 86, paragraph 1, of the Rules of the Court ('the Rules')<sup>2</sup>.
2. Ireland's intervention under Article 63 of the Statute involves the exercise of a right by a State party to a convention the construction of which is in question before the Court<sup>3</sup>. As determined by the Court in the Order on Admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention, the construction of Article IX and of other provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ('Genocide Convention')<sup>4</sup> concerning the Court's jurisdiction *ratione materiae* is in question at the present stage of the Proceedings<sup>5</sup>. In accordance with the Order on Admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention, these Written Observations will solely concern the construction of Article IX and other provisions of the Genocide Convention that are relevant for the determination of the Court's jurisdiction *ratione materiae* in the Proceedings<sup>6</sup>. References to other rules and principles of international law outside the Genocide Convention in these Written Observations will only concern the construction of the Convention's provisions, in accordance with the customary rule of interpretation reflected in Article 31, paragraph 3 (c), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ('Vienna Convention')<sup>7</sup>. Ireland will not address other matters, such as the dispute between the Parties, the evidence, the facts or the application of the Genocide Convention in the present case<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)* (Order of 5 June 2023) <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/182/182-20230605-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>, paras 99 and 102(1).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 102(3).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 26.

<sup>4</sup> Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277.

<sup>5</sup> Order on Admissibility of the Declarations of Intervention (n 1), p. 26.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 99.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 84.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 84.

3. Upon the Court's invitation to coordinate with other intervening States, Ireland has agreed the substance of its position with other Member States of the European Union, namely Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. Parts II and III of the present written observation are therefore in the same terms as the corresponding Parts of the Written Observations of those intervening states. However, in order to meet the strict time-limit set by the Court, and for logistical reasons, Ireland files these Written Observations separately in its national capacity.

## **II. CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE IX AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION RELEVANT FOR JURISDICTION RATIONE MATERIAE**

4. In its order of 16 March 2022 indicating provisional measures, the Court affirmed its jurisdiction *prima facie* on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention<sup>9</sup>.
5. Ireland wishes to make four observations on the construction of the Genocide Convention at the present stage of the proceedings.
6. First, applying the rules of treaty interpretation (Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention that reflect rules of customary international law<sup>10</sup>), it is important to recall the broad scope of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which includes disputes about the 'fulfilment' of obligations under the Convention.
7. Second, Article IX of the Genocide Convention applies to disputes about abusive allegations of genocide under the Genocide Convention.
8. Third, Article IX of the Genocide Convention applies to disputes about unlawful action as a means for prevention and punishment of genocide under the Genocide Convention.
9. Fourth, any party to the dispute may seize the Court under Article IX, including the party which is the victim of an abusive allegation of genocide or any unlawful action as a means for prevention and punishment of genocide.

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<sup>9</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Order of 16 March 2022, paras. 28-49.

<sup>10</sup> *Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela)* [2023] ICJ Judgment of 6 April 2023 <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/171/171-20230406-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>, para. 87.

**A. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is formulated in broad terms and covers disputes about the ‘fulfilment’ of the Convention**

10. Article IX of the Genocide Convention reads as follows:

*‘Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.’*

11. Ireland contends that the notion of ‘dispute’ is already well-established in the case law of the Court. It concurs with the meaning given to the word dispute as ‘a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests’ between parties<sup>11</sup>. In order for a dispute to exist, ‘[i]t must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other’<sup>12</sup>. The two sides must ‘hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain international obligations’<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, ‘in case the respondent has failed to reply to the applicant’s claims, it may be inferred from this silence, in certain circumstances, that it rejects those claims and that, therefore, a dispute exists’<sup>14</sup>.

12. In that respect, the document communicated by the Russian Federation to the Court on 7 March 2022 seems to construe the notion of a dispute unduly narrowly by insisting that Article IX cannot be used to establish jurisdiction of the Court for disputes relating to the use of force or issues of self-defence under general international law<sup>15</sup>. However, it follows from the consistent jurisprudence of the Court that certain facts or omissions may give rise to a dispute that falls within the ambit of more than one treaty<sup>16</sup>. Hence, a parallel dispute

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<sup>11</sup> *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions*, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> *South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319, at p. 328.

<sup>13</sup> *Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates)*, Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July 2018, I.C.J. Reports 2018, p. 406, at p. 414, para. 18; ICJ, *Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 3, at p. 26, para. 50, citing *Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania*, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74.

<sup>14</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)*, Judgment of 22 July 2022, p. 27, para. 71.

<sup>15</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Document of the Russian Federation of 7 March 2022, paras. 8-15.

<sup>16</sup> *Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 3 February 2021, para. 56.

arising out of the same facts about the use of force between two States does not create an obstacle to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article IX of the Genocide Convention, provided that its other conditions are fulfilled.

13. In particular, such a dispute must relate ‘to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention’. Ireland contends that Article IX is a broad jurisdictional clause, allowing the Court to adjudicate upon disputes concerning the fulfilment by a Contracting Party of its obligations under the Convention. The inclusion of the word ‘fulfilment’ is ‘unique as compared with the compromissory clauses found in other multilateral treaties which provide for submission to the International Court of Justice of such disputes between Contracting Parties as relate to the *interpretation or application* of the treaties in question’<sup>17</sup>.
14. The ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention’ may be considered by reference to three points.
15. The first point (‘relating to’) establishes a link between the dispute and the Convention.
16. The second point (‘interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention’) encompasses three terms. While ‘interpretation’ is typically understood as the process of ‘explaining the meaning’ of a legal norm, ‘application’ is the ‘action of putting something into operation’ in a given case<sup>18</sup>. The term ‘fulfilment’ partially overlaps with the latter, and it may be understood to refer to an application that ‘meets the requirements’ of a norm<sup>19</sup>. Nevertheless, the addition of the term ‘fulfilment’ supports a broad interpretation of Article IX<sup>20</sup>. It appears that ‘by inserting all the three alternative terms, the drafters had sought to ‘give a coverage as exhaustive as possible to the compromissory clause’ and to ‘close down all possible loopholes’<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Preliminary Objections, Declaration of Judge Oda, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 627, para. 5 (emphasis in the original).

<sup>18</sup> C. Tams, Article IX, note 45, in: Tams/Gerster/Schiffbauer, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide*, A Commentary (Beck 2014).

<sup>19</sup> C. Tams (n 18), Article IX, note 45.

<sup>20</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Joint Declaration of Intervention of the Governments of Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 7 December 2022, para. 29.

<sup>21</sup> C. Tams (note 18), Article IX, note 45; R. Kolb, *Scope Ratione Materiae*, in: Paola Gaeta (ed), *The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary*, (OUP 2009), p. 451.

17. The third point ('of the Convention') makes clear that the compromissory clause refers back to all the provisions of the Convention. In other words, Article IX does not create further substantive rights or obligations for the parties; the substantive legal norms that are subject to the Court's jurisdiction must be found elsewhere in the Convention. At the same time, the *renvoi* relates to the entire life of the Convention, including breaches thereof<sup>22</sup>.
18. For example, there can be a dispute about the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention when one State alleges that another State has committed genocide<sup>23</sup>. In that scenario, the Court verifies the factual basis for such an allegation: if it is not satisfied that there were any acts of genocide actually being committed by the respondent State, it may decline its jurisdiction<sup>24</sup>.
19. While this scenario of (alleged) responsibility for acts of genocide constitutes an important type of dispute about the 'interpretation, application or fulfilment' of the Convention, it is not the only one. In the case *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia*, the applicant alleged several violations of the Convention by the respondent, including a failure to prevent and punish genocide under Article I<sup>25</sup>, and the Court affirmed its jurisdiction *ratione materiae*<sup>26</sup>. In the case *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (pending), the applicant claims that the respondent not only bears responsibility for prohibited acts under Article III, but also for violations of its obligations under the Convention by failing to prevent genocide in violation of Article I; and failing to punish genocide in violation of Articles I, IV and V<sup>27</sup>. In these examples, one State alleges that another State is not honouring its commitment to 'prevent' and 'punish' genocide, because it grants impunity to acts of genocide committed on its territory. Therefore, there can also be disputes about 'non-action' as a violation of the substantive obligations under Article I, IV and V.

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<sup>22</sup> R. Kolb, *Scope Ratione Materiae* (note 21), p. 453 with an account of the case law.

<sup>23</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 75, para. 169.

<sup>24</sup> *Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. France)*, Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 363, at pp. 372-373, paras. 24-31. Later, the ICJ declined its jurisdiction on the ground that Serbia and Montenegro did not have access to the Court, at the time of the institution of the proceedings, under Article 35 of the Statute (see e.g. ICJ, *Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 15 December 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 595).

<sup>25</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 11 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, at p. 614, para. 28 and p. 603, para. 4.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 615-617, paras. 30-33.

<sup>27</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)*, Judgment of 22 July 2022, p. 12, para. 24, Points (1) (c), d) and (e).

20. The ordinary meaning of Article IX makes it clear that there is no need to establish genocidal acts in order to affirm the Court’s jurisdiction. Rather, the Court has jurisdiction over the question whether genocidal acts have been or are being committed or not<sup>28</sup>.
21. The context of the phrase (‘relating to ...’) further confirms this reading. In particular, the unusual feature of the words ‘including’ in the intermediate sentence indicates a broader scope of Article IX of the Convention when compared to a standard compromissory clause<sup>29</sup>. Disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III are therefore only one type of dispute covered by Article IX, which are ‘included’ in the wider phrase of disputes ‘relating to the interpretation, application and fulfilment’ of the Convention<sup>30</sup>.
22. Hence, the context of the phrase (‘relating to’) in Article IX confirms that the Court’s jurisdiction goes beyond disputes between States about the responsibility for alleged genocidal acts, but also covers disputes between States about the absence of genocide and the about the performance of treaty obligations by one or more States parties. In other words: ‘With a view to the question of positive fulfilment, the court has jurisdiction over the question whether a Contracting Party (...) has not violated its obligation to prevent and punish genocide. In a negative way, the Court can also adjudicate whether a Contracting Party has failed to fulfil these obligation’<sup>31</sup>.
23. Finally, the object and purpose of the Convention gives further support to the wide interpretation of Article IX. The Court noted that ‘[a]ll the States parties to the Genocide Convention [thus] have a common interest to ensure the prevention, suppression and punishment of genocide, by committing themselves to fulfilling the obligations contained

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<sup>28</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Order of 16 March 2022, p. 10, para. 43; *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)*, Order of 23 January 2020, I.C.J. Reports 2020, p. 14, para. 30.

<sup>29</sup> *Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 75, para. 169.

<sup>30</sup> See also the Written Observations of The Gambia on the Preliminary Objections raised by Myanmar, 20 April 2021, pp. 28-29, para. 3.22 (‘The inclusion of disputes ‘relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide’ among those that can be brought before the Court unmistakably means that responsibility for genocide can be the object of a dispute brought before the Court by any contracting party’).

<sup>31</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Declaration of Intervention of the Principality of Liechtenstein of 15 December 2022, para. 20.

in the Convention'<sup>32</sup>. The *erga omnes* nature of the obligations under the Convention also underpins the paramount significance of the text for the international community as a whole, entrusting the International Court of Justice in 1948 with a particularly important mission to enforce it in the interests of all States.

24. Famously, in its 1951 Advisory Opinion, the Court held<sup>33</sup>:

*'The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provisions.'*

25. The Convention's object to protect the 'most elementary principles of morality' also requires that a State party does not abuse its provisions for other purposes. It also strongly supports a reading of Article IX, according to which disputes relating to the interpretation, application and fulfilment of the Convention include disputes about the abuse of the Convention's substantive provisions to justify a State's action vis-à-vis another State party to the Convention. Such abuse can take two forms: abusive allegations and/or or abusive action, which will now be examined in the next two sections.

### **B. Article IX of the Genocide Convention Applies to Disputes About Abusive Allegations of Genocide**

26. Ireland now wishes to turn to one of the scenarios of a dispute under Article IX more precisely, namely the abusive allegation of one State that another State has committed genocide.

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<sup>32</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)*, Judgment of 22 July 2022, p. 36, para. 107.

<sup>33</sup> *Reservations to the Genocide Convention*, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1951, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.



27. In doing so, it has carefully reviewed the question of whether the Convention enables a State to seize the Court of a dispute concerning allegations of genocide made by another State<sup>34</sup>.

28. Ireland contends that Article IX of the Genocide Convention applies also to disputes relating to abusive allegations of genocide, as they raise the question of compliance with Article I of the Convention, which provides context for the construction of Article IX. Article I of the Convention reads:

*'The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.'*

29. According to Article I of the Genocide Convention, all States parties are obliged to prevent and punish genocide. As the Court already emphasised, in fulfilling their duty to prevent genocide, Contracting Parties must act within the limits permitted by international law<sup>35</sup>. Moreover, carrying out the duty under Article I must be done in good faith (Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and general international law<sup>36</sup>). As the Court has observed, the principle of good faith 'obliges the Parties to apply [a treaty] in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized'<sup>37</sup>. Good faith interpretation thus operates as a safeguard against misuse of the Genocide Convention. As 'one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations', good faith is also directly linked to the 'trust and confidence [that] are inherent in international co-operation'<sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of this question, see e.g. Order on Provisional Measures (n 9), Declaration of Judge Bennouna, para. 2.

<sup>35</sup> *Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 221, para. 430; *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Order of 16 March 2022, para. 57.

<sup>36</sup> *Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 275, 296, para. 38: 'The Court observes that the principle of good faith is a well-established principle of international law. It is set forth in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations; it is also embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969.'

<sup>37</sup> *Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, at p. 79, para. 142.

<sup>38</sup> *Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France)*, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 7, at p. 142.

30. In Ireland's view, the notion of 'undertake to prevent' implies that each State party must assess whether a genocide or a serious risk of genocide exists prior to taking action pursuant to Article I<sup>39</sup>. Such an assessment must be based on substantial evidence<sup>40</sup>.
31. Importantly, the UN Human Rights Council called upon all States, 'in order to deter future occurrences of genocide, to cooperate, including through the United Nations system, in strengthening appropriate collaboration between existing mechanisms that contribute to the early detection and prevention of massive, serious and systematic violations of human rights that, if not halted, could lead to genocide'.<sup>41</sup>
32. It constitutes good practice to rely on the results of independent investigations under UN auspices<sup>42</sup> before qualifying a situation as genocide.
33. Moreover, the Genocide Convention provides guidance concerning the lawful means by which the Contracting Parties may prevent and punish genocide. While 'Article I does not specify the kinds of measures that a Contracting Party may take to fulfil this obligation',<sup>43</sup> 'the Contracting Parties must implement this obligation in good faith, taking into account other parts of the Convention, in particular Articles VIII and IX, as well as its Preamble'.<sup>44</sup> Rather than making an abusive allegation of genocide against another State without having discharged its due diligence obligations, a State may seize the United Nations' political or judicial organs<sup>45</sup>.
34. It follows that an abusive allegation by one State against another State runs contrary to the former State's obligations to apply Article I of the Convention in good faith and distort the terms of the Convention. Accordingly, Article IX also covers such disputes.

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<sup>39</sup> *Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at pp. 221-222, paras. 430-431.

<sup>40</sup> *Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 90, para. 209.

<sup>41</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 43/29: Prevention of Genocide (29 June 2020), UN Doc A/HRC/RES/43/29, para. 11.

<sup>42</sup> See for example the reliance of The Gambia on the reports of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar established by the UN Human Rights Council before bringing a case to the Court; for details see *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar)*, Judgment of 22 July 2022, at pp. 25-27, paras. 65-69.

<sup>43</sup> Order on Provisional Measures (n 9), para. 56.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Order on Provisional Measures (n 9) Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson, para. 30.

### **C. Article IX of the Genocide Convention Applies to Disputes about Unlawful Action as Means of Preventing and Punishing Genocide**

35. Another important scenario coming within the scope of Article IX of the Convention are disputes about otherwise unlawful action as a means of preventing and punishing genocide. As described in the previous section, the correct construction of Article I is that a State is under a due diligence obligation to gather evidence from independent sources before making any allegation of genocide against another State.
36. In the same vein, a State may not take unlawful action based on such abusive allegations.
37. Rather, the scope of the ‘undertaking to prevent’ should be read in light of the final recital in the preamble, which emphasizes the need for ‘international co-operation’. Referring to the preamble is an accepted method of treaty interpretation, as stressed by the Court for example in the Whaling case<sup>46</sup>. Moreover, under Article VIII States may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take action, and Article IX provides for judicial settlement. All this speaks in favour of a duty under the Convention to employ multilateral and peaceful means to prevent genocide. Such reading is in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Article IX also gives effect to the parties’ pre-existing obligations under Article 2(3) of the UN Charter and customary international law to settle all their disputes peacefully<sup>47</sup>. Ireland emphasizes that all States parties shall be engaged in preventing and punishing genocide worldwide for the benefit of humankind, and not in order to protect their own interests.
38. It follows from the obligation to carry out a good faith assessment of the existence of genocide or serious risk of genocide that, where a State has not carried out such an assessment, it cannot invoke the ‘undertak[ing] to prevent’ genocide in Article I of the Convention as a justification for its conduct. This includes conduct which involves the threat or use of force, as underlined by the Court in the *Oil Platforms* case<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> See e.g. *Australia v. Japan (New Zealand intervening)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2014, p. 226, at p. 215, para. 56 (referring to the preamble of the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling to discern its object and purpose).

<sup>47</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Declaration of Intervention of New Zealand of 28 July 2022, para. 25.

<sup>48</sup> *Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, pp. 811-812, para. 21. See also *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention*

39. A State may not claim to enforce international law by violating international law. As the Court explained in the *Bosnian Genocide* case (*cf.* para. 29 above), ‘it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law’<sup>49</sup>. In other words, Article I of the Genocide Convention imposes an obligation on States parties ‘not only to act to prevent genocide, but to act within the limits permitted by international law to prevent genocide’<sup>50</sup>.

40. In conclusion, the jurisdiction of the Court extends to disputes concerning unlawful action for the stated purpose of preventing and punishing alleged genocide<sup>51</sup>.

#### **D. Any party to the dispute may seize the Court under Article IX of the Genocide Convention**

41. Finally, Ireland wishes to comment on the view according to which a State cannot invoke the compromissory clause under Article IX of the Convention ‘only to have the Court confirm its own compliance’<sup>52</sup>.

42. As noted in Section B above, the concepts of ‘dispute’ and ‘fulfilment’ in Article IX are sufficiently broad to allow the Court to issue a declaration that the applicant State bears no responsibility for a breach under the Convention, as alleged by another State. Moreover, the plain wording of Article IX confirms that ‘any of the parties’ to the dispute may seize the Court. Thus, where there is a dispute concerning whether a State has engaged in conduct contrary to the Convention, the State accused of such conduct has the same right to submit the dispute to the Court as the State that has made the accusation with the effect that the Court will have jurisdiction over that dispute<sup>53</sup>.

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*and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Declaration of Intervention of Australia of 30 September 2022, para. 41.

<sup>49</sup> *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at p. 221, para. 430.

<sup>50</sup> Order on Provisional Measures (n 9), Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson, para. 27.

<sup>51</sup> Order on Provisional Measures (n 9), p. 11, para. 45;

<sup>52</sup> Order on Provisional Measures (n 9), Declaration of Vice-President Gevorgian, para. 8.

<sup>53</sup> *Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)*, Declaration of Intervention of the United Kingdom of 1 August 2022, para. 34; Declaration of Intervention of Australia of 30 September 2022, paras. 35-36; Declaration of Intervention of Norway of 10 November 2022, para. 21.

43. In addition, the already mentioned *erga omnes partes* character of the Genocide Convention speaks against a narrowly construed right to seek the judicial protection of the Court. On the contrary, such an interpretation would risk precluding a victim State from seeking relief from the Court in the face of abuse of the Convention. This would undermine the Convention's credibility and efficiency as a universal instrument for the prevention of genocide, as well as the role of the Court as a critical avenue for redress against abuses of the law.
44. More generally, nothing prevents a requesting State from invoking the compromissory clause of a given Convention to ask the Court for a negative declaration that it has not breached its international obligations under the Convention in question. For example, in the *Lockerbie* case, Libya had requested several Court findings that it had complied with Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the of the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation on the basis of Article 14 of the Convention<sup>54</sup>. The United States objected and argued that none of the provisions quoted by the applicant concerned obligations binding upon it as respondent<sup>55</sup>. The Court rejected the preliminary objection. It held that there was a specific dispute before it on the interpretation and application of Article 7 – read in conjunction with Article 1, Article 5, Article 6 and Article 8 of the Montreal Convention – which fell to be decided by the Court on the basis of Article 14<sup>56</sup>. The Court thus assumed jurisdiction over the applicant's request for a determination that it had not violated the Montreal Convention.
45. Moreover, Ireland notes that it may not even be necessary for the Court to enter into consideration of whether Article IX also covers 'non-violation complaints'. In its application, Ukraine respectfully requests the Court to:

*'(a) Adjudge and declare that, contrary to what the Russian Federation claims, no acts of genocide, as defined in by Article III of the Genocide Convention have been committed in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine'.*

*(b) Adjudge and declare that the Russian Federation cannot lawfully take any action under the Genocide Convention in or against Ukraine aimed at preventing or punishing an alleged genocide, on the basis of its false claims of*

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<sup>54</sup> *Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America)*, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 115, at p. 123, para. 25.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, p. 124, para. 26

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, p. 127, para. 28.

*genocide in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine.*  
*(c) Adjudge and declare that the Russian Federation's recognition of the independence of the so-called 'Donetsk People's Republic' and 'Luhansk People's Republic' on 22 February 2022 is based on a false claim of genocide and therefore has no basis in the Genocide Convention.*  
*(d) Adjudge and declare that the 'special military operation' declared and carried out by the Russian Federation on and after 24 February 2022 is based on a false claim of genocide and therefore has no basis in the Genocide Convention.*  
*(e) Require that the Russian Federation provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition that it will not take any unlawful measures in and against Ukraine, including the use of force, on the basis of its false claim of genocide.*  
*(f) Order full reparation for all damage caused by the Russian Federation as a consequence of any actions taken on the basis of Russia's false claim of genocide.'*

46. While it is for the Court to clarify the precise meaning of the requests, none of the reliefs sought expressly mention the question of 'compliance' of Ukraine with the Convention. In particular, point (a) could also be understood as a request to the Court to declare that Russia's allegation that genocide had taken place in the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk were abusive. Under such reading, the jurisdiction of the Court would have to be ascertained in line with the interpretation of Article IX of the Convention advanced in Section C. above.

### **III. CONCLUSION**

47. Ireland puts forward four observations on the construction of the Genocide Convention. First, Article IX thereof is formulated in broad terms to include disputes about the fulfilment of obligations under the Convention. Second, it applies to disputes relating to false and abusive allegations of genocide under the Genocide Convention. Third, it also applies to disputes about otherwise unlawful action as a means of preventing and punishing genocide under the Genocide Convention. Fourth, any party to the dispute may seize the Court under Article IX, including the party that is the victim of an abusive allegation or unlawful action as a means of preventing and punishing genocide.

48. In conclusion, the ordinary meaning of Article IX of the Convention, its context and the object and purpose of the entire Convention show that a dispute regarding acts carried out by one State against another State based on abusive claims of genocide falls under the notion of 'dispute between Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or

fulfilment of the present Convention'. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to declare the absence of genocide and the violation of a good faith performance of the Convention. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Court extends to disputes concerning unlawful action for the stated purpose of preventing and punishing alleged genocide.

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Frank Groome

Co-Agent of the Government of Ireland

5 July 2023