

OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN RESPECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE

(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)

EXHIBITS OF THE
AFRICAN UNION



22 March 2024

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No.	Title	Date
1	Assembly of the Union, Decision On The Katowice Climate Conference (UNFCCC Cop 24) And Africa's Engagements At The Global Climate Change Conference At COP25/CMP 15, Doc. Assembly/ AU/Dec.723(XXXII)	10-11 February 2019
2	African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032)	2 October 2023
3	African Union, The African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call To Action	4-6 September 2023
4	African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa	23 October 2009
5	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, (OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58)	27 June 1981
6	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa	11 July 2003
7	African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	11 July 1990
8	Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights	10 July 1998
9	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution 153 (XLVI) 2009, 'Resolution on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its impact in Africa'	25 November 2009
10	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution 271(LV) 2014, 'Resolution on Climate Change in Africa'	28 April to 12 May 2014
11	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution 342(LVIII) 2016, 'Resolution on Climate Change and Human Rights'	6 to 20 April 2016
12	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution 417 (LXIV) 2016, 'Resolution on the Human Rights Impact of Extreme Weather in Eastern and Southern Africa due to Climate Change'	14 May 2019

13	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Resolution 491 (LXIX) 2021, 'Resolution on Climate Change and Forced Displacement in Africa'	5 December 2021
14	Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Assembly/AU/Dec.9 (II) - Doc EX/CL/50 (III), OXIO 615	11 July 2003
15	African Union Commission (2015b). Agenda 2063. 'The Africa We Want. A Shared Strategic Framework for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable development'	September 2015
16	Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration Environment and climate change	29 July 2022
17	African Union Assembly/AU/Dec.855(XXXVI), Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Thirty-Six Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union	19 February 2023
18	African Union Assembly/AU/Decl.4(XXXVI), Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Thirty-Six Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union	19 February 2023
19	African Union Assembly/AU/Dec. 819(XXXV), Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union	6 February 2022
20	African Union Assembly/AU/Dec. 753(XXXIII), Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Thirty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union	9 February 2020
21	African Union Assembly/AU/Dec. 764(XXXIII), Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Thirty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union	9 February 2020

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ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION
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Assembly/AU/Decl.1-8(XXXII)
Assembly/AU/Res.1(XXXII)
Assembly/AU/Motions1-2(XXXII)

**DECISIONS, DECLARATIONS,
RESOLUTION AND MOTIONS**



**DECISION ON THE KATOWICE CLIMATE CONFERENCE (UNFCCC COP 24)
AND AFRICA'S ENGAGEMENTS AT THE GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE CONFERENCE AT COP25/CMP 15
Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XXXII)**

The Assembly,

1. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION of:

- a) the Report by H.E. Ali Bongo Ondimba, President of Gabon, on the Coordinator of the Committee of the African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), on the outcomes of the 24th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); 14th Meeting of the Parties serving as the Conference of the Parties to Its Kyoto Protocol (COP 24/ CMP14); and Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1.3) and **ENDORSES** the recommendations therein;
- b) the successful operationalization by H.E. Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of the Congo, of the Climate Commission for the Congo Basin and its Blue Fund;
- c) the successful operationalization by H.E. Mahamadou Issoufou, the President of the Republic of Niger, of the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region;
- d) the commitment of H.E. Denny Faure, President of the Republic of Seychelles, in expediting the operationalization of the Climate Commission for Island States and ocean economies.

2. FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES the crucial role of Gabon as chair of CAHOSCC and AMCEN, and Egypt as chair of G77 and China, during the negotiations building up to COP24 in Poland, and commends the two countries for their dedication and support for the African cause in climate change;

3. FURTHER TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION, of the two preparatory meetings convened by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and the several meetings of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN) in preparation for the COP;

4. ACKNOWLEDGES the utmost commitment of CAHOSCC in the provision of the political directive and guidance that has been facilitating Africa to be stronger, bonded together in the spirit of Pan-Africanism and to continue to speak with one voice in the global Climate Change negotiations, highlighting African commitment to fully implement the Convention, the Paris Agreement in line with the Principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities;

5. CONGRATULATES the Commission, AUDA/NEPAD, AfDB; UNECA, in collaboration with the Kingdom of Lesotho and Republic of Gabon, and in

partnership with the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the African Risk Capacity (ARC), for organizing the Africa Day events at COP 24 on 3 December 2018 on the theme: "**The Africa NDC Hub: Going further and faster with NDC implementation in support of Agenda 2063**";

6. **CONGRATULATES** Poland for successfully hosting COP 24/CMP14 and for the adoption of the Katowice Climate Package; and **WELCOMES** the offer by Chile to host COP 25/CMP 15/ CMA2, in December 2019;
7. **ACKNOWLEDGES**, the efforts and commitment of the African Ministers, who participated in facilitating the final days of the negotiations, towards the promotion of the African positions, and the work undertaken by the AGN, in the preparation and the negotiations leading to COP24 outcomes and in securing African priorities in the negotiations;
8. **REITERATES** the need of the multilateral approach of addressing the global challenge of climate change, through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and **REAFFIRMS** Africa's commitment to implement the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, in the best interest of African countries, which are particularly vulnerable to climate change and already adversely affected by the impacts of this phenomenon, while ensuring that African countries are accorded policy space needed to achieve sustainable development;
9. **URGES** parties to the Paris Agreement to recognize the special circumstances and needs of African countries, in line with the relevant and previous decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties and **CALLS UPON** the incoming presidency of the Conference of the Parties to continue with the consultations, with a view to reaching a decision in that regard, by the 25th session of the Conference of the Parties, scheduled to be held in Santiago, Chile, from 2 to 13 December 2019, and **REQUESTS** the AGN to continue pursuing the issue;
10. **URGES** Developed countries to continue to scale up mobilized climate finance towards achieving the 2020 finance goal, through private and public funds, to deliver on the US\$100 billion annually building on the needs of developing countries and enhancing the country ownership of developing countries, and further enhance the provisions of predictable and sustainable finance building on the floor of the 100 billion USD annually;
11. **WELCOMES** the role of the GCF in supporting African countries implementing their climate actions and projects, while concerned with the shortfalls of some pledges of the IRM, and commends the work achieved by the outgoing African board members and their positions defending Africa interests in the board and in this regard, **URGES** developed countries to enhance their contributions to the GCF to ensure a timely, successful, first replenishment process of the GCF, that reflects the commitment to tackle climate change both on mitigation and adaptation;

12. **HIGHLIGHTS** the importance of reaching an ambitious outcome of the GCF first replenishment of at least double the provisions of finance pledged during the initial resource mobilization 'IRM', taking into consideration the capacity of the GCF secretariat to program between 3 to 5 billion USD annually; while **STRESSING** on the importance of ensuring allocation of adequate share of GCF resources for Africa in particular for Adaptation through grant instruments;
13. **FURTHER URGES** the Parties and the COP 24 and COP 25 Presidencies to expedite action on consultations on the specific needs and special circumstances of Africa, as contained in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as mandated at COP 22;
14. **NOTES WITH CONCERN** that current levels of global warming have induced unprecedented and widespread insecurities, especially to the poor and vulnerable groups in the African communities, resulting in food insecurity, displacement of human and livestock populations, health challenges, and other negative impacts on livelihoods and economies;
15. **ALSO NOTES** the warning by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its Special Report on the Implications of 1.5 degree Celsius warming, which recognizes that most of Africa has already surpassed 1 degree Celsius warming and could rapidly exceed 2 degrees in the absence of drastic action;
16. **CALLS UPON** the global leaders to implement radical policy measures as recommended by the IPCC, to ensure the integrity of the climate system and **REQUESTS** that such policies have a stronger focus on building the resilience of vulnerable groups in society;
17. **ALSO CALLS UPON** developed countries to enhance provisions of support, both financial, transfer of technology and facilitate access by African countries to this support, which should be provided on concessional and preferential basis;
18. **REQUESTS** the Commission, Pan African institutions, and Climate Commissions, in collaboration with Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI), to embark on programmes to document climate impacts on Africa's economies and ecosystems and propose appropriate policy and other interventions to guide African States' climate response;
19. **IMPLORES** all Parties to work together for the effective operationalization of the Paris Agreement and completion of the pending work on the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP), beyond COP24 outcomes, in order to support Developing countries, especially Africa, in the implementation of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs);
20. **ENCOURAGES** the African countries to ratify the Kigali Amendment of the Montreal protocol as a vehicle to strengthen efforts to tackle climate change;

21. **REQUESTS** the AGN to continue its efforts in relation to promoting and supporting Africa's priorities in the UNFCCC negotiations and other related fora, building on African common position document and relevant AMCEN and CAHOSCC decisions;
22. **ENCOURAGES** African and international stakeholders, especially those working on cities and local governments, including the UN organizations like UNHABITAT, UNEP, and as appropriate, other stakeholders like UCLGA, to enhance their support to African countries, to the extent possible, through coordination and cooperation with the AU Commission, the Permanent Representatives' Committee (PRC), through the Sub-Committee on Environment and the AGN, for the successful implementation of the African NDCs at local level, in line with the national rules and regulations;
23. **REQUESTS** the Commission, in collaboration with the AGN relevant initiatives such as AAI, Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) and Climate Commissions, with the support of relevant partners and stakeholders, to coordinate, support, monitor and report on the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions of Member States;
24. **ALSO REQUESTS** the Commission, in collaboration with the AGN, the Climate Commissions, AAI and AREI, to continue its efforts and support for Africa's preparations for COP25, and facilitate the continent's showcase of Africa's efforts to adapt to the impacts of climate change and on-going efforts to mitigate climate change;
25. **URGES** the Commission, in collaboration with Pan African Agencies, to organize an African Summit on Climate Change in 2020, prior to COP26, as the year 2020 is critical in the global climate change calendar;
26. **WELCOMES** the Leaders' participation and **NOTES** the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration;
27. **NOTES WITH APPRECIATION** the support provided by different African institutions and development partners, in particular AFDB, UNDP, UNEP, European Union and Germany, for the AGN and the Commission to enhance their engagement in the negotiations and other related processes;
28. **REQUESTS** the Commission to develop, in consultation with AMCEN, as appropriate, the rules of procedures for CAHOSCC to enhance effective operations of this High Level Committee for the consideration of the CAHOSCC at its next session;
29. **REQUESTS** Partners to support the Commission and the African Group of Negotiators at all levels in the implementation of this Decision.



AFRICAN UNION CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN (2022-2032)



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FOREWORD



H. E. Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta, CGH
*President of the Republic of Kenya and
Coordinator (2022-2024), Committee of the
African Heads of State and Government
on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)*

The realization of Africa's Agenda 2063 cannot be possible without proactive collective continental efforts aimed at addressing the impacts and encumbrances of climate change, which hampers our integration and development. There is sufficient scientific evidence – corroborated by the voices from diverse strata of our own communities – that Africa is bearing the brunt of climate change impacts, despite contributing less than 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and negligible historical responsibility. Our economies greatly rely on climate-sensitive sectors, which have great similarities across the continent. Increased frequency of climate related emergencies and conflicts across the continent continue to divert our meagre resources, hampering our overdue economic development. The message is clear – climate change is already significantly impacting Africa. We are the continent most vulnerable to climate change.

We also know that Africa has immense potential and capacity to innovate and adapt, to draw on our resilience, to prosper in the face of difficult circumstances. Endowed with rich and diverse culture and natural resources, with a youthful talented human resource base, Africa will emerge to be a global hub for climate change solutions.

Responding effectively to climate change is going to require deep collaboration. As a continent, we need to work together, and we must also build effective and meaningful partnerships with the broader international community. Much has already been achieved in this regard. The work of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment, the Africa Group of Negotiators, and countless other platforms and processes have supported coordination of our climate response and a consistent message to the broader international community. The core of that message is this: Africa is willing to play its part in the global response to climate change, but other parts of the world, particularly those most responsible for historical emissions, have a responsibility to assist us in our efforts. Africa's special needs and circumstances must be recognized and must inform climate support to our region. We need a quantum increase in climate finance and that finance must become easier to access. We need a greater focus on adaptation, including financing for adaptation. We need increasing ambition in emission reduction targets and a clear commitment to the full and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement.

The African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan is a key instrument in supporting regional collaboration on climate change and more effective international partnerships. It provides a framework for joint action and clearly expresses our needs and priorities. It will unlock Africa's potential in building climate-resilient communities and economies, which are an integral component of the continental vision for 'an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena'. We all now have a responsibility to ensure that this becomes a living document, one that informs and enriches our actions at local, regional and global levels.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'U. Kenyatta', written over a horizontal dotted line. The signature is fluid and cursive.

PREFACE



H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat
Chairperson
African Union Commission

Climate change is an existential threat to Africa's communities, ecosystems and economies. It places our developmental gains, our prosperity and the aspirations of Agenda 2063 in jeopardy. It is a critical issue that every African has to deal with on a daily basis, albeit in differentiated ways. We must respond, collectively and boldly, to the cross-scale challenges presented by climate change. Partnerships are critical to an effective African climate response, and such partnerships will need to span ministries, sectors, public and private divisions and across regional and national borders. We must work together, both within Africa and with our international partners, not only in addressing the threats posed by climate change, but also in leveraging the opportunities of a just, inclusive and equitable transition to an African green economy.

While informed and guided by the existing national climate efforts and aspirations of African Member States, this Strategy and Action Plan provides an outline for a harmonized and coordinated approach to respond to climate change, setting out common principles, priorities, and action areas for enhanced climate cooperation, strengthened adaptation capacity, and long term, equitable and transformative low-emission, climate-resilient development pathways for the continent. The Strategy is founded on core principles including

VISION

A sustainable, prosperous, equitable and climate-resilient Africa.

GOAL

To provide a continental framework for collective action and enhanced cooperation in addressing climate change issues that improves livelihoods and well-being, promotes adaptation capacity, and achieves low-emission, sustainable economic growth.

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

Building the resilience of African communities, ecosystems and economies, and supporting regional adaptation.

1

Strengthening the adaptive capacity of affected communities and managing the risks related to climate change.

2

Pursuing equitable and transformative low emission, climate-resilient development pathways.

3

Enhancing Africa's capacity to mobilise resources and improve access to and development of technology for ambitious climate action.

4

Enhancing inclusion, alignment, cooperation, and ownership of climate strategies, policies, programmes and plans across all spheres of government and stakeholder groupings.

African-led and African-owned innovation, social and cultural values, leveraging the continent's natural endowments, renewable energy potential, nature-based solutions, and transformative industrial pathways. A key principle that underpins the Strategy and Action


Plan is a core emphasis on a people-centred approach and equitable access for all citizens to green economic recovery and sustainable development. The Strategy and Action Plan highlights the importance of supporting the most vulnerable communities and groups in addressing their particular challenges in responding to climate impacts.

In addition, it acknowledges the importance of social inclusion, including the critical role that women and youth, and Indigenous People play as change agents in informing and driving climate responses at multiple levels. In order to promote an inclusive and ambitious climate approach, the Strategy and Action Plan seeks to enhance collective development, broad-based participation, implementation, and monitoring by providing a consolidated framework around which partnerships can be built with state and non-state actors.



Guiding Principles

1. A People Centred Approach
2. Conserving and restoring natural capital
3. Aligning plans and priorities
4. Leave no one behind/a just transition
5. Evidence and practice
6. African-led and African-owned
7. Whole of economy approach
8. Intersectionality
9. Common but differentiated approach



Support for the implementation of this Strategy and its Action Plan from regional economic communities, member states, citizens at large, and local and international partners, is key to achieving the climate goals of the continent over the next ten years.



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Strategic alignment



Josefa Leonel Correia Sacko

Commissioner

*Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment
African Union Commission*

2. Supporting renewable energy, energy efficiency and national Just Transition programmes.
3. Nature-based solutions and focus on biodiversity through work on sustainable land management, forestry, oceans, and ecotourism.
4. Resilient agriculture, by focusing on inclusive economic development and green jobs; and
5. Green and resilient cities, including a focus on water (flooding and water resources) and enhancing information, communication and technology.

The alignment between the Green Recovery Action Plan and Africa's Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy is clear. In responding to the daunting challenges, we face, we have an opportunity to reassess and redesign our systems and put ourselves on a path towards sustainability. We must embrace this opportunity; we must recognize that time is not on our side. The health of our environment and the flourishing of our communities and our economies are inseparable. As the Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy highlights, the growth Africa has experienced over the past decades has largely been driven by climate-sensitive sectors, including service sectors (such as tourism and hospitality, real estate, banking and transport), energy, industry and agriculture; as well as the blue economy. The Strategy also speaks to the role of climate change as a potential threat multiplier in the context of conflict and human security. Our response to climate change is therefore central to our ability to realise our continental vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global region. As we launch this Strategy, the real work begins. Let us all work together to make our climate and resilient development ambitions a reality.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of the international system. We have seen the vulnerabilities that emerge from that interconnectedness, but we have also seen the potential for collaboration and shared solutions. Our environmental challenges, including climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are similarly intertwined, and are in turn also linked to social and economic challenges. As Africa strives towards sustainable and resilient food systems, blue economies, cities and rural communities, as we strive to protect and restore the natural ecosystems on which our livelihoods and our economies rely, decisive action on climate change is fundamental.

On 15 July 2021 the African Union launched our continental Green Recovery Action Plan, which focuses on five priority areas:

1. Climate finance, including increasing flows, efficiency, and impact of funding.

ACRONYMS

AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area	IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
AfDB	African Development Bank	IPP	Independent Power Producer
AGN	African Group of Negotiators	LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
AIP	Africa Investment Programme	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment	MDG	Madagascar
ARBE	Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment	MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
AU	African Union	MRV	Measure, Report and Verify
AUC	African Union Commission	MW	Megawatt
AUDA-NEPAD	African Union Development Agency – New Partnership for Africa's Development	NAP	National Adaptation Plan
AUPSA	African Union Peace and Security Architecture	NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme	NEAF	North East Africa
CAF	Central Africa	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
CAHOSCC	Committee of African Heads of State on Climate Change	NIS	National Innovation System
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity	NMHS	National Meteorological and Hydrological Services
CDR	Carbon Dioxide Removal	PA	Protected Area
CIS	Climate Information Services	PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development
COP	Conference of the Parties	RCP	Representative Concentration Pathway
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	RECs	Regional Economic Communities
EbA	Ecosystem-based Adaptation	SAH	Sahara
ESAF	East Southern Africa	SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund
ESG	Environmental, Social and Governance	SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
GCF	Green Climate Fund	SEAF	South East Africa
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	TNA	Technology Needs Assessment
GEF	Global Environment Facility	UN	United Nations
GI	Green Infrastructure	UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
GHG	Greenhouse Gas	UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
GW	Gigawatt	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
GWL	Global Warming Level	UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Ha	Hectares	WAF	Western Africa
ICLEI	Local Governments for Sustainability	WEF	Water, Energy, Food
ICT	Information and Communications Technology	WMO	World Meteorological Organization
		WSAF	West Southern Africa

1 | AFRICAN UNION CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN (2022-2032)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Africa Union's Agenda 2063 makes it clear that climate-resilient communities and economies are an integral component of the continental vision for an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena. This African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032) supports the realization of this vision by setting out principles, priorities and action areas for enhanced climate cooperation and long term, climate-resilient development. The Strategy provides an outline for harmonized and coordinated actions to respond to the impacts of climate change, thereby supporting planning for the continent's low-emission future. The Strategy defines the main parameters and priorities in building African resilient capacities for adaptation and exploiting the benefits of the mitigation potential of the continent. It seeks to ensure that institutions, strategies, and decisions for climate risk management and climate-resilient development are integrated and implemented as a central aspect of achieving sustainable development, as framed by Agenda 2063 and the United Nations' Agenda 2030.

The Strategy builds on the continent's commitment to ensuring an effective multilateral approach to addressing climate change through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement adopted thereunder, while emphasizing equitable access to sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of African countries.

Through a focus on strengthening adaptation and resilience building of Member States across the continent, the Strategy identifies key priority areas, interventions, and actions to reduce the vulnerability of affected communities and manage the risks related to climate change and climate-induced extreme events. These key priority areas include enhanced governance and institutional collaboration with a wide range of state and non-state actors, policy coherence and enhanced climate knowledge systems, as well as anticipatory planning. The Strategy also seeks to enhance Africa's capacity to respond to climate impacts through the mobilisation of domestic and international financial resources, enhancing access to technology and innovation, and developing safety nets for loss and damage

In order to pursue low-emission, climate-resilient growth pathways across various sectors and systems, this Strategy highlights key principles of the green and

circular economy, as well as innovation, sustainable development, poverty reduction and job creation. These pathways are aligned with Africa's green recovery efforts and provide opportunities to catalyse socio-economic transformation on the continent towards a resource efficient, environmentally sustainable, climate-resilient, and more equitable society.

The Strategy supports the commitments made by African countries under the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Agreement and is guided by the existing national climate efforts and aspirations of its 55 Member States, as expressed through Nationally Determined Contributions, National Adaptation Plans and long-term, climate-resilient development and decarbonization visions contained in national Long-Term Strategies. It is recognized that each Member State will direct their climate response in a self-determined manner, based on their unique national circumstances and capacities. While recognising differences in national contexts and circumstances, this Strategy builds upon the shared challenges and opportunities for the continent, encouraging African-led and African owned innovation, social and cultural values, and leveraging of nature-based solutions.

The Strategy aims to enhance inclusion, alignment, cooperation, and ownership across all spheres of government and stakeholder groupings. The Strategy highlights the importance of supporting the most vulnerable communities and groups. It recognizes that women and the youth face particular challenges in responding to climate impacts, but also acknowledges and seeks to support the critical role that they play as change agents driving climate responses at local, national, sub-regional and continental levels.

To promote an inclusive climate approach, this Strategy seeks to enhance collective development, participation, implementation, and monitoring. In particular, the Strategy provides a consolidated platform around which partnerships can be built with non-governmental and civil society organizations, as well as the private sector.

This Strategy was developed with the technical and financial support from the following institutions:

Accelerating Impacts of CGIAR Climate Research for Africa (AICCRA), the European Union (EU), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the Netherlands Red Cross, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and Sweden

01

INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE

Climate change poses unprecedented challenges to the survival of humans, animals, plant life and ecosystems. It threatens social and economic systems, while putting development gains at risk. Relief programmes and other responses to disasters may require countries to redirect limited resources intended for other development priorities. Despite Africa having contributed less than 4% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it is one of the regions that are most vulnerable to climate variability and change. This is due to the continent's biophysical makeup as well as numerous socio-economic vulnerabilities – including a high dependence on rain-fed agriculture (and natural resource-based sectors broadly), a lack of alternative livelihood support, widespread poverty and inequality, weak adaptive capacity, low levels of education, and inequitable access to financial resources, credit, markets, and climate information services (CIS).

Even as Africa grapples with the impacts of climate change, agricultural production will need to increase by approximately 50% by 2050 to meet the needs of the region's growing population. Cities need to provide services to ever greater numbers of urban residents and massive investments are needed to address infrastructure backlogs. It is therefore urgent for the continent to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and mainstream climate action into its broader social and economic development activities.

The average growth of Africa's economy between 2002 and 2018 was 3.37%. This was largely driven by climate-sensitive sectors – including service sectors (such as tourism and hospitality, real estate, banking and transport), energy, industry and agriculture; as well as the blue economy. It is therefore important for Africa to climate-proof these primary growth sectors and develop plans to ensure that the region's broader development objectives are attained.

The African Union's (AU's) 55 Member States collectively have an estimated population of over 1.2 billion people, making it the eleventh largest economy in the world, with a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of about US\$2.263 trillion. The African population is the youngest in the world and the continent is set to be the most populous by 2023.

Since climatic and ecological regions cut across national political boundaries, a continental, trans-boundary response is important in the formulation and implementation of climate change responses. It's within this context that the region, through the African Union Commission (AUC), has developed this 10-year, African Union Climate Change and Resilient

Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032). This Strategy provides a broad outline for harmonised and coordinated actions to respond to the impacts of climate change, as well as to plan for the continent's low-emission, climate-resilient future.

The Strategy defines the main parameters and priorities to build African-resilient capacities for adapting to climate change and exploiting the benefits of the mitigation potential of the continent. It seeks to ensure that institutions, strategies and decisions for climate-risk management and climate-resilient development are identified, implemented and sustained as an integrated part of achieving sustainable development as framed by the AU's Agenda 2063 and the United Nations (UN) Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development.

This Strategy supports the commitments made by African countries under the 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Agreement and is guided by the existing national climate efforts and aspirations of its 55 Member States, as expressed through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and long-term, climate-resilient development and decarbonization visions contained in member countries' Long-Term Strategies (2050). The continent consists of diverse landscapes, ecosystems and weather systems, which are impacted differently by climate change. It is recognised that each Member State will respond in a self-determined manner to the impacts they experience, based on their unique national circumstances, the views of their citizens (including young people), and capacities to respond. While recognising differences in national contexts and circumstances, this Strategy builds upon the shared challenges and opportunities for the continent.

Agenda 2063 expresses a vision for the continent's future as an 'integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in international fora'. Agenda 2063 emphasises that the achievement of climate-resilient economies and communities is an integral part of this vision and commits the region to play its part in supporting global climate action. The development visions and commitments expressed in Agenda 2063 therefore form the basis of the Strategy.

The Strategy is also aligned with several global frameworks, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the UN Convention for Biological Diversity and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. It is also aligned with existing regional protocols, policies and strategies that govern key sectoral and thematic actions

of relevance to the region's climate response. This includes continental frameworks such as the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa initiative, the AU's Green Recovery Action Plan, and many others. The Strategy further builds on existing work under various initiatives, including – but not limited to – the Africa Adaptation Initiative, the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, the Africa Blue Economy Strategy, the Pan-African Action Agenda on Ecosystem Restoration for Increased Resilience, the Great Green Wall Initiative, the Climate for Development in Africa Programme, and the three regional Climate Commissions (the African Island States, the Congo Basin, and the Sahel). (See **Appendix 2** for a more comprehensive list of strategies and protocols). It also seeks to complement and support the climate strategies and green growth plans of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

The Strategy provides a robust framework for ensuring climate justice for Africa through inclusive and equitable participation in climate action and climate-resilient development pathways. The Strategy engages with the disproportionate impacts of climate change on youth and women. A consolidated platform is provided around which partnerships can be built with non-governmental and civil society organizations, as well as the private sector. These stakeholders are also needed to advocate for the continent's adaptation capacity, champion Africa's needs and priorities, and play an important support role for the implementation of actions and the monitoring of the Strategy's outcomes.

Future planning for climate-resilient development will require strategic interventions and actions that consider multiple trends, drivers and uncertainties throughout the continent. It will necessitate the strengthening of governance systems and policy responses to enhance climate-resilient development. This includes planning tools that can help Member States to develop and implement policies to address both current and longer-term existential threats and assist governments to move away from reactive crisis-management approaches to dealing with climate risks. These anticipatory practices can help the region to manage and plan for future risks – and ultimately, to better protect vulnerable people and their livelihoods.

The Strategy can also assist Africa to take advantage of opportunities related to the transition to a low-emission green economy and green recovery efforts. Africa should embrace opportunities to catalyse



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socio-economic transformation towards a resource-efficient, environmentally sustainable, climate-resilient, and more equitable society. This can improve human well-being and economic growth over the long term, while mitigating the exposure of future generations to significant environmental risks and ecological scarcities.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that Africa will need investment of over US\$3 trillion in mitigation and adaptation by 2030 to effectively implement its NDCs. While the Africa region has been consistent in its call for developed countries to support developing regions in addressing the financing, technology transfer and capacity building needs related to ambitious climate action, there is also a need for enhanced domestic resource mobilization and capacity development in support of African-led and African-owned climate responses.

The Strategy seeks to build the continent's capacity to utilise new evidence and knowledge that influences global discussions and agreements. It also addresses the means needed to tackle the implementation of climate policies and plans – including finance, insurance mechanisms, technology and inclusive partnerships. Monitoring and evaluation will be an integral component of the Strategy to allow for it to be adequately tracked and implemented.

The Committee of African Heads of State on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) was established in 2009 by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government to

spearhead the African common position on climate change and ensure that Africa speaks with one voice in global climate-change negotiations. The African common position, which evolves in response to the progress of the negotiations and changing circumstances on the continent, is achieved through sustained consultations at the national, REC and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN)-levels. The outcome of these consultations is tabled for approval by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and endorsed by the CAHOSCC. This is the position that guides the AGN members in their engagement at the UNFCCC across its mechanisms, bodies and panels. (For more information on the AU organs and decision-making structures, please see **Appendix 1**.)

A well-orchestrated and coordinated African agenda on climate change with common targets, indicators and milestones is key for a stronger climate change response and voice. This Strategy will help to determine Africa's common priorities, and it is key to guiding the AGN positions. It will also help to streamline approaches in implementing climate action – bringing about synergies, efficiencies and economies of scale.

This requires visionary leadership and partnerships that enable Africa to speak with one voice – which will strengthen its international presence, its negotiating power and the attainment of its climate change goals.

02

STRATEGIC FRAMING



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This Strategy is a 10-year strategic planning document that defines the main priorities, intervention areas and action areas required to build resilient capacities for adaptation – and to unlock the benefits of the mitigation potential of the continent. It is designed as a living document to keep pace with the latest science, technological advancements and other global, continental, sub-regional and national developments. As such, the Strategy will be revised every five years.

In realization of a shared vision for a prosperous, secure, inclusive and innovative future for Africa, the Strategy builds on the continent's commitment to ensuring an effective multilateral approach to addressing climate change through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement adopted thereunder, while emphasizing equitable access to sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of African countries. The Strategy outlines priority areas, sector-based interventions and actions for adaptation. While prioritising adaptation, the Strategy recognizes the opportunities of adopting low-emission development pathways to develop green industrialisation and skills, and to position the continent strategically in terms of emerging economic, regulatory and technological trends.

This Strategy seeks to enhance the adaptive capacities of Member States. It further seeks to promote low-emission growth pathways aligned with the 1.5 degree Paris Agreement goal, and shaped by the principles of the green and circular economy, sustainable development, and poverty reduction. The Strategy also seeks to and orient governance, knowledge systems, planning, and national/regional/international structures to addressing climate change as a development imperative.

2.1 Vision

A sustainable, prosperous, equitable and climate-resilient Africa.

2.2 Goal

To provide a continental framework for collective action and enhanced cooperation in addressing climate change issues that improves livelihoods and well-being, promotes adaptation capacity, and achieves low-emission, sustainable economic growth.

2.3 Overall Objective

Building the resilience of African communities, ecosystems and economies, and supporting regional adaptation.

2.4 Specific Objectives

1. Strengthening the adaptive capacity of affected communities and managing the risks related to climate change.
2. Pursuing equitable and transformative low-emission, climate-resilient development pathways.
3. Enhancing Africa's capacity to mobilise resources and improve access to and development of technology for ambitious climate action.
4. Enhancing inclusion, alignment, cooperation, and ownership of climate strategies, policies, programmes and plans across all spheres of government and stakeholder groupings.

2.5 Strategic Intervention Axes

The Strategy's objectives will be achieved by concentrating on four main strategic intervention axes, namely:

- **Strategic Intervention Axis 1:** Strengthening Policy and Governance
- **Strategic Intervention Axis 2:** Adopting Pathways towards Transformative Climate-Resilient Development
- **Strategic Intervention Axis 3:** Enhancing the Means of Implementation towards Climate-Resilient, Low-Emission Development, Including through Climate Finance
- **Strategic Intervention Axis 4:** Leveraging Regional Flagship Initiatives

Under Strategic Intervention Axis 1 – 'Strengthening Policy and Governance', – the Strategy highlights five key policy and governance interventions areas and associated actions that are needed to pursue climate-resilient development. These include:

1. Enhanced climate policy, inclusive, multi-scalar governance and institutional coordination
2. Coordinated regional climate action
3. Anticipatory governance and long-term planning
4. Enhance climate information services
5. Improved climate literacy and awareness; and,
6. Governance solutions to address the climate-conflict nexus.

Strategic Intervention Area 2 – 'Adopting Pathways towards Transformative Climate-Resilient Development' identifies key systems transitions that must be achieved to address climate change, move towards a resilient and low-emission future, and support ecosystems and

biodiversity. These systems face significant climate change impacts as well, making adaptation action critical across all eight areas. These systems are also critical to achieving a countries broader development goals. They require participation and collective action from the public and private sector to reduce the trajectory of emissions and limit climate vulnerabilities, but also to unlock major economic opportunities and create new markets and jobs. Interventions that support these key transitions will need to consider macroeconomic and fiscal impacts, in addition to managing social and labour impacts.

Drawing on the UNFCCC Climate Action Pathways, This Strategy identifies eight cross-sectoral opportunities that are essential for achieving climate-resilient development pathways and accomplishing the SDGs. It provides recommended interventions and actions for each priority area:

1. Transforming food systems
2. Protecting land-based ecosystems
3. Transforming energy systems
4. Transforming mobility and transport
5. Enhancing inclusive, low-emission industrialisation
6. Transforming water systems
7. Transforming the blue economy
8. Digital transformation
9. Resilience urban centres

The Strategy also requires key areas for intervention support. **Strategic Intervention Axis 3 – 'Enhancing the Means of Implementation towards Climate-Resilient, Low-Emission Development, Including through Climate Finance'** – is centred on the following key priorities:

1. Climate finance and resource mobilization
2. Promoting safety mechanisms for loss and damage
3. Technological development and transfer
4. Inclusive participation of marginalised and vulnerable groupings, especially women and youth
5. Capacity development

The Strategy also includes **Strategic Intervention Axis 4 – 'Leveraging Regional Flagship Initiatives'**. This section highlights African programmes and flagship initiatives that work towards climate resilience through generating political buy in for collective action, serving as the foundation for partnerships, facilitating information exchange, and mobilizing domestic and international resources. These initiatives address many of the themes outlined in the preceding axes, including food systems, climate information services and energy.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning has also been incorporated to allow for tracking and measuring the successful implementation of the Strategy.



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2.6 Guiding Principles

The Africa Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan is guided by seven fundamental principles that drive the African Union and Member States' work across all sectors:

- 1. A people-centred approach:** People must benefit from the transition to a low-emission and resilient future. They are at the centre of climate action and need support to manage the transition and changes that accompany climate-focused policies. A people-centred approach is essential for the political feasibility of climate action – and to ensure that gains and losses from the transition to a low-emission, resilient economy are shared equitably. This approach requires citizen engagement and participatory processes that consider diverse viewpoints – including gender and youth. Given the strong interest that young people have in their futures, it is essential that young people are consulted and able to provide direction to climate action plans at national and regional levels. The Strategy will ensure that gender- and youth-sensitive approaches are central to driving climate action on the ground, as well as supporting the strengthening of social protection programmes. This includes job training, retraining and education initiatives that assist people to develop livelihoods and adapt to climate change. To promote a people-centred approach, the Strategy must be owned and driven by the inclusion of stakeholders and partners. This is best achieved through the collective development and implementation of the Strategy – guided by multilevel stakeholder participation and multi-sectoral engagement. To encourage stakeholder support, a public participation process to promote awareness of and engagement with this strategy at REC and Member State level is strongly encouraged. This includes engagement with development banks, international organizations, monetary and financial institutions, the private sector, think tanks and civil society organizations.
- 2. Conserving and restoring ecosystems:** Healthy ecosystems are critical to addressing climate change in Africa. Conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystem services can contribute significantly to both mitigation and adaptation, while simultaneously producing multiple socio-economic co-benefits. Scaling up investments to strengthen and expand the waste value chain, including addressing marine plastics and land pollution, is critical to generating a sustainable circular economy. Deployment of technology, including fintech, can realise possibilities for rewarding farmers and local communities for stewarding and protecting ecosystems.

3. **Aligning plans and priorities:** The alignment of existing development plans and existing national development priorities within fiscal budgetary planning processes is recommended. This should be guided by frameworks such as Agenda 2063, the SDGs and post-COVID recovery plans. Co-benefits with these agenda should be promoted.
4. **Leave no one behind/a just transition:** The Strategy must address issues related to equity and justice, given that climate change has the potential to exacerbate current inequality throughout the continent. This includes procedural, distributional and recognition justice, especially in relation to who is most vulnerable, where the burden of adaptation lies, and how to mobilise resources for adaptation.
5. **Common but differentiated responsibilities:** The Strategy reflects the need for ambitious climate action in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.
6. **Intersectionality:** The Strategy recognizes that vulnerabilities overlap in multiple ways (climate, gender, poverty, age groups, etc.) and supports comprehensive, integrated responses to resilience-building.
7. **Evidence and practice:** The Strategy must continue to draw on the best available science, knowledge and practice within the international, regional and national context. This should be based on existing experiences, climate science and traditional knowledge and practices.
8. **African-led and African-owned:** Built on the foundations of Agenda 2063, the continent must generate its own dynamic scientific, technological and entrepreneurial capability, and innovate new, predictable and sustainable sources of funding for its response to climate change that includes Africa's social and cultural values and natural capital endowments.
9. **Whole of economy approach:** Integrated, cross-sectoral and holistic manner throughout national and regional economic planning. The Strategy considers and integrates a systems approach to climate change sectors.

2.7 Beneficiaries/Stakeholders

The success of this Strategy is highly dependent on the active commitment and involvement of the main beneficiaries and stakeholders in its development and implementation. These players involve government institutions, individuals, social international organizations,

funding agencies, etc. It is important that the Strategy helps to clarify the mandate, role and responsibility of each organization, particularly as it relates to the Strategy.

They include, but are not limited to, the following:

- The AUC
- Regional institutions such as the AfDB, the African Union Development Agency-New Partnership for Africa's Development (AUDA-NEPAD), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
- AU technical and negotiating structure such as AMCEN, AGN, CAHOSCC
- RECs
- Heads of State of the 55 AU Member States
- Technical institutions responsible for implementing actions
- National policy institutions
- National scientific and meteorological institutions
- Health institutions
- National and regional research centres
- Non-governmental organizations
- Public and private sector entities
- Women's organizations
- Youth groups
- Farmer groups
- Communities and citizens
- International organizations, including UN agencies
- Technical collaborators
- Development partners
- Financial institutions.

2.8 Methodology

Appendix 3 illustrates the regional stakeholder and outreach meetings hosted by the African Union Commission in collaboration with UNECA on the Strategy. Extensive feedback was received from key stakeholders from various RECs, academia, UN agencies and civil society organizations. These comments and recommendations have been incorporated to produce a more detailed draft of the Strategy. Multiple sectoral experts were also directly approached for their specific input. Please see a list of contributors in **Appendix 4** of this document.



03

CONTEXT AND JUSTIFICATION

3.1 Africa's Climatic Change Conditions and Vulnerability

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report (2021) indicates that it is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land and that widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred. The average global temperatures for the past five years were the highest on record.

The future annual global mean near-surface temperature is likely to be at least 1°C warmer than pre-industrial levels each year over 2021-2025. Global warming levels (GWLs) of 1.5°C and 2°C will be exceeded during the 21st century. The IPCC AR6 Working Group I report further states that the 1.5°C and 2°C thresholds can only be avoided if deep cuts in carbon dioxide emissions are made rapidly (in the 2020's) and that net-zero emissions are reached by 2050. Moreover, global surface temperatures will continue to increase until at least the mid-century – under

all emissions scenarios considered. As the warming continues, an increase in the frequency and intensity of hot extremes, marine heatwaves and heavy precipitation is projected, as well as agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions and reductions in Arctic sea ice.

Africa is the driest of the world's continents, with 45% of its land mass consisting of drylands and 50% of the population living in arid, semi-arid, dry, sub-humid and hyper-arid areas. It is forecasted that climate change-

induced water stress could affect up to 700 million people in arid and semi-arid areas. The impacts of climate change add to the already difficult water management challenges in arid and semi-arid regions. Since 1797, the number of extreme hot days in Africa have increased sevenfold. The continent is projected to see an increase in average temperatures and hot extremes, and will likely experience drier conditions, with the exception of the Sahara and East Africa. Alarmingly, it is likely that surface temperatures in Africa will rise faster than the global average, particularly in more arid regions. Warming between 0.5°C and 2.5°C (relative to the 20th century mean) is projected by mid-century for Africa under all scenarios. Under medium scenarios, it is very likely that warming will stay below 2°C. Under high scenarios, all African regions will very likely experience warming greater than 3°C by the end of the century. Africa is likely to experience an increase in droughts in several regions. Heavy precipitation events and associated flooding are projected to increase in frequency and intensity almost everywhere in Africa.

The African continent is characterised by different climatic regimes, ranging from extremely arid to very humid conditions that remain highly variable and unpredictable. The IPCC divides the African continent into nine regions: Sahara (SAH), Mediterranean (North Africa), Western Africa (WAF), Central Africa (CAF), Northern East Africa (NEAF), Southern East Africa (SEAF), Western Southern Africa (WSAF), Eastern Southern Africa (ESAF) and Madagascar (MDG).



Temperature

A substantial increase in the magnitude of heat waves is projected for most of Africa, with potential effects for health and agriculture. For 2°C global warming (and under RCP8.5), mortality-related heat stress and deadly temperatures are projected to become more frequent in the future. This is particularly the case for equatorial regions where heat occurs with higher humidity levels. North Africa, the Sahel, and Southern Africa will experience the largest increase in heat stress.

Under 1.5°C and 2°C GWL, regional models project a substantial increase in hydrological drought affecting the West African basin. Given that global models disagree, confidence in these projections is however low. An increase in agricultural and ecological drought at 2°C GWL is projected for North Africa, WSAF, ESAF and MDG, and generally rises for higher emission scenarios. Southern Africa has been identified as a drought 'hottest spot' in Africa. Weather conducive to wildfires is also projected to increase in North and Southern Africa before the middle of the century.

Southern Africa has been identified as a drought 'hottest spot' in Africa. Southern Africa is likely to become generally drier, and reductions in precipitation can already be detected. Moreover, periods of drought will occur more frequently at 1.5 °C of global warming, and more so as the level of global warming increases. The region is warming at twice the global rate. Further strong regional warming with associated increases in heat-wave events will continue to occur as global warming continues. This points towards significant future challenges in terms of adaptation in the region.

Cold spells and low temperatures will decrease in West, Central and East Africa.

Precipitation

Total precipitation is projected to decrease in the northern and southern regions of Africa, while West and East Africa have a west-to-east pattern of decreasing-to-increasing precipitation. Most African regions are going to experience an increase in heavy precipitation

events that could lead to pluvial flooding. Under 1.5°C and 2°C global warming, West and Central Africa, in particular, are projected to experience an increase in the intensity of extreme precipitation, threatening widespread flood occurrences before, during and after the mature monsoon season. For 2°C GWL, extreme precipitation is also projected to increase in several other regions – including SAH, NEAF, SEAF, ESAF and MDG.

Projected declines in precipitation and soil moisture indicate an increase in aridity over the 21st century for NAF, WSAF, ESAF and MDG, with low confidence for other regions. A growing number of studies indicate expanding aridity in East and West Africa.

West African Monsoon

Monsoon precipitation is projected to increase over the central Sahel and decrease over the far western Sahel. The monsoon season is projected to have a delayed onset and delayed response.

Wind and storms

By mid-century, there is high confidence of a decrease in windspeed and wind energy potential for North Africa, and medium confidence in increases for South and West Africa. Tropical cyclones making landfall are projected to decrease in frequency in eastern parts of the continent, and overall there is medium confidence that there will be a general increase in their intensity.

Coastal and oceanic

Coastal- and ocean-related hazards will increase over the 21st century. Relative sea level rise will contribute to increased coastal flooding in low lying areas and shoreline retreat will occur along most sandy coasts. Median shoreline change projections relative to 2010, under RCP4.5, show that shorelines in Africa will retreat by between 30m (SAH, NEAF, WSAF, ESAF, MDG) and 55m by mid-century (WAF and CAF). By 2100, marine heatwaves will increase around Africa, with a hotspot of around 2°C (5°C) along the 24 coastlines of South Africa under RCP4.5 (RCP8.5).

3.2 Africa's Socio-Economic and Development Context and Climate Change

The IPCC defines climate vulnerability as the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse impacts. Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents due to its high exposure and low adaptive capacity. The continent's peculiar vulnerability is caused by the effects of multiple stressors – notably by low adaptation and mitigation capacities, fuelled by scant finance and investments. The UN State of the Climate in Africa (2019) report shows that there are increasing climate change threats for ecosystems, biodiversity, human health, food and water security and socio-economic development in Africa due to climate hazards such as increasing temperatures, rising sea levels, extended dry seasons, changing precipitation patterns and more extreme weather events. Improving the continent's climate resilience is key to unlocking its development potential. Climate change is estimated to cost the region US\$40 billion each year to 2030.

Globally, economic systems are growing in fragility, as increased sectoral co-dependence and the quest for increasing efficiencies lays them open to rapidly propagating shocks. The COVID-19 pandemic is an example of an unexpected and unprecedented event, with impacts cascading across national borders. As is typically the case, the impacts have been felt most strongly by those with the lowest levels of wealth and resilience.

Africa's development context is defined by many factors in addition to a warming climate. With respect to **demographics**, the continent is expected to experience the highest rate of population growth globally in the coming decades, although there is considerable range in the level of projected increase, depending particularly on changes in total fertility rate. The population increase could be between 50-300%, depending on the assumptions used. All scenarios see a substantial **youth bulge** up to mid-century and beyond. Africa's **urban population** is projected to expand threefold from 360 million in 2015 to 1.137 billion by 2050, with 55% of the continent's population living in urban areas by mid-century. Increased urbanization, along with slowly rising incomes, will continue to drive **dietary transitions** to increased consumption of highly refined food high in calories and fat, while for rural and poor groups, high levels of food insecurity and nutritional deficits are likely to remain. Africa in general is squeezed by a **double burden of health risks**: on the one hand, undernutrition and stunting – as well as high vulnerability to communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria; and on the other, inadequate diets leading to obesity and a surge in non-communicable diseases. Although great strides have been made in reducing **food insecurity** in recent

decades, there have been increases in the number of food insecure people in Africa since 2018.

Gender inequality, with women having less political, social and economic power than men, continues to be a major challenge in Africa, which is the least gender-equal of all regions of the globe, according to the 2019 SDG Gender Index – though some improvements have been achieved with participation in political representation and schooling for females. Africa has made some progress in achieving universal access to primary school **education**, with 70% of school-aged children enrolled, though drop-out rates are over 10% in most countries and secondary and tertiary school enrolment levels are low: typically 50% in lower secondary, 30% in upper secondary and under 15% in tertiary for most countries.

Africa continues to see high and persistent levels of **extreme poverty**, with significantly higher levels in rural areas. In general, low levels of **economic growth** and high levels of inequality in access to key productive assets inhibit successful and broad poverty reduction. The systems of **land tenure** are highly diverse across the continent, but customary systems are important for most. More transparent and equitable land tenure systems, that allow greater access and security of women to land, are needed. More than 90% of farms in Africa are less than five hectares in size; although in some regions there is growth in medium sized farms, the small farm sector and some of the pastoral lands are seeing increasing **fragmentation**. The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP is highly variable across the continent, though its often the most important sector for employment. Increasing **youth unemployment** is a major challenge, along with increasing **food prices**, despite increased food imports and some expansion of food production. **Land degradation** remains a major constraint to raising the continent's agricultural productivity, owing to poor soils, reduced fallows, and nutrient mining. Much of Africa is characterized by low levels of **energy access**, particularly in rural areas. Energy demand is projected to grow rapidly to mid-century due to growth of the industrial sector, which creates opportunities for the expansion of energy production from decentralized and renewable sources, particularly wind, hydro and solar.

These are serious challenges, but at the same time, opportunities abound – in two realms in particular: innovation and localization. Some argue we are in The Great Acceleration, an era of unprecedented and increasingly rapid socio-economic and earth system changes, and this includes the rate of technological change. Transformation of energy and food systems offers a host of potential entry points for effective poverty

reduction strategies based on innovation bundles and appropriate enabling conditions. There are already African examples in the domain of information and communications technology, for example. Innovation can be fostered and accelerated by broadening participation in innovation dialogues, novel financing of discovery for open-source innovation, and reforms of intellectual property regimes that can impede affordable access to and adaptation of new discoveries. For food systems, transformative change can be driven by behavioural and dietary changes that in many places are already underway, moving from calorie-rich but nutrient-poor diets with high costs to human health and the environment, to more environmentally sustainable food systems that could reduce the social burdens and economic costs of malnutrition and associated non-communicable diseases. At the same time, geopolitical shifts are discernible, and these give pause to notions of a global future characterised by ever more liberal trade (consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also geopolitical implications of climate change and more frequent environmental disasters). This offers considerable opportunities for sustainable local and regional food systems to develop and meet the burgeoning demand of growing, increasingly youthful populations.

Business as usual is not an option; and the future is increasingly unlikely to be a predictable extrapolation of the past. By embracing the energy transition and green economy skills and technologies, Africa can position itself strategically within the global economy to support its vision of a prosperous, equitable continent that represents a dynamic force in the international arena.

Green recovery and COVID-19

Within this context, COVID-19 represents the biggest global economic shock since The Great Depression and has hit Africa particularly hard due to existing vulnerabilities. The World Bank estimates that an additional 23 million people will be pushed into extreme poverty and 20 million jobs could disappear, costing Africa up to US\$500 billion in revenue. Food insecurity and debt are rising, and hard-won development gains are being lost. Many countries entered the COVID-19 crisis with significantly greater debt vulnerabilities than they had at the start of the global financial crisis. In the years leading up to COVID-19, the composition of debt held by many African countries shifted away from traditional multilateral and concessional lending to both non-Paris Club official creditors – including China, Gulf States and India – and privately held, non-concessional loans. In addition, levels of debt held by African countries also increased over this time, averaging debt-to-GDP ratios of above 50%, with several outliers having ratios in excess of 100%.

Before the pandemic, the majority of African countries had fiscal deficits in excess of 3%. Post COVID-19, the debt situation has resulted in a lack of fiscal space for Africa to simultaneously respond to the pandemic, build resilience to climate change, and get back on track to achieve the SDGs in this Decade of Action.

The United Nations Secretary-General's policy brief on the impact of the pandemic in Africa recognises that, in addition to the health impact, indirect consequences such as food insecurity, a lack of medical supplies, loss of income and livelihoods, looming debt crises, as well as related security and political risks will be significant. As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolds globally and in Africa, the situation remains fluid and rapidly evolving, and urgent responses, interventions, measures and responses are required. It calls for increased agility and heightened responsiveness from African states and other agencies to intervene and contribute positively in a timely and meaningful manner. There is a need to seize the opportunities in the recovery from the pandemic to support the transformation of the continent towards a more inclusive and sustainable future. As such, the recovery from COVID-19 is an important opportunity to deliver cleaner, healthier, more resilient and more inclusive economies and societies, accelerating progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Health

Human health will be negatively affected by climate change and its impacts, which can modify the transmission of diseases such as cholera, malaria meningitis, and zoonotic diseases such as Ebola and coronaviruses. The death rate from climate change is 60 to 80% higher in Africa than it is in the next most vulnerable region (Southeast Asia) due to pre-existing vulnerabilities and the weakened ability of Africa to adapt to the impacts of climate change. These results imply that there will be up to 70,000 additional deaths in Africa by 2030 because of climate change, with malaria and diarrhoea responsible for the largest proportions of these deaths. Furthermore, climate change-induced floods and cyclones can lead to contamination of water supplies, increasing the prevalence of vector-borne diseases. The health of animals and other plants that humans depend on is not spared as they are also impacted by climate change in ways that are still yet to be fully understood.

The COVID-19 pandemic has also highlighted the inextricable link between human health and the health of the environment. Recent research suggests that the emergence of new human diseases is closely linked to

loss and degradation of ecosystems and habitats, which in turn is driven by climate change, resource extraction, urban and agricultural expansion and pollution. Finally, it should be recognised that transitioning to renewable energy sources has direct health benefits in terms of air quality. Combustion fuels like coal, oil and natural gas release pollutants that lead to widespread respiratory disorders, the exacerbation of asthma and other severe health implications. Atmospheric pollutants from the increasing rate of open burning of waste are also contributing to the rise in respiratory infection and cardiovascular diseases in African urban centres, in addition to contributing to climate change through the release of short-lived climate pollutants. Replacing biomass (wood and charcoal) as a cooking and heating source with solar cookers and electric-powered appliances (which can be powered by renewable sources) will also have significant direct positive health impacts.

Climate, conflict, movement and human security

Changes in climate, demography and urbanization are rapidly changing Africa's security landscape. By 2050, parts of Africa will become hotter and more arid while others will become increasingly more prone to flooding, rising sea levels, and related natural disasters. This may continue to increase international migration and see levels of internally displaced persons grow, while also creating competition for resources. Over the next decade, the continent's proportion of people of working age is projected to increase sharply and new entrants to the job market may find it increasingly difficult to gain employment. Increased urbanization and internal displacement will cause a rise in the number of urban dwellers living in slums. In this context, a lack of service delivery, unemployment and underemployment, and political and social marginalization will make vulnerable groups, and particularly youth, more susceptible to recruitment into various forms of violence.

Nevertheless, movement or migration is an adaptation strategy employed by hundreds of millions of people, both in response to negative stimuli and as a means of pursuing a worthwhile life. Migration decisions are highly context-specific and vary according to interactions between economic, political, social, cultural, demographic, and other factors that operate across scales to create vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Migration outcomes reflect a continuum of agency, from voluntary movement to involuntary displacement, and a continuum of time scales, from temporary, seasonal to permanent, and spatial scales, from local to regional to international. Despite narratives that can portray

international migrants as a threat to national security, the overwhelming majority of those who migrate are peaceful, productive, and bring many economic and social benefits to the places they settle as well as to the places they leave.

Climate change undermines human security and acts as a driver of conflict in Africa under certain circumstances and through different pathways. Defining a direct causal link between climate change and conflict can be challenging. For example, statistical studies have found no direct causal link between precipitation levels and violent conflict.

Rather, climate change undermines human security and drives local conflicts and other types of violence by interacting with other intervening variables, such as social, political, and economic marginalization; water scarcity and resource competition; food insecurity; low economic development; weak institutions; population displacement and migration, among others.

It must be noted that conflict and human security threats are multi-layered and highly complex, even without climate change as a contributing factor. Climate-induced risks may only be one factor to exacerbate existing issues, which is why climate change is often described as a threat multiplier/ intensifier/ catalyst. However, the importance of climate change as a threat-multiplier should not be underestimated or trivialised.

Climate change may contribute to an increase in the frequency and intensity of conflict and human security issues on the continent, creating protracted and multifaceted humanitarian and security crises that will strain the capacity of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (AUPSA) and other peace and security mechanisms to effectively respond. Recent framings in the research literature highlight the past and potential effectiveness of migration in all its forms as a means of adaptation, and there may be a considerable role for governments in normalizing and facilitating the movement of people in situations where climate variability or conflict pose an acute risk.

Urbanization and cities

It is anticipated that more than a quarter of the world's fastest growing cities are in Africa and that by 2050, its urban population will have tripled. This exponential growth, coupled with weak governance structures, limited infrastructure and resources, high levels of poverty, a growing demand for resources, lack of reliable data and limited service delivery, puts immense pressure on local and regional governance, ecosystems and infrastructure, and increases the vulnerability of urban



populations to climate change and other impacts. It is estimated that 59% of sub-Saharan Africa's urban populations live in informal settlements, slums or peri-urban areas. Despite an increase in improved housing from 11% to 23% from 2000-2015, 53 million urban Africans were still living in unimproved housing in 2015, often in highly overcrowded conditions. Despite growing faster than other areas, large deficits in city infrastructure and public service provision exposes much of the population to high levels of risk.

Linear transport infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and pipelines, are expected to rapidly expand in the coming decades across Africa. In Africa, dozens of development corridors have been proposed or are being created, involving large-scale expansion of infrastructure such as roads, railroads, pipelines, and port facilities. While facilitating trade and development, these corridors also open up extensive areas of land to new environmental pressures. There is a high likelihood that these new and existing investments in infrastructure risk exposure from extreme weather events (for example flooding that could lead to destruction, water canal blockages, waterway diversions, and downstream sedimentation). These risks can be lowered through life cycle planning, development and management of infrastructure, rigorous mitigation and protection measures, strategic foresight, and appropriate environmental regulations, licensing, contracting and enforcement of regulations, together with well monitored and deliberate investments, and inclusion in planning with the communities which are both impacted and dependent upon them.

Africa is known to be one of the most rapidly urbanising continents. In this way, Africa's urban transition is a key global game-changer: the way that African cities develop will determine whether or not we achieve our collective global climate mitigation and adaptation targets, SDGs, biodiversity, poverty and inequality targets, and resource sustainability. About 60% of the built environment that African cities will require has yet to be built, and this provides a unique opportunity for African countries to leapfrog into more low-emission and climate resilient infrastructure. On the contrary, if this is laid into place using business-as-usual and conventional approaches, we will not meet our development goals. Therefore, there is global interest in ensuring that Africa urbanises sustainably.

The growth of cities is also one of the primary drivers of the loss of urban natural assets, which undermines the quality and functioning of ecosystems, and thereby diminishes the ability of nature to provide the very

services on which our growing urban communities - and in fact, all life on Earth - ultimately depend. This loss undermines the resilience of city-regions and ultimately impacts on socio-economic systems, governance as well as human health and well-being. To sustainably accommodate urban growth, cities must 'think beyond the city limits' to develop mutually beneficial urban-rural linkages, and territorial scale development, to invest in regeneration and the renewability of their urban, peri-urban and hinterland natural environments, and embrace a planning approach that puts the ecological landscape first, before embedding urban development. This landscape approach can improve the circular economy at the city region scale, aid in disaster risk reduction, draw attention to ecosystem service synergies and promote agroecological food systems localization.

African cities, while currently responsible for a negligible amount of total global GHG emissions, are also under significant threat from climate change, which significantly exacerbates all the conditions mentioned above. Changes in precipitation levels, likely increases in temperature extremes and rising sea levels will have a wide range of direct and indirect impacts on Africa. To adapt to these future climate challenges, it is important for decision makers to help reduce the negative consequences for society and, in particular, to protect vulnerable groups. Referring to sound research, it is necessary to understand what the future changes to the climate are likely to be (especially at a downscaled level), how impacts will be distributed across different regions, the direct and indirect impacts of these changes, and the appropriate adaptation responses to these impacts.

Furthermore, ensuring climate and biodiversity/ecosystem considerations are embedded in all city planning policies - not just in standalone climate plans - is crucial to ensuring resilient and sustainable development. Climate change is a multi-sectoral issue. It will affect all of us, in multiple ways, and therefore integrated and systemic approaches are needed.

Harnessing the skills and opportunities within all municipal departments is therefore vital. And perhaps even more vital is proactively securing finance for climate change and sustainability actions - to ensure that they don't just remain in policies, but lead to tangible, on-the-ground change. Fortunately, African cities are not alone in this effort, and both regional and international networks for learning and exchange between cities and territories have been rapidly evolving to bolster this urban transformation toward resilience (such as Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), C40 cities, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and others).

Inadequate human, financial and technological resources

While Africa has achieved significant development gains in recent decades, the continent still lags behind other world regions in terms of many social and economic development indicators. Financial resource constraints, inadequate skills development and governance challenges all contribute to this reality. Planning and implementing effective climate responses at local, national, sub-regional and continental levels, while at the same time addressing other developmental challenges, requires appropriate and effective institutional structures and coordination mechanisms.

A key challenge stems from insufficient data and capacity to generate accurate, site-specific forecasts regarding the changing climate. The regional and national climate information service centres are inadequately resourced to capture, analyse and effectively communicate climate data, undertake modelling, and make accurate, timely and user-friendly weather forecasts.

The competition for limited resources between responses to climate change and other pressing developmental needs undermines progress; when disasters occur, resources and capacities must be diverted from planned development actions to managing and recovering from the disasters. Yet, if a small proportion of the resources that are channelled into disaster relief and recovery is invested into effective early warning, preparedness and resilience-building, the negative impacts and reconstruction costs will be greatly reduced. Recovery would be faster and more resources would be invested to support development and prosperity.

Africa must continue to insist on appropriate, accessible and adequate support from partners in developed countries to address climate challenges. Such support includes financial, technological and capacity development components. At the same time, AU Member States should strengthen domestic resource mobilization, capacity development, and support domestic public and private investment in research and development, green technologies and climate information services.



Photo: © Felix Clay (Duckrabbit)

Groupings particularly vulnerable to climate change

Gender

Gender norms and power structures play a critical role in determining how women and men of different backgrounds are impacted by, and respond to, climate change. Pre-existing inequalities, gender-related roles and expectations, and unequal access to resources can deepen inequality and leave some groups disproportionately vulnerable. Women are more exposed and vulnerable to climate change because they are often poorer, receive less education, and are not involved in political and household decision-making processes that affect their lives. Women are also more vulnerable to climate shocks due to their role in subsistence rain-fed agriculture and weaker access to resources and decision-making power. Research suggests that even after controlling for socio-economic characteristics, women still had about a 13% higher chance of experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity than men, and that their chance was close to 27% higher for being severely food insecure at the global level. As such, addressing inequalities is an essential part of building resilience and addressing climate and environmental challenges. Numerous studies indicate that if adaptation actions do not consider age and gender in their application, the loss of future livelihoods and educational opportunities will occur. This highlights the need to include gender and youth dimensions of climate adaptation at all levels.

Women and girls require support tailored to their specific needs to mitigate the changes that threaten their social and economic well-being. For example, women's participation at the political level has resulted in greater responsiveness to citizen's needs and increased cooperation. Conversely, if policies are implemented without meaningful participation of women, inequalities can increase and effectiveness decreases. Women, children and the elderly are the most frequent victims of natural and man-made disasters. Therefore, empowering women and building their resilience has a positive impact on the family and community. Access to education by women, young girls and adolescent females must be a priority in the fight against climate change, its impacts and poverty – which are interlinked.

Youth

Youth are among the key players identified in achieving the SDGs and Africa's developmental ambitions. Young Africans are one of the continent's greatest resources. Africa has the world's youngest population and future generations who are young today will experience significant climate change impacts over the course of their lifetimes if climate impacts are not efficiently and effectively managed. These include school disruptions, social and political disorders, food insecurity, diseases, and threats to water and sanitation services – to name a few. Today's young people will also enter the workforce in coming years as economies and industries are impacted by, and must respond to, climate change.

The 'Africa We Want' articulated in Agenda 2063 has a strong focus on children and the youth of today, as they are the elders and leaders of tomorrow and the key to the survival of mankind. African youth are projected to experience the worst impacts of climate change. As a result, their welfare and interests should not only be provided for, but their voices should also be heard – and they should play key roles in the development and implementation of solutions to the challenges they face – from today and going into the future.

3.3 Key Sectoral Challenges and Opportunities Related to Climate Change

While adaptation and resilience-building remain Africa's top priority, mitigation actions will also be required as part of the region's climate response. It is recognised that the continent has an immense mitigation potential due to its vast land mass, forests, agricultural systems and oceans. Africa also has unrivalled potential for renewable energy – especially solar – for its own development and export.

Africa's leadership has an opportunity to evolve and entrench a new ethos and establish pan-African networks for creating sustainable green jobs and livelihoods, based on enhancing the continent's natural capital, ecosystems and biodiversity. The continent's population demographics are an opportunity and latent strength, as most of the population is of school-going age, and can therefore be equipped with the skills to

become innovative and enterprising citizens supporting the realization of 'The Africa We Want.'

The continent possesses significant mitigation potential which, if fully unlocked, can attract substantial resource inflows to fund adaptation and resilience-building. The massive untapped source of clean renewable energy on the continent is an advantage for its own low-emission development, and potentially for powering and selling technology-driven carbon dioxide removal. Africa is well positioned to tap into the ever-rising global demand for clean energy, including green hydrogen, which is set to become the fuel of the future as the technology develops and costs are reduced. Climate-smart sustainable land and water use, agricultural practices and ecosystem management can transform Africa from a hungry continent into a net food exporter in a short period.

Climate actions are at times presented as a hindrance to growth or a diversion from more pressing development priorities. In truth, ambitious action in support of clean, low-emission growth can position the continent strategically in terms of the skills, technologies and industries of tomorrow, thereby supporting job creation, global competitiveness and sustainable growth and industrialization.

As countries move from a focus on containing the COVID-19 virus to economic recovery, choices are being made that will shape trajectories on emissions, resilience, and biodiversity for decades to come. A clean and resilient recovery in Africa will lead to employment in the industries of the future, while ensuring that the region addresses the linked challenges of public health, prosperity and climate change. National or sectoral masterplans, climate change adaptation plans and the NDCs – as well as a host of other national plans – provide blueprints for action. Within this context, the AU's Green Recovery Action Plan (2021-2027) will tackle the combined challenges of the COVID-19 recovery and climate change, by focusing on critical areas of joint priority – including climate finance, renewable energy, resilient agriculture, resilient cities, land use and biodiversity.

Food systems, health and nutrition in a changing climate

A World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report on the State of the Climate in Africa 2019, indicates that recent years have witnessed some of the highest temperatures on record, with the latest decadal predictions, covering the five-year period from 2020-2024, showing continued warming and decreasing rainfall, especially over North and Southern Africa, and increased rain-fall over the Sahel. IPCC Assessment Report 5 projects that extensive areas of Africa will

exceed 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels by the last two decades of this century under medium GHG emission scenarios. IPCC projections suggest that warming scenarios risk having devastating effects on crop and livestock production and food security, with key risks to agriculture including "reduced [agricultural] productivity associated with heat and drought stress and increased pest damage, disease damage and flood impacts on food system infrastructure, resulting in serious adverse effects on food security and on livelihoods at the regional, national and individual household levels".

Anticipated challenges

By the middle of this century, major cereal crops grown across Africa will be adversely impacted as they are at the edge of physical thresholds at which yields decline, albeit with regional variability and differences between crops. This includes primary sources of carbohydrates in African diets, such as maize, rice and millet, with each vulnerable to temperature increases, irregular rainfall and other deteriorating growing conditions. Other crops such as cassava may be more resilient to droughts and heat, but have far less support in terms of production-related research or infrastructure developed to provide sufficient substitute sources of nutrition.

The climate-related challenges to the livestock sector have also been evaluated in recent research, including the decline in quality and quantity of animal feeds and forage; a reduction in water availability; heat stress; biodiversity change; changes in the distribution and occurrence of livestock pests and diseases; and increased livelihood and income vulnerability affecting food security, purchasing power and resilience. Climate challenges to the livestock sector will need to be addressed at the same time as the sector responds to existing challenges. An assessment carried out in all regions of Africa determined that the livestock sector is not producing according to its potential due to multiple factors, including under-investment in more productive breeds, poor quality feed, poor disease control measures, low compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and poor planning or monitoring and a low commitment of resources devoted to improvements of rangelands and their management.

Climate change and increasing climate variability present a growing threat to food security and nutrition in Africa because of the region's heavy dependence on climate-sensitive activities. The threat of these climatic uncertainties is linked to all determinants of malnutrition, ranging from underlying factors such as socio-economic status and environmental conditions to direct determinants such as droughts, floods, diseases and inadequate food and nutrient intake. It exacerbates malnutrition through three main pathways: household food security, child feeding and care practices, and

health. There is growing evidence that these effects are exacerbated by gender and social disparities between and within households and communities.

Africa (along with Southern Asia) is projected to be most exposed to an increased risk of hunger due to climate change. Malnutrition is a major cause of morbidity and mortality on the continent and statistics show that a quarter of a billion Africans suffered chronic undernutrition. 426 million experienced moderate food insecurity, 51% could not afford "nutrient-adequate" diets, and 11.3% could not afford "energy-sufficient" diets.

Health status affects how nutrients are absorbed and used by the body. Climate-change projections for Africa for the full range of emissions scenarios indicate that 350-600 million people will be at greater risk of water stress by the 2050s, and similar numbers at greater risk of heat stress and reduced labour productivity. In addition to the impacts on agricultural production, reduced health status affects food utilization and nutrition through increased incidence and prevalence of diseases such as diarrhoea, limiting nutrient uptake and further driving undernourishment.

Increasing frequency of very hot days is already having effects on the capacity of people to work in the fields, with major implications for livelihoods based on human labour, such as non-mechanized agriculture. Globally, rural labour capacity declined by more than 5% between 2000 and 2016. Further declines in labour capacity during the current century are very likely under all future climate scenarios.

By 2050, 54% of the projected increase in undernourishment globally will be in Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, child malnutrition, measured by severe stunting, may increase by 23% by 2050, compared with a future without climate change. Climate change will continue to counteract the benefits of socio-economic development, exacerbated by rapid population growth.

Opportunities

The main challenge will be to establish the backbone infrastructure and services on the large scale needed to enable the majority of farmers in outlying areas to achieve a reasonably dignified life – as well as establishing mechanisms to ensure equity and fairness in sharing of risk and value along value chains. Digital technology offers significant opportunities for providing information, education, awareness and other climate risk management services at scale, speed and in a targeted and differentiated manner. It can also be used to enhance fairness and equity in the distribution of risk and value. Policy innovations also have the potential to

effect change at scale and at the lowest cost. Finally, the development of a new generation of data driven and ICT-enabled climate sensitive farmers, which is both environmentally and financially rewarding, is going to be a critical lever for the region's climate response. The development and selection of climate-resilient crops and breeds, using some of the new tools of genetics and genomics as well as traditional approaches, also represents significant adaptation opportunities for the agricultural sector.

Priorities for research and innovation needs to focus on addressing the fundamental challenges faced by farmers, which relates to policies, institutions, and society in general. The prevailing focus of research and innovation tends to concentrate largely on technical solutions and less upon the needs and opinions of farmers who are on the frontline of climate change and most exposed to the risks. Although entire agricultural chains are anchored on farmers as primary producers on the front-line of climate risk, the majority are uninsured and have no other adequate social safety nets. In addition, farmers' contribution to the management of various ecosystems is neither properly valued nor remunerated, yet they provide essential and valuable products and services.

Land-based ecosystems and carbon sinks

According to Swiss Re (2020), 55% of global GDP, equal to US\$41.7 trillion, is dependent on high-functioning biodiversity and ecosystem services. Regrettably, ecosystems and the services they provide, such as oxygen water and protection from flooding, are also affected by climate change and its impacts. Additionally, climate change is projected to decrease biodiversity and wetlands, leading to loss of soil and trees and the possible proliferation of zoonotic diseases. The poor and vulnerable communities mostly depend on ecosystem services and are therefore the most affected by the crisis.

If natural ecosystems continue to be degraded and habitat loss is left unchecked, human-wildlife conflict is inevitable and the experiences so far suggests that the odds are stacked against wildlife and ecosystems.

Africa is highly vulnerable to climate change, which is further exacerbated by the significant rates of land use change, population growth and industrial development.

Land-based ecosystems and the carbon sinks they comprise are concomitantly Africa's biggest risk and opportunity in the face of projected impacts of climate change. Terrestrial biodiversity conservation is dependent on the protection and restoration of key ecosystems such as forests, wetlands, grasslands,

highlands and coastal systems, which all serve as carbon sinks. Human-induced modification of the structure and function of many ecosystems through land use change and degradation (e.g., agricultural conversion, forest/grassland clearing and burning, urban expansion, mine and road expansion etc.) has significantly altered the relationships between natural carbon sources and sinks. Africa's extensive tropical forests, mangroves and rangelands are critical land-based ecosystems in combating global climate change and provide valuable ecosystem services to its people. These ecosystems hold significant carbon stocks, 17.5 billion tons (Gt) of irrecoverable carbon, more than 12% of the world's total. Additionally, 62% of Africa comprises rangeland, mainly supporting extensive livestock production, wildlife conservation, and agro-pastoralism. Africa's rangelands contain 36% of the world's total carbon and, if fully restored, can sequester carbon in amounts equal to that of the Amazon rainforest. However, an estimated 700 million hectares of rangeland in Africa requires restoration.

Climate change poses a real threat to the African continent, with 85% of the people dependent on the natural environment to meet at least one of their basic human needs (shelter, energy for cooking, income, and clean water), and 65% dependent on subsistence agriculture for food production. This highlights the importance of the sustainable use and management of natural resources to maintain the livelihoods of people across the continent that are affected by climate change, while avoiding practices that contribute to environmental degradation.

Anticipated challenges

Globally, Africa had the highest net annual loss of forests (4.3 million ha) from 2010-2020, due to unsustainable agriculture, fuelwood harvesting and logging. Desertification affects approximately 45% of Africa's total land area, with 55% of this area at high or very high risk of further degradation. According to the IPCC, Africa will see increased droughts, which will continue to affect livelihoods, agriculture, water systems and ecosystems. Already, 18 of the world's 20 most food insecure countries are in Africa. Furthermore, two of the world's areas most vulnerable to ecosystem collapse within the next decade (due to resource scarcity and natural disasters) are in African rangelands.

Additionally, international interest in utilising African lands for Ecosystem-based approaches carbon dioxide removal activities may present unique governance challenges with regard to development trade-offs, land-use rights, safeguarding of biodiversity and food security, and water resources. Balancing potential financial benefits of these activities with risks may require new policy frameworks and collaboration.



Opportunities

Data indicates that nature offers more than 30% of the mitigation action needed by 2030 to limit the worst effects of climate change through natural climate solutions. In effect, Africa could reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 22% by implementing a multi-pronged approach to natural climate solutions that entails protecting key carbon ecosystems, avoiding further loss of nature and restoring important ecosystems. Therefore, many African countries could exceed their national climate targets through natural climate solutions alone. For example, innovative, regenerative farming approaches to livestock management that are community-driven, climate-smart and wildlife-friendly can support rangeland restoration at scale, making livestock farmers and pastoralists part of the solution, and enabling livelihood diversification and resilience. There is some experience in Africa of schemes that provide payments to land users for ecosystem services such as biodiversity conservation. Taking successful PES pilots to scale has considerable potential for helping to diversify livelihoods and increase resilience. Furthermore, modelling has shown that the protection of 30% of Africa's land area could reduce total species extinction risk by more than 60% under both 1.5°C (RCP2.6) and 4.5°C (RCP8.5) scenarios. This presents an opportunity for investment in protecting and restoring natural ecosystems to achieve not only climate benefits, but also biodiversity and social and economic development, thereby ensuring a green development pathway for Africa. Protecting and restoring Africa's ecosystems also has implications for the health of the population as land use change is increasingly linked to the occurrence and risk of zoonotic and vector-borne diseases.

Energy and infrastructure

Africa's energy systems face several climate risks. Extreme weather can lead to widespread damage to electricity generation, transmission, and distribution networks.

Higher temperatures reduce the operating efficiency of thermal generation, while simultaneously increasing energy demand for air conditioning. Reduced rainfall and associated streamflow can limit hydropower output and other water-dependent energy generation.

Several African countries are particularly vulnerable to reduced rainfall and runoff due to their heavy reliance on hydropower for generation. As of 2018, Africa had over 36 Gigawatt (GW) of installed hydroelectric capacity, roughly 20% of installed generation capacity, which was highly concentrated along the continent's major river basins. In East and Southern Africa (excluding South Africa), hydropower represents over half of electricity generation. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia, hydropower accounts for over 90% of capacity.

Constrained hydropower generation due to reduced rainfall and runoff has already resulted in drought-induced electricity rationing in several African countries. The 2015-2016 El Niño drought led to severe reductions in electricity generation in Southern Africa due to low water levels at the Kariba and Cahora Bassa dams on the Zambezi River. Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe all experienced load shedding due to the drought. Zambia resorted to importing costly emergency power. The energy shortages resulted in a decline in the mining sector, along with overall economic growth.

Energy production is central to addressing developmental challenges, such as poverty, inequality, climate change, food security, health and education. Energy poverty can be defined as an absence of sufficient choice in accessing adequate, affordable, reliable, clean, high-quality, and safe energy services to support economic and human development. In Africa, climate change does not affect all members of the population in the same way. For example, women and girls are the most at risk and require support tailored to their specific needs to adapt to the changes that threaten their social and

¹ Energy justice refers to the need for social and economic equity in the energy system and the remediation of the social, economic, and health burdens of those historically affected by it.

economic well-being. This is most evident for women in rural areas who are particularly time-poor and the associated drudgery of their tasks is mainly fulfilled through their own physical labour, particularly fuelwood collection, fetching water and food processing. It is therefore critical that energy access programmes focus on women and promote energy justice¹ through better access to and control of energy resources, thereby contributing to the empowerment of women.

Anticipated challenges

Current actions to eradicate energy poverty and promote energy justice are falling short both in terms of scale and pace. Should this trajectory remain unchanged, more people will be without access to modern energy in 2030 than is presently the case. The climate risks that Africa's electricity systems will face in the future are heavily influenced by the infrastructure decisions that governments make in the near term. Hydropower plays a central role in African governments' plans to scale up generation. The African Union's (AU's) PIDA, along with other national energy plans (jointly referred to as PIDA+) aim to add 80 GW of hydroelectric capacity to the existing 36 GW, with an estimated cumulative cost of US\$75 billion over the period 2015-2050. The majority of these future additions would occur in the Congo (44.4 Megawatt (MW)), the Nile (21.4 MW), the Zambezi (8.2 MW) and the Niger (4.7 MW) river basins.

As African economies expand hydroelectric production, they risk becoming more sensitive to climate variability. Current climate models disagree on whether Africa's major river basins will become wetter or drier. Regardless, future levels of rainfall, evaporation and run-off will have a substantial impact on hydropower production. The biggest risk to hydropower output is in the Zambezi River Basin, where the driest scenarios would see a 58% reduction in revenues relative to a scenario without climate change.

Opportunities

A global political commitment that goes beyond abstraction and sets out actions and associated benchmarks is required. Innovative and interdisciplinary approaches have been developed, notably, the operationalization of the energy justice framework has led to new energy justice indicators, such as affordability that includes opportunity cost (time and distance travelled). As research activities continue, it will be essential to integrate insights and lessons related to energy access and energy justice on an ongoing basis. There are also opportunities related to off-grid and smart-grid solutions, designed around renewable energy technologies, to support rapid expansion of energy

access. Investment opportunities can also arise from appropriate policy frameworks and programmes, such as South Africa's Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme.

Climate change, transport and mobility

Transport systems in Africa are exposed to extreme climatic events and weather conditions, such as flooding (surface, fluvial and coastal), tropical cyclones, and high temperatures. The impacts of flooding on infrastructure can prove catastrophic for food security, communication, and the economy of affected regions. Simultaneously, transport systems can compound climate impacts, contributing to heat stress and air pollution. Increasing urbanization, motorization, and poor transport and urban planning exacerbates climate vulnerability and reduces the ability of cities to adapt. For example, in many African countries, the majority of poor urban residents commute by foot and are forced to walk through corridors of land unsuitable for development, such as swamps, floodplains, and hillsides, thereby increasing their exposure to extreme weather.

Anticipated challenges

Trade is crucial to food security, and transport infrastructure is the conveyance mechanism for trade. Food security in many African countries is exacerbated by a lack of resilient transport infrastructure. As critical trade routes face significant risk to disruption by climate impacts it is expected that food insecurity will worsen. Further, it is estimated that a direct liability of over US\$73.2 billion will be incurred to repair and maintain African roads damaged by projected climate change impacts, up to the year 2100.

Opportunities

Modelling suggests that proactive adaptation in the transport sector to account for temperature increases is a 'no regret' option in all cases, but precipitation increases should be considered on a case-by-case basis. By implementing adaptation measures, climate-related road maintenance could be reduced by 61% in Mozambique, 47% in Zambia and 43% in South Africa by 2050.

There is a dearth of literature on observed and projected climate impacts on the African transport sector. This presents an opportunity for research and innovation in the sector, to come up with timely solutions.

There are significant opportunities for Africa in transitioning to low-emission transport modalities (e.g., electric vehicles) for both public and private transport.

Water systems

Water is a key driver for development across the African continent and a critical enabler for productivity and sustainable economic growth. It contributes significantly to human development, poverty reduction, and the attainment of the African Union Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. Despite the critical role water plays towards economic and social prosperity, investments into Africa's water sector are not advancing at the rate needed to achieve SDG6. The AfDB estimates that investments totalling approximately US\$64 billion per year are required to meet the targets set out in the Africa Water Vision of 2025. The AfDB states that the current financial flows for water sector investment programmes are approximately US\$10.5 billion per year.

Water systems across Africa are characterized by stark differences in both hydrological and climate dynamics that shape their risk and vulnerability to predicted climate futures. However, one constant across the continent is that livelihoods, ecosystems, and biodiversity are inextricably dependent on the sustainable functioning of water systems. Key examples include:

- Higher temperatures are projected to cause increases in water deficits of about 71% in agriculture, 27% in hydropower, and 1% in livestock production;
- RCP8.5 projections put 1.2 billion African people at significant risk of being negatively impacted by water pollution due to reduced water quality regulation by natural ecosystems;
- Climate change projections will reduce available habitat for aquatic species due to increases in water temperatures above optimal physiological limits; and,
- Minor climatic variations have been linked to significant impacts on ecosystem functioning in Africa's freshwater ecosystems.

The observed and projected increases in heavy precipitation and pluvial flooding, as well as observed and projected increases in aridity, agricultural and ecological droughts, will affect primary productivity (forests, grasslands, fodder). Also affected will be subsistence agricultural productivity, with repercussions for increased dependence on natural resources for sustenance, which are already under pressure from climate and other threats. These will increase water use and abstraction, causing further impacts for freshwater ecosystems while also increasing conflict between people and wildlife.

Many studies report the significant socio-economic consequences of climate variability and extreme



weather events on water systems, increasingly in urban areas, often related to flooding. Notably, the El Niño event in 2015-2016 and associated drought in Southern Africa impacted, among other things, hydropower generation and electricity supply in Lusaka with serious implications for businesses. In 2017, the Day Zero water supply crisis in Cape Town had unequal impacts on communities and prompted intense debate over the role water resource management decisions, investment and drought prior to and during the crisis. An Indian Ocean Dipole event in 2019 produced high rainfall over East and the Horn of Africa triggering mud slides, destruction of crops and property, and loss of lives.

Marine heat waves have become more frequent since the 20th century and are projected to increase around Africa. Relative sea level has increased at a higher rate than global mean sea level around Africa over the last three decades. Relative sea-level rise is likely to virtually certain to continue around Africa, contributing to increases in the frequency and severity of coastal flooding in low-lying areas and coastal erosion along sandy coastlines.

Example of human and property losses due to climate events

- **1960s to present day:** Lake Chad (the vanishing lake), receded from 25,000 km² in the 1960s to between 2,000 km² and 15,000 km² (depending on the season) over the last 40 years, affecting the lives of about 30 million people.
- **2000:** Floods in Mozambique caused 800 deaths, affected about 2,000,000 people, 329 people were displaced and agricultural land was negatively impacted.
- **2001:** Floods in Northern Algeria resulted in approximately 800 deaths and caused an economic loss of about US\$400 million.
- **2011-2012:** Severe drought affected the entire East Africa region and was said to be "the worst drought in 60 years". Within the same year floods affected the region and caused further damage.
- **2014-2019:** In Central and West Africa, a total of 700,000 people were displaced mainly due to flooding. This also resulted in localized crop and livestock losses.
- **2019:** Flooding due to Cyclone Idai destroyed about US\$1 billion of infrastructure, about 100,000 homes were damaged/destroyed and at least 400,000 ha of crops were destroyed.
- **2019:** Heavy rainfall triggered widespread flooding, which resulted in a loss of life, displacement, damage to crops and livestock deaths, mainly in central and southern Somalia, south-eastern Ethiopia, northern and eastern Kenya and South Sudan. The heavy rains created conditions conducive to the severe desert locust outbreak, the worst in decades, affecting most parts of East Africa.

Anticipated challenges

Poverty is arguably the biggest challenge facing Africa, and more specifically in relation to changes in climate and the water sector, inequities in adaptive capacity for poorer populations. Adaptive capacity in Africa is often largely a function of access to natural and/or financial resources. Africa accounts for two-

thirds of the world's extreme poor; combined with the fact that Africa's population is projected to double by 2050 and the significant water stress that already exists across the continent (to be compounded further by climate change), water access and governance presents the most significant challenge for this decade. The increased drying of the continent will result in food shortages, conflicts over increasingly scarce resources and increasing dependence on natural resources.

There is a need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of transboundary cooperation to ensure that decision-making and investment occur at appropriate timeframes to respond to the speed of changes in the climate and environment. In general, investment in water in Africa is low, contributing to inadequate capacity to minimise climate risks and enhance climate-resilient water systems. Although water is identified as one of the priority sectors affected by climate change, there is a lack of support and financing/resource mobilization required to facilitate climate-resilient water investment policy development.

Through potentially rapid and large changes in socially and economically critical aspects of the hydrological cycle, climate change represents a major cross-cutting challenge, in terms of availability, exposure to hazard, management capacity (both supply and demand), and individual well-being. Africa's size and diversity of climate conditions, often with high spatial and temporal variability, make it difficult to generalise about the current and future status of water resources. This is further compounded by limited availability and quality of climate data in Africa. Despite these challenges, it is evident that surface and subsurface water availability is being altered by changes in the timing, amount, intensity, and state of precipitation as well as atmospheric evaporative demand due to changes in temperature, humidity, radiation, and windspeed.

Increases in climate variability are likely in the future with possible long-term shifts in climate characteristics, including areas of wetting and drying. However, multiple atmospheric and oceanic processes, incompletely understood and represented in climate models, lead to uncertainty in the detail of future climate. Nevertheless, during the last 50-100 years observed warming over land in Africa has increased and is very likely to continue, including higher frequency and intensity of heat waves.

A comprehensive analysis of global and regional climate model rainfall projections shows both differences and similarities. There is limited consistency between ensembles in projections of seasonal mean rainfall (global models tending to be wetter than regional models) and large spread between model results, which often show opposite signs in the direction of projected change. Consistent patterns include higher maximum



Photo © Cyclone Idai (World Vision)

rainfall intensities in all regions during the wet season and a decrease in frequency of daily rainfall events. The length of dry spells increases over Southern Africa and the Ethiopian Highlands in most models.

The latest IPCC review notes from global studies of fluvial impacts increases in river discharge in terms of the 30-year return period (of five-day average peak flows) by end of this century for most river basins in tropical Africa. This suggests higher frequency and intensity of floods and as a consequence more extensive impacts and greater need for action on flood mitigation.

Opportunities

There are numerous opportunities for enabling the most vulnerable populations to adapt to the impacts of climate change. For example, the adoption of water-efficient technologies, such as drip-irrigation or small-scale water harvesting, can both help to adapt to the impending impacts of climate change but also create significant private sector business opportunities across the continent.

Furthermore, the development of bankable/investable solutions for adaptation, particularly through ecosystem-based approaches and ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA)², that benefit the most vulnerable populations and ecosystems across Africa. This includes investing in water-efficient agricultural systems, rural/urban developments and using natural systems to ameliorate water pollution. For example, adaptation and disaster risk reduction could include reforesting hill slopes to prevent landslides from increased rains, re-vegetating riverine areas to

prevent silt and flooding or wetland restoration to act as carbon sinks and to absorb floodwaters. These adaptation solutions present significant opportunities for carbon storage and avoided emissions, as well as ecosystem protection and restoration. Ultimately, these types of solutions will capitalise on integrated revenue streams (e.g., water, carbon, ecosystems, biodiversity etc.) that are enabled at the landscape level through multi-sector and multi-stakeholder partnerships.

International climate change legislative frameworks such as the Paris Agreement of 2015, SDGs of 2015, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), climate finance mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and continental, sub-regional and national water and climate policies provide strategic directions and commitments that governments, non-state actors, the private sector and communities can apply in designing, implementing and managing climate-resilient water investments.

Climate finance mechanisms and development funds provide an avenue for mobilising financial resources for practical climate-resilient water investments. Furthermore, the current Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) developed by respective Member States provide an opportunity for outlining integrated water-related climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes. For example, the continental Africa Water Investment Programme (AIP) has systematically incorporated water resources, SDG6 investments, climate resilience, gender transformative action and transboundary water cooperation and is ready for financing.

² Involves a variety of ecosystem management activities to increase the resilience and reduce the vulnerability of communities and the environment to climate change.

Climate-resilient urban areas

Inadequate city planning, inefficient land use, and poor regulatory systems have created an unsustainable model of urban growth that has resulted in unmanaged, fragmented and hyper-informal cities and all forms of pollution. Moreover, the potential consequences of climate change such as the rise in sea levels and increased frequency of extreme weather events are expected to increasingly strain the capacities of Africa's urban systems and heighten their vulnerability.

The ability of cities to mainstream climate goals into their activities is, to a large extent, influenced by the vertical divisions of responsibilities across different levels of government, which provides a key opportunity to overcome these challenges. Improved multi-level governance arrangements and processes, improved progress with implementing decentralization reforms, increased alignment of sectors that could influence those with significant emissions reduction potential and strengthened systemic capacity and resource mobilization all offer the potential to develop proactive climate governance.

Anticipated challenges

An estimated US\$20-25 billion per year needs to be invested in basic urban infrastructure, and an additional US\$20 billion per year in housing to respond to urban population growth; these investments need to be climate-proofed to ensure a sustainable pathway for urban development. This surge in urban population (particularly in Africa's secondary cities) is paired with rapid urbanization and increased transportation.

Consequently, harmful emissions from transportation and land-use change are growing significantly across Africa, further driven by urban sprawl and low levels of institutional capacity to manage growth and its impact.

Opportunities

Nature-based solutions in the form of ecological (or green) infrastructure have emerged as spatial planning tools for ensuring functional networks of natural and semi-natural areas: demonstrating the importance of ecological systems as part of the infrastructural fabric that supports and sustains society and builds resilience. In various cases across Africa, well-functioning ecosystems provide diverse provisioning, regulating, supporting and cultural services that can buffer against risks, with benefits for physical/psychological health, social equity and well-being.

For example, hill forestation, terracing, green public open spaces, and clearing invasive alien plants can all help to reduce erosion, filter grey water, provide timber,

fodder, windbreaks, and shade, promote the provision of downstream water, regulate flood shocks, reduce sedimentation and run-off, complement drainage, and create opportunities for social interaction, community cohesion, foster inclusion and attachment to space. Green infrastructure can also help in recovering from hazards (e.g., poles for construction) or provide a safety net (e.g., wild foods in times of drought). Maintaining or restoring green infrastructure is considered to complement or substitute for more expensive infrastructure investments that are not available to meet local needs. Moreover, green infrastructure can lengthen the life of existing built infrastructure and make areas more attractive for investment, promoting multi-functionality, connectivity, and accessibility. Preferences and values differ by scale, proximity to natural areas, land prices, users' needs (e.g., design vs. use), and socio-economic classes.

The application of green infrastructure to enhance climate resilience in the African context is unique compared to other developing countries, considering the sociocultural context, and spatial challenges. Africa must therefore not necessarily emulate Western models of green infrastructure planning. Adaptation strategies should sensitize decision makers about the value and benefits of ecosystem-based adaptation and prioritize green infrastructure within broader land-use, valuation and spatial planning approaches. Integrated planning needs to prioritize capturing multiple functions, zones, ensure quality and accessibility in relation to function and form, and promote more even distribution in high- and low-income neighbourhoods (including backyard dwellings).

Green infrastructure needs to be understood as part of the infrastructural fabric and economic good, rather than a "luxury and visual good, in comparison to more pressing needs". In small, secondary and even megacities, low-income and other marginalised urban residents are typically more dependent on ecosystem services than higher-income groups. However, these resources have not been included in previous assessments of the informal economy to show economic benefits. For green infrastructure to be successful, sustainable landscapes and regions require both stewardship and management at multiple levels of governance and social scales to maintain the composition, structure and function of ecosystems. With changing precipitation, we need to maintain and restore degraded wetlands, riparian corridors, and rivers to enhance flood regulation, water purification functions, reduce contamination, and the spread of communicable and waterborne pathogens. Land use land cover change needs to be monitored, and urban ecosystem services incorporated in scenarios, and not managed intensively for one type of ecosystem service at the expense of others.



Climate change and Africa's blue economy

The challenges posed by climate change to the region's blue economy is highlighted in the Africa Blue Economy Strategy (2019), the Policy Framework and Reform Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa (2014) and other key thematic and sectoral frameworks and strategies. Addressing climate threats to Africa's blue economy will be central to realising the region's commitment to SDG14 'Life under Water' and Agenda 2063's vision for the region's oceans, coasts and inland water bodies to serve as major contributors to continental transformation and growth.

The oceans play a key role in regulating the earth's climate, having absorbed over 90% of the excess heat generated by greenhouse gases in the climate system, as well as 20-30% of anthropogenic carbon emissions. This regulating capacity is not unlimited, however, and there is a growing understanding of the diverse ways in which climate change is impacting oceans. The key climate impacts on oceans are changes in water temperature, ocean acidification and deoxygenation. These drive a number of secondary impacts such as changes in ocean circulation and chemistry, rising sea levels, increased storm intensity, as well as changes in the diversity, distribution and abundance of marine species and phenomena such as coral bleaching. In turn, these changes impact society through physical risk to infrastructure and human life, as well as economic and food security risks. These risks are particularly acute for coastal and island communities who rely on marine resources for food security and a range of ecosystem services, and who are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts such as extreme weather events.

Anticipated challenges

Climate change is already impacting coastal and island communities in Africa through more frequent and intense extreme weather events, coastal erosion, sea level rise, saltwater intrusion, coral bleaching and other impacts. A critical factor in the ocean is the dynamism and movement of whole systems, such as current regimes, increasing unpredictability and the magnitude of fluctuations and biodiversity responses and loss resulting from climate change. These climate-induced changes impact on entire economic sectors – for example, the change in productivity and dynamics of upwelling currents affects fishery stocks (e.g., in the Canary Current); and the collapse of coral reefs impacts on small scale fishers and tourism industries (e.g., in east and southern Africa). These impacts will intensify over the medium term (to 2030), underscoring the need for effective climate responses to protect coastal and island infrastructure, livelihoods and industries.

Opportunities

While oceans and coastal zones are impacted by climate change in significant ways, they can also be an integral part of climate responses, for example through ecosystem-based adaptation approaches. Restoring mangrove ecosystems has both mitigation and adaptation advantages, while also providing important economic and biodiversity co-benefits. Efforts to increase the resilience of coastal economies and communities to sea level rise, and efforts to further enhance the ability of oceans to drawdown carbon dioxide, via expansion of mangroves, ocean alkalization, and other approaches, can create livelihoods as well as financial flows for mitigation efforts. Mapping and analysis of ecosystems

services, including economic production, carbon sinks and carbon dioxide removal potentials, can generate policy space for these activities.

It is important that climate responses are integrated into existing governance approaches and mechanisms, building on the significant investment in co-management, ecosystem-based governance approaches, integrated coastal zone management, and emerging practice around marine spatial planning. Regional and adaptive governance approaches will be central to addressing climate challenges; it is therefore essential to leverage existing regional institutions and programmes to support joint research, sharing of data and good practice, and joint programme implementation in strengthening the climate resilience of Africa's blue economy.

Climate information services

The past several decades have witnessed phenomenal advances in the understanding of the laws that govern the characteristics and behaviour of the global climate system. This led to the development of Climate Information Services (CIS). CIS can be broadly defined as the generation, tailoring and provision of weather and climate information to inform all levels of decision. CIS are provided by a range of actors across the continent but are primarily the remit of National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHSs). Types of CIS offered may include, observational data, daily to weekly forecasts, seasonal forecasts, impacts advisories and climate change projections. General packaging of climate data, information and related products find application in multiple climate-sensitive socio-economic sectors such as: agriculture; disasters risk management; water resources; health; and energy for societal benefits. CIS builds on continued improvements in climate forecasts and climate change scenarios to expand access to the best available climate data and information. Policy makers, planners, investors and vulnerable communities need climate information in user-friendly formats so that they can prepare for expected trends and changes.

Emerging Issues for Climate

While the primary strategy for reducing and eliminating climate change and limiting its impacts remains the rapid reduction in the burning of fossil fuels, as well as protecting and enhancing natural carbon sinks, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other GHG continue to rise. Many governments, universities, and private institutions are now actively researching, developing and in some cases deploying new and novel approaches to fighting climate change.

Notable examples include: carbon dioxide removal (CDR), the process of capturing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and sequestering it; synthetic biology and genetic engineering approaches to changing properties of plants and crops to enable enhanced carbon drawdown or to make leaves more reflective; solar radiation modification, which by various proposed approaches would reflect increased amounts of solar radiation back into space, cooling the lower atmosphere. Each of these carries potential benefits and risks, with physical impact, legal, ethical, and social aspects to consider, and will require the development of governance frameworks that are relevant and appropriate for African contexts.

Anticipated challenges

Over the next decade, emerging technologies for responding to climate change can present a number of challenges. Governance of these technologies at international, regional and national levels will require increased attention from policy makers. Governance considerations of these technologies in African contexts may include access to and control over technologies, access to finance, questions of liability and accountability, development of insurance mechanisms, questions of private versus public control or use, access to and control over data, and more. Further, some emerging climate response technologies carry significant risk in use, which will have to be weighed against the risks inherent in climate change impacts in the absence of the use of the same technologies.

Opportunities

Many new and proposed responses to climate change, either to enhance mitigation or adaptation capacity, are in early stages of development and research. Some are inherently global in nature, in their likely impacts, benefits and risks, and therefore will require input and shaping from African governments, research institutes, and civil society actors. Engaging in early-stage research, development, and regulation can ensure that African interests help to shape new technologies and their use.

Opportunities inherent in early engagement with emerging topics include: conducting, shaping and directing research to ensure consideration of African contexts and needs; shaping of technology transfer standards; engage and encourage innovation in African research institutions.



STRATEGIC INTERVENTION AXES

4.1 Strategic Intervention Axis 1: Strengthening Policy and Governance

4.1.1 Enhanced Climate Policy, Inclusive Multi-Scalar Governance and Institutional Coordination

Climate policy at a national level presents unique multi-scalar governance challenges by requiring the coordination between different spheres of government and non-state actors, across multiple sectors of society. It is also multi-dimensional, centring on different objectives, which can impact other developmental priorities. For this reason, the evolution of climate policy requires high levels of participation and coordination amongst ministries, spheres of government, non-state actors and citizens. Appropriate climate policy also requires relevant and up to date scientific knowledge, an understanding of anticipate climate risks and impacts, mitigation potentials and adaptation needs, the potential economic, social and biodiversity/ ecosystem co-benefits, as well as the identification, prioritization and costing of the requisite measures. Capacitated institutions with the requisite mandates to implement policy and facilitate well-coordinated climate action are also necessary drivers.

Countries are at different stages of addressing climate change, with NDCs having varying levels of detail and differing structures, and many Long-term Strategies (LTSs) still in the initial stages of planning and development.

Many have developed national climate policies and/or strategies and in some cases have developed dedicated National Adaptation Programmes of Action and mitigation policies such as REDD+ strategies. The mainstreaming of climate change considerations across other sectoral policies is, however, ongoing and there are different levels of coherence on climate change issues within, for example, water and agricultural policies. Equally, governance structures and process for Africa climate policies need to be enhanced. Weak institutions, inadequate coordination and collaboration amongst sectoral line ministries have been identified by African governments as impediments to effective policy implementation. Research indicates that a lack of or limited authority by certain government ministries to implement national climate policy, as well as limited data, are presenting barriers to successful NDC implementation. Other challenges identified in the development and implementation of African climate policies, plans and strategies have included inadequate emphasis of gender dimensions, inclusion of local communities and engagement with district and local level governance actors.

Climate legislative frameworks are considered to play a determinative role in influencing the successful implementation of climate policy. Robust legislative frameworks, both climate change specific and non-specific, are likely to drive better adaptive responses. Research has indicated that outdated legislation can present a barrier to NDC implementation, an issue identified as a barrier by a number of African countries. A few African countries have developed or are in the process of developing dedicated framework climate change laws, whilst others have developed dedicated sector specific laws, for climate change trust funds,

and forestry laws. A review of these laws indicates evidence of cross-pollination in design across African jurisdictions, creating the potential for a unique and regionally appropriate body of law with a strong focus on adaptation. Whilst there is evidence of a regional influence, there remains a need for domestic analysis of the national legal landscape to craft suitable climate laws that adequately take into account national climate priorities, institutional requirements and the relevant legal culture.

Table 1. Priority interventions and suggested actions for enhanced climate policy, multi-scalar governance and institutional coordination.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
<p>1. Continued development, review and update of climate change policies and implementation plans at a regional, national, sectoral and local level.</p>	<p>1a. Review and revise existing policies and plans to ensure alignment with revised NDCs and LTS's under the Paris Agreement. Update or develop related implementation plans, investment plans and M&E plans.</p>
	<p>1b. Mainstream climate change considerations (including gender, youth and indigenous knowledge considerations) and updated NDC policy actions across sectoral policies, including national development plans, water, agriculture, health, energy, human settlements, environment, transport and infrastructure, utilizing an open and transparent engagement process with stakeholders.</p>
	<p>1c. Adopt a "whole-of-economy" approach to climate change, prioritizing the integration in long-term climate priorities in countries' macro-economic frameworks, national budgets and expenditure frameworks, financial sector regulations and incentives; and in systems planning.</p>
	<p>1d. Develop/implement sound monitoring, review and reporting processes and systems, including MRV of GHG emissions, sinks and removals, and M&E of adaptation, climate finance and technical support outcomes to obtain the relevant data and information for policy development.</p>
<p>2. Strengthen institutional structures for policy implementation, through fostering good governance structures at the regional, national and sub-national levels.</p>	<p>2a. Strengthen of mechanisms for co-ordination and collaboration between countries, sectoral line ministries and spheres of government, as well as communication with citizens and stakeholders.</p>
	<p>2b. Identify line ministries and institutional bodies for the implementation of climate policy, development of legal mandates and delegations for these ministries/bodies, and capacitation of these bodies with qualified, well-equipped and motivated staff.</p>
	<p>2c. Develop systems for the monitoring and reporting of policy implementation, as well as open data and information sharing platforms to foster accountability and transparency.</p>

Intervention area	Suggested actions
3. Cultivate robust climate change legislative frameworks .	3a. Review of the national legal barriers to successful climate change policy implementation through a legal landscape analysis, including existing provisions which hinder implementations as well as empowering provisions required for implementation, to determine the most appropriate legal instrument(s) to develop as well as their content.
	3b. Develop national, district and local level climate relevant laws to facilitate and enable effective policy implementation that give effect to the legal landscape analysis.
4. Improved multi-level governance arrangements, equitable partnerships and coordination platforms for dialogue and learning.	4a. Focus on the process, not just the output. Too often, the focus when developing strategies is on the "what" and not on the "how" or the "why", and yet the process followed to design activities is at least as valuable as the end product.
	4b. Support the implementation of well-resourced decentralization reforms and local stewardship. Awareness raising and contextualising issues for citizens immediately improves local stewardship and participation in co-designing of solutions.
	4c. Promote equitable partnerships, local buy in and shared visioning. Shared visioning of future pathways, open dialogue, and a close analysis of assumptions underpinning worldviews, identities, beliefs, and stigmas based on social circumstances.
	4d. Mainstream climate-resilient development objectives and targets across all areas of governance and into all local development and sector plans.

4.1.2 Coordinated Regional Climate Action

Various structures of the African Union deal with climate change policy and implementation. However, the role of these various structures and bodies in supporting Member States' transition to low emission, climate development needs to be further refined and unpacked. This includes clarifying the role of the African Union and its structures, as well as the AU's specialised agencies and institutions, specialised technical committees, and the 8 African RECs. In addition, the role of UNECA and other UN agencies, as well as other partners, in supporting Africa climate change vision needs to be well coordinated. Please see Appendix 8 for further detail on the existing AU structures.

The AU has a three-tiered climate change negotiating structure, which comprises of the technical African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC). Strengthening collaboration and coherence between these structures is integral to pursuing a unified African voice at the global climate negotiations.

Table 2. Priority intervention areas and suggested actions for coordinated regional climate action.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Strengthen coordination among the African Union and its structures, as well as key regional partners, in supporting Member States to achieve climate action	1a. Mainstream low-emission, climate resilient development across all continental and regional level policies, frameworks and action plans
	1b. Promote synergies between African Union institutions and structures in addressing climate change matters.
	1c. Enhance coordination between the regional economic communities and Member States in addressing and managing transboundary and cascading climate risks.
	1d. Support Member States to develop and implement ambitious NDCs, consistent with national priorities and global Paris Agreement goals.
2. Strengthen Africa's common position in global climate negotiations	2a. Encourage Member States to negotiate as a consolidated Africa bloc.
	2b. Strengthen collaboration between the AGN, AMCEN and CAHOSCC.
	2c. Pursue an integrated and cohesive engagement in global negotiations on collective action, including in relation to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

4.1.3 Anticipatory governance and long-term planning

Climate change policies are developed considering the current challenges we face and what we expect to change (based on a certain vision of the future), recognising that this idea of the future can change. To improve the effectiveness of long-term policies we need to consider what might change in our environment, speculate about how a range of possible futures might look, and use this knowledge to shape better decisions. This will not only make policies more effective but will also increase the confidence of countries in setting ambitious climate goals. Planning processes therefore need to be adaptive and flexible to avoid locking governments and other stakeholders into specific designs and operating procedures as the climate evolves or new information becomes available. In the face of uncertainty and variability, many approaches to natural resource management, infrastructure development and investment may need to be strengthened to deal with the level of uncertainty associated with climate change. Foresight tools can bring citizens, designers, and planners together to reimagine social-ecological connections and overcome sectoral and institutional silos.

An example of an emerging issue for anticipatory governance is engaging the rapidly evolving field of

CDR, which is inherent in many net-zero promises and increasingly in NDCs. African government officials, policy bodies and relevant stakeholders have not been fully engaged in the discussions on CDR as a concept, the approaches to CDR that are being researched, nor understand what role CDR could play in African or global climate policy.

There is broad agreement that African states should be shaping CDR research to understand better how nature-based and technology-driven CDR can support sustainable development and climate adaptation in Africa and globally. Research shows that almost all approaches to CDR would involve both risks and benefits to sustainable development, and African states and organizations should be working to identify the specific approaches that would benefit their states and Africa more broadly.

Not engaging these processes poses a risk to African states related to climate and trade negotiations, the pursuit of finance, efforts to achieve the SDGs, adaptation planning and development planning, as well as access to relevant technologies.



Table 3. Priority interventions and suggested actions for anticipatory governance and proactive, long-term planning.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Increase the robustness of climate policy processes by strengthening their effectiveness in possible future conditions.	1a. Identify the assumptions the climate policies are based on and the shaping and hedging of actions to assure climate goals will be reached.
	1b. Identify drivers of change in national, regional and global contexts, create scenarios to explore possible futures of Africa, and use these to test and enhance climate policies in a participatory manner, involving stakeholders from different groups, ages and backgrounds.
2. Consider the assumptions that underpin climate change plans.	2a. Consider alternative options and back up plans.
	2b. Use assumption-based planning methodologies.
3. Move to a more collective process when developing NDCs, NAPs, other climate and long-term policy planning and development.	3a. Include a broad range of stakeholders throughout the climate policy cycle – from development and design, participatory scenarios development, to implementation and monitoring.

4.1.4 Increase Uptake of Climate Information Services

Despite significant international investment in African CIS, there is an incommensurate uptake of CIS into decision making. Reasons for this include: inaccessibility to and lack of understanding of CIS products; lack of trust in CIS products; a mismatch between the type of information supplied through CIS and the type of information required for decision making. While these represent challenges to the uptake and use of CIS, there are corresponding challenges in the supply/provision of CIS. Limited observational networks in many Africa countries, together with outdated technology, limited internet bandwidth and constrained financial and personnel resources, represent a barrier to provision of quality African-led CIS. These constraints perpetuate a reliance on the global North for provision of CIS for

African decision making. However, within the current CIS landscape there is scope to strengthen the supply of CIS from within Africa, as outlined in the table following.

These actions refer to enhanced collaboration, partnerships and/or co-production, which is a theme that runs through the suggested actions. Collaborative and co-productive processes require equitable partnerships between a variety of knowledge holders, ranging from producers of CIS to intermediaries and users of CIS. Substantial knowledge regarding collaborative processes has been gained in recent years and can be used to guide the processes needed to inform the development, tailoring and delivery of CIS.

Table 4. Priority interventions and suggested actions for the increased uptake of CIS.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Build and enhance weather and climate observational infrastructure and networks for medium and long-term planning.	1a. Harness financial resources for maintaining observation networks, data rescue, storage and sharing. This could include proposals for funding to international (as well as national) funding agencies.
	1b. Motivate for central NMHS budgets from government.
	1c. Investigate and formalise public-private partnerships. This could be facilitated under the WMO Open Consultative Platform for public-private engagement.
2. Improve the uptake and effectiveness of CIS by increasing the coordinated delivery and sustainability of CIS interventions, including through User-Interface Platforms (UIPs).	2a. Enhance collaboration between the NMHS, sectoral experts, practitioners and policy makers to enable central delivery of decision-relevant CIS.
	2b. Develop CIS capacity, based on regional need and developed within African institutions in response to that need. Reduce reliance on international sources of CIS where possible.
	2c. Ensure regular and sustained monitoring and evaluation of CIS interventions.
	2d. Identify and prioritise initiatives that enable CIS interventions to be sustained after funding ceases.
3. Build capacity in the generation, uptake and effective use of CIS across various stakeholder groupings.	3a. Enhance user-informed co-production of CIS, based on good practice guidance.
	3b. Develop capacity to understand and use CIS through training courses, experiential learning (placements, internships etc) and inter-institutional partnerships.
	3c. Enhance methodologies for combining trusted indigenous and scientific knowledge to generate CIS products.
	3d. Develop regional institutional knowledge related to climate modelling and CIS to enhance policy making and increase effective monitoring

4.1.5 Improved Climate Literacy and Awareness

Climate literacy can be defined as an understanding of one's influence on climate and the influence of climate on one and on society. Our response to climate change is affected by our perception of change and an understanding of its causes, impacts and future risks. In general, people with knowledge of the human causes of climate change and who have experienced its impacts are more likely to understand it as a serious threat. As a result, climate change literacy is recognized with "high confidence" by the IPCC as a key foundation for climate change adaptation and mitigation globally. The

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has also recognized the importance of climate change literacy for decision-making and governance, reflected in their development of a new curriculum on environmental law for judiciaries across Africa.

At a minimum, climate change literacy includes both having heard of climate change and understanding that it is, at least in part, caused by people. Advanced levels of climate change literacy include knowledge and skills enabling individuals to make informed decisions

and actions. Understanding the human cause of climate change is a strong predictor of climate change risk perception and can enable responses to climate change that go beyond simply reacting to climate change or business as usual. This is important for Africa, as uninformed and inappropriate responses to climate change can lead to maladaptation and exacerbate vulnerability.

Although perception of climatic change is common across Africa, this alone cannot inform the depth and scope of transformative responses that climate change requires. Furthermore, perception commonly houses misconceptions on the cause of climate change, highlighting the importance of climate change literacy. The average national climate change literacy rate in Africa is only 39%, with large variations within and between countries.

Education is the strongest predictor of climate change literacy in Africa, particularly those with post-secondary education. In every country, the average climate change literacy rate is higher among men than women (mean difference of country means for men and women

was 12.8%). The gender difference varies between 5-25% across African countries; 60% of countries had gendered climate change literacy rates that differed between men and women by more than 10%, and 11 of the 15 countries with the largest gender gap are in West Africa. These are concerning findings given that women are often more vulnerable to climate impacts than men. Poverty undermines climate change literacy and perception that droughts and floods are getting worse by those in poverty highlights exposure to climate change impacts by those with least adaptive capacity.

These observed drivers of climate change literacy overlap with broader developmental challenges on the continent, affording opportunities for co-benefits between progress towards SDGs and climate action, particularly for education, gender equality and poverty reduction. Progress in climate change literacy would therefore afford a concrete opportunity to mainstream climate change within core national and sub-national developmental agendas in Africa, thereby supporting more climate-resilient development pathways.

Table 5. Priority interventions and suggested actions for improved climate literacy and awareness.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Increase regional climate change literacy across all levels of formal and informal education curricula.	1a. Develop and include climate change literacy curricula for formal education (primary, secondary and tertiary levels), extending skills and knowledge for responses to climate change.
	1b. School girls need to be the focus of gender-sensitive approaches to education, emphasising attendance and completion of their schooling.
	1c. Develop regional climate change literacy programmes for informal education (e.g., civil society and other partnering actors), extending skills and knowledge for responses to climate change.
2. Mainstream climate change literacy into targeted sectors most vulnerable to climate change in Africa (across food systems, health, cities, infrastructure, economies, water, heritage, with an emphasis on gender).	2a. Develop extension services that include climate change literacy in programmes for small holder farmers with concentration on skills and knowledge, particularly for adaptation to climate change.
	2b. Promote climate information services co-production and communication in ways that enhance climate change literacy and improved access to useable climate information, particularly for adaptation to climate change.
	2c. Address gendered vulnerability to climate change across all sectors, together with the implementation of equity-based approaches, including provision of skills and knowledge for adaptation to climate change for women.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
3. Mainstream climate change literacy across government policy and decision makers for greater climate action.	3a. Enhance training of and support to high-level government officials with regards to skills and knowledge for climate action (both mitigation and adaptation), for example for the Minister of Finance, and with regards to new and rapidly evolving approaches to climate response, including carbon dioxide removal.
	3b. Advance climate change literacy across all implementing levels and departments of government extending skills and knowledge for responses to climate change.
	3c. Advance climate change literacy for key environmental decision makers, e.g., the Judiciary (UNEP has recognised the importance of climate change literacy for decision making and governance with a new curriculum on environmental law for judiciaries across the continent).

4.1.6 Governance Solutions to Address the Climate-Conflict Nexus

Over the next decade, climate change will have a significant impact on human security in Africa in a variety of ways, such as increasing the number of natural disasters and humanitarian crises, contributing to agricultural loss and food insecurity, and increasing water scarcity. To mitigate the impact of climate change on human security and its potential to induce conflict, it is crucial that steps are taken to improve our understanding of the links between climate change-induced conflict and insecurity, as well as to take pre-emptive action to improve resilience and adaptive capacity, particularly of the most vulnerable states and communities.

Key security institutions in the field of conflict prevention/ resolution/ management need to be trained in a climate sensitive approach, while the adaptation to climate

change also needs to happen in a conflict sensitive manner. An overly technical approach to climate change adaptation may not take other security-related issues (again, this includes development as a whole) into account and therefore even create more tension. Political and societal realities must be considered. Linking the two processes could, on the one hand, contribute to friction and tension, on the other hand, it can also lead to cooperation and understanding and therefore contribute to a more sustainable peace.

Furthermore, what causes conflict in one area does not necessarily cause the same outcome in another area. Thus, highly context-based and localized solutions are crucial (especially with regards to the respective country's history of violence/conflict).

Table 6. Priority interventions and suggested actions for governance solutions to address the climate-conflict nexus.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Strengthen the capacity of AUPSA and institutions to analyse climate-related peace and security risks and develop appropriate detection, mediation, and resolution strategies.	1a. Provide intelligence and regional early warning centres with training on integrating climate risks into existing analytical tools and conducting in-depth climate-sensitive conflict analysis and climate-sensitive peacebuilding strategies.
	1b. Provide the AU Mediation Support Unit and RECs Mediation Support Units with training in climate-conflict dispute resolution.
	1c. Call on RECs to develop regional climate-conflict prevention frameworks that identify context, institution performance, and the role of key actors, and recognises the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of climate risks.
	1d. Advance post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding activities through climate development objectives and common activities.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
2. Strengthen the capacity of Member States and RECs to develop more integrated responses to climate-related security risks.	2a. Support the development of national structures and processes that allow for integrated responses to climate-related security risks and coordination between policy areas and monitoring and evaluation systems.
	2b. Establish training for government members across departments and agencies on climate risks, development and peacebuilding strategies.
3. Strengthen the capacity of vulnerable communities to better engage in national climate policy process.	3a. Identify communities most vulnerable to climate-change human security risks, such as farmers, coastal fishing communities, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and provide them with training in national climate policy planning, agenda setting, monitoring and implementation.
	3b. Develop national mechanisms that allow vulnerable communities to engage with parliament on national climate adaptation and green industrialization initiatives.

4.2 Strategic Intervention Axis 2: Adopting Pathways Towards Transformative Climate Resilience Development

This section addresses the key cross-sectoral systems transitions required to address climate change, including systems related to food, ecosystems, energy, infrastructure, mobility, cities, water, the blue economy and the digital economy. In addition to their central role in achieving mitigation objectives, these systems themselves face significant climate change impacts, making adaptation action in these systems critical. These systems are key drivers for development across the African continent and are critical enablers for productivity, sustainable economic growth, job creation and social inclusion. These cross-cutting systems also contribute significantly to human development, poverty reduction, and the attainment of the Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, and research shows that investing in these cross-sectoral opportunities, including as part of post COVID-19 stimulus packages, can aid in a sustainable green recovery. Transforming them is key for countries at all stages of development and requires action from the public and private sector to unlock major economic opportunities and create new markets and jobs, and to reduce the trajectory of emissions and limit climate

vulnerabilities. Interventions and actions that support these key transitions will need to take into account macroeconomic and fiscal impacts, in addition to managing social and labour impacts.

This Strategy identifies eight systems for transformation and recommends key intervention strategies and actions for each. Climate action includes both mitigation and adaptation across these key systems. Significant investment in education, training, and retraining to develop skills in these key systems is essential for people to benefit from the jobs created in the green economy. The Strategy will thus prioritize climate action across these systems to advance development objectives through impactful country operations and programmes – including support for policy reforms, public and private sector investments, guarantees, and advisory services – and to support a just transition for African Union Member States, including through additional financing, technical and capacity support. In addition to these eight key systems, the Strategy will also support adaptation action in other priority areas such as disaster risk management.

The interventions and actions outlined below require a strong foundation of cross-cutting themes to be successful:

- **A strong, integrated and cohesive policy environment:** Governments should revise and strengthen policies to realign incentives across all land tenure and oceans systems, ensure integrated land-use and spatial planning, clarify tenure and rights, provide better management related to land use planning and protected areas, and develop carbon trading opportunities.
- **Economic development, financial opportunities and job creation:** Governments should prioritize green job creation and enterprise development to support economic development in all sectors of the economy.
- **Strengthening effective governance systems:** Governments should invest in technical and institutional capacity building, as well as supporting stakeholder-driven and responsive participation, transparency and accountability.
- **Effective and equitable application of safeguards towards high-quality outcomes:** Governments should develop frameworks and mechanisms for the effective inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, ensure to not only do no harm but also achieve positive social outcomes for communities, and promote gender-sensitive inclusion in decision-making.
- **Emphasis needs to be placed on regional and localised differences in climate change impacts and development contexts.** Regional strategies often apply broad approaches to challenges and opportunities. Institutional coordination at local, national, sub-regional and continental level is key. The AU, working with RECs and Member States, can play a key role in driving climate responses by integrating climate change into key development, trade, finance, environmental and economic policies, strategies and action plans.
- **Trade-offs between objectives need to be explicitly addressed to prevent significant disconnect between strategies and actions on the ground.** For example, attracting capital for climate mitigation activities may lead to conflict with food security, biodiversity, and local development initiatives. Although not easy, developing a hierarchy of priorities/objectives/goals goes a long way towards addressing national and local trade-offs.
- **Finance, investment and resource allocation** are key to support the implementation of NDCs, climate policies more broadly, as well as climate change projects.
- **Strengthening capacity building and development** so that all stakeholders can effectively engage in climate action.

4.2.1 Food Systems Under a Changing Climate

Africa's commitment to transform its food systems is articulated in Agenda 2063 and associated policy frameworks. CAADP and the African Union's Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods provide a coherent framework for tackling intrinsic challenges within Africa's many food systems. These frameworks spell out the continent's targets for food and agriculture by 2025, using 2013 as the baseline. The targets are to end hunger, halve poverty, triple intra-Africa trade and ensure that at least 30% of livelihoods dependent on agriculture are resilient to climate change. The challenge is to reconcile between

these frameworks and provide a mechanism for tracking progress in multiple domains based on country reporting.

Deeper commitments to addressing climate change will need to take on board multiple linkages to food systems that have been identified through forums, processes, and institutions such as the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit, the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) processes and the work of the IPCC. Opportunities to intensify efforts on biodiversity and land health are also included in the Decade on Ecosystem Restoration; the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

Accelerating this progress requires a profound change in all facets of the food system, especially in the context of climate change, emerging pandemics, and threats to biological diversity. Food systems continent-wide are under increasing pressure and have yet to produce sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, or to prioritise nutritional outcomes and needs in agricultural sector planning. National and regional organizations and governments will need to work hard to benefit populations equally and equitably, and to account for and address the negative impacts of food systems on the environment and natural resources. At the same time, large amounts of investment will need to be sought so that biophysical, social and ecological performance indicators can be monitored rapidly and efficiently to ensure progress towards the continent's food system targets.

The challenges of prioritising, financing and implementing the changes needed in Africa's food systems need to

be urgently addressed, so that existing failings can be rectified and the threats from climate change addressed. Central to these challenges are dimensions of inclusion, equitable distribution of risks and benefits across food systems, and a focus on gender, youth empowerment, and rural employment

Priorities for research and innovation need to focus on addressing the fundamental challenges faced by farmers, which relate to policies, institutions, and society in general. In the past, the prevailing focus of research and innovation has tended to concentrate largely on technical solutions. For the future, technical innovation needs to be supported by appropriate enabling conditions so that the finance, markets, capacity development, policy and regulatory frameworks and social safety nets needed are all in place. Crucially, the needs and voices of farmers who are on the frontline of climate change and most exposed to the risk need to be at the centre of the transformation agenda.



Table 7. Priority interventions and suggested actions for food systems under a changing climate.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Promote the equitable sharing of climate risk and reward amongst all food system actors, especially small-scale, rural farmers	1a. Establish a climate-risk insurance facility at a regional level to which every food systems player contributes, directly or indirectly.
	1b. Enhance availability of and access to appropriate climate-related insurance products to farmers, as well as novel risk-sharing mechanisms like risk pooling and other innovative models.
	1c. Develop regional mechanisms that ensure that the financial costs of climate disasters are not borne solely by farmers, but spread more equitably across the range of food systems actors, including consumers.
2. Enhance resilience of food systems against climate effects, while emphasising nutrition outcomes and integrated planning.	2a. Enhance regional capacity development, communication and social movements around blended local and international food systems.
	2b. Extend use of smart, innovative and climate-resilient technologies, renewable energy production, breed/variety development/switching and technologies that preserve and enhance nutritional qualities in food.
	2c. Implement appropriate valuation framework for the ecosystems management services provided by farmers to the general public and pay them fair value.
3. Emphasise production toward agro-ecological transition , to reduce GHG intensity (including methane and other gases), and dependencies on external inputs.	3a. Support research, extension and implementation of public sector and market-based instruments toward agroecological, regenerative, nature-based and indigenous approaches for integrated farming and pastoral systems or resilient landscapes).
	3b. Provide resources to enable/facilitate the transition to more nature positive production systems by farmers.
4. Strengthen food system governance interventions across Africa's regions.	4a. Conduct systematic review of existing policies, strategies and incentive mechanisms that support/inhibit transition to sustainable food systems.
	4b. Modify policies, processes and strategies to become more inclusive and participatory (farmers, women and youth) and support sub-national scales of food systems governance (territorial/landscape) while linking them with resources and authority to national level.
	4c. Enhance the role and influence of public procurement in food purchasing to support diverse and nutritious diets (for example, municipal support for local sourcing to public canteens, home-grown school feeding programmes).
	4d. Develop synergies across sectoral planning and investments in infrastructure and related investments (for example, how energy and transport dependencies can better cohere with resilience goals for food systems, as well as how to improve infrastructure to reduce post-harvest losses).
	4e. Align food system visions and targets with other national strategies and commitments (for example, NDCs, UNCCD net-zero land degradation targets, AFR100 and CBD biodiversity frameworks, SDGs and national development plans).

Intervention area	Suggested actions
5. Strengthen finance, investment and resource allocation interventions.	5a. Coordinate and augment investments by channelling flows toward sustainable food systems from philanthropy, private sector direct investment, and multi-lateral donors.
	5b. De-risk investment toward transition by distribution roles across philanthropic, public and private finance by avoiding single source funds; ensure better coverage across short- and long-term investing; maintain balance of risk to investors across spectrum of scales; ensure that ESG and social impact investment reporting by private sector is well monitored and promoted.
	5c. Analyse subsidy and investment programmes to ensure that direct payment schemes for food system actors are aimed toward sustainable food systems transformation.
	5d. Assess how financial and non-monetary incentives are applied to shift behaviours into more resilient, collaborative and integrated approaches.
	5e. Draw from cross-value chain initiative models that recognise and remunerate champions of transformation – highlighting successes (for examples, Beacons of Hope, Milan Urban Food Policy Pact and Rockefeller Food System Vision Prize).
	5f. Support development of market-based mechanisms to reward social and environmental outcomes (Ecosystem outcome verification, bundling of ecosystem services with carbon markets for agriculture sector, etc.).
	5g. Explore and establish innovative mechanisms that enhance availability and access to financial resources (both mitigation and adaptation) by farmers, such as soil carbon management carbon dioxide removal.

4.2.2 Managing and Protecting Land-Based Ecosystems

Ecosystem protection and restoration practices may be the best means in African contexts for removing atmospheric carbon in many different future scenarios. Such practices, if governed well, can also generate social, environmental, and economic benefits. For example, water and food security (and energy security, to a lesser extent) is highly dependent on functioning ecosystems.

Sustainable intensification and integration of agricultural systems into landscapes and ecosystems that improve soil carbon storage are a priority for the continent. This includes regenerative agricultural practices that disincentivise clearing of forests and natural vegetation, maintain/improve groundwater recharge, and improve biodiversity outcomes.

African governments need to prioritise investment in ecosystem protection and restoration practices, and other ecosystem-based approaches, to build green

economies, mitigate climate change and increase peoples' resilience to climate shocks. The 'Restoration Economy' refers to enhancing the environmental integrity of a landscape through a variety of place-appropriate interventions built on sustainable investment streams that deliver economic returns. In this context, ecosystem restoration, enterprise development and conservation finance methods can be utilised to support long-term climate security through accessing private sector finance for small, micro- and medium-sized enterprises. The interventions have co-benefits of enhancing community-level resilience to climate change and delivering EbA through livelihood and business activities. This can lead to the creation of social, and for-profit enterprises, which support both ecosystem restoration and economic development in remote, rural communities. Potential value chains in Africa include red meat, alien biomass, ecotourism and carbon.

Table 8. Priority interventions and suggested actions for protecting land-based ecosystems and carbon sinks.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Develop bankable measures for ecosystem protection/restoration, sustainable water resources management and regenerative agriculture.	1a. Study and implement a broad range of economic incentives for sustainable businesses that contribute to ecosystem protection/restoration, sustainable water resources management and regenerative agriculture. This includes Article 6's carbon trading opportunities.
	1b. Ensure incentives and bankable solutions align with continental, sub-regional, national and local policy directions and socio-political contexts.
2. Build technical capacity for implementing and investing in regenerative and biodiversity positive agricultural systems across the region.	2a. Develop and support landscape scale multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable agricultural intensification and expansion.
	2b. Design regional agricultural intensification and expansion plans in line with projected changes in climate change.
	2c. Lobby for and develop intra-African agricultural trade, development and investment partnerships to aggregate performance and risk.
3. Finance sustainable land-based ecosystems to enhance for climate adaptation and mitigation.	3a. Develop continental financing mechanisms for EbA that consider a wider range of costs and benefits in credit risk assessments.
	3b. Develop regional financing facilities (including nationally nested facilities) for supporting the development of EbA that have both social and environmental benefits.
4. Protect key carbon sinks in all ecosystems found in Africa.	4a. Support the establishment and improve management of Protected Areas (PA) in irrecoverable carbon ecosystems through integrated land use planning for new PA siting, increased enforcement of PAs and capacity building for PA managers, and incentives for community monitoring of PAs.
	4b. Increase designation of community managed ecosystem-rich areas, capacity building for community management, and empower Indigenous Peoples and local communities through clarifying land rights, providing training and strengthening governance.
5. Avoid further degradation of and enhance sustainable management of all ecosystems.	5a. Encourage zero loss of biodiversity commodity supply chains by leveraging climate-positive commitments/investments by private sector companies to support activities that strengthen landscape governance; facilitate alignment and action across stakeholders; support capacity building on land use planning; provide extension services and training; clarify land tenure, enhance governance and undertake policy revisions.
	5b. Remove perverse incentives that lead to destructive activities (fossil fuel subsidies) and encourage nature-positive activities (through tax incentives).

Intervention area	Suggested actions
5. Avoid further degradation of and enhance sustainable management of all ecosystems.	5c. Leverage climate finance opportunities to encourage REDD+ implementation at site-scale and jurisdictional level in alignment with national GHG accounting, including by creating the appropriate policy and technical processes and infrastructure, attracting private sector investment, clarifying carbon rights and benefit-sharing arrangements, and providing capacity-building.
6. Restore and sustainably manage agricultural systems (including crop and livestock systems) to reduce and remove GHG emissions, reduce human-wildlife conflict, enhance food security and water regulation benefits.	6a. Catalyse continent-wide actions on commitments (such as AFR100) to scale restoration, with a key focus on cost-effective and science-driven assisted natural regeneration through a mix of active planting and eliminating barriers and disturbances to native vegetation recovery.
	6b. Promote agroforestry systems with local and climate-resilient species that provide diversified livelihoods.
	6c. Prioritise novel, integrated livestock management approaches, such as the Herding 4 Health model, which is scalable and traditionally acceptable, enables wildlife-livestock coexistence, climate-change adaptation, carbon sequestration and water regulation.
	6d. Develop policy to allow livestock development strategies that support rural development and contribute to a restoration economy, including the development of national policies and mechanisms to allow for carbon credit trading and benefit sharing for communities that implement rangeland restorative practices.
7. Integrate biodiversity conservation and sustainable management in climate change actions.	7a. Promote and expand conservation of biodiverse areas, including sustainable use and community management.
8. Ensure focus on food security, land-use rights and protection of biodiversity in projects for ecosystem-based approaches approaches to carbon removal.	8a. Integrate full community impact assessments into projects for afforestation, soil enhancement, coastal wetland expansion, and others which are driven by goals of carbon dioxide removal for either credits or payment.
	8b. Develop 'sustainable ecosystem-based approaches' frameworks to ensure that carbon dioxide removal is not done at expense of development needs and local rights.

4.2.3 Enhancing Climate-Resilient and Low-Emission Energy and Infrastructural Systems

Renewable energy generation and sustainable domestic energy consumption are key target areas for achieving a climate-resilient and low-emission future in Africa.

Energy generation

Access to adequate and reliable electricity services is a necessary pre-condition for economic growth. Yet nearly half of Africans lack electricity access in their homes. Furthermore, around 80% of companies in Africa face regular disruptions to their electricity supply. Many African countries are failing to build the distribution networks required to connect poor households or add sufficient generation supply to meet growing demand. The International Energy Agency projects that total generation in the region must more than double by 2030 to meet demand. Outside of South Africa, it must triple.

Renewable energy is central to addressing both these challenges. Africa is endowed with a wealth of renewable resources. Its river systems, bioenergy, sunshine and wind could meet the region's current and future electricity needs. Hydropower already generates 22% of sub-Saharan Africa's electricity. However, wind, solar, biomass and geothermal collectively contribute only 1%.

The cost of non-hydro renewable electricity has declined dramatically in recent years. Off-grid solar home systems are the cheapest option for providing electricity to nearly a quarter of unconnected homes, negating the need for extending distribution lines to rural areas. Renewable electricity generation from solar PV, wind, biomass, geothermal and hydropower is also increasingly the most cost-effective option for expanding grid-connected supply in many African countries. By 2030, solar is expected to be the cheapest or second-cheapest domestic energy source in most African countries.

In the International Renewable Energy Agency's Renewable Energy Roadmap 2030 scenario, renewable energy contributes 58% of sub-Saharan Africa's electricity mix by 2030, with non-hydro renewables contributing 23%. Underpinning this scenario is a dramatic increase in investment, with over US\$500 billion needed between

2015 and 2030 – 50% of which is needed for renewable energy. Both public and private finance will be required to close this spending gap.

Furthermore, given abundant renewable energy potential in different parts of the continent, there is also the possibility that some renewable energy could power technological carbon dioxide removal approaches, such as direct air capture and storage, potentially funded by developed countries. Also, some carbon dioxide removal approaches, such as Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, if designed and governed sustainably, could both generate energy and remove carbon from the atmosphere to meet obligations, or to generate financial flows and livelihoods, enabling development or further expansion of renewable energy infrastructure.

Domestic energy consumption

Most of the domestic energy consumed in rural Africa comes from biomass (wood energy and charcoal), the use of which not only causes deforestation and health problems, but also contributes to climate change. This has led to the development of technological solutions such as improved stoves for cooking, biogas and solar energy systems for pumping water. However, the uptake of these technologies remains insufficient for Africa to realise a low-emission and climate-resilient future.

Africa needs to fully commit to overhauling its modes of energy production, transformation and consumption to strengthen a security of supply, preserve the competitiveness of its economy, and protect the environment. An analysis of African countries' energy systems and the challenges faced over the past decade highlights the need for system transformation via two priority areas:

- Use of renewable energies
- Strengthening energy use efficiency

Table 9. Priority interventions and suggested actions for enhancing climate-resilient and low-emission energy and infrastructural systems.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
Energy generation	
1. Integrated water resource management.	1a. Ensure that hydropower infrastructure is planned in coordination with other sectors that compete for the same water resources.
2. Promote power system planning for a climate-resilient, low-emission electricity network.	2a. Set long-term targets for renewables to stimulate a pipeline of investible renewable projects.
	2b. Hydropower development must include projections of potential future patterns of hydrological variability, not just historical data.
3. Increase power capacity by harnessing the regional potential of river basins to strengthen resilience to droughts and get renewable electricity to markets.	3a. To enable cross-basin trade, the transmission networks and market structures in the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) and East Africa Power Pool (EAPP) should be interconnected, as is currently planned, not developed independently.
4. Strengthen power sector reforms to enable renewable energy.	4a. Allow broad-based participation in power supply to deliver financial needs and to harness the expertise of international renewable energy developers and investors, including independent power producers (IPPs).
	4b. Enhance regional policy and regulatory frameworks to encourage power sector reforms.
5. Expand renewable capacity through competitive auctions.	5a. Increase competitive tenders can simulate a pipeline of bankable projects, if held regularly, through transparent and predictable planning processes.
6. Strengthen finance and risk mitigation for efficient and renewable energy.	6a. Governments and development finance institutions should crowd-in private investment by providing robust power purchase agreements, affordable loans and risk guarantee facilities to mitigate risks that the private sector is ill-equipped to handle.
Domestic energy consumption	
7. Enhance access to energy efficient solutions for all.	7a. Improve access to energy for more people by enhancing energy efficiency.
	7b. Focus efficiency interventions on electricity use and fuel types used for cooking.
	7c. Promote policies and organizational frameworks more conducive to enhanced energy efficiency and new market development.
	7d. Increase access to modern cooking fuels and promote nation-wide energy efficiency, in collaboration with implementing partners, local governments and communes.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
8. Increase adoption of new low-cost, energy saving technologies.	8a. Identify appropriate energy efficiency solutions/technologies that could be scaled up for larger development impact.
	8b. Promote improved cooking stoves, mini-grids and other innovative solutions.
	8c. Exchange knowledge and technology between rural and urban households to support rural households in the adoption and use of improved stoves.
	8d. Build knowledge on energy efficiency.
9. Build climate resilience and a just transition with a focus on women, girls and young people.	9a. Ensure that sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns target women, as they are almost exclusively in charge of collecting fuel for cooking.
	9b. Support households in reducing energy poverty and address the challenges of cooking with solid biomass.
	9c. Encourage the adoption of improved stoves and modern cooking fuels. This reduces cooking time (alleviating women's time-poverty), greenhouse gas emissions, and health risks.
	9d. Provide high quality training to those who play a key role in the dissemination and implementation of energy efficiency.

4.2.4 Inclusive, low-emission and resource-efficient industrialization

Agenda 2063 recognizes the centrality of industrialization as one of the key strategic objectives that will drive the social and economic structural transformation of the continent. The first 10-year implementation plan for Agenda 2063 also identifies industrialization and manufacturing as one of the seven core priority areas for its implementation. Agenda 2063 clearly highlights the need to implement continental strategies for industrialization in Africa. This has provided for the development and implementation of major continental strategies that support Africa's industrialization.

The implementation strategy for The African Union Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA), which aims at fostering sustainable economic growth, wealth creation and global integration using manufacturing as a dynamic force, provided a major strategic underpinning for industrialization. AIDA focuses on driving the integration of industrialization in national development policies, especially in poverty alleviation strategies, development and implementation of industrial policy, with priority accorded to maximizing the

use of local productive capacities and inputs through value addition and local processing of natural resources in each country. The coming into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), has also provided a new impetus for promoting industrialization in Africa.

There is no doubt that Africa has enormous potential for industrialization, given its rich natural resources as well as prospects for developing intra-African value chains and integration into global value chains. Industrialization in Africa, however, does not necessarily need to follow the same path of polluting and inefficient industrialization process that had been followed by countries in other regions. On the contrary, following the conventional industrialization path under an increasingly carbon and resource constrained world is neither viable nor tenable. In this context, African countries need to adopt a new path of industrialization that creates jobs and livelihoods for its people, while at the same time responding to climate change and maintaining the sustainability and integrity of its natural ecosystems.

Effective industrial policy and strategy is about anticipating important long-term trends of technology and market development and providing incentives to adopt the structure of a national economy in such a way that it can take advantage of the change. Looking back at the economic history of Africa, it is evident that the region has not adequately leveraged earlier stages of the industrial revolution. We are now faced with the prospect of the fourth industrial revolution (4IR). Depending on how African countries prepare and position themselves, they would either be further marginalized from the global economy or be an active contributor and beneficiary from this transition.

Africa has a unique leapfrogging opportunity to build inclusive, resource-efficient and climate-resilient industrial economies. This would require learning from the mistakes made by developed countries and transition economies, taking advantage of existing and emerging knowledge and technology systems, fostering innovation, developing appropriate skills, and capitalizing on emerging global and continental opportunities related to sustainability and green economy transitions.

Table 10. Priority intervention areas and suggested actions for inclusive, low emission and resource efficient industrialisation

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Develop institutional infrastructure that could effectively guide sustainable industrial development.	1a. Develop coherent and integrated industrial development policies and strategies for low-emission and resource-efficient industrialization. 1b. Promote effective university-industry linkages that generate qualified human resources equipped with the required skill-sets for low-emission industrial development.
2. Develop industrial infrastructure that provides a sustainable basis for industrialization.	2a. Ensure that all industrial infrastructure is developed and managed in a climate-resilient resource-efficient approach. 2b. Develop eco-industrial parks that are horizontally and vertically integrated with local, national and regional economies.
3. Develop distributed renewable energy systems for decent job creation and wellbeing.	3a. Promote development of distributed renewable energy systems as drivers for sustainable local and regional value addition and job creation. 3b. Facilitate digital technology application to enhance the economic empowerment and inclusivity of communities, with particular focus on youth on women.
4. Promote energy efficient industrial development.	4a. Develop and implement national industrial energy efficiency improvement programmes that are aimed at reducing both the material and energy intensity of economic activities. 4b. Provide incentives and institutional support that encourages industries to increase the share of renewable energy in the overall energy mix.
5. Promote waste management systems that emphasise waste to resource conversion.	5a. Promote national industrial waste management programmes, with a particular focus on prevention at the source and waste-to-resource conversion 5b. Develop properly designed and managed waste management infrastructure that reduces emissions and the discharge of toxic and hazardous pollutants.



4.2.5 Promoting Low-Emission, Resilient Mobility and Transport Systems

Discussions and priorities around climate change in the mobility sector can be grouped into three broad categories: mitigation, adaptation, and planning.

In terms of mitigation, there is a growing interest in the electrification of vehicles on the continent, with their work on electrifying 2- and 3-wheelers in East Africa and the uYilo programme in South Africa being leaders in the discussion. The conversation on the electrification of bus fleets has started among operators, often linked to Bus Rapid Transport and other public transport reform programmes, with Marrakesh and Cape Town leading the way.

The electrification of the paratransit industry in African cities is entangled in the complex relationship that it has with the state, but opportunities exist in programmes like the South African Taxi Recapitalization Scheme. Improving fuel standards and regulating the import of used vehicles has seen considerable progress across the continent in recent years, though the air quality in

many cities continues to decline and an acceleration of this progress would be welcomed by the environmental and public health sectors. Adaptation discussions in the African transport sector have primarily focused on the climate resilience of road infrastructure. For example, in response to anticipated climate change, the Ethiopian Roads Authority has proposed increasing the flood levels for road design by 10% up to 2030 and by 20% from 2030 to 2090.

While vehicle electrification, improvements to fuel standards and road infrastructure resilience are important climate change actions, arresting the rise in motorization across the continent and retaining the high public and non-motorised transport mode shares through low-emission infrastructure investment has the potential for a significantly larger effect. Under the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) programme, some African states have identified investments in public transport and transit-oriented development as desired mitigation-adaptation interventions within their cities.

These interventions have been highlighted as examples of 'triple-wins', which simultaneously reduce the vulnerability of low-income residents to climate shocks, prevent lock-ins into carbon-intensive development pathways, and reduce poverty. African cities have the opportunity to build resilient, transit-oriented cities from the outset, but the higher upfront financial burden on the state may need support from the international community. The combined 'mitigation-adaptation' interventions in the land use-transport systems of African cities are also likely to have sufficient short-term co-benefits (reducing air pollution, congestion, and traffic fatalities) to be no-regret investments.

To facilitate these mitigation and adaptation interventions, the approaches to planning mobility systems in African countries need to become more climate aware. It's a process that many countries themselves are leading,

but it requires greater collaboration and discussion at the continental level. The coming transitions in transport planning, such as incrementalism, hybridity, digitalization, access-based planning and decision-making under deep uncertainty all need to be contextualised within African environments and cognisant of the associated climate risks. The traditional transport planning paradigm premised on travel time savings during the peak hour commute to formal employment nodes is being questioned heavily, and new paradigms – such as the Avoid-Shift-Improve framework – are gaining momentum. Homegrown frameworks for the design and planning of low-emission mobility systems in African countries need to be explored to achieve specific goals and remain resilient to the unique risks the region will face in the years to come

Table 11. Priority interventions and suggested actions for promoting low-emission, resilient mobility and transport systems.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Build climate-aware transport planning capacity to better shape resilient mobility systems and infrastructure.	1a. Train transport planners and engineers in climate policy, planning under deep uncertainty, access-based planning, incrementalism, hybridity, adaptive project implementation and dynamic monitoring.
	1b. Collaborate in developing climate-aware, locally appropriate transport-planning masters and undergraduate courses at African universities.
	1c. Invest in research around the 'just transition' to low-emission, resilient mobility in African cities through a continental knowledge platform.
	1d. Invest in research on green and efficient fuel supply options.
2. Change the project financing and evaluation requirements for development banks to prioritise resilience, modal split, access equity, and emission mitigation, alongside travel time savings.	2a. Guide the use of development, concession and blended financing arrangements to include the complex climate and social risks – including risks that stem from the projects themselves.
	2b. De-prioritise the use of travel time savings as a metric for transport project benefit to acknowledge its effects on carbon intensity, as well as its weakening correlation with access, economic productivity, and social progress.
3. Support the adaptation of road standards and transport planning guidelines to include resilient designs, as well as prioritise the needs of the most popular and lowest carbon transport modes – walking and cycling.	3a. Compile African design standards for public transport systems and roads, including the infrastructure for non-motorised transport, which adheres to African resilience and universal accessibility principles.
	3b. Include the voices of vulnerable walking and cycling groups within local, national and regional planning processes.

4.2.6 Building Low-Emission, Resilient Urban Areas

African cities, and current and future urban transitions, can contribute significantly to the continent's climate mitigation and adaptation targets, as well as SDG, biodiversity, poverty, resource sustainability and inequality targets. It can do this by developing mutually beneficial urban-rural linkages, and territorial scale development, in order to invest in regeneration and the renewability of urban, peri-urban and hinterland

natural environments – as well as embracing a planning approach that puts the ecological landscape first, before embedding urban development. This landscape approach can improve the circular economy at the city region scale, aid in disaster-risk reduction, draw attention to ecosystem service synergies and promote agroecological food systems localization.

Table 12. Priority interventions and suggested actions for building low-emission, more resilient urban areas.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Promote resilient, nature-based solutions and urban green infrastructure.	1a. Promote opportunities to realise the multiple co-benefits of incorporating ecosystem-based approaches, including hybridised blue-green-grey infrastructure, to help regulate water flow, reduce the heat island effect, treat wastewater, reduce stormwater runoff, and improve water supplies.
	1b. Adopt an integrated landscape approach as a basic framework to balance competing demands, manage multiple land uses, and understand connections in a specific area.
	1c. Invest in long-term maintenance and security and surveillance measures in both individual nodes (e.g., parks) and connections (e.g., pedestrian walkways) to support nature-based solutions in urban centres.
	1d. Scale monetary and non-monetary valuation of nature-based solutions, enhance appreciation of natural capital and complement this with cultural ecosystem assessments that consider production capacities, cultural practices, and access to markets.
	1e. Employ new metrics such as Biodiversity Net Gain, where infrastructure development leaves biodiversity in a measurably better state than beforehand.
	1f. Implement and enforce robust environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental impact assessments prior when expanding urban centres.
	1g. Promote soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon management as vital elements to ensure the land's ability to produce food, store water, control soil erosion and dust, maintain soil stability during extreme rainfall events, reduce carbon losses, among other benefits.
	1h. Plant indigenous trees for shade, reduction of heat stress, and, buffering against storm surges (e.g., mangroves and seagrass), thereby preventing the loss of property and human lives.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
2. Invest in the circular economy, smart mobility, decarbonization and net zero carbon buildings .	<p>2a. Focus on resource efficient, compact, and mixed-use urbanization as well as net-zero carbon building designs.</p> <p>2b. Prioritise smart mobility, transit-oriented bicycle, and walking infrastructure in new or refurbished designs.</p> <p>2c. Integrate water resource use efficiency in the design of infrastructure as well as building a circular economy for waste.</p> <p>2d. Decarbonise and detoxify energy systems by considering renewable energy in new or existing infrastructure designs.</p> <p>2e. Scale up district heating. In dense urban areas, district heating radically increases thermal efficiency and decreases heat loss through heat recycling, combined heat and power systems, and economies of scale.</p>
3. Build technical capacity in African cities to adapt to the impacts of climate change.	<p>3a. Support cities access to climate finance by developing concept notes, investment cases and pre-feasibility studies for pilot projects to developers/funders.</p> <p>3b. Train local government officials in climate finance processes, language and opportunities.</p> <p>3c. Strengthen national education and outreach campaigns related to climate-resilient urban development.</p> <p>3d. Promote knowledge exchanges around best practices. These are particularly valuable in data poor regions where information sharing is challenging, ecological and social observations are scarce, institutional mandates for monitoring are ill-defined, and data access is often cost prohibitive.</p>
4. Prioritise risk reduction and building adaptive capacity of residents living in informal, or peri urban settlements .	<p>4a. Accelerate and simplify land tenure reforms to stimulate phased restoration of urban natural ecosystems to buffer against hydroclimatic risks and heat stress.</p> <p>4b. Upgrade informal settlements and slum areas in cities to build urban climate resilience and therefore should be considered in policy making.</p> <p>4c. Develop extended and inclusive planning processes that rely on assessments to help prioritise specific needs of a city and its communities. Co-producing relevant interventions is crucial to ensure social ownership of strategies.</p> <p>4d. Change the perceptions around how decision makers see areas of informality to foster better engagement between informal sector representatives and municipalities. These are the ideal entry point to service these settlements with the potential to take implementation from the unplanned to the planned.</p>



4.2.7 Enhancing Resilient Water Systems

Building the resilience of water investments in Africa is a critical response to the projected severe and more frequent impacts of climate change. Climate-resilient water interventions need to consider gender inequalities since men and women are impacted by, and respond differently to, the impacts of climate change. Africa needs to move towards a gender equal and climate-resilient water system to ensure water security that will support sustainable socio-economic development.

Major decisions require careful planning; in cases involving large investments, long lifetimes and irreversibility, there is a strong argument for assessing resilience to future climate change. However, uncertainty is particularly high in relation to future rainfall patterns due to differences between climate model results. It is exacerbated by the fact that changes may not be unidirectional; it is possible for rainfall to fluctuate over decadal timescales, inducing wet and dry periods in the same location. This uncertainty has important bearing on research directions and practical approaches to climate resilience in the water sector.

While many features of water-resources management have evolved measures to build resilience in the face of uncertainty and variability (such as forecasting, supply augmentation, storage, the use of groundwater and in some cases, demand management), many traditional approaches to infrastructure design for long-term assets and investments may be inadequate for the level of uncertainty associated with climate change. In such situations, Robust Decision-Making or Decision-Making Under Uncertainty approaches can help to identify adaptation strategies that work reasonably well under a range of conditions ('stress testing' system performance under a range of climate projections is recommended). This requires identifying what is at risk, for whom, under different policies. Flexible options that avoid locking into specific designs and operating procedures can be useful as the climate evolves or new information becomes available. Flexibility and robustness are generally desirable properties for resilient water systems.

Another important requirement for resilience is the recognition of interdependencies between water and other sectors. The water-energy-food (WEF) nexus is a good example, and its growing prominence is driven by concern about natural resource scarcities and the recognition that the WEF nexus sectors and other resources are strongly interdependent— such that development may imply significant trade-offs. In Africa, this is compounded by, among other things, the consequences of rapid development trajectories, including an upsurge in new dam construction, and high levels of physical and socio-economic exposure to climate in nexus sectors with crucial economic roles throughout the continent. However, few studies in Africa fully integrate all three nexus sectors, and they rarely include an explicit focus on climate change. This is a gap in our knowledge base.

While most climate impact assessments consider the physical components of nexus sectors and their interdependencies, understanding their management and governance structures is also important. Resilient systems require a cross-sectoral understanding of vulnerabilities and management decision points, and a cross-sectoral coordination for effective implementation. Barriers to coordination include institutional structures, limited resources, issues around cost recovery, free-riders and a need to protect roles and responsibilities to ensure future budgets. Political will and appropriate budget and human resource allocation can help to address such barriers.

Table 13. Priority interventions and suggested actions for enhancing resilient water systems.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Increase water investment.	1a. Increase political commitment for gender equal and climate-resilient water investment.
	1b. Mobilise financial and other resources for water investment.
	1c. Strengthen capacities (institutional and individual) for developing, implementing, operating and managing water investment programmes/ projects.
2. Establish systems for developing and transferring technologies to support climate resilience building.	2a. Develop innovation to produce water-efficient and climate-sensitive technologies, including water harvesting.
	2b. Develop innovation and practices to deal with cost-effective wastewater treatment
	2c. Develop national systems for transferring, adapting and applying technologies.
3. Integrate water resource management.	3a. Take actions to ensure that the natural resource base (water, land other natural resources) is maintained to support development in a changing climate.
	3b. Protect water-related ecological systems and build their climate resilience. Also deal with demand management challenges.
	3c. Establish systems for managing water resources, considering hydrological boundaries as units of management/development.
4. Strengthen transboundary water management and cooperation.	4a. Develop cooperative mechanisms for managing shared water resources.
	4b. Take actions for joint investment projects in shared water resources for benefit sharing.
	4c. Develop and implement a basin-wide development and management plans/programmes considering climate change.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
5. Integrate water security issues into development plans/ programmes.	5a. Integrate water security into national and sectoral development plans/ programmes.
	5b. Integrate water security into climate response strategies such as NDCs and NAPs.
6. Strengthen the characterisation of climate risk in water systems.	6a. Include a focus on past and recent variability and extremes and their impacts.
	6b. Improve linkages between technical departments on weather/climate and water, build capacity in climate-risk assessment.
	6c. Agree on principles for risk-assessment approaches, share experiences on how future risks are assessed, and develop practical approaches suitable for operational implementation.
	6d. Consider the range of impacts – including who is affected and why/ how risk assessments need to consider local perspectives about who is vulnerable, and which risk mitigation steps are appropriate.
7. Strengthen the mandate to undertake climate risk assessment of major investment decisions aiming for system resilience.	7a. Lobby donors to adopt risk assessment into planning and financing decisions.
	7b. Work through international adaptation mechanisms to support national government and relevant line ministries to design policy for climate risk assessment, consider policy to make it a requirement in some situations.
	7c. Work with technical departments to facilitate design and adoption of these approaches.
	7d. Raise awareness of decision-making under uncertainty approaches to planning and management. Where major decisions/investments are involved incorporate 'stress testing' of water resource systems under a range of climate (and other) conditions.
8. Improve coordination between multiple sectors, particularly water-energy-food, but also environment and land.	8a. Address governance and institutional barriers to coordinated planning and management.
	8b. Promote tools and decision-making approaches that incorporate multi-sector objectives and performance indicators.
	8c. Build the evidence base to demonstrate the value of greater coordination in planning.



4.2.8 Building a Climate-Resilient African Blue Economy

There has been a growing interest in the role of oceans in supporting sustainable development and providing broader social and economic benefits, commensurate with a growing awareness of the pressures that marine ecosystems face through drivers such as pollution, habitat destruction, unsustainable and illegal harvesting of marine resources and climate change. The oceans agenda, often framed in terms of the blue economy or oceans economy, has been included in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as SDG14 'Life Under Water', and has also been promoted through a range of international platforms and processes, such as the UN Ocean Conference and the High-Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy.

In the Africa region, too, the blue economy has become more prominent in national and regional policy arenas. African coastal and island states have combined ocean territories of 13 million km². Fisheries and aquaculture, marine and coastal tourism, offshore extractive industries and other ocean-based industries have been estimated to generate a value of US\$296 billion and support 49 million jobs. Investing in coastal/blue carbon infrastructure, mangrove expansion and shellfish fisheries can also draw down carbon and create jobs.

Several regional policy frameworks recognise the importance of Africa's blue economy, with the Africa Union's Agenda 2063 envisioning the region's

blue economy as a major contributor to continental transformation and growth (it is important to note that in key policy frameworks, Africa's blue economy is defined as including both marine and freshwater ecosystems). Africa's Blue Economy Strategy (2019) and preceding regional frameworks have highlighted the risk posed by climate change to the region's blue economy. Climate-related risks are impacting communities and ecosystems already threatened by pressures such as the overharvesting and illegal harvesting of fisheries and other marine resources, pollution, unsustainable coastal development, habitat destruction and governance challenges.

The foundations for climate resilience lie in ensuring the natural assets on which economic activity depends are secured and even enhanced, and that economic production and consumption processes do not degrade them. Healthier, more productive ecosystems are inherently more resilient to climate pressures, and therefore drivers undermining ecosystem health must be addressed as part of an integrated approach to ocean health. Integrated, adaptive and inclusive governance is therefore central to addressing climate change impacts and ensuring that Africa's maritime and freshwater ecosystems can effectively support a vibrant, prosperous, equitable, resilient and sustainable blue economy.

Table 14. Priority interventions and suggested actions for building a climate-resilient African blue economy.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Promote climate-resilient coastal development .	1a. Invest in ecosystems and natural assets as multi-benefit providers, thereby enhancing natural capital that supports livelihoods and climate resilience.
	1b. Strengthen grey and green (ecosystem-based/nature-based) adaptation in coastal zones.
	1c. Enhance financing for adaptation in marine and coastal zones (blue carbon, 'blue finance', private sector partnerships, debt-for-nature swaps and other mechanisms).
	1d. Integrate climate risk in coastal development planning.
	1e. Strengthen disaster risk reduction and preparedness plans and strategies.
2. Support sectoral and integrative blue economy interventions .	2a. Strengthen co-governance and regional fisheries governance mechanisms for enhanced climate resilience.
	2b. Integrate climate in marine spatial planning, integrated coastal zone management and other planning frameworks.
	2c. Support sector-specific interventions for key blue economy sectors, including tourism, shipping, fisheries and aquaculture.
3. Strengthen research and policy .	3a. Strengthen the role of oceans and coasts in NDCs and other climate-related policies and strategies.
	3b. Support research to predict, monitor and respond to ocean-related climate impacts.
	3c. Ensure ocean-related climate policy interventions consider equity and the unique position of vulnerable groups.

4.2.9 Digital Transformation

Timely and accurate information is critical in building climate resilience across Africa. Digitalization within the context of the climate change agenda should be framed as a continent-wide capacity-building process that enables access to up-to-date climate data for informed decision-making and service-provision and ensures that the continent is ever-ready and able to rapidly adapt when required. To achieve this, a process of changing data from analogue to digital form (digital enablement) is needed. With the foundation of digitization, actors such as individuals, businesses and governments will be able to leverage digital innovations and business processes to transform climate responses and green economy development.

Within the agricultural sector, digitalization is seen as a game-changer for agricultural transformation across Africa as it has huge potential for product development, service delivery, and operationalization of services. However, for digitalization to work, especially in building resilience against climate variabilities, a holistic approach is needed. This means ensuring that the provision of climate advisory services for farmers would have to be consistent, sustainable, and scalable across the sector.

Digital innovations, consisting of digital solutions and services and digital technologies, are critical in data capture, processing and service delivery. The effective functioning of digital services and solutions such as



production information services, access and use of climate sensitive inputs, and financial services – including index-based insurance services – depend on pioneering digital technologies such as drones or sensors, satellite technologies, artificial intelligence, cloud technologies and high-end devices for service delivery and access. However, access to accurate, customised, targeted and tailored advisory services, which is needed now more than ever before, depends on up-to-date user data and quality content data management. This requires complex data infrastructure to support the effective functioning of content data, derived from varied sources, and user data across diverse value chain actors.

A holistic approach also means understanding financing models for digital innovations, subsequent investments by private sector investors, the business models behind the delivery of the digital services, and the willingness of users to pay for the products and services to ensure continuous adoption, scale, and sustainability.

Furthermore, the rules of the game that define the enabling environment for digitalization, such as infrastructure and access, policies and strategies, knowledge and networking, and literacy and skills, are key to a holistic approach. Without the involvement of private sector investors, the holistic approach will fail, and for the private sector to invest in the innovations, an enabling environment is needed.

The following considerations are suggested at the intersection of digital transformation and climate change:

- Give environmental concerns prime importance in the development of digital technologies, services and interventions;
- Support multi-sectoral approaches to address digital transformation issues and involve all relation holders and stakeholders to ensure that digital technology is developed wisely and environmentally responsibly;
- Employ a holistic approach to the environmental impact of technologies;

- Incorporate energy efficiencies and account for the power consumption of digital health interventions (including, for instance, mobile base stations, server farms, and air conditioners) and the replacement of batteries;
- Control electronic waste, for example, by prioritising repair over replacement and aiming for circularity in digital apparatus;
- Avoid constant equipment upgrades and accelerating hardware-software cycles; challenge related unsustainable business models and practices;
- Limit the need for air travel by digital transformation projects; and,
- Assess the impacts of digital transformation on the environment (not only on climate) in relation to government action and international agreements.

It is important to note that digital transformation narratives have largely been framed by the Global North. Therefore, the first step to achieving meaningful African engagement is the decentring of digital transformation.

Promoting and implementing digital transformation in an interdependent, decentred and climate conscious way means:

- Building on African knowledge and capacities;
- Focusing on African people, communities and their demands, resources and agency;
- Respecting African authority;
- Aligning with African policies, standards and regulations;
- Being inclusive and leaving no one behind; and,
- Balancing human rights and human responsibilities.

Table 15. Priority interventions and suggested actions for digital transformation.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Governments should coordinate their national digital climate-related data infrastructure.	1a. Ensure governments take the lead in coordinating their national climate data infrastructure and connect them across the continent for policy and decision-making.
	1b. Involve private sector investors in the development of necessary facilities/ systems to support climate data for sustainability.
2. Engage private sector digital innovators and service providers as business partners.	2a. Involve young digital entrepreneurs across the continent to support local data ownership models and safeguard the continent's climate data.
	2b. Explore viable business models for scaling digital climate advisory services through big data and analytics.
3. Strengthen community engagement and digital inclusion.	3a. Develop and implement digital transformation frameworks that glean common values from the African concepts like ubuntu (communal love), guiding interactions, research and capacity development in the Africa.
	3b. Involve dynamic and integrative approaches, focus on local agency, seek reciprocity and the pragmatic inclusion of different ways of knowing, conceptualization, and meaning-making.
4. Promote workforce enhancement.	4a. Recognise and expand African capacity for climate-conscious digital transformation.
5. Develop and promote thought leadership.	5a. Develop communities of practice to contribute to conversations in international digital transformation.
6. Strengthen system conciliation.	6a. Acknowledge that digital transformation is a social action that requires empathy and the incorporation of all views.
	6b. Recognise that system experiences and standards in affluent settings are not necessarily useful to guide systems elsewhere.
	6d. Appreciate that solutions proposed by exogenous industries present technical, political, and climate challenges for African communities and governments.

4.3 Strategic Intervention Axis 3: Enhancing the Means of Implementation Towards Climate-Resilient Development

The effective implementation of climate-resilient development plans and policies will require support in terms of climate finance and resource mobilization; technology transfer and enhanced capacity building; and awareness creation and outreach.

4.3.1 Enhanced Finance Flows and Resource Mobilization

Developed-country Parties to the UNFCCC have committed to mobilising US\$100 billion per year by 2020 to support climate action in developing countries. The UNFCCC defines climate finance as local, national or transnational financing, drawn from public, private and alternative sources, which seeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions to address climate change.

Climate change is a cross-cutting macro-economic issue, and climate finance is 'strategic' in the sense that it enables the delivery of multiple development outcomes such as food and water security, energy security, good health, employment, and other benefits. As such, climate finance can support countries to deliver not only on SDG13 (Climate Action), but also on several other related SDGs. Without financial support for action to reduce risks from climate change, most SDGs may not be achieved.

Climate finance can come from bilateral and multilateral sources. Bilateral climate finance comes directly from a country or an institution in that country, such as government development agencies. Multilateral sources are finance institutions that have multiple countries as contributors or shareholders, bringing together funding contributions from these different countries. Multilateral sources include Multilateral Development Banks, such as the World Bank, regional development banks, international public funds, and UN agencies. International public funds include those under the Convention such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and the GCF. There exist also carbon markets, private equity and other alternative sources. Most OECD countries provide funding bilaterally and also channel some of their financial support to developing countries via multilateral institutions.

Most publications point to the fact that the amount of adaptation finance, although on an upward trend, falls far short of the scale of investments needed. Annual

adaptation costs in developing countries alone are estimated at US\$70 billion currently, according to the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report (2020). Although research costing climate-resilient development in Africa is limited, many African countries, particularly Least Developed Countries, express a stronger demand for adaptation compared to mitigation finance.

Africa is struggling to access climate finance and to deliver sustainable and transformative responses to climate-change impacts at scale. For example, the total financial commitments from bilateral and multilateral funders for adaptation between 2014 and 2018 remained well below US\$5.5 billion per year. This is far below the various estimates of adaptation costs in Africa, which range between US\$7-15 billion per year for 2020.

Moreover, the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement are clear on the need for developed countries to provide financial support to developing countries in view of their constraints and the need to balance mitigation and adaptation finance. However, research on quantifying international public finance for climate change adaptation in Africa (2014-2018), found finance targeting mitigation (US\$30.6 billion) was almost double that for adaptation (US\$16.5 billion), with more adaptation-related finance provided as loans (57%), compared to grants (42%), and 50% of that amount targeting mainly two sectors: agriculture, and water supply and sanitation. Adaptation financing has not preferentially targeted the most vulnerable African countries. Furthermore, the disbursement ratio from 2014-2018, indicating whether approved projects are actually receiving funding and being implemented as planned, or whether they are encountering challenges on the ground, was found to be as low as 56% for mitigation and 46% for adaptation (compared to 96% for other development projects). This suggests constraints particular to climate-related projects.

Adaptation costs in Africa are expected to rise rapidly as global warming increases. Africa is highly vulnerable to climate change as many of the continent's key economic sectors, such as agriculture and hydropower, are climate-sensitive, making adaptation financing a key priority. Annual adaptation costs in developing countries are expected to reach US\$140-300 billion in 2030 and US\$280-500 billion in 2050. However, this could be a substantial underestimate. For example, the Coalition for Urban Transitions, which advises governments on economic development and climate change, estimates investments of about US\$280 billion will be needed to cope with the effects of climate change by 2050 in 35 cities in three African countries alone (South Africa,

Kenya and Ethiopia). The 2010 global goal of mobilizing US\$100 billion per year by 2020 is therefore outdated and it is hoped that by 2025, Parties will set a more realistic and collectively quantified goal.

Cumbersome procedures for gaining direct access accreditation to multilateral funds makes it difficult to access international climate finance for African countries. The capacity to develop fundable projects in Africa is also inadequate, including required upfront investments (e.g., for feasibility studies and co-financing) and lack of reliable data and evidence for a climate rationale. An analysis of proposals submitted to the GCF up to 2017 shows African countries had the lowest percentage of approvals (39%) compared to all other regions.

Not just the quantity, but also the quality of climate finance is important for climate-resilient development. For example, in contrast to finance for mitigation projects, such as renewable energy, many adaptation interventions for the most vulnerable countries and communities provide low or inadequate financial return on investments for private funders and can therefore only be funded with public finance. Yet public finance targeting adaptation in Africa has been provided mostly as loans rather than as concessional finance such as grants. This hinders adaptive capacity, because many African countries are at high risk of debt distress, especially due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and will need to decrease their debt levels for governments to have more fiscal space to invest domestically in climate resilience. The total external debt servicing payments across African countries currently far exceed commonly discussed or committed levels of near-term climate finance for adaptation.

Nonetheless, African governments already invest a substantial amount in national adaptation action, such as drought relief programmes, agricultural support programmes, and disaster management programmes. Research estimates public spending on adaptation from domestic budgets may average 3.4% of GDP, potentially diverting resources from other development priorities in cases where integrated project planning is not used to align multiple development goals. Work on adaptation

planning and mainstreaming of climate into budgeting and financing, such as climate public expenditure reviews, is still at nascent stages in Africa.

Public funds are very likely insufficient to meet rapidly growing adaptation needs. Public mechanisms should leverage private sector finance for climate-resilient development by reducing regulatory, cost and market barriers through blended finance approaches, public-private partnerships, or innovative financial instruments and structuring to support of private sector investment, such as green bonds. Subnational actors can be key agents to unlock domestic resources in the implementation of adaptation action, provided they are sufficiently resourced, and their participation and agency are supported.

Once finance is flowing, tracking of climate adaptation at a national level is challenging for many African countries, due to factors such as different tracking approaches and data gaps and limitations. Many countries lack the capacity to measure, report and verify (MRV) climate finance, thus putting Africa in a position where it is less able to demand accountability from funders because of the lack of transparency and challenges in how climate finance is defined by funders, as well as being less able to demonstrate transparency and effectiveness of financial support in climate-related projects.

Many climate funds continue to be programmed through multilateral entities. However, more recently direct access modality has enabled national and regional entities from African countries to manage their resources, promote national agency for climate action and to build in-country capacity for sustained climate action. Direct access also has an important role to play in strengthening the pathways for translating international climate finance disbursements into local action by building and reinforcing important connections between actors and structures on multiple domestic governance, decision-making and implementation levels. Many African institutions and agencies are still struggling to get accredited as a direct access entity (DAE) though, making them dependant on multilateral implementing entities.

Table 16. Priority interventions and suggested actions for enhanced finance flows and resource mobilization.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Establish mechanisms to mobilise climate finance at scale in Africa.	1a. Manage the decline in public climate finance and address the unfulfilled international finance-related obligations and commitments.
	1b. Assess current climate financial flows to Africa and develop a roadmap for achieving Africa's adaptation financial needs (as set out in NDCs).
	1c. Establish and maintain an MRV system for financial support for Africa as a means to enhance transparency.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Establish mechanisms to mobilise climate finance at scale in Africa.	1d. Implement policy, institutional and legal reforms for enhanced resource mobilization and scaled-up, transformative climate finance.
	1e. Integrate climate action in fiscal policy and public financial management systems.
	1f. Strengthen climate and disaster risk financing mechanisms in Africa.
2. Balance mitigation and adaptation finance	2a. Prioritize predictable and sustainable finance for adaptation at scale.
	2b. Ensure that adaptation finance is delivered on grant basis.
	2c. Address the decline in grant finance and the climate-related increasing debt burden of many African countries.
	2d. Mobilise finance for the just and equitable transition in Africa.
3. Strengthen Africa's readiness and capacity to access and absorb international climate finance.	3a. Provide support for accreditation of African entities.
	3b. Build a cadre of African climate finance experts and establish a climate finance portal for Africa.
	3c. Strengthen Ministries of Finance/Planning leadership role in resource mobilization for climate action.
4. Promote investment from non-state actions, including the private sector, in climate action.	4a. Build capacity for local, small and medium private sector engagement and win-win contracting.
	4b. Identify barriers to private sector investment and promote use of policy and financial de-risking instruments.
	4c. Develop capacity for formulation of investment ready project pipelines and enhance matchmaking platforms.
5. Mobilise new financial instruments and accountability structures to support climate adaptation and mitigation.	5a. Mobilise financing from the private sector to reduce risk and enhance the quality and life of existing urban infrastructure.
	5b. Promote the uptake of nature positive infrastructure to reduce business risks, fewer stranded assets and new market opportunities.
	5c. Given the historical legacies across African cities (e.g., from colonialism and apartheid), investments should be targeted to address legacies of unequal development.
	5d. Local governments should re-examine the impact of cost recovery policies on low-income communities (e.g., for water, storm water drainage, waste services) - considering the need to achieve distributional and procedural equity in service delivery.
	5e. Increase public sector funding for adaptation in cities to mitigate and adapt climate change impacts and address infrastructure development needs.
	5f. Align local plans and policies with NDCs and NAPs to ensure climate finance flows to a local level and national targets and actions are achieved.
6. Strengthen climate finance effectiveness.	6a. Encourage cross-sectoral approaches to adaptation planning that emphasize reducing risk across interconnected sectors affected by climate change, such as the water-energy-food nexus and the biodiversity-health nexus.
	6b. Strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in climate finance projects.

4.3.2 Safety Mechanisms to Reduce Loss and Damage

Social protection mechanisms have significant potential to improve or support households' adaptation to climate change through social assistance (cash or in-kind transfers), social insurance (cover against designated contingencies), or labour market programmes (such as unemployment benefits). Evidence is emerging that demonstrates by alleviating credit, savings and liquidity constraints, such transfers can stimulate agricultural production through investment in technology and productive assets (farm, livestock, non-farm), and increased own-farm household labour allocation. There may also be positive impacts on savings and reduction of pressure on informal insurance mechanisms. Adaptive social protection emphasizes livelihood promotion in addition to protection, via mechanisms to increase benefits per participant and to reach more beneficiaries in the face of emerging shocks. Innovations in risk finance can increase the effectiveness and timeliness of adaptive social protection programmes.

Institutional risk management options can complement risk-reducing production technologies. They intervene in different aspects of the risk-poverty connection: technologies can reduce production or income losses when weather-related stresses occur, whereas institutional risk management can increase access to capital and uptake of improved production technologies and practices. For those living in chronic poverty in rural areas, adaptive social protection can provide a complementary safety net to reduce climate risk. They can also be complementary through bundling risk-reducing technologies to stabilize production in the face of moderate climate fluctuations, plus social protection to buffer the effects of extreme events such as drought.

Early Warning Systems can help to build resilience by responding to crises before they occur. If properly linked with national social protection systems, forecast based financing has the potential to not only help smooth climate-related shocks, avoiding set-backs in development, but also to enable poor and vulnerable people to manage climate risks more effectively and in a proactive manner.

Social Behavioural Change and Communication interventions can be linked to social protection programmes with the purpose of addressing some of the values, preferences and social norms that influence a behaviour, including maladaptation.

Social transfers should be predictable and flexible and the value and duration should be sufficient to protect and promote livelihood diversification.

Home-Grown School Feeding programmes can provide a platform for delivering other services and reaching schoolchildren, promoting knowledge and innovations, and strengthening relevant capacities of households and communities, and help to advance successful outcomes for climate change adaptation.

Asset-creation programmes can improve food security and boost income among the poorest people. However, in terms of climate change, there is a trade-off in some of these types of programmes, as there is a high carbon 'hoofprint' of livestock production, so improving livestock feeding is crucial.


Climate risk insurance also plays a role in reducing climate risks and uncertainty through transferring risk, incentivising risk prevention and management and mobilising capital to help manage climate risks:

- Risk transfer: insurers protect households and businesses by absorbing financial shocks due to climate disasters.
- Risk managers: insurers help stakeholders understand, prevent and reduce risk through research and analytics, catastrophe risk models and loss prevention. Insurers also advocate proper land-use planning, zoning and building codes, and promote disaster preparedness. Furthermore, insurance pricing provides risk signals and rewards risk reduction efforts.
- Institutional investors. Insurance for, and investments, in renewable energy, green buildings, low-emission transportation, sustainable agriculture, carbon dioxide removals and climate-resilient infrastructure promote sustainable development.

A large risk protection gap currently exists, with 91% (US\$1 billion) of losses from climate risks in Africa being uninsured. Furthermore, African countries are, in general, not well insured against climate risks. Fewer than 10% of people have cover in most countries and penetration is generally less than 2% of GDP. The African insurance sector has thus played a very limited role in climate risk reduction or transfer to date.

Table 17. Priority interventions and suggested actions for to enhance safety mechanisms for loss and damage.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Promote a comprehensive and integrated risk management approach for loss and damage.	1a. Extend cash plus programmes to support adaptation through the promotion of income-generating activities, livelihood diversification and financial inclusion, promoting opportunities and strategies to deal with future risks.
2. Strengthen social protection programmes across all regions.	2a. Establish robust public works programmes with regular scheduling and maintenance and not as a temporary safety-net.
	2b. Ensure community assets address key challenges to livelihoods, that they are relevant to local needs and support environmental rehabilitation and conservation in order to achieve longer-term impacts.
3. Promote asset creation.	3a. Develop asset-creation programmes to improve food security and boost income among the poorest people.
4. Improve understanding of risk exposure among the insurance sector and clients.	4a. Identify data and model requirements for underwriting needs and work to fill these gaps.
	4b. Support the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) strategy development among insurers to enable them to better understand and manage impacts of climate change on their business.
	4c. Improve collaboration between stakeholders to improve data access, sharing and integration across use cases.
5. Develop innovative risk transfer and management solutions.	5a. Identify clients' key risks through conducting risk assessments.
	5b. Build capacity and trust among clients by training them on acquisition and use of data to better understand and manage their exposure to climate change.
	5c. Develop risk transfer products to meet the needs of key stakeholders, including support with prediction/ early warning and preparation activities.
6. Develop harmonised climate finance policies and regulation.	6a. Develop climate insurance policies that support national and continent-wide climate policies.
	6b. Identify priority regulatory constraints and address them to enable the provision of more innovative climate products.
	6c. Stimulate the market for climate risk insurance by building underwriting capacity in local markets, enabling access to global reinsurance and promote alternative risk transfer structures (i.e., insurance pools).
	6d. Promote innovation in product design and distribution through pilots, regulatory sandboxes, allowing development of index insurance products.
	6e. Improve collaboration between public and private sector stakeholders and champion climate risk insurance.



4.3.3 Equitable Technology Transfer and Development

Implementing and reaching African NDC goals requires a sound and tailored development and technology transfer programme for key prioritised sectors. Alongside implementation of the Paris Agreement technology framework (Article 10, Paragraph 1), adopted during COP24, African national technology systems still encounter a range of constraints including political will, siloed approaches (weak multisectoral and multi-actor collaboration) and low promotion and support of in-country technology development processes.

Despite the numerous efforts undertaken by the Africa Group of Negotiators and Least Developed Countries,

African technology concerns and needs are not adequately addressed in climate negotiation processes. Furthermore, under the Poznan Strategic Programme (Decision 4/CP.13), many African countries have updated their Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), but are waiting for financial support to implement their Technology Action Plans and Project Ideas.

There is great development potential for endogenous technologies that are relevant and appropriate to the local environment.




Table 18. Priority interventions and suggested actions for equitable technology transfer.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Support the development of a sustained national and regional technology innovation system.	1a. Update a technology gap and needs assessment at relevant levels (territorial, national and regional).
	1b. Support the design of an institutionalized national innovation system (NIS) including climate endogenous technologies. Technologies need to be at a higher level of use and understanding.
	1c. Develop and support the implementation of resource mobilization (national and international level) to implement the NIS.
	1d. Support the piloting and implementation of TNAs where needed and specifically in countries where the assessments have been successful.
	1e. Support private actors' (especially young entrepreneurs) access to climate finance to foster the deployment of mature technologies.
2. Promote regional south-south technology development and transfer/local dissemination.	2a. Design and implement a regional platform for climate technology knowledge management.
	2b. Identify, review and enhance the functioning of existing regional technology development and transfer centres.
	2c. Support in- and cross-country peer-to-peer learning and technical assistance.
3. Enhance the participation of African negotiators in technology-related agendas.	3a. Co-develop and implement a permanent and tailored capacity building programme for junior technology development negotiators that addresses negotiations, transfers and related agenda items.
	3b. Support technology negotiators (before, during and after climate negotiation events).

4.3.4 Inclusive Participation, Especially of Gender and Youth

The impacts of inequality and the socio-economic disadvantages of vulnerable people are not adequately addressed in climate change policy design and implementation, which ultimately undermines the continent's efforts towards inclusive resilience building. Despite their vulnerability to climate change, the mobilization of vulnerable communities in climate politics remains a challenge. Although a plethora of climate change impact studies exist, there is a need to capture the responses of men, women, children and the disabled to a series of climatic stressors and shocks over time and to carefully consider these needs in policy frameworks.

In addition, Agenda 2063 is designed around a people-centred approach, and intentionally developed to be

driven by Africa's citizens. Likewise, a key determinant of the Strategy's success is the capacity of government and non-government stakeholders, including citizens, to play a role in the domestication of this Strategy. In this regard, assessments and interventions are required to support the capacity needs of all continental players to adequately perform a role in the Strategy's roll-out and implementation. Also, a communications plan for this Strategy needs to be developed so that its intentions are effectively disseminated and can guide stakeholders in their desired roles. Delays in the implementation of inclusive climate processes will negatively affect the future of Africans and their livelihoods.

Gender

Integrating gender issues in climate action will require coherence among the institutions responsible for climate change and gender policies in Africa. There is also a need to build the capacity of relevant institutions for mainstreaming gender into climate change policy formulation, planning, monitoring and evaluation. Climate change policy needs to equally address the interests of men and women and use disaggregated data to support policy initiatives. An understanding of gender inequalities is important to identify gender gaps and devise strategies to bridge them through policy.

The 16th session of the African Ministerial Conference on Environment focused on the development and strengthening of gender-responsive policies to empower women and men, as well as the enabling conditions and national policies needed to empower African youth. The Strategy acknowledges the existence of societal challenges, including gender inequality, and the need for partnerships that embrace inclusive

and sustainable approaches for socio-economic empowerment. Barriers to such an approach include inadequate platforms for meaningful engagement, restricted inclusion of women and youth in decision making, a lack of awareness of gender and youth dimensions of climate change, inadequate finance and missing inter-generational knowledge transfer. These challenges suggest the need for climate adaptation responses to be contextually embedded and to include resilience-building activities targeted at gender and youth.

Means for overcoming the identified barriers include establishing an enabling environment that institutionalizes gender participation in decision-making processes, dedicated climate change education and special funds for financing youth climate change action. Climate change vulnerability is multidimensional, the needs of the youth and women differ according to the geographic, cultural and social context.

Youth

Despite their vulnerability to climate change, the mobilization of youth in climate politics remains a challenge. Many attempts to involve young people often do so in a tokenistic way and do not provide youth with an opportunity to properly prepare content, understand procedures and substantively contribute. When discussing youth and climate change, there is often a framing that situates young people as only being impacted in the future, while failing to recognise the current impacts experienced by youth and how these impacts may differ from older generations. The same can be said for the for a growing area of climate-related work around creating a just transition in Africa. A new opportunity around the just transition serves as important way to engage youth to ensure that the benefits of a transition to a green, low-emission economy are shared widely, while also supporting those who

stand to lose economically. This includes not only creating decent work and quality jobs, but also dismantling systems of inequality that allow for the intersectionality of issues to be better understood. Youth are clearly central to this but are often only positioned as future participants or beneficiaries and not as current actors.

The important role that youth are already playing as active change agents should be recognized and supported. Young people across the continent have increasingly taken action in their own communities and at a national and regional level to put forward their own youth submissions, actions, plans and contributions to the policy space. The Youth Strategy of the UNEP, for example, speaks of harnessing Africa's youth to contribute towards the realization of Agenda 2063 as well as the global Agenda 2030.



Table 19. Priority interventions and suggested actions for equitable inclusive participation.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Improve gender and youth participation in policy co-design, co-development processes, co-implementation and M&E.	1a. Increase women's representation in major climate change policy making positions.
	1b. Facilitate gender-sensitive dimensions in National Adaptation Planning processes and climate change development plans at all levels.
2. Empower and engage young people and women in climate adaptation planning and implementation through inclusive and participatory approaches.	2a. Involve young people in planning and implementation of climate change adaptation strategies using interactive methods.
	2b. Build the capacity of the youth, prioritizing their development in national budgets, to ensure their contribution in climate change adaptation efforts.
3. Enhance education and sensitization on gender and youth responsive approaches.	3a. Conduct regular advocacy and awareness programmes on youth and gender equality and inclusivity in climate change policies, programmes and procedures.
	3b. Increase information sharing for enhancing gender- and youth-sensitive climate change impacts.
4. Increase financial and technical support for youth and gender organisations	4a. Financial support to be directed towards grassroots organisations.
	4b. Include young people in the institutional mechanisms of the AU, as well as within regional negotiating bodies to the UNFCC COP.

4.3.5 Capacity Development

It is essential that all climate stakeholders have the relevant capacities needed to deliver climate adaptation and low-emission, climate-resilient development, together with the ability to apply skills, knowledge and tools and the willingness to deliver change. This includes:

- Institutional capacity for governance and coordination;
- Technical capacity to carry out modelling and evaluation, including sectoral expertise;
- Relational capacity to build partnerships and invest time in processes; and,

- Strategic capacity for systemic policy design and implementation.

Capacity-building is country-driven and involves learning by doing. It also requires the support from existing national institutions and civil society more broadly. Much capacity building work on climate action is taking place under the UNFCCC's Action for Climate Empowerment agenda, as well as in AGNES, which focuses on education, public awareness and access to data.

Table 20. Priority interventions and suggested actions for capacity development.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Develop African-focused training and capacity development courses on climate change that promote the Strategy's overall objectives.	1a. Plan stakeholder workshops to provide updates on global changes in legislation, policies and tools to ensure negotiators, Member States, RECs, advocacy groups and non-governmental stakeholders are informed and up to date.
	1b. Develop training intervention for the communication and dissemination of the Strategy specifically.
2. Develop capacity needs assessments to analyse regional stakeholder capacity-building requirements to develop actionable interventions and strategies.	2a. This capacity assessment should form the basis of discussions and priority intervention areas with technical partners, providers, and funders.
	2b. Develop a capacity assessment to address the capacity needs of all continental players to adequately perform a role in the Strategy's roll-out and implementation.
3. Support various stakeholders in effective decision-making processes.	3a. Develop the skills and relationships needed to drive forward new strategies, policies and climate-change actions.
	3b. Plan stakeholder workshops to provide updates on global changes in legislation, policies and tools. For example, to ensure that government officials are kept abreast of the latest best practices, guidance and approaches.
	3c. Promote learning exchanges, shadowing or secondments to foster knowledge, and the exchange of skills. Also explore common challenges and questions on NDC implementation.

4.4 Strategic Intervention Axis 4: Leveraging Regional Flagship Initiatives

This section highlights African programmes and flagship initiatives that operate at a continent-wide level and that contribute to accelerating climate action across the continent. These initiatives are already contributing in meaningful ways to enhancing Africa's climate resilience through generating political buy-in for collective action, serving as the foundation for partnerships, facilitating information exchange, and mobilizing domestic and international resources. These initiatives address many of the themes outlined in the preceding axes, including food systems, climate information services and energy.

The multiplicity of initiatives and partnerships underscores the need for coordinated regional action and effective collaboration between AU structures, RECs, non-state actors, national governments and a variety of other stakeholders.

4.4.1 Infrastructure

The **Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)** is an AUC initiative carried out in partnership with AUDA-NEPAD, the AfDB and other partners, which aims to accelerate infrastructure development across the continent. PIDA's main purpose is to strengthen the consensus and ownership of large cross-border infrastructure projects that integrate energy, transportation, and water development on a continental scale. The significant deficit in Africa's infrastructure is resulting in increased production and transaction costs, reduced competitiveness of businesses, negative impact on foreign direct investment flows to the continent; therefore affecting the rate of economic and social development on the continent. PIDA was designed to address these constraints by establishing a common vision and global partnership to put in place an adequate, cost effective and sustainable regional infrastructure base to promote Africa's socio-economic development and integration into the global economy.

4.4.2 Trade

In January 2012, the AU adopted a decision to establish the **African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)**. The AfCFTA brings together 54 African countries with a combined population of more than one billion people and a combined GDP of more than USD 3.4 trillion. The Objectives of the AfCFTA are to:

- Create a single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of business, persons and investments, and thus pave the way for accelerating the establishment of the Continental Customs Union and the African customs union.
- Expand intra African trade through better harmonization and coordination of trade liberalization and facilitation regimes and instruments across RECs and across Africa in general.
- Resolve the challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional and continental integration processes.
- Enhance competitiveness at the industry and enterprise level through exploiting opportunities for scale production, continental market access and better reallocation of resources.

There is potential for the AfCFTA to enable Africa's response to climate change through targeted trade-related measures. For example: the exemption of environmental goods and technologies such as turbines and photovoltaic systems from sensitive and exclusion lists; prioritisation of the liberalisation of trade in environmentally related services since this sector is not among the five priority service sectors (i.e. business services, financial services, transport, communications and tourism) identified by AfCFTA negotiators for early liberalization; due attention given to the harmonisation and strengthening of environmental standards and regulation under the relevant provisions of the AfCFTA Protocol on Trade in Goods and Protocol on Trade in Services as well as within the framework of the African Quality Standards Agenda; and the mainstreaming of climate friendly considerations into the negotiations on investment, intellectual property rights, competition policy and e-commerce.

4.4.3 Climate Information Services for adaptation and resilience

Africa has fewer land-based observation networks than any other region. Moreover, the land-based observational network on the continent is only one-eighth of the minimum required density. Despite the progress made towards the development of observational networks on

the continent, observational infrastructure has not yet met the optimum standards for effective forecasts and early warning systems.

ClimDev-Africa is a programme working to enhance observational infrastructure in Africa. It is an initiative of the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) to increase finance for investments in climate and weather observation networks across Africa, to build partnerships for collective investments in weather observation systems and innovative risk financing mechanisms and to enhance Africa's capacity to access and utilise climate information for policy making purposes. Furthermore, AfDB and UNECA are committed to support Regional Climate Centres (RCCs) that are installing infrastructure for climate and severe weather observation, capturing satellite and remote sensed data to improve severe weather monitoring. While significant observation infrastructure already exists, the distribution and types of instruments still need to adequately cover the entire continent.

Efforts have been made to increase investments for modernising regional hydrology and meteorology infrastructure. For example, the **Hydromet Africa Programme** is a special purpose vehicle to engage the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and other development partners to mobilise finance to facilitate the delivery of national climate and weather services for development. Hydromet projects are meeting the gaps in hydro-meteorological observation networks, telecommunications, and climate data and weather systems.

To enhance development planning, existing programmes such as Weather and **Climate Information Services for Africa (WISER)** are in place to stimulate the uptake of climate information by policy makers. WISER comprises two components: the East Africa component whose implementation is led by the UK Met-Office and the Pan Africa component led by African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC), the Secretariat of ClimDev- Africa.

Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Africa (GMES & Africa) is a joint initiative of the AUC and the European Union, geared towards addressing the growing needs of African countries to access and use Earth Observation data for the implementation of sustainable development policies on the continent. The programme builds on the infrastructure and capacities established by earlier projects such as PUMA (Preparation for the Use of Meteosat Second Generation in Africa), AMESD (African Monitoring of Environment and Sustainable Development), and MESA (Monitoring of the Environment and Security in Africa). The programme enhances the capacity of African policymakers and

planners to design, implement, and monitor national, regional and continental policies, whilst promoting the sustainable management of natural resources through the use of EO data and derived information.

The **Integrated African Strategy on Meteorology** was developed collaboratively by the WMO and the African Ministerial Conference on Meteorology (AMCOMET) in consultation with the AUC, RECs, Member States, RCCs, and other relevant stakeholders. The overall purpose of the strategy is to correctly position weather and climate services as an essential component in national and regional development framework and sustainable development in Africa, particularly in poverty reduction efforts and climate change. Its objective is to enhance cooperation between African countries and to strengthen the capabilities of their National Meteorological Services. The Strategy further aims to serve as a framework for integrated and coordinated mechanisms, which provides strategic direction to Member States and other stakeholders in streamlining policies that address challenges and opportunities associated with the development of adequate weather and climate services at the national and regional levels.

4.4.4 Climate-resilient agriculture

The **Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)** is a policy framework that has inspired and energised stakeholders across Africa to achieve the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods in Africa. CAADP seeks to boost investment to stimulate growth in the agricultural sector. This means bringing together the public and private sectors and civil society at the continental, regional and national levels for collective action and to increase investment. Spearheaded by AUDA-NEPAD, 47 African countries have signed the CAADP Compact resulting in an increase of public agricultural expenditures by more than 7% per year.

The development of National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs) is at the core of CAADP implementation. Yet, these plans do not sufficiently consider nor implement adaptation to climate change. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture of the African Union Commission (AUC-ARBE) have established a framework for the CAADP agenda for adaptation to climate change. The project is building capacity at AUC and NPCA to support Member States in developing climate-friendly NAIPs and applying climate-smart agricultural methods.

CAADP currently works to raise climate change awareness amongst institutions and to disseminate knowledge and lessons learned across the continent. Together with the NPCA, CAADP supports Member States in developing financing and implementation strategies that contribute to achieving climate targets in agriculture. Subsequently, more than 15 African countries have included adaptation to climate change in their NAIPs and are implementing climate-smart measures. Furthermore, the continent-wide exchange platform Africa Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance promotes the regular exchange of lessons learned and knowledge on climate change and agriculture.

An existing African-led initiative that is transboundary in nature and applies a landscape approach is the Implementation of the **Great Green Wall for the Sahara and Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI)**. It is a collaborative effort involving more than 20 African countries through the AU. By 2030, the Wall aims to restore 100 million hectares of currently degraded land, sequester 250 million tonnes of carbon and create 10 million jobs in rural areas.

In addition, the **African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative (AFR100)**, in alignment with the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration, aims to bring 100 million hectares of degraded land under restoration by 2030. AFR100 also contributes to the Bonn Challenge, the African Resilient Landscapes Initiative (ARLI), the African Union Agenda 2063, the SDGs and other targets. AFR100 applies best practices to ensure restoration efforts are successful.

The **African Resilient Landscapes Initiative (ARLI)** is implemented through forest and ecosystem restoration, biodiversity conservation, climate smart agriculture, and rangeland management. The World Bank Group and World Resources Institute support the mobilisation of financial and technical resources from multiple sources to design and implement country-specific strategies. The ARLI mobilises African countries and partners to leverage sectorial interventions and collectively ensure the integrity, resilience, restoration and sustainable management of landscapes across regions.

4.4.5 Enhancing access to renewable energy

Through active engagement with partners and mandated continental and regional organisations such as the AU, Member States could seize the opportunity to bypass fossil fuel technologies and pursue a climate-friendly, needs-oriented power strategy aligned with the Paris Agreement and low-carbon growth. Renewable energy is in most cases the least-cost option for new electricity

generation capacity globally. Technology solutions are abundant and ready to be deployed to meet Africa's growing energy demand in an economically viable manner, while offering significant opportunities for job creation and industrial development.

The **Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)** is an inclusive, transformative, Africa-owned and Africa-led effort to accelerate and scale up the harnessing of the continent's renewable energy potential. Under the mandate of the AU and endorsed by the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), the initiative aims to achieve at least 300 GW by 2030. The AREI has two over-arching goals: (1) to help achieve sustainable development, enhanced well-being, and sound economic development by ensuring universal access to sufficient amounts of clean, appropriate and affordable energy; and (2) to help African countries move towards renewable energy systems that support their low-carbon development strategies while enhancing economic and energy security.

4.4.6 Climate change risk management

Climate risk insurance, risk transfer, and risk sharing and pooling mechanisms have an important and growing role to play, particularly in offsetting the economic impacts associated with extreme events to encourage adaptation programmes and policies that should minimise future loss and damage and contribute to sustainable development. In contrast to developed economies where there are various forms of insurance cover available, it is estimated that 99% of losses from disasters in Africa are uninsured. Under such conditions, the ability of governments to invest in increasingly needed adaptations, which are designed to lessen the consequences on social well-being, infrastructure, and economic activity, are restricted and thereby enhance vulnerability.

African countries, through the AU, have established the **African Risk Capacity (ARC)** to build the capacities of African governments to identify their climate risk, plan for climate disasters, and access capital at critical times. As an African-led and owned catastrophe risk pool created with risk capital from donor partners, the ARC has already disbursed US\$ 36 million in four years of operations which have helped to support drought-affected countries. The ARC capacity building programme aims to prepare African governments for effective DRM through the introduction of tools and processes that enhance a multidisciplinary response by governments. Through this programme, experts from key government departments undergo training and have to complete milestones in risk

modelling, contingency planning and risk transfer which allows them to make informed decisions on insurance uptake.

Through the African strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), the AUC established dedicated DRR structures at the continental level. RECs and Member States have made progress in developing respective regional and national strategies on DRR. Subsequently the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was formulated, and the AUC developed the **Programme of Action** for its implementation in Africa. It is intended to provide guidance and direction for actions by all at the continental, regional, national and sub-national/ local levels in Africa to prevent and reduce the risk of disasters for resilience in line with the Sendai Framework. The Programme of Action comprises and integrates strategic DRR elements to be carried out over the 15-year period of the Sendai Framework.

To date, the provision of climate risk finance has been inadequate. The **Extreme Climate Facility (XCF)** is a new financial mechanism for securing climate finance for African governments. The XCF will use both public and private funds and facilitate direct access to climate adaptation finance for eligible African governments based on the demonstrated need for enhanced adaptation measures.

4.4.7 A climate-resilient African blue economy

The **Africa Blue Economy Strategy** was developed following the Sustainable Blue Economy Conference that took place in Nairobi, Kenya in 2018. The objective of the Strategy is to guide the development of an inclusive and sustainable blue economy that becomes a significant contributor to continental transformation and growth, through advancing knowledge on marine and aquatic biotechnology, environmental sustainability, the growth of an Africa-wide shipping industry, the development of sea, river and lake transport, the management of fishing activities on these aquatic spaces, and the exploitation and beneficiation of deep sea mineral and other resources. The implementation of the Africa Blue Economy Strategy addresses various themes related to climate change, including blue carbon, blue energy, climate-resilient coastal infrastructure and responses to improve the climate resilience of Africa's fisheries and aquaculture sectors.

4.4.8 Accelerating adaptation and building resilience in Africa

Historical emissions have caused a global average warming of at least 1°C highlighting the need to enhance adaptation action today. African countries are already undertaking actions to adapt to the impacts of climate change, but these efforts need to be intensified as the impacts of climate change increase.

The **Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI)** was developed in response to a mandate from the African Heads of State and Government, the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) together with the African Group of Negotiators (AGN). The AAI facilitates enhanced action on adaptation and addresses loss and damage in four key pillars of work: (1) enhancing CIS, (2) strengthening policies and institutions, (3) enhancing concrete action on the ground, and (4) facilitating access to and mobilising additional climate finance and investment for adaptation and addressing loss and damage.

4.4.9 Building on climate change capacity building programmes

There is a need build on capacity building programmes to improve the technical development and capacities of stakeholders to allow them to effectively engage in climate action. Capacity building is typically MS driven and involves learning by doing. Much capacity building work on climate action is taking place under the UNFCCC's Action for Climate Empowerment agenda, as well as in AGNES, which focuses on education, public awareness and access to data.

The AU has developed several youth development policies and programmes at the continental level to ensure Africa benefits from its demographic dividend. The policies include the **African Youth Charter**, **Youth Decade Plan of Action (2009-2018)**, and the **Malabo Decision on Youth Empowerment**, all of which are implemented through various AU Agenda 2063 programmes. The Plan of Action contains five key priority areas, two of which pertain to climate change and education and skills development. The Plan of Action focuses on youth empowerment defining it as building knowledge and education through awareness raising, capacity and skills building and enhancing the accessibility of youth to opportunities.

4.4.10 Capacity needs and gaps for climate research

It is essential that all climate stakeholders have the relevant capacities needed to deliver climate adaptation and low-carbon, climate-resilient development, together with the ability to apply skills, knowledge and tools and the willingness to deliver change. There are an increasing number of regional and continental initiatives that are aimed at addressing the major limitations and challenges related to climate research in Africa.

The Alliance for Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa (AESA) was created in 2015 through a partnership of the African Academy of Sciences (AAS), AUDA-NEPAD, the founding and funding global partners, and through a resolution of the summit of AU Heads of Governments. AESA is to enhance African science for and by Africans through agenda setting, mobilising Research and Development (R&D) funding, and managing continent-wide Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) programmes that promote the brightest minds, strengthening the best possible science

environments in Africa, fostering scientific excellence, inspiring and mentoring emerging research leaders, and accelerating and translating research and innovations into products, policies and practices that will improve and transform lives in Africa.

The Climate Research for Development (CR4D) for Africa is a regional initiative that was launched to strengthen links between climate science research and climate information needs in support to development planning in Africa. CR4D has the objective of supporting the Africa climate research community (scientists and institutions) in generating end-user climate information.

Future Climate for Africa (FCFA) aims at generating fundamentally new climate science focused on Africa, and to ensure that this science has an impact on human development across the continent.

Table 21. Priority interventions and suggested actions on Africa regional flagship initiatives.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Further strengthen climate dimensions of key regional flagship initiatives (e.g. PIDA, CAADP) and integrate these into the implementation of Africa's Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy	1a. Enhance climate dimensions of regional flagship programmes to support climate-resilient development.
	1b. Ensure sufficient resource mobilization and budgetary allocations for climate-related actions within regional flagship initiatives.
	1c. Strengthen information sharing and reporting and integrate this into the monitoring, evaluation and learning activities related to Africa's Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy.
2. Strengthen coordination for more effective implementation	2a. Support coordinated and aligned action between AU structures and key regional partners, as well as non-state actors and Member States to strengthen climate action

05

MONITORING, EVALUATION AND LEARNING PLAN

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The Strategy covers a period of 10 years, during which several actors at the local, national, and international levels will closely collaborate to attain the specified objectives. The implementation, under the overall supervision of the AU, will work alongside the Strategic Objectives, Overall and Specific Objectives, Expected Results, Key Strategic Interventions and Actions. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activity described in this section will ensure that all planned interventions, outputs, and outcomes are on track and will be verified periodically during the lifetime of the Strategy. A detailed M&E Plan will be developed before the start of the implementation of the Strategy, specifying actors, roles and responsibilities for various activities, and reviews. Their involvement will depend on their ability and capacity to deliver results and utilise knowledge in specific areas. The Plan will also include budgetary frameworks to support the implementation of the Strategy. The M&E Plan will be used to manage accountability and relationships.

Given the geographical extent, the diverse human resource involvement, and the range of factors that can influence the scope and pace of the work, the process will be one of Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL). To achieve this, the M&E Plan will be based on a Logical Framework of the Strategy, which will define the indicators needed to achieve the desired results. Provision will be made for flexibility in the face of unpredictable occurrences, such as health pandemics and economic disruptions. The active players who will drive the implementation and the M&E of activities will belong to the AU and its partner organizations, national

governments, RECs, civil society and the public and private sectors.

The M&E Plan that will be used to monitor progress during the implementation phase will allow the AU and other partners to track the:

- Schedules and timelines
- Level of success of the climate change programme across the continent
- Key indicators monitored
- Data sources, collection, management, and quality assurance
- How data will be analysed
- Feedback mechanisms for improving interventions
- Questions related to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the proposed interventions and
- Contribution of stakeholders to achievements.

The Strategy is focused on supporting institutions to provide the enabling environment for effective mitigation, resilience, adaptation; improving capacities; and information collection, use and dissemination. As a result, the successful implementation of this Strategy will depend on the ability of the M&E activity to provide accurate and useful responses for these areas, which include:

An enabling environment

- Institutions and mechanisms that are in place to enhance mitigation, resilience and adaptation on the continent;
- Policies adopted and/or implemented;
- The extent to which relevant and credible information is used in the conception and adoption of policies; and,
- The extent to which the participation and inclusion of all stakeholders are reflected in policies and mechanisms adopted.

Information Acquisition, Data Analysis and Dissemination

- The extent to which quality data has been available from various partners and sectors to assess the effectiveness of various actions carried out;
- The impact of the interventions in achieving the objectives of the strategy; and,
- The level of the dissemination of results and their effect in addressing mitigation, resilience and adaptation.

Supporting capacity building initiatives

- Avenues, approaches and finance identified for capacity development for policy engagement on all areas of climate policy;
- Development and strengthening of human resources and institutional capacity to achieve strategy objectives;
- Level of ownership of strategy and activities achieved by partners; and,
- Level of self-reliance as an index of effectiveness created among partners.

These M&E activities will be carried out by the AU Commission's competent experts that understand how to detect gaps in knowledge, as well as associated gaps in data, analytical tools and information and that have experience with working across multiple disciplines to interact with content experts in developing appropriate methodologies for collecting and analysing data. This collection of personnel will exist in various partner institutions so that a critical mass of M&E personnel in climate change assessment will exist. The main idea is to develop continent-wide capacity in this area, as well as to obtain reliable information on the progress of implemented activities.

The range of activities covered by M&E will include aspects such as:

- Assessing results (for example, the effects of activities, using indicators);
- Assessing the implementation process (organizational, financial, organizational and physical);
- Monitoring of objectives (assessment of impact);
- Monitoring of change and attitudes; and,
- The overall monitoring and evaluation (using baseline information, internal evaluations, mid-term and final evaluations, indicators, etc).

The AU will ensure that high-quality data is gathered at pre-determined intervals, depending on the nature of the activity being carried out. M&E personnel in partner institutions will support these goals by delivering information in specified formats to the AU for compilation and analysis, as required. This process of data-gathering will ideally be well served during review meetings aimed at collecting information, data-quality control and the assessment of any difficulties.

Data-quality control will enjoy a very high priority. All data producers will ensure that they use high quality, robust and objective data in their reports; that they have a strengthened intellectual authority in their fields of competence; and that their brand and image in quality data and report preparation is strong. The following criteria should be respected to achieve the above conditions:

Validity, which assesses:

- The robustness of the design of the data-collection tools
- The existence of any reasons to suggest that respondents can give misleading information
- An understanding of indicators and data-collection definitions of concepts and terms
- Profiles of the data collectors
- A level of training for data collectors and supervisors
- The transcription of data
- The existence of room for mistakes at any level

Reliability, which assesses:

- Variability in the data-collection process year-on-year and place-to-place
- Using the same data-collection tools
- A description of data-collection process
- What happens if a problem is found in the data, and how it is fixed
- Discussions on issues related to data quality

Timeliness, which assesses:

- The frequency of data collection, and how current they are;
- A timetable for data collection
- An identification of data collected

Accuracy, which assesses:

- The margin of error of indicators
- The sufficiency of current data and the cost and worth of collecting additional precise data

Data integrity, which assesses:

- The mechanisms in place to prevent data manipulation
- The extent to which there is objectivity and independence in the procedures for collecting, managing and evaluating the data
- A review by an independent authority

An implementation plan will be included with this Strategy to indicate the main areas of intervention and the associated actions needed to achieve the desired objectives. A more detailed plan will be developed with areas of responsibility, costs and timeframes. The Strategy will be subjected to a five-year evaluation and review to ensure that the Strategy is up to date, relevant and making progress.

Evaluations carried out will be based on the use of clearly defined indicators, baseline data, deliverables and periodic internal monitoring produced by all partners. These M&E activities will contribute to improving the performance of the management of the programme, as well as help to determine the extent to which the

objectives of the programme are being met. In general, this will enhance the MEL process within the AU and its partners.

To aid the M&E process, a Results Framework and Logical Framework will be developed by the M&E team from the outset and before the activities start. The Results Framework that link the results to the activities and each of the specific objectives will show the causal linkages in the proposed interventions. The Logical Framework will help the AU to determine which indicators to follow to determine success. These frameworks should be useful in assisting the AU in the overall management of programmes related to this strategy.

Table 22. Priority interventions and suggested actions for Monitoring and Evaluation.

Intervention area	Suggested actions
1. Development of inclusive Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan for the Strategy.	1a. Develop an inclusive plan that specifies different actors, their roles and responsibilities for various activities and reviews.
	1b. Develop a comprehensive results and logical framework which defines the indicators and baseline data needed to achieve the desired results.
	1c. Conduct a mid-term review of the Strategy.
2. Develop the capacity of the AUC and other partner organizations to carry out M&E services.	2a. Train AUC personnel to effectively carry out M&E reporting practices and collection of relevant data.
3. Development of a resource mobilization Strategy .	3a. Mobilise resources specifically to support the implementation and sensitization of the Strategy.
	3b. Develop strategies to explore new financing options, operationalise these financing strategies and expand partnerships for support.

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IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
Strategic Intervention Axis 1: Strengthening Policy and Governance				
1. Enhanced climate policy, multi-sector governance and institutional coordination				
1. Continued development, review and update of climate change policies and implementation plans at a regional, national, sectoral and local level.	1a. Review and revise existing policies and plans to ensure alignment with revised NDCs and LTSs under the Paris Agreement. Update or develop related implementation plans, investment plans and M&E plans.			
	1b. Mainstream climate change considerations (including gender, youth and indigenous knowledge considerations) and updated NDC policy actions across sectoral policies, utilizing an open and transparent engagement process with stakeholders.			
	1c. Adopt a "whole-of-economy" approach to climate change, prioritizing the integration in long-term climate priorities in countries' macroeconomic frameworks, national budgets and expenditure frameworks, financial sector regulations and incentives; and in systems planning.			
	1d. Develop/implement sound monitoring, review and reporting processes and systems, including MRV of GHG emissions, sinks and removals, and M&E of adaptation, climate finance and technical support outcomes to obtain the relevant data and information for policy development.			
2. Strengthen institutional structures for policy implementation, through fostering good governance structures at the national and sub-national levels.	2a. Strengthen of mechanisms for co-ordination and collaboration between countries, sectoral line ministries and spheres of government, as well as communication with citizens and stakeholders.			
	2b. Identify line ministries and institutional bodies for the implementation of climate policy, development of legal mandates and delegations for these ministries/bodies, and capacitation of these bodies with qualified, well-equipped and motivated staff.			
	2c. Develop systems for the monitoring and reporting of policy implementation, as well as open data and information sharing platforms to foster accountability and transparency.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
1. Enhanced climate policy, inclusive multi-sector governance and institutional coordination				
3. Cultivate robust climate change legislative frameworks .	3a. Review of the national legal barriers to successful climate change policy implementation through a legal landscape analysis, including existing provisions which hinder implementations as well as empowering provisions required for implementation, to determine the most appropriate legal instrument(s) to develop as well as their content.			
	3b. Develop national, district and local level climate relevant laws to facilitate and enable effective policy implementation that give effect to the legal landscape analysis.			
4. Improved multi-level governance arrangements, equitable partnerships and coordination platforms for dialogue and learning.	4a. Focus on the process, not just the output. Too often, the focus when developing strategies is on the "what" and not on the "how" or the "why", and yet the process followed to design activities is at least as valuable as the end product.			
	4b. Support the implementation of well-resourced decentralization reforms and local stewardship. Awareness raising and contextualising issues for citizens immediately improves local stewardship and participation in co-designing of solutions.			
	4c. Promote equitable partnerships, local buy in and shared visioning. Shared visioning of future pathways, open dialogue, and a close analysis of assumptions underpinning worldviews, identities, beliefs, and stigmas based on social circumstance can help break path dependence.			
	4d. Mainstream climate-resilient development objectives and targets across all areas of governance and into all local development plans (LDP).			
2. Coordinated regional climate action				
1. Strengthen coordination among the African Union and its structures, as well as key regional partners, in supporting Member States to achieve climate action.	1a. Mainstream low-emission, climate resilient development across all continental and regional level policies, frameworks and action plans			
	1b. Promote synergies between African Union institutions and structures in addressing climate change matters.			
	1c. Enhance coordination between the regional economic communities and Member States in addressing and managing transboundary and cascading climate risks.			
	1d. Support Member States to develop and implement ambitious NDCs, consistent with national priorities and global Paris Agreement goals.			
2. Strengthen coordination among the African Union and its structures, as well as key regional partners, in supporting Member States to achieve climate action.	2a. Encourage Member States to negotiate as a consolidated Africa bloc.			
	2b. Strengthen collaboration between the AGN, AMCEN and CAHOSCC.			
	2c. Pursue an integrated and cohesive engagement in global negotiations on collective action, including in relation to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
3. Anticipatory governance and proactive, long-term planning				
1. Increase the robustness of climate policy processes by strengthening their effectiveness in possible future conditions.	1a. Identify the assumptions the climate policies are based on and the shaping and hedging of actions to assure climate goals will be reached.			
	1b. Identify drivers of change in national, regional and global contexts, create scenarios to explore possible futures of Africa, and use these to test and enhance climate policies in a participatory manner, involving stakeholders from different groups, ages and backgrounds.			
2. Consider the assumptions that underpin climate change plans.	2a. Consider alternative options and back up plans.			
	2b. Use assumption-based planning methodologies.			
3. Move to a more collective process when developing NDCs and long-term policy planning and development.	3a. Include a broad range of stakeholders throughout the climate policy cycle – from development and design, participatory scenarios development, to implementation and monitoring.			
4. Increase uptake of climate information services				
1. Build and enhance weather and climate observational infrastructure and networks for medium and long-term planning.	1a. Harness financial resources for maintaining observation networks, data rescue, storage and sharing. This could include proposals for funding to international (as well as national) funding agencies.			
	1b. Motivate for central NMHS budgets from government.			
	1c. Investigate and formalise public-private partnerships. This could be facilitated under the WMO Open Consultative Platform for public-private engagement.			
2. Improve the uptake and effectiveness of CIS by increasing the coordinated delivery and sustainability of CIS interventions, including through User-Interface Platforms (UIPs).	2a. Enhance collaboration between the NMHS, sectoral experts, practitioners and policy makers to enable central delivery of decision-relevant CIS.			
	2b. Develop CIS capacity, based on regional need and developed within African institutions in response to that need. Reduce reliance on international sources of CIS where possible.			
	2c. Ensure regular and sustained monitoring and evaluation of CIS interventions.			
	2d. Identify and prioritise initiatives that enable CIS interventions to be sustained after funding ceases.			
3. Build capacity in the generation, uptake and effective use of CIS across various stakeholder groupings.	3a. Enhance user-informed co-production of CIS, based on good practice guidance.			
	3b. Develop capacity to understand and use CIS through training courses, experiential learning (placements, internships etc.) and inter-institutional partnerships.			
	3c. Enhance methodologies for combining trusted indigenous and scientific knowledge to generate CIS products.			
	3d. Develop regional institutional knowledge related to climate modelling and CIS to enhance policy making and increase effective monitoring.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
5. Improved climate literacy and awareness				
1. Increase climate change literacy across all levels of formal and informal education curricula.	1a. Develop and include climate change literacy curricula for formal education (primary, secondary and tertiary levels), extending skills and knowledge for responses to climate change.			
	1b. School girls need to be the focus of gender-sensitive approaches to education, emphasising attendance and completion of their schooling.			
	1c. Develop regional climate change literacy programmes for informal education (e.g., civil society and other partnering actors), extending skills and knowledge for responses to climate change.			
2. Mainstream climate change literacy into targeted sectors most vulnerable to climate change in Africa (across food systems, health, cities, infrastructure, economies, water, heritage, with an emphasis on gender).	2a. Develop extension services that include climate change literacy in programmes for small holder farmers with concentration on skills and knowledge, particularly for adaptation to climate change.			
	2b. Promote climate information services co-production and communication in ways that enhance climate change literacy and improved access to useable climate information, particularly for adaptation to climate change.			
	2c. Address gendered vulnerability to climate change across all sectors, together with the implementation of equity-based approaches, including provision of skills and knowledge for adaptation to climate change for women.			
3. Mainstream climate change literacy across government policy and decision makers for greater climate action.	3a. Enhance training of and support to high-level government officials with regards to skills and knowledge for climate action (both mitigation and adaptation), for example for the Minister of Finance, and with regards to new and rapidly evolving approaches to climate response, including carbon dioxide removal.			
	3b. Advance climate change literacy across all implementing levels and departments of government extending skills and knowledge for responses to climate change.			
	3c. Advance climate change literacy for key environmental decision makers, e.g., the Judiciary (UNEP has recognised the importance of climate change literacy for decision making and governance with a new curriculum on environmental law for judiciaries across the continent).			
6. Governance solutions to address the climate-conflict nexus				
1. Strengthen the capacity of AUPSA and institutions to analyse climate-related peace and security risks and develop appropriate detection, mediation, and resolution strategies.	1a. Provide CISSA and regional early warning centres with training on integrating climate risks into existing analytical tools and conducting in-depth climate-sensitive conflict analysis and climate-sensitive peacebuilding strategies.			
	1b. Provide the AU Mediation Support Unit and RECs Mediation Support Units with training in climate-conflict dispute resolution.			
	1c. Call on RECs to develop regional climate-conflict prevention frameworks that identify context, institution performance, and the role of key actors, and recognises the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of climate risks.			
	1d. Advance post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding activities through climate development objectives and common activities.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
2. Strengthen the capacity of Member States to develop more integrated responses to climate-related security risks.	2a. Support the development of national structures and processes that allow for integrated responses to climate-related security risks and coordination between policy areas and monitoring and evaluation systems.			
	2b. Establish training for government members across departments and agencies on climate risks, development and peacebuilding strategies.			
3. Strengthen the capacity of vulnerable communities to better engage in national climate policy process.	3a. Identify communities most vulnerable to climate-change human security risks, such as farmers, coastal fishing communities, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and provide them with training in national climate policy planning, agenda setting, monitoring and implementation.			
	3b. Develop national mechanisms that allow vulnerable communities to engage with parliament on national climate adaptation and green industrialization initiatives.			
Strategic Intervention Axis 2: Adopting Pathways Towards Transformative Climate-Resilient Development				
7. Food systems under a changing climate				
1. Promote the equitable sharing of climate risk and reward amongst all food system actors, especially small-scale, rural farmers.	1a. Establish a climate-risk insurance facility at a regional level to which every food systems player contributes, directly or indirectly.			
	1b. Enhance availability of and access to appropriate climate-related insurance products to farmers, as well as novel risk-sharing mechanisms like risk pooling and other innovative models.			
	1c. Develop regional mechanisms that ensure that the financial costs of climate disasters are not borne solely by farmers, but spread more equitably across the range of food systems actors, including consumers.			
2. Enhance resilience of food systems against climate effects, while emphasising nutrition outcomes and integrated planning.	2a. Enhance regional capacity development, communication and social movements around blended local and international food systems.			
	2b. Extend use of smart, innovative and climate-resilient technologies, renewable energy production, breed/variety development/switching and technologies that preserve and enhance nutritional qualities in food.			
	2c. Implement appropriate valuation framework for the ecosystems management services provided by farmers to the general public and pay them fair value.			
3. Emphasise production toward agro-ecological transition, to reduce GHG intensity (including methane and other gases), and dependencies on external inputs.	3a. Support research, extension and implementation of public sector and market-based instruments toward agroecological, regenerative, nature-based and indigenous approaches for integrated farming and pastoral systems or resilient landscapes (practices to increase agrobiodiversity, conserve land and water, cycle nutrients, reduce waste and enhance productivity).			
	3b. Provide resources to enable/facilitate the transition to more nature positive production systems by farmers.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
4. Strengthen food system governance interventions across Africa's regions.	4a. Conduct systematic review of existing policies, strategies and incentive mechanisms that support/inhibit transition to sustainable food systems.			
	4b. Modify policies, processes and strategies to become more inclusive and participatory (farmers, women and youth) and support sub-national scales of food systems governance (territorial/landscape) while linking them with resources and authority to national level.			
	4c. Enhance the role and influence of public procurement in food purchasing to support diverse and nutritious diets (for example, municipal support for local sourcing to public canteens, home-grown school feeding programmes).			
	4d. Develop synergies across sectoral planning and investments in infrastructure and related investments (for example, how energy and transport dependencies can better cohere with resilience goals for food systems, as well as how to improve infrastructure to reduce post-harvest losses).			
	4e. Align food system visions and targets with other national strategies and commitments (for example, NDCs, UNCCD net-zero land degradation targets, AFR100 and CBD biodiversity frameworks, SDGs and national development plans).			
5. Strengthen finance, investment and resource allocation interventions.	5a. Coordinate and augment investments by channelling flows toward sustainable food systems from philanthropy, private sector direct investment, and multi-lateral donors.			
	5b. De-risk investment toward transition by distribution roles across philanthropic, public and private finance by avoiding single source funds; ensure better coverage across short- and long-term investing; maintain balance of risk to investors across spectrum of scales; ensure that ESG and social impact investment reporting by private sector is well monitored and promoted.			
	5c. Analyse subsidy and investment programmes to ensure that direct payment schemes for food system actors are aimed toward sustainable food systems transformation.			
	5d. Assess how financial and non-monetary incentives are applied to shift behaviours into more resilient, collaborative and integrated approaches.			
	5e. Draw from cross-value chain initiative models that recognise and remunerate champions of transformation – highlighting successes (for examples, Beacons of Hope, Milan Urban Food Policy Pact and Rockefeller Food System Vision Prize).			
	5f. Support development of market-based mechanisms to reward social and environmental outcomes (Ecosystem outcome verification, bundling of ecosystem services with carbon markets for agriculture sector, etc.).			
	5g. Explore and establish innovative mechanisms that enhance availability and access to financial resources (both mitigation and adaptation) by farmers, such as soil carbon management carbon dioxide removal.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
8. Protecting land-based ecosystems and carbon sinks				
1. Develop bankable solutions for ecosystem protection/restoration, sustainable water resources management and regenerative agriculture.	1a. Study and implement a broad range of economic incentives for sustainable businesses that contribute to ecosystem protection/restoration, sustainable water resources management and regenerative agriculture. This includes Article 6's carbon trading opportunities.			
	1b. Ensure incentives and bankable solutions align with continental, sub-regional, national and local policy directions and socio-political contexts.			
2. Build technical capacity for implementing and investing in regenerative and biodiversity positive agricultural systems across the region.	2a. Develop and support landscape scale multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable agricultural intensification and expansion.			
	2b. Design regional agricultural intensification and expansion plans in line with projected changes in climate change.			
	2c. Lobby for and develop intra-African agricultural trade, development and investment partnerships to aggregate performance and risk.			
3. Finance sustainable land-based ecosystems and carbon sinks to enhance climate adaptation and mitigation.	3a. Develop continental financing mechanisms for ecosystem-based approaches and EbA that consider a wider range of costs and benefits in credit risk assessments.			
	3b. Develop regional financing facilities (including nationally nested facilities) for supporting the development of ecosystem-based approaches and EbA that have both social and environmental benefits.			
4. Protect key carbon sinks in all ecosystems found in Africa.	4a. Support the establishment and improve management of Protected Areas (PA) in irrecoverable carbon ecosystems through integrated land use planning for new PA siting, increased enforcement of PAs and capacity building for PA managers, and incentives for community monitoring of PAs.			
	4b. Increase designation of community managed ecosystem-rich areas, capacity building for community forest management, and empower Indigenous Peoples and local communities through clarifying land rights, providing training and strengthening governance.			
5. Avoid further degradation of and enhance sustainable management of all ecosystems.	5a. Encourage zero-deforestation commodity supply chains by leveraging climate-positive commitments/investments by private sector companies to support activities that strengthen landscape governance; facilitate alignment and action across stakeholders; support capacity building on land use planning; provide extension services and training; clarify land tenure, enhance governance and undertake policy revisions.			
	5b. Remove perverse incentives that lead to destructive activities (fossil fuel subsidies) and encourage nature-positive activities/ecosystem-based approaches (through tax incentives).			
	5c. Leverage climate finance opportunities to encourage REDD+ implementation at site-scale and jurisdictional level in alignment with national GHG accounting, including by creating the appropriate policy and technical processes and infrastructure, attracting private sector investment, clarifying carbon rights and benefit-sharing arrangements, and providing capacity-building.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
6. Restore and sustainably manage agricultural systems (including crop and livestock systems) to reduce and remove GHG emissions, reduce human-wildlife conflict, enhance food security and water regulation benefits.	6a. Catalyse continent-wide actions on commitments (such as AFR100) to scale restoration, with a key focus on cost-effective and science-driven assisted natural regeneration through a mix of active planting and eliminating barriers and disturbances to native vegetation recovery.			
	6b. Promote agroforestry systems with local and climate-resilient species that provide diversified livelihoods.			
	6c. Prioritise novel, integrated livestock management approaches, such as the Herding 4 Health model, which is scalable and traditionally acceptable, enables wildlife-livestock coexistence, climate-change adaptation, carbon sequestration and water regulation.			
	6d. Develop policy to allow livestock development strategies that support rural development and contribute to a restoration economy, including the development of national policies and mechanisms to allow for carbon credit trading and benefit sharing for communities that implement rangeland restorative practices.			
7. Integrate biodiversity conservation and sustainable management in climate change actions.	7a. Promote and expand conservation of biodiverse areas, including sustainable use and community management.			
8. Ensure focus on food security, land-use rights and protection of biodiversity in projects for ecosystem-based approaches to carbon removal.	8a. Integrate full community impact assessments into projects for afforestation, soil enhancement, coastal wetland expansion, and others which are driven by goals of carbon dioxide removal for either credits or payment.			
	8b. Develop 'sustainable ecosystem-based approaches' frameworks to ensure that carbon dioxide removal is not done at expense of development needs and local rights.			
9. Enhancing climate-resilient and low-emission energy and infrastructural systems				
Energy generation				
1. Integrated water resource planning.	1a. Ensure that hydropower infrastructure is planned in coordination with other sectors that compete for the same water resources such as agriculture, industry and domestic households, because lack of integrated planning risks leading to inconsistent strategies and inefficient use of resources.			
2. Promote power system planning for a climate-resilient, low-emission electricity network.	2a. Set long-term targets for renewables to stimulate a pipeline of investible renewable projects.			
	2b. Hydropower development must include projections of potential future patterns of hydrological variability, not just historical data.			
3. Increase power capacity by harnessing the regional potential of river basins to strengthen resilience to droughts and get renewable electricity to markets.	3a. To enable cross-basin trade, the transmission networks and market structures in the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) and East Africa Power Pool (EAPP) should be interconnected, as is currently planned, not developed independently.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
4. Strengthen power sector reforms to enable renewable energy.	4a. Allow broad-based participation in power supply to deliver financial needs and to harness the expertise of international renewable energy developers and investors, including independent power producers (IPPs).			
	4b. Enhance regional policy and regulatory frameworks to encourage power sector reforms.			
5. Expand renewable capacity through competitive auctions.	5a. Increase competitive tenders can simulate a pipeline of bankable projects, if held regularly, through transparent and predictable planning processes.			
6. Strengthen finance and risk mitigation for efficient and renewable energy.	6a. Governments and development finance institutions should crowd-in private investment by providing robust power purchase agreements, affordable loans and risk guarantee facilities to mitigate risks that the private sector is ill-equipped to handle.			
7. Enhance access to energy efficient solutions for all.	7a. Improve access to energy for more people by enhancing energy efficiency.			
	7b. Focus efficiency interventions on electricity use and fuel types used for cooking.			
	7c. Promote policies and organizational frameworks more conducive to enhanced energy efficiency and new market development.			
	7d. Increase access to modern cooking fuels and promote nation-wide energy efficiency, in collaboration with implementing partners, local governments and communes.			
8. Increase adoption of new low-cost, energy saving technologies.	8a. Identify appropriate energy efficiency solutions/technologies that could be scaled up for larger development impact.			
	8b. Promote improved cooking stoves, mini-grids and other innovative solutions.			
	8c. Exchange knowledge and technology between rural and urban households to support rural households in the adoption and use of improved stoves.			
	8d. Build knowledge on energy efficiency.			
9. Build climate resilience and a just transition with a focus on women, girls and young people.	9a. Ensure that sensitization and awareness-raising campaigns target women, as they are almost exclusively in charge of collecting fuel for cooking.			
	9b. Support households in reducing energy poverty and address the challenges of cooking with solid biomass.			
	9c. Encourage the adoption of improved stoves and modern cooking fuels. This reduces cooking time (alleviating women's time-poverty), greenhouse gas emissions, and health risks.			
	9d. Provide high quality training to those who play a key role in the dissemination and implementation of energy efficiency.			
10. Inclusive, low-emission and resource-efficient industrialization				
1. Institutional infrastructure that could effectively guide sustainable industrial development.	1a. Develop coherent and integrated industrial development policies and strategies for low-emission and resource-efficient industrialization.			
	1b. Promote effective university-industry linkages that generate qualified human resources equipped with the required skill sets for low-emission industrial development.			
2. Industrial infrastructure development that provides a sustainable basis for industrialization.	2a. Ensure that all industrial infrastructure is developed and managed in a climate-resilient resource-efficient approach.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
2. Industrial infrastructure development that provides a sustainable basis for industrialization.	2b. Develop eco-industrial parks that are horizontally and vertically integrated with local, national and regional economies.			
3. Distributed renewable economy network development for decent job creation and wellbeing.	3a. Promote development of distributed renewable energy systems as drivers for sustainable local and regional value addition and job creation.			
	3b. Facilitate digital technology application to enhance the economic empowerment and inclusivity of communities, with particular focus on youth on women.			
4. Energy systems that promote efficient generation and utilization of industrial energy input.	4a. Develop and implement national industrial energy efficiency improvement programmes that are aimed at reducing both the material and energy intensity of economic activities.			
	4b. Provide incentives and institutional support that encourages industries to increase the share of renewable energy in the overall energy mix.			
5. Waste management system that emphasises waste to resource conversion.	5a. Promote national industrial waste management programmes, with a particular focus on prevention at the source and waste-to-resource conversion.			
	5b. Develop properly designed and managed waste management infrastructure that reduces emissions and the discharge of toxic and hazardous pollutants.			
11. Promoting low-emission, resilient mobility and transport systems				
1. Build climate-aware transport planning capacity to better shape resilient mobility systems and infrastructure.	1a. Train transport planners and engineers in climate policy, planning under deep uncertainty, access-based planning, incrementalism, hybridity, adaptive project implementation and dynamic monitoring.			
	1b. Collaborate in developing climate-aware, locally appropriate transport-planning masters and undergraduate courses at African universities.			
	1c. Invest in research around the 'just transition' to low-emission, resilient mobility in African cities through a continental knowledge platform.			
	1d. Invest in research on green and efficient fuel supply options.			
2. Change the project financing and evaluation requirements for development banks to prioritise resilience, modal split, access equity, and emission mitigation, alongside travel time savings.	2a. Guide the use of development, concession and blended financing arrangements to include the complex climate and social risks – including risks that stem from the projects themselves.			
	2b. De-prioritise the use of travel time savings as a metric for transport project benefit to acknowledge its effects on carbon intensity, as well as its weakening correlation with access, economic productivity, and social progress.			
3. Support the adaptation of road standards and transport planning guidelines to include resilient designs, as well as prioritise the needs of the most popular and lowest carbon transport modes – walking and cycling.	3a. Compile African design standards for public transport systems and roads, including the infrastructure for non-motorised transport, which adheres to African resilience and universal accessibility principles.			
	3b. Include the voices of vulnerable walking and cycling groups within local, national and regional planning processes.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
12. Building low-carbon, resilient urban areas				
1. Promote nature-based solutions and urban green infrastructure.	1a. Promote opportunities to realise the multiple co-benefits of incorporating ecosystem-based approaches, including hybridised blue-green-grey infrastructure, to help regulate water flow, reduce the heat island effect, treat wastewater, reduce stormwater runoff, and improve water supplies.			
	1b. Adopt an integrated landscape approach as a basic framework to balance competing demands, manage multiple land uses, and understand connections in a specific area. Working with natural processes involves actions across spatial and temporal scales to manage risk in urban areas.			
	1c. Invest in long-term maintenance and security and surveillance measures in both individual nodes (e.g., parks) and connections (e.g., pedestrian walkways) to support nature-based solutions in urban centres.			
	1d. Scale monetary and non-monetary valuation of nature-based solutions, enhance appreciation of natural capital and complement this with cultural ecosystem assessments that consider production capacities, cultural practices, and access to markets.			
	1e. Employ new metrics such as Biodiversity Net Gain, where infrastructure development leaves biodiversity in a measurably better state than beforehand.			
	1f. Implement and enforce robust environmental impact assessments and strategic environmental impact assessments prior when expanding urban centres.			
	1g. Promote soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon management as vital elements to ensure the land's ability to produce food, store water, control soil erosion and dust, maintain soil stability during extreme rainfall events, reduce carbon losses, among other benefits to people and ecosystems living in harsh and increasing warm dryland environments.			
	1h. Plant indigenous trees for shade, reduction of heat stress, and buffering against storm surges (e.g., mangroves and sea grass), thereby preventing the loss of property and human lives.			
2. Invest in the circular economy, smart mobility, decarbonization and net zero carbon buildings.	2a. Focus on resource efficient, compact, and mixed-use urbanization as well as net-zero carbon building designs.			
	2b. Prioritise smart mobility, transit-oriented bicycle, and walking infrastructure in new or refurbished designs.			
	2c. Integrate water resource use efficiency in the design of infrastructure as well as building a circular economy for waste.			
	2d. Decarbonise and detoxify energy systems by considering renewable energy in new or existing infrastructure designs.			
	2e. Scale up district heating. In dense urban areas, district heating radically increases thermal efficiencies and decreases heat loss through heat recycling, combined heat and power systems, and economies of scale.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
3. Build technical capacity in African cities to adapt to the impacts of climate change.	3a. Support cities access to climate finance by developing concept notes, investment cases and pre-feasibility studies for pilot projects to developers/funders.			
	3b. Train local government officials in climate finance processes, language and opportunities.			
	3c. Strengthen national education and outreach campaigns related to climate-resilient urban development.			
	3d. Promote knowledge exchanges around best practices. These are particularly valuable in data poor regions where information sharing is challenging, ecological and social observations are scarce, institutional mandates for monitoring are ill-defined, and data access is often cost prohibitive.			
4. Prioritise risk reduction and build adaptive capacity of residents living in informal, slum or peri urban settlements.	4a. Accelerate and simplify land tenure reforms to stimulate phased restoration of urban natural ecosystems to buffer against hydroclimatic risks and heat stress.			
	4b. Upgrade informal settlements and slum areas in cities to build urban climate resilience and therefore should be considered in policy making.			
	4c. Develop extended and inclusive planning processes that rely on assessments to help prioritise specific needs of a city and its communities. Co-producing relevant interventions is crucial to ensure social ownership of strategies.			
	4d. Change the perceptions around how decision-makers see areas of informality to foster better engagement between informal sector representatives and municipalities. These are ideal entry points to service these settlements with the potential to take implementation from the unplanned to the planned.			
13. Enhancing resilient water systems				
1. Increase water investment.	1a. Increase political commitment for gender equal and climate-resilient water investment.			
	1b. Mobilise financial and other resources for water investment.			
	1c. Strengthen capacities (institutional and individual) for developing, implementing, operating and managing water investment programmes/projects.			
2. Establish systems for developing and transferring technologies to support climate resilience building.	2a. Develop innovation to produce water-efficient and climate-sensitive technologies, including water harvesting.			
	2b. Develop innovation and practices to deal with cost-effective wastewater treatment.			
3. Integrate water resource management.	3a. Take actions to ensure that the natural resource base (water, land other natural resources) is maintained to support development in a changing climate.			
	3b. Protect water-related ecological systems and build their climate resilience. Also deal with demand management challenges.			
	3c. Establish systems for managing water resources, considering hydrological boundaries as units of management/ development.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
4. Strengthen transboundary water management and cooperation.	4a. Develop cooperative mechanisms for managing shared water resources.			
	4b. Take actions for joint investment projects in shared water resources for benefit sharing.			
	4c. Develop and implement a basin-wide development and management plans/programmes considering climate change.			
5. Integrate water security issues into development plans/programmes.	5a. Integrate water security into national and sectoral development plans/programmes.			
	5b. Integrate water security into climate response strategies such as NDCs and NAPs.			
6. Strengthen the characterisation of climate risk in water systems.	6a. Include a focus on past and recent variability and extremes and their impacts.			
	6b. Improve linkages between technical departments on weather/climate and water, build capacity in climate-risk assessment.			
	6c. Agree on principles for risk-assessment approaches, share experiences on how future risks are assessed, and develop practical approaches suitable for operational implementation.			
	6d. Consider the range of impacts – including who is affected and why/how risk assessments need to consider local perspectives about who is vulnerable, and which risk mitigation steps are appropriate.			
7. Strengthen the mandate to undertake climate risk assessment of major investment decisions aiming for system resilience.	7a. Lobby donors to adopt risk assessment into planning and financing decisions.			
	7b. Work through international adaptation mechanisms to support national government and relevant line ministries to design policy for climate risk assessment, consider policy to make it a requirement in some situations.			
	7c. Work with technical departments to facilitate design and adoption of these approaches.			
	7d. Raise awareness of decision-making under uncertainty approaches to planning and management. Where major decisions/investments are involved incorporate 'stress testing' of water resource systems under a range of climate (and other) conditions.			
8. Improve coordination between multiple sectors, particularly water-energy-food, but also environment and land.	8a. Address governance and institutional barriers to coordinated planning and management.			
	8b. Promote tools and decision-making approaches that incorporate multi-sector objectives and performance indicators.			
	8c. Build the evidence base to demonstrate the value of greater coordination in planning.			
14. Building a climate-resilient African blue economy				
1. Promote climate-resilient coastal development.	1a. Invest in ecosystems and natural assets as multi-benefit providers, thereby enhancing natural capital that supports livelihoods and climate resilience.			
	1b. Strengthen grey and green (ecosystem-based/nature-based) adaptation in coastal zones.			
	1c. Enhance financing for adaptation in marine and coastal zones (blue carbon, 'blue finance', private sector partnerships, debt-for-nature swaps and other mechanisms).			
	1d. Integrate climate risk in coastal development planning.			
	1e. Strengthen disaster risk reduction and preparedness plans and strategies.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
2. Support sectoral and integrative blue economy interventions.	2a. Strengthen co-governance and regional fisheries governance mechanisms for enhanced climate resilience.			
	2b. Integrate climate in marine spatial planning, integrated coastal zone management and other planning frameworks.			
	2c. Support sector-specific interventions for key blue economy sectors, including tourism, shipping, fisheries and aquaculture.			
3. Strengthen research and policy.	3a. Strengthen the role of oceans and coasts in NDCs and other climate-related policies and strategies.			
	3b. Support research to predict, monitor and respond to ocean-related climate impacts.			
	3c. Ensure ocean-related climate policy interventions consider equity and the unique position of vulnerable groups.			
15. Digital transformation				
1. Governments should coordinate their national digital climate data infrastructure.	1a. Ensure governments take the lead in coordinating their national climate data infrastructure and connect them across the continent for policy and decision-making.			
	1b. Involve private sector investors in the development of necessary facilities/systems to support climate data for sustainability.			
2. Engage private sector digital innovators and service providers as business partners.	2a. Involve young digital entrepreneurs across the continent to support local data ownership models and safeguard the continent's climate data.			
	2b. Explore viable business models for scaling digital climate advisory services through big data and analytics.			
3. Strengthen community engagement and digital inclusion.	3a. Develop and implement digital transformation frameworks that glean common values from the African concepts like ubuntu (communal love), guiding interactions, research and capacity development in Africa.			
	3b. Involve dynamic and integrative approaches, focus on local agency, seek reciprocity and the pragmatic inclusion of different ways of knowing, conceptualization, and meaning-making.			
4. Promote workforce enhancement.	4a. Recognise and expand African capacity for climate-conscious digital transformation.			
5. Develop and promote thought leadership.	5a. Develop communities of practice to contribute to conversations in international digital transformation.			
6. Strengthen system conciliation.	6a. Acknowledge that digital transformation is a social action that requires empathy and the incorporation of all views.			
	6b. Recognise that system experiences and standards in affluent settings are not necessarily useful to guide systems elsewhere.			
	6c. Appreciate that solutions proposed by exogenous industries present technical, political, and climate challenges for African communities and governments.			
Strategic Intervention Axis 3: Enhancing the means of implementation Towards Climate-Resilient Development				
16. Enhanced finance flows and resource mobilization				
1. Establish mechanisms to mobilise climate finance at scale in Africa.	1a. Manage the decline in public climate finance and address the unfulfilled international finance-related obligations and commitments.			
	1b. Assess current climate financial flows to Africa and develop a roadmap for achieving Africa's adaptation financial needs (as set out in NDCs).			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
1. Establish mechanisms to mobilise climate finance at scale in Africa.	1c. Establish and maintain an MRV system for financial support for Africa. Also promote enhanced transparency framework for climate finance in Africa.			
	1d. Implement policy, institutional and legal reforms for enhanced resource mobilization and scaled-up, transformative climate finance.			
	1e. Integrate climate action in fiscal policy and public financial management systems.			
	1f. Strengthen climate and disaster risk financing mechanisms in Africa.			
2. Balance mitigation and adaptation finance	2a. Prioritize predictable and sustainable finance for adaptation at scale			
	2b. Ensure that adaptation finance is delivered on grant basis.			
	2c. Address the decline in grant finance and the climate-related increasing debt burden of many African countries. 2c. Mobilise finance for the just and equitable transition in Africa.			
3. Strengthen Africa's readiness and capacity to access international climate finance.	3a. Provide support for accreditation of African entities.			
	3b. Build a cadre of African climate finance experts and establish a climate finance portal for Africa.			
	3c. Strengthen Ministries of Finance/Planning leadership role in resource mobilization for climate action.			
4. Promote investment from non-state actors, including the private sector, in climate action.	4a. Build capacity for local, small and medium private sector engagement and win-win contracting.			
	4b. Identify barriers to private sector investment and promote use of policy and financial de-risking instruments.			
	4c. Develop capacity for formulation of investment ready project pipelines and enhance matchmaking platforms.			
5. Mobilise new financial instruments and accountability structures to support climate adaptation and mitigation.	5a. Mobilise financing from the private sector to reduce risk and enhance the quality and life of existing urban infrastructure.			
	5b. Promote the uptake of nature positive infrastructure to reduce business risks, fewer stranded assets and new market opportunities.			
	5c. Given the historical legacies across African cities (e.g., from colonialism and apartheid), investments should be targeted to address legacies of unequal development.			
	5d. Local governments should re-examine the impact of cost recovery policies on low-income communities (e.g., for water, storm water drainage, waste services) - considering the need to achieve distributional and procedural equity in service delivery.			
	5e. Increase public sector funding for adaptation in cities to mitigate and adapt climate change impacts and address infrastructure development needs.			
	5f. Align local plans and policies with NDCs and NAPs to ensure climate finance flows to a local level and national targets and actions are achieved.			
6. Strengthen climate finance effectiveness.	6a. Encourage cross-sectoral approaches to adaptation planning that emphasize reducing risk across interconnected sectors affected by climate change, such as the water- energy-food nexus and the biodiversity-health nexus.			
	6b. Strengthen gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls in climate finance projects.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
17. Safety mechanisms to reduce loss and damage				
1. Promote a comprehensive and integrated risk management approach for loss and damage.	1a. Extend cash plus programmes to support adaptation through the promotion of income-generating activities, livelihood diversification and financial inclusion, promoting opportunities and strategies to deal with future risks.			
2. Strengthen social protection programmes across all regions.	2a. Establish robust public works programmes with regular scheduling and maintenance and not as a temporary safety-net.			
	2b. Ensure community assets address key challenges to livelihoods, that they are relevant to local needs and support environmental rehabilitation and conservation in order to achieve longer-term impacts.			
3. Promote asset creation.	3a. Develop asset-creation programmes to improve food security and boost income among the poorest people.			
4. Improve understanding of risk exposure among the insurance sector and clients.	4a. Identify data and model requirements for underwriting needs and work to fill these gaps.			
	4b. Support the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) strategy development among insurers to enable them to better understand and manage impacts of climate change on their business.			
	4c. Improve collaboration between stakeholders to improve data access, sharing and integration across use cases.			
5. Develop innovative risk transfer and management solutions.	5a. Identify clients' key risks through conducting risk assessments.			
	5b. Build capacity and trust among clients by training them on acquisition and use of data to better understand and manage their exposure to climate change.			
	5c. Develop risk transfer products to meet the needs of key stakeholders, including support with prediction/ early warning and preparation activities.			
6. Develop harmonised climate finance policies and regulation.	6a. Develop climate insurance policies that support national and continent-wide climate policies.			
	6b. Identify priority regulatory constraints and address them to enable the provision of more innovative climate products.			
	6c. Stimulate the market for climate risk insurance by building underwriting capacity in local markets, enabling access to global reinsurance and promote alternative risk transfer structures (i.e., insurance pools).			
	6d. Promote innovation in product design and distribution through pilots, regulatory sandboxes, allowing development of index insurance products.			
	6e. Improve collaboration between public and private sector stakeholders and champion climate risk insurance.			
18. Equitable technology transfer and development				
1. Support the development of a sustained national technology innovation system.	1a. Update a technology gap and needs assessment at relevant levels (territorial, national and regional).			
	1b. Support the design of an institutionalized national innovation system (NIS) including climate endogenous technologies. Technologies need to be at a higher level of use and understanding.			
	1c. Develop and support the implementation of resource mobilization (national and international level) to implement the NIS.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
18. Equitable technology transfer				
1. Support the development of a sustained national technology innovation system.	1d. Support the piloting and implementation of TNAs where needed and specifically in countries where the assessments have been successful.			
	1e. Support private actors' (especially young entrepreneurs) access to climate finance to foster the deployment of mature technologies.			
2. Promote regional south-south technology development and transfer/local dissemination	2a. Design and implement a regional platform for climate technology knowledge management.			
	2b. Identify, review and enhance the functioning of existing regional technology development and transfer centres.			
	2c. Support in- and cross-country peer-to-peer learning and technical assistance.			
3. Enhance the participation of African negotiators in technology-related agendas.	3a. Co-develop and implement a permanent and tailored capacity building programme for junior technology development negotiators that addresses negotiations, transfers and related agenda items.			
	3b. Support technology negotiators (before, during and after climate negotiation events).			
19. Inclusive participation, especially of gender and youth				
1. Improve gender and youth participation in policy co-design, co-development processes, co-implementation and M&E.	1a. Increase women's representation in major climate change policy making positions.			
	1b. Facilitate gender-sensitive dimensions in National Adaptation Planning processes and climate change development plans at all levels.			
2. Empower and engage young people in climate adaptation planning and implementation through inclusive and participatory approaches.	2a. Involve young people in planning and implementation of climate change adaptation strategies using interactive methods.			
	2b. Build the capacity of the youth, prioritizing their development in national budgets, to ensure their contribution in climate change adaptation efforts.			
3. Enhance education and sensitization on gender and youth responsive approaches.	3a. Conduct regular advocacy and awareness programmes on youth and gender equality and inclusivity in climate change policies, programmes and procedures.			
	3b. Increase information sharing for enhancing gender- and youth-sensitive climate change impacts.			
4. Increase financial and technical support for youth and gender organisations.	4a. Financial support to be directed towards grassroots organisations.			
	4b. Include young people in the institutional mechanisms of the AU, as well as within regional negotiating bodies to the UNFCCC COP.			
20. Capacity development				
1. Develop African-focused training courses on climate change that promote the Strategy's overall objectives.	1a. Plan stakeholder workshops to provide updates on global changes in legislation, policies and tools to ensure negotiators, Member States, RECs, advocacy groups and non-governmental stakeholders are informed and up to date.			
	1b. Develop training intervention for the communication and dissemination of the Strategy specifically.			

Priority intervention area	Suggested actions	Responsibility	Time-frame	Cost
2. Develop capacity needs assessments to analyse country and stakeholder capacity-building requirements to develop actionable interventions and strategies.	2a. This capacity assessment should form the basis of discussions and priority intervention areas with technical partners, providers, and funders.			
	2b. Develop a capacity assessment to address the capacity needs of all continental players to adequately perform a role in the Strategy's roll-out and implementation.			
3. Support various stakeholders in effective decision-making processes.	3a. Develop the skills and relationships needed to drive forward new strategies, policies and climate-change actions.			
	3b. Plan stakeholder workshops to provide updates on global changes in legislation, policies and tools.			
	3c. Promote learning exchanges, shadowing or secondments to foster knowledge, and the exchange of skills. Also explore common challenges and questions on NDC implementation.			
Strategic Intervention Axis 4: African Regional Flagship Initiatives				
1. Further strengthen climate dimensions of key regional flagship initiatives (e.g. PIDA, CAADP) and integrate these into the implementation of Africa's Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy	1a. Enhance climate dimensions of regional flagship programmes to support climate-resilient development.			
	1b. Ensure sufficient resource mobilization and budgetary allocations for climate-related actions within regional flagship initiatives.			
	1c. Strengthen information sharing and reporting and integrate this into the monitoring, evaluation and learning activities related to Africa's Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy			
2. Strengthen coordination for more effective implementation	2a. Support coordinated and aligned action between AU structures and key regional partners, as well as non-state actors and Member States to strengthen climate action.			
21. Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning				
1. Develop an inclusive Monitoring, Learning and Evaluation Plan for the Strategy.	1a. Develop an inclusive plan that specifies different actors, their roles and responsibilities for various activities and reviews.			
	1b. Develop a comprehensive results and logical framework which defines the indicators and baseline data needed to achieve the desired results.			
	1c. Conduct a mid-term review of the Strategy.			
2. Develop the capacity of the AUC and other partner organizations to carry out M&E services.	2a. Train AUC personnel to effectively carry out M&E reporting practices and collection of relevant data.			
3. Development of a resource mobilization Strategy.	3a. Mobilise resources specifically to support the implementation and sensitization of the Strategy.			
	3b. Develop strategies to explore new financing options, operationalise these financing strategies and expand partnerships for support.			

07

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Strategic Intervention Axis 2: Pathways Towards Transformative Climate-Resilient Development

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APPENDICES

AU institutional overview and structures

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
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APPENDICES



Photo: ©Annie Spratt (Unsplash)

Appendix 1: AU institutional overview and structures



The three-tiered African climate change negotiation structure

Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)

Established in 2009 by the **AU Assembly**, CAHOSCC is the highest political tier in the African climate change negotiation structure. It is **mandated to spearhead the African Common Position on Climate Change** and its key messages and ensure that Africa speaks with one voice in global climate change negotiations.

The coordination and chairmanship of CAHOSCC rotates every two years.

African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN)

Established in 1985 following a conference of African ministers of environment, AMCEN is mandated to provide advocacy for environmental protection in Africa, to ensure that basic human needs are met adequately and in a sustainable manner, to ensure that social and economic development is realised at all levels, and to ensure that agricultural activities and practices meet the food security needs of the region.

African Group of Negotiators (AGN)


The AGN was established at COP1 in 1995, it is an alliance of African Member States that **represents the interests of the region in international climate change negotiations**, with a common and unified voice. It is the technical body that engages in negotiations during the COP and intersessional negotiations. The AGN prepares and drafts text and common positions, **guided by decisions and key messages from CAHOSCC and AMCEN**, and prepares text for adoption by Ministers during the COPs.

Climate for Development in Africa Programme

ClimDev-Africa is an initiative of the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). It is mandated at the highest level by the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government. The Programme was established to **create a solid foundation for Africa's response to climate change**. Beyond the AUC-UNECA-AfDB partnership, the Programme works closely with other African and non-African institutions and partners specialised in climate and development. **Its purpose is to explore actions required in overcoming climate information gaps, for analyses leading to adequate policies and decision-making at all levels.**

African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC)

ACPC is an integral part of ClimDev-Africa, it is a **hub for demand-led knowledge generation on climate change in Africa**. The ACPC serves RECs, governments and communities across Africa. ACPC works with stakeholders and partners to address the need for improved climate information for Africa and strengthen the use of such information for decision making, by improving analytical capacity, knowledge management and dissemination activities.





Regional Climate Centres (RCCs)


RCCs offer opportunities for networking and pooling the capacities of National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHSs) in the region to enable each NMHSs to provide the full suite of climate services to meet national needs. RCCs are fundamental components to support the achievement of several important climate initiatives designed to improve the provision and use of appropriate climate information to promote planning for sustainable development in Africa.

African Ministerial Conference on Meteorology (AMCOMET)

AMCOMET was established in 2010 as a high-level policy mechanism and the intergovernmental authority for the development of meteorology and its applications in Africa and is a body endorsed by the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government. Its mission is to provide policy direction and advocacy in the provision of weather, water and climate information and services that meet societal and sector specific needs, including agriculture, health, water resource management and disaster risk reduction, amongst others.

African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD) – Continental level

ACMAD was established in 1987 by the Conference of Ministers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa on behalf of the Member States of the UNECA and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). ACMAD as an institution is mandated to provide weather and climate information for the promotion of sustainable development in Africa.



IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)

ICPAC is a specialised institution of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) whose objectives are to improve the technical capacity of producers and users of climatic information; to develop an improved, proactive, timely, broad-based system of information and product dissemination and feedback and to expand the knowledge base within the sub-region to facilitate informed decision making, through a clearer understanding of climatic and climate-related processes. IGAD Member States are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.


AGRHYMET (AGriculture, HYdrology and METeorology)

AGRHYMET is a specialised institution of Permanent Inter-States Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) whose Members States are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. AGRHYMET is mandated to train and inform on Sahelian food security, desertification and water control and management.

SADC Climate Services Centre (SADC-CSC)

SADC-CSC provides operational, regional climate services for monitoring and predicting all facets of seasonal climate conditions including extreme variations for the countries in Southern Africa.

AU Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE)



Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE): Commissioner - H.E. Josefa Leonel Correia Sacko

The Department's mandate is to boost AU Member States' rural economy development and agricultural transformation by supporting the adoption of measures, strategies, policies and programmes on agriculture. Key tasks include developing programmes to ensure food security and nutrition; **promoting efforts to combat desertification and drought; promoting policies and strategies to mitigate disasters**; supporting harmonisation of policies and strategies among the RECs; initiating research on climate change, water and sanitation, and land management, amongst others. In executing its mandate, the Department works closely with the AU Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD), RECs, non-state actors, and technical and financial partners.

ARBE has two Directorates, namely the Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) and the Directorate of Sustainable Environment and Blue Economy (SEBE) Climate Change falls under the SEBE Directorate.

The Department's flagship programmes include the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Great Green Wall for the Sahara and Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI), Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs), Land Policy Initiative (LPI), Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCs), Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+), the AU Green Recovery Action Plan, and Africa's Blue Economy Strategy, amongst others.

Appendix 2: Continental and regional level policies, frameworks and action plans responsive to climate change (non-exhaustive)

Policies/Frameworks/Action Plans	Timeframe	Description
AU continental vision policies		
Agenda 2063: Africa We Want	2013-2063	Agenda 2063 is the continent's 50-year strategic framework that aims to deliver on its goal for inclusive and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the Pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance.
Africa Water Vision (AWV) 2025	2000-2025	The AWV is a vision intended to move Africa from where it is today to where it needs to be to ensure that water available in the future is sustainable and adequate in quantity and quality to meet competing demands in the long term.
AU sector policies, strategies and frameworks		
Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Live-lihoods	2015-2025	The Malabo Declaration provides the direction for Africa's agricultural transformation within the framework of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), as a vehicle to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the First Ten-year Implementation Plan of Africa's Agenda 2063.
Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP)	2003	CAADP is Africa's policy framework for agricultural transformation, wealth creation, food security and nutrition, economic growth and prosperity for all.

Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDev Africa)	2008	The Programme was established to create a solid foundation for Africa's response to climate change. Its purpose is to explore actions required in overcoming climate information gaps, for analyses leading to adequate policies and decision-making at all levels.
African Climate Resilient Agricultural Development Programme	2015	The Programme is to enhance adaptation to climate change and build the resilience of farmers to climate related and economic shocks including scaling up climate smart agriculture to enhance food security and agricultural livelihoods.
African Union Sustainable Forest Management Framework	2020-2030	The Framework serves to guide MS and other African stakeholders in the forestry sector in their efforts to eliminate deforestation and forest degradation by 2063. It provides a scope and priority areas for investments and partnerships in the forest sector.
Africa Blue Economy Strategy (ABES)	2021-2025	ABES guides the development of an inclusive and sustainable blue economy to become a significant contributor to continental transformation and growth.
Integrated African Strategy on Meteorology (weather and climate services)	2021-2030	The Strategy positions weather and climate services as essential components in national and regional development frameworks. Its objective is to enhance cooperation between MS and to strengthen the capabilities of their National Meteorological Services.
Strategic Framework for Drought Risk Management and Enhancing resilience in Africa (DRAPA)	2018	The outcome of the strategic framework will be to sharpen the focus on drought and its impacts and to enhance resilience across all segments of society.
Programme of Action (PoA) for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa	2015-2030	The PoA is the strategic plan for the implementation of the Sendai Framework in Africa. It is intended to provide guidance and direction for actions by all at the continental, regional, national and sub-national/local levels in Africa to prevent and reduce the risk of disasters for resilience in line with the Sendai Framework.
Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa (PIDA)	2012-2040	PIDA provides a common framework for African stakeholders to build the infrastructure necessary for more integrated transport, energy, ICT and transboundary water networks to boost trade, spark growth and create jobs.
Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA)	2008	AIDA provides a continental framework for addressing the root causes of Africa's low industrial development. It aims to mobilise both financial and non-financial resources and increase Africa's competitiveness with the rest of the world.
Science, Technology, Innovation Strategy for Africa	2014-2024	The Strategy is to accelerate the transition of African countries to innovation-led and knowledge-based economies. This will be achieved by improving science, technology and innovation readiness in Africa and implementing specific policies and programmes which address societal needs in a holistic and sustainable way.
AU initiatives and action plans		
Great Green Wall Initiative	2007	This is an African-led movement with the ambition to grow an 8,000 km natural wonder of the world across the width of Africa. It aims to restore Africa's degraded landscapes and transform millions of lives.
African Forest Landscape Restoration Initiative (AFR100)	2015	AFR100 is a country-led effort to bring 100 million hectares of land in Africa into restoration by 2030. It aims to accelerate restoration to enhance food security, increase climate change resilience and mitigation, and combat rural poverty.
Initiative for the Adaptation of African Agriculture to Climate Change	2016	The Initiative aims to contribute to food security in Africa, to improve the living conditions of vulnerable farmers and to increase employment in rural areas by promoting adaptation practices to climate change, building the capacity of actors and channelling financial flows to vulnerable farmers.
Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI)	2015	The AAI aims to enhance action on adaptation, addressing the adaptation financing gap, and implementing measures to address disaster risk reduction and resilience needs in Africa. The AAI takes a strategic view of adaptation across Africa, identifying the gaps and connecting regional partners to find solutions.
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)	2015-2030	AREI is a transformative, Africa-owned and Africa-led inclusive effort to accelerate and scale up the harnessing of the continent's renewable energy potential. The initiative is set to generate at least 300 GW by 2030.
AU Green Recovery Action Plan (AU GRAP)	2021-2027	The Plan will strengthen collaboration on the shared priorities in support of the AU's objectives for the Continent's sustainable and green recovery from COVID-19 by focusing on critical areas of joint priority, including climate finance, renewable energy, resilient agriculture, resilient cities, land use and biodiversity.
Pan-African Action Agenda on Ecosystem Restoration for Increased Resilience	2018	The Agenda proposes policy measures, strategic actions, cooperation mechanisms and on-the-ground actions to advance land and ecosystem restoration in Africa.
Just Rural Transition (JRT) Initiative	2019	The JRT supports and amplifies innovative and ambitious policies, investments, and multi-stakeholder solutions that deliver positive outcomes for people, planet, and economies. It aims to transform food and land use systems by building an action-oriented evidence base, mobilising stakeholders and catalysing partnerships, and strengthening collective purpose.
NDC Partnership	2016	The NDC Partnership works directly with national governments, international institutions, civil society, researchers, and the private sector to fast-track climate and development action.

Regional climate change policies, strategies and frameworks		
SADC Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (CCSAP)	2020-2030	Regional climate change strategy and action plan for the SADC region. The Strategy is intended to build resilience, and climate proof all SADC protocols, policies and strategies.
SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)	2020-2030	The RISDP provides strategic direction for achieving SADC's long-term social and economic goals. Climate change is included as one of the overarching principals of the RISDP.
ECOWAS Strategic Programme on Reducing Vulnerability and Adapting to Climate Change	2020-2030	A Strategy to reduce vulnerability to climate change and to build the resilience of affected communities.
COMESA Strategy on Climate Change	2020-2030	The Strategy defines the main parameters for an effective climate change response in the COMESA region that builds resilient adaptive capacities and unlocks the benefits of the mitigation potential of the region.
EAC Climate Change Policy	2011	The aim of the Policy is to address the adverse impacts of climate change in the region in response to the growing concern about the increasing threats of the negative impacts of climate change to national and regional development targets and goals.
ECCAS Action Plan For Implementation of the Central Africa Gender Responsive Regional Strategy for Risk Prevention, Disaster Management and Climate Change Adaptation	2020-2030	The Plan is aligned with the priorities of the Sendai Framework namely, understanding disaster risk, strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk, investing in DRR for resilience, enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to "Build Back Better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Central Africa Regional Integration Strategy Paper (RISP-CA)	2019-2025	The RISP-CA seeks to stimulate economic diversification and structural transformation by increasing intra-regional trade in Central Africa. This is to be achieved by reinforcing regional infrastructure and supporting reforms that develop intra-regional trade and build regional economic communities' institutional capacity.

Appendix 3: AU Strategy stakeholder engagement events

Stakeholder engagement event	Virtual or in-person	Region	Date and place	Description
AU/UNECA Draft Africa Climate Change Strategy Consultation Webinar	Virtual	All regions	2-3 December 2020	Consultation on the Draft AU Africa Climate Change Strategy
AU/UNECA Climate Change Strategy Consultation for Southern and Eastern African regions	In-person	Southern and Eastern African regions	28-30h July 2021, Nairobi, Kenya	Consultation on the AU Africa Climate Change Strategy
	Virtual	All regions		
AU/UNECA Second Consultative Workshop for the Northern, Central and Western African regions	In-person	Northern, Central and Western African regions	25-27 August 2021, Dakar, Senegal	Consultation on the AU Africa Climate Change Strategy
	Virtual	All regions		
AU/ UNECA Climate Change Strategy Validation meeting	In-person and virtual	All regions	2-3 December 2021, Gaborone, Botswana	Consultation and validation of the AU Africa Climate Change Strategy
Stakeholder engagement event: Specialised Technical Committee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment.	Virtual	All regions	13-17 December 2021	Consideration of documents and reports for agriculture, rural development, water and environment.

Appendix 4: Contributors

Name	Position/qualification	Programme/institution
Overall Strategy development drafting		
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Fiona Napier	Engagement Lead in Africa	UN Climate Champions
Hellen Wanjohi	Resilience African Cities Lead, Cities R2R	UN Climate Champions
Desta Mebratu	Waste Lead	Professor Centre for Sustainability Transition, Stellenbosch University, South Africa Africa Fellow, African Academy of Sciences/ UN Climate Champions
Andriannah Mbandi	Deputy Waste Lead	UN Climate Champions
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Africa's Climate Change Conditions and Vulnerability		
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Climate Information Services		
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Climate Literacy		
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Food systems under a changing climate		
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Laila Lokosang	Former Senior Advisor (Food & Nutrition Security) Food Policy Consultant, Group Board Member	AU Commission Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA) Africa Risk Capacity
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Land-based ecosystems and carbon sinks		
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Resilient urban areas		
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Kate Strachan	Senior Professional Officer	ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, Africa Secretariat
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Digital transformation		
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Equitable technology transfer		
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Fatou Jeng	Gender and Action for Climate Empowerment Negotiator	Clean Earth Gambia
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Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan		
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THE AFRICAN LEADERS NAIROBI DECLARATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CALL TO ACTION

PREAMBLE

We, the African Heads of State and Government, gathered for the inaugural Africa Climate Summit (ACS) in Nairobi, Kenya, from 4th to 6th September 2023; in the presence of other Global Leaders, Intergovernmental Organizations, Regional Economic Communities, United Nations Agencies, Private Sector, Civil Society Organizations, Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities, Farmer Organizations, Children, Youth, Women and Academia:

1. *Recall* the Assembly Decisions (AU/Dec.723(XXXII), AU/Dec.764(XXXIII) and AU/Dec.855(XXXVI)) requesting the African Union Commission to organize an African Climate Summit and endorsing the offer by the Republic of Kenya to host the Summit;
2. *Commend* H.E Dr. William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya, and Chair of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) for providing the political leadership of an African vision that simultaneously pursues climate change and development agenda;
3. *Commend also* H.E Moussa Faki Mahamat, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), for his dedication and commitment towards the convening of the Summit;
4. *Further Commend* the Arab Republic of Egypt for the successful COP27 and its historic outcomes, particularly regarding loss and damage, just transition and energy, and call for the full implementation of all COP27 decisions;

5. *Acknowledge* that climate change is the single greatest challenge facing humanity and the single biggest threat to all life on Earth, demanding urgent and concerted action from all nations to lower emissions and reduce the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere;
6. *Take Note* of the 6th Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), stating that the world is not on track to keeping within reach the 1.5°C limit agreed in Paris and that global emissions must be cut by 43% in this decade;
7. *Underscore* the IPCC confirmation that Africa is warming faster than the rest of the world and if unabated, climate change will continue to have adverse impacts on African economies and societies, and hamper economic growth and wellbeing;
8. *Recognise* that Africa is not historically responsible for global warming, but bears the brunt of its effects, impacting lives, livelihoods, and economies;
9. *Reaffirm* the principles set out in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, namely equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities;
10. *Express concern* that many African countries face disproportionate burdens and risks arising from climate change-related unpredictable weather events and patterns, including prolonged droughts, devastating floods, out-of-season storms, and wildfires, which cause massive humanitarian crisis with detrimental impacts on economies, health, education, peace and security, among other risks;
11. *Recall* that only seven years remain to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda, and note with concern that 600 million people in Africa still lack access to electricity while about 970 million lack access to clean cooking;
12. *Further note* that extreme weather events and changes in water cycle patterns are making it more difficult to access safe drinking water,

resulting in about 400 million people in Africa having no access to clean drinking water and 700 million without good sanitation;

13. *Further recognise* that African cities and urban centres are growing rapidly, and by 2050 would be home to over 1.0 billion people. Cognisant of the fact that rapid urbanization, poverty, and inequality limit planning capacities and other urban dynamics which increase people's exposure and vulnerability to hazards and have thus turned cities into disaster hotspots across the continent;
14. *Concerned* that despite Africa having an estimated 40 percent of the world's renewable energy resources, only \$60 billion or two percent of US\$3 trillion renewable energy investments in the last decade have come to Africa;
15. *Reiterate* Africa's readiness to create an enabling environment, enact policies and facilitate investments necessary to unlock resources to meet our own climate commitments, and contribute meaningfully to decarbonisation of the global economy;
16. *Recognise* that Africa's vast forests, especially the Congo Basin rainforest are the largest carbon sinks globally, and the important ecosystem services provided by Africa's vast savannahs, Miombo woodlands, peatlands, mangroves, and coral reefs, it is time that Africa's natural capital wealth is properly measured by recognizing its contribution to reducing global carbon emissions;
17. *Further recognise* the critical importance of the oceans in climate action and commitments made on ocean sustainability in multiple fora such as the Second UN Oceans Conference in 2022, and the Moroni Declaration for Ocean and Climate Action in Africa in 2023;
18. *Emphasise* that Africa possesses both the potential and the ambition to be a vital component of the global solution to climate change. As home to the world's youngest and fastest-growing workforce, coupled with massive untapped renewable energy potential, abundant natural assets and an entrepreneurial spirit, our continent has the fundamentals to spearhead a climate compatible pathway as a thriving, cost-competitive

industrial hub with the capacity to support other regions in achieving their net zero ambitions;

Now hereby identify the following to be critical agendas for urgent collective action at the continental and global level:

19. We call upon the global community to act with urgency in reducing emissions, fulfilling its obligations, honouring past promises, and supporting the continent in addressing climate change, specifically to:

- i) Accelerate all efforts to reduce emissions to align with goals of the Paris Agreement
- ii) Honour the commitment to provide \$100 billion in annual climate finance, as promised in 2009 at the UNFCCC COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark
- iii) Uphold commitments to a fair and accelerated process of phasing down unabated coal power and phase out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition.

20. We call for climate-positive investments that catalyse a growth trajectory anchored in the industries poised to transform our planet and enable African countries to achieve stable middle-income status by 2050.

21. We urge global leaders to join us in seizing this unprecedented opportunity to accelerate global decarbonization, while pursuing equality and shared prosperity.

22. We call for the operationalization of the Loss & Damage fund as agreed at COP27 and resolve for a measurable Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) with indicators and targets to enable assessment of progress against negative impacts of climate change.

In recognition of the scale, urgency and importance of these collective actions, we commit to:

23. Develop and implement policies, regulations and incentives aimed at attracting local, regional and global investment in green growth, inclusive of green and circular economies;
24. Propel Africa's economic growth and job creation in a manner that reflects our commitments to the Paris Agreement and also aids global decarbonization efforts, by leapfrogging the traditional progression of industrial development and fostering green production and supply chains on a global scale;
25. Focus our economic development plans on climate-positive growth, including expansion of just energy transitions and renewable energy generation for industrial activity, climate smart and restorative agricultural practices, and essential protection and enhancement of nature and biodiversity;
26. Promote clean cooking technologies and initiatives as a just energy transition and gender equality for African rural women, youth, and children;
27. Strengthen actions to halt and reverse biodiversity loss, deforestation, and desertification, as well as restore degraded lands to achieve land degradation neutrality; and implement the Abidjan declaration on achieving gender equality for successful land restoration;
28. Strengthen continental collaboration, which is essential to enabling and advancing green growth, including but not limited to regional and continental grid interconnectivity, and further accelerating the operationalization of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement;
29. Advance green industrialization across the continent by prioritizing energy-intensive industries to trigger a virtuous cycle of renewable energy deployment and economic activity, with a special emphasis on adding value to Africa's natural endowments;

30. Promote investments in reskilling to unlock the human capital that will power for Africa's inclusive green transition;
31. Redouble our efforts to boost agricultural yields through sustainable agricultural practices, to enhance food security while minimizing negative environmental impacts;
32. Contribute to the development of global standards, metrics, and market mechanisms to accurately value and compensate for the protection of nature, biodiversity, socio-economic co-benefits, and the provision of climate services;
33. Finalise and implement the African Union Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, with the view to realizing the 2050 vision of living in harmony with nature;
34. Provide all the necessary reforms and support required to raise the share of renewable energy financing to at least 20 percent by 2030;
35. Promote the production of green hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives such as green fertilizer and synthetic fuels;
36. Integrate climate, biodiversity and ocean agendas into national development plans and processes to increase resilience of local communities and national economies;
37. Promote regenerative blue economy and support implementation of the Moroni Declaration for Ocean and Climate Action in Africa, and the Great Blue Wall Initiative, whilst recognising the circumstances of Africa's Island States;
38. Support smallholder farmers, indigenous peoples, and local communities in the green economic transition, given their key role in ecosystems stewardship;
39. Identify, prioritize, and mainstream adaptation into development policy-making and planning, including in the context of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs);

40. Build effective partnerships between Africa and other regions, to meet the needs for financial, technical and technological support, and knowledge sharing for climate change adaptation;
41. Promote investments in urban infrastructure including through upgrading informal settlements and slum areas to build climate resilient cities and urban centres;
42. Strengthen early warning systems and climate information services, as well as taking early action to protect lives, livelihoods and assets and inform long-term decision-making related to climate change risks. We emphasise the importance of embracing indigenous knowledge and citizen science in both adaptation strategies and early warning systems;
43. Support implementation of the Africa Water Investment Programme (AIP), which aims to close the Africa water investment gap by mobilising US\$30 billion by 2030;
44. Enhance drought resilience systems to shift from crisis management to proactive drought preparedness and adaptation, to significantly reduce drought vulnerability of people, economic activities, and ecosystems;
45. Further enhance our inclusive approach including through engagement and coordination with the children, youth, women, persons living with disabilities, indigenous people, and communities in climate vulnerable situations;
46. Accelerate implementation of the *African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032)*

CALL TO ACTION:

47. *We call* upon world leaders to recognise that decarbonizing the global economy is an opportunity to contribute to equality and shared prosperity.
48. We invite Development Partners from the global north and south to align technical and financial support to Africa for sustainable

utilization of Africa's natural assets for low carbon development that contributes to global decarbonization.

49. To accomplish this vision of economic transformation in harmony with our climate needs, **we further call upon** the international community to contribute to the following:

- i) Increase Africa's renewable generation capacity from 56 Giga Watts (GW) in 2022 to at least 300 GW by 2030, both to address energy poverty and to bolster the global supply of cost-effective clean energy for industry.
- ii) Shift exports of energy intensive primary processing of Africa's raw material back to the continent, to serve as an anchor demand for our renewable energy and a means of rapidly reducing global emissions.
- iii) Access to, and transfer of environmentally sound technologies, including technologies to support Africa's green industrialisation and transition.
- iv) Design global and regional trade mechanisms in a manner that enables products from Africa to compete on fair and equitable terms.
- v) Request that trade-related environmental tariffs and non-tariff barriers must be subject to multilateral discussions and agreements and not be unilateral, arbitrary or discriminatory measures.
- vi) Accelerate efforts to decarbonize the transport, industrial and electricity sectors through the use of smart, digital and highly efficient technologies such as green hydrogen, synthetic fuels and battery storage.
- vii) Design industry policies that incentivize global investment to locations that offer the most and substantial climate benefits, while ensuring benefits for local communities.
- viii) Implement a mix of measures that elevate Africa's share of carbon markets.

50. Reiterate the decision 1/COP27 that states that global transformation to a low-carbon economy is expected to require investment of at least USD 4 - 6 trillion per year and delivering such funding in turn requires a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors.
51. We call for collective global action to mobilise the necessary capital for both development and climate action, echoing the statement of the Paris Pact for People and the Planet, that *no country should ever have to choose between development aspirations and climate action.*
52. Call for concrete, time-bound action on the proposals to reform the multilateral financial system currently under discussion specifically to:
- i. Build resilience to climate shocks, including better deployment of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) liquidity mechanism and disaster suspension clauses.
 - ii. Re-channeling of at least \$100 billion of SDRs to Africa, including through institutions such as the African Development Bank which will be able to leverage the SDRs by three to four times. We also call for the formation of a group of SDR donors to expedite this re-channeling ahead of COP28.
 - iii. Propose for consideration a new SDR issue for climate crisis response of at least the same magnitude as the Covid19 issue (US\$650 billion).
 - iv. Better leverage of the balance sheets of MDBs to scale up concessional finance to at least \$500b per year.
 - v. Improve debt management, including:
 - a. the inclusion of 'debt pause clauses', and
 - b. the proposed expert review of the Common Framework and the Debt Sustainability Analysis.
 - vi. Provide interventions and instruments for new debt relief to pre-empt debt default to:
 - a. extend sovereign debt tenor, and
 - b. include a 10-year grace period.
 - vii. Decisively act on the promotion of inclusive and effective international tax cooperation at the United Nations with the aim to reduce Africa's loss of US\$ 27 billion annual

corporate tax revenue through profit shifting, by at least 50% by 2030 and 75% by 2050.

- viii. Put additional measures to crowd in and de-risk private capital, such as blended finance instruments, purchase commitments, partial foreign exchange (FX) guarantee and industrial policy collaboration, which should be informed by the risks that drive lack of private capital deployment at scale.
- ix. Redesign MDB governance, to ensure a “fit for purpose” system with appropriate representation, voice, and agency of all countries.

53. *Note* that multilateral finance reform is necessary but not sufficient to provide the scale of climate financing the world needs to achieve 43 percent emission reduction by 2030 required to meet the Paris Agreement goals, without which keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees celsius will be in serious jeopardy.

54. *Further note* that the scale of financing required to unlock Africa’s climate-positive growth is beyond the borrowing capacity of national balance sheets, or at the risk premium that Africa is currently paying for private capital.

55. *Draw attention* to the finding that inordinate borrowing costs, typically 5 to 8 times what wealthy countries pay (the “great financial divide”), are a root cause of recurring debt crises in developing countries and an impediment to investment in development and climate action.

56. *We call* for adoption of principles of responsible sovereign lending and accountability encompassing credit rating, risk analysis and debt sustainability assessment frameworks and urge the financial markets to commit to eliminate this disparity by 2025.

57. *Urge* world leaders to consider the proposal for a global carbon taxation regime including a carbon tax on fossil fuel trade, maritime transport and aviation, that may also be augmented by a global financial transaction tax (FTT) to provide dedicated, affordable, and accessible finance for climate-positive investments at scale, and establish a balanced, fair and representative global governance structure for its management, with an assessment of the financial implications on socio-economic impacts on Africa.

58. *Propose to establish* a new financing architecture that is responsive to Africa's needs including debt restructuring and relief, and the development of a new Global Climate Finance Charter through UNGA and COP processes by 2025.
59. *We call* for revaluation of the Gross Domestic Product of Africa through the proper valuation of its abundant natural capital and ecosystem services including but not limited to its vast forests that sequester carbon to unlock new sources of wealth for Africa. This will entail the use of natural resource accounting and development of national accounting standards.
60. *Note* that the first Global Stocktake which will conclude at COP28 offers a pivotal opportunity to correct course by including a comprehensive outcome, both backward and forward looking.
61. *Resolve* to establish the **Africa Climate Summit** as a **biennial event** convened by African Union and hosted by AU Member States, to set the continent's new vision, taking into consideration emerging global climate and development issues.
62. *Resolve also* that this Declaration will serve as a strong contribution from the African continent to the global climate change process including COP 28 and beyond.
63. Welcome the pledges and commitments made at the Summit to a tune of USD 26 billion from Development Partners including the European Union, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as COP28 President-Designate, the Government of the United States, MDBs, Philanthropic Foundations, and Private Sector, to support Africa especially in the areas of renewable energy and adaptation.
64. Appreciate the efforts of the United Arab Emirates as the COP28 President-Designate in the preparation of COP28 and affirm Africa's full support for a successful and ambitious outcome of COP28.

65. *Request* African Union Commission to develop an implementation framework for this Declaration and to make Climate Change an AU theme for the Year 2025 or 2026.

66. *Thank* the Government and People of the Kenya for successfully hosting the inaugural Africa Climate Summit, and the warm hospitality accorded to all delegations to the Summit.

In witness of which we the African Heads of State and Government assembled in the (venue) of the Kenyatta International Convention Centre in Nairobi now make this declaration in the presence of global leaders and high-level representatives on this 6th day September 2023, in Nairobi, Kenya



AU-4



An Integrated, Prosperous
and Peaceful Africa

KAMPALA CONVENTION

African Union Convention for
the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
(Kampala Convention)



KAMPALA CONVENTION

Adopted by
the Special Summit of the Union
Kampala, Uganda 23rd October 2009

Entry into Force
6th December 2012

African Union Convention for the
Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa
(Kampala Convention)

PREAMBLE ■

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union;

CONSCIOUS of the gravity of the situation of internally displaced persons as a source of continuing instability and tension for African states;

ALSO CONSCIOUS of the suffering and specific vulnerability of internally displaced persons;

REITERATING the inherent African custom and tradition of hospitality by local host communities for persons in distress and support for such communities;

COMMITTED to sharing our common vision of providing durable solutions to situations of internally displaced persons by establishing an appropriate legal framework for their protection and assistance;

DETERMINED to adopt measures aimed at preventing and putting an end to the phenomenon of internal displacement by eradicating the root causes, especially persistent and recurrent conflicts as well as addressing displacement caused by natural disasters, which have a devastating impact on human life, peace, stability, security, and development;

CONSIDERING the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union and the 1945 Charter of the United Nations;

REAFFIRMING the principle of the respect of the sovereign equality of States Parties, their territorial integrity and political independence as stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the United Nations Charter;

RECALLING the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

the 1949 Four Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the 1994 Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced Population Displacement in Africa, and other relevant United Nations and African Union human rights instruments, and relevant Security Council Resolutions;

MINDFUL that Member States of the African Union have adopted democratic practices and adhere to the principles of non-discrimination, equality and equal protection of the law under the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as under other regional and international human rights law instruments;

RECOGNISING the inherent rights of internally displaced persons as provided for and protected in international human rights and humanitarian law and as set out in the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which are recognized as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons;

AFFIRMING our primary responsibility and commitment to respect, protect and fulfill the rights to which internally displaced persons are entitled, without discrimination of any kind;

NOTING the specific roles of international Organizations and agencies within the framework of the United Nations inter-agency collaborative approach to internally displaced persons, especially the protection expertise of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the invitation extended to it by the Executive Council of the African Union in Decision EX/CL.413 (XIII) of July 2008 at Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, to continue and reinforce its role in the

protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, within the United Nations coordination mechanism; and noting also the mandate of the International Committee of the Red Cross to protect and assist persons affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence, as well as the work of civil society organizations, in conformity with the laws of the country in which they exercise such roles and mandates;

RECALLING the lack of a binding African and international legal and institutional framework specifically, for the prevention of internal displacement and the protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons;

REAFFIRMING the historical commitment of the AU Member States to the protection of and assistance to refugees and displaced persons and, in particular, the implementation of Executive Council Decisions EX.CL/Dec.129 (V) and EX.CL/127 (V) of July 2004 in Addis Ababa, to the effect that that the specific needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) such as protection and assistance should be addressed through a separate legal instrument, and to collaborate with relevant cooperating partners and other stakeholders to ensure that internally displaced persons are provided with an appropriate legal framework to ensure their adequate protection and assistance as well as with durable solutions, respectively;

CONVINCED that the present Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons presents such a legal framework;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article I

DEFINITIONS ■

For the purpose of the present Convention:

- a. **“African Charter”** means the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;
- b. **“African Commission”** means the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights;

- c. **“African Court of Justice and Human Rights”** means the African Court of Justice and Human Rights;
- d. **Arbitrary displacement** means arbitrary displacement as referred to in Article 4 (4) (a) to (h);
- e. **“Armed Groups”** means dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of the state;
- f. **“AU”** means the African Union;
- g. **“AU Commission”** means the Secretariat of the African Union, which is the depository of the regional instruments;
- h. **“Child”** means every human being below the age of 18 years;
- i. **“Constitutive Act”** means the Constitutive Act of the African Union;
- j. **“Harmful Practices”** means all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of persons, such as but not limited to their right to life, health, dignity, education, mental and physical integrity and education;
- k. **“Internally Displaced Persons”** means persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border;
- l. **“Internal displacement”** means the involuntary or forced movement, evacuation or relocation of persons or groups of persons within internationally recognized state borders;
- m. **“Member State”** means a Member State of the African Union;
- n. **“Non-state actors”** means private actors who are not public officials of the State, including other armed groups not referred to in article 1(d) above, and whose acts cannot be officially attributed to the State;


- o. "OAU"** means the Organization of African Unity;
- p. "Women"** mean persons of the female gender, including girls;
- q. "Sphere standards"** mean standards for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness and impact of humanitarian assistance; and
- r. "States Parties"** means African States which have ratified or acceded to this Convention.

Article II

OBJECTIVES ■

The objectives of this Convention are to:

- a.** Promote and strengthen regional and national measures to prevent or mitigate, prohibit and eliminate root causes of internal displacement as well as provide for durable solutions;
- b.** Establish a legal framework for preventing internal displacement, and protecting and assisting internally displaced persons in Africa;
- c.** Establish a legal framework for solidarity, cooperation, promotion of durable solutions and mutual support between the States Parties in order to combat displacement and address its consequences;
- d.** Provide for the obligations and responsibilities of States Parties, with respect to the prevention of internal displacement and protection of, and assistance, to internally displaced persons;
- e.** Provide for the respective obligations, responsibilities and roles of armed groups, non-state actors and other relevant actors, including civil society organizations, with respect to the prevention of internal displacement and protection of, and assistance to, internally displaced persons;



A LANDMARK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: The Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement came into Effect on **6th December 2012**

Article III

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO STATES PARTIES ■

1. States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present Convention. In particular, States Parties shall:
 - a) Refrain from, prohibit and prevent arbitrary displacement of populations;
 - b) Prevent political, social, cultural and economic exclusion and marginalisation, that are likely to cause displacement of populations or persons by virtue of their social identity, religion or political opinion;
 - c) Respect and ensure respect for the principles of humanity and human dignity of internally displaced persons;
 - d) Respect and ensure respect and protection of the human rights of internally displaced persons, including humane treatment, non-discrimination, equality and equal protection of law;
 - e) Respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law regarding the protection of internally displaced persons;
 - f) Respect and ensure respect for the humanitarian and civilian character of the protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, including ensuring that such persons do not engage in subversive activities;
 - g) Ensure individual responsibility for acts of arbitrary displacement, in accordance with applicable domestic and international criminal law;
 - h) Ensure the accountability of non-State actors concerned, including multinational companies and private military or security companies, for acts of arbitrary displacement or complicity in such acts;
 - i) Ensure the accountability of non-State actors involved in the exploration and exploitation of economic and natural resources leading to displacement;
 - j) Ensure assistance to internally displaced persons by meeting their basic needs as well as allowing and facilitating rapid and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations and personnel;

- k)** Promote self-reliance and sustainable livelihoods amongst internally displaced persons, provided that such measures shall not be used as a basis for neglecting the protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons, without prejudice to other means of assistance;

2. States Parties shall:

- a)** Incorporate their obligations under this Convention into domestic law by enacting or amending relevant legislation on the protection of, and assistance to, internally displaced persons in conformity with their obligations under international law;
- b)** Designate an authority or body, where needed, responsible for coordinating activities aimed at protecting and assisting internally displaced persons and assign responsibilities to appropriate organs for protection and assistance, and for cooperating with relevant international organizations or agencies, and civil society organizations, where no such authority or body exists;
- c)** Adopt other measures as appropriate, including strategies and policies on internal displacement at national and local levels, taking into account the needs of host communities;
- d)** Provide, to the extent possible, the necessary funds for protection and assistance without prejudice to receiving international support;
- e)** Endeavour to incorporate the relevant principles contained in this Convention into peace negotiations and agreements for the purpose of finding sustainable solutions to the problem of internal displacement.

Article IV

OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES RELATING TO PROTECTION FROM INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ■

1. States Parties shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to the arbitrary displacement of persons;
2. States Parties shall devise early warning systems, in the context of the continental early warning system, in areas of potential displacement, establish and implement disaster risk reduction strategies, emergency and disaster preparedness and management measures and, where necessary, provide immediate protection and assistance to internally displaced persons;
3. States Parties may seek the cooperation of international organizations or humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and other relevant actors;
4. All persons have a right to be protected against arbitrary displacement. The prohibited categories of arbitrary displacement include but are not limited to:
 - a) Displacement based on policies of racial discrimination or other similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the population;
 - b) Individual or mass displacement of civilians in situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand, in accordance with international humanitarian law;
 - c) Displacement intentionally used as a method of warfare or due to other violations of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict;
 - d) Displacement caused by generalized violence or violations of human rights;
 - e) Displacement as a result of harmful practices;
 - f) Forced evacuations in cases of natural or human made disasters or other causes if the evacuations are not required by the safety and health of those affected;

- g)** Displacement used as a collective punishment;
 - h)** Displacement caused by any act, event, factor, or phenomenon of comparable gravity to all of the above and which is not justified under international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.
- 5.** States Parties shall endeavour to protect communities with special attachment to, and dependency, on land due to their particular culture and spiritual values from being displaced from such lands, except for compelling and overriding public interests;
- 6.** States Parties shall declare as offences punishable by law acts of arbitrary displacement that amount to genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Article V

OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES RELATING TO PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE ■

- 1.** States Parties shall bear the primary duty and responsibility for providing protection of and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their territory or jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind.
- 2.** States Parties shall cooperate with each other upon the request of the concerned State Party or the Conference of State Parties in protecting and assisting internally displaced persons.
- 3.** States Parties shall respect the mandates of the African Union and the United Nations, as well as the roles of international humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, in accordance with international law.
- 4.** States Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change.
- 5.** States Parties shall assess or facilitate the assessment of the needs and vulnerabilities of internally displaced persons and of host communities, in cooperation with international organizations or agencies.

- 6.** States Parties shall provide sufficient protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, and where available resources are inadequate to enable them to do so, they shall cooperate in seeking the assistance of international organizations and humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and other relevant actors. Such organizations may offer their services to all those in need.
- 7.** States Parties shall take necessary steps to effectively organize, relief action that is humanitarian, and impartial in character, and guarantee security. States Parties shall allow rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel to internally displaced persons. States Parties shall also enable and facilitate the role of local and international organizations and humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and other relevant actors, to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. States Parties shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is permitted.
- 8.** States Parties shall uphold and ensure respect for the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian actors.
- 9.** States Parties shall respect the right of internally displaced persons to peacefully request or seek protection and assistance, in accordance with relevant national and international laws, a right for which they shall not be persecuted, prosecuted or punished.
- 10.** States Parties shall respect, protect and not attack or otherwise harm humanitarian personnel and resources or other materials deployed for the assistance or benefit of internally displaced persons.
- 11.** States Parties shall take measures aimed at ensuring that armed groups act in conformity with their obligations under Article 7.
- 12.** Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

Article VI

OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES ■

1. International organizations and humanitarian agencies shall discharge their obligations under this Convention in conformity with international law and the laws of the country in which they operate.
2. In providing protection and assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, international organizations and humanitarian agencies shall respect the rights of such persons in accordance with international law.
3. International organizations and humanitarian agencies shall be bound by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian actors, and ensure respect for relevant international standards and codes of conduct.

Article VII

PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT ■

1. The provisions of this Article shall not, in any way whatsoever, be construed as affording legal status or legitimizing or recognizing armed groups and are without prejudice to the individual criminal responsibility of the members of such groups under domestic or international criminal law.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.
3. The protection and assistance to internally displaced persons under this Article shall be governed by international law and in particular international humanitarian law.
4. Members of Armed groups shall be held criminally responsible for

their acts which violate the rights of internally displaced persons under international law and national law.

5. Members of armed groups shall be prohibited from:

- a)** Carrying out arbitrary displacement;
- b)** Hampering the provision of protection and assistance to internally displaced persons under any circumstances;
- c)** Denying internally displaced persons the right to live in satisfactory conditions of dignity, security, sanitation, food, water, health and shelter; and separating members of the same family;
- d)** Restricting the freedom of movement of internally displaced persons within and outside their areas of residence;
- e)** Recruiting children or requiring or permitting them to take part in hostilities under any circumstances;
- f)** Forcibly recruiting persons, kidnapping, abduction or hostage taking, engaging in sexual slavery and trafficking in persons especially women and children;
- g)** Impeding humanitarian assistance and passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel to internally displaced persons
- h)** Attacking or otherwise harming humanitarian personnel and resources or other materials deployed for the assistance or benefit of internally displaced persons and shall not destroy, confiscate or divert such materials; and
- i)** Violating the civilian and humanitarian character of the places where internally displaced persons are sheltered and shall not infiltrate such places.

Article VIII

OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO THE AFRICAN UNION ■

- 1.** The African Union shall have the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity;
- 2.** The African Union shall respect the right of States Parties to request

intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act and thus contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for finding durable solutions to the problem of internal displacement;

3. The African Union shall support the efforts of the States Parties to protect and assist internally displaced persons under this Convention. In particular, the Union shall:
 - a) Strengthen the institutional framework and capacity of the African Union with respect to protection and assistance to internally displaced persons;
 - b) Coordinate the mobilisation of resources for protection and assistance to internally displaced persons;
 - c) Collaborate with international organizations and humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and other relevant actors in accordance with their mandates, to support measures taken by States Parties to protect and assist internally displaced persons.
 - d) Cooperate directly with African States and international organizations and humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations and other relevant actors, with respect to appropriate measures to be taken in relation to the protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons;
 - e) Share information with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on the situation of displacement, and the protection and assistance accorded to internally displaced persons in Africa; and,
 - f) Cooperate with the Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights for Refugees, Returnees, IDPs and Asylum Seekers in addressing issues of internally displaced persons.

Article IX

OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES RELATING TO PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE DURING INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ■

1. States Parties shall protect the rights of internally displaced persons regardless of the cause of displacement by refraining from, and preventing, the following acts, amongst others:

- a)** Discrimination against such persons in the enjoyment of any rights or freedoms on the grounds that they are internally displaced persons;
- b)** Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law against internally displaced persons;
- c)** Arbitrary killing, summary execution, arbitrary detention, abduction, enforced disappearance or torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
- d)** Sexual and gender based violence in all its forms, notably rape, enforced prostitution, sexual exploitation and harmful practices, slavery, recruitment of children and their use in hostilities, forced labour and human trafficking and smuggling; and
- e)** Starvation.

2. States Parties shall:

- a)** Take necessary measures to ensure that internally displaced persons are received, without discrimination of any kind and live in satisfactory conditions of safety, dignity and security;
- b)** Provide internally displaced persons to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, with adequate humanitarian assistance, which shall include food, water, shelter, medical care and other health services, sanitation, education, and any other necessary social services, and where appropriate, extend such assistance to local and host communities;
- c)** Provide special protection for and assistance to internally displaced persons with special needs, including separated and unaccompanied children, female heads of households, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities or with communicable diseases;
- d)** Take special measures to protect and provide for the reproductive and sexual health of internally displaced women as well as appropriate psycho-social support for victims of sexual and other related abuses;
- e)** Respect and ensure the right to seek safety in another part of the State and to be protected against forcible return to or resettlement in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or

- health would be at risk;
- f)** Guarantee the freedom of movement and choice of residence of internally displaced persons, except where restrictions on such movement and residence are necessary, justified and proportionate to the requirements of ensuring security for internally displaced persons or maintaining public security, public order and public health;
 - g)** Respect and maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of the places where internally displaced persons are sheltered and safeguard such locations against infiltration by armed groups or elements and disarm and separate such groups or elements from internally displaced persons;
 - h)** Take necessary measures, including the establishment of specialized mechanisms, to trace and reunify families separated during displacement and otherwise facilitate the re-establishment of family ties;
 - i)** Take necessary measures to protect individual, collective and cultural property left behind by displaced persons as well as in areas where internally displaced persons are located, either within the jurisdiction of the State Parties, or in areas under their effective control;
 - j)** Take necessary measures to safeguard against environmental degradation in areas where internally displaced persons are located, either within the jurisdiction of the State Parties, or in areas under their effective control;
 - k)** States Parties shall consult internally displaced persons and allow them to participate in decisions relating to their protection and assistance;
 - l)** Take necessary measures to ensure that internally displaced persons who are citizens in their country of nationality can enjoy their civic and political rights, particularly public participation, the right to vote and to be elected to public office; and
 - m)** Put in place measures for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the humanitarian assistance delivered to internally displaced persons in accordance with relevant practice, including the Sphere Standards.

3. States Parties shall discharge these obligations, where appropriate, with assistance from international organizations and humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations, and other relevant actors.

Article X

DISPLACEMENT INDUCED BY PROJECTS ■

1. States Parties, as much as possible, shall prevent displacement caused by projects carried out by public or private actors;
2. States Parties shall ensure that the stakeholders concerned will explore feasible alternatives, with full information and consultation of persons likely to be displaced by projects;
3. States parties shall carry out a socio-economic and environmental impact assessment of a proposed development project prior to undertaking such a project.

Article XI

OBLIGATIONS OF STATES PARTIES RELATING TO SUSTAINABLE RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION OR RELOCATION ■

1. States Parties shall seek lasting solutions to the problem of displacement by promoting and creating satisfactory conditions for voluntary return, local integration or relocation on a sustainable basis and in circumstances of safety and dignity.
2. States Parties shall enable internally displaced persons to make a free and informed choice on whether to return, integrate locally or relocate by consulting them on these and other options and ensuring their participation in finding sustainable solutions.
3. States Parties shall cooperate, where appropriate, with the African Union and international organizations or humanitarian agencies and civil society organizations, in providing protection and assistance in the course of finding and implementing solutions for sustainable return, local integration or relocation and long-term reconstruction.

4. States Parties shall establish appropriate mechanisms providing for simplified procedures where necessary, for resolving disputes relating to the property of internally displaced persons.
5. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, whenever possible, to restore the lands of communities with special dependency and attachment to such lands upon the communities' return, reintegration, and reinsertion.

Article XII

COMPENSATION ■

1. States Parties shall provide persons affected by displacement with effective remedies.
2. States Parties shall establish an effective legal framework to provide just and fair compensation and other forms of reparations, where appropriate, to internally displaced persons for damage incurred as a result of displacement, in accordance with international standards.
3. A State Party shall be liable to make reparation to internally displaced persons for damage when such a State Party refrains from protecting and assisting internally displaced persons in the event of natural disasters.

Article XIII

REGISTRATION AND PERSONAL DOCUMENTATION ■

1. States Parties shall create and maintain an up-dated register of all internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction or effective control. In doing so, States Parties may collaborate with international organizations or humanitarian agencies or civil society organizations.
2. States Parties shall ensure that internally displaced persons shall be issued with relevant documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their rights, such as passports, personal identification documents, civil certificates, birth certificates and marriage certificates.
3. States Parties shall facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost or destroyed in the course of

displacement, without imposing unreasonable conditions, such as requiring return to one's area of habitual residence in order to obtain these or other required documents. The failure to issue internally displaced persons with such documents shall not in any way impair the exercise or enjoyment of their human rights.

4. Women and men as well as separated and unaccompanied children shall have equal rights to obtain such necessary identity documents and shall have the right to have such documentation issued in their own names.

Article XIV

MONITORING COMPLIANCE ■

1. States Parties agree to establish a Conference of States Parties to this Convention to monitor and review the implementation of the objectives of this Convention.
2. States Parties shall enhance their capacity for cooperation and mutual support under the auspices of the Conference of the States Parties.
3. States Parties agree that the Conference of the States Parties shall be convened regularly and facilitated by the African Union.
4. States Parties shall, when presenting their reports under Article 62 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights as well as, where applicable, under the African Peer Review Mechanism indicate the legislative and other measures that have been taken to give effect to this Convention.

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article XV

APPLICATION ■

1. States Parties agree that except where expressly stated in this Convention, its provisions apply to all situations of internal displacement regardless of its causes.
2. States Parties agree that nothing in this Convention shall be construed as affording legal status or legitimizing or recognizing armed groups and that its provisions are without prejudice to the individual criminal responsibility of their members under domestic or international criminal law.

Article XVI

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND MEMBERSHIP ■

1. This Convention shall be open to signature, ratification or accession by Member States of the AU in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
2. The instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

Article XVII

ENTRY INTO FORCE ■

1. This Convention shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification or accession by fifteen (15) Member States.
2. The Chairperson of the AU Commission shall notify Member States of the coming into force of this Convention.

Article XVIII

AMENDMENT AND REVISION ■

1. States Parties may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Convention.
2. Proposals for amendment or revision shall be submitted, in writing, to the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU who shall transmit the same to the States Parties within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof.
3. The Conference of States Parties, upon advice of the Executive Council, shall examine these proposals within a period of one (1) year following notification of States Parties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. Amendments or revision shall be adopted by the Conference of States Parties by a simple majority of the States Parties present and voting.
5. Amendments shall come into force thirty (30) days following the depositing of the fifteenth (15) instrument of ratification by the States Parties with the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

Article XIX

DENUNCIATION ■

1. A State Party may denounce this Convention by sending a written notification addressed to the Chairperson of the AU Commission, while indicating the reasons for such a denunciation.
2. The denunciation shall take effect one (1) year from the date when the notification was received by the Chairperson of the AU Commission, unless a subsequent date has been specified.

Article XX

SAVING CLAUSE ■

1. No provision in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting or undermining the right of internally displaced persons to seek and

be granted asylum within the framework of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and to seek protection, as a refugee, within the purview of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa or the 1951 U.N Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

2. This Convention shall be without prejudice to the human rights of internally displaced persons under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other applicable instruments of international human rights law or international humanitarian law. Similarly, it shall in no way be understood, construed or interpreted as restricting, modifying or impeding existing protection under any of the instruments mentioned herein.
3. The right of internally displaced persons to lodge a complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights or the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, or any other competent international body shall in no way be affected by this Convention.
4. The provisions of this Convention shall be without prejudice to the individual criminal responsibility of internally displaced persons, within the framework of national or international criminal law and their duties by virtue of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Article XXI

RESERVATIONS ■

States Parties shall not make or enter reservations to this Convention that are incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention.

Article XXII

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ■

1. Any dispute or differences arising between the States Parties with regard to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be settled amicably through direct consultations between the States Parties concerned. In the event of failure to settle the dispute or

differences, either State may refer the dispute to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

2. Until such time as and when the latter shall have been established, the dispute or differences shall be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties, which will decide by consensus or, failing which, by a two-third (2/3) majority of the States Parties present and voting.

Article XXIII

DEPOSITORY ■

1. This Convention shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the AU Commission, who shall transmit a certified true copy of the Convention to the Government of each signatory State.
2. The Chairperson of the AU Commission shall register this Convention with the United-Nations Secretary-General as soon as it comes into force.
3. This Convention is drawn up in four (4) original texts; in the Arabic, English, French and Portuguese languages, all four (4) being equally authentic.

**Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union
held in *Kampala, Uganda 23rd October 2009***

IN WITNESS WHEREOF WE, the Heads of African State and Government, have signed this Convention. **DONE** in the City of Kampala this **23rd day of October 2009**.

List of countries who have ratified the OAU Convention as at 16th May 2019

- | | | |
|--|--------------------------|--|
| 1. Algeria | 19. Eswatini | 39. Nigeria |
| 2. Angola | 20. Ethiopia | 40. Rwanda |
| 3. Benin | 21. Gabon | 41. Sao Tome & Principe |
| 4. Botswana | 22. Gambia | 42. Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic |
| 5. Burkina Faso | 23. Ghana | 43. Senegal |
| 6. Burundi | 24. Guinea-Bissau | 44. Seychelles |
| 7. Cameroon | 25. Guinea | 45. Sierra Leone |
| 8. Central African
Republic | 26. Kenya | 46. Somalia |
| 9. Cape Verde | 27. Libya | 47. South Africa |
| 10. Chad | 28. Lesotho | 48. South Sudan |
| 11. Côte d'Ivoire | 29. Liberia | 49. Sudan |
| 12. Comoros | 30. Madagascar | 50. Tanzania |
| 13. Congo | 31. Malawi | 51. Togo |
| 14. Djibouti | 32. Mali | 52. Tunisia |
| 15. Democratic Rep. of
Congo | 33. Mauritania | 53. Uganda |
| 16. Egypt | 34. Mauritius | 54. Zambia |
| 17. Equatorial Guinea | 35. Morocco | 55. Zimbabwe |
| 18. Eritrea | 36. Mozambique | |
| | 37. Namibia | |
| | 38. Niger | |

- Convention entered into force on 6th December 2012

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WHILE EVERY
REFUGEE'S STORY IS
DIFFERENT AND THEIR
ANGUISH PERSONAL,
THEY ALL SHARE A
COMMON THREAD OF
UNCOMMON COURAGE
– THE COURAGE NOT
ONLY TO SURVIVE,
BUT TO PERSEVERE
AND REBUILD THEIR
SHATTERED LIVES.

**António
Guterres**

2019


**THE YEAR OF
REFUGEES,
RETURNEES AND
INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS:**

Towards Durable
Solutions
to Forced Displacement in
Africa.

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AU-5

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE

AFRICAN CHARTER
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTSPREAMBLE

The African States members of the Organization of African Unity, parties to the present convention entitled "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights",

Recalling Decision 115 (XVI) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session held in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July 1979 on the preparation of "a preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights providing inter alia for the establishment of bodies to promote and protect human and peoples' rights" ;

Considering the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which stipulates that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples" ;

Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ;

Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights ;

Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings, which justifies their international protection and on the other hand that the reality and respect of peoples rights should necessarily guarantee human rights ;

- 2 -

Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone ;

Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights ;

Conscious of their duty to achieve the total liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are still struggling for their dignity and genuine independence, and undertaking to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, zionism and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases and all forms of discrimination, particularly those based on race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion or political opinions ;

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations ;

Firmly convinced of their duty to promote and protect human and peoples' rights and freedoms taking into account the importance traditionally attached to these rights and freedoms in Africa ;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS :

PART I : RIGHTS AND DUTIES

CHAPTER I

HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

ARTICLE 1 :

The Member States of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.

ARTICLE 2

Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.

ARTICLE 3

1. Every individual shall be equal before the law
2. Every individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.

ARTICLE 4

Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right.

ARTICLE 5

Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.

ARTICLE 6

Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.

ARTICLE 7

1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises :
 - a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force ;
 - b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal ;
 - c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice ;
 - d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.

2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.

ARTICLE 8

Freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms.

ARTICLE 9

1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information.
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law.

ARTICLE 10

1. Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law.
2. Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in Article 29 no one may be compelled to join an association.

ARTICLE 11

Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.

ARTICLE 12

1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law.
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality.

- 5 -

3. Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the laws of those countries and international conventions.

4. A non-national legally admitted in a territory of a State Party to the present Charter, may only be expelled from it by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law.

5. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.

ARTICLE 13

1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.

2. Every citizen shall have the right of equal access to the public service of his country.

3. Every individual shall have the right of access to public property and services in strict equality of all persons before the law.

ARTICLE 14

The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.

ARTICLE 15

Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work.

ARTICLE 16

1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.

2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.

ARTICLE 17

1. Every individual shall have the right to education.
2. Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his community.
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State.

ARTICLE 18

1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral.

2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the community.

3. The State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.

4. The aged and the disabled shall also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs.

ARTICLE 19

All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.

ARTICLE 20

1. All peoples shall have right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen.

2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.

3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States Parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural.

ARTICLE 21

1. All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.

2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.

3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law.

4. States parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity.

5. States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practised by international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their national resources.

ARTICLE 22

1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.

2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.

ARTICLE 23

1. All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. The principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African Unity shall govern relations between States.

2. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, States parties to the present Charter shall ensure that :

- 8 -

- (a) any individual enjoying the right of asylum under Article 12 of the present Charter shall not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or any other State party to the present Charter ;
- (b) their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any other State party to the present Charter.

ARTICLE 24

All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.

ARTICLE 25

States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood.

ARTICLE 26

States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.

CHAPTER II

DUTIES

ARTICLE 27

1. Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognised communities and the international community.
2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.

ARTICLE 28

Every individual shall have the duty to respect and consider his fellow beings without discrimination, and to maintain relations aimed at promoting, safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.

ARTICLE 29

The individual shall also have the duty :

1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need ;
2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service ;
3. Not to compromise the security of the State whose national or resident he is ;
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened ;
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its defence in accordance with the law ;
6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the society ;
7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society ;
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African unity.

PART II - MEASURES OF SAFEGUARDCHAPTER IESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTSARTICLE 30

An African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, hereinafter called "the Commission", shall be established within the Organization of African Unity to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa.

ARTICLE 31

1. The Commission shall consist of eleven members chosen from amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples' rights ; particular consideration being given to persons having legal experience.

2. The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity.

ARTICLE 32

The Commission shall not include more than one national of the same State.

ARTICLE 33

The members of the Commission shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, from a list of persons nominated by the States parties to the present Charter.

ARTICLE 34

Each State party to the present Charter may not nominate more than two candidates. The candidates must have the nationality of one of the States parties to the present Charter. When two candidates are nominated by a State, one of them may not be a national of that State.

ARTICLE 35

1. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity shall invite States parties to the present Charter at least four months before the elections to nominate candidates ;

2. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity shall make an alphabetical list of the persons thus nominated and communicate it to the Heads of State and Government at least one month before the elections.

ARTICLE 36

The members of the Commission shall be elected for a six year period and shall be eligible for re-election. However, the term of office of four of the members elected at the first election shall terminate after two years and the term of office of three others, at the end of four years.

ARTICLE 37

Immediately after the first election, the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity shall draw lots to decide the names of those members referred to in Article 36.

ARTICLE 38

After their election, the members of the Commission shall make a solemn declaration to discharge their duties impartially and faithfully.

ARTICLE 39

1. In case of death or resignation of a member of the Commission, the Chairman of the Commission shall immediately inform the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or from the date on which the resignation takes effect.

2. If, in the unanimous opinion of other members of the Commission, a member has stopped discharging his duties for any reason other than a temporary absence, the Chairman of the Commission shall inform the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, who shall then declare the seat vacant.

3. In each of the cases anticipated above, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall replace the member whose seat became vacant for the remaining period of his term unless the period is less than six months.

ARTICLE 40

Every member of the Commission shall be in office until the date his successor assumes office.

ARTICLE 41

The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity shall appoint the Secretary of the Commission. He shall also provide the staff and services necessary for the effective discharge of the duties of the Commission. The Organization of African Unity shall bear the cost of the staff and services.

ARTICLE 42

1. The Commission shall elect its Chairman and Vice Chairman for a two-year period. They shall be eligible for re-election.

2. The Commission shall lay down its rules of procedure.

3. Seven members shall form the quorum.

4. In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.
5. The Secretary-General may attend the meetings of the Commission. He shall neither participate in deliberations nor shall he be entitled to vote. The Chairman of the Commission may, however, invite him to speak.

ARTICLE 43

In discharging their duties, members of the Commission shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities provided for in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity.

ARTICLE 44

Provision shall be made for the emoluments and allowances of the members of the Commission in the Regular Budget of the Organization of African Unity.

CHAPTER IIMANDATE OF THE COMMISSIONARTICLE 45

The functions of the Commission shall be :

1. To promote Human and Peoples' Rights and in particular :
 - a) To collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights, organize seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights, and should the case arise, give its views or make recommendations to Governments.
 - b) to formulate and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African Governments may base their legislations.
 - c) co-operate with other African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights.
2. Ensure the protection of human and peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter.
3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State Party, an institution of the OAU or an African organization recognized by the OAU.

4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

CHAPTER III

PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION

ARTICLE 46

The Commission may resort to any appropriate method of investigation; it may hear from the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity or any other person capable of enlightening it.

COMMUNICATION FROM STATES

ARTICLE 47

If a State party to the present Charter has good reasons to believe that another State party to this Charter has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may draw, by written communication, the attention of that State to the matter. This communication shall also be addressed to the Secretary-General of the OAU and to the Chairman of the Commission. Within three months of the receipt of the communication, the State to which the communication is addressed shall give the enquiring State, written explanation or statement elucidating the matter. This should include as much as possible relevant information relating to the laws and rules of procedure applied and applicable and the redress already given or course of action available.

ARTICLE 48

If within three months from the date on which the original communication is received by the State to which it is addressed, the issue is not settled to the satisfaction of the two States involved through bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure, either State shall have the right to submit the matter to the Commission through the Chairman and shall notify the other States involved.

ARTICLE 49

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 47, if a State party to the present Charter considers that another State party has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter directly to the Commission by addressing a communication to the Chairman, to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the State concerned.

ARTICLE 50

The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure that all local remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious to the Commission that the procedure of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.

ARTICLE 51

1. The Commission may ask the States concerned to provide it with all relevant information.
2. When the Commission is considering the matter, States concerned may be represented before it and submit written or oral representations.

ARTICLE 52

After having obtained from the States concerned and from other sources all the information it deems necessary and after having tried all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution based on the respect of Human and Peoples' Rights, the Commission shall prepare, within a reasonable period of time from the notification referred to in Article 48, a report stating the facts and its findings. This report shall be sent to the States concerned and communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

ARTICLE 53

While transmitting its report, the Commission may make to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government such recommendations as it deems useful.

ARTICLE 54

The Commission shall submit to each Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government a report on its activities.

OTHER COMMUNICATIONSARTICLE 55

1. Before each Session, the Secretary of the Commission shall make a list of the communications other than those of States parties to the present Charter and transmit them to the Members of the Commission, who shall indicate which communications should be considered by the Commission.
2. A communication shall be considered by the Commission if a simple majority of its members so decide.

ARTICLE 56

Communications relating to human and peoples' rights referred to in Article 55 received by the Commission, shall be considered if they :

1. indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity,
2. are compatible with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or with the present Charter,
3. are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the State concerned and its institutions or to the Organization of African Unity,
4. are not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass media,
5. are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged,
6. are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is seized of the matter, and
7. do not deal with cases which have been settled by these States involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter.

ARTICLE 57

Prior to any substantive consideration, all communications shall be brought to the knowledge of the State concerned by the Chairman of the Commission.

ARTICLE 58

1. When it appears after deliberations of the Commission that one or more communications apparently relate to special cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights, the Commission shall draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to these special cases.

2. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual report, accompanied by its finding and recommendations.

3. A case of emergency duly noticed by the Commission shall be submitted by the latter to the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government who may request an in-depth study.

ARTICLE 59

1. All measures taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide.
2. However, the report shall be published by the Chairman of the Commission upon the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
3. The report on the activities of the Commission shall be published by its Chairman after it has been considered by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

CHAPTER IV - APPLICABLE PRINCIPLESARTICLE 60

The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human and peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter are members.

ARTICLE 61

The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, other general or special international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with international norms on human and peoples' rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and doctrine.

ARTICLE 62

Each State party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date the present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effects to the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter.

ARTICLE 63

1. The present Charter shall be open to signature, ratification or adherence of the member states of the Organization of African Unity.
2. The instruments of ratification or adherence to the present Charter shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity.
3. The present Charter shall come into force three months after the reception by the Secretary General of the instruments of ratification or adherence of a simple majority of the member states of the Organization of African Unity.

PART III - GENERAL PROVISIONSARTICLE 64

1. After the coming into force of the present Charter, members of the Commission shall be elected in accordance with the relevant Articles of the present Charter.
2. The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity shall convene the first meeting of the Commission at the Headquarters of the Organization within three months of the constitution of the Commission. Thereafter, the Commission shall be convened by its Chairman whenever necessary but at least once a year.

ARTICLE 65

For each of the States that will ratify or adhere to the present Charter after its coming into force, the Charter shall take effect three months after the date of the deposit by that State of its instrument of ratification or adherence.

ARTICLE 66

Special protocols or agreements may, if necessary, supplement the provisions of the present Charter.


ARTICLE 67

The Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity shall inform member states of the Organization of the deposit of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

ARTICLE 68

The present Charter may be amended if a State party makes a written request to that effect to the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government may only consider the draft amendment after all the States parties have been duly informed of it and the Commission has given its opinion on it at the request of the sponsoring State. The amendment shall be approved by a simple majority of the States parties. It shall come into force for each State which has accepted it in accordance with its constitutional procedure three months after the Secretary General has received notice of the acceptance.

Adopted by the eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and
Government June 1981 - Nairobi,
Kenya



AU-6



**PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA**

PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA

The States Parties to this Protocol,

CONSIDERING that Article 66 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights provides for special protocols or agreements, if necessary, to supplement the provisions of the African Charter, and that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Thirty-first Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 1995, endorsed by resolution AHG/Res.240 (XXXI) the recommendation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to elaborate a Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa;

CONSIDERING that Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights enshrines the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status;

FURTHER CONSIDERING that Article 18 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights calls on all States Parties to eliminate every discrimination against women and to ensure the protection of the rights of women as stipulated in international declarations and conventions;

NOTING that Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights recognise regional and international human rights instruments and African practices consistent with international norms on human and peoples' rights as being important reference points for the application and interpretation of the African Charter;

RECALLING that women's rights have been recognised and guaranteed in all international human rights instruments, notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and its Optional Protocol, the



African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and all other international and regional conventions and covenants relating to the rights of women as being inalienable, interdependent and indivisible human rights;

NOTING that women's rights and women's essential role in development, have been reaffirmed in the United Nations Plans of Action on the Environment and Development in 1992, on Human Rights in 1993, on Population and Development in 1994 and on Social Development in 1995;

RECALLING ALSO United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1325 (2000) on the role of Women in promoting peace and security;

REAFFIRMING the principle of promoting gender equality as enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union as well as the New Partnership for Africa's Development, relevant Declarations, Resolutions and Decisions, which underline the commitment of the African States to ensure the full participation of African women as equal partners in Africa's development;

FURTHER NOTING that the African Platform for Action and the Dakar Declaration of 1994 and the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995 call on all Member States of the United Nations, which have made a solemn commitment to implement them, to take concrete steps to give greater attention to the human rights of women in order to eliminate all forms of discrimination and of gender-based violence against women;

RECOGNISING the crucial role of women in the preservation of African values based on the principles of equality, peace, freedom, dignity, justice, solidarity and democracy;

BEARING IN MIND related Resolutions, Declarations, Recommendations, Decisions, Conventions and other Regional and Sub-Regional Instruments aimed at eliminating all forms of discrimination and at promoting equality between women and men;

CONCERNED that despite the ratification of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other international human rights instruments by the majority of States Parties, and their solemn



commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination and harmful practices against women, women in Africa still continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices;

FIRMLY CONVINCED that any practice that hinders or endangers the normal growth and affects the physical and psychological development of women and girls should be condemned and eliminated;

DETERMINED to ensure that the rights of women are promoted, realised and protected in order to enable them to enjoy fully all their human rights;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1
Definitions

For the purpose of the present Protocol:

- a) "African Charter" means the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights;
- b) "African Commission" means the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights;
- c) "Assembly" means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union;
- d) "AU" means the African Union;
- e) "Constitutive Act" means the Constitutive Act of the African Union;
- f) "Discrimination against women" means any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by



women, regardless of their marital status, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life;

- g) "Harmful Practices" means all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity;
- h) "NEPAD" means the New Partnership for Africa's Development established by the Assembly;
- i) "States Parties" means the States Parties to this Protocol;
- j) "Violence against women" means all acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental freedoms in private or public life in peace time and during situations of armed conflicts or of war;
- k) "Women" means persons of female gender, including girls.

Article 2

Elimination of Discrimination Against Women

1. States Parties shall combat all forms of discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures. In this regard they shall:

- a) include in their national constitutions and other legislative instruments, if not already done, the principle of equality between women and men and ensure its effective application;
- b) enact and effectively implement appropriate legislative or regulatory measures, including those prohibiting and curbing all forms of discrimination particularly those



harmful practices which endanger the health and general well-being of women;

- c) integrate a gender perspective in their policy decisions, legislation, development plans, programmes and activities and in all other spheres of life;
- d) take corrective and positive action in those areas where discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist;
- e) support the local, national, regional and continental initiatives directed at eradicating all forms of discrimination against women.

2. States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of women and men through public education, information, education and communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men.

Article 3 **Right to Dignity**

1. Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition and protection of her human and legal rights.
2. Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free development of her personality.
3. States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to prohibit any exploitation or degradation of women.
4. States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to ensure the protection of every woman's right to respect for her



dignity and protection of women from all forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence.

Article 4
The Rights to Life, Integrity and Security of the Person

1. Every woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity and security of her person. All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.
2. States Parties shall take appropriate and effective measures to:
 - a) enact and enforce laws to prohibit all forms of violence against women including unwanted or forced sex whether the violence takes place in private or public;
 - b) adopt such other legislative, administrative, social and economic measures as may be necessary to ensure the prevention, punishment and eradication of all forms of violence against women;
 - c) identify the causes and consequences of violence against women and take appropriate measures to prevent and eliminate such violence;
 - d) actively promote peace education through curricula and social communication in order to eradicate elements in traditional and cultural beliefs, practices and stereotypes which legitimise and exacerbate the persistence and tolerance of violence against women;
 - e) punish the perpetrators of violence against women and implement programmes for the rehabilitation of women victims;
 - f) establish mechanisms and accessible services for effective information, rehabilitation and reparation for victims of violence against women;



- g) prevent and condemn trafficking in women, prosecute the perpetrators of such trafficking and protect those women most at risk;
- h) prohibit all medical or scientific experiments on women without their informed consent;
- i) provide adequate budgetary and other resources for the implementation and monitoring of actions aimed at preventing and eradicating violence against women;
- j) ensure that, in those countries where the death penalty still exists, not to carry out death sentences on pregnant or nursing women;
- k) ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights in terms of access to refugee status determination procedures and that women refugees are accorded the full protection and benefits guaranteed under international refugee law, including their own identity and other documents.

Article 5 **Elimination of Harmful Practices**

States Parties shall prohibit and condemn all forms of harmful practices which negatively affect the human rights of women and which are contrary to recognised international standards. States Parties shall take all necessary legislative and other measures to eliminate such practices, including:

- a) creation of public awareness in all sectors of society regarding harmful practices through information, formal and informal education and outreach programmes;
- b) prohibition, through legislative measures backed by sanctions, of all forms of female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-medicalisation of female genital mutilation and all other practices in order to eradicate them;



- c) provision of necessary support to victims of harmful practices through basic services such as health services, legal and judicial support, emotional and psychological counselling as well as vocational training to make them self-supporting;
- d) protection of women who are at risk of being subjected to harmful practices or all other forms of violence, abuse and intolerance.

Article 6 **Marriage**

States Parties shall ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in marriage. They shall enact appropriate national legislative measures to guarantee that:

- a) no marriage shall take place without the free and full consent of both parties;
- b) the minimum age of marriage for women shall be 18 years;
- c) monogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of women in marriage and family, including in polygamous marital relationships are promoted and protected;
- d) every marriage shall be recorded in writing and registered in accordance with national laws, in order to be legally recognised;
- e) the husband and wife shall, by mutual agreement, choose their matrimonial regime and place of residence;
- f) a married woman shall have the right to retain her maiden name, to use it as she pleases, jointly or separately with her husband's surname;



- g) a woman shall have the right to retain her nationality or to acquire the nationality of her husband;
- h) a woman and a man shall have equal rights, with respect to the nationality of their children except where this is contrary to a provision in national legislation or is contrary to national security interests;
- i) a woman and a man shall jointly contribute to safeguarding the interests of the family, protecting and educating their children;
- j) during her marriage, a woman shall have the right to acquire her own property and to administer and manage it freely.

Article 7
Separation, Divorce and Annulment of Marriage

States Parties shall enact appropriate legislation to ensure that women and men enjoy the same rights in case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage. In this regard, they shall ensure that:

- a) separation, divorce or annulment of a marriage shall be effected by judicial order;
- b) women and men shall have the same rights to seek separation, divorce or annulment of a marriage;
- c) in case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage, women and men shall have reciprocal rights and responsibilities towards their children. In any case, the interests of the children shall be given paramount importance;
- d) in case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage, women and men shall have the right to an equitable sharing of the joint property deriving from the marriage.



Article 8
Access to Justice and Equal Protection before the Law

Women and men are equal before the law and shall have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure:

- a) effective access by women to judicial and legal services, including legal aid;
- b) support to local, national, regional and continental initiatives directed at providing women access to legal services, including legal aid;
- c) the establishment of adequate educational and other appropriate structures with particular attention to women and to sensitise everyone to the rights of women;
- d) that law enforcement organs at all levels are equipped to effectively interpret and enforce gender equality rights;
- e) that women are represented equally in the judiciary and law enforcement organs;
- f) reform of existing discriminatory laws and practices in order to promote and protect the rights of women.

Article 9
Right to Participation in the Political and Decision-Making Process

1. States Parties shall take specific positive action to promote participative governance and the equal participation of women in the political life of their countries through affirmative action, enabling national legislation and other measures to ensure that:

- a) women participate without any discrimination in all elections;



- b) women are represented equally at all levels with men in all electoral processes;
 - c) women are equal partners with men at all levels of development and implementation of State policies and development programmes .
2. States Parties shall ensure increased and effective representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making.

Article 10
Right to Peace

1. Women have the right to a peaceful existence and the right to participate in the promotion and maintenance of peace.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the increased participation of women:
- a) in programmes of education for peace and a culture of peace;
 - b) in the structures and processes for conflict prevention, management and resolution at local, national, regional, continental and international levels;
 - c) in the local, national, regional, continental and international decision making structures to ensure physical, psychological, social and legal protection of asylum seekers, refugees, returnees and displaced persons, in particular women;
 - d) in all levels of the structures established for the management of camps and settlements for asylum seekers, refugees, returnees and displaced persons, in particular, women;



- e) in all aspects of planning, formulation and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

3. States Parties shall take the necessary measures to reduce military expenditure significantly in favour of spending on social development in general, and the promotion of women in particular.

Article 11
Protection of Women in Armed Conflicts

1. States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict situations, which affect the population, particularly women.

2. States Parties shall, in accordance with the obligations incumbent upon them under international humanitarian law, protect civilians including women, irrespective of the population to which they belong, in the event of armed conflict.

3. States Parties undertake to protect asylum seeking women, refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons, against all forms of violence, rape and other forms of sexual exploitation, and to ensure that such acts are considered war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity and that their perpetrators are brought to justice before a competent criminal jurisdiction.

4. States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure that no child, especially girls under 18 years of age, take a direct part in hostilities and that no child is recruited as a soldier.

Article 12
Right to Education and Training

- 1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to:
 - a) eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and guarantee equal opportunity and access in the sphere of education and training;



- b) eliminate all stereotypes in textbooks, syllabuses and the media, that perpetuate such discrimination;
 - c) protect women, especially the girl-child from all forms of abuse, including sexual harassment in schools and other educational institutions and provide for sanctions against the perpetrators of such practices;
 - d) provide access to counselling and rehabilitation services to women who suffer abuses and sexual harassment;
 - e) integrate gender sensitisation and human rights education at all levels of education curricula including teacher training.
2. States Parties shall take specific positive action to:
- a) promote literacy among women;
 - b) promote education and training for women at all levels and in all disciplines, particularly in the fields of science and technology;
 - c) promote the enrolment and retention of girls in schools and other training institutions and the organisation of programmes for women who leave school prematurely.

Article 13
Economic and Social Welfare Rights

States Parties shall adopt and enforce legislative and other measures to guarantee women equal opportunities in work and career advancement and other economic opportunities. In this respect, they shall:

- a) promote equality of access to employment;



- b) promote the right to equal remuneration for jobs of equal value for women and men;
- c) ensure transparency in recruitment, promotion and dismissal of women and combat and punish sexual harassment in the workplace;
- d) guarantee women the freedom to choose their occupation, and protect them from exploitation by their employers violating and exploiting their fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws and regulations in force;
- e) create conditions to promote and support the occupations and economic activities of women, in particular, within the informal sector;
- f) establish a system of protection and social insurance for women working in the informal sector and sensitise them to adhere to it;
- g) introduce a minimum age for work and prohibit the employment of children below that age, and prohibit, combat and punish all forms of exploitation of children, especially the girl-child;
- h) take the necessary measures to recognise the economic value of the work of women in the home;
- i) guarantee adequate and paid pre- and post-natal maternity leave in both the private and public sectors;
- j) ensure the equal application of taxation laws to women and men;
- k) recognise and enforce the right of salaried women to the same allowances and entitlements as those granted to salaried men for their spouses and children;



- l) recognise that both parents bear the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of children and that this is a social function for which the State and the private sector have secondary responsibility;
- m) take effective legislative and administrative measures to prevent the exploitation and abuse of women in advertising and pornography.

Article 14
Health and Reproductive Rights

1. States Parties shall ensure that the right to health of women, including sexual and reproductive health is respected and promoted. This includes:

- a) the right to control their fertility;
- b) the right to decide whether to have children, the number of children and the spacing of children;
- c) the right to choose any method of contraception;
- d) the right to self-protection and to be protected against sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS;
- e) the right to be informed on one's health status and on the health status of one's partner, particularly if affected with sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS, in accordance with internationally recognised standards and best practices;
- g) the right to have family planning education.

2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to:

- a) provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services, including information, education and communication programmes to women especially those in rural areas;



- b) establish and strengthen existing pre-natal, delivery and post-natal health and nutritional services for women during pregnancy and while they are breast-feeding;
- c) protect the reproductive rights of women by authorising medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus.

Article 15
Right to Food Security

States Parties shall ensure that women have the right to nutritious and adequate food. In this regard, they shall take appropriate measures to:

- a) provide women with access to clean drinking water, sources of domestic fuel, land, and the means of producing nutritious food;
- b) establish adequate systems of supply and storage to ensure food security.

Article 16
Right to Adequate Housing

Women shall have the right to equal access to housing and to acceptable living conditions in a healthy environment. To ensure this right, States Parties shall grant to women, whatever their marital status, access to adequate housing.

Article 17
Right to Positive Cultural Context

1. Women shall have the right to live in a positive cultural context and to participate at all levels in the determination of cultural policies.



2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to enhance the participation of women in the formulation of cultural policies at all levels.

Article 18
Right to a Healthy and Sustainable Environment

1. Women shall have the right to live in a healthy and sustainable environment.

2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to:

- a) ensure greater participation of women in the planning, management and preservation of the environment and the sustainable use of natural resources at all levels;
- b) promote research and investment in new and renewable energy sources and appropriate technologies, including information technologies and facilitate women's access to, and participation in their control;
- c) protect and enable the development of women's indigenous knowledge systems;
- c) regulate the management, processing, storage and disposal of domestic waste;
- d) ensure that proper standards are followed for the storage, transportation and disposal of toxic waste.

Article 19
Right to Sustainable Development

Women shall have the right to fully enjoy their right to sustainable development. In this connection, the States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to:



- a) introduce the gender perspective in the national development planning procedures;
- b) ensure participation of women at all levels in the conceptualisation, decision-making, implementation and evaluation of development policies and programmes;
- c) promote women's access to and control over productive resources such as land and guarantee their right to property;
- d) promote women's access to credit, training, skills development and extension services at rural and urban levels in order to provide women with a higher quality of life and reduce the level of poverty among women;
- e) take into account indicators of human development specifically relating to women in the elaboration of development policies and programmes; and
- f) ensure that the negative effects of globalisation and any adverse effects of the implementation of trade and economic policies and programmes are reduced to the minimum for women.

Article 20
Widows' Rights

States Parties shall take appropriate legal measures to ensure that widows enjoy all human rights through the implementation of the following provisions:

- a) that widows are not subjected to inhuman, humiliating or degrading treatment;
- b) that a widow shall automatically become the guardian and custodian of her children, after the death of her husband, unless this is contrary to the interests and the welfare of the children;



- c) that a widow shall have the right to remarry, and in that event, to marry the person of her choice.

Article 21
Right to Inheritance

1. A widow shall have the right to an equitable share in the inheritance of the property of her husband. A widow shall have the right to continue to live in the matrimonial house. In case of remarriage, she shall retain this right if the house belongs to her or she has inherited it.
2. Women and men shall have the right to inherit, in equitable shares, their parents' properties.

Article 22
Special Protection of Elderly Women

The States Parties undertake to:

- a) provide protection to elderly women and take specific measures commensurate with their physical, economic and social needs as well as their access to employment and professional training;
- b) ensure the right of elderly women to freedom from violence, including sexual abuse, discrimination based on age and the right to be treated with dignity.

Article 23
Special Protection of Women with Disabilities

The States Parties undertake to:

- a) ensure the protection of women with disabilities and take specific measures commensurate with their physical, economic and social needs to facilitate their access to



employment, professional and vocational training as well as their participation in decision-making;

- b) ensure the right of women with disabilities to freedom from violence, including sexual abuse, discrimination based on disability and the right to be treated with dignity.

Article 24
Special Protection of Women in Distress

The States Parties undertake to:

- a) ensure the protection of poor women and women heads of families including women from marginalized population groups and provide an environment suitable to their condition and their special physical, economic and social needs;
- b) ensure the right of pregnant or nursing women or women in detention by providing them with an environment which is suitable to their condition and the right to be treated with dignity.

Article 25
Remedies

States Parties shall undertake to:

- a) provide for appropriate remedies to any woman whose rights or freedoms, as herein recognised, have been violated;
- b) ensure that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by law.



Article 26
Implementation and Monitoring

1. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of this Protocol at national level, and in their periodic reports submitted in accordance with Article 62 of the African Charter, indicate the legislative and other measures undertaken for the full realisation of the rights herein recognised.

2. States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures and in particular shall provide budgetary and other resources for the full and effective implementation of the rights herein recognised.

Article 27
Interpretation

The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights shall be seized with matters of interpretation arising from the application or implementation of this Protocol.

Article 28
Signature, Ratification and Accession

1. This Protocol shall be open for signature, ratification and accession by the States Parties, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

2. The instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU.

Article 29
Entry into Force

1. This Protocol shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the fifteenth (15) instrument of ratification.



2. For each State Party that accedes to this Protocol after its coming into force, the Protocol shall come into force on the date of deposit of the instrument of accession.

3. The Chairperson of the Commission of the AU shall notify all Member States of the coming into force of this Protocol.

Article 30 **Amendment and Revision**

1. Any State Party may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Protocol.

2. Proposals for amendment or revision shall be submitted, in writing, to the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU who shall transmit the same to the States Parties within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof.

3. The Assembly, upon advice of the African Commission, shall examine these proposals within a period of one (1) year following notification of States Parties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article.

4. Amendments or revision shall be adopted by the Assembly by a simple majority.

5. The amendment shall come into force for each State Party, which has accepted it thirty (30) days after the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU has received notice of the acceptance.

Article 31 **Status of the Present Protocol**

None of the provisions of the present Protocol shall affect more favourable provisions for the realisation of the rights of women contained in the national legislation of States Parties or in any other regional, continental or international conventions, treaties or agreements applicable in these States Parties.



Article 32
Transitional Provisions

Pending the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights shall be seized with matters of interpretation arising from the application and implementation of this Protocol.

**Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session
of the Assembly of the Union**

Maputo, 11 July 2003



PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA

1. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

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2. Republic of Angola

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3. Republic of Benin

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4. Republic of Botswana

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5. Burkina Faso

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6. Republic of Burundi

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7. Republic of Cameroon

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8. Republic of Cape Verde

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9. Central African Republic

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10. Republic of Chad

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11. Union of the Comoros

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12. Republic of the Congo

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13. Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

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14. Democratic Republic of Congo

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15. Republic of Djibouti

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16. Arab Republic of Egypt

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17. State of Eritrea

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18. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

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19. Republic of Equatorial Guinea

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20. Republic of Gabon

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21. Republic of The Gambia

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22. Republic of Ghana

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23. Republic of Guinea

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24. Republic of Guinea Bissau

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25. Republic of Kenya

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26. Kingdom of Lesotho

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27. Republic of Liberia

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28. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

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29. Republic of Madagascar

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30. Republic of Malawi

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31. Republic of Mali

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32. Islamic Republic of Mauritania

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33. Republic of Mauritius

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34. Republic of Mozambique

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35. Republic of Namibia

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36. Republic of Niger

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37. Federal Republic of Nigeria

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38. Republic of Rwanda

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39. Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

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40. Republic of Sao Tome and Principe

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41. Republic of Senegal

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42. Republic of Seychelles

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43. Republic of Sierra Leone

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44. Republic of Somalia

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45. Republic of South Africa

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46. Republic of Sudan

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47. Kingdom of Swaziland

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48. United Republic of Tanzania

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49. Republic of Togo

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50. Republic of Tunisia

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51. Republic of Uganda

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52. Republic of Zambia

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53. Republic of Zimbabwe

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AU-7



An Integrated, Prosperous
and Peaceful Africa

AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD



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AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD

Adopted by
by the 26th Ordinary Session
of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the OAU

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia - July 1990
Entered into force on 29 November, 1999

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PREAMBLE ■

The African Member States of the Organization of African Unity, Parties to the present Charter entitled “African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child”,

CONSIDERING that the Charter of the Organization of African Unity recognizes the paramountcy of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed therein, without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status,

RECALLING the Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child (AHG/ST.4 Rev.I) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session in Monrovia, Liberia, from 17 to 20 July, 1979 recognized the need to take all appropriate measures to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the African Child,

NOTING WITH CONCERN that the situation of most African children, remains critical due to the unique factors of their socio-economic, cultural, traditional and developmental circumstances, natural disasters, armed conflicts, exploitation and hunger, and on account of the child’s physical and mental immaturity he/she needs special safeguards and care,

RECOGNIZING that the child, due to the needs of his physical and mental development requires particular care with regard to health, physical, mental, moral and social development, and requires legal protection in conditions of freedom, dignity and security,

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION the virtues of their cultural heritage, historical background and the values of the African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of the rights and welfare of the child,

CONSIDERING that the promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of the child also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone,

REAFFIRMING ADHERENCE to the principles of the rights and welfare of the child contained in the declaration, conventions and other instruments of the Organization of African Unity and in the United Nations and in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the OAU Heads of State and Government's Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child.

HAVE AGREED as follows:

PART I: **RIGHTS AND DUTIES**

CHAPTER ONE **RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD**

Article 1

OBLIGATION OF STATES PARTIES ■

- 1.** The Member States of the Organization of African Unity Parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights, freedoms and duties enshrines in this Charter and shall undertake to take the necessary steps, in accordance with their Constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Charter, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Charter.
- 2.** Nothing in this Charter shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the realization of the rights and welfare of the child contained in the law of a State Party or in any other international convention or agreement in force in that State.
- 3.** Any custom, tradition, cultural or religious practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations contained in the present Charter shall to the extent of such inconsistency be discouraged.

Article 2

DEFINITION OF A CHILD ■

For the purposes of this Charter, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years.

Article 3

NON-DISCRIMINATION ■

Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in this Charter irrespective of the child's or his/her parents' or legal guardians' race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.

Article 4

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD ■

1. In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.
2. In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of communicating his/her own views, and opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative as a party to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law.

Article 5

SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT ■

1. Every child has an inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the survival, protection and development of the child.
3. Death sentence shall not be pronounced for crimes committed by children.

Article 6

NAME AND NATIONALITY ■

1. Every child shall have the right from his birth to a name.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
4. States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to ensure that their Constitutional legislation recognize the principles according to which a child shall acquire the nationality of the State in the territory of which he has been born if, at the time of the child's birth, he is not granted nationality by any other State in accordance with its laws.

Article 7

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION ■

Every child who is capable of communicating his or her own views shall be assured the rights to express his opinions freely in all matters and to disseminate his opinions subject to such restrictions as are prescribed by laws.

Article 8

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ■

Every child shall have the right to free association and freedom of peaceful assembly in conformity with the law.

Article 9

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION ■

1. Every child shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
2. Parents, and where applicable, legal guardians shall have a duty to provide guidance and direction in the exercise of these rights having regard to the evolving capacities, and best interests of the child.
3. States Parties shall respect the duty of parents and where

applicable, legal guardians to provide guidance and direction in the enjoyment of these rights subject to the national laws and policies.

Article 10

PROTECTION OF PRIVACY ■

No child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to the attacks upon his honour or reputation, provided that parents or legal guardians shall have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of their children. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 11

EDUCATION ■

1. Every child shall have the right to education.
2. The education of the child shall be directed to:
 - (a) the promotion and development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential;
 - (b) fostering respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms with particular reference to those set out in the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples' rights and international human rights declarations and convention;
 - (c) the preservation and strengthening of positive African morals, traditional values and cultures;
 - (d) the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, tolerance, dialogue, mutual respect and friendship among all peoples ethnic, tribal and religious groups;
 - (e) the preservation of national independence and territorial integrity;
 - (f) the promotion and achievements of African Unity and Solidarity;
 - (g) the development of respect for the environment and natural resources;
 - (h) the promotion of the child's understanding of primary health care.

- 3.** States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures with a view to achieving the full realization of this right and shall in particular:

 - (a)** provide free and compulsory basic education;
 - (b)** encourage the development of secondary education in its different forms and to progressively make it free and accessible to all;
 - (c)** make the higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity and ability by every appropriate means;
 - (d)** take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rate;
 - (e)** take special measures in respect of female, gifted and disadvantaged children, to ensure equal access to education for all sections of the community.
- 4.** States Parties to the present Charter shall respect the rights and duties of parents, and where applicable, of legal guardians to choose for their' children schools, other than those established by public authorities, which conform to such minimum standards may be approved by the state, to ensure the religious and moral education of the child in a manner with the evolving capacities of the child.
- 5.** States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is subjected to schools or parental discipline shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the child and in conformity with the present Charter.
- 6.** States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children who become pregnant before completing their education shall have an opportunity to continue with their education on the basis of their individual ability.
- 7.** No part of this Article shall be construed as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions subject to the observance of the principles set out in Paragraph 1 of this Article and the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the states.

Article 12

LEISURE, RECREATION AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child and to participate freely in cultural life and the arts.
2. States Parties shall respect and promote the right of the child to fully participate in cultural and artistic life and shall encourage the provision of appropriate and equal opportunities for cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity.

ARTICLE 13

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN

1. Every child who is mentally or physically disabled shall have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with his physical and moral needs and under conditions which ensure his dignity, promote his self-reliance and active participation in the community.
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall ensure, subject to available resources, to a disabled child and to those responsible for his care, of assistance for which application is made and which is appropriate to the child's condition and in particular shall ensure that the disabled child has effective access to training, preparation for employment and recreation opportunities in a manner conducive to the child achieving the fullest possible social integration, individual development and His cultural and moral development.
3. The States Parties to the present Charter shall use their available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full convenience of the mentally and physically disabled person to movement and access to public highway buildings and other places to which the disabled may legitimately want to have access to.

Article 14

HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES ■

1. This Article shall apply to the offences established by the State Parties in accordance with this Convention.
2. Offences falling within the jurisdiction of this Convention shall be deemed to be included in the internal laws of State Parties as crimes requiring extradition. State Parties shall include such offences as extraditable offences in extradition treaties existing between or among them.
 - (a) to reduce infant and child mortality rate;
 - (b) to ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care;
 - (c) to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water;
 - (d) to combat disease and malnutrition within the framework of primary health care through the application of appropriate technology;
 - (e) to ensure appropriate health care for expectant and nursing mothers;
 - (f) to develop preventive health care and family life education and provision of service;
 - (g) to integrate basic health service programmes in national development plans;
 - (h) to ensure that all sectors of the society, in particular parents, children, community leaders and community workers are informed and supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of domestic and other accidents;
 - (i) to ensure the meaningful participation of non-governmental organizations, local communities and the beneficiary population in the planning and management of basic service programme for children;
 - (j) to support through technical and financial means, the mobilization of local community resources in the development of primary health care for children.

Article 15

CHILD LABOUR ■

1. Every child shall be protected from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development.
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures to ensure the full implementation of this Article which covers both the formal and informal sectors of employment and having regard to the relevant provisions of the International Labour Organization's instruments relating to children, States Parties shall in particular:
 - (a) provide through legislation, minimum ages for admission to every employment;
 - (b) provide for appropriate regulation of hours and conditions of employment;
 - (c) provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of this Article;
 - (d) promote the dissemination of information on the hazardous of child labour to all sectors of the community.

Article 16

PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE AND TORTURE ■

1. States Parties to the present Charter shall take specific legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and especially physical or mental injury or abuse, neglect or maltreatment including sexual abuse, while in the care of a parent, legal guardian or school authority or any other person who has the care of the child.
2. Protective measures under this Article shall include effective procedures for the establishment of special monitoring units to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as other forms of prevention and for

identification, reporting referral investigation, treatment, and follow-up of instances of child abuse and neglect.

Article 17

ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ■

- 1.** Every child accused or found guilty of having infringed penal law shall have the right to special treatment in a manner consistent with the child's sense of dignity and worth and which reinforces the child's respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of others.
- 2.** States Parties to the present Charter shall in particular:
 - (a)** ensure that no child who is detained or imprisoned or otherwise deprived of his/her liberty is subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
 - (b)** ensure that children are separated from adults in their place of detention or imprisonment;
 - (c)** ensure that every child accused of infringing the penal law:
 - i.** shall be presumed innocent until duly recognized guilty;
 - ii.** shall be informed promptly in a language that he understands and in detail of the charge against him, and shall be entitled to the assistance of an interpreter if he or she cannot understand the language used;
 - iii.** shall be afforded legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his defence;
 - iv.** shall have the matter determined as speedily as possible by an impartial tribunal and if found guilty, be entitled to an appeal by a higher tribunal;
 - v.** shall not be compelled to give testimony or confess guilt.
- 3.** The essential aim of treatment of every child during the trial and also if found guilty of infringing the penal law shall be his or her reformation, re-integration into his or her family and social rehabilitation.
- 4.** There shall be a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.

Article 18

PROTECTION OF THE FAMILY ■

1. The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall enjoy the protection and support of the State for its establishment and development.
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses with regard to children during marriage and in the event of its dissolution. In case the dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of the child.
3. No child shall be deprived of maintenance by reference to the parents' marital status.

Article 19

PARENTAL CARE AND PROTECTION ■

1. Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of parental care and protection and shall, whenever possible, have the right to reside with his or her parents. No child shall be separated from his parents against his will, except when a judicial authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law, that such separation is in the best interest of the child.
2. Every child who is separated from one or both parents shall have the right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis.
3. Where separation results from the action of a State Party, the State Party shall provide the child, or if appropriate, another member of the family with essential information concerning the whereabouts of the absent member or members of the family. States Parties shall also ensure that the submission of such a request shall not entail any adverse consequences for the person or persons in whose respect it is made.
4. Where a child is apprehended by a State Party, his parents or guardians shall, as soon as possible, be notified of such apprehension by that State Party.

Article 20

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES ■

1. Parents or other persons responsible for the child shall have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child and shall have the duty:
 - (a) to ensure that the best interests of the child are their basic concern at all times;
 - (b) to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, conditions of living necessary to the child's development; and
 - (c) to ensure that domestic discipline is administered with humanity and in a manner consistent with the inherent dignity of the child.

2. States Parties to the present Charter shall in accordance with their means and national conditions take all appropriate measures;
 - (a) to assist parents and other persons responsible for the child and in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes particularly with regard to nutrition, health, education, clothing and housing;
 - (b) to assist parents and others responsible for the child in the performance of child-rearing and ensure the development of institutions responsible for providing care of children; and
 - (c) to ensure that the children of working parents are provided with care services and facilities .

Article 21

PROTECTION AGAINST HARMFUL SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PRACTICES ■

1. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child and in particular:
 - (a) those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the child; and
 - (b) those customs and practices discriminatory to the child -on the grounds of sex or other status.

2. Child marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys shall be prohibited and effective action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify the minimum age of marriage to be eighteen years and make registration of all marriages in an official registry compulsory.

Article 22

ARMED CONFLICTS ■

1. States Parties to this Charter shall undertake to respect and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts which affect the child.
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting any child.
3. States Parties to the present Charter shall, in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law, protect the civilian population in armed conflicts and shall take all feasible measures to ensure the protection and care of children who are affected by armed conflicts. Such rules shall also apply to children in situation of internal armed conflicts, tension and strife.

Article 23

REFUGEE CHILDREN ■

1. States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with applicable international or domestic law shall, whether unaccompanied or accompanied by parents, legal guardians or close relatives, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of the rights set out in this Charter and other international human right and humanitarian instruments to which the States are parties.
2. States Parties shall undertake to cooperate with existing international organizations which protect and assist refugees in their efforts to protect and assist such a child and to trace the parents or other close relatives of an unaccompanied refugee child in order to obtain information necessary for reunification with the family.

3. Where no parents, legal guardians or close relatives can be found, the child shall be accorded the same protection as any other child permanently or temporarily deprived of his family environment for any reason.
4. The provisions of this Article apply Mutatis Mutandis to internally displaced children whether through natural disaster, internal armed conflicts, civil strife, breakdown of economic and social order or howsoever caused.

Article 24

ADOPTION ■

States Parties which recognize the system of adoption shall ensure that the best interest of the child shall be the paramount consideration and they shall:

1. Establish competent authorities to determine matters of adoption and ensure that the adoption is carried out in conformity with applicable laws and procedures and on the basis of all relevant and reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child's status concerning parents, relatives and guardians and that, if necessary, the appropriate persons concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption on the basis of appropriate counselling;
2. Recognize that inter-country adoption in those States who have ratified or adhered to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child or this Charter, may, as the last resort, be considered as an alternative means of child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin;
3. Ensure that the child affected by inter-country adoption enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing in the case of national adoption;
4. Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in intercountry adoption, the placement does not result in trafficking or improper financial gain for those who try to adopt a child;

5. Promote, where appropriate, the objectives of this Article by concluding bilateral or multilateral arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within this framework to ensure that the placement of the child in another country is carried out by competent authorities or organs.
6. Establish a machinery to monitor the well-being of the adopted child.

Article 25

SEPARATION FROM PARENTS ■

1. Any child who is permanently or temporarily deprived of his family environment for any reason shall be entitled to special protection and assistance;
2. States Parties to the present Charter:
 - (a) shall ensure that a child who is parentless, or who is temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or who in his or her best interest cannot be brought up or allowed to remain in that environment shall be provided with alternative family care, which could include, among others, foster placement, or placement in suitable institutions for the care of children;
 - (b) shall take all necessary measures to trace and re-unite children with parents or relatives where separation is caused by internal and external displacement arising from armed conflicts or natural disasters.
3. When considering alternative family care of the child and the best interests of the child, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child's up-bringing and to the child's ethnic, religious or linguistic background.

Article 26

PROTECTION AGAINST APARTHEID AND DISCRIMINATION ■

1. States Parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively undertake to accord the highest priority to the special needs of children living under Apartheid and in States subject to

military destabilization by the Apartheid regime.

2. States Parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively undertake to accord the highest priority to the special needs of children living under regimes practicing racial, ethnic, religious or other forms of discrimination as well as in States subject to military destabilization.
2. States Parties shall undertake to provide whenever possible, material assistance to such children and to direct their efforts towards the elimination of all forms of discrimination and Apartheid on the African Continent.

Article 27

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION ■

States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and shall in particular take measures to prevent;

- (a) the inducement, coercion or encouragement of a child to engage in any sexual activity;
- (b) the use of children in prostitution or other sexual practices;
- (b) the use of children in pornographic activities, performances and materials.

Article 28

DRUG ABUSE ■

States Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to protect the child from the use of narcotics and illicit use of psychotropic substances as defined in the relevant international treaties, and to prevent the use of children in the production and trafficking of such substances.

Article 29

SALE, TRAFFICKING AND ABDUCTION ■

States Parties to the present Charter shall take appropriate measures to prevent:

- (a) the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form, by any person including parents or legal guardians of the child;

- (b) the use of children in all forms of begging.

Article 30

CHILDREN OF IMPRISONED MOTHERS ■

States Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to provide special treatment to expectant mothers and to mothers of infants and young children who have been accused or found guilty of infringing the penal law and shall in particular:

- (a) ensure that a non-custodial sentence will always be first considered when sentencing such mothers;
- (b) establish and promote measures alternative to institutional confinement for the treatment of such mothers;
- (c) establish special alternative institutions for holding such mothers;
- (d) ensure that a mother shall not be imprisoned with her child;
- (e) ensure that a death sentence shall not be imposed on such mothers;
- (f) the essential aim of the penitentiary system will be the reformation, the integration of the mother to the family and social rehabilitation.

Article 31

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHILD ■

Every child shall have responsibilities towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the international community. The child, subject to his age and ability, and such limitations as may be contained in the present Charter, shall have the duty:

- (a) to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times and to assist them in case of need;
- (b) to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service;
- (c) to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity;
- (d) to preserve and strengthen African cultural values in his relations with other members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and to contribute to the moral well-being of society;

- (e) to preserve and strengthen the independence and the integrity of his country;
- (f) to contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African Unity.

PART II

CHAPTER TWO ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD

Article 32

THE COMMITTEE ■

An African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child hereinafter called “the Committee” shall be established within the Organization of African Unity to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the child.

Article 33

COMPOSITION ■

1. The Committee shall consist of 11 members of high moral standing, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of the rights and welfare of the child.
2. The members of the Committee shall serve in their personal capacity.
2. The Committee shall not include more than one national of the same State.

Article 34

ELECTION ■

As soon as this Charter shall enter into force the members of the

Committee shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government from a list of persons nominated by the States Parties to the present Charter.

Article 35

CANDIDATES ■

Each State Party to the present Charter may nominate not more than two candidates. The candidates must have one of the nationalities of the States Parties to the present Charter. When two candidates are nominated by a State, one of them shall not be a national of that State.

Article 36 ■

1. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African unity shall invite States Parties to the present Charter to nominate candidates at least six months before the elections.
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall draw up in alphabetical order, a list of persons nominated and communicate it to the Heads of State and Government at least two months before the elections.

Article 37

TERM OF OFFICE ■

1. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of five years and may not be re-elected, however, the term of four of the members elected at the first election shall expire after two years and the term of six others, after four years.
2. Immediately after the first election, the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity shall draw lots to determine the names of those members referred to in sub-paragraph 1 of this Article.
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall convene the first meeting of the Committee at the Headquarters of the Organization within six months of the election of the members of the Committee, and thereafter the Committee shall be convened by its Chairman whenever necessary, at least once a year.

Article 38

BUREAU ■

1. The Committee shall establish its own Rules of Procedure.
2. The Committee shall elect its officers for a period of two years.
3. Seven Committee members shall form the quorum.
4. In case of an equality of votes, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.
5. The working languages of the Committee shall be the official languages of the OAU.

Article 39

VACANCY ■

If a member of the Committee vacates his office for any reason other than the normal expiration of a term, the State which nominated that member shall appoint another member from among its nationals to serve for the remainder of the term - subject to the approval of the Assembly.

Article 40

SECRETARIAT ■

Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall appoint a Secretary for the Committee.

Article 41

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ■

In discharging their duties, members of the Committee shall enjoy the privileges and immunities provided for in the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity.

CHAPTER THREE

MANDATE AND PROCEDURE OF THE COMMITTEE

Article 42

MANDATE ■

The functions of the Committee shall be:

- (a)** To promote and protect the rights enshrined in this Charter and in particular to:
 - i.** collect and document information, commission inter-disciplinary assessment of situations on African problems in the fields of the rights and welfare of the child, organize meetings, encourage national and local institutions concerned with the rights and welfare of the child, and where necessary give its views and take recommendations to Governments;
 - ii.** formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at protecting the rights and welfare of children in Africa;
 - iii.** cooperate with other African, International and Regional Institutions and Organizations concerned with the promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of the child.
- (b)** To monitor the implementation and ensure protection of the rights enshrined in this Charter.
- (c)** To interpret the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a State Party, an Institution of the Organization of African unity or any other person or Institution recognized by the Organization of African Unity, or any State Party.
- (d)** Perform such other tasks as may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Secretary-General of the OAU and any other organs of the OAU, or the United Nations.

Article 43

REPORTING PROCEDURE ■

- 1.** Every State Party to the present Charter shall undertake to submit to the Committee through the Secretary-General of the Organization

of African Unity, reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the provisions of this Charter and on the progress made in the enjoyment of these rights.

- (a)** within two years of the entry into force of the Charter for the State Party concerned; and
 - (b)** thereafter, every three years.
- 2.** Every report made under this Article shall:
 - (a)** contain sufficient information on the implementation of the present Charter to provide the Committee with comprehensive understanding of the implementation of the Charter in the relevant country; and
 - (b)** shall indicate factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the fulfilment of the obligations contained in the Charter.
- 3.** A State Party- which has submitted a comprehensive first report to the Committee need not, in its subsequent reports submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 (a) of this Article, repeat the basic information previously provided.

Article 44

COMMUNICATIONS ■

- 1.** The Community may receive communication, from any person, group or non- governmental organization recognized by the Organization of African Unity, by a Member State, or the United Nations relating to any matter covered by this Charter.
- 2.** Every communication to the Committee shall contain the name and address of the author and shall be treated in confidence.

Article 45

INVESTIGATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE

- 1.** The Committee may, resort to any appropriate method of investigating any matter falling within the ambit of the present Charter, request from the States Parties any information relevant to the implementation of the Charter and may also resort to any appropriate method of investigating the measures a State Party has adopted to implement the Charter.

2. The Committee shall submit to each Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government every two years, a report on its activities and on any communication made under Article 46 of this Charter.
3. The Committee shall publish its report after it has been considered by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
4. States Parties shall make the Committee's reports widely available to the public in their own countries.

CHAPTER FOUR

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 46

SOURCES OF INSPIRATION ■

The Committee shall draw inspiration from International Law on Human Rights, particularly from the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human rights, and from African values and traditions.

Article 47

SIGNATURE RATIFICATION OR ADHERENCE ■

1. The present Charter shall be open to signature by all the Member States of the Organization of African Unity.
2. The present Charter shall be subject to ratification or adherence by Member States of the Organization of African Unity. The instruments of ratification or adherence to the present Charter shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African unity.
3. The present Charter shall come into force 30 days after the reception by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity of the instruments of ratification or adherence of 15 Member

Article 48

AMENDMENT AND REVISION OF THE CHARTER ■

1. The present Charter may be amended or revised if any State Party makes a written request to that effect to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, provided that the proposed amendment is not submitted to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for consideration until all the States Parties have been duly notified of it and the Committee has given its opinion on the amendment.
2. An amendment shall be approved by a simple majority of the States Parties.

List of countries which have signed, Ratified/ Acceded to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child




Additionally:

1. **Botswana:** Does not consider itself bound by:
 - **Article 2** - Definition of a Child
2. **Egypt:** Does not consider itself bound by the following Articles:
 - **Article 24** - Adoption;
 - **Article 30(a- e)** - Children of imprisoned mothers;
 - **Article 44** - Communications; and
 - **Article 45(1)** - Investigations by Committee.
3. **Mauritania:** Does not consider itself bound by:
 - **Article 9** – Freedom of conscience and religion
4. Sudan: Does not consider itself bound by the following **Articles:**
 - **Article 10** – Protection of privacy;
 - **Article 11(6)** – Education of children who become pregnant before completing their education; and
 - **Article 21(2)** – Child marriage and betrothal of girls and boys.

No	Country /Pays	Date of/de Signature	Date of/ de Ratification/ Accession	Date Deposited/ Date de Depot
1	Algeria	21/05/1999	08/07/2003	24/09/2003
2	Angola	27/01/2012	11/04/1992	07/10/1999
3	Benin	27/02/1992	17/04/1997	30/05/1997
4	Botswana	10/07/2001	10/07/2001	10/07/2001
5	Burkina Faso	27/02/1992	08/06/1992	10/07/1992
6	Burundi	21/05/2004	28/06/2004	24/08/2004
7	Cameroon	16/09/1992	05/09/1997	23/06/1999
8	Central African Rep.	04/02/2003	07/07/2016	01/08/2016
9	Cape Verde	27/02/1992	20/07/1993	01/09/1993
10	Chad	06/12/2004	30/03/2000	04/04/2000
11	Côte d'Ivoire	27/02/2004	01/03/2002	18/06/2007
12	Comoros	26/02/2004	18/03/2004	16/04/2004
13	Congo	28/02/1992	08/09/2006	10/10/2006
14	Djibouti	28/02/1992	03/01/2011	25/01/2011
15	Democratic Rep. of Congo	02/02/2010	-	-
16	Egypt	30/06/1999	09/05/2001	22/05/2001
17	Equatorial Guinea	-	20/12/2002	19/02/2003
18	Eritrea	-	22/12/1999	25/01/2000
19	Ethiopia	-	02/10/2002	27/12/2002
20	Gabon	27/02/1992	18/05/2007	12/06/2007
21	Gambia	-	14/12/2000	30/03/2001
22	Ghana	18/08/1997	10/06/2005	15/07/2005
23	Guinea-Bissau	08/03/2005	19/06/2008	14/10/2008
24	Guinea	22/05/1998	27/05/1999	21/01/2000
25	Kenya	-	25/07/2000	10/08/2000
26	Libya	09/06/1998	23/09/2000	03/11/2000
27	Lesotho	-	27/09/1999	29/10/1999

28	Liberia	14/05/1992	01/08/2007	15/07/2008
29	Madagascar	27/02/1992	30/03/2005	24/06/2005
30	Mali	28/02/1996	03/06/1998	14/08/1998
31	Malawi	13/07/1999	16/09/1999	17/11/1999
32	Morocco	-	-	-
33	Mozambique	-	15/07/1998	22/12/1998
34	Mauritania	-	21/09/2005	14/12/2005
35	Mauritius	07/11/1991	14/02/1992	27/02/1992
36	Namibia	13/07/1999	23/07/2004	26/08/2004
37	Nigeria	13/07/1999	23/07/2001	02/05/2003
38	Niger	13/07/1999	11/12/1996	05/03/1997
39	Rwanda	02/10/1991	11/05/2001	17/05/2001
40	South Africa	10/10/1997	07/01/2000	21/01/2000
41	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	23/10/1992	-	-
42	Senegal	18/05/1992	29/09/1998	30/10/1998
43	Seychelles	27/02/1992	13/02/1992	27/02/1992
44	Sierra Leone	14/04/1992	13/05/2002	18/06/2002
45	Somalia	01/06/1991	-	-
46	South Sudan	24/01/2013	-	-
47	Sao Tome & Principe	01/02/2010	18/04/2019	27/06/2019
48	Sudan	-	30/07/2005	18/07/2008
49	Eswatini	29/06/1992	05/10/2012	06/11/2012
50	Tanzania	23/10/1998	16/03/2003	09/05/2003
51	Togo	27/02/1992	05/05/1998	18/05/1998
52	Tunisia	16/06/1995	-	-
53	Uganda	26/02/1992	17/08/1994	21/10/1994
54	Zambia	28/02/1992	02/12/2008	10/02/2009
55	Zimbabwe	-	19/01/1995	22/02/1995
	Total countries: 55	of signature: 44	of ratification: 49	of deposit: 49



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**PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF AN AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS**

**PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AFRICAN
COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS**

The Member States of the Organization of African Unity hereinafter referred to as the OAU, States Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights:

Considering that the Charter of the Organization of African Unity recognizes that freedom, equality, justice, peace and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples;

Noting that the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights reaffirms adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights, freedoms and duties contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the Organization of African Unity, and other international organizations;

Recognizing that the twofold objective of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is to ensure on the one hand promotion and on the other protection of human and peoples' rights, freedoms and duties;

Recognizing further, the efforts of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights since its inception in 1987;

Recalling resolution AHG/Res.230 (XXX) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 1994 in Tunis, Tunisia, requesting the Secretary-General to convene a Government experts' meeting to ponder, in conjunction with the African Commission, over the means to enhance the efficiency of the African Commission and to consider in particular the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights;

Noting the first and second Government legal experts' meetings held respectively in Cape Town, South Africa (September, 1995) and Nouakchott,

Mauritania (April, 1997), and the third Government Legal Experts meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (December, 1997), which was enlarged to include Diplomats;

Firmly convinced that the attainment of the objectives of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights requires the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to complement and reinforce the functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT

There shall be established within the Organization of African Unity an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Court"), the organization, jurisdiction and functioning of which shall be governed by the present Protocol.

Article 2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURT AND THE COMMISSION

The Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission") conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Charter").

Article 3 JURISDICTION

1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.
2. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.

Article 4 ADVISORY OPINIONS

1. At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, or any African organization recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission.
2. The Court shall give reasons for its advisory opinions provided that every judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate or dissenting decision.

Article 5 ACCESS TO THE COURT

1. The following are entitled to submit cases to the Court
 - a. The Commission;
 - b. The State Party which has lodged a complaint to the Commission;
 - c. The State Party against which the complaint has been lodged at the Commission;
 - d. The State Party whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation;
 - e. African Intergovernmental Organizations.
2. When a State Party has an interest in a case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to join.
3. The Court may entitle relevant Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34 (6) of this Protocol.

Article 6 ADMISSIBILITY OF CASES

1. The Court, when deciding on the admissibility of a case instituted under article 5 (3) of this Protocol, may request the opinion of the Commission which shall give it as soon as possible.
2. The Court shall rule on the admissibility of cases taking into account the provisions of article 56 of the Charter.
3. The Court may consider cases or transfer them to the Commission.

Article 7 SOURCES OF LAW

The Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned.

Article 8 CONSIDERATION OF CASES

The Rules of Procedure of the Court shall lay down the detailed conditions under which the Court shall consider cases brought before it, bearing in mind the complementarity between the Commission and the Court.

Article 9 AMICABLE SETTLEMENT

The Court may try to reach an amicable settlement in a case pending before it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Article 10 HEARINGS AND REPRESENTATION

1. The Court shall conduct its proceedings in public. The Court may, however, conduct proceedings in camera as may be provided for in the Rules of Procedure.
2. Any party to a case shall be entitled to be represented by a legal representative of the party's choice. Free legal representation may be provided where the interests of justice so require.

3. Any person, witness or representative of the parties, who appears before the Court, shall enjoy protection and all facilities, in accordance with international law, necessary for the discharging of their functions, tasks and duties in relation to the Court.

Article 11 COMPOSITION

1. The Court shall consist of eleven judges, nationals of Member States of the OAU, elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of high moral character and of recognized practical, judicial or academic competence and experience in the field of human and peoples' rights.
2. No two judges shall be nationals of the same State.

Article 12 NOMINATIONS

1. States Parties to the Protocol may each propose up to three candidates, at least two of whom shall be nationals of that State.
2. Due consideration shall be given to adequate gender representation in the nomination process.

Article 13 LIST OF CANDIDATES

1. Upon entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary-General of the OAU shall request each State Party to the Protocol to present, within ninety (90) days of such a request, its nominees for the office of judge of the Court.
2. The Secretary-General of the OAU shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the candidates nominated and transmit it to the Member States of the OAU at least thirty days prior to the next session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU hereinafter referred to as "the Assembly".

Article 14 ELECTIONS

1. The judges of the Court shall be elected by secret ballot by the Assembly from the list referred to in Article 13 (2) of the present Protocol.
2. The Assembly shall ensure that in the Court as a whole there is representation of the main regions of Africa and of their principal legal traditions.
3. In the election of the judges, the Assembly shall ensure that there is adequate gender representation.

Article 15 TERM OF OFFICE

1. The judges of the Court shall be elected for a period of six years and may be re-elected only once. The terms of four judges elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years, and the terms of four more judges shall expire at the end of four years.
2. The judges whose terms are to expire at the end of the initial periods of two and four years shall be chosen by lot to be drawn by the Secretary-General of the OAU immediately after the first election has been completed.
3. A judge elected to replace a judge whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor's term.
4. All judges except the President shall perform their functions on a part-time basis. However, the Assembly may change this arrangement as it deems appropriate.

Article 16 OATH OF OFFICE

After their election, the judges of the Court shall make a solemn declaration to discharge their duties impartially and faithfully.

Article 17 INDEPENDENCE

1. The independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in accordance with international law.
2. No judge may hear any case in which the same judge has previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for one of the parties or as a member of a national or international court or a commission of enquiry or in any other capacity. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by decision of the Court.
3. The judges of the Court shall enjoy, from the moment of their election and throughout their term of office, the immunities extended to diplomatic agents in accordance with international law.
4. At no time shall the judges of the Court be held liable for any decision or opinion issued in the exercise of their functions.

Article 18 INCOMPATIBILITY

The position of judge of the Court is incompatible with any activity that might interfere with the independence or impartiality of such a judge or the demands of the office, as determined in the Rules of Procedure of the Court.

Article 19 CESSATION OF OFFICE

1. A judge shall not be suspended or removed from office unless, by the unanimous decision of the other judges of the Court, the judge concerned has been found to be no longer fulfilling the required conditions to be a judge of the Court.
2. Such a decision of the Court shall become final unless it is set aside by the Assembly at its next session.

Article 20 VACANCIES

1. In case of death or resignation of a judge of the Court, the President of the Court shall immediately inform the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, who shall declare the seat vacant from the date of death or from the date on which the resignation takes effect.
2. The Assembly shall replace the judge whose office became vacant unless the remaining period of the term is less than one hundred and eighty (180) days.
3. The same procedure and considerations as set out in Articles 12, 13 and 14 shall be followed for the filling of vacancies.

Article 21 PRESIDENCY OF THE COURT

1. The Court shall elect its President and one Vice-President for a period of two years. They may be re-elected only once.
2. The President shall perform judicial functions on a full-time basis and shall reside at the seat of the Court.
3. The functions of the President and the Vice-President shall be set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court.

Article 22 EXCLUSION

If a judge is a national of any State which is a party to a case submitted to the Court, that judge shall not hear the case.

Article 23 QUORUM

The Court shall examine cases brought before it, if it has a quorum of at least seven judges.

Article 24 REGISTRY OF THE COURT

1. The Court shall appoint its own Registrar and other staff of the registry from among nationals of Member States of the OAU according to the Rules of Procedure.
2. The office and residence of the Registrar shall be at the place where the Court has its seat.

Article 25 SEAT OF THE COURT

1. The Court shall have its seat at the place determined by the Assembly from among States parties to this Protocol. However, it may convene in the territory of any Member State of the OAU when the majority of the Court considers it desirable, and with the prior consent of the State concerned.
2. The seat of the Court may be changed by the Assembly after due consultation with the Court.

Article 26 EVIDENCE

1. The Court shall hear submissions by all parties and if deemed necessary, hold an enquiry. The States concerned shall assist by providing relevant facilities for the efficient handling of the case.
2. The Court may receive written and oral evidence including expert testimony and shall make its decision on the basis of such evidence.

Article 27 FINDINGS

1. If the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples' right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or reparation.

2. In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary.

Article 28 JUDGMENT

1. The Court shall render its judgment within ninety (90) days of having completed its deliberations.
2. The judgment of the Court decided by majority shall be final and not subject to appeal.
3. Without prejudice to sub-article 2 above, the Court may review its decision in the light of new evidence under conditions to be set out in the Rules of Procedure.
4. The Court may interpret its own decision.
5. The judgment of the Court shall be read in open court, due notice having been given to the parties.
6. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the Court.
7. If the judgment of the Court does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous decision of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate or dissenting opinion.

Article 29 NOTIFICATION OF JUDGMENT

1. The parties to the case shall be notified of the judgment of the Court and it shall be transmitted to the Member States of the OAU and the Commission.
2. The Council of Ministers shall also be notified of the judgment and shall monitor its execution on behalf of the Assembly.

Article 30 EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

The States parties to the present Protocol undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution.

Article 31 REPORT

The Court shall submit to each regular session of the Assembly, a report on its work during the previous year. The report shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a State has not complied with the Court's judgment.

Article 32 BUDGET

Expenses of the Court, emoluments and allowances for judges and the budget of its registry, shall be determined and borne by the OAU, in accordance with criteria laid down by the OAU in consultation with the Court.

Article 33 RULES OF PROCEDURE

The Court shall draw up its Rules and determine its own procedures. The Court shall consult the Commission as appropriate.

Article 34 RATIFICATION

1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and ratification or accession by any State Party to the Charter.
2. The instrument of ratification or accession to the present Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the OAU.
3. The Protocol shall come into force thirty days after fifteen instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited.

4. For any State Party ratifying or acceding subsequently, the present Protocol shall come into force in respect of that State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.
5. The Secretary-General of the OAU shall inform all Member States of the entry into force of the present Protocol.
6. At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State shall make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under article 5 (3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under article 5 (3) involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration.
7. Declarations made under sub-article (6) above shall be deposited with the Secretary General, who shall transmit copies thereof to the State parties.

Article 35 AMENDMENTS

1. The present Protocol may be amended if a State Party to the Protocol makes a written request to that effect to the Secretary-General of the OAU. The Assembly may adopt, by simple majority, the draft amendment after all the States Parties to the present Protocol have been duly informed of it and the Court has given its opinion on the amendment.
2. The Court shall also be entitled to propose such amendments to the present Protocol as it may deem necessary, through the Secretary-General of the OAU.
3. The amendment shall come into force for each State Party which has accepted it thirty days after the Secretary-General of the OAU has received notice of the acceptance.

ACHPR/Res.153 (XLVI) 09: RESOLUTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEED TO STUDY ITS IMPACT IN AFRICA

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, (African Commission), meeting at its 46th Ordinary Session held from 11 to 25 November 2009 in Banjul, The Gambia,

Bearing in mind its mandate to promote human and peoples rights and ensure their protection in Africa under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter);

Considering the provisions of Articles 22 and 24 of the African Charter relating to the right of peoples to economic, social and cultural development and the right of peoples to a satisfactory environment favourable to their development;

Considering the provisions of the United Nations Declarations on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which recognises the rights of indigenous peoples and communities to their ancestral lands, cultures, lifestyles and a safe satisfactory environment;

Noting Article II of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Maputo Convention) of 11 July 2003, which among other things, provides for "socially acceptable development policies and programmes" guided by human rights principles, including the right to development and the right of all peoples to a satisfactory environment favourable to their development;

Recalling that the Convention on Biological Diversity urges states Parties thereto to "... *respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities...protect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use requirements*";

Noting further that African regional standards for the protection of the environment, management of natural resources and human rights are consistent with provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity of 5 June 1992, to which more than 40 African States are parties;

Taking note that climate change is principally the result of emissions of greenhouse gases, which remain relatively high in developed countries;

Concerned that the negotiations on climate change leading to the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009, make no clear reference to human rights principles, such as the rights to traditional knowledge and intellectual property of local and indigenous communities, as well as the principle of free, prior and informed consent by communities, as enshrined in the Maputo Convention and other relevant African human rights instruments;

Concerned further that the lack of human rights safeguards in various draft texts of the conventions under negotiation could put at risk the life, physical integrity and livelihood of the most vulnerable members of society notably isolated indigenous and local communities, women, and other vulnerable social groups; The African Commission hereby:

1. **Urges** the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union to ensure that human rights standards safeguards, such as the principle of free, prior and informed consent, be included into any adopted legal text on climate change as preventive measures against forced relocation, unfair dispossession of properties, loss of livelihoods and similar human rights violations;
2. **Urges** the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to ensure that special measure of protection for vulnerable groups such as children, women, the elderly, indigenous communities and victims of natural disasters and conflicts are included in any international agreement or instruments on climate change;
3. **Calls on** the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to take all necessary measures to ensure that the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is included in the African Union's negotiating team on climate change;
4. **Decides** to carry out a study on the impact of climate change on human rights in Africa.

ACHPR/Res.271 (LV) 2014: RESOLUTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission) meeting at its 55th Ordinary Session held in Luanda, Angola, from 28 April to 12 May 2014;

Recalling its mandate to promote and protect human and peoples' rights in Africa under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter);

Mindful of the provisions of Article 45(1)(b) of the African Charter which provides that the Commission shall "formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African governments may base their legislation;"

Considering the provisions of Article 24 of the African Charter on the right of all peoples to a satisfactory environment favourable to their development;

Recalling its **Resolution ACHPR/Res.153(XLVI)09: Resolution on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impact in Africa**, adopted at the 46th Ordinary Session of the Commission held in Banjul, The Gambia, from 11 to 25 November 2009, in which the Commission decided to carry out a study on the impact of climate change on human rights in Africa;

Convinced that the conduct of an in-depth study on the impact of climate change in Africa will contribute to the development of effective human rights-based measures and solutions;

Requests the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations in Africa (the Working Group on Extractive Industries) to undertake an in-depth study on the impact of climate change on human rights in Africa;

Calls on civil society and other stakeholders to support the work of the Working Group on Extractive Industries.

Adopted at the 55th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights held in Luanda, Angola, from 28 April to 12 May 2014

ACHPR/Res. 342(LVIII) 2016: Resolution on Climate Change and Human Rights in Africa

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission), meeting at its 58th Ordinary Session, held in Banjul, The Islamic Republic of The Gambia, from 6 to 20 April 2016:

Recalling its mandate to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter);

Mindful of the provisions of Article 45 of the African Charter providing a mandate to "promote human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa;" **Considering** the provisions of Articles 22 and 24 of the African Charter relating to the right of peoples to economic, social and cultural development and the right of peoples to a satisfactory environment favourable to their development;

Recalling the Commission's Resolution ACHPR/Res.153 (XLVI) 09 on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impact in Africa, adopted at its 46th Ordinary Session on 25 November 2009 and the Commission's Resolution ACHPR/Res.271 (LV) 14 on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impacts in Africa, adopted on 11 May 2014 at its 55th Ordinary Session; **Considering** that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which all almost all African States have ratified, obliges States Parties thereto to "... protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities";

Noting that the implementation of the UNFCCC, and the Paris Agreement under it, should adequately reflect the African perspective on human and peoples' rights, especially the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development, the right to development and the right to health;

Noting further that African regional standards for the protection of the environment, management of natural resources and human and peoples' rights are consistent with provisions of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, to which all African States are parties;

Welcoming the agreement reached at the COP21 meetings of December 2015 held in Paris, France outlining obligations relating to, among others, the limitation of green gas emissions, mitigations of and adaptations to climate change;

Concerned about the detrimental impact of the increased levels of greenhouse gases which could lead to temperature rises with serious consequences on the lives of African populations;

Concerned about the failure of developed countries Parties to the UNFCCC to comply with their obligation to take the lead in mitigation

while creating enabling conditions for African countries to realise their right to sustainable development and adapt to climate change;

Concerned that the absence of full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, including a lack of technology transfer and financial assistance for mitigation and adaptation, seriously undermines the capacity of African governments to safeguard human rights in Africa;

The Commission:

- i. **Encourages** Member States to strengthen regional and international cooperation in order to achieve a strong, committed and comprehensive climate action that will ensure that the human rights of Africans are safeguarded to the greatest extent possible both today and for future generations;
- ii. **Urgently requests** Member States to adopt and implement the special measures of protection for vulnerable groups such as children, women, older persons and persons with disabilities, indigenous communities and other minorities as well as victims of natural disasters and conflict;
- iii. **Tasks** its Working Group on Economic and Social Rights, in collaboration with the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations, to undertake a “study on the impact of climate change on human rights in Africa” and to present it within two years.

Done in Banjul, The Islamic Republic of The Gambia, 20 April 2016

ACHPR / Res. 417 (LXIV) 2019: Resolution on the human rights impacts of extreme weather in Eastern and Southern Africa due to climate change

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission), meeting at its 64th Ordinary Session, held in Sharm el Sheikh, Arab Republic of Egypt, from 24 April to 14 May 2019:

Considering the provisions of Articles 22 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter) relating to the right of peoples to economic, social and cultural development and the right of peoples to a satisfactory environment favourable to their development;

Considering also the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) which requires of State Parties to take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change;

Recalling its Resolution 153 on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impact in Africa adopted at its 46th Ordinary Session in November 2009; Resolution 271 on Climate Change in Africa, adopted at its 55th Ordinary Session in May 2014; and Resolution 342 on Climate Change and Human Rights in Africa adopted at its 58th Ordinary Session in April 2016;

Mindful of the findings of the 5th Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of 2014, which found that human activities cause global warming; and that impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires reveal significant human and ecosystem vulnerability to climate variability;

Further recalling its Press Release of 08 April 2019 on Cyclone Idai and the subsequent flooding in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe in which it expressed its solidarity with the government and people affected by the thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of displacements;

Concerned by the consequences of cyclone Kenneth which ravaged the east coast of Africa within just more than a month after cyclone Idai, resulting in dozens of further deaths and displacements in Mozambique, Tanzania, Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles, Malawi and Mayotte Island;

Deeply Concerned by the human rights implications of the two cyclones, including destruction of homes and other property, closure of schools and offices, the heightened risk of large-scale cholera outbreaks and the specific vulnerability of displaced women and girls to gender based violence and exploitation;

Further Concerned by the lack of preparedness by State Parties to the increased risks of extreme weather events as a result of climate change and lack of coordinated adaptive strategies to increase the resilience of their people to climate change;

Appreciating the commitment of the African Union (AU) to address the humanitarian crisis through support of USD 350 000 to the three countries affected by cyclone Idai and “immediate dispatch of a high level assessment mission to be led by the Permanent Representative Committee’s (PRC) Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and IDPs to assess the situation firsthand”;

The Commission:

1. Commends the efforts of affected countries to provide urgent humanitarian relief and undertake the process of recovery and reconstruction and urges them to facilitate the provision by humanitarian actors of the urgent relief that affected communities require;
2. Commends the mobilization of additional support from the AU and the international community for recovery and reconstruction efforts;
3. Supports the efforts of the AU, in particular the decision to task the PRC Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and IDPs to undertake a mission to the affected areas;
4. Strongly urges the affected State Parties to ensure that the human and peoples’ rights of affected persons and communities, including vulnerable groups, are protected, and that they are not subjected to further violations resulting from lack of security institutions and health services as a result of the cyclones,
5. Urges that women and girls in particular are protected from exposure to sexual abuse and manipulation in relation to accessing humanitarian assistance and other basic necessities such as shelter and food;
6. Reiterates its call to all African States and the international community to support the ongoing efforts and provide immediate emergency relief to the affected areas and to mobilize resources for the reconstruction of the infrastructure and rehabilitation of the livelihoods of people in the affected areas;
7. Calls on African countries to reaffirm the African Union common position on humanitarian effectiveness adopted by the African Union in January 2015 and accelerate the process of creation and operationalization of the African Humanitarian Agency;
8. Urges State Parties to the African Charter to ensure that contingency plans and emergency measures are put in place to increase the level of preparedness for an increase in extreme weather events and unstable weather patterns as the consequences of climate change intensify;
9. Encourages State Parties to fully integrate climate change considerations and the human and peoples’ rights consequences into their broader development plans;
10. Encourages State Parties, the AU and Regional Economic Communities to strengthen regional and continental cooperation in relation to climate change adaptation and mitigation and response to climate change induced humanitarian crisis taking full account of

the human and peoples' rights considerations of present and future generations;

11. Calls on the AU to declare 2021 the African Union Year on Climate Change, for the mobilization of awareness of Member States and Regional Communities of the challenges of climate change, in particular for vulnerable communities, and preparedness through putting in place structures for adaptation, mitigation, humanitarian relief and reconstruction; and
12. Remains seized of this matter through its commitment to prepare a Study on Climate Change and Human Rights in Africa.

Done in Sharm el Sheikh, 14 May 2019

AU-13

Resolution on Climate Change and Forced Displacement in Africa - ACHPR/Res. 491 (LXIX)2021

Dec 31, 2021

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission), meeting at its 69th Ordinary Session held virtually from 15 November to 5 December 2021;

Recalling its mandate of promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in Africa, pursuant to Article 45 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter);

Considering its Resolutions ACHPR/Res.114(XXXII) 07 on Migration and Human Rights, ACHPR/RES.333(EXT.OS/XIX) 2016 on the situation of migrants in Africa, ACHPR/Res.369(LX) 2017 on the situation of internally displaced persons in Africa; ACHPR/Res.470 (LXVII) 2020 on the protection of refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and migrants in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa; and ACHPR/Res. 484 (EXT.OS/XXXIII) 2021 on the respect for the principle of non-refoulement of asylum seekers and refugees;

Further recalling the implementation commitments from the 1st Meeting of the Conference of States Parties to the Kampala Convention held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in April 2017;

Further recalling the provisions of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement;

Considering the commitment of States Parties in the preamble of the Kampala Convention to provide durable solutions to situations of internally displaced persons by establishing an appropriate legal framework for their protection and assistance, and to adopt measures aimed at preventing and putting an end to internal displacements by eradicating the root causes, especially those caused by natural disasters;

Further considering the vulnerability of refugees, internally displaced and stateless persons who are among the most affected by the climate emergency;

Taking into account the findings of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights which indicate that weather events have triggered an average of 21.5 million new displacements each year, more than twice as many as displacements caused by conflict and violence;

Deeply concerned about the direct effects on forced displacement of increasingly frequent and intense natural disasters due to climate change;

Concerned about increased poverty, food insecurity, water shortages and lack of access to other natural resources on which communities depend for their survival, due to climate change;

Recalling the need to meet the requirements of those living in climate-sensitive areas, where they generally lack the resources to adapt to an increasingly hostile environment;

Bearing in mind the role of the Commission under Article 45, paragraph 1(a) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which authorises it to "(...) give its views or make recommendations to Governments";

The Commission:

1. Reminds States of their treaty obligations and the commitments they have made by embracing the standards and policies of the African Union relating to the protection of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants on the continent, in particular the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention);
2. Calls on States to add climate change and its impact on populations on their agenda and to take the necessary measures to prevent forced displacement as a result of climate change;
3. Urges the African Union to develop a plan of action to address forced displacement due to climate change, by ensuring inter alia that factors contributing to climate change are strictly controlled, including deforestation and over-exploitation of natural resources without any consideration of the impact on the environment and the climate;
4. Encourages States to work in a proactive manner with displaced populations and adjust their national plans for livelihood support and resilience accordingly; and
5. Calls on States to continue making progress in promoting the rights of people displaced by the climate crisis and developing long-term solutions for their benefit.

Done virtually, on 5 December 2021

AU-14

African
Union



An Integrated, Prosperous
and Peaceful Africa

**AFRICAN
CONVENTION
ON THE
CONSERVATION
OF NATURE
AND NATURAL
RESOURCES**





AFRICAN CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Adopted by
by the 2nd Ordinary Session
of the Assembly
Maputo, Mozambique - 11 July 2003

Entered into force on 23 July 2016.

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PREAMBLE |

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union (AU),

Conscious

that the natural environment of Africa and the natural resources with which Africa is endowed are an irreplaceable part of the African heritage and constitute a capital of vital importance to the continent and humankind as a whole;

Confirming,

as we accepted upon declaring our adherence to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, that it is our duty “to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in spheres of human endeavour

Conscious

of the ever-growing importance of natural resources from economic, social, cultural and environmental points of view

Affirming

that the conservation of the global environment is a common concern of human kind as a whole, and the conservation of the African environment a primary concern of all Africans;

Re-affirming

that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, a sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;

Re-affirming further

that States are responsible for protecting and conserving their environment and natural resources and for using them in a sustainable manner with the aim to satisfy human needs according to the carrying capacity of the environment;

Conscious

of the dangers which threaten some of these irreplaceable assets;

Desirous

of undertaking individual and joint action for the conservation, utilization and development of these assets by establishing and maintaining their sustainable use;

Recalling

the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa and the Final Act of Lagos as well as the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights;

Taking note

of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and of the World Charter for Nature adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

Conscious

of the need to continue furthering the principles of the Stockholm Declaration, to contribute to the implementation of the Rio Declaration and of Agenda 21, and to work closely together towards the implementation of global and regional instruments supporting their goals;

Considering

the principles and objectives stated in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and the Constitutive Act of the African Union;

Convinced

that the above objectives would be better achieved by amending the 1968 Algiers Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources by expanding elements related to sustainable development;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I.

SCOPE

This Convention shall apply

1. to all areas which are within the limits of national jurisdiction of any Party; and
2. to the activities carried out under the jurisdiction or control of any Party within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of its national jurisdiction.

Article II.

OBJECTIVES

1. to enhance environmental protection;
2. to foster the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources; and
3. to harmonize and coordinate policies in these fields

with a view to achieving ecologically rational, economically sound and socially acceptable development policies and programmes.

Article III.

PRINCIPLES

In taking action to achieve the objectives of this Convention and implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided by the following:

1. the right of all peoples to a satisfactory environment favourable to their development;
2. the duty of States, individually and collectively to ensure the enjoyment of the right to development;
3. the duty of States to ensure that developmental and environmental needs are met in a sustainable, fair and equitable manner.

Article IV.

FUNDAMENTAL OBLIGATION

The Parties shall adopt and implement all measures necessary to achieve the objectives of this Convention, in particular through preventive

measures and the application of the precautionary principle, and with due regard to ethical and traditional values as well as scientific knowledge in the interest of present and future generations.

Article V.

USE OF TERMS

For purposes of this Convention:

- 1.** “Natural Resources” means renewable resources, tangible and non tangible, including soil, water, flora and fauna and non renewable resources. Whenever the text of the Convention refers to non renewable resources this will be specified.
- 2.** “Specimen” means any animal or plant or micro organism, alive or dead.
- 3.** “Product” means any part or derivative of a specimen.
- 4.** “Species” means any species, sub species, or geographically separate population thereof
- 5.** “Threatened Species” means any species of fauna or flora which is considered critically endangered, endangered, or vulnerable, for which definitions are contained in Annex 1 to this Convention, and for which criteria may be adopted and from time to time reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, taking into consideration the work of competent international organisations in this field.
- 6.** “Conservation area” means
 - a)** any protected area designated and managed mainly or wholly for one of the following purposes:
 - i)** science or wilderness protection (Strict Nature Reserve/ Wilderness Areas);
 - ii)** ecosystem protection and recreation (National Parks);
 - iii)** conservation of specific natural features (National Monuments);
 - iv)** conservation through management interventions (Habitat/ Species Management Areas);
 - v)** landscape/seascape conservation and recreation (Protected Landscapes/Seascapes);
 - vi)** the sustainable use of natural ecosystems (Managed Resource Protected Areas).

for which definitions and management objectives are contained in Annex 2 to this Convention, as well as

- b)** other areas designated and/or managed primarily for the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, for which criteria may be adopted and from time to time reviewed by the Conference of the Parties.
- 7.** Biological Diversity” means the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine, or other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.
- 8.** “Original Convention” means the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, adopted in 1968 in Algiers.

Whenever a specific term not defined in this Convention has been defined in global conventions it can be construed as defined in those conventions. Where an African regional or sub regional convention exists that defines such terms, these definitions shall prevail.

Article VI.

LAND AND SOIL ■

- 1.** The Parties shall take effective measures to prevent land degradation, and to that effect shall develop long-term integrated strategies for the conservation and sustainable management of land resources, including soil, vegetation and related hydrological processes.
- 2.** They shall in particular adopt measures for the conservation and improvement of the soil, to, inter alia, combat its erosion and misuse as well as the deterioration of its physical, chemical and biological or economic properties.
- 3.** To this end:
 - a)** they shall establish land-use plans based on scientific investigations as well as local knowledge and experience and, in particular, classification and land-use capability;
 - b)** they shall, when implementing agricultural practices and agrarian reforms,

- i)** improve soil conservation and introduce sustainable farming and forestry practices, which ensure long-term productivity of the land,
 - ii)** control erosion caused by land misuse and mismanagement which may lead to longterm loss of surface soils and vegetation cover,
 - iii)** control pollution caused by agricultural activities, including aquaculture and animal husbandry;
 - c)** they shall ensure that non-agricultural forms of land use, including but not limited to public works, mining and the disposal of yvastes, do not result in erosion, pollution, or any other form of land degradation;
 - d)** they shall, in areas affected by land degradation, plan and implement mitigation and rehabilitation measures.
- 4.** Parties shall develop and implement land tenure policies able to facilitate the above measures, inter alia by taking into account the rights of local communities.

Article VII.

WATER ■

- 1.** The Parties shall manage their water resources so as to maintain them at the highest possible quantitative and qualitative levels. They shall, to that effect, take measures designed to:
 - a)** maintain water-based essential ecological processes as well as to protect human health against pollutants and water-borne diseases,
 - b)** prevent damage that could affect human health or natural resource in another State by the discharge of pollutants, and
 - c)** prevent excessive abstraction, to the benefit of downstream communities and States.
- 2.** The Parties shall establish and implement policies for the planning, conservation, management, utilization and development of

underground and surface water, as well as the harvesting and use of rain water, and shall endeavour to guarantee for their populations a sufficient and continuous supply of suitable water, taking appropriate measures with due regard to:

- a) the study of water cycles and the investigation of each catchment area,
 - b) the integrated management of water resources,
 - c) the conservation of forested and other catchment areas and the co-ordination and planning of water resources development projects,
 - d) the inventory and management of all water resources, including the administration and control of all water utilization, and
 - e) the prevention and control of water pollution through, inter alia, the establishment of effluent and water quality standards.
3. Where surface or underground water resources and related ecosystems, including wetlands, are transboundary to two or more of the Parties, the latter shall act in consultation, and if the need arises, set up inter-State Commissions for their rational management and equitable utilization and to resolve disputes arising from the use of these resources, and for the cooperative development, management and conservation thereof.
 4. The Parties undertake, individually or within sub-regional arrangements, to cooperate in rational water husbandry and conservation in irrigated agriculture for improved food security and sustainable agro-based industrialization.

Article VIII.

VEGETATION COVER

1. The Parties shall take all necessary measures for the protection, conservation, sustainable use and rehabilitation of vegetation cover. To this end they shall:
 - a) adopt scientifically-based and sound traditional conservation,

utilization and management plans for forests, woodlands, rangelands, wetlands and other areas with vegetation cover, taking into account the social and economic needs of the peoples concerned, the importance of the vegetation cover for the maintenance of the water balance of an area, the productivity of soils and the habitat requirements of species;

- b)** take concrete steps or measures to control fires, forest exploitation, land clearing for cultivation, grazing by domestic and wild animals, and invasive species;
- c)** establish forest reserves and carry out afforestation programmes where necessary;
- d)** limit forest grazing to season and intensities that will not prevent forest regeneration.

Article IX.

SPECIES AND GENETIC DIVERSITY ■

- 1.** The Parties shall maintain and enhance species and genetic diversity of plants and animals whether terrestrial, fresh-water or marine. They shall, for that purpose, establish and implement policies for the conservation and sustainable use of such resources; particular attention shall be paid to socially, economically and ecologically valuable species, which are threatened and species which are only represented in areas under the jurisdiction of one Party.
- 2.** The Parties shall ensure the conservation of species and their habitats within the framework of land-use planning and of sustainable development Management of species and their habitats shall be based on the results of continued scientific research and Parties shall:
 - a)** manage plant and animal populations. inside conservation areas according to the objectives of such areas;
 - b)** manage harvestable populations outside such areas in a sustainable manner, compatible with and complementary to other sustainable land uses;

- c)** establish and/or strengthen existing facilities for ex situ conservation to perpetuate animal or plant species of particular interest;
- d)** manage and protect aquatic environments, whether in fresh, brackish or marine water, with a view to minimising deleterious effects of any water and land use practice which might adversely affect aquatic habitats;
- e)** undertake inventories of species of fauna and flora and prepare maps of their distribution and abundance, and conduct regular reviews to facilitate the monitoring of the status of such species and their habitats with a view to:
 - i)** providing the appropriate scientific basis for decisions pertaining to their conservation and use,
 - ii)** identifying species that are threatened or may become so, and providing them accordingly with appropriate protection, and
 - iii)** identifying species that are migratory or congregatory and therefore confined to specific areas at particular seasons, and providing them with appropriate protection;
- f)** identify areas of critical importance for the survival of species of fauna and flora which are threatened;
- g)** preserve as many varieties as possible of domestic or cultivated species and their wild relatives, as well as of other economically valuable species, including forest trees and micro-organisms;
- h)** strictly control the intentional and, in as far as possible, accidental introduction, in any area, of species which are not native to that area, including modified organisms, and endeavour to eradicate those already introduced where the consequences are detrimental to native species or to the environment in general;
- i)** take appropriate measures to control pests and eradicate animal and plant diseases;
- j)** provide for fair and equitable access to genetic resources, on terms mutually agreed between the providers and users of such resources; and
- k)** provide for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of

biotechnologies based upon genetic resources and related traditional knowledge with the providers of such resources.

- 3.** Parties shall adopt legislation regulating all forms of taking, including hunting, capture and fishing and collection of whole or parts of plants under which:
 - a)** the conditions and procedures for issue of permits are appropriately regulated;
 - b)** taking is regulated with a view to ensuring that the use of any population is sustainable. Measures to that effect shall include:
 - i)** closed seasons,
 - ii)** temporary or local prohibitions of exploitation, as needed to restore satisfactory population levels,
 - iii)** the prohibition of the use of all indiscriminate means of taking and of the use of all means capable of causing mass destructions, as well as local disappearance of, or serious disturbance to, populations of a species, in particular the means specified in Annex 3;
 - c)** with a view to as rational use as possible, the products of hunting and fishing, the use and abandonment of such products, and plant collection are regulated;
 - d)** operations carried out by, or under the control of, the competent authority for management purposes may nevertheless be exempted from specific restrictions.

Article X.

PROTECTED SPECIES

- 1.** The Parties undertake to identify the factors that are causing the depletion of animal and plant species which are threatened or which may become so, with a view to their elimination, and to accord a special protection to such species, whether terrestrial, freshwater or marine, and to the habitat necessary for their survival. Where a species is represented only in areas under the jurisdiction of one Party, that Party has a particular responsibility for its protection.

2. The Parties shall adopt legislation on the protection of species referred to in paragraph 1 above, taking into particular account the need to develop or maintain throughout the African continent concerted protection measures for such species. One or several Annexes to this Convention may be adopted by the Conference of the Parties to that effect

Article XI.

TRADE IN SPECIMENS AND PRODUCTS THEREOF

1. The Parties shall:
 - a) regulate the domestic trade in, as well as the transport and possession of specimens and products to ensure that such specimens and products have been taken or obtained in conformity with domestic law and international obligations related to trade in species;
 - b) in the measures referred to under a) above, provide for appropriate penal sanctions, including confiscation measures.
2. The Parties shall, where appropriate, cooperate through bilateral or sub-regional agreements with a view to reducing and ultimately eliminating illegal trade in wild fauna and flora or their specimens or products.

Article XII.

CONSERVATION AREAS

1. The Parties shall establish, maintain and extend, as appropriate, conservation areas. They shall, preferably within the framework of environmental and natural resources policies, legislation and programmes, also assess the potential impacts and necessity of establishing additional conservation areas and wherever possible designate such areas, in order to ensure the long term conservation of biological diversity, in particular to:
 - a) conserve those ecosystems which are most representative of and peculiar to areas under their jurisdiction, or are characterized by a

high degree of biological diversity;

- b)** ensure the conservation of all species and particularly of those which are:
 - i)** only represented in areas under their jurisdiction;
 - ii)** threatened, or of special scientific or aesthetic value;

and of the habitats that are critical for the survival of such species.

- 2.** The Parties shall seek to identify areas critically important to the goals referred to in sub paragraph 1 (a) and 1 (b) above which are not yet included in conservation areas, taking into consideration the work of competent international organisations in this field.
- 3.** The Parties shall promote the establishment by local communities of areas managed by them primarily for the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.
- 4.** The Parties shall, where necessary and if possible, control activities outside conservation areas which are detrimental to the achievement of the purpose for which the conservation areas were created, and establish for that purpose buffer zones around their borders.

Article XIII.

PROCESSES AND ACTIVITIES AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

- 1.** The Parties shall, individually or jointly, and in collaboration with the competent international organizations concerned, take all appropriate measures to prevent, mitigate and eliminate to the maximum extent possible, detrimental effects on the environment, in particular from radioactive, toxic, and other hazardous substances and wastes. For this purpose, they shall use the best practicable means and shall endeavour to harmonize their policies, in particular within the framework of relevant conventions to which they are Parties.

- 2.** To that effect, Parties shall
 - a)** establish, strengthen and implement specific national standards, including for ambient environmental quality, emission and discharge limits as well as process and production methods and product quality;
 - b)** provide for economic incentives and disincentives, with a view to preventing or abating harm to the environment, restoring or enhancing environmental quality, and implementing international obligations in these regards; and
 - c)** adopt measures necessary to ensure that raw materials, non-renewable resources, and energy, are conserved and used as efficiently as possible, and that used materials are reused and recycled to the maximum extent possible while nondegradable materials are disposed of in the most effective and safe way.

Article XIV.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

- 1.** The Parties shall ensure that
 - a)** conservation and management of natural resources are treated as an integral part of national and/or local development plans;
 - b)** in the formulation of all development plans, full consideration is given to ecological, as well as to economic, cultural and social factors

in order to promote sustainable development.
- 2.** To this end, the Parties shall:
 - a)** to the maximum extent possible, take all necessary measures to ensure that development activities and projects are based on sound environmental policies and do not have adverse effects on natural resources and the environment in general;
 - b)** ensure that policies, plans, programmes, strategies, projects and activities likely to affect natural resources, ecosystems and the environment in general are the subject of adequate impact

assessment at the earliest possible stage and that regular environmental monitoring and audit are conducted;

- c)** monitor the state of their natural resources as well as the impact of development activities and projects upon such resources.

Article XV.

MILITARY AND HOSTILE ACTIVITIES

- 1.** The Parties shall:
 - a)** take every practical measure, during periods of armed conflict, to protect the environment against harm;
 - b)** refrain from employing or threatening to employ methods or means of combat which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term, or severe harm to the environment and ensure that such means and methods of warfare are not developed, produced, tested or transferred;
 - c)** refrain from using the destruction or modification of the environment as a means of combat or reprisal;
 - d)** undertake to restore and rehabilitate areas damaged in the course of armed conflicts.
- 2.** The Parties shall cooperate to establish and further develop and implement rules and measures to protect the environment during armed conflicts.

Article XVI.

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

- 1.** The Parties shall adopt legislative and regulatory measures necessary to ensure timely and appropriate
 - a)** dissemination of environmental information;
 - b)** access of the public to environmental information;
 - c)** participation of the public in decision-making with a potentially significant environmental impact; and

- d) access to justice in matters related to protection of environment and natural resources.
2. Each Party from which a transboundary environmental harm originates shall ensure that any person in another Party affected by such harm has a right of access to administrative and judicial procedures equal to that afforded to_ nationals or residents of the Party of origin in cases of domestic environmental harm.

ARTICLE XVII.

TRADITIONAL RIGHTS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

1. The Parties shall take legislative and other measures to ensure that traditional rights and intellectual property rights of local communities including farmers' rights are respected in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
2. The Parties shall require that access to indigenous knowledge and its use be subject to the prior informed consent of the concerned communities and to specific regulations recognizing their rights to, and appropriate economic value of, such knowledge.
3. The Parties shall take the measures necessary to enable active participation by the local communities in the process of planning and management of natural resources upon which such communities depend with a view to creating local incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of such resources.

Article XVIII.

RESEARCH

1. The Parties shall strengthen their capabilities to carry out scientific and technological research in conservation, sustainable utilization and management of natural resources paying particular attention to ecological and socio-economic factors as well as their integration, and shall ensure the application of research results to the development and implementation of their environmental conservation policies.

2. The Parties shall promote cooperation in scientific and technological research, as well as in economic and marketing systems, between themselves and with third parties in the field of environmental conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.

To that end, they shall in particular:

- a) coordinate their research programmes with a view to achieving maximum synergy and complementarity;
- b) promote the exchange of research results; and
- c) promote the development of joint research activities and programmes

in the fields covered by this Convention.

Article XIX.

DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY

1. The Parties shall encourage and strengthen cooperation for the development and use, as well as access to and transfer of, environmentally sound technologies on mutually agreed terms, with a view to accelerating the transition to sustainable development, in particular by establishing joint research programmes and ventures.
2. To that effect the Parties shall adopt legislative and regulatory measures which provide for inter alia, economic incentives for the development, importation, transfer and utilization of environmentally sound technologies in the private and public sectors.

In implementing paragraphs 1. and 2. above, attention shall be paid to technologies which can be used locally by individuals, local communities and small/medium enterprises.

Article XX.

CAPACITY BUILDING, EDUCATION AND TRAINING

1.
 - a) The Parties shall promote environmental education, training and awareness creation at all
 - b) For this purpose they shall ensure that environmental matters:

- i)** are included in educational and training programmes at all levels, and
 - ii)** form the object of information campaigns capable of acquainting the public with, and winning it over to, the concepts of conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.
 - c)** In order to put into effect paragraphs a) and b) above, the Parties shall make maximum use of the educational and training value of conservation areas and the experience of local communities.
- 2.** Parties shall develop their capacities in the field of education and training relating to environmental and natural resources conservation and use, in particular through the promotion and development of:
- a)** training of trainers programmes;
 - b)** appropriate teaching and training materials ;
 - c)** available and accessible educational and training opportunities at all levels.
- 3.** In order to facilitate the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Parties shall cooperate among themselves, in particular with a view to strengthening or establishing
- a)** regional or sub-regional training institutions;
 - b)** joint training programmes;
 - c)** libraries and documentation centres; and
 - d)** a continuous exchange of information and experience
- in the fields covered by this convention.

Article XXI.

NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

Each Party shall establish or designate, if it has not already done so, a national authority empowered to deal with all matters covered by this Convention, and/or, where appropriate, establish a co-ordinating machinery between existing national institutions.

Article XXII.

CO-OPERATION

- 1.** The Parties shall co-operate between themselves and, where appropriate and possible, with other States:
 - a)** to give effect to the provisions of this Convention;
 - b)** whenever any national measure is likely to affect the environment or natural resources of any other State or areas beyond national jurisdiction;
 - c)** in order to enhance the individual and combined effectiveness of their policies and legislations, as well as measures adopted under this Convention and under other international conventions in the fields of environmental protection and natural resources conservation and use; and
 - d)** in order to harmonize their policies and laws at the continental or regional levels, as appropriate.
- 2.** In particular:
 - a)** whenever an environmental emergency or natural disaster occurring in a Party is likely to affect the natural resources of another State, the latter shall be provided with all relevant available data by the former as early as practicable;
 - b)** when a Party has reasons to believe that a programme, activity or project to be carried out in areas under its jurisdiction may have adverse effects on the natural resources of another State, it shall provide that other State with relevant information on the proposed measures and their possible effects, and shall consult with that

State;

- c)** whenever a Party objects to an activity referred to in sub-paragraph b) above, they shall enter into negotiations;
- d)** Parties shall develop disaster preparedness, prevention and management programmes, and as the need arises hold consultations towards mutual assistance initiatives
- e)** whenever a natural resource or an ecosystem is transboundary , the parties concerned shall undertake to cooperate in the conservation, development and management of such resource or ecosystem and if the need arises, set up interstate commissions for their conservation and sustainable use;
- f)** the Parties shall, prior to the export of hazardous substances, or of alien or modified organisms, undertake to secure the prior informed consent of the importing, and where appropriate, transit States
- g)** the Parties shall take concerted action regarding the transboundary movement, management and processing of hazardous wastes, with a view to supporting, individually and jointly, international accords in this field, and to implementing African instruments related thereto;
- h)** the Parties shall exchange information bilaterally or through competent international agencies on activities and events likely to affect the natural resources and the environment of areas beyond national jurisdiction

Article XXIII.

COMPLIANCE

The Conference of mechanisms the Parties shall, as soon as possible, develop and adopt rules, procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote and enhance compliance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article XXIV.

LIABILITY

The Parties shall, as soon as possible, adopt rules and procedures concerning liability and compensation of damage related to matters covered by this Convention.

Article XXV.

EXCEPTIONS

1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the responsibilities of Parties concerning:
 - a) "force majeure"; and
 - b) defence of human life.
2. The provisions of this Convention shall not prevent Parties:
 - a) in time of declared emergencies arising from disasters; and
 - b) for the protection of public health;

from adopting precisely defined measures derogatory to the provisions of the Convention, provided their application is limited in respect of aim, duration and place.

3. The Parties who take action in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 undertake to inform the Conference of the Parties without delay, through the Secretariat, of the nature and circumstances of these measures.

Article XXVI.

CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

1. A Conference of the Parties is hereby established at ministerial level, as the decision-making body of this Convention. The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties shall be convened by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union not later than one year after the entry into force of the Convention. Thereafter ordinary meetings shall be convened at least once every two years, unless

the Conference decides otherwise.

- 2.** Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to them by the Secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.
- 3.** At its first meeting, the Conference of the Parties shall adopt rules of procedure for itself and for any subsidiary body it may establish, as well as determine the rules governing the funding and operation of the Secretariat; Parties shall make every effort to reach these decisions by consensus; if all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the decisions shall as a last resort be adopted by a two-third majority of the Parties present and voting.
- 4.** At each of its ordinary meetings the Conference of the Parties shall adopt a programme and budget for the financial period until the next ordinary meeting.
- 5.** The Conference of the Parties shall keep under review and promote the effective implementation of this Convention, and, for this purpose, shall:
 - a)** make recommendations to the Parties on any matters related to the implementation of this Convention;
 - b)** receive and consider information and reports presented by the Secretariat or by any Party and make recommendations thereto;
 - c)** establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation of this Convention, in particular to provide scientific and technical advice;
 - d)** review reports submitted by any subsidiary body and provide guidance to them;
 - e)** promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures proposed or adopted by the Parties;
 - f)** consider and undertake any additional action that may be required

for the achievement of the purposes of this Convention;

- g)** consider and adopt, as required, amendments to this Convention;
 - h)** consider and adopt, as required, additional Annexes and amendments to the Annexes to this Convention;
 - i)** seek, through the Secretariat, the co-operation of, and utilize the services of and information provided by, competent bodies or agencies, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, and strengthen the relationship with other relevant conventions; and
 - j)** consider any other matter within the scope of this Convention.
- 6.** African Regional Economic Communities, as well as African regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organizations may be represented at meetings of the Conference of the Parties without the right to vote. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and any State Party to the original Convention not party to this Convention, may be represented at meetings of the Conference of the Parties and participate as observers. Any non-governmental organization, whether national, continental, regional or sub-regional, or international, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the Secretariat of its wish to be represented at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The participation of Observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.

Article XXVII.

THE SECRETARIAT

- 1.** A Secretariat to this Convention is hereby established.
- 2.** At its first meeting, the Conference of the Parties shall designate an organisation to carry out the Secretariat functions under the Convention or shall appoint its own Secretariat and determine its location.

- 3.** The functions of the Secretariat shall be:
- a)** to arrange for and service meetings of the Conference of the Parties and of its subsidiary bodies;
 - b)** to execute the decisions addressed to it by the Conference of the Parties;
 - c)** to draw the attention of the Conference of the Parties to matters pertaining to the objectives of this Convention and its implementation;
 - d)** to gather and disseminate among the Parties the texts of laws, decrees, regulations and instructions in force which are intended to ensure the implementation of this Convention, as well as reports pertaining to such implementation;
 - e)** to administer the budget for the Convention and if established, its conservation fund;
 - f)** to enter into such administrative and contractual arrangements as may be required for the effective discharge of its functions;
 - g)** to prepare studies and reports on its activities carried out in the implementation of its functions under this Convention and present them to the Conference of Parties;
 - h)** to coordinate its activities with the secretariats of other relevant international bodies and conventions;
 - i)** to provide information for the general public concerning the Convention and its objectives; and
 - j)** to perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by this Convention, or determined by the Conference of the Parties.

Article XXVIII.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES █

- 1.** Given the central importance of financing to the achievement of the purposes of this Convention, each Party, taking into account its capability, shall make every effort to ensure that adequate financial

resources are available for the implementation of this Convention.

- 2.** Financial resources towards the budget of the Convention shall consist of assessed contributions from Parties, annual contributions by the AU, and contributions from other institutions. Contributions of the Parties to the budget of the Convention shall be in accordance with the scale of assessment approved by the Conference of the Parties at its first meeting.
- 3.** The Conference of the Parties may establish a conservation fund constituted from voluntary contributions of Parties or from any other source accepted by the Conference for the purpose of financing projects and activities relating to the conservation of the environment and natural resources. The fund shall function under the authority of, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties.
- 4.** The Parties, individually or jointly, shall seek to mobilize further financial resources and to that effect seek full use and continued qualitative improvement of all national, bilateral and multilateral funding resources and mechanisms, using consortia, joint programmes and parallel financing, and shall seek to involve private sector funding resources and mechanisms, including those of non-governmental organizations.

Article XXIX.

REPORTS AND INFORMATION ■

- 1.** The Parties shall present, through the Secretariat, to the Conference of the Parties reports on the measures adopted by them in the implementation of this Convention and the results thereof in applying its provisions in such form and at such intervals as the Conference of the Parties may determine. This presentation shall be accompanied by the comments of the Secretariat, in particular regarding failure to report, adequacy of the report and of the measures described therein.
- 2.** The Parties shall supply the Secretariat with:
 - a)** the texts of laws, decrees, regulations and instructions in

force which are intended to ensure the implementation of this Convention;

- b)** any other information that may be necessary to provide complete documentation on matters dealt with by this Convention;
- c)** the names of the agencies or coordinating institutions empowered to be focal points in matters under this Convention; and
- d)** information on bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to the environment and natural resources to which they are parties.

Article XXX.

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES █

- 1.** Any dispute between the Parties regarding the interpretation or the application of the provisions of this Convention shall be amicably settled through direct agreement reached by the parties to the dispute directly or through the good offices of a third party. If the parties concerned fail to settle such dispute, either party may, within a period of twelve months, refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the African Union.
- 2.** The decisions of the Court of Justice shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal.

Article XXXI.

AMENDMENTS OF THE CONVENTION █

- 1.** Any Party may propose amendments to this Convention.
- 2.** The text of any proposed amendment to this Convention shall be communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat at least six months before the meeting of the Conference of the Parties at which it is proposed for approval. The Secretariat shall also communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to this Convention at least three months before the meeting.
- 3.** The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to this Convention by consensus. If all efforts

at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a two-third majority vote of the Parties present and voting.

4. The Depository shall communicate the adoption of the amendment to all Parties and signatories to this Convention.
5. Ratification, acceptance or approval of amendments shall be notified to the Depository in writing. Amendments shall enter into force among Parties having accepted them on the ninetieth day after the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval by at least two thirds of the Contracting Parties to this Convention. Thereafter the amendments shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after that Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendments.
6. For the purposes of this Article, “Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote.

Article XXXII.

ADOPTION AND AMENDMENTS OF ANNEXES ■

1. The annexes to this Convention shall form an integral part of the convention. Such annexes shall be restricted to scientific, technical, financial and administrative matters.
2. The following procedure shall apply to the proposal, adoption and entry into force of additional annexes to this Convention
 - a) any Party may propose additional annex to this Convention;
 - b) the text of any proposed additional annex to this Convention shall be communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat at least six months before the meeting of the Conference of the Parties at which it is proposed for adoption. The Secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed additional annex to the signatories to this Convention at least three months before the meeting;
 - c) the Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed additional annex to this Convention by consensus. If

all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the additional annex shall as a last resort be adopted by a two-third majority vote of the Parties present and voting;

- d)** the Depository shall communicate the adoption of the Annex to all Parties and signatories to this Convention;
 - e)** any Party that is unable to accept an additional annex to this Convention shall notify the Depository, in writing, within six months from the date of the communication of the adoption by the Depository. The Depository shall without delay notify all Parties of any such notification received. A Party may at any time substitute an acceptance for a previous declaration of objection and the annexes shall thereupon enter into force for that Party;
 - f)** upon expiration of six months from the date of the circulation of the communication by the Depository, the annex shall enter into force for all Parties to this Convention, which have not submitted a notification in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph e) above.
- 3.** The proposal, adoption and entry into force of amendments to annexes to this Convention shall be subject to the same procedure as for the proposal, adoption and entry into force of additional annexes to the Convention.
- 4.** If an additional annex or an amendment to an annex is related to an amendment to this Convention, the additional annex or amended annex shall not enter into force until such time as the amendment to this Convention enters into force.

Article XXXIII.

RIGHT TO VOTE █

Each Party to this Convention shall have one vote.

Article XXXIV.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTIES TO THE REVISED CONVENTION AND PARTIES BOUND BY THE 1968 ALGIERS CONVENTION

1. Between Parties which are bound by this Convention, only this Convention shall apply.
2. The relationships between Parties to the original Convention and Parties to this Convention shall be governed by the provisions of the original Convention.

Article XXXV.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

The provisions of this Convention do not affect the rights and obligations of any Party deriving from existing international treaties, conventions or agreements.

Article XXXVI.

SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION

1. This Convention shall be open for signature immediately after being adopted by the Assembly of the African Union.
2. The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each of the States referred to in paragraph 1 above. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article XXXVII.

ACCESSION

1. This Convention shall be open to accession by Member States of the AU from the date on which it is closed for signature.
2. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article XXXVIII.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary, who shall inform the States referred to in Articles XXXVI and XXXVII accordingly.
2. For each State which ratifies, accepts or approves this Convention or accedes thereto after the depositing of the fifteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
3. Any State that becomes a party to the present Convention that was not a party to the 1968 Algiers Convention shall take necessary steps to withdraw from the London Convention of 1933 on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna in their Natural state.
4. No instrument of accession to the 1968 Algiers Convention may be deposited after the adoption of this Convention.

Article XXXIX.

RESERVATIONS

No reservation may be made to this Convention.

Article XL.

WITHDRAWAL

1. Any Party may withdraw from this Convention by notification in writing addressed to the Depositary.
2. Such withdrawal shall take effect, for such a Party, one year after the date of receipt of its notification by the Depositary.
3. No withdrawal shall, however, be made before the expiry of a period

of five years from the date at which this Convention comes into force for the Party concerned.

Article XLI.

SECRETARIAT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS

The Secretariat functions referred to in Article XVII.3 shall be carried out on an interim basis by the Chairperson of the African Union until the decision of the Conference of the Parties referred to in Article XXVII.2 has been taken.

Article XLII.

DEPOSITARY

The Chairperson of the African Union shall be the Depositary of this Convention.

Article XLIII.

AUTHENTIC TEXTS

The original of this Convention of which the Arabic, English, French and Portuguese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ANNEX 1

THREATENED SPECIES DEFINITION

A threatened species is a species which is either:

a) Critically Endangered:

A taxon is “critically endangered” when the best available evidence indicates that it is considered to be facing an extremely high risk of extinction in the wild.

b) Endangered:

A taxon is “endangered” when the available evidence indicates that it is considered to be facing a very high risk of extinction in the wild.

c) Vulnerable:

A taxon is “vulnerable” when the best available evidence indicates that it is considered to be facing a high risk of extinction in the wild.

ANNEX 2:

CONSERVATION AREAS

Definitions and Management Objectives

Strict Nature Reserve: protected area managed mainly for science

Definition

Area of land and/or sea possessing some outstanding or representative ecosystems, geological or physiological features and/or species, available primarily for scientific research and/or environmental monitoring.

Objectives of Management

- to preserve habitats, ecosystems and species in as undisturbed a state as possible;
- to maintain genetic resources in a dynamic and evolutionary state;
- to maintain established ecological processes;
- to safeguard structural landscape features or rock exposures;

- to secure examples of the natural environment for scientific studies, environmental monitoring and education, including baseline areas from which all avoidable access is excluded;
- to minimise disturbance by careful planning and execution of research and other approved activities; and
- to limit public access.

Wilderness Area: protected area managed mainly for wilderness protection

Definition

Large area of unmodified or slightly modified land, and/or sea, retaining its natural character and influence, without permanent or significant habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural condition.

Objectives of Management

- to ensure that future generations have the opportunity to experience understanding and enjoyment of areas that have been largely undisturbed by human action over a long period of time;
- to maintain the essential natural attributes and qualities of the environment over the long term;
- to provide for public access at levels and of a type which will serve best the physical and spiritual well-being of visitors and maintain the wilderness qualities of the area for present and future generations; and
- to enable local communities living at low density and in balance with the available resources to maintain their life style.

National Park: protected area managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation

Definition

Natural area of land and/or sea, designated to (a) protect the ecological integrity of one or more ecosystems for present and future generations, (b) exclude exploitation or occupation inimical to

the purposes of designation of the area and (c) provide a foundation for spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and visitor opportunities, all of which must be environmentally and culturally compatible.

Objectives of Management

- to protect natural and scenic areas of national and international significance for spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational or tourist purposes;
- to perpetual, in as natural a state as possible, representative examples of physiographic regions, biotic communities, genetic resources, and species, to provide ecological stability and diversity;
- to manage visitor use for inspirational, educational, cultural and recreational purposes at a level which will maintain the area in a natural or near natural state;
- to eliminate and thereafter prevent exploitation or occupation inimical to the purposes of designation;
- to maintain respect for the ecological, geomorphologic, sacred or aesthetic attributes which warranted designation; and
- to take into account the needs of local communities, including subsistence resource use, in so far as these will not adversely affect the other objectives of management.

Natural Monument: protected area managed mainly for conservation of specific natural features

Definition

Area containing one, or more, specific natural or natural/cultural feature which is of outstanding or unique value because of its inherent rarity, representative or aesthetic qualities or cultural significance.

Objectives of Management

- to protect or preserve in perpetuity specific outstanding natural features because of their natural significance, unique or representational quality, and/or spiritual connotations;

- to an extent consistent with the foregoing objective, to provide opportunities for research, education, interpretation and public appreciation;
- to eliminate and thereafter prevent exploitation or occupation inimical to the purpose of designation; and
- to deliver to any resident population such benefits as are consistent with the other objectives of management.

Habitat/Species Management Area: protected area managed mainly for conservation through management intervention

Definition

Area of land and/or sea subject to active intervention for management purposes so as to ensure the maintenance of habitats and/or to meet the requirements of specific species.

Objectives of Management

- to secure and maintain the habitat conditions necessary to protect significant species, groups of species, biotic communities or physical features of the environment where these require specific human manipulation for optimum management;
- to facilitate scientific research and environmental monitoring as primary activities associated with sustainable resource management;
- to develop limited areas for public education and appreciation of the characteristics of the habitats concerned and of the work of wildlife management;
- to eliminate and thereafter prevent exploitation or occupation inimical to the purposes of designation; and
- to deliver such benefits to people living within the designated area as are consistent with the other objectives of management.

Protected Landscape/Seascape: protected area managed mainly for landscape/seascape conservation and recreation

Definition

Area of land, with coast and sea as appropriate, where the interaction of people and nature over time has produced an area of distinct character with significant aesthetic, ecological and/or cultural value, and often with high biological diversity. Safeguarding the integrity of this traditional interaction is vital to the protection, maintenance and evolution of such an area.

Objectives of Management

- to maintain the harmonious interaction of nature and culture through the protection of landscape and/or seascape and the continuation of traditional land uses, building practices and social and cultural manifestations;
- to support lifestyles and economic activities which are in harmony with nature and the preservation of the social and cultural fabric of the communities concerned;
- to maintain the diversity of landscape and habitat, and of associated species and ecosystems;
- to eliminate where necessary, and thereafter prevent, land uses and activities which are inappropriate in scale and/or character;
- to provide opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism appropriate in type and scale to the essential qualities of the areas;
- to encourage scientific and educational activities which will contribute to the long term well-being of resident populations and to the development of public support for the environmental protection of such areas; and
- to bring benefits to, and to contribute to the welfare of, the local community through the provision of natural products (such as forest and fisheries products) and services (such as clean water or income derived from sustainable forms of tourism).

Managed Resource Protected Area: protected area managed mainly for the sustainable use of natural ecosystems

Definition

Area containing predominantly unmodified natural systems, managed to ensure long term protection and maintenance of biological diversity, while providing at the same time a sustainable flow of natural products and services to meet community needs.

Objectives of Management

- to protect and maintain the biological diversity and other natural values of the area in the long term;
- to promote sound management practices for sustainable production purposes;
- to protect the natural resource base from being alienated for other land-use purposes that would be detrimental to the area's biological diversity; and to contribute to regional and national development.
- to contribute to regional and national development

ANNEX 3

PROHIBITED MEANS OF TAKING

- Snares
- Live animals used as decoys which are blind or mutilated
- Tape recorders
- Electrical devices capable of killing and stunning
- Artificial light sources
- Mirrors and other dazzling devices
- Devices for illuminating targets
- Sighting devices for night shooting comprising an electronic image magnifier or image converter
- Explosives
- Fire
- Nets (except as specified by the Conference of the Parties)
- Traps
- Poison and poisoned or anaesthetic bait

- Gassing or smoking out
- Semi-automatic or automatic weapons with a magazine capable of holding more than two rounds of ammunition
- Aircraft
- Motor vehicles in motion

List of Countries which have signed, Ratified/ Acceded to the Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

No	Country /Pays	Date of/de Signature	Date of/ de Ratification/ Accession	Date Deposited/ Date de Depot
1	Algeria	-	-	-
2	Angola	27/01/2012	31/08/2020	15/10/2020
3	Benin	11/02/2004	29/03/2016	10/06/2016
4	Botswana	-	-	-
5	Burkina Faso	26/02/2004	10/05/2016	23/06/2016
6	Burundi	03/12/2003	14/05/2007	20/06/2007
7	Cameroon	-	-	-
8	Central African Rep.	04/07/2012	-	-
9	Cape Verde	-	-	-
10	Chad	06/12/2004	20/01/2015	13/02/2015
11	Côte d'Ivoire	27/02/2004	22/07/2013	23/10/2013
12	Comoros	26/02/2004	02/04/2004	16/04/2004
13	Congo	27/02/2004	08/01/2014	04/02/2014
14	Djibouti	18/12/2003	-	-
15	Democratic Rep. of Congo	29/06/2008	-	-
16	Egypt	-	-	-
17	Equatorial Guinea	30/01/2005	-	-
18	Eritrea	-	-	-
19	Ethiopia	01/06/2004	-	-
20	Gabon	21/01/2014	-	-
21	Gambia	24/12/2003	11/07/2018	04/02/2019
22	Ghana	31/10/2003	13/06/2007	20/07/2007
23	Guinea-Bissau	08/03/2005	-	-
24	Guinea	16/12/2003	-	-
25	Kenya	17/12/2003	-	-
26	Libya	19/02/2004	04/06/2006	21/06/2006

27	Lesotho	27/02/2004	26/10/2004	05/11/2004
28	Liberia	16/12/2003	23/02/2014	07/03/2017
29	Madagascar	28/02/2004	-	-
30	Mali	09/12/2003	13/01/2005	03/02/2005
31	Malawi	-	-	-
32	Morocco	-	-	-
33	Mozambique	04/02/2004	-	-
34	Mauritania	29/06/2018	-	-
35	Mauritius	-	-	-
36	Namibia	09/12/2003	-	-
37	Nigeria	16/12/2003	-	-
38	Niger	06/07/2004	11/10/2006	28/02/2007
39	Rwanda	19/12/2003	25/06/2004	01/07/2004
40	South Africa	18/04/2012	23/04/2013	15/05/2013
41	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	02/07/2018	-	-
42	Senegal	16/01/2004	-	-
43	Seychelles	-	-	-
44	Sierra Leone	09/12/2003	-	-
45	Somalia	23/02/2006	-	-
46	South Sudan	24/01/2013	-	-
47	Sao Tome & Principe	01/02/2010	-	-
48	Sudan	30/06/2008	-	-
49	Eswatini	07/12/2004	-	-
50	Tanzania	05/11/2003	-	-
51	Togo	30/12/2003	-	-
52	Tunisia	-	-	-
53	Uganda	18/12/2003	-	-
54	Zambia	03/08/2005	-	-
55	Zimbabwe	18/11/2003	-	-
	Total countries: 55	of signature: 44	of ratification: 17	of deposit: 17



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AU-15



FRAMEWORK
DOCUMENT

Agenda 2063

The AFRICA We Want



“A shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable Development & a global strategy to optimize the use of Africa’s Resources for the benefit of all Africans”

Agenda 2063

The AFRICA We Want

FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

“A shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development & a global strategy to optimize the use of Africa’s resources for the benefit of all Africans”

September - 2015

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I am pleased to present to Member States of the African Union, all Africans, including those in the Diaspora and the international community, the Agenda 2063 Framework Document. This document, the fruit of a comprehensive consultative process spanning 24 months, charts Africa's long-term strategy for realizing the aspirations of the continent's citizens over the next 50 years.

As you are aware, in May 2003, Africa celebrated the Golden Jubilee of the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). On that occasion, Africa's political leadership took stock of past achievements and challenges, and rededicated itself to the continent's socioeconomic and political transformation through a forward-looking 50-year continental framework. Agenda 2063 is founded on the AU vision of “ ***an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena***”.

The Agenda 2063 Framework document and its Popular Version were adopted by the 24th Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in Addis Ababa, January 2015, following extensive consultations involving all formations of African society - including the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and other continental bodies, as well as the Diaspora. It is therefore an Agenda to which every African woman, man, girl and boy have contributed directly or indirectly, and therefore has a stake in its implementation.

In Africa today, a new momentum for structural transformation is gathering steam. After years of conflict, turmoil and economic stagnation, Africa's fortunes have turned for the better. The continent is once again on a positive path of growth and political and socioeconomic transformation, despite the strong headwinds caused by the global economic downturn.

Many of Africa's population and her Member States are benefitting from the process of renewed growth, social progress and increased peace and reductions in conflict. Notable progress is being made in many areas; millions of Africans have escaped absolute poverty and there are improvements in all spheres of human development – health, education, gender, youth and access to services and basic necessities of life. This is as evidenced by progress made in implementing the Millennium Development Goals. Democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are now more firmly entrenched than a few decades ago.

At continental and regional levels, Africa continues to make significant strides in building the institutions required for political and economic integration. A plethora of protocols, frameworks and plans are leading to increased harmonization of policies and actions, and advances in key areas such as infrastructure, trade, agriculture and other fields, are laying a solid foundation for future progress.

Many challenges however, still remain. There are still far too many people living in abject poverty, the lack of decent jobs is pervasive, especially for the youth, and the continent lags behind other regions of the world with respect to social development indicators. The progress made is also threatened by rising inequalities of incomes and opportunity, particularly for the youth and women.

While conflicts have abated, there are still many examples of intractable conflicts and new eruptions of violence. Furthermore, Africa remains marginalized in global governance system, and lacks full control over her resources and destiny.

In spite of the recent positive growth, African economies have not been sufficiently transformed and continue to be commodity-based, with weak value addition, poor manufacturing and industrialization – in short, limited transformation of the structure of our economies. Most of the benefits of recent growth have not been widely shared, as the main drivers of this growth (e.g. extractive industries) have not been job creators.

Although modest progress is being made, Africa has still not reaped the benefits that accrue from trading with itself, or with the rest of the world, resulting in a share of global trade that is not commensurate with its population or resource endowments. One of the biggest challenges remains the inability of the continent to finance its own development, while at the same time it is hemorrhaging heavily from illicit flow of resources.

Africa's recent economic performance, as well as examples of positive advances in other regions has raised the expectations of African people for a better life for themselves, their communities, nations and the continent.

It is evident that a *business as usual* scenario will not be adequate to satisfy these expectations and aspirations of Africans on the continent and the Diaspora. Nor will such a path enable the continent to catch up with the rest of the world, and enable Africa to reclaim its rightful place in the global economic, political and social order. More is needed and with a greater sense of urgency.

To build upon the current positive trends and address old and new challenges, Africa needs a clear long-term vision of where it wants to be in the next 50 years and a plan as to how to get there. Through Agenda 2063, Africa now has that vision and plan.

As a Union of 54 countries, Africa has the biggest landmass and is the second largest in terms of population. As can be expected, the continent is strikingly diverse – in terms of geography, language, culture, history, political developments, resource endowments, and other factors. However, the continent which is the cradle of human civilization, is also shaped by a sense of shared destiny, with similar languages, cultural values and heritage, as well as a shared history of struggle against colonialism and liberation from external dominance and unity as expressed by the Founders. This is what led to the setting up of the OAU in 1963 and its transformation into the African Union in 1999.

Agenda 2063 should therefore be seen in the context of the “long walk” of Africa's struggles against colonialism and foreign domination, and Africa's pursuit of self-determination, freedom, justice, peace and prosperity. Agenda 2063 is founded first and foremost on the Constitutive Act of the Union, and the Africa Union vision of a prosperous, united and integrated continent, at peace with itself and driven by its citizens and occupying its rightful place in global affairs.

The Agenda is a collective guide for action, based on the principle of solidarity and an appreciation of what binds Africans together. It serves as a guide for actions at continental and regional levels, but most importantly also it should inform actions at national level. A central tenet of Agenda 2063 is the imperative of building upon best practices and what has worked in Africa so as to forge a new paradigm on African development based on home grown solutions.

A 50 – year planning horizon is ambitious and no model is rigorous enough to predict that far in the future due to the breathtaking and complex changes (political, social, cultural, economic and technological) the world and Africa is experiencing. However, as was succinctly put during the 2014 Bahir Dar Ministerial Retreat on Agenda 2063, “*planning 50 years ahead, allows us to dream, think creatively, and sometimes crazy...to see us leapfrog beyond the immediate challenges.*”

Agenda 2063 is a flexible instrument and a living document to be adjusted according to exigencies of the time; thus the decision to develop 10-year implementation plans, laying out in an incremental manner, concrete steps and milestones to be achieved in the journey towards 2063, and the African Union vision. Through its elaborate results and monitoring and evaluation framework, it strengthens accountability for results through clarifying roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders at all levels.

The Agenda is a call to action. Policy makers at all levels, business, religious, community, women and youth leaders, ordinary citizens must therefore act with determination and muster the needed resolve, exercise greater unity of purpose to confront the challenges facing Africa, including the likely headwinds in an uncertain global environment, in order to realize this vision for a better future. Individually and collectively, African countries and people must pursue the right policies with consistency over the long-term if the rising expectations of ordinary African are to be realized.

The year 2015 is pivotal in many respects: the world celebrates 70 years since the formation of the UN; the UN General Assembly adopted the post-2015 Development agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals; COP 21 of the Climate Change Conference is taking place in Paris; and we are celebrating 20 years since the historic Beijing Women's Conference. Africa has been and remains very active in all these processes, especially through its continental framework, now Agenda 2063 and the Common African Position on the post-2015 agenda and sustainable development goals. We therefore look forward to our continued collaboration with the UN System as we move towards the implementation of Agenda 2063, and the Sustainable Development Goals.

I take this opportunity to reiterate the call of the Assembly of the AU or Member States to take urgent measures to domesticate Agenda 2063 at national and regional levels. I also call upon the international community to align their assistance and development cooperation agreements with Agenda 2063.

Finally, let me take this opportunity to thank all those who have contributed to the preparation of the Agenda. I recognize the key role played by regional institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the private sector as well as other non-state actors including women and youth in the preparation of Agenda 2063. Our collective efforts must be sustained during implementation and thus lead to a better future for Africa.

Our journey towards 2063 has started; the best is yet to come.



HE Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma

Chairperson
The African Union Commission

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Agenda 2063 is the fruit of an immense collaborative effort to reflect on the “*Africa We Want by 2063*”. Ideas and inputs have therefore been received from Africans of all walks of life, and through a variety of forums and mechanisms, including from the general African citizenry and the Diaspora. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to acknowledge all the diverse inputs and contributions. The African Union Commission from the onset therefore expresses its gratitude and sincere thanks to all those who contributed to the preparation of Agenda 2063.

However, there are organizations and individuals whose role deserves recognition and special mention.

The Commission expresses its deep gratitude to the Assembly of the Union, the Executive Council, the Bahir Dar Ministerial Committee on Agenda 2063, as well as the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of the AU, for their outstanding leadership in steering the development and final adoption of Agenda 2063.

The Commission further gratefully acknowledges the pivotal role of AU Member States, who through written submissions, as well as through participation of their experts in diverse forums, have contributed significantly to the preparation and adoption of Agenda 2063. The Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia hosted the first Ministerial Retreat of the Executive Council, 24-26 January 2014 at Bahir Dar, which laid the basis of, and contributed greatly to the development of Agenda 2063.

The Commission notes with particular pleasure and gratitude the enthusiasm with which the Forum of Former African Heads of State and Government embraced Agenda 2063 and the richness of their inputs into the process, and wishes to take this opportunity to thank them and the Secretariat of the Forum.

Leading African policy makers, including Ministers and national experts also took part in various Ministerial conferences that discussed Agenda 2063. Similarly, many senior African experts participated in continent-wide stakeholder consultations, including from the private sector, academics/think tanks, civil society, planners, women, youth, media, the Diaspora, faith-based groups and others. Their inputs were critical and helped lay the foundations of the Agenda 2063 Framework document.

The Executives of the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA), UNECA and AfDB - Dr. Ibrahim Mayaki, Dr. Carlos Lopez and Dr. Donald Kaberuka - played an outstanding role, sharpened the debate and contributed immensely to shaping Agenda 2063. The Commission sincerely thanks them for their dedication and commitment to this and other continental causes.

The Regional Economic Communities are at the forefront of the implementation of Agenda 2063. Fittingly, they also played a key role in its formulation. The Commission takes this opportunity to express its sincere thanks to the Chief Executives of the RECs and their staff for their contributions, and for hosting the Commission’s teams during visits to their respective institutions.

In any endeavor, it is important to have a locomotive to drive the process and lead it to a successful conclusion. The Commission gratefully acknowledges the key role played by all the AU Commissioners in this regard. At the political level, the Commissioner for Economic Affairs Dr. Anthony Maruping, on behalf of the Chairperson of the Commission, led the process. At the technical level, our late brother Mr. Mandla Mandonsela, who as Director of Strategic Planning, Policy, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Resource Mobilization (SPPMERM) ably led the Agenda 2063 team; setting the overall strategic direction, overseeing the technical work and managing the necessary partnerships. The Commission takes this opportunity to pay a special tribute to the late Mr. Madonsela for his outstanding leadership, dedication and commitment to the African cause.

Ambassadors Febe Potgieter-Gqubule, Basso Sangqu and Lazarous Kapambwe, respectively Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief Advisor and Advisor in the Bureau of the Chairperson similarly made many valuable contributions, which the Commission gratefully acknowledges.

The Commission takes this opportunity to express special thanks to the Agenda 2063 Technical team comprised of Dr. Amadou Tijan Jallow, Mr. Yaw Adu-Boahene, Mr. Mersie Ejigu, Mr. Oumar Seck, Mr. Retselisitsoe Mabote and Mr. Kassim M. Khamis for their outstanding contributions. This core team spent many months synthesizing the inputs received from all stakeholders, undertaking the background research and drafting/finalizing the Agenda 2063 documents, namely: Agenda 2063 Framework Document, the Popular Version and the First Ten Year Implementation Plan. Their dedication and commitment has been exemplary. Ms. Christiane Matondo as part of the team also played a key role in the communication and outreach activities on Agenda 2063.

Sincere thanks also go to all staff of the Strategic Planning Directorate, in particular, Mr. Christopher Kachiza, Mr. Abdelkreem Ezaldin and Mr. Charles Wangadya, as well as the departmental planners and support staff of SPPMERM for facilitating the stakeholder consultations and contributing in many other ways. Sincere thanks also to all AUC Heads of Departments/Directorates and other Commission staff who in various contributed to Agenda 2063.

Sincere thanks also go to staff of the three core AUC partner institutions; members of the Agenda 2063 Technical Committee – the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (Mr. Gengezi Mgidlana); UN Economic Commission for Africa (Adeyemi Dipeolu, Emebet Mesfin, Francis Ikome, Hopestone Chavula and Mama Keita); African Development Bank (Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Chioma Onukogu and other staff); as well as the Joint Secretariat (AUC/AfDB/UNECA). The Commission acknowledges with gratitude, the following additional contributions from these institutions: African Development Bank for the financial and technical resources provided and UNECA for the short-term consultants put at the disposal of the Commission.

Finally, the Commission would like to express its appreciation to AU partners in general, especially those involved in the Joint Programme Arrangement (JPA) for Institutional Capacity Building. The Commission takes the opportunity to also sincerely thank the Government of Denmark in particular, as well as the Government of Sweden for their generous support to the work on the preparation of Agenda 2063.

Fifty years after the first thirty-three (33) independent African states gathered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to form the Organization of African Union, now the African Union, the continent is looking ahead towards the next fifty years.

On the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the OAU in May 2013, Africa's political leadership acknowledged past achievements and challenges and rededicated itself to the Pan African vision of **“an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena.”** The AU Summit tasked the African Union Commission (AUC), supported by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), to prepare a 50-year continental agenda through a people-driven process.

Agenda 2063 was developed through an extensive consultative process involving various African stakeholders, including the youth, women, Civil Society Organizations, the Diaspora, African Think Tanks and Research Institutions, Government planners, Private Sector, the African media, inter-faith leaders, the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government, African Islands States and others. In addition, ideas captured from continent wide sector ministerial meetings and meetings with the Regional Economic Communities are included. Outcomes of these consultations form the basis for the **Aspirations of the African People**, the driver of Agenda 2063.

Preparation of Agenda 2063 also included an extensive review of African development experiences, analysis of challenges and opportunities of today, as well as a review of national plans, regional and continental frameworks and technical studies, including drawing upon publications and research materials from many institutions and organizations. The plans and the frameworks reviewed contributed insights for the development of the priorities that form a plank for Agenda 2063, in particular the First 10 Year Implementation Plan. Furthermore, a resource mobilization strategy for Agenda 2063 has been developed looking at strategies for Africa to finance her own development. Lastly, an Agenda 2063 communication strategy has been designed and it is now being implemented with the goal of engaging Africans from all works of life, and the Diaspora to galvanize action in support of Agenda 2063.

Agenda 2063, Africa's endogenous plan for structural transformation and a shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development, consists of three dimensions as follows:

1. **The Vision for 2063:** based on the African Union Vision and the seven aspirations emanating from the voices of the stakeholders consulted, it paints a vivid picture of where Africans would like to see their continent 50 years from now, when Africa would be celebrating the centenary of the founding of the OAU. The vision incorporates milestones, which represent transitions in the journey towards the “Africa we Want” by 2063.
2. **The Transformation Framework:** presents the foundations on which Agenda 2063 is built, as well as the detailed milestones in the journey in the form of goals, priority areas, targets and indicative strategies. The framework is presented in two comprehensive results matrices; at national and at regional and continental levels. This will facilitate measurement of progress and strengthen accountability for results at all levels. The transformation framework represents the “what must be done” to attain the vision for 2063.
3. **Making it Happen:** outlines the “how to get there” of Agenda 2063, and treats aspects related to: implementation, monitoring and evaluation principles and responsibilities; financing; partnerships; capacities for implementation; and communication and outreach.

The three dimensions described above are presented in the six chapters of the Agenda 2063 Framework document, whose contents are summarized below:

CHAPTER1: Introduction

Chapter 1 outlines the genesis of Agenda 2063 anchoring it on the AU Vision, and the eight ideals of the Solemn Declaration of the Golden Jubilee of the founding of the OAU. It situates Agenda 2063 in the historical context of Pan Africanism, as well as the various transitions marking the responses of African countries to the exigencies of the times. The chapter shows that Agenda 2063 builds upon past and present continental initiatives such as the Monrovia Declaration, the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty and NEPAD, as well as on Africa's recent positive performance in the economic, social and political fields to put the continent on a new positive trajectory of growth, peace and prosperity. The Agenda draws upon the continent's rich history, natural resources, people, culture, as well as its institutions at all levels, and capitalizes on the opportunities of changing African and global trends and dynamics.

CHAPTER 2: The Vision and African Aspirations for 2063

This chapter presents the Vision for 2063. Africans of diverse social formations¹ and in the Diaspora affirmed the AU Vision of **“an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena”** as the overarching guide for the future of the African continent. Further, they reaffirmed the relevance and validity of the OAU/AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration.

The converging voices of Africans of different backgrounds, including those in the Diaspora have painted a clear picture of what they desire for themselves and the continent in the future. From these converging voices, a common and a shared set of aspirations has emerged:

1. *A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development;*
2. *An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance;*
3. *An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law;*
4. *A peaceful and secure Africa;*
5. *An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics;*
6. *An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and*
7. *Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.*

These seven aspirations show strong convergence with the AU Vision, and are in line with the eight priorities of the OAU/AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. Collectively these shared aspirations demonstrate strong continuity of thinking between the OAU founders and the present generation of Africans, albeit in a new dynamic global context.

The chapter details what achieving each of the seven aspirations would mean for Africa and her citizenry. For example, the attainment of Aspiration 1 (*A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development*) would mean that:

- African people will have a high standard of living and quality of life and well-being;
- Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation for a knowledge society will be broad-based, and no child misses school due to poverty or any form of discrimination;
- Citizens are healthy, well-nourished and have long life spans;
- Cities, peri-urban and rural communities are equipped with modern communication, sanitation, education and health facilities and are vibrant, dynamic market economies, people have access to affordable and decent housing including, housing finance together with all the basic necessities of life, and social capital is valued and preserved;

¹ Different consultations were made with the following stakeholders: Academicians and Think Tanks, Civil Society, Planning Experts from Ministries of Planning, Women, Youth, Media, Private sector, RECs representatives, Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government and others.

- Economies are structurally transformed through industrialization, manufacturing and value addition to create shared growth through private sector development, entrepreneurship and decent jobs for all;
- Modern agriculture for scaled-up production, improved productivity and value addition through commodity transformation and services, contribute to farmer and national prosperity and food and nutrition security; and
- The continent embeds principally adaptation processes to maintain healthy ecosystems, preserve the African natural environment – as the largest remaining reserve of pristine waters, old growth forests and land in the world.

The chapter concludes by indicating that at current rates of performance (i.e. a “business as usual” scenario), the continent would neither catch up nor be able to meet the rising expectations of her citizens, especially the youth and women as:

- Only a tiny number of countries, which had consistently high growth for the last two decades, will converge with the rest of the world, while the majority of the other countries do not converge, and the fragile countries stay fragile.
- Per capita incomes continue to rise at 1.9 per cent annually but given growth in the rest of the world, however, Africa’s per capita incomes would actually diverge further from those of the rest of the world.
- The middle-class would increase but after decades would still be only a third of the population. Nearly one in five Africans would, correspondingly, still be mired in poverty.
- Finally, given growth elsewhere in the world, Africa’s share of global GDP would stagnate at a low level.

Such a scenario, or at worst one of stagnation does not correspond with the aspirations of Africans for their future and is certainly unacceptable.

CHAPTER 3: Africa the last Fifty Years and the Present: Progress, Challenges and Implications for Agenda 2063

This chapter takes each aspiration as a point of departure, and presents a comprehensive analysis of progress made and identifies some of the key issues and challenges to be addressed if the vision outlined in chapter 2 is to be attained. While recognizing the tremendous progress the continent has made in all areas, the following summarizes some of the main priorities for action (see annex 1 for a more elaborate summary):

- ***Aspiration 1 (A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development):*** ending poverty, inequalities of income and opportunity; job creation; addressing the challenges of rapid urbanization, improvement of habitats and access to basic necessities of life; providing social security and protection; developing Africa’s human and social capital (through an education and skills revolution emphasizing science and technology and expanding access to quality health care services, particularly for women and girls); transforming Africa’s economies through beneficiation from Africa’s natural resources, manufacturing, industrialization and value addition, as well as raising productivity and competitiveness; radically transforming African agriculture to enable the continent to feed itself and be a major player as a net food exporter; exploiting the vast potential of Africa’s blue/ocean economy; and finally putting in place measures to sustainably manage the continent’s rich biodiversity, forests, land and waters and using mainly adaptive measures to address Climate change risks.
- ***Aspiration 2 (An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance):*** accelerating progress towards continental unity and integration for sustained growth, trade, exchanges of goods, services, free movement of people and capital through: (i) establishing a United Africa; (ii) fast tracking of the CFTA; (iii) improving connectivity through newer and bolder initiatives to link the continent by rail, road, sea and air; and (iv) developing regional and continental power pools, as well as ICT.

- **Aspiration 3 (An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law):** consolidating democratic gains and improving the quality of governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law; building strong institutions for a development state; and facilitating the emergence of development-oriented and visionary leadership in all spheres and at all levels.
- **Aspiration 4 (A peaceful and secure Africa):** strengthening governance, accountability and transparency as a foundation for a peaceful Africa; strengthening mechanisms for securing peace and reconciliation at all levels, as well as addressing emerging threats to Africa's peace and security; and putting in place strategies for the continent to finance her security needs.
- **Aspiration 5 (An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics):** inculcating the spirit of Pan Africanism; tapping Africa's rich heritage and culture to ensure that the creative arts are major contributors to Africa's growth and transformation; and restoring and preserving Africa's cultural heritage.
- **Aspiration 6 (An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children):** strengthening the role of Africa's women through ensuring gender equality and parity in all spheres of life (political, economic and social); eliminating all forms of discrimination and violence against women and girls; creating opportunities for Africa's youth for self-realization, access to health, education and jobs; and ensuring safety and security for Africa's children, and providing for early childhood development.
- **Aspiration 7 (Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner):** improving Africa's place in the global governance system (UNSC, financial institutions, global commons such as outer space); improving Africa's partnerships and refocusing them more strategically to respond to African priorities for growth and transformation; and ensuring that the continent has the right strategies to finance its own development and reducing aid dependency.

CHAPTER 4: Agenda 2063: Goals, Priority Areas, Targets and Indicative Strategies

Chapter 4 presents the transformation framework, including the foundation of Agenda 2063, the conceptual approach, and importantly the goals, priority areas, targets and indicative strategies. These are presented in detail in Annexes 3 and 4.

Below is a schematic presentation of the foundation of Agenda 2063, the aspirations, as well as the goals.



The Table below presents the Aspirations and the related goals and priority areas at national level.

Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas
A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development	A high standard of living, quality of life and wellbeing for all citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incomes, jobs and decent work • Poverty, inequality and hunger • Social security and protection, including persons with disabilities • Modern, affordable and liveable habitats and quality basic services
	Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education and science, technology and innovation (STI) driven skills revolution
	Healthy and well-nourished citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Health and nutrition
	Transformed economies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable and inclusive economic growth • STI driven manufacturing, industrialization and value addition • Economic diversification and resilience • Tourism/Hospitality
	Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural productivity and production
	Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marine resources and energy • Port operations and marine transport
	Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable natural resource management • Biodiversity conservation, genetic resources and ecosystems • Sustainable consumption and production patterns • Water security • Climate resilience and natural disasters preparedness and prevention • Renewable energy
An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance	A United Africa (Federal or Confederate)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frameworks and institutions for a United Africa
	Continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial and monetary institutions
	World class infrastructure criss - crosses Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communications and infrastructure connectivity.

Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas
An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law	Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy and good governance • Human rights, justice and the rule of law
	Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutions and leadership • Participatory development and local governance
A peaceful and secure Africa	Peace, security and stability is preserved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintenance and preservation of peace and security
	A stable and peaceful Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional structure for AU instruments on peace and security • Defence, security and peace
	A fully functional and operational APSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully operational and functional APSA pillars
Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics	African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Values and ideals of Pan Africanism • Cultural values and African Renaissance • Cultural heritage, creative arts and businesses
An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential offered by African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children	Full gender equality in all spheres of life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women and girls empowerment • Violence and discrimination against women and girls
	Engaged and empowered youth and children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth empowerment and children's rights
An Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner	Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Africa's place in global affairs • Partnerships
	Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African capital markets • Fiscal systems and public sector revenue • Development assistance

The transformation framework recognizes the diversity of the continent. Each country while being inspired by the same set of goals and targets will develop policies and strategies adapted to its circumstances. Agenda 2063 also emphasizes the need to build on existing frameworks and of integrating the Flagship programs in the First 10-Year Implementation Plan, namely:

- i) The Integrated High speed Train Network;
- ii) African Virtual and e-university;
- iii) African Commodity Strategy;
- iv) Annual African Forum;

- v) Continental Free Trade Area;
- vi) A Single African Airspace;
- vii) African Passport and Free Movement of People;
- viii) Continental Financial Institutions;
- ix) The Grand Inga Dam Project;
- x) The Pan African e-Network;
- xi) Silencing the Guns;
- xii) Outer Space.

CHAPTER 5: Critical Factors for Success, Potential Risks, Threats and Mitigation Strategies

Chapter 5 identifies the critical factors for success, as well as the risks, threats and mitigation strategies for attaining the vision for 2063.

- **Critical success factors** identified include: mobilizing African resources to finance and accelerate its transformation and integration; putting in place transformational leadership at all levels and in all fields; ensuring capable developmental states with the appropriate institutions, policies, human resources, systems and processes; changing attitudes and mind-sets to strengthen Pan African values of self-reliance, solidarity, hard work and collective prosperity and building on African successes, experiences and best practices; taking charge of Africa’s narrative and brand, to ensure that it reflects continental realities, aspirations and priorities and Africa’s position in the world; integrating Agenda 2063 into all national and regional development plans; strengthening and transforming national, regional and continental institutions and the manner of doing business, so as to effectively lead and drive the agenda for transformation and integration; and learning from the diverse, unique and shared experiences of various countries and regions as a basis of forging an African approach to transformation.
- **Risk factors** identified include: conflict, instability and insecurity; social and economic inequalities; organized crime, drugs trade and illicit financial flows; poor management of diversities; religious extremism; failure to harness the demographic dividend; escalation of Africa’s disease burden; climate risks and natural disasters; and external shocks.
- **Mitigation strategies** include: drawing on the resilience found in African societies and communities; economic diversification, climate resilience and disaster preparedness and prevention; and the priority that Agenda 2063 accords to well-educated citizens underpinned by skills revolution, science, technology and innovation.

The Chapter also analyses mega and global trends likely to impact Africa’s growth and transformation such as: democratization, the rise and empowerment of the individual; climate change and the low carbon economy; natural resource depletion and demand shifts; demographics and urbanization; new technologies and innovation; changes in the global financial architecture; and global political and economic power shifts.

CHAPTER 6: “Making It Happen” – Implementation, Monitoring, Evaluation, Financing, Capacities for Implimentation and Communication

This chapter makes proposals on implementation; monitoring and evaluation; financing; partnerships; capacities for implementation; and communication and outreach:

- **Implementation arrangements and M&E** is based on the need for the identification of all key stakeholders in the results chain from continental, regional and national levels. It also spells out the various roles and responsibilities in implementation and monitoring and evaluation. The First 10-Year Implementation Plan provides greater detail on these aspects.

- **Financing and domestic resource mobilization and intermediation strategy:** detailed strategies for the financing of Agenda 2063 are presented and related to the attaining of each of the seven aspirations of Agenda 2063. In contrast to mobilizing external resources (through FDI, aid, trade, and debt relief), domestic resource mobilization (DRM) offers the advantages of greater domestic policy ownership and greater coherence with domestic needs, and higher development impact. For these reasons, Agenda 2063 requires Member States to place greater emphasis on domestic resources in the financing of Agenda 2063. It is anticipated that DRM has the potential to contribute, up to 70per cent to 80per cent, of the financing needs of the Agenda 2063.

Agenda 2063 financing strategy is articulated around three dimensions: (i) domestic resource mobilization; (ii) intermediation of resource into investment and (iii) access to finance facilitation, including through project development fund, viability gap funding, capitalization fund, and bankability and investment-readiness support for projects, firms/SMEs, entrepreneurs and other parties.

Agenda 2063 financing and DRM strategy involves different areas of **policy and reform** including: (a) public/fiscal revenue maximization; (b) enhanced savings mobilization; (c) curbing of illicit financial flows and fighting corruption; (d) regional bond market, regional stock exchange and African-owned private equity funds promotion; (e) Diaspora financial resources leveraging; (f) leveraging institutional financial resources of pension fund, sovereign wealth fund, insurance funds, governments' foreign reserves and wealthy African citizen; and (g) promoting intra-African investment.

A number of **intermediation instruments** and **intervention areas** are proposed: policy, knowledge and capacity building (enabling environment front); fund mobilization and intermediation (supply-side front); and access to finance facilitation (demand-side front). A more detailed elaboration can be found in “*Agenda 2063 Financing and Domestic Resource Mobilization Strategy*”.

- **Partnerships:** the need to re-orient Africa's partnerships in line with the continent's ambitious agenda for economic, political, social transformation has been articulated based on the assessment of partnerships in place.
- **Capacities for implementation:** building upon the NEPAD Capacity Development Strategic Framework (CDSF), this section looks at capacity needs at individual, organizational levels, and those related to the policy and enabling environment in line with Africa's transformation agenda.
- **Communication and outreach:** outlines the strategies and activities to galvanize and mobilize the continent's population on a sustained basis to achieve Agenda 2063.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

3ADI	Africa Agro-Industry and Agro-Business Initiative
AIDA	Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa
AfDB	African Development Bank
ACCNNR	African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
ACGF	Africa Credit Guarantee Fund
ACHR	African Charter on Human Rights
AGI	African Governance Initiative
AIB	African Investment Bank
AIDF	Africa Infrastructure Development Facility
AIF	African Investment Fund
AIMS	Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AMV	Africa Mining Vision
APCI	Africa Productive Capacity Initiative
APRM	Africa Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM	AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASACOF	Africa-South America Cooperation Forum
ASCI	African Scientific and Innovation Council
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BDEAC	Banque de Développement des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale
BIAT	Boosting Intra African Trade
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program
CADF	China-Africa Development Fund
CAPST	Consolidated Action Plan for Science and Technology
CENSAD	Community of Sahel Saharan States
CFTA	Continental Free Trade Area
CDSF	Capacity Development Strategic Framework (NEPAD)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CoSSE	Committee of SADC Stock Exchanges

CSI	Corporate Social Investment
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DFI	Development finance institution
DREA	Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture
DRM	Domestic Resource Mobilization
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIB:	European Development Bank
ERA	Economic Report of Africa
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FfD:	Financing for Development
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GHA	Greater Horn of Africa
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI:	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
HLPASF	High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding
HPS	Health Plan and Strategy
HSGOC	NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee
IAIGC	Inter Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation
ICIEC	Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IFF	Illicit Financial Flows
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IPPF	NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
ITF	Infrastructure Trust Fund
ITN	Insecticide Treated Nets
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
LAC	Latin American Countries
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFI	Microfinance Institution
MIGA	World Bank Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MIN	Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey
MIP	Minimum Integration Program
MN	Multinational Corporation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOS	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPCA	NEPAD Coordinating Agency
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAF	Pan African Fisheries Development
PDF	Project Development Fund
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa
PIPO	Pan African Intellectual Property Organization
PPP	Public-Private Partnership

PRC	Permanent Representative Committee
PSO	Private Sector Organization
PTA Bank	Preferential Trade Area Bank
RADS	Resource-based African Development Strategy
RECS	Regional Economic Communities
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SMEs	Small and Medium Scale Enterprises
SPF	Social Policy Framework
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary System
ST&I	Science Technology and Innovation
STAP	Short Term Action Plan on Infrastructure
STISA	Science Technology and innovation Strategy for Africa
TICAD	Tokyo International Cooperation on Africa's Development
TVET	Technical Vocational Education and Training
UMA	Union of Maghreb Arab
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNCBD	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
UNCCD	United Nations Convention on Combatting Desertification
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Program
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
US	United States
USD	United States Dollars
VGF	Viability Gap Funding
WHO	World Health Organization
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group

1.1 Background

Fifty years after the first thirty-three (33) independent African states gathered in Addis Ababa to form the Organization of African Union, now the African Union, the continent is looking ahead towards the next fifty years.

Thus, on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the OAU, Africa's political leadership acknowledged past achievements and challenges and rededicated itself to the Pan African vision of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena."

The Summit tasked the African Union Commission (AUC), supported by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), to prepare a continental 50-year agenda through a people-driven process – hence Agenda 2063.

The 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration incorporates a pledge to make progress in eight priority areas (see text box). These priorities define the continental agenda, which will be integrated into regional and national development plans.

The Eight Priorities of the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration

- African Identity and Renaissance.
- Continue the struggle against colonialism and the right to self-determination.
- The Integration Agenda
- Agenda for Social and Economic Development.
- Peace and Security Agenda.
- Democratic Governance.
- Determining Africa's Destiny
- Africa's Place in the World

Agenda 2063, the continent's shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development, takes account of past achievements, challenges and opportunities at the national, continental and global levels to provide the basis and context in which the continent's transformation is being designed and implemented, including:

- ***The durability of the Pan African vision and project***, which guided struggles of African people and their descendants against slavery, and the disruptiveness of colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination; and the commitment of the founders of the OAU to self-determination, integration, solidarity and unity. This today forms the backdrop for Africa's renaissance, transformation and integration.
- ***Lessons from global developmental experiences***, such as: the significant advances by major countries of the Global South to lift huge segments of their populations out of poverty, improve incomes and catalyse economic and social transformation, and the global drive through the United Nations to find multi-lateral approaches to humanity's most pressing concerns including human security and peace; the eradication of poverty, hunger and disease; and reduction in vulnerability to climate change risks.
- ***An African turning point***, with the end of the Cold War and the destruction of apartheid in Namibia and South Africa, reigniting Africa's determination to end wars and conflicts, to build shared prosperity, to integrate, to build responsive and pluralist democratic governance and to end the continent's marginalization and return to Africa's priorities through the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union. Thus over the last decade Africa has experienced sustained levels

of growth, much greater peace and stability and positive movements on several human development indicators. Africa must sustain and consolidate this positive turnaround, using it as a springboard to ensure its transformation and renaissance.

- ***The continuities and changes in the African development paradigm and dynamics***, reflected in post-independence state - and nation-building, industrialization and modernization efforts, the fight against disease, and poverty; the focus on deepening Africa's appreciation of its many, diverse assets and the push for integration, as captured in the OAU Charter, the Monrovia Declaration, the Lagos Plan of Action and NEPAD; the sectoral policy frameworks, strategies and architectures including agriculture, peace and security, infrastructure, science and technology, governance, industrialization, education, social policy, culture, sports and health and in normative frameworks around human and people's, children's and women's rights.
- ***The need for people-centred development and gender equality***, which places the African People at the centre of all continental efforts, to ensure broad-based participation in the transformation of the continent, and the building of caring and inclusive societies and communities. It recognizes that empowering and removing all obstacles to women's full participation in all areas and levels of human endeavour, is pivotal for any society reaching its full potential. Further, an enabling environment for its children and young people to flourish and reach their full potential is a pre-requisite to sustained innovation.
- ***The ebbs and flows of the global context***, and in our times the modern information technology revolution of real time communication across vast distances, globalization and changes in production, changes and advances in technology, production, trade expansion, development of new knowledge and labour markets; the opportunities presented by global demographic trends and the increasing global middle and working classes in emerging and developing countries and regions; the move towards multi-polarity with strong elements of uni-polarism remaining, global security alliances and the undisputable evidence of the impact of climate change. Humanity today has the capacities, technology and know-how to ensure human security and a decent standard of living for all inhabitants of our earth, yet children continue to die of preventable diseases, while hunger and malnutrition remain part of the human experience, and inequality between regions and countries and within countries persist.

Over the last fifty years, African states have developed a number of responses to the exigencies of the times. Two major transitions stand out in this regard:

The first transition came in the 1960s and 1970s - a decade after the majority of African countries gained independence. To continue advancing the agenda for economic emancipation and drawing lessons from the global energy crisis of the 1970s, Africa took the strategic decision to pursue continental integration as a strategy for economic development. The various liberation and economic development strategies of the seventies and eighties including the Lagos Plan of Action have their genesis in that transition. This period was also marked by the Bretton Woods agenda on Structural Adjustments, which saw the contraction of African economies with far reaching consequences on critical social sectors.

The ***second transition*** occurred in the decade of the 1990s after the end of cold war and the adoption by the OAU of the Declaration of the Fundamental Changes in the World and Africa's Response. The Declaration encapsulated Africa's determination to tackle the peace and security challenges of the continent, including those within nations, to foster democracy and good governance as well as economic development through deepening integration of the continent. After two dead decades of development (80's and 90's) in Africa and the potential for increased marginalization, the continent turned the corner, with a better organized African Union and Regional

Economic Communities (RECs). Since then the continent has witnessed impressive and sustained growth, the consolidation of democracy and good governance such as the introduction of the African Peer Review Mechanism, and improved gender equality, and through the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.

As Africa celebrates half-century of independence, it is opportune to embark on a critical process of stock taking and mapping out a new long-term vision for the continent. “*Agenda 2063: The Future We Want for Africa*” is, therefore, an endogenous, shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development for Africa’s transformation, and a continuation of the Pan African drive, for self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity, in order to:

- Galvanize and unite in action all Africans and the Diaspora around the common vision of a peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa, driven by its citizens and taking its rightful place in the world;
- Harness Africa’s continental endowments embodied in its people, history, cultures and natural resources, and geo-political position to effect equitable and people-centred growth and development; eradicate poverty; develop Africa’s human capital; build social assets, infrastructure and public goods; consolidate enduring peace and security; put in place effective and strong developmental states, participatory and accountable institutions; and empower women and youth to bring about the African renaissance;
- Build on and accelerate the implementation of continental frameworks including, most notably, the Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty, NEPAD, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme–CAADP, the 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods (3AGTs), the Plan of Action for Accelerated Industrial Development in Africa (AIDA), the Minimum Integration Programme, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU/NEPAD Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action, and Africa’s Agro-industry and Agribusiness Development Initiative (3ADI) ;
- Provide internal coherence, alignment and coordination to continental, regional and national frameworks and plans adopted by the AU, RECs and Members states;
- Offer policy space/platform for individual, sectoral and collective actions to realize the continental vision;
- Develop an implementation mechanism that is underpinned by a strong knowledge management system which enhances the quality of delivery through cutting edge research, innovation and codification of ground breaking experiences, promote sharing of experiences and learning from each other, and establish communities of practices; and
- Delineate the respective roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder such as RECs, Member States, Civil Society and private sector in the formulation and implementation of Agenda 2063.

This new effort to envision Africa’s long-term development trajectory is timely for several reasons. Globalization and the information technology revolution have provided unprecedented opportunities for countries and regions, including Africa, with the right policies to make significant advances and lift huge sections of populations out of poverty improve incomes and catalyse economic and social transformations.

Africa is also now in a better position to build on the past and present successes such as the NEPAD experience. National, regional and continental efforts made to implement NEPAD, unseen during the LPA and the Abuja Treaty, have enabled AU to build institutions (e.g., APRM, etc.),

demonstrate strong commitment to implement agreed agenda, generate valuable lessons that present a strong foundation for Agenda 2063, and which can be considered a logical continuation of NEPAD and other initiatives.

The continent is more united, a global power to reckon with, capable of rallying support around a common agenda and speaking with one voice with capacity to negotiate and withstand the influence of forces that would like to see it divided. Furthermore, Africa's regional institutions have been rationalized and the eight officially AU recognized Regional Economic Communities (CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and UMA) are today stronger development and political institutions that citizens' can count on and Agenda 2063 can stand on.

Finally, a confluence of factors presents a great opportunity for consolidation and rapid progress of the continent. These include: significant positive and sustained growth trajectory of many African countries; notable reduction in violent conflict, increased peace and stability, coupled with advances in democratic governance; prospects for a rising middle class, coupled with the youth bulge, which can act as catalyst for further growth, particularly in the consumer sectors and services; and the change in the international finance architecture, with the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and improved flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

The above-mentioned factors constitute a unique opportunity for Africa to capitalize upon. However, success depends upon acting in unity, transparency, willingness and capability to assess performance and correct mistakes and build on successes, placing citizens' first, and sound governance and values.

Long - term planning as per Agenda 2063 is not new. A number of African countries have developed long term plans and national visions (e.g., Uganda (2040), South Africa and Egypt (2050), Sierra Leone, Senegal and Cameroon (2035); while Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Lesotho, Cote D'Ivoire are preparing to replace their respective visions that end in 2020, which would take them to beyond 2050. Agenda 2063 fits within this tradition and seeks to build upon and consolidate these efforts.

1.2 Agenda 2063 Preparatory Process

Agenda 2063 was developed through an extensive consultative process of various African stakeholders, including Youth, Women, Civil Society Organizations', the Diaspora, African Think Tanks and Research Institutions, Government Planners, Private Sector, the Media, inter-faith leaders, the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government, African Island States and others². In addition, ideas captured from continent wide sector ministerial meetings and meetings with the Regional Economic Communities are included. Outcomes of these consultations form the basis for **Aspirations of the African People**, the driver of Agenda 2063.

Preparation of agenda 2063 also included an extensive review of the African development experience, analysis of challenges and opportunities of today as well as a review of national plans, regional and continental frameworks and technical studies. The plans and frameworks provided insights for the development priorities that form a plank for Agenda 2063, in particular in the First 10 Year Implementation Plan. Furthermore, a Resource Mobilization Strategy for Agenda 2063 has been developed looking at strategies for Africa to finance her own development. Lastly, a specific Agenda 2063 Communication Strategy has been designed and it is being implemented with the goal of engaging Africans from all works of life, and the Diaspora to galvanize action in support of Agenda 2063.

² Written contributions/Inputs were also received from diverse stakeholders such as African governance forum, Association of Public Administration, African Trade Unions, RUFORUM, Wildlife Foundation, Cultural Heritage Foundation, African Airlines Association and many others

Agenda 2063 is presented in three key documents listed below:

- **Agenda 2063 Framework Document** that contains the vision for 2063, a comprehensive situational analysis of key issues, the goals, priorities, targets and indicative strategies, as well as proposals on “Making it happen” dealing with implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
- **Agenda 2063 Popular Version** presenting the Agenda in simple terms to facilitate ownership by the African citizenry; and
- **First 10-year Implementation Plan (2013-2023)** which lays out the immediate priorities and is designed to kick-start the journey towards 2063.

1.3 Overview of Agenda 2063 Framework Document

The Framework document is organized in three parts and presented in six chapters as follows:

- The Vision** (context, challenges and opportunities for achieving it) - Chapters 1-3;
- The Transformation Framework** outlining the goals, priority areas, targets and indicative strategies (Chapter 4) as well as the critical success factors - Chapter 5; and
- “Making it Happen”**: implementation, monitoring, evaluation and associated accompanying measures – Chapter 6.

The Vision for 2063	Chapter 1: Introduction	Situates Agenda 2063 in the historical context of Pan Africanism, African Renaissance and the struggle for self-determination and economic independence; outlines the preparatory process; and presents the Agenda 2063 document.
	Chapter 2: The Vision and African Aspirations for 2063	Paints a detailed picture of where Africa would be in 2063 when the continent will be celebrating the centenary of the founding of the OAU.
	Chapter 3: Comprehensive Situational Analysis	Examines the trends, challenges and opportunities in the political, economic, social, cultural fields and highlights key issues to address.
The Transformation Framework	Chapter 4: Agenda 2063 Goals, Priority Areas, Targets and Indicative Strategies	Outlines Agenda 2063 goals, priority areas, targets and indicative strategies.
	Chapter 5: Critical Success Factors Risks and Mitigation measures	Presents critical success factors, risks and mitigating strategies, as well as global megatrends likely to impact Africa’s future.

Making it Happen	<i>Chapter 6: Making it Happen</i>	Presents implementation, monitoring and evaluation arrangements, financing, communication strategy and capacity for implementation.
Annexes	<i>Annexes</i>	<p>Annex 1; Highlights African initiatives for economic growth and transformation in the 1980s and 1990s</p> <p>Annex 2 Synthesizes the main areas of concern Agenda 2063 should address based on the comprehensive situational analysis in Chapter 3.</p> <p>Annexes 3 and 4 present the national and regional/continental results matrices, respectively</p>

2.1 AFRICAN ASPIRATIONS FOR 2063

Africans of diverse social formations³ and in the Diaspora affirmed the AU Vision of “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena” as the overarching guide for the future of the African continent. Further, they reaffirmed the relevance and validity of the OAU/AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration.

The converging voices of Africans of different backgrounds, including those in the Diaspora have painted a clear picture of what they desire for themselves and the continent in the future. From these converging voices, a common and a shared set of aspirations has emerged:

1. *A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development;*
2. *An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance;*
3. *An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law;*
4. *A peaceful and secure Africa;*
5. *An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics;*
6. *An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and*
7. *Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.*

These seven aspirations show strong convergence with the AU Vision, and are in line with the eight priorities of the OAU/AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. Collectively these shared aspirations demonstrate strong continuity of thinking between the OAU founders and the present generation of Africans, albeit in a new dynamic context.

The aspirations reflect the desire of Africans for prosperity and well-being, for unity and integration, for a continent of free citizens and expanded horizons, with freedom from conflict and improved human security. They also project an Africa of strong identity, culture and values, as well as a strong and influential partner on the global stage making equal, respected contribution to human progress and welfare – in short a different, better and dynamic Africa than in 2013.

There are transitions to the aspirations and each milestone is a step towards attainment of Africa by 2063. These transition points, exciting milestones in themselves, appear in the Agenda 2063 Results Framework (Annex 3 and 4).

³ Different consultations were made with the following stakeholders: Academicians and Think Tanks, Civil Society, Planning Experts from Ministries of Planning, Women, Youth, Media, Private sector, inter-faith groups, Forum of Former Heads of States and Government, African Island States, RECs representatives, Sector Ministries and others

The aspirations embed a strong desire to see a continent where women and the youth have guarantees of fundamental freedoms to contribute and benefit from a different, better and dynamic Africa by 2063, and where women and youth assume leading roles in growth and transformation of African societies. They are based on the conviction that Africa has the potential and capability to converge and surpass other regions of the world and take her rightful place in the world community.

Aspiration # 1: A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development

Africa will by 2063 be a continent of shared prosperity, which finances and manages its own growth and transformation – meaning that:

- African people will have a high standard of living and quality of life and well-being;
- Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation for a knowledge society will be broad-based, and where no child misses school due to poverty or any form of discrimination;
- Citizens are healthy, well-nourished and have long life spans;
- Cities, peri-urban and rural communities are equipped with modern communication, sanitation, education and health facilities and are vibrant, dynamic market economies, people have access to affordable and decent housing including, housing finance together with all the basic necessities of life, and social capital is valued and preserved;
- Economies are structurally transformed to create shared growth through entrepreneurship and decent jobs for all;
- Modern agriculture for scaled-up production, improved productivity and value addition through commodity transformation and services, contribute to farmer and national prosperity and food and nutrition security; and
- The continent embeds principally adaptation processes to maintain healthy ecosystems, preserve the African natural environment – as the largest remaining reserve of pristine waters, old growth forests and land in the world.

By 2063, African countries will be amongst the best performers in quality of life indicators. Africa's collective GDP will be proportionate to its share of the world's population and natural resource endowments, with economies that are transformed through science, technology, innovation, entrepreneurship and competitiveness.

High standard of living, quality of life and well-being

A high standard of living for all Africans will be reflected in increased per capita income to a level that is at least 10 times the value of the 2013 level (USD 1878⁴) to USD 18,878 – 20,000. There will be a marked reduction in the number of people holding vulnerable jobs, and increased employment opportunities for all, especially the young. The growth in decent jobs for all working age adults will be the key driver of broad-based increases in incomes and improved livelihoods, social stability and cohesion. Ending all forms of poverty will be the highest priority of African governments in the next decades.

⁴ AfDB, AU and UNECA, African Statistical Year Book 2013

The African continent will graduate from being characterized by predominantly low income market-based, country economies to higher-end middle income to high-income dynamic, market-based groups of countries. Improved incomes and jobs creation, especially through formal private sector growth will translate into the elimination of poverty. This will be coupled with reduction in income disparities between rural and urban areas, men and women, leading to more inclusive and cohesive societies.

The Africa of 2063 will be a continent without any form of food or nutrition insecurity and hunger by 2025. Measures will be adopted that lead to food sovereignty by supporting women's capacity to produce safe, nutritious and culturally acceptable foods, promoting research in local seeds systems and farming methods, protection of indigenous seeds and knowledge technologies, establishment of local seed banks and ensuring access to natural resources by women farmers, fishers and pastoralists.

By 2025, stunting will be reduced to 10per cent of the youth population and underweight prevalence shall not exceed 5per cent among children. Neither stunting nor underweight children will exist by 2063. The vision of a prosperous, food and nutrition secure and, therefore poverty-free Africa will be fully realized.

To guarantee the high standard of living as a right, Africa of 2063 will be characterized by all its citizens being entitled to affordable social security by law and where social protection is extended to physically and mentally disabled citizens, elderly and children. Africans will be free from fear and want, and all public facilities and services will be accessible to all persons, including those with physical disabilities. The Africa of 2063 will be a compassionate and caring society.

Well-educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation

Africa by 2063 will be the world's most populous continent with the largest population segment being the youth, of which 70per cent or more will be highly skilled. The continent will have the largest concentration of middle class citizens as a percentage of the population with a significant spending power.

A key driver of Africa's prosperity will be its world class human capital developed through quality education focused on achieving 100 per cent literacy and numeracy, and clear emphasis on science, technology and engineering. Universal access to quality, accredited education at all levels will be enshrined in law. To ensure a vibrant citizenry, Africa will invest to make health services readily accessible to the rapidly increasing population and cater for needs of both the young and its growing elderly population. Anticipated decline in fertility rates and dependency ratios in Africa, along with the expected emergence of a middle-class, will translate to a demographic transition, allowing for higher per capita investments in human capital development and continued increases in incomes.

From early childhood education to primary, secondary, technical, vocational and higher education, Africa will witness a true renaissance, through investments made by governments and the private sector in education and through growth and expansion of industries in the fields of technology, science, research and innovation. In the Africa of 2063, at least 70per cent of all high school graduates will go on to have tertiary education at technical and vocational education and training (TVET) institutions, and Universities with 70per cent of them graduating in the sciences, technology and innovation programmes, to lay the foundation for competitive economies built upon human capital to complement the African continent's rich endowments in natural resources.

Africa of 2063 will have harmonized education and professional qualifications systems, with the Pan African University and several centres of excellence across the continent, a Pan African Virtual university that uses technology to provide mass post-secondary school education and indeed

the university sector and intelligentsia playing an instrumental role. Millions of Africans will have been trained, educated and skilled with special emphasis on science, technology, research and innovation, as well as vocational training in every sector. Unlike in the past this human capital would choose to remain on the continent, rather than migrating, thus contributing to the continent's socio-economic development. By 2063, the mass out-migration of talented, educated, innovative Africans that characterized the brain-drain of earlier years will change to a situation where Africa is the centre of convergence of the world's best and brightest; akin to the role and status, in ancient times, of the famed city of Timbuktu in the empire of Mali.

Healthy and well-nourished citizens

By 2063, every citizen will have full access to affordable and quality health care services, universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights information, and these services will be available to all women, including young women, adolescents, women with disability, those living with AIDS and all vulnerable groups.

Africa will be rid of all the neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), and all communicable and infectious diseases, such as Ebola, will be fully brought under control. Robust, integrated systems will be in place to significantly reduce non-communicable and lifestyle changes related diseases, including obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and deaths from HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis will be reduced to zero. Integrated and comprehensive health services and infrastructure will be in place, where services are available, accessible, affordable, acceptable and of quality.

The African population of 2063 will be healthy, well nourished, and enjoying a life expectancy of above 75 years.

Modern, affordable and liveable habitats

African cities by 2063 will be well planned with modern mass transit systems, while rural communities will be connected to the rest of the economy through road, energy, mobile communication networks, water, sanitation and hygiene systems. Over 60 per cent of the African population would be living in cities/urban areas, which in turn will generate the lion's share of the continent's GDP and its economic activities.

The Africa of 2063 while being characterized predominantly by urban communities, will have healthy, vibrant, prosperous and liveable rural communities that will come from broad-based breakthroughs in agricultural productivity, investments in education, building of local institutions, infrastructure which allow rural populations to be key drivers of agri-based and resource-based value-chains that generate high income levels. Rural dwellers will enjoy similar social services and infrastructure as in urban areas.

The Africa of 2063 will be one where every citizen has affordable and sustainable access to quality basic services such as decent affordable housing, access to adequate and clean water and sanitation, transport and other services. Access to high-speed broadband Internet connectivity will no longer be a luxury a few can afford but will be a right for all citizens.

Transformed economies

Africa of 2063 will be an integrated continent of consistent wealth creation, inclusivity and a pole of tolerance and leading to a pole of global growth and transformation.

In order to become a global growth pole, the continent will sustain and improve upon Africa's recent above world average economic growth momentum for the coming decades, while at the same time vigorously addressing the challenges of structural transformation of output and trade, and weak infrastructure connectivity, and weak human resource base, to emerge significantly strengthened and modernized through investments in science and technology capability.

Africa will by 2063 be a continent, which will have benefitted from macroeconomic stability, diversified, accelerated and inclusive economic growth. There will be annual GDP growth rates of not less than 7per cent, investment and savings of 25per cent and above and macroeconomic policies that promote growth, distribution, employment creation, investments and industrialization. Africa's domestic private sector will have grown to claim over 50per cent of the GDP.

Accelerated manufacturing activities will result in the 2063 share of manufacturing in GDP rising to at least 50per cent and its value added would rise to five-fold. The sector will absorb at least 50per cent of new entrants to the labour market. At least 90per cent of all agricultural exports will be processed locally (value addition). By 2063, the share of technology-driven manufacturing firms in total manufacturing output will rise above 50per cent. Africa will effectively participate in global value chains, not at the low but at the high end of the chain.

As a continent, Africa's collective GDP by 2063 will be proportionate to the continent's population and resource endowments with concomitant increases in Africa's share of global manufacturing output, global financial services as well as its share of knowledge-driven products and services. The continent will witness the growth of commodity futures exchanges and continental commercial giants will be flourishing with a mix of intra-African trade and off-continent export businesses. This will be coupled with the growth of regional manufacturing hubs, around the beneficiation of Africa's minerals and natural resources in all corners of the continent. A number of African majority-owned companies would feature significantly among the top 500 global companies. The return of the diaspora, with its infusion of talent, energy and finances into African economies, will play a critical role in the transformation process across Africa.

Africa will continue to be dominant in the global markets on natural resources, including agriculture and the extractives - oil, gas, minerals - but will capture a greater share of the returns from its natural resources and ensure their equitable redistribution to Africa's rapidly expanding population, especially in the initial decades. By 2063 there will be expanded control and ownership of the extractive industries as demonstrated through the establishment of commodity exchanges for all major commodities, and the increased share of firms under African - majority ownership and control, as well as increased control of mining operations as envisaged under the Africa Mining Vision.

African economies by 2063 will be structurally transformed to ensure equitable growth, fair distribution of opportunities and decent employment, labour standards and safe working conditions for all, including enhanced women's productivity, access to basic services and commodities and income distribution. Diversified economies with increased resilience will be achieved through systematic approaches to managing risks from external shocks. This will come through increased reliance on new products generated through innovation, knowledge, science and entrepreneurship, and growth of sectors such as tourism, the blue economy, creative arts and financial services. Natural resources (renewable and non-renewable) will be sustainably managed to avoid increased volatility - the phenomenon of "boom and bust". Intergenerational Sovereign Wealth Funds will be in place to safeguard returns on investments from exploiting and managing Africa's resources for future generations.

Economic development driven by science and technology will result in 25 per cent of businesses emanating from technological breakthroughs and innovations generated and commercialized by African citizens. This will be reflected by: an increased number of world class regional/continental research centres established on the continent which provide critical research outputs that are priorities for Africa, leading to the transformation of agriculture, manufacturing, industry and natural resource exploitation; establishment of regional and continental research centres of technology, innovation and competitiveness that generate ideas for novel businesses; and regional/continental poles for industrialization that are defined by 2020 and fully functional by 2025.

Modern agriculture for increased production, productivity and value addition

Africa in 2063 will be greatly enhanced by the creation of a broad-based foundation in agriculture mechanized farming, access to production inputs, financing, enhanced role of women farmers leading to enhanced agricultural productivity, making local food production competitive enough to replace food imports and generate surpluses for export and position Africa to feed the rest of the world. This in turn will increase wages in labour abundant states, and capital deepening in states with insufficient labour. The agricultural transformation will also have resulted in increased commercialization of agriculture and reduction in labour employed in agriculture. The significant value addition in agriculture will drive manufacturing and the structural transformation of African economies.

A modern and productive agriculture anchored in a solid science knowledge foundation, building of resilient food and agricultural systems and self-financing of agricultural development will be in place by 2063. This will lead to improved productivity. The 2063 rural landscape of medium and large-scale farms, owned and operated by African men and women, reflects a natural transition from the small plot, mixed farming characteristics of Africa's rural areas in 2013. Additionally, investments will result in consistent supply of agricultural commodities, attract financial capital to agri-based value chains, which will create employment opportunities. Modernizing agriculture will put an end to human drudgery in agriculture; African agriculture of the future will see the banishment of the hand hoe, and finally render the sector modern, profitable and attractive to the continent's women and youth.

Africa, while taking advantage of its untapped arable land, will be a major player in the global agro-food economy. African agriculture will be a competitive food and agriculture system which meets the fast-growing and diversifying agro-food demands of intra-African, local, national, regional markets and, beyond, responding increasingly to the demands of a growing and exigent global market. By 2025, intra-African trade in food and agriculture will have increased three-fold to account for at least 50 per cent of the continent's total formal food trade. This growth would be made possible through broader and deeper continental market integration and facilitated by the establishment of adequate market and trade infrastructure – including roads, railways and transport services; ICT; irrigation, and storage and agro-processing facilities; commodity exchanges, market information and other structured trade facilitation services. This will connect farmers to local, national and regional markets through a dynamic network of efficient value chains of strategic food and agricultural commodities.

Africa's blue/ ocean economy

Of particular significance are the results from focusing on the contribution of opportunities related to the “blue/ ocean economy” which is expected to gain momentum in 2020. This will lead among other initiatives, to advanced knowledge on marine and aquatic biotechnology to produce new products; and to the establishment of Africa-wide shipping, with African lakes and rivers serving as fully developed waterways and navigable links to landlocked states, thus integrating their markets with the rest of the continent and the world. African fisheries companies will exploit these resources sustainably for the benefit of Africans and market-led aquaculture (fish farming) will close the supply gap in fish. Africa's seas, oceans, lakes, rivers and floodplains will be yielding valuable minerals mined sustainably from deep seas and ocean and lake beds, and will be free of piracy, illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU fishing) and other criminal activities, including illegal dumping of wastes.

Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities

Africa in 2063 will be recognized globally as a continent respectful of its environment, ecologically conscious based on sustainable development and renewable energy. The aspired prosperity of

Africa will be based on inclusive growth and sustainable development to enable Africa reclaim its natural heritage, build prosperous societies, and reduce vulnerability to climate change. While Africa has played a relatively minor role and contributed little to the accumulation of greenhouse gases and the attendant climate change, it is the most vulnerable region to climate change risks.

Africa by 2063 will have been transformed such that natural resources will be sustainably managed and the integrity and diversity of Africa's ecosystems conserved. Wildlife crimes including poaching, trafficking and illegal trade will be eliminated before 2025 through effective legislation and management systems in member states.

African societies will consume and produce goods and services in a sustainable manner. National income accounts will be reformed to fully reflect changes in renewable and non-renewable natural resources wealth.

By 2063, Africa's biodiversity, including its forests, wild life, wetlands (lakes and rivers), genetic resources, as well as aquatic life, most notably fish stocks and coastal and marine ecosystems, including trans-boundary natural resources will be fully conserved and used sustainably. Forest and vegetation cover would be restored to 1963 levels; while national parks and protected areas (both terrestrial and marine) will be well managed and threats to them significantly reduced.

Land degradation and desertification would have been stopped and then reversed. All agricultural land will be managed in a manner that is environmentally and socially sustainable. African countries would have reduced loss of biodiversity by at least 90per cent; and natural habitats conserved.

Africa will be a fully water secure continent by 2030. New practices and technologies will be in place to ensure efficient use of water resources and development of new sources. About 90per cent of domestic waste - water will be recycled to supplement water for agricultural and industrial use.

By 2063, climate resilient low carbon production systems will be in place, thus significantly minimizing vulnerability to climate risk and related natural disasters. This will, among others, lead to reductions in per capita deaths from climate change induced natural disasters by at least 75per cent through comprehensive and robust disaster risk reduction and preparedness strategies put in place earlier. All agricultural and industrial activities will be climate smart and sustainability certified. An African climate fund (ACF) to address the continent's climate adaptation concerns, including technology development will be fully operational and regional/continental sustainability certification schemes will be established.

Africa will realize its full potential in energy production, and in fact in the foreseeable future will provide energy to other regions on demand. The African strategic vision in this regard will involve the utilization of the continent's energy sources, especially renewable energy in fostering economic growth and eradicating energy poverty. Renewable energy (wind, solar, hydro, bioenergy, ocean tidal waves, geothermal and other renewables) will claim more than half of the energy consumption for households, businesses and organizations. All urban buildings will be certified, as energy smart and all urban mass transport will operate on renewable and low to zero emissions fuels. The share of renewable energy to total energy production will have exceeded the 50per cent threshold. Regional power pools will be in place a few decades earlier, while continental power pools (e.g. Inga Dam) will be fully functional before 2063 thus making the continent well lit and fully powered.

Functioning institutions, regulations, systems and processes will be in place to govern the management and exploitation of trans-boundary natural resources, including water, forests, fisheries, biodiversity, genetic resources, energy and renewable and non-renewable resources.

Aspiration # 2: An integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance

By 2063 Africa will have emerged as a sovereign, independent and self-reliant continent - a united and strong Africa that realizes full economic and political integration.

Africa will witness the rekindling of solidarity and unity of purpose that underpinned the struggle for emancipation from slavery, colonialism, apartheid and economic subjugation. By 2020 all remnants of colonialism will have ended and all African territories under occupation fully liberated. We shall take measures to expeditiously end the unlawful occupation of the Chagos Archipelago, the Comorian Island of Mayotte and affirm the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. All kinds of oppression including gender, racial and other forms of discrimination will be ended.

Africa will by 2063 be:

- A United Africa; and
- Having world-class infrastructure that criss-crosses the continent.

A United Africa (federal or confederate)

Since 1963, the quest for the unity of Africa has been inspired by the Pan African spirit focusing particularly on liberation, political and economic independence and development based on self-reliance of African people with democratic governance playing a fundamental role to facilitate continental unity. These are a condition *sine qua non* for Africa's renaissance and emergence on the world stage.

Africa by 2063 will have realized the fulfilment of the founders' dream or vision of a United Africa, a union of well-governed and democratic continent. The political unity of Africa will be the culmination of the integration process, including the free movement of people, the establishment of continental institutions, and full economic integration.

By 2030, there will be consensus on the form of the continental unity and its underlying institutions. By 2045, all legal measures required for the formation of a United Africa will be in place with all its institutions (executive, legislative and Judicial). Regional, state and local governance structures will be appropriately reformed.

There will be an African citizenship and passport, and the Union anthem and flag will be widely observed. There will also be direct election of Members of Parliament to the Union legislative body and the President of the Union will be elected by universal suffrage.

As part of the political evolution to a United Africa, key economic institutions and frameworks, inter alia, the African Common Market (2025), Africa Monetary Union (2030), Africa Customs Union (2019) and Continental Free Trade Area (2017) will have been established as anchors of the governance structure of a United Africa.

Africa will witness the re-kindling of African solidarity and unity of purpose of the founders that underpinned the struggle for emancipation from colonialism, apartheid and economic subjugation.

World-class infrastructure criss-crosses Africa.

By 2063 the necessary diverse infrastructure (quality and size) will be in place to support Africa's accelerated growth, technological transformation, trade and development, including: high-speed railway networks, roads, shipping lines, sea and air transport, expanded investment in ICT, and digital economy. There will be a continental High Speed Train Network connecting all the major cities/capitals of the continent, as well as through other means connecting African Island States

to the mainland continent. The freeway will have adjacent highways and contain pipelines for gas, oil, water, as well as ICT Broad Band cables. This will be a catalyst for manufacturing, skills development, technology development, research and innovation.

Africa will witness full liberalization of air transport and full implementation of the Yamoussoukro decision through ratification and adoption of all related treaties and protocols, making the African aviation industry a positive force for regional integration, job creation and economic transformation.

Investment in these world-class, well managed infrastructure networks will be key to catalysing the mushrooming of intra-African trade from less than 12per cent in 2013 to approaching 50per cent of Africa's trade portfolio by 2045. In turn, this will spur the growth of Pan African companies in mining, manufacturing, finance, food and beverages, hospitality and tourism, pharmaceuticals, fashion design, fisheries and ICT, and diverse industry operations supporting companies generating world leaders in their sectors.

Africa will be a continent with increased factor mobility (labour, capital and skills), free movement of people and enhanced trade, and continental institutions such as the African Central Bank, will be fully functional.

Intra-African trade will flourish and the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), the African Monetary Union and related financial instruments will be established and made fully operational.

The political union brought to reality well before 2063 coupled with improved connectivity and inter-linkage of technology, finance and markets, free movement of people, goods and services will be instrumental in establishing the strong economic base to spur intra-African trade to unprecedented levels and strengthen Africa's place in global trade.

Aspiration # 3: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law

By 2063, Africa will have undergone a deepening of the culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law. This aspiration reflects the desire for an Africa where women, men, youth, the elderly and all races of the continent will enjoy fundamental freedoms and rights to participate in the development of modern societies in the continent.

By 2063, Africa will be:

- A continent where democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law are entrenched, and it will fully adhere to and observe the African Human Rights instruments, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and the Protocols thereto; and
- Characterized by institutions capable of designing and implementing, empowering multi-sectoral processes and leadership that is transformative at all levels.

Entrenched democratic values, practices, and respect for universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law

By 2063, Africa will be characterized as a continent of democratic values and practices, which are entrenched in the political culture and in law, as provided for in the African Governance Architecture.

Africa will be a continent that conducts free, fair and credible elections which includes: (i) multi-party, plural systems; (ii) level, transparent playing field in the political competitive process; (iii) education of the electorate to make informed choices; and (iv) Pan Africanism, equality, diversity,

excellence and solidarity. A vibrant, diverse, well trained and responsible press that holds all branches of government accountable will be the norm. Freedom of access to information by all citizens, while safeguarding privacy, will be a right enshrined in law.

Africa by 2063 will be a continent that fully adheres to the universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law, including respect and protection of human rights of women and girls. All states will fully adhere to and observe the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.

The continent's citizenry will enjoy access to independent courts and judiciary that dispense and deliver justice with neither fear nor favour. There will be affordable and timely access to justice for all. Corruption and impunity will be a thing of the past.

Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place at all levels

Africa will be a continent where the institutions are at the service of its people - strong institutions in place to enhance citizens' participation in development and in economic and governance management. Competent, professional and neutral bureaucracies based on merit will serve the continent and deliver effective and efficient services. Institutions at all levels of government will have the capacity to prioritize, design, implement and monitor development activities in an accountable manner, and with full participation of the people. In short, capable democratic and developmental states and institutions will characterize the continent.

Local communities will not only be responsible for their development but will also have their fair share of the exploitation of natural resources and use them for the benefit of all by 2025.

Aspiration # 4: A peaceful and secure Africa

By 2063, Africa will emerge as a **peaceful and secure continent**, a conflict-free continent with harmony and understanding among communities at the grassroots level. Inter-state and intra-state wars will be fully eliminated and mechanisms put in place to prevent and/ or immediately resolve any kind of inter-community conflict; and organized crime, terrorism (a major hindrance to peace and development) and other forms of criminal networks, such as piracy fully controlled. Africa will be a drugs-free continent, with no human trafficking. Diversity (ethnic, religious, economic, cultural, etc.) will be a source of wealth and accelerated economic growth rather than a source of conflict.

A prosperous, integrated and united Africa, and an Africa based on good governance, democracy, and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law are the necessary pre-conditions for a peaceful and conflict-free continent.

A peaceful and secure Africa will be achieved through ensuring that by 2063, Africa will have in place:

- Entrenched culture of peace;
- Security and safety for all citizens; and
- Appropriate majority contributions in defending the continent's security and interest.

By 2020 all guns will be silenced. By 2063, all conflicts emanating from ethnic, religious, cultural diversity and all forms of social exclusion will have been eliminated. National and other mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts will be in place and a culture of peace will be nurtured in Africa's children through integration of peace education in all school curricula.

Africa will have well-built mechanisms for conflict resolution, conflict de-escalation and threat minimization. The norms of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for inter/intra and cross border conflict arbitration/negotiation schemes will be in place by 2020.

Africa will have in place cooperative mechanisms for dealing with transnational criminal activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, cybercrimes, terrorism and related activities through simplification of legal measures, including the putting in place of an African Arrest Warrant System by 2020 and a system for exchange of information.

The continent will have witnessed improved human security with sharp reductions in per capita violent crimes. For Africa's citizenry improved security will be the norm with safe and peaceful spaces for individuals, families and communities.

There will be complete and full civilian control of the uniformed services. Capable, professional and dedicated security services will be the norm and in place across the entire continent.

By 2063, Africa will have the necessary capacity to secure its interests by ensuring a peaceful and a militarily strong continent. Africa will possess strong security with a continental defence and security policy and strategy, so that the continent is capable of defending itself.

African land, air and sea forces for peace and conflict resolution under the appropriate United Africa authority will be established and fully operational. At the same time, national peace structures and mechanisms with standing capacities for conflict prevention and mediation, as well as the enhancement of the African Union capacities in peacekeeping, post conflict activities and peace building will be in place. An African Naval Command will be place to ensure that Africa's maritime interests are secure. Cyber security will be embedded in Africa's security framework, so that protection and defence capability is comprehensive and inclusive.

The present AU peace and security arrangements, their underlying philosophy, operational institutions as well as the partnerships that underpin them will be fully in tune with the realities on the ground and respond to the needs of ending conflicts and securing enduring peace. The African Peace and Security Architecture will be fully operational and supported principally by African resources.

Aspiration # 5: An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics

Africa, as the cradle of human civilization, is custodian of a cultural patrimony that has contributed enormously to human progress. **African cultural identity, values and ethics** as a critical factor in Africa's re-emergence on the global stage in the decade of the 2010s, will be promoted and strengthened by 2063. African people are imbued with a sense of their fundamental cultural unity, which has fostered a sense of a common destiny and African identity and Pan-African consciousness.

By 2063, Africa will be a continent where:

- Pan Africanism is fully entrenched; and
- African cultural renaissance is preeminent.

Pan Africanism

By 2063, the fruits of the values and ideals of Pan Africanism will be manifest everywhere on the continent and beyond. The goal of the unity of the African peoples and peoples of African descent will be attained (2025). An Agency for Diaspora Affairs will be established in all member states by 2020 with the Diaspora integrated into the democratic processes by 2030. Dual citizenship for the Diaspora will be the standard by 2025, and importantly all nations under colonial rule will have won their freedom by 2020. Pan African ideals will be mainstreamed in all school curricular and Pan African cultural assets (film, music, theatre, etc.) will be enhanced to ensure that African creative arts contribute significantly to GDP, directly and through heightened innovation among Africa's youth, and in world culture.

African cultural renaissance

The Africa of 2063 will be one, where cultures will flourish. National languages will be the basis for administration, and there will be a strong work ethic based on merit. Traditional African values of family, community and social cohesion will be firmly entrenched and the resulting social capital will be valued and stand as an example to the rest of the world.

Africa will be a continent where the choices of roles of women are diverse, and include leadership across all aspects of society. The traditional and religious leaders, and Africa's youth are drivers of change. Mechanisms will be in place for inter-generational cultural dialogue to ensure that Africa's cultures are alive and evolving, while continuing to be a mainstay of the fabric of the continent.

Africa is a religious continent and its people are religious as well. Religion and religious expressions play a profound role in the construction of the African identity and social interaction. The Africa of the future is one that vehemently opposes all forms of politicization of religion and religious extremism.

Cultural heritage preservation – languages, customs, foods, traditions that are not harmful to women, girls, boys or men will be supported, including strengthened cooperation in the fields of culture, science and education. The 10th Edition of the WE Du Bois grand project of **Encyclopaedia Africana** will be published and available by the year 2063.

The Africa of 2063 will see Africa's creative arts, folklore, national languages/literatures flourish and contribute to the growth and preservation of national cultures, with resources invested to establish programs to identify and preserve Africa's oral history by 2025. Pan Africa Cultural Festivals (music, dance, film, couture) will be organized biannually. Africa's contribution to global output in the creative arts/fine arts (film, literature, theatre, music and dance, couture) will be at least 15per cent and regional / continental associations for film, literature, theatre, arts, couture, oral tradition will be in place by 2025.

The Museum of African History, Culture and Art will be in place by 2025, opening a bi-annual African Cultural and Sports Festival of 2025. Prior to this, all African cultural treasures / patrimony will be retrieved by 2025.

Aspiration # 6: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children

By 2063, Africa will be a continent where all citizens will be actively involved in decision-making in all aspects of development, including social, economic, political and environmental. Africa will be a continent where no child, woman or man will be left behind.

Well before 2063, Africa will be a continent where gender equality is the norm in participation and access to social and economic opportunity, benefits and contributions for all segments of the continent's population. Economic growth and development outcomes, social and political discourse will be plural, such that viewpoints from all, regardless of sex, political affiliation, religion, ethnic affiliation, locality, age or other factors, serve to strengthen, broaden and deepen participation in all spheres of life.

The Africa of 2063 will be a continent where:

- Gender equality is embedded in all spheres of life;
- Engaged and empowered Youth is the norm; and
- Children are nurtured and cherished.

Gender equality in all spheres of life

Africa in 2063 will be a continent where the critical role of women in Africa's transformation is recognized and proactively harnessed.

By 2063, all forms of violence and discrimination (social, economic, political) against women and girls, including sexual violence in conflict situations, will cease to exist and they will fully enjoy all their human rights. This means an end to all harmful social practices (child marriages, female genital mutilation, etc), all barriers to access to quality health and education for women and girls will be eliminated, and all gender disparities at all levels of education ended.

The Africa of 2063 will reflect the benefits of fully empowered women with equal access and opportunity in all spheres of life, including their human rights. This means that the African woman will have equal economic rights, including the rights to own and inherit property, sign a contract, register and manage a business, access to land, agricultural supports, financial and banking services, while recognizing, valuing unpaid care work and domestic work. Over 95per cent of rural women will have access to productive assets, including land, credit, inputs and financial and insurance services.

The Africa of 2063 will have seen full gender parity. It will see women occupy 50per cent of elected offices at state, regional and local bodies, and 50per cent of managerial positions in government and private sector will be held by women. The economic and political glass ceiling hindering women's progress, handicapping broad based participation in Africa's transformation will finally have been broken.

Engaged and empowered youth, and caring for children

Africa's young people are the primary vehicle for realizing the demographic dividend and the principal engine for fostering development at all levels. By 2063, Africa's children and youth will be fully engaged as the talent pipeline, principal innovators, and indeed the sustainers of Africa's advantages from transformation. Youth overt unemployment will have been eliminated and they would have full access to educational training opportunities, health services, and recreational and cultural activities, as well as to financial means to allow each youth to fully realize their full potential. The youth will be incubators of new knowledge driven business start-ups and will contribute significantly to the economy.

By 2063 all forms of systematic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people will be eliminated and youth issues mainstreamed in all development agenda.

All forms of illegal migrations and trafficking of youth will have ended, with youth travels to beyond the continent undertaken mainly for cultural and recreational purposes, and not as a search for opportunities. The talent of African youth will be finally leveraged fully to foster the continent's political, social, cultural and economic development.

Africa's children, the future of the continent will be well cared for and protected from all forms of exploitation and harmful practices to ensure that they grow in safe, nurturing and fulfilling environments. They shall have full access to health, education and recreational activities. The provisions of the African Charter on the Rights of the Child will be fully implemented by 2020.

Aspiration # 7: Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner

Africa will emerge as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner with a bigger role in world affairs.

By 2063, Africa will:

- Be a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence; and
- Take full responsibility to finance her growth and transformation; and will not be donor dependent.

Africa as major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence

The African continent will assume its rightful place in assuring global peace and security through its permanent seats on the UN Security Council with all the privileges of permanent membership category, and with a deepened south-south cooperation based on a Common African Foreign Policy. There will be a strengthened African presence in other multilateral fora such as the IMF and World Bank, as well as on those relating to global and regional security.

There will be a self-re-empowerment of Africa; Africa determining its own future, leading its agenda and developing effective partnership frameworks with its external partners.

The new strategic role and place of Africa in the global arena will be based on mutually beneficial partnerships with the outside world. A United Africa will strengthen its capacity and role in global negotiations-in the global economic, environment, security and social negotiations, as well as on the reforms of the multilateral institutions including the UN Security Council based on the African common position enshrined in the Ezulweni consensus and the Sirte Declaration.

Africa shall also continue to advocate for the reform of the other global institutions, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, as well as the World Trade Organization to enhance international standards in a way that caters to the aspirations of developing countries and enable these countries face their challenges.

By 2063, Africa endowed with empowering policies, capable institutions, systems and finances and people with a range of skills in sufficient numbers will be in a strong position to meet the exigency of peace and security and exit dependence on external benefactors.

Established in 2020, the Pan African Leadership Institute (PALI) will by 2025 be graduating Africa's future leaders. These young men and women will be adequately moulded and inculcated with an *esprit de corps* and the ideals of Pan Africanism, and they in turn would run the capable developmental state in the Pan African spirit. By 2025, PALI will be the centre of convergence for policy makers, political leaders, captains of industry, cultural and spiritual leaders, academics, African philosophers, artists, linguists and opinion makers who would on a yearly basis gather to debate and forge consensus on all aspects of Africa's relentless march towards attaining the Agenda 2063 Vision.

The Union will have strengthened its institutional capacities and reclaimed the political initiative through making good on commitments to its people through increased resource collection and allocation to the work of the organs of the Union. With strengthened institutions the Union will reclaim the political initiative and realise an increased share in world economy and trade.

Africa takes responsibility to finance her own development

Africa by 2063 will take full responsibility for financing its own growth and transformation, with dependency on donors, or commodity exports being completely removed from the factors shaping the continent.

Taking full charge of its natural resources, investing in, and engaging its well-trained and skilled citizens of the time, while developing financial capital and commodity futures markets and expansive ICT and networked systems, Africa will also be in a position to finance the Union Government, and other key strategic initiatives, inter alia the African Space Agency and the Agency for Arctic and Antarctic Explorations and Oceanography.

New sources of funding from growing economies will fuel internal growth. The African Capital Market, alone, linked by member states' capital markets will contribute about 30 per cent of Africa's investment capital needs thus ending aid dependency.

Africa will work to ensure that the post – 2015 development agenda reaffirms the Rio Principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, the right to development and equity, and mutual accountability and responsibility, as well as ensure policy space for nationally tailored policies and programmes. In this regard, Africa's partners have a crucial role to play in supporting the continent's development efforts through ODA and technology transfer in accordance with national needs and interests.

By 2063 Africa will be in a position to strategically manage the opportunities and risks presented by the evolution of a multi-polar world that is being shaped through a significant re-alignment of global political and economic power.

2.2 CONCLUSION - OTHER SCENARIOS

The Africa of 2063 depicted above and desired by her citizens if fulfilled will result in the continent taking her rightful place on the global stage. The convergence with the rest of the world will be reflected in the wellbeing of her citizens, the dynamism of her economy, the unity of her people, the culture of good governance, democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law that will have taken root, the peace and security enjoyed by her citizens, the status of her women, as well as the cultural renaissance that will be generalized throughout the continent.

Other futures are possible; including a “business as usual” scenario, or at worse stagnation.

Africa's economic development over the past two decades has been impressive. With the adoption of democratic and economic reforms since the 1990s, the continent's economic growth has averaged between 5 to 6 per cent per cent annually. “A business as usual” scenario assumes that such economic growth and investment rates of recent years will continue, its labour force continues to grow, commodity prices remain high, and the generally improved policies of the last two decades are maintained. But under this scenario, there is no sustained action on a new policy agenda, including no action taken to correct the lack of inclusiveness, lack of job growth, substantial poverty reduction and unsustainable natural resource management that recent economic growth rates are criticized for; and that productivity growth does not accelerate and Africa's economies are not transformed.

The consequences of a “business as usual” scenario are as follows⁵:

- Only a tiny number of countries, which had consistently high growth for the last two decades, will converge with the rest of the world, while the majority of the other countries do not converge, and the fragile countries stay fragile.
- Per capita incomes continue to rise at 1.9 per cent annually but given growth in the rest of the world, however, Africa's per capita incomes would actually diverge further from those in the rest of the world.
- The middle-class would increase but after decades would still be only a third of the population. Nearly one in five Africans would, correspondingly, still be mired in poverty.
- Finally, given growth elsewhere in the world, Africa's share of global GDP would stagnate at a low level.

⁵ See Africa 2050: Realizing the Continent's Potential

A scenario of stagnation is one that projects a reproduction of post-liberation African development patterns with high levels of external dependency, low productivity, low innovation, and unrelenting poverty. It is a scenario of stagnation or slow growth. In this scenario, there will be “neither major catastrophe, nor significant development” regarding the transformation of the African continent. It is part of the dominant narrative of the last twenty to thirty years when Africa had gone through a slow growth based on the formula of aid-based and structural adjustment futures.

Such a scenario is possible but highly improbable, and one that neither Africa’s citizen nor their governments will accept.

The optimistic picture of the continent reflected in the “Africa We Want by 2063” does not mean that the road to be travelled will be easy. As will be shown in the following chapter (3), the continent despite recent progress faces many deep-seated problems and challenges for which creative solutions and approaches are urgently needed.

INTRODUCTION

Getting to the “Africa We Want by 2063” articulated in Chapter 2 will not be easy nor will it come automatically, and setbacks and reversals along the way cannot be discounted. There will be challenges but success will be assured if African countries build upon past achievements and capitalize on emerging opportunities, and draw upon the continent’s strong cultural and spiritual values.

This chapter analyses in four parts the progress, challenges and opportunities facing the continent in the context of attaining the vision for Africa in 2063.

Part I presents an overview of the continent’s drive for political unity and economic emancipation over the last 50 years. It looks at the political evolution of the continent, including establishment of the OAU and its eventual transformation into the African Union, and reviews attempts to plan the continent’s long-term economic development, through initiatives such as the Monrovia Declaration, the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty and others.

Part II takes stock of where the continent stands today; the progress and the challenges. The stocktaking is based on the seven aspirations outlined in chapter two, covering, social, political and economic development, as well as democracy and governance, peace and security, women and youth issues, culture, as well as Africa’s place in the global context.

Part III reviews the lessons from current responses to these challenges as reflected in national development plans of African countries, as well as regional and continental frameworks.

Finally, the chapter concludes by drawing the implications for Agenda 2063.

3.1 AFRICA THE PAST FIFTY YEARS (1963-2013): The Quest for Political Unity and Economic Emancipation

3.1.1 Pan Africanism, decolonization, political liberation and independence

Pan Africanism emerged in the early 19th century as an important vehicle in the struggle of Africans and people of African descent for emancipation and the restoration of their dignity and against slavery, colonialism, and all forms of racism and racial exploitation. It was founded on the conviction that Africans have a common history, destiny, emanated from ancient cultures and civilizations and that Africa is the cradle of humankind. The various strands of Pan-Africanism converged into the founding of the OAU in 1963 and were crystallised in the major objectives of the organization, captured in Article II of the organization’s Charter.

The goals of the organization were to be achieved through the harmonization of African countries’ policies in all fields. The OAU had a mandate to pursue both a political and socio-economic agenda and did so in five main areas: decolonization; advancement of peace and security; promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance; fostering international relations and cooperation; and regional integration. However, the political agenda dominated, particularly issues of decolonization, liberation and the struggle against apartheid.

Article II of the OAU Charter

- Promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
- Co-ordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
- Defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
- Eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
- Promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

At the time the OAU was established, only thirty-two African countries were independent. Twenty-four achieved their independence thereafter out of which eleven received direct assistance from the OAU. Today with the exception of some six islands that are still under direct colonial rule: Chagos Islands (United Kingdom); St. Helena Island (United Kingdom), The Canary Islands (Spain); The Azores (Portugal); The Madeiras (Portugal); La Réunion (France); La Mayotte (France); and Ceuta and Melilla (Spain)], and other lingering colonial legacies, remarkable achievement has been registered in the decolonization of the continent and the abolition of the apartheid regime.

Developments leading to the establishment of the African Union

The establishment of the OAU was a challenging process, and this impacted on the fulfilment of its mission for political unity and economic emancipation. From the beginning Member States had divergent views on the nature of the African unity they were striving for⁶. Africa's early leaders had adopted different ideologies as their respective national visions, thus both the objectives of African unity and the methods by which they would be promoted and achieved were therefore contested issues during the deliberations leading to the establishment of the OAU⁷.

These differences manifested into two groups: Monrovia and Casablanca⁸. The main issue was whether continental political unity was to be brought about immediately or set as a long-term objective, and gradually achieved through the consolidation of the newly independent nation-States, and through the creation of sub-regional groups as the building blocks. The Monrovia group pressed for immediate continental unity. The Casablanca group however, argued for a more gradualist approach and won the day and influenced the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its Charter.

The fact that the OAU Charter did not have a clear vision and strategy for the realization of continental unity affected its structures, organs and performance in general. As a result, some of the resolutions taken by the OAU policy organs and the strategies that were adopted were not fully implemented.

In the 1974 OAU summit in Mogadishu, African leaders critically reviewed OAU's performance and urged reforms needed during the implementation of the African Economic Community (AEC) process. Ultimately, because of lingering challenges and the changing context the OAU and the AEC were transformed into the African Union.

The African Union

Some of the main challenges faced by the OAU, particularly in the political field, were a combination of its strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in Member States, its subordination to the interests of Member States and persistent financial difficulties. The Sirte Declaration of 1999 was a major effort to reform the organization.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union incorporates the objectives of both the OAU and AEC's and brought in new elements, under its principles. These included more participation of the African citizens in the activities of the Union; the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. These were in addition to "the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security; peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security; and promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union". All this enabled the AU to perform better.

⁶ Capturing the 21st Century: African Peer review (APRM) Best practices and lessons Learned (UNECA (2011)

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

The AU has been able to put in place many important organs, such as, the Pan-African Parliament; the African Court of Justice; the Commission on Human and Peoples Rights; the Peace and Security Council; the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council. It has enhanced not only the involvement of people, including the Africans in the diaspora, but also its relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Above all, Member States have agreed on the AU vision of “**an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena**”.

In line with the above vision, the AU has formulated many frameworks and strategies in both the political and socio-economic fields, which are now being consolidated as the African Union Agenda 2063. However, the central question of political unity, or the form it should take, remains unresolved; instead a strategy of building from the bottom through establishment of Regional Economic Communities has been adopted.


3.1.2 The Quest for Economic Emancipation

African countries had initially been preoccupied with nation building and the liberation of the continent, particularly in southern Africa and against Apartheid, and some would argue, with less emphasis on the promotion of democracy and good governance in the independent African countries.

Nonetheless, economic emancipation was one of the fundamental objectives of the Pan-African Movement. The OAU from early on intensified cooperation in various fields and put in place appropriate continental frameworks aimed at advancing regional integration and re-organizing the continent politically, economically and socially. Examples include: (i) the Economic and Social Commission (1964) mandated to handle socio-economic matters leading to the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area and a Common Market; (ii) various Commissions on Education and Culture; Scientific, Technical and Research; and Health, Sanitation and Nutrition; (iii) Memorandum on the Responsibilities and Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Economic and Social Fields (1970) identifying Africa’s priorities in relation to the UN Development Decades which were initiated before the establishment of the OAU; (iv) African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence (or the Economic Charter of Africa) adopted during the Tenth Anniversary of the OAU, and which paved the way for the adoption of the Inter-African Convention Establishing an African Technical Co-operation Program in 1975; and (v) in 1976, the Cultural Charter for Africa intended to emancipate Africans from unfavourable socio-cultural conditions and promote ‘Africanism’ as well as the Kinshasa Declaration that provided for the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2000 with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as its pillars.

However, the most significant efforts at visioning Africa’s development over the long-term were the various strategies and frameworks for economic development formulated and agreed by the continent’s leadership from the late 1970s onwards. This was a period when Africa sought to grapple with the severe economic and political crisis that affected many African countries, and the need therefore to evolve strategies to come out of these crises.

During the first decade and half after independence (1960-1975), Africa as a whole performed relatively well economically; Africa’s GDP growth rate averaged 4.5per cent; exports growth rate was 2.8per cent; agriculture grew at 1.6per cent and manufacturing at 6per cent. However, by the end of the 1970s, serious economic crisis beset most African countries. By the beginning of the 1980s, the economic, social and political problems in African countries had reached crisis proportions. African countries had failed to generate and sustain economic growth to meet the growing needs of their expanding populations. Many were faced with severe balance of payments problems, external debt, and African countries largely followed daily crisis management and survival strategies. The situation was exacerbated by the world oil crisis. It was around this period that Africa’s per capita income levels began to diverge from other regions – see figure below.



In addressing the crisis, there were two competing approaches and visions; (i) African-driven and internally conceived visions and plans; (ii) externally driven visions and plans. These two had different approaches to the diagnosis of the problem as well as the prescription. Whereas the African grown initiatives largely put the blame for the continent's problems on external forces and factors (colonialism, unfair international relations, etc.), the reports and plans of the external players (largely the Bretton Woods Institutions) blamed "internal domestic policies" of African countries.

In the end, Africa's own initiatives prior to the 1990s in the wider global context of the Cold War were side lined by external forces, which controlled African economies and the political systems. Nonetheless, African countries also bore some responsibility for the situation due to poor economic policies and deficits in governance systems.

African initiatives for economic growth and transformation⁹

In response to the crisis of the late 1970s the OAU in collaboration with UNECA in 1979 mobilized to forge a vision and plan to address the crisis. This led to the Monrovia Declaration (1979). The

African Initiatives for Economic Growth and Transformation – 1979 to the Present

- The Monrovia Declaration (1979)
- The Lagos Plan of Action (1980)
- The Final Act of Lagos (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991)
- OAU: Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery (1986-1990)
- The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Program for Socio-economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) – 1989
- The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990)
- The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990)
- The OAU Re-launching of Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action (1995)
- NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

⁹ Abdalla Burja (2004) Pan-African political and Economic Visions of Development, From OAU to the AU: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership for African Development; Capturing the 21st Century: African Peer review (APRM) Best Practices and Lessons Learned UNECA (2011)

strategies of the Monrovia Declaration were subsequently incorporated in the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980). These three strategic visions articulated Africa's future development trajectory, provided a practical plan of action to foster the continent's development, and were underpinned by political decisions for attaining economic cooperation and integration—see Annex 1 for an overview.

These initiatives demonstrate that Africa has made several attempts to define continental visions and actions plans to address the economic, social and political challenges facing the continent, in particular the crisis that set in a decade and half after independence and later. These endogenous frameworks sought to carve out alternative paths for the continent's future. Issues of poverty reduction, industrialization, agriculture, science and technology, structural transformation, integration and cooperation remained at the core of all these initiatives.

Unfortunately many remained only partly implemented. A variety of reasons have been advanced such as: lack of capacity; lack of political will; lack of resources; and external interference. One important factor was that the development of the plans was mostly technocratic in approach, were not sufficiently participatory and therefore failed to galvanize ordinary Africans.

Externally driven initiatives

Key among the externally-driven initiatives, backed essentially by the Bretton woods Institutions in the decades of the 1980s and early 1990s, was the World Bank Berg Report (1981) named “*Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*”, which was the foundation for the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that followed. The SAPs gained pre-eminence in African countries with adverse consequences on the socio-economic development of the continent. In many instances, the debt-ridden African countries were powerless to do otherwise.

Under the SAPs, African countries were compelled to devalue their currencies, raise interest rates, withdraw state subsidies, curtail service provision, reduce government role in economic activities and retrench and reduce the public sector leading to the creation of a “minimalist state”. By reducing the sphere of state activities in the field of economics and opening up Africa's nascent economies to competition from more mature economies, SAPs contributed to slow growth, de-industrialization and increased dependence on raw materials exports. It is reported that real GDP growth rate averaged 1.32 per cent during 1980-1989, and by 1990, per capita incomes in Africa were about half the level in Asia and a quarter of Latin America. Although the SAPs were not to be entirely blamed for the state of affairs, they bore a significant part of the responsibility.

Thus during the 1980s and 1990s, African countries at continental level continued to endorse bold and far-sighted visions and plans for socio-economic transformation, while at national level, competing external agendas held the day; at national level many African countries followed a course of action which was different from the strategies adopted at continental level. These experiences provide lessons that are of crucial importance for Agenda 2063, and highlight the importance of ensuring that Agenda 2063 is fully integrated into national and regional plans, and the need for strong political leadership to ensure that continental commitments are followed through at national and regional levels.

3.1.3 Conclusions

From the foregoing brief analysis of Africa's political and socio-economic development since the founding of the OAU in 1963, the following conclusions emerge:

(a) *The durability of the quest for political unity, integration, dignity and economic emancipation*

As shown above, political unity and economic emancipation have been a consistent quest for Africa from the early post-colonial times to the present. Against tremendous odds, the continent has continued to forge ahead, re-inventing and adapting to new challenges and forging new strategies appropriate to the times. Agenda 2063 should be seen in the context of the durability of this quest for political unity and economic emancipation of the continent.

(b) *The illusiveness of attaining economic and political emancipation*

Since 1963, Africa's continental and regional organizations have endeavoured to realize the objectives of Pan Africanism among which was the quest for dignity and political and economic emancipation. However, in spite of commendable progress, the task has not been easy, and the political and economic agenda remains an unfinished business. As a result, the fight against colonialism and its legacies is yet to be fully accomplished as some African territories are still under direct colonial occupation; and peace and security needs to be consolidated and stability maintained through full implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture. While economic growth has been strong in recent decades, too many African are still mired in poverty and the growth has been mostly a jobless one.

Meanwhile, despite recent gains, democracy, human rights and good governance remain a challenge. On another level, harmonization of policies on international relations and cooperation need to be strengthened so that Member States speak with one voice in order to ensure better gains in the international arena. The pace of regional integration needs to be accelerated to allow Africans to take their destiny in their own hands.

(c) *Re-kindling the spirit of African solidarity in the face of new challenges*

A spirit of solidarity, determination and sacrifice was a strong feature in the efforts of Africans and their political leadership in their quest to rid the continent of colonialism, apartheid, including the many scarifies made by the "Frontline States". This spirit needs to be re-kindled, especially among Africa's young people, to enable the continent to face the challenges of our times.

(d) *Strong political commitment to implement agreed actions*

As shown by the preceding analysis, Africa has not been bereft of bold initiatives to address its political and economic agenda. What has been lacking is the commitment to implement agreed actions; in effect the continental agreements, programs and

Elements of the Paradigm Shift

- The promotion of effective citizens participation in public policy processes, government accountability, openness and transparency at all levels of governance - national, regional and continental are increasingly recognized as prerequisites for the continent's overall transformation.
- Africa should speak with one voice and cede sovereignty in order to make progress and strengthen collective unity. A key feature of Agenda 2063 is that it seeks to alter Africa's standing in the global political economy, away from its historical status as a 'passive object' to an active and dynamic actor. This means empowering the African Union and enabling it to authoritatively speak for the continent. This should be coupled with vigorous follow-up on the reform of key global institutions of governance such as the UN, IMF, and WB, strategic involvement in platforms of bloc politics such as the G8, G20 and BRICs, as well as negotiations on global agendas such as the Doha Round of Trade negotiations; climate change negotiations and the Post 2015 Development Agenda.
- Accountability for delivery of results so that the continent's citizens can realize concrete benefits from continental and regional initiatives. The old way of doing business, namely elaboration of initiatives at continental level that are unimplemented at regional and national level must end. Agenda 2063 must be results-driven with accountability for delivering on programs rather a focus on purely normative processes.

frameworks are only slowly translated into national level actions. To succeed, Agenda 2063 should be embedded in national and regional plans and frameworks.

(e) *The imperative of a paradigm shift*

The continent stands at a crucial point. After decades of poor growth, hopes for a better future have been rekindled in all corners of the continent. Over the last few decades there has been a remarkable convergence of Africa's political and economic systems; all countries have adopted pluralistic democracy and market economies as models. Ideological tensions that divided Africa in the past and acted as bottleneck to political unity and economic integration have dissipated.

However, Africa must do business differently and adopt a paradigm shift if current hopes for a better future for the continent are to be realized. Key elements of this paradigm shift include citizens' participation, speaking with one voice in international affairs and accountability for results. These represent a few elements that should underpin Agenda 2063. Chapter 5 presents a more detailed treatment of some of the critical drivers and enablers for the successful implementation of Agenda 2063.

The paradigm shift is critical if the problems and challenges Africa faces today (treated in detail in the section below) are to be resolved and the continent launched on a positive trajectory.

3.2 AFRICA TODAY: Progress, Challenges And Implications For Agenda 2063

Africa's achievements over the last decade and a half are significant. Across the region, economic growth has firmly taken root (and there is more to that growth than just export of raw materials), with increased exports and foreign direct investment. If current growth trajectory is maintained, incomes are projected to double in 22 years. Furthermore, political stability, peace and security and reforms in governance have changed the political landscape. Women and youth are progressively having a greater voice in decision-making. With aid declining, Africa is also increasingly financing its own development thanks to export earnings, trade and remittances among others.

However, these positive developments are juxtaposed with significant challenges and the positive overview also masks significant variations across regions and between countries.

Below is an assessment of Africa today, the progress and challenges in context of the quest to attain the AU vision of **“an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena”** and the seven African Aspirations outlined in chapter 2.

3.2.1 A Prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development

The Africa of 2063 envisioned under this aspiration is a prosperous continent where the citizens have a high standard of living, are well educated with a skilled labour force, transformed economies, productive agriculture and healthy ecosystems, with well-preserved environment and a continent resilient to climate change.

An assessment of where Africa stands today with respect to four parameters that are critical for attaining the African aspiration for prosperity based on inclusive growth and sustainable development is presented below:

- **Social and human development:** poverty, inequality, jobs and incomes, health, education, social security and protection, demographics and urbanization;

- **Economic transformation and job creation:** economic growth, private sector development, industrialization, manufacturing, trade and investment;
- **Agriculture and the blue/ocean economy:** agricultural productivity and production; and
- **Environment and natural resources management:** biodiversity, forests, wildlife, land, desertification and climate change.

Social and human development in Africa

In recent years, Africa has made much progress in the area of social and human development. Poverty levels are falling, incomes are rising and there are improvements in both health and education outcomes¹⁰. The Human Development Index (HDI) is reported to improve at a 1.5per cent annual growth and 15 African countries are now classified as medium to high human development¹¹. However, 34 out of the 43 (i.e. 79per cent) of the countries in the low human development category are from Africa, and none were in the very high category. Globally, this demonstrates that despite commendable progress the continent still lags behind other regions.

Improvements in both income and non-income components have been reported to have a positive impact on human development in Africa¹². Some countries have improved both incomes and non-income components (i.e. access to health and education) while in others (e.g. resource rich countries), incomes are rising faster than access to health and education. In these countries, growth is not broad-based enough and is not being translated into human development fast enough. In a few other countries social outcomes (health and education) are improving at a faster pace than improvements in incomes. Such investments in social capital can be expected to pay-off in terms of accelerated development once the fetters to economic growth are removed.

Poverty, inequality, incomes and hunger

According to key indicators, poverty in Africa is falling for the first time in a generation. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty (i.e. less than USD 1.25/day) fell from 56.5per cent in 1990 to 48.5per cent in 2010¹³. Furthermore, a number of countries have reached or are close to reaching the MDG target of halving poverty by 2015. However, the poverty situation has worsened in several other countries. Overall, the gains remain fragile and reversible due to rising inequalities and exposure to shocks (economic, political, social and environmental).

Despite the progress, Africa remains the continent with the highest concentration of poverty. The number of Africans living below the poverty line has in fact increased from 290 million in 1990 to 376 million in 1999 to 414 million in 2010¹⁴. The continent's share of global poverty rose from 15 per cent in 1990 to 34 per cent in 2010. The continent has also made little progress in addressing the depth of poverty; the average per capita income of the extreme poor in Africa has remained almost constant between 1990 and 2010.

The consensus is that rapid economic growth of recent years has failed to translate into corresponding and significant poverty reduction or improved living conditions for many Africans. A key factor is the structure of growth. For example, the significant progress made in reducing poverty in Ethiopia and Rwanda is linked to rapid growth of the agriculture sector, and this is in contrast to those countries where growth is more linked to the extractive sectors, such as in Angola, Nigeria and Zambia.

¹⁰ African Economic Outlook 2014

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid

¹³ Africa MDG Report, 2014

¹⁴ Ibid

Exclusion and gender inequality are major sources of poverty¹⁵. Africa is reportedly the second most unequal region in the world after Latin America; the Gini Index for 2000 to 2009 was 43.9 compared to 52.2 for Latin America and the Caribbean¹⁶. However, Africa has made more rapid progress than other regions and showed the largest decline in inequality between 1990s and 2000s.

Women's unequal access to land, ownership and control is a major factor behind inequality in many African countries; addressing inequality in Africa requires dealing with women's access to ownership and control of land¹⁷. Agenda 2063 will only succeed if it changes the face of women poverty in Africa.

Projections from the Africa Progress Panel (2014) shows that eradicating poverty within a generation is ambitious but not impossible as prospects are determined more by policies adopted by governments than by past trends.

Another dimension is the poverty - hunger nexus in Africa. Between 1990 and 2013, Africa reduced hunger by 23 per cent¹⁸. However, performance varies with countries; four countries have reached the MDG target in 2013 (Ghana, Angola, Malawi and Rwanda) while six are close, and some 29 countries have made modest to moderate progress. The reduction in prevalence of underweight children remains a daunting task. Overall, Africa is still far from reaching the MDG target on hunger. The main challenges in addressing hunger include: poor performance of agricultural sector; climate change and drought; conflicts; and more recently the outbreak of diseases (e.g. Ebola).

Strategies for poverty reduction should therefore include broad-based economic growth, job creation and substantial investments in building social capital in terms of access to education and health, as well as reduction in exclusion and inequalities of opportunities. As stated in the Common African Position on Post 2015, African countries need to give priority to structural transformation and people-centred development in order to address poverty.

Exclusion and unequal access to economic and social opportunities inhibit human rights and thwart both improvements to livelihoods and development of skills that economic expansion can offer. For instance, unequal access to education and barriers to the labour market exclude young people living in rural or urban low-income areas, women and the disabled from lucrative jobs in productive sectors that require skilled labour. This locks young people, for example, in a cycle of low-skilled jobs in low productive sectors with low remuneration, fuelling poverty. Only 51% of 15-24 year olds participate in wage-earning jobs. The lack of growing skilled- labour force in turn reduces national competitiveness and opportunities to attract investment that can promote economic diversification and technological advancement.

Some Policy Measures on Poverty and Hunger in Africa

- Economic diversification and structural transformation are key, and accelerated, inclusive and diversified growth and effective distribution policies will contribute to achieving the ambitious poverty reduction target;
- African governments will need to privilege structural transformation and people-centered development;
- Macro-economic stability and the pattern of economic growth are important factors in accelerating poverty reduction. Policies related to fiscal, monetary and exchange rates need to be aligned to sector poverty reduction objectives;
- Countries that have been able to address inequality have also succeeded in accelerating growth and reducing poverty - high inequality reduces the impact of high growth on poverty reduction;
- There is a need to invest in social protection programs – social protection in Africa currently covers only 20 percent of the poorest quintile compared to 50 percent in Central Asia and 55 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Strategies must be put in place to address the following features that characterize poverty in Africa: (i) predominance of rural poverty; and (ii) feminization of poverty.
- Unemployment is a huge challenge, with Africa in 2013 contributing the major share of global unemployment. Creation of decent jobs is therefore a policy priority.

¹⁵ Inequality is expressed in terms of access to income, economic opportunities, productive assets (land), and use of public services (education and health)

¹⁶ Africa MDG Report 2014

¹⁷ Africa MDG Report 2014

¹⁸ Ibid

Social protection and social security

Social security and protection can play a vital role in ensuring that growth leads to reduced poverty and inequality, as experience from Europe, Latin America and Asia has shown. Furthermore, addressing inequality through social protection makes growth more inclusive by contributing to domestic demand-led growth. It is also important to underline that social security is both a human right, and an economic and social necessity.

In Africa, employment - based contributory social security system hardly covers 10 per cent of workers, as a result of the dominance of the informal economy and rural sector, and the increase in informal employment. This results in a significant social security coverage gap in the labour market. On the other hand, African countries have put in place many non-contributory social protection strategies/programs, including cash transfers, public works programs and a range of safety nets for the poor and vulnerable. These include 123 cash transfer programs in 34 countries and over 500 public works programs. The number of African countries with social protection programs increased from 21 in 2010 to 37 in 2013, nearly doubling in number in a space of just three years¹⁹. In addition almost all African countries have safety nets programs – out of 48 countries sampled 45 had conditional in-kind transfers, 13 had conditional cash transfers, 39 had unconditional in-kind transfers, 37 had unconditional cash transfers and 39 had public works programs²⁰.

These efforts have yielded some results in terms of reducing poverty and inequality. Some are fairly extensive such as the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), which reaches 8 million beneficiaries in 1.5 million households. Other country experiences include Mauritius, South Africa, Namibia, Rwanda (with universal healthcare covering 90 per cent of the population), Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania. Several countries also provide emergency food (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, etc.).

At the continental level, the African Union has adopted the Social Policy Framework (SPF), which aims to encourage Member States to extend coverage and provide a minimum package of services to the poor and vulnerable. Social protection plans target the Informal economy and rural workers since the huge majority of the labour force is engaged in the informal economy and rural sector with low social security coverage.

However, current measures are far from being adequate due to²¹: (i) underfunding: only up to 2 per cent of GDP is spent on social protection compared to 4 per cent as the global average, and in most AU Member States it is less than 2 per cent; (ii) limited coverage - only 20 per cent of African citizens benefit from social protection, this includes old age pensions and grants to persons with

Measures to enhance Social Protection

- Mitigating risks-African informal economy workers and farmers face through innovative insurance schemes;
- Protecting and building productive assets in case of emergencies triggered by floods, droughts, crop failures;
- Protecting and building human capital through cash transfers and other support measures.
- By injecting resources into local economies well designed social protection programs can yield dividends and spillovers in terms of local economic growth and job creation and strengthen social cohesion.

¹⁹ Reported in Africa MDG Report, 2014

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ At international level, key partners have developed social protection policies for developing countries: EU Agenda for Change (2012), World Bank Social Protection Strategy for Africa (2012-2022) and the ILO Social Protection Floors which inspire the policy commitment and work of other international structures such as the G20 and the OECD.

disabilities; (iii) the fragmented, donor-driven and disjointed nature of many projects leading to limited systematic approaches; and (iv) the limited effectiveness and efficiency of the existing social security systems.

To strengthen social security and social protection African countries should adopt a two-pronged strategy:

- Firstly, as a protection against poverty, African countries should build social protection floor and minimum package to improve access to essential health care and basic income security for children and families, women and men of working age, in particular in the informal economy and rural sector, and for older persons. On average, by allocating 5 per cent of GDP, Member States will ensure the above minimum social protection package. Fiscal space exists in many countries for such strategies.
- Secondly, progressively ensuring social security benefits of guaranteed levels for all by extending contributory social security systems targeting household economic units in the informal economy and rural sector.

Education and skills development

Africa needs to significantly improve its human capital in order to achieve the economic transformation envisaged under Agenda 2063. This transformation calls for a transition from low to high productivity sectors, which is critical for enhancing productivity and competitiveness of African economies in a global knowledge-based economy. This in turn will translate into improved incomes, reduced poverty and overall better well-being for African citizens.

Most of Africa's recent growth performance can be attributed to harvesting the "low hanging fruits" related to macroeconomic policy reforms, political stability, improvements in business climate and export of primary commodities²². While these are important to jump-start economic growth, they are not by themselves sufficient to sustain and expand growth in the long run²³. The continent needs to raise the quality and quantity of its human capital significantly, build critical capacities, and expand skills in order for her to harness new job and technological opportunities in a global knowledge-based economy. Improved human capital will also help prepare countries to better capitalize on opportunities and mitigate risks in a fast-changing world.

The critical role of education in economic growth and transformation has been demonstrated by recent research²⁴. A significant positive correlation exists between the two, with rates of return ranging from 5 per cent to 12 per cent for each additional schooling year, and higher rates for tertiary as compared to secondary education. The economic growth trajectory of the so-called Asian tigers closely mirrors their human capital formation. In the quest to build their human capital, African countries should take a critical look at their educational systems at all levels, with a view to adapting them to today's (and the future) global knowledge-driven economy, as well as to the values of the African Renaissance and Africa's emergence on the world stage.

This section analyses the progress made, and the challenges with respect to: basic (primary and secondary) education and tertiary education, including science and technology.

²² Africa 2050 Realizing the Continent's Potential

²³ Africa 2050

²⁴ Barro and Lee. A New Data Set for Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010

Basic (primary and secondary) education

Coming from a relatively low base, African countries have made spectacular progress, when compared to the rest of the world in primary school enrolment. The continent increased net enrolment by 24 per cent over the period 1990-2011²⁵. In addition, gender parity has also improved markedly. The number of out of school children fell from 40 million in 1999 to 22 million currently. The policy of providing free, compulsory and universal primary education in many countries has been a major driving factor.

However, low completion rates and issues of educational quality and relevance remain as key concerns. When compared to other regions, Africa's progress still leaves much to be desired. Pre-primary school coverage is 17 per cent per cent compared to 48 per cent for South Asia, 57 per cent for East Asia and 70 per cent for Latin America.

Furthermore, the slow demographic transition in Africa means that the continent will have to greatly expand basic education in the next few decades to keep pace with population growth while other regions would be shifting resources to expand post-basic education and improve education quality at all levels²⁶.

High primary enrolment has boosted literacy rates in many African countries, although average literacy rates stand at 50 per cent continent-wide. In general, countries with high completion rates at primary level tend to have high youth literacy rates. Due to low completion rates, poor quality and the mismatch between educational systems and requirements of the job market, as well as the imperative of creating jobs for Africa's growing youth population, many African countries have embarked on Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) initiatives.

Tertiary education

Investing in higher education²⁷ will ensure that African countries produce the critical stock of human capital (engineers, doctors, accountants, lawyers, etc.) required to build modern competitive societies and economies. Tertiary education supports economic development directly by generating new knowledge, building capacity to access the global storehouse of knowledge, and adapting knowledge for local use.

Challenges in Education

- Although free primary education has been a positive factor, the cost of learning materials has in many instances made schooling unaffordable for poor families. Post-conflict countries such as Liberia, face serious challenges in improving primary education due to shortage of resources and immense demands.
- Completion rates at the primary level are low in general; 28 percent of the countries with data have below 60 percent completion rates. Moreover, progress in completion is also slow. A key problem is that in expanding access, a number of countries recruited many unqualified teachers, making teacher and professional development of key concern;
- Despite the progress made in education access it is estimated that one out of every three children drop out without having met the basic competencies in reading and mathematics. Low quality primary education has significant impact on prospects for jobs for young people and this in turn perpetuates inter-generational poverty. Thus special programs are needed to address the problems of school dropouts.
- Educational disparity between boys and girls have been drastically reduced at the primary level, however, the gap still exists, especially in rural and urban-poor areas – only 23% of poor girls in rural areas are completing primary education.

Lessons for Accelerating Achievement of MDG Targets on Education

- Speeding up private sector involvement in education;
- Enhancing science, technology and innovation (STI) to extend access and improve educational quality;
- Addressing the root causes of low completion rates and putting in place remedial measures
- Upgrading education management and planning capacities.

²⁵ Africa MDG Report 2014

²⁶ Africa 2050

²⁷ Universities, Colleges and Polytechnics

In the immediate post-independence period, higher education in most African countries was seen as a “public good” and tertiary institutions received direct budget support from African governments. However, the crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s (i.e. the era of structural adjustment) led to reductions in funds allocated to the sector. This together with the surge in enrolments led to severe underfunding of Africa’s institutions of higher learning. Coupled with the generalized conflicts and poor economic conditions that prevailed in many African countries, the continent’s institutions of higher learning, some of which were comparable to the best in the world (e.g. Makerere University in Uganda, University of Ibadan in Nigeria) rapidly declined.

Current demand for higher education has expanded rapidly. For example, student population trebled from 2.7 million in 1991 to 9.3 million in 2006 and it is projected to rise to 18-20 million by 2015²⁸. It is estimated that Africa currently has over 800 universities and 1,500 institutions of higher learning²⁹. Private universities have expanded rapidly; from 7 private universities in 1960 to 27 by 1990, and it is estimated that in 2006 up to 22 per cent of higher education was serviced by the private sector³⁰. The importance of private providers of education at the tertiary level is shown by the following statistics: Uganda (7 public and 27 private); Somalia (40 universities, all private); South Africa (21 public and 87 private); Ghana (6 public and 42 private); and (Nigeria (36 Federal, 37 State and 45 private)³¹. This growth in private institutions at the tertiary level has helped meet the surging demand for higher education but it has also introduced issues of quality and standards.

Throughout the continent, there has been significant investment taking place in tertiary education, with the UNESCO Science Report of 2010 stating that investment in Higher Education in Africa averaged 4.5 per cent of GDP, which is close to the global median for developing countries. Similarly, there has been a surge in scholarly research, with 11,142 peer review articles in 2008.

Despite the growth in tertiary enrolments and the rapid increase in both public and private institutions at the tertiary level, Africa’s stock of human capital is comparatively small and its quality variable. African countries risk being marginalized in a highly competitive global economy because of weaknesses in tertiary education. Long-term investment is needed to both revitalize higher education and to support the development of centres of excellence in science, engineering and technology, as well as reverse the brain drain.

The African Union’s 2nd Decade of Education, spells out specific strategies for revitalizing the tertiary education sector.

Challenges in Tertiary Education

- Underfunding: over the past decades, enrollment surged but funding declined resulting in fall in quality and relevance. Between 1991 and 2005, enrollment tripled (8.7% growth), while at the same time public financing declined such that annual funding per student went from USD 6,800 in 1981 to USD 980 in 2005.
- With decline in funding, across disciplines, only 70% of required faculty positions were filled, with some as low as 30-40 percent;
- Leadership and management were weak, and in the face of declining funding quality and research are falling and institutional quality assurance mechanisms are either not in place or are weak;
- The relevance of the curriculum in many tertiary education institutions is questionable given that most students continue to be enrolled in “soft” disciplines – in 2004 only 28 percent were in science and technology. This situation is compounded by the fact that in Africa, only 0.3 percent of the budget is allocated to Research & Development.
- There is a mismatch between the education provided and the capabilities required in the job market leading to waste of scarce educational resources and unemployment.

²⁸ Olugbemiro Jegede (2012) The Status of Higher Education in Africa

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Ibid

AU Second Decade of Education: Tertiary Level

- Encourage greater mobility of academics, researchers, staff and students and recognition of qualifications from different regions through harmonization of degree structures
- Establish an African Higher education and Research Space that will pay serious attention to institutional and national quality assurance systems and promote high level relevant research and post-graduate training tailored towards solving Africa's problems;
- Adopt and adapt Open and Distance Learning as instructional delivery mechanisms in Africa as other continents have done in order for Africa to significantly raise its tertiary education enrollment from current 6 percent (face-to-face mode) to at least 50 percent;
- Use ICT effectively for instructional delivery, professional communication to develop, acquire, produce and distribute knowledge, skills and competencies across the continent; and
- Create centers of excellence within regions of the continent to develop robust post-graduate studies and develop strong research base and global competitive advantage.

At continental level, progress is being made as exemplified by the following: (i) the revised Arusha Convention whose aim is to promote pan-African cooperation for mutual recognition of academic qualifications (i.e. the legal instrument for the AU Harmonization Strategy) and which to date has been signed by 20 countries; (ii) the establishment of Pan African University (PAU) designed to contribute to higher education and meeting Africa's development needs through innovation in training and research with a focus on science technology and innovation; (iii) the AUC's Mwalimu Nyerere African Union Scholarship Scheme launched in 2007 to enable young African to study in leading universities; and (iv) an African Quality Rating Mechanism (AQRM) that has been set up to support development of institutional cultures of quality and commitment to quality.

These and other measures taken at national and regional levels reflect the awareness of African policy makers of the importance of tertiary education to the continent's development. However, the pace is slow and reform efforts need to be re-doubled to ensure that the required skills and competencies for a globally competitive economy are rapidly available in all African countries.

For Africa to build its human capital base it needs to expand enrolments at pre-school level, scale up completion rates at the basic, secondary and tertiary levels and expand literacy. There is an urgent need of ensuring access to quality education, including universal access through at least secondary education for all children, with particular attention to girls' retention and completion rates, as well as the need for more girls and women to enrol in STEM subjects for Africa to achieve rapid industrialization and economic transformation.

African countries would require aggressive and committed leadership and long-term investment if the continent is to close the human and skills gap needed to transform lives and build competitive economies. Tertiary education is the backbone of research and development, an area where Africa lags significantly. Although South Africa and Nigeria are able to act as global players in technology development, including in aero-spatial research, many African countries have poorly developed R&D capacities, which is also male dominated. Research and development as a percentage of GDP ranges from 0.3 per cent to 1 per cent in most African countries, as compared to European countries (Finland 3.5 per cent, Sweden 3.9 per cent), USA (2.7 per cent), as well as Japan, Singapore and Korea (2-3 per cent)³². However, in 2003, African Ministers of Science and Technology committed to raise R&D to at least 1 per cent in five years, demonstrating that African policy makers are fully cognizant of the challenge.

Action areas for Agenda 2063

- Investing in Early Childhood Education;
- Building critical skills through expanded access to primary education for all, addressing the issue of school-drop outs and improving quality issues;
- Improving the quality and relevance of technical and vocational skills development to address the needs of both cutting edge skills and training the majority who are involved in the informal economy; and
- Revitalizing tertiary education through expanding access, improving quality and relevance;
- Building human capital for knowledge and innovation-driven economies; and
- Harnessing regional and continental resources to significantly scale up human capital formation.

³² Simon. E (2008) Current state of International Science Statistics for Africa

Health

Despite the current outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, notable gains have been realized in the health sector of many African countries in recent decades. The current status of health on the continent however, also shows that many challenges remain. Progress with respect to some of the MDG-related health targets are briefly highlighted below³³:

- **Child Mortality:** steep declines in under 5 mortality rates have been realized; continent-wide U5MR has fallen from 145 deaths per 1000 live births in 1990 to 80 per 1000 live births in 2012, which translates into a 44 per cent decline. Annual progress has also improved markedly; increasing from 1.4 per cent in the 1990 to 2000 period to 3.8 per cent in the 2000 to 2012 period. However, the gains are insufficient for the continent to meet the MDG target by 2015.
- **Maternal mortality:** significant progress has been registered with maternal mortality ratio dropping from 870 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 470 in 2013, reflecting a 47 per cent decline. It is also reported that the number of women dying from pregnancy and birth complications declined by almost half in 2010 as compared to 1990. However, the continent is off-track for achieving this target. Reasons for this situation are poor access to community health services, especially in the rural areas, high adolescent birth rates and limited number of skilled birth attendants.
- **HIV and AIDS:** the trends with respect to HIV and AIDS among adults have been reversed due to strong political will and, increased access to antiretroviral drugs among other measures. HIV prevalence rates have declined from 5.89 per cent to 4.7 per cent between 1995 and 2012, and between 2010 and 2011 access to antiretroviral drugs increased from 48 per cent to 56 per cent. However, some 25 million people are still living with HIV and AIDS in Southern, East, Central and West Africa.

Features and Challenges in Health

- The continent has 12 percent of the world's population but 25 percent of its disease burden, 70 percent of those living with HIV and AIDs live in Africa and 50 percent of under 5 deaths are in Africa. Africa's high disease burden is putting a major break on economic growth. A stark case in point is the current Ebola out-break in West Africa, which is predicted to curb growth by between 2.5 to 4 percent in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone.
- Health system strengthening is a major concern with most health care systems being seriously under-funded. Although 53 countries have signed the Abuja Declaration committing them to allocate 15 percent of their budgets to the health sector, most have not met this goal and some of those who have met it, have done so using donor funds, an unsustainable situation.
- Although infectious diseases as a cause of mortality and morbidity have declined in the rest of the world, these remain as the most frequent causes of deaths in Africa due to poor environmental management, weak water and sanitation systems and low knowledge of basic health household practices.
- With rising urbanization and lifestyle changes, it is predicted that there will be major increases in deaths related to cardio-vascular and respiratory illnesses, as well as from diabetes.
- Malaria continues to cause many avoidable deaths and hinders development in parts where it is endemic; global distribution of per-capita gross domestic product shows a striking correlation between malaria and poverty¹. It is therefore imperative that Africa counters this major challenge to development whose comprehensive control amounts to approximately US\$3.0 billion per year on average, or around US\$4.02 per African at risk².

Continental initiatives on Health

- **Maternal Health:** "No woman shall die in pregnancy. There shall be full access to integrated sexual and reproductive health care and institutional delivery for all women of reproductive age"
- **Child Health:** "Africa shall advance towards nil death in under-five children in our continent"
- **Maternal, Newborn and Child Health:** To ensure the continuum of care, especially around MNCH, efforts will be scaled up to promote the integration of services, particularly at the primary health care level.
- **HIV/AIDS:** "Towards zero incidence, zero deaths from HIV&AIDS"
- **Tuberculosis:** "An Africa continent free of TB (Zero deaths, disease or suffering due to TB)".
- **Malaria:** "Together with the world, we shall achieve an Africa free of malaria"
- **Non-communicable diseases:**
- **Neglected tropical diseases:**
- **Infectious diseases (Public Health Emergencies):** African governments should commit to the creation of a continent capable of preventing, detecting, containing, eliminating and responding to epidemic diseases and other public health risks attributable to human and animal diseases through multi-sector cooperation and strong partnerships.
- **Health care financing:** "Quality health care everywhere in Africa, every time"

³³ Africa MDG Report 2014

- **Malaria:** the incidence, prevalence and deaths from malaria have declined over the past decade as a result of expanded treatment, care and preventive measures. However, the malaria burden remains high, especially for children under 5 years who continue to suffer disproportionately. For example, in 2012, it is estimated that 90 per cent of the 627,000 malaria cases world-wide occurred in Southern, East, Central and West Africa with 77 per cent of those cases affecting children under 5 years.

At continental level, various initiatives are underway to address the continent's health related challenges- see box.

Looking to the future, the following actions need to be taken into account:

- a) Committing to the achievement of financially sustainable health care systems, which ensure equitable access, aligned with local health priorities while being domestically directed and financed, including through:
 - Engendering country ownership of the funding and management of health care, including increase in domestic funding;
 - Engaging the relevant stakeholders in the funding of health care delivery;
 - Mobilizing resources especially local and international, for the financing of health; and
 - Aligning donor policy and funding with national government and local priorities.

The continent must optimally explore some opportunities that could effectively change the current scenario of health financing. This includes creating pooled funding at the national level to finance health, which may involve corporate social responsibility contributions as well as taxation.

The dwindling and unpredictability of development assistance compels Africa to look inwards for domestic resources for the care of her people. Africa will need to mobilize internal resources for the promotion of her health, encourage public –private partnership in the financing of health and the provision of services while promoting equity through universal health coverage. Cultural and context specific (community) health insurance schemes would need to be developed to guarantee access to services especially for the disadvantaged and the most vulnerable. The health system, defined to its fullest extent would need to be strengthened with sustained investment to ameliorate the social determinants of health.

Value for money will remain a critical component of health policy and processes will continuously need to be improved to ensure efficiency and curbing of wastages. Accountability mechanisms should be put in place at all levels to ensure that duty bearers remain accountable to the right holders with regards to responsibilities they have been assigned and resources over which they have custodial authority.

- b) The African health agenda for 2063, due to the continent's demographic profile, calls for a focus on both the health needs of the young and the chronic degenerative diseases of the old. Africa's population has shifted from a 6per cent proportion of the aged to the total population to 13 per cent. The situation in northern part of Africa is

Health Policy Measures

- Aggressively address and reduce the high levels of communicable and non-communicable diseases on the continent
- Take preemptive measures to curtail the growth of chronic lifestyle diseases;
- Strengthen health systems, build technical capacity and institute health reforms that should include decentralization of health systems in an effort to promote universal access
- Put in place sustainable funding strategies to ensure universal basic health provision for all
- Make health services accessible to all through sustainable social policies such as development of robust health insurance systems, to replace subsidies that currently exist in most African countries

even more acute with the aged population reaching as high as 25per cent of the total in some countries. The African health agenda of the millennium will need to cater for the younger population while focusing heath services on effectively tackle the tertiary needs of the aged population, as well.

- c) The increasing changes of lifestyles, particularly the abandonment of the traditional high fibre diets for high sugar and refined diets, coupled with the increasing adoption of other habits such as smoking and urban stress in rapidly urbanizing centres portends a conglomeration of risk factors for non-communicable diseases. The current emphasis on primary health care is consequently inadequate to respond to the projected health challenges. Thus African countries should develop policies to incorporate non-communicable diseases in primary health care while strengthening the technological base of secondary and tertiary health care services. Such investments are not only capital intensive but would require a new set of skills on the part of policy makers, program managers and health care workers.


Improving the health of Africa’s citizens also calls for broad-based strategies and a multifaceted approach that addresses access to water and sanitation, women’s empowerment, nutrition, access to basic services and improved education, rather than narrow vertical approaches that characterizes efforts so far.

The Abuja Declaration related to Health and the African Leaders’ Malaria Alliance, point to strong political commitment to improving Africa’s health status and this momentum should be sustained, including the mobilization of the continent, under the auspices of the AU to address Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The commitments to integrate sexual and reproductive health and rights, family planning and HIV/AIDS services through reinforcing action on earlier commitments to enhance maternal, newborn and child health status, ensuring the integration necessary to facilitate synergies between HIV/AIDS, TB, Malaria and Maternal, Newborn and Child Health programmes must be vigorously followed through.

Demographic Trends

Since 1950, Africa’s population size and growth has experienced an upward trend, growing from about 229 million to 1.2 billion in 2014, representing 9.1 and 15.1 per cent of the total world population respectively. This proportion is projected to increase to 19.7 and 35.3 per cent respectively by 2034 and 2100 (see Figure 1). Over this period, the African population will increase far more rapidly than the rest of the world population.

Figure 1- Evolution of the World population and relative share (per cent) of the African population, 1950-2100



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, DVD Edition.

The pattern of population distribution varies between countries and regions, and over the years the geographical distribution of the population will change. East Africa is the most populous region today; by 2100, West Africa will occupy that rank. Central Africa is and will remain the least populous region on the continent.

Africa's population is young with a median age of about 20 years in 2014, compared to a world average of 30 years. By 2050 the median age for Africa will increase to 25 years, while the average for the world as whole will climb to 38 years. The proportion of children aged 0 to 14 to the total population is projected to fall from 42.2 per cent in 2000 to 30.6 per cent by 2050, while the percentage of the working age population 15 to 64 is expected to increase from 54.5 per cent to 62.8 per cent between the two periods and, is projected to be at 63.7 per cent in 2100.

The continent is experiencing rapid urbanization (see next section). Migration is intense in Africa and takes various forms. There is first a rural-urban migration, contributing to rapid urbanization; there is also movements of populations across countries where there are limited visa issues; there are young Africans taking their chances outside the continent; and finally there are a good number of forced displacements, due to factors such as civil wars, droughts, water shortages and natural disasters. The rural-urban migration presents development challenges in the form of land access, infrastructure and provision of basic services, as well as employment.

The demographic changes underway in Africa including rapid urbanization, rapid increases in the workforce, the changing age structure are complex and have profound implications for the continent's human development and structural transformation. The key question is how Africa can leverage and harness these dynamics and ensure that they do not hinder but rather boost its economic growth and structural transformation.

Turning rapid urbanization into an opportunity requires new policy approaches to development and management of Africa's cities. Harnessing the demographic dividend of a youth bulge resulting from the changing age structure and deriving economic, social and environmental gains may happen through the following process. As youthful populations become older and have fewer children than previous generations, a bulge in the working age population will likely result in many countries. When there are more working-age adults relative to children and the elderly, then the working-age population has a lower dependency burden, with fewer people to support with the same income and assets. That creates a window of opportunity to save on health care and other social services, improve the quality of education, increase economic output because of more

Some Priority Actions for Urbanization and Human Settlements

- Improving shelter/housing delivery and slum eradication is a major priority in view of the rapidly expanding urban population and the backlog in delivery of shelter and services. This will require improvements in legal, institutional, regulatory systems and capacities.
- Ensuring financing for urban development: to cope with existing and anticipated needs to expand infrastructure, facilities, housing, innovative financing approaches will be required. Already there are emerging good practices: land value sharing; municipal development funds; urban bonds markets; improved revenue-generating efficiency; etc.
- Facilitating spatial planning and service delivery: rapidly growing urban populations need access to basic services in the areas of: water, sanitation, electricity, transport, waste management. Innovative strategies, which stress sustainability, low carbon green growth, are needed.
- Strengthening the productive base of urban economies: urban centers make substantial contributions to the GDP in African countries and can contribute to reducing poverty and generating employment. Thus Africa's cities and towns can be a major driving force for the continent's transformation. Appropriate policies and institutions need to be developed to ensure that the potential is realized.
- Improving management systems, governance and legislative frameworks: many countries have taken significant steps over the last decades, but these measures have not been effective to cope with rapid urbanization.
- Ensuring urban safety, disaster risk reduction: the imperative of creating safe urban neighborhoods, drugs and crime-free urban areas, as well as risks associated with climate change.

people working, invest more in technology and skills to strengthen the economy, and create the wealth needed to cope with the future aging of the population.

All these efforts need to be translated into action in a way that expands youth opportunities, giving them the skills to participate fully in the economy and public life, and promote healthy behaviours. The mega demographic shifts in Africa and the profound transitions in life styles from traditional to modern will support economic transformation if supported by appropriate population and development policies.

Urbanization and human settlements

As indicated in the previous section, the Africa of 2063 will be a predominantly urban future. It is estimated that more than two-thirds of the projected population of 2.5 billion will be living in urban centres by 2063³⁴. This has far-reaching implications from demographic, spatial and structural standpoints. Thus the urban issue is a crucial part of Agenda 2063. Africa needs to tap the transformative force of urbanization; it offers vital opportunities for economic development, entry into export markets and global value chains, as well as social and human development.

Urbanization is estimated to be occurring at an average rate of 3.2 per cent annually. The implications are a doubling of the continent's population in 20 years and a tripling in 40 years. Africa's urban population will reach over 800 million from 400 million, just slightly over 50 per cent of the population³⁵. By 2063, up to 62 per cent of Africa's projected population will be found in urban centres, while 38 per cent will be in rural areas³⁶.

However, unlike experiences from other regions, rural populations will continue to rise up to 2050, making it important to address both urban and rural population growth. Africa's urbanization agenda must thus address the dynamics of human settlements in the framework of increasing urbanization accompanied by an absolute increase in the number of the rural population.

This growth in urban population has many implications: spatial planning; access to housing; provision of basic services; job creation; economic and social development. However, construction of housing to accommodate a trebling of urban population will be a major challenge.

Urban centres will act as important engines of growth and Africa's economic transformation in the coming decades. Urbanization and urban centres will contribute through enhanced productivity, industrialization, manufacturing and value-addition. The growth of Africa's middle class, which will mostly occur in urban centres, will spur the growth of consumer-facing sectors.

However, skills development, employment and access to services and finance will be critical, as well as urban-rural linkages. Urban centres will also be a key to promoting regional integration, providing the nodes for the linkages associated with integration, and facilitating the movement of goods, services, capital and people.

Rapid urbanization in Africa is likely to impact on all aspects of the continent's development in the coming decades. Appropriate policies need to be in place to address the challenges and tap the benefits and opportunities associated with the phenomenon.

³⁴ Framework for Africa Urban Agenda. AMCHUD, Fifth Session of the African Ministerial Conference on Housing and urban Development, February 2014, N'Djamena, Chad

³⁵ Ibid

³⁶ Ibid

Economic growth, structural transformation and job creation

Maintaining high economic growth rates, coupled with structural transformation of African economies and more inclusive job-creating growth are central to attaining the Agenda 2063 aspiration of prosperity.

The overview presented below highlights the progress and challenges with respect to: economic growth, employment, trade and investment; private sector development and financial services; and industrialization and manufacturing.

Economic growth, employment, trade and investment

One of the outstanding features of Africa in the past two decades has been the continent's performance on the economic front – see text box. However, as indicated earlier, the robust economic growth experienced by many African countries has not translated into wellbeing of most African people, mainly because of low employment intensity of the primary commodities' (mostly exported in raw form) sector (poor ability to generate jobs)³⁷.

In terms of employment: (i) Africa's labour force reached 419 million in 2012, with a participation rate of 65.5 per cent of the working-age population (excluding UMA countries). The participation of women and youth falls below the average; (ii) the employment generated was also of low quality and low wage with limited possibilities for labour to move from one job to another. Today, about 75 per cent of the African labour force is engaged in vulnerable employment, which is mostly in the informal sector of the economy. Africa's trade performance has improved in recent years, but is dominated by primary commodities, and continues to be driven by rising commodity prices.

The main features of Africa's trade are: (i) Africa's share in global exports has also declined from 4.99 per cent in 1970 to 3.33 per cent in 2010, while that of East Asia, for example, rose from 2.25 per cent to 17.8 per cent during the same

Highlights of Africa's Economic Performance

- African countries have been among the fastest growing in the world in recent decades. During the 2002–2008 period, Africa's economic growth rate averaged 5.6 per cent per annum. After a dip to 2.2 per cent in 2009, in the aftermath of the global food crisis of 2007/2008 and fuel price hikes, growth rebounded to 4.6 per cent in 2010 and 5.0 per cent in 2012. Excluding UMA countries, growth in the rest of Africa averaged 5 percent in 2013; and is projected to reach 5.8 percent in 2014 and 5 – 6 percent in 2015.
- This positive growth has been generally shared by all regions, but with variation among sub-regions. Primary commodities export has been the main driver of growth in many cases, although some countries, which are neither oil nor mineral exporting countries, have done remarkably well. The continent's collective GDP reached US\$2.5 trillion in 2013; however, this is roughly equal to that of Brazil's or Russia's.
- Per capita income more than doubled in the past decade—from US\$958 (2004) to US\$1878 (2012) but with variation among countries. It is worth noting that Africa's per capita income was at par with that of East Asia in 1970. Forty years later in 2010, East Asia's per capita income was five times higher.
- African states have improved their respective macroeconomic management, which was reflected in the continent's macroeconomic stability of the past decade. Africa reduced its collective inflation rate from 22 percent in the 1990s to 2.6 percent in the past decade. Aggregate foreign debt declined from 82 percent of GDP to 59 percent; while the budget deficit from 4.6 percent of GDP to 1.8 percent.
- Africa's investment share in GDP reached 23 percent, during the last decade, ending a long period of decline and stagnation during the 1980s and the 1990s. However, it remains about 10 percentage points lower than, for example, India.
- Private sector investment has also grown in absolute terms; although its relative share in GDP has declined. Recorded remittances have also shown resilience to the economic and financial crisis of past years; and continued to support livelihoods of many Africans including their access to education and health services. For the upper-middle-income African countries, private investment represents the main source of development finance, on average, accounting for 70% of total external flows over the 2010–14 period.

³⁷ (ECA and AUC, 2010)

period (UNECA 2013); (ii) on the import side, fuels make up more than 17 per cent of Africa's imports, of which over 90 per cent consist of refined petroleum products³⁸. Africa also continues to source basic consumables, such as food, clothing and household items largely from outside of the continent; (iii) trade in agri-food, an important sector, continues to face several challenges due to its heavy concentration on a limited range of raw commodities (coffee, cocoa, tea, cotton, peanut, palm oil, pineapple, banana, fish and shellfish); high vulnerability to price volatility in global markets; unfair global trade practices and severe competition from highly developed and more productive systems; and (iv) Africa (excluding North Africa) remains one of the most expensive regions for trading internationally, just below Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Trade costs in landlocked countries are even higher; Africa has eleven of the world's twenty countries with the highest cost of exports. This is compounded by: long processing time; limited port capacity and limited access to trade finance.

Challenges of Africa's Private Sector

- A relatively large and growing informal segment, which is also a dominant source of employment for women. "The share of informal employment as a percentage of local non-agricultural employment rose from 40 per cent in the period from 1985 to 1989 to 61 per cent over the period from 2000 to 2007";
- Dominance of micro- and small-scale enterprises in both formal and informal sectors. Although large firms exist in many countries, "medium-scale enterprises that play a crucial role in the economic development of emerging and developed economies are either absent or few in number" (UNCTAD 2013). The relatively small size of African firms represents missed opportunity to operate at an optimum scale and benefit from the economies of scale needed to be competitive;
- Absence of or limited inter-firm linkages, i.e., between the formal and informal economies, between small and large firms and between domestic and foreign firms hinders expansion of skills base, innovation capabilities and creation of horizontal and vertical linkages within the national economy.

Private sector development and financial services

Africa's private sector is growing rapidly as countries continue to liberalize their markets, promote entrepreneurship, improve their legal and institutional frameworks, offer incentives and guarantees, and encourage open competition. Nevertheless, the sector remains at an infant stage compared to other continents.

Africa continues to lag behind other regions of the world in financial sector development. Commercial banks dominate the financial sector. Capital markets (stock exchanges) are not also well developed. Interbank market transactions are limited. Only 3.5 per cent of the African market is insured, indicating a vast opportunity for insurance firms as untapped sources of finance. With growth of population, incomes and the middle class, while the African pension industry is growing fast with asset value estimated at \$379 billion,³⁹ it is not yet fully integrated into the continent's financial system and economic development. In general, the lack of access to finance by households and enterprises, particularly the smaller ones, and women continue to be a major constraint to development.

Industrialization and manufacturing⁴⁰

Industrialization and manufacturing is key to Africa's structural transformation. This will enable value-addition, growth of high paying jobs, increased incomes and greater share of Africa in global value chains.

In the early decades following independence, many African countries embarked on state - led import substitution industrialization. The initial impact of the strategy was an increase in manufacturing output and jobs. By the mid-70's, however, the strategy ran into problems, including productivity declines and recurring losses fuelled by overvalued currencies, macro-economic imbalances, inflation and shortage of foreign exchange to purchase critical inputs. Stabilization

³⁸ UNECA analysis based on UNCTAD statistics.

³⁹ Wall Street Journal, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/pension-funds-hold-substantial-cash-for-private-equity-investment-in-africa>

programs (Structural Adjustment Programs) under the Bretton Woods Institutions led to the closing down / sale of some of the industries, reduction of local manufacturing capacity and employment, worsening of poverty and increasing socio-economic inequities. The SAP period as been described by many as the beginning of the de-industrialization of Africa at a time when East Asian countries embarked upon the transformation of their economies through export led industrialization / manufacturing.

Today, Africa's manufacturing sector faces many challenges such as: lack of appropriate policies and shortage of skills; rigid labour laws in some countries; inadequate power supply; cumbersome and expensive transport within the continent; low labour productivity and lack of innovation; political instability; and corruption (UNECA 2013).

Low productivity, competitiveness and poor linkages with global value chains also hamper growth of the manufacturing sector. Africa's competitiveness has improved in recent years, although it continues to lag behind the rest of the world. Even the most competitive African economy, South Africa, ranks 54th out of 144 countries and the second most competitive country, Mauritius, ranks 55th ⁴¹. This low level of Africa's competitiveness is reflected in Africa's very low share (4 per cent) of global trade.

Based on the above analysis, the following policy measures need to be put in place to ensure Africa's industrial development and growth of manufacturing and private sector development:

- **Industrialization and commodity diversification:** Build on measures promoted by the LPA, NEPAD's / AU Africa Productive Capacity Initiative and its sequel the AIDA together with others (African Mining Vision and the Yaoundé Vision on Artisanal and Small-scale Mining).
- Accelerate the **development of the private sector.** Build on the creation of the AU Private Sector Forum as part of the AU structures and the Investment Climate Facility (ICF), building capacities in several fronts to: (i) overcome market and institutional failures and pursue sustainable business practices, (ii) strengthen and expand innovation capabilities and value chains to be regionally and globally competitive; and (iii) promote effective involvement in areas traditionally in the public domain, for example, investment in infrastructure markets including ICT, transport (road, air and maritime) and power.
- Africa has the potential to access global value chains and enter into global processes and markets directly by providing specific skills or products without the need to create entire industries. But harnessing such opportunities entails putting in place the right policies and organizations as well as governance architecture to ensure that Africa not only participates in global value chains, but does so at the high end rather than at the low end of the chain.

Features of Africa's Manufacturing Sector

- The share of the manufacturing sector in GDP declined from more than 12 per cent to around 11 per cent (UNECA, 2013).
- Africa's share in world output and global exports, the share of manufacturing in GDP, share of manufacturing in total exports have all declined relative to their 1970 levels; including during the past decade, when Africa enjoyed impressive GDP growth rates of around 5-6 percent.
- Africa's share in world output declined marginally between 1970 (2.75%) and 2010 (2.7%) while that of East Asia increased by more than two fold: 1970 (9.82%) and 2010 (20%).
- Between 1980 and 2010, Africa's manufacturing share in GDP declined by one percent to about 10 percent, while that of East Asia remained above 31 percent.
- Africa's share of manufactured goods in total export of goods was 18 percent in 2010, while for countries that transformed their economies through export led industrialization was about 87 percent.
- Africa's medium and high technology manufacturing output was 25 percent of total manufacturing output in 2010 while the corresponding figure for countries that achieved industrial transformation was over 85 percent. Source: Economic Report on Africa 2013.

⁴⁰ The countries that transformed their economies are: Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam

⁴¹ World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013

- **Beneficiation**⁴²: To fuel its industrialization, manufacturing and value addition, as well as contribute to structural transformation, Africa needs to benefit from more value addition to its vast mineral resources potential. Rising commodity prices have spurred mining companies to make significant investments in exploration. New technologies will make mining in Africa's remote regions economically viable; and also transform the landscape of mineral-dependent countries with some benefiting from shifts in globally important minerals, while others, once heavily dependent on mining and mineral revenues, will need to diversify into other sectors.

Political instability and state fragility have emerged as a tendency in countries with poor resource management records. In many cases, the sheer volume of revenues generated from the mineral or oil resources has also taken the attention of decision makers away from export diversification and value addition at the expense of local production. Many African economies remain highly vulnerable to the volatility of commodity exports and large price fluctuations in global markets.

Recent discoveries of minerals in several African countries is expected to further expand fiscal space as well as public spending in several African countries. It is imperative that the wealth generated be reinvested, particularly, in developing human capital, industry/manufacturing capacity, social and economic infrastructure through: (i) ensuring Africa's ownership of the development process and strengthening initiatives to monitor revenues generated; (ii) achieving a higher level of transparency and investing natural resources wealth in the creation of knowledge for economic innovation; (iii) negotiating better terms with external partners; and (iv) integrating fully the natural resources sector into national development plans.

Agriculture, food and nutrition

In the last decade, many African countries have experienced significant economic growth. However, the continent still faces major challenges including food insecurity and undernourishment, unemployment particularly of youth and women and this situation is most acute in rural areas.

The agricultural/rural population in Africa stands at 530 million people, and is expected to exceed 580 million by 2020. About 48 per cent of this population relies directly on agriculture for economic and livelihood needs. Evidence in Africa and elsewhere shows that agricultural performance is central in driving socio-economic transformation, especially in the traditionally economically marginalized and largely rural populations.

With 60 per cent of the world's arable land, agriculture is Africa's greatest potential and can serve as the main engine to propel the continent's growth and transformation. Africa has everything it needs to feed itself and the world – including arable lands with fertile soils and abundant water and hard-working farmers with longstanding knowledge of working the land. The sector

Key global trends and factors

- Due to her high population growth, low and declining agricultural productivity, policy distortions, weak institutions and poor infrastructure, among others, Africa has turned into a net food importer, is currently importing nearly a quarter of her food needs. Consequently, one in four undernourished people in the world live in Africa. This calls for urgent measures for reducing food insecurity and malnutrition, among them, the need to implement clear and affirmative policies for sustainable food security.
- Climate change requires rethinking of farming systems as existing know-how and traditions are now challenged by environmental changes; thus, new cases are being advanced for adaptation and increased resilience;
- Globalization of market induced competition with products that benefit from support by some of the exporting countries or are produced under improved technology supported and productive economies of scale are conditions that are barely reachable by average African farmers. This results in prices that hamper the competitiveness of African agricultural products, especially those emanating from smallholders, and calls for measures aimed at enhancing competitiveness; and
- The search for new sources of green energy induces increased demand for staples and for land, particularly for bio-fuel production. Without proper policies, regulatory frameworks, transparency and accountability, such ventures are driving the poor and rural/agriculture population further into poverty.

⁴² It is estimated that Africa hosts about 30 percent of the world's mineral reserves, including 40 percent of gold, 60 percent of cobalt, 72 percent of chromium and 65 percent of diamonds.

accounts, on the average, for 37 per cent of Africa's GDP, 40 per cent of total export value, and engages over 65 per cent of the African workforce. Smallholder, rain-fed and subsistence sector dominates Africa's agriculture. Currently only 3.5 per cent of Africa's agriculture is irrigated and despite its huge endowment with land, Africa generates only 10 per cent of the world's agricultural output.

Despite strong economic growth over the last decade, the average annual growth of agricultural output barely reached 4 per cent; way below the 6 per cent CAADP target. Africa's food demand continues to outstrip domestic supply owing to high population growth, rapid urbanization, income growth and the emergence of a large middle class. While Africa's food production rose significantly from around 130 million metric tons in 1963 to 580 million metric tons in 2011, cereal imports, for example, increased from 5 million metric tons in 1963 to over 50 million metric tons today.

The average daily per capita caloric intake stands at 2,500 (up from just over 2,000 in 1963) with poor households spending more than 60 per cent of their income on food (UNECA 2009). Further, the high world food prices that started in the second half of the first decade of the new Millennium resulted in the deterioration of Africa's terms of trade (UNECA 2009) and increased dependence on food aid.

In terms of productivity, Africa's (excluding the UMA countries) average fertilizer use is 11 kg/ha as compared to 167 kg/ha for other developing regions, and 250 kg/ha for Asia; and the continent continues to suffer from serious soil nutrient depletion including primarily from soil and water erosion and nutrient leaching. The soils of many African countries are among the most degraded in the world with about 20 per cent of Africa's agricultural lands seriously degraded; while up to 75 per cent of farmland is vulnerable to erosion and soil nutrient depletion.

Further, Africa (excluding UMA countries) has the lowest rate of mechanization with motorized equipment contributing to only about 10 per cent of farm power, compared to 50 per cent in other regions. Although the area of cultivated arable land has expanded from 132 to 184 million hectares between 1970 and 2010, the average farm size has declined from 0.59 hectares per rural person to 0.35 hectare during the same period (Africa Agriculture Status Report, 2014).

Despite huge fresh water resources, large rivers and lakes (Congo, Nile, Zambezi and Niger and Lake Victoria), Africa is the second driest continent in the world, after Australia. Africa's annual water availability of 4,008m³ although way above the water stress limit of 1,700 m³ is unevenly distributed. Ground water, which about 75 per cent of the African population uses, accounts only for about 15 per cent of the continent's total renewable water resources (Africa Water Vision 2025). Several countries, for example, all Greater Horn of Africa countries are either close to or below the water the water stress limit. In response, the AUC in collaboration with UNECA and AfDB have launched the "Africa Water Vision 2025," which promotes, inter alia, the development of water sources as well as the equitable and sustainable use and efficient management of water resources.

There are a number of AU continental frameworks and declarations made to combat Africa's food and agriculture problem, notably, CAADP (2003), the Maputo Declaration (2003), the Sirte Declaration (2004), Abuja Food Security Summit Declaration (2006), and Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation that offer strong basis for Agenda 2063 to build upon. There is now an Implementation strategy and Roadmap to translate the Malabo declaration into concrete outcomes. It is, however, vitally important to put in place mechanisms that help break the cycle of failures to translate political commitments to actual implementation and deliver on such commitments.

In the area of nutrition, one in four undernourished people in the world live in Africa, where the number of undernourished people has consistently increased over the last several decades. Since the early 1970s, Africa has increasingly turned into a net food importer, is currently importing nearly a quarter of her food needs. Reasons for this scenario are many and vary from country to country. However, common issues include high population growth, low and declining agricultural productivity, policy distortions, weak institutions and poor infrastructure. Indeed, for Africa, food security is a matter of national security that calls for urgent measures for reducing food insecurity and malnutrition. To this end, African countries need to implement clear and affirmative policies for attaining sustainable food security.

Blue / ocean economy⁴³

Africa's bodies of water are endowed with abundant flora and fauna and marine ecosystems including diverse fish and other aquatic life, coral reefs; and are also sources of livelihoods to many Africans including water, food, power generation and transportation. Coastal areas and lake basins have also emerged not only as major tourist attractions but also as important sources of minerals, including oil and gas. The sector creates jobs for 7.1 million fishers (2.7 million in marine fisheries and 3.4 million in inland fisheries and 1 million in aquaculture) and over 59 per cent of these people are women.

Africa's ocean and coastal resources include a total length of over 26,000 nautical miles of coastline across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean and Red Seas. However, the dumping of toxic waste, illegal trafficking, oil spills, degradation of the marine environment, transnational organized crimes, among others, have seriously threatened Africa's oceans, seas and lakes. These problems are compounded by the aggravated effects of climate change, most notably the rising ocean temperatures and ocean acidification that is leading to the weakening of the capacity of the ocean carbon sink and loss of fishery resources, and also reduction in the size of water bodies, such as Lake Chad (UNEP 2002). In response, the AU developed and launched the 2050 African Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy to help tackle the above problems in a strategic, coordinated and sustainable manner.

There is need to develop a framework that defines Africa's Blue Economy, help coordinate activities at the continental level and provide support to member states, in particular, small island states on strategies for beneficiation of sectors that have immediate potential for growth and job creation, such as aquaculture in marine and fresh waters; enhanced science, technology and innovations for sustainable management, and collaborative management of shared water resources and conservation.

Environment, natural resources and climate change

Africa's natural resources: biodiversity, land, forests and wetlands

Africa's natural resources play a critical role for vast segments of Africa's population who depend on the continent's biodiversity, forests and land for their livelihoods directly or indirectly. These natural resources also make a direct contribution to economic development through tourism, agriculture, logging and other activities.

⁴³ "Blue Economy" as used here refers to a sustainable and equitable economic growth driven by oceans, seas, lakes, rivers and floodplains.

Specifically:

- Africa is well endowed with biodiversity: both variety and abundance of species, ecosystems and genetic resources. Five of the 20 global centres of plant diversity are located in Africa. Africa has over 2 million km² of protected areas, which is about 6.6 per cent of Africa's total land area, less than the 10 per cent recommended by IUCN. These national parks and protected areas are concentrated in the savannah habitats of large mammals (elephants, black and white rhinos, lions, etc.), particularly those of Eastern and Southern Africa.
- In the African setting, land, in addition to it being the primary source of livelihood and productive base, continues to occupy a central place in the cultural, political and social organization of many countries.
- Forests have special place in Africa's economic, social, and cultural wellbeing. They are vital sources of food, energy, construction material, employment, local and foreign trade as well as cultural identity. Forests also provide essential environmental services including controlling soil and water erosion, regulating climatic variability, conserving lakes and wetlands, and freshwater systems.

However, the continent's natural resources – biodiversity, land and forests – are facing increasing challenges:

- Habitat loss is the major factor behind biodiversity loss. Evidence supports also a trend of accelerating erosion of the genetic resources of agricultural plants and animals with growing genetic uniformity of agricultural plants and animals, which means an increased risk of food loss from major epidemics.
- Land: unequal distribution of land, small farmers pushed out to marginal areas by large investment programs, severe soil degradation, deforestation accompanied by flooding and intermittent droughts are its main features. The recent scramble for Africa's land by big investors (mostly foreign) in bio-fuels, minerals and oil, lately food production for consumption abroad without the necessary arrangements to ensure value addition, social and environmental sustainability as well as strong backward and forward linkages to the economy.
- Land degradation and desertification are believed to impact 43 per cent of Africa's land surface with serious environmental and socio-economic consequences.
- The continent lost over 4 million hectares of forests annually over the past two decades due to extensive agricultural practices, unregulated and unsustainable wood harvesting and illegal commercial logging.

A number of policy measures need to be put in place:

- The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, African Water Vision, the Land Policy Framework for Africa lay the ground for putting in place the necessary sustainable land management, conservation of wild life and ecosystems, adaptation and mitigation programs and make transition to a low carbon economy through climate smart agriculture and energy development.
- The land question is a critical issue, hence the need to incorporate the implementation of the AU, AfDB and UNECA Framework Guideline on Land Policy in Africa as well as the Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa to ensure equitable access to land, sustainable management of all land and water resources, protection of national parks and Natural World Heritage sites. Corporate social and environmental responsibility should also be enforced with observance of and recognition of the centrality of sustainable natural

resource management in the development process, including social reconstruction, poverty reduction, enhancing economic opportunities for women, tenure security, accelerating agricultural modernization, preventing conflicts and enhancing conflict resolution.

Climate change

Climate change is a global threat with severe, cross-sectoral, long-term, and in several cases, irreversible impact. While Africa's contribution to the effects of global climate change remains low due to its low industrialization rate, the IPCC in its 2007 Report declared Africa as one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change. Furthermore, the most recent IPCC report (2014) confirms with a high degree of confidence that African ecosystems are already being affected by climate change, and future impacts are expected to be substantial.

Effects of climate change include the prevalence and severity of extreme events such as heat and cold waves, dust storms, severe winds, floods, droughts, greater rainfall variability and patterns that distort traditional crop cycles, would diminish agricultural and industrial raw materials productivity as well as export earnings, increase in plant and animal pests and diseases. Africa's fragile peace and security is also severely impacted by the worsening environmental stress and resulting population displacement, spontaneous large-scale migration, land encroachment, and refugees. Sea level rise, increased frequency of coastal cities and erosion of coastal assets would severely impact major African cities. Nevertheless, Africa has a huge opportunity to build robust economies with sustained high economic growth rate, while at the same time reducing the immense risks of climate change.

In particular, Africa's agriculture is highly vulnerable to climate change, which adversely impacts not only production and productivity, but also people's daily lives, including what to grow and when to plant, what livestock to keep, where to live, settlement patterns, overall well-being, attitudes, and hopes. However, under current agricultural management and practices, agriculture is also a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions; about 24 per cent of global GHG emissions is through enteric fermentation, manure deposited on pasture, synthetic fertilizers, paddy rice cultivation and biomass burning (Africa Agriculture Status Report, 2014), compounded by land use changes arising from extensive agricultural practices.

Disaster risk reduction and management

Because of its geographic location and low level of technological development, Africa remains highly vulnerable to disasters⁴⁴. Most Africa's disaster risks appear climate related or hydro-meteorological hazards, i.e., drought, flood and windstorms.

Less frequent hazards include pest infestation, earthquakes, landslides, wildfire and volcanic eruptions. Cyclones mainly affect Madagascar, Mozambique, and some of the Indian Ocean islands. More prevalent are diseases outbreaks, such as Ebola, that have left a trail of heavy destruction of both life and livelihoods. While African households have developed strong disaster capacity entrenched in their culture, these capacities, however, are challenged by outbreaks such as Ebola.

The African Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006-2015) provide a foundation for a comprehensive and robust disaster risk reduction and preparedness African capacity with financing mechanism.

⁴⁴ AU, NEPAD, AfDB, UN and International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), 2004. Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction.

3.2.2 An Integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance

Under this aspiration, Africa by 2063 would have emerged as a sovereign, independent and self-reliant continent - a united and strong Africa that realizes full economic and political integration.

Political unity

As shown previously, the OAU was largely hamstrung and incapable of spearheading continental unity because of its insistence on non-interference in Member States, its subordination to State interests and its lack of appropriate structures and resources. The AU on the other hand has set up strong institutions/organs and established robust normative frameworks to address democracy, governance and human rights, constitutional government, promote regional integration and economic development, peace and security to cite a few.

From the analysis in section 3.1, it is clear that the piece-meal approach to continental unity has not borne fruit. After 50 years, the vision of a United Africa remains elusive; furthermore, the question of the ultimate form of continental unity: a United States of Africa, or a Confederation of States, or some other form has still not been resolved.

Agenda 2063 affords a unique opportunity for the present generation of African leaders, intellectuals, policy makers, ordinary men and women, as well as the youth to debate and reach consensus so as to definitively decide this question. While the voices of Africans during the consultations, particularly the youth, showed a strong preference for rapid progress towards continental unity, it is unclear to what extent this is a priority for Africa's current political leadership.

Regional integration

When the OAU was established, regional integration was one of its primary objectives. However, due to the circumstances in which it was established, the organization found itself focusing more on political issues, particularly the decolonization agenda. However, by the mid-1970s, OAU took concrete steps towards promoting socio-economic development and integration and decided in 1976 to establish the African Economic Community (AEC) by the year 2000 - a culmination of many related previous initiatives.

Today, with 55 states, Africa is the world's most fragmented continent - a legacy of colonialism. Small population and economic output, hence limited markets and lack of competitiveness as well as economies of scale in the production and distribution of goods and services characterize many African countries.

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980 placed regional/economic integration as a key pillar of Africa's self-reliance, economic growth and transformation. A decade later, in 1991, the Abuja Treaty was signed to complete the process and "establish an African Economic Community constituting an integral part of the OAU" to "promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies." The Abuja Treaty envisaged establishing the African Economic Community over a 34-year period in stages starting with the establishment of economic communities in regions.

Currently, there are eight officially recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs): the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

An urgent measure to promote regional integration is the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area. The Addis Ababa AU Summit of 2014 agreed upon, among others, to: fast-track the

establishment of the CFTA and the transition to a continental Customs Union with a Common External Tariff (CET) scheme; increase investment in market and trade infrastructure; promote/strengthen multi-stakeholder platforms; and strengthen/streamline coordination mechanisms to promote a common African position on agriculture-related international trade negotiations and partnership agreements.

The BIAT (Boosting of Intra-African Trade) Action Plan has seven critical clusters that include: trade policy; trade facilitation; productive capacity; trade and infrastructure; trade finance; trade information; factor market and integration. The action plan has short, medium and long-term measures to deliver concrete outputs with responsibilities shared between the RECs, Member States and the AU organs. The establishment of the CFTA and its fast tracking will lead to a significant growth of Intra-Africa trade and assist Africa to use trade more effectively as an engine of growth, job creation, reducing poverty and sustainable development.

The CFTA will help enhance resilience of African economies to external shocks; improve competitiveness of Africa's industrial products through harnessing the economies of scale of a large continental market; increase the depth and breadth of diversification through geographically based specialization and transform the continent's capacity to supply its import needs from within Africa; and boost food security through reduction of protection on trade in agricultural produce among African countries.

In a huge step towards the CFTA, it has been agreed to launch the tripartite FTA. The tripartite FTA encompassing 26 Member/Partner States from COMESA, EAC and SADC, has a combined population of 625 million people and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 1.2 trillion, and will account for half of the membership of the African Union and 58 per cent per cent of the continent's GDP. The tripartite FTA will be the largest economic bloc on the continent and the launching pad for the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in 2017.

Intra- African trade

Trade has played a critical role in the economic development of countries both developed and developing. In recent times, the rise of the "Asian tigers" and China has largely been attributed to the impact of trade. This has had a tremendous impact on incomes, jobs and poverty reduction. In fact through trade China has been able to lift over 300 million of its population out of poverty in just a few decades. However, trade has still not played this role in Africa's development.

- The volume of intra-African trade has increased from \$32 billion in 2000 to \$130 billion in 2011. Despite this growth, the share of intra-African trade in total trade has not shown significant progress over the past half century and remained at 12 per cent per cent.
- During the 2007 to 2011 period, for example, the average share of intra-African exports in total merchandise exports was 11 per cent compared with 50 per cent in developing Asia, 21 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean and 70 per cent in Europe⁴⁵.
- Africa's phenomenal economic growth in recent years, has not been translated into improved intra-African trade; but improved trade with external partners. Africa's trade with emerging economies has been, particularly, growing fast (UNCTAD, 2010).
- On the positive side, intra-African trade is diversified and favours manufactured goods signalling the huge potential intra-African trade has to support Africa's industrialization and structural transformation.

⁴⁵ (UNCTAD 2013).

- In 2012, industrial products accounted for about 60 per cent of the total intra-African trade, while primary and petroleum products accounted for 18.5 per cent followed by agriculture and food products at 17.9 per cent. Services trade remains low at only 4.3 per cent.
- There is, however, significant country heterogeneity in the importance of intra-African trade among African countries. For example, over the period from 2007 to 2011, intra-African exports accounted for at least 40 per cent of total exports in 9 countries: Benin, Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
- In terms of imports, 11 countries imported at least 40 per cent of their goods from Africa over the same period. With the exception of ECCAS, a very high percentage of the African trade carried out within each REC goes to its own region, indicating that the formation of these communities has a positive impact on trade within the bloc. For example, in the period from 2007 to 2011, 78 per cent of SADC trade within Africa went to the SADC region.
- For many African countries, trading costs, manufacturing tariff costs and non-tariff trade costs are higher vis-à-vis regional partners than with the rest of the world⁴⁶. Document preparation for export/import⁴⁷ and settling of payments in Africa are relatively very expensive processes. Africa remains one of the most expensive regions for trading internationally, just below Eastern Europe and Central Asia⁴⁸.

Key policy measures for expanding trade and investment: This involves, first and foremost, expanding productive capacity of the economy and its competitiveness. It will also involve:

- (i) Expanding and deepening intra-African trade through, among others, removing constraints to trade through removing tariff and non-tariff barriers including poor infrastructure, limited port capacity, limited access to finance, lack of exploitation of supply chain potential, paucity of productive capacity, governance issues and political/security instability; and
- (ii) Accelerating the establishment of CFTA as per decisions of the Addis Ababa Summit (2014), which agreed upon, among others, to fast-track the establishment of the CFTA and the transition to a continental Customs Union with a Common External Tariff (CET) scheme, increase investment in market and trade infrastructure, promote/strengthen multi-stakeholder platforms, and strengthening/streamlining coordination mechanisms to promote a common African position on agriculture-related international trade negotiations and partnership agreements.

Infrastructure, connectivity and energy

Infrastructure

Africa's economic infrastructure gap remains a key constraint to development and provision of basic services. The lack of interconnectedness hinders countries from linking up and benefiting from national, regional and global opportunities. Africa's deficient infrastructure curtails economic growth by as much as 2 per cent a year.

Railways, a common and cheap form of transportation elsewhere in the developing world, has been slow to develop in Africa. The existing railway infrastructure is old with poor technical standards and only little investment has been made in the last decades. The situation appears to be changing however, as shown by planned new rail line linking Mombasa to Uganda and Butare in Rwanda.

⁴⁶ UNECA, 2013: Facilitating Trade: an African Perspective. Addis Ababa: UNECA.

⁴⁷ UNECA analysis based on ESCAP World Bank International Trade Costs Statistics.

⁴⁸ UNECA, 2013: Facilitating Trade: an African Perspective. Addis Ababa: UNECA.

Africa's road access rate is only 34 per cent compared with 50 per cent in other parts of the developing world. Transport costs are also high. The road infrastructure, though most dominant, is uneven and concentrated in urban areas. Africa's rural sector remains poorly served. The delay in developing the Trans Africa Highway Network to connect the continent is seriously hampering the physical interconnectedness of the continent. Today, about 25 per cent of the Trans Africa Highways (TAHs) is still to be completed.

Maritime transport and intra- African trade are constrained by aging fleet, high freight cost and poor inland transport. Also a challenge is poor connectivity between the mainland continent and African Island States. Problems associated with the limited port capacities and facilities are compounded by port inefficiencies, which result in long delays, first at anchorage, and in the series of operations necessary to lift merchandise from the port (the so-called 'dwell time').

The African air routes network is relatively small with low connectivity; and with "non-African airlines accounting for 80 per cent of the intra-continental market"⁴⁹ Air transport is booming and the market in Africa is growing at an unprecedented rate, but the same cannot be said about the airlines in the continent. With its wide geographical area, Africa is a home to about 1 billion people. The most dynamic economies of recent years are in Africa and the continent is now the second fastest growing with rapid development and transformation. Air transport has a significant role as an engine for inter and intra-regional integration as it increases accessibility between regions, reduces travel time and cost by providing connectivity amongst several cities and countries of the African continent which would have been very difficult otherwise. The expansion of air service is also important for enhancing tourism and trade; the International Air Transport Association (IATA) statistics show that aviation in Africa supports 6.7 million jobs and contributes \$67.8 billion in economic activity.

However, according to estimates by the African Airlines Association's (AFRAA), the African Airlines share of world traffic is barely 3 per cent. The capacity share of African Airlines on European and Middle Eastern routes has declined from 58 per cent in 2002 to 22 per cent in 2012 making Africa the only continent where foreign carriers perform the largest proportion of intercontinental air transportation.

African airlines are losing their market share to foreign carriers due to lack of full implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision, which is resulting in the fragmentation of the African aviation market and airspace and difficult air connectivity. Because airlines' operating costs in Africa are well above the world average and ground handling, navigation as well as other services costs are high, coordinated efforts are needed that focus on reducing costs in the industry. For aviation to be the driver of Africa's political, economic and social integration, as defined by the Yamoussoukro Decision, African states should demonstrate commitment for the full implementation of this decision.

Among the policy measures needed to address Africa's infrastructure challenges are:

- (i) **Developing infrastructure and related services as well as predictable / transparent legal systems.** This involves the full realization of PIDA. In particular, in the ICT sector, there is need to: put in place policies and strategies that will lead to transformative e-applications and services in Africa; improve physical infrastructure, especially the intra-African broad band terrestrial infrastructure; and cyber security, making the information revolution the basis for service delivery in the bio and nanotechnology industries. Further, the African Internet Exchange System (AXIS); e-Transform Africa, which envisages transforming Africa into an e-Society and PIDA and the manufacturing component parts for e-devices merit priority consideration;

⁴⁹ Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014. Regional Integration: Uniting to Compete- Facts & Figures.

- (ii) **Expanding and up-scaling the fiscal space for regional integration.** Regional integration goes hand in hand with a growing inter-dependence of African economies, both in the real and financial sectors, and with a transfer of monetary and fiscal autonomy from single countries to continental institutions. Successfully managing these processes will require devising effective ways to: (i) deal with shocks affecting countries in the continent; and (ii) address issues of structurally-surplus and structurally-deficit countries within the future African Monetary Union. Further, the focus of regional trade initiatives needs to shift towards development of productive capacities;
- (iii) **Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision on the full liberalization of the Airline industry leading to “open skies”; and**
- (iv) **Expanding Africa’s railway and road networks, port facilities and other transport infrastructure to enhance connectivity, spur trade and economic growth and create jobs and putting in place the appropriate funding arrangements and instruments.**

Energy

Africa’s energy profile is characterized by low production, low consumption, and high dependence on traditional biomass energy in the midst of a huge wealth of unexploited energy resources. The continent’s energy resource endowment includes: crude oil reserves estimated at over 130 billion barrels - about 9.5 per cent of world’s reserves; about 8 per cent of the world’s total reserves of natural gas estimated at about 15 trillion cubic metres; about 4 per cent of the world’s total proven reserves (about 95 per cent of these reserves found in Southern Africa); hydropower resources potential to generate over 1,800 TWh/yr of electricity; geothermal energy potential estimated at over 15,000 MW; and huge solar and wind power potential. Because of its proximity to the Equator, Africa has also the world’s highest average amount of solar radiation each year. Africa’s bioenergy potential is immense, particularly given rapid advances in research that have brought new energy crops into production and second-generation lingo-cellulosic technologies within reach in less than a decade.

Despite the huge energy resources, the continent faces enormous energy challenges that include low generation capacity and efficiency, high costs, unstable and unreliable energy supplies, low access to modern energy, insufficient energy infrastructure, and lack of institutional and technical capacity to harness huge resources. Partly due to dependence on fossil fuels for generation of electricity, the average electricity tariff in Africa is about US\$0.14 per kWh compared to US\$0.04 in East Asia. Further, a number of countries have introduced containerized mobile diesel units for emergency power generation to cope with power outages at a cost of about US\$0.35/KWh, with lease payment absorbing more than 1 per cent of GDP in many cases (UNECA 2011).

Today, most African countries have developed energy plans and policies that aim at: attaining energy security, achieving transition from traditional to modern and clean sources of energy and ensuring access of a majority of their citizens to electricity, and raise the share of renewable energy in total energy production. For countries heavily dependent on petroleum, technological change and rapid development of new sources of energy are likely to reduce the importance of petroleum.

Accelerating Africa’s **transition from traditional to modern sources of energy** and ensuring access to clean and affordable energy is a development imperative. Under the auspices of the AU, nineteen African countries have, recently, endorsed the Africa Clean Energy Corridor, an initiative that could advance the development of renewable energy projects in the East and Southern African Power Pool from its current 12 per cent to at least 40 per cent by 2030.

Information and communication technology

The ICT industry is among the fastest growing sectors in Africa. Growth in terms of information flow, domestic and international trade, telecommunications network and services, public service provision, human capacity development and innovation and skill enhancement are huge. Despite starting from a low base, Africa, today, has the potential to harness sophisticated technologies and investment in the sector is growing rapidly.

In the mobile sector, for example, in 2011, Africa became the second largest mobile market in the world after Asia, with about 620 million mobile connections. Currently, the mobile phone industry contributes around 3.5 per cent of Africa's GDP and employs over 5 million people. The average number of Internet users in Africa is about 12 per 100 people, with large variation among countries. Increased investment in the ICT sector has clearly enormous rate of returns and has the potential to revolutionize access to markets and services.

3.2.3 An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law

The Africa of 2063 envisaged under this aspiration, is a continent that has undergone a deepening of the culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law.

The political systems of African countries have evolved considerably since independence and this evolution has been shaped by a number of realities and trends.

Two considered here are: (i) the movement towards greater political pluralism, decentralization and growth of civil society, as well as human rights, access to justice and the rule of law; (ii) the evolution of the role of the African state in the development process.

Democracy, governance, human rights and rule of law

Political governance, human rights and rule of law

In reviewing the evolution of governance and democracy on the continent, it is important to note that the struggle for democracy and human rights in post-colonial Africa – the so-called second wave of liberation – was essentially home-grown and had been impelled and won by Africans. The famous but now almost forgotten “national conferences” in many Francophone countries, paved the way to multi-party systems. Similarly, the “so-called “Arab spring” started on African soil in Tunisia.

Governance and Democracy in Africa – Key Milestones and Instruments

- Recognition of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- Approval by the OAU in 1981 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
- Adoption (1981) and ratification (1986) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights;
- Establishment of the African Commission on Human Peoples' Rights in Banjul, The Gambia;
- Participation in February 1990 of the OAU in election observation exercises in its Member States;
- Endorsement by the AU in 2002 of the “Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa”, re-affirming the universal principles of democratic elections stipulated in the UDHR;
- Adoption in 2005 of the Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes in Government;
- Adoption of the “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance” (ACDEG) in January 2007 and entry into force in February 2012;
- Establishment of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as an important instrument on governance in Africa, a home-grown instrument that has triggered the process of institutionalizing a culture of accountability, especially domestic accountability; and
- Establishment of regional level instruments which include:
 - SADC: Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004); Parliamentary Forum on Norms and Standards for Elections (2001); Protocol on Gender and Development (2008); Electoral Commission Forum (2001)
 - ECOWAS: Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) and its supplementary protocol.
 - EAC: Principles for Election Observation and Evaluation (2012) and Protocol on Good Governance.
 - ECCAS: Brazzaville Declaration (2005).

The process of democratization began with the establishment of the OAU and has continued since. However, for many years following the independence decade of the 1960s, Africa was, with a few exceptions, characterized by deficits in governance, in the form of weak institutions, unaccountable leadership, constricted political spaces and non-inclusive democratic processes. In many African countries there was a failure in participatory development and promotion of democracy, as demonstrated by military coups, one-party states, Marxist socialist regimes, authoritarian top-down systems, human rights abuses, etc. Between 1960 and 1990, it is reported that not a single opposition party came to power through the ballot box, and the ruling parties “won” all elections.

Beginning in the late 1980s however, a confluence of internal and external factors heralded remarkable transformations in Africa’s governance landscape. Notwithstanding the persistence of a number of challenges, a majority of African states have considerably improved political accountability, public service delivery and administration; devolved power to local governance structures and a culture of regular competitive elections is progressively taking root.

Since 2000, Africa has experienced significant improvements in political governance. Africa’s democracy has largely improved through the holding of free and fair elections.

Stronger democracy has helped once marginalized groups to play increasing roles in the political process⁵⁰. For example, women’s participation in the political process has increased across a number of countries. New constitutional, legal and institutional frameworks are strengthening the role of women in political and electoral processes. Young voters are increasingly likely to play important roles both as voters and in election observation and monitoring.

With the adoption in 2005 of the Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government, Africa has since witnessed a decline in the number of leaders ousted unconstitutionally, although five have been forced out since 2010. There are currently many former Heads of State in Africa who voluntarily left office after finishing their constitutionally determined mandates and are free citizens in their respective countries⁵¹. This phenomenon clearly reflects a maturing of democracy and governance on the continent.

The 2014 Ibrahim index of African governance shows that between 2009 and 2013, overall governance on the continent has improved. The main drivers of this overall trend have been participation and human rights, as well as human development. Positive trends are also registered for gender and rights, but the biggest gains have been recorded for political participation.

Challenges to Governance and Democracy

- The quality of democracy remains a challenge: Internalization of democratic norms and the inconsistency in their application. Detention without trial, arbitrary arrests, torture, forced disappearances and extra-judicial killings are still unfortunately widespread;
- Access to justice and independence of the judicial system is a widespread concern;
- There are pervasive weaknesses of institutions, especially in the field of human rights at national, regional and continental levels;
- Progress in the area of human rights and the rule of law leaves much room for improvement. There many reported cases of violations of human rights, including limitations of freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech, lack of independence of the courts, detentions (lengthy and without trails), and abuse by the uniformed services, as well as violence against women;
- While elections are essential in building democracy, they are not a panacea and there should be an active search for innovative models that secure citizens’ voice and dividends in governance;
- Civil society participation and contributions to democracy is frequently handicapped by their capacity and resources, as well as competition, internal governance and representation and legitimacy; and
- Policy making and service delivery is compromised in many countries due to poor public institutions and administration at central, municipal and local levels, leaving many citizens poorly served by their governments.

⁵⁰ African economic Outlook 2014

⁵¹ For example: 3 in Botswana; 6 in Nigeria; 3 in Cape Verde; etc.

At the continental and regional levels, there has been commendable progress in terms of norms and standard setting on crucial political governance and democracy issues. A dense body of African grown norms, standards and institutions for governance and democracy have been developed. Furthermore, there is a growing consolidation of the role of civil society and non-state actors in the governance and socio-economic development of the continent. However, despite these remarkable achievements, the gains are fragile and several challenges remain.

Progress in Elections

- While an average of only 28 elections were held on the continent in the 1960-1970 period, an average of 65 elections took place in the decade of 1980-1990. Between 2000 and 2005, some 41 elections were held on the continent.
- There were 15 Presidential elections in 2011 and five each in 2012 and 2013.
- In 2014-15, some 18 countries, which together account for half the continent's population or over 600 million will elect their leaders.
- Most elections are now violence-free.
- By 2011, over 18 African countries were considered as democracies as compared to only 4 in 1991.

Addressing these challenges calls for visionary and transformative political leadership combined with vibrant citizen engagement both of which are critical for the realization of the ideals of African Agenda 2063.

Economic governance

Economic governance has shown steady progress over the last decade, which has a direct bearing on the sustainability of the economic performance of African countries⁵²:

- Over the past decade 41 of 52 countries where data is available have registered improvements in domestic resource mobilization and public administration. There are improvements in budget transparency and accountability of public institutions through for example, Parliamentary Accounts Committees (PACs).
- Modest progress is being made in fighting corruption, however according to Transparency International, four out of five African countries are below the world average.
- There are significant improvements in the business climate in many African countries. In 2013 countries with the best business climate include several African countries (Mauritius, Rwanda, Botswana, South Africa).
- Modest progress is being made in addressing illicit capital outflows, which will enhance domestic resource mobilization, strengthen inclusive growth, create jobs and sustain current growth performance.

Of particular importance is African and international initiatives for better governance in the mining sector and the extractive industry. Africa's natural resources need to be governed effectively to foster transparency and counter illicit resource outflows and unacceptable exploitation of Africa's natural resources. In this regards AU Member States need to be supported to fully implement the Africa Mining Vision.

To sum up, the continent has witnessed significant improvements in both political and economic governance over the last few decades but there are still many outstanding challenges.

The role of the African State in the development process

Overcoming the challenges of underdevelopment has been a constant priority for post-independence African states. As a result, African states have over the years played a central role in the development process.

⁵² African Economic Outlook 2014

However, the efforts of African States to foster development and improve the wellbeing of its people have not been entirely successful, partly explaining continent's status as one of the least developed on the globe. The involvement of the African State in the development process, ranged from experiments with import substitution industrialization policies, backed by national development planning in the 1960s; through state-led inward-looking collective self-reliance strategies embodied especially in the Lagos Plan of Action in the 1980s. These approaches allotted the African State a commanding role in the development process, which saw it attempting to act as both the designer and executor of nearly all aspects of development. The end result was that the African State became overburdened and inefficient.

With the advent of Structural Adjustments Programs (SAPs), instituted by the Britton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) during the 1980s and 1990s, the role of the State in the development process was seriously questioned. However, today, there is consensus that without an effective State sustainable economic and social development is impossible. This has been accompanied by a gradual reinvention of the African State, which has become increasingly, more tolerant of the involvement of other actors in the continent's development endeavours, including civil society and the private sector.

Increasingly the role of the African State is seen to consist of providing the requisite

Characteristics of a Developmental State

- Vision setting, capable leadership and a developmental ideology (Capable (but not necessarily authoritarian) leadership constitutes a primary agency in the construction of a developmental state.
- Relative state autonomy, especially in formulating and implementing policy (the capacity of the state to formulate policies independent of contending social forces, to serve the best interests of the country as perceived by the managers of state power).
- State institutional capacity, notably a strong and competent bureaucracy
- Effective national development planning
- Coordination of economic activities and resources (effective coordination of economic activities includes creation of a pro-investment macroeconomic environment, effective supervision and monitoring of financial institutions, fiscal policies that provide incentives to the private sector, domestic resource mobilization and an effective public financial management system).
- Support for a national entrepreneurial class - make conscious efforts to expand and nurture its bourgeoisie, as it will facilitate industrialization and private sector-led economic growth.
- Commitment to expansion of human capacity
- Peace, political stability, rule of law and predictability in government business.

Measures to Consolidate Peace and Security in Africa

- Promote ratification and implementation, building on existing AU mechanisms by setting up an independent monitoring mechanism and facilitate and support think tanks, civil society and other stakeholders to regularly evaluate the status of ratification, domestication and implementation;
- Prioritize and deepen support for the development of strong institutions at national and regional levels, in order to effectively tackle the root causes of conflicts such as bad governance and weak state institutions that perpetuate poverty, inequality, marginalization and exclusion, as well as issues relating to state legitimacy and the rule of law;
- Demilitarize politics at national level through establishment of effective civilian oversight mechanisms and processes as well as professionalization of security establishment to deepen accountability
- Strengthen capacity at all levels to implement continental frameworks on democratic governance, peace and security (the AGA and APSA) in order to accelerate progress towards sustainable peace, stability and development;
- Ensure an active involvement of all segments of society into the efforts aimed at the promotion of peace, security and stability is not only the preserve of Governments and International organizations.
- Consolidate the foundation of national infrastructures for peace involving civil society organizations, religious figures and institutions, women, private sector and other actors, including community and religious leaders, with a view to fostering inclusivity in peace processes.
- Ensure that the African Standby Force (ASF) attains full operational capability by 2015, as scheduled. In the meantime, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) should be fully operationalized in the shortest time possible.
- Find a lasting solution with respect to the sustainable funding of AU led operations, especially those undertaken with the consent of the UN Security Council.
- Enhance the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN to ensure that both organizations are better equipped to deal with the evolving peace and security challenges on the continent.
- Strengthen coordination between the conflict prevention and mediation mechanisms of the Union, in particular, the relationship between the Panel of the Wise and Special Envoys and Representatives, as well as the human, financial and material resources available to these mechanisms;
- Sustain efforts to address the root causes of conflict and violence, including those relating to the eradication of poverty and the promotion of equal chances with in African societies.
- Find innovative approaches that address the nexus between security and development, prioritize the rule of law, good governance and the promotion of human rights.
- Build synergies and providing a more integrated framework for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building.

environment that enables various societal actors to effectively play their respective roles in the development of their polities; thus, the interest among various stakeholders of the need to encourage the emergence of developmental states in Africa, superintended by a transformative and visionary leadership, imbued with the determination to address Africa's inter-locking challenges of participatory democracy and development.

African countries need to diversify their economies away from being raw materials exporters into manufacturing, value-addition and industrialization that is technologically advanced. Such a transformation requires an active role to be played by the State in order to direct resources and investments to productive sectors of the economy; market forces alone cannot accomplish this. African States should adopt active industrial, manufacturing and technological policies to drive the continent's transformation. A hands-off role for the African State will not enable these functions to be fulfilled.

3.2.4 A peaceful and secure Africa

Under this aspiration, Africa is envisaged to emerge as a conflict-free continent with harmony among communities at the grassroots level and inter-state and intra-state wars eliminated and mechanisms put in place to prevent and/ resolve conflicts. Diversity (ethnic, religious, economic, cultural, etc.) would be a source of wealth and accelerated economic growth rather than a source of conflict.

The importance of ensuring peace, security and stability of the continent was recognized by the OAU from the very beginning of its existence. It established the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration as well as the Defence Commission and later the Central Organ and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Thus peace and security have been at the heart of concerns of Africa's leadership from the very start.

For many decades, many African countries struggled with the challenges of deficits in governance, in the form of weak institutions, constricted political spaces and non-inclusive processes. These, alongside other factors, such as ethnicity, combined with exogenous factors, particularly the Cold War, made Africa's peace and security landscape particularly volatile. The continent was the theatre of numerous inter-state conflicts, which were only overtaken both in frequency and intensity by intra-state conflicts after the end of the Cold War.

Many of the armed conflicts in the early decades after independence were fuelled by external interests and had their roots in economic factors. For example, mineral - rich areas were encouraged to secede with support of external forces to facilitate their easy access to these resources (e.g. Shaba in DRC in the 1960s)⁵³. These conflicts left behind a legacy of failed and ungovernable states, insecurity and lack of development, the effects of which are still being felt today.

A deplorable effect of conflict and insecurity in Africa is the forced displacement of millions of people, particularly women and children, coupled with the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and the phenomenon of child soldiers. These displacements predated the colonial times and continue today. Today, there are nearly 3.4 million refugees and 5.4 million internally displaced persons, and this combined with stateless people brings the total number of the forcibly displaced to 11million in Africa in 2014.

Africa's conflicts also led to the diversion of resources away from critical development imperatives. For example, in some countries, there were prolonged periods of conflicts lasting over 20 years (Angola, Mozambique, Sudan), during which a great proportion of the country's resources were

⁵³ Egide. R (2005) Forced Migration in Africa: A Challenge to Development

directed to the war efforts. Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations, the OAU/AU and the regional economic communities (RECs), dedicated much of their efforts on peace and security issues at the expense of pursuing their primary mandates of accelerating the continent's economic development and integration. Similarly, Africa's engagement with the rest of the world was generally dominated by calls for the international community to underwrite the cost of the continent's conflicts, as well as to pressure its leadership to get its governance right.

Over the last decades however, there has also been a remarkable overall decline in the number of conflicts on the continent, despite the intractable character of several old conflicts and the emergence of new ones, in places such as South Sudan, Central African Republic and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. These positive changes have been bolstered by the sustained economic growth in a number of countries, the increasing trends towards electoral democracy as opposed to unconstitutional changes of government, and the progress made in combating corruption in many countries.

Significantly also, although Africa continues to solicit the support of the international community in the management of its conflicts, the continent has, in the past decade and half, through the African Union, successfully put in place an elaborate peace and security architecture (APSA) intended to address the entire gamut of Africa's peace and security challenges, from prevention, through conflict management to post-conflict reconstruction and development.

The APSA complements the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and together, they hold great promise in the entrenchment of well-governed, secure and peaceful African states, which would facilitate the emergence of the Africa envisioned in Agenda 2063.

Yet, despite these significant achievements, the continent still faces tremendous challenges, particularly evidenced by recent increases in conflict since 2010, as well as violence and civil protests with potentials to degenerate into civil wars⁵⁴. Incompatibility of positions, competition over scarce resources, behavioural characteristics and mutually opposed goals are some of the factors driving conflicts. Thus the need to build conflict resolution, conflict de-escalation and threat minimization mechanisms, as well as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for intra/inter and cross border conflicts.

There are also increasing threats posed by emerging transnational crimes such as terrorism and violent extremism, drug trafficking, piracy, illicit arms proliferation, human trafficking and smuggling, and money laundering. Other threats include: the rise in urbanization, social exclusion and unemployment; conflicts over trans boundary resources (e.g. water, oil, gas and minerals); and the impact of climate change and other factors (e.g. population growth) is triggering new conflicts over resources.

Major Threats to Africa's Peace and Security

- The propensity to resort to the use of violence or resolution of contestations on real or perceived differences or on the distribution of resources within communities;
- Ineffective credible and legitimate democratic governance institutions for the prevention of violent conflicts; such as the rule of law, democratic access to power and effective wealth distribution;
- New practices and forms of confrontation and mobilization by citizens and youth that cut across historically established borders and render national level responses ineffective;
- Cultural, political, social and economic gaps between the minority at the center and the larger population – rural or urban and intergenerational;
- Ease of trading, acquiring and circulating weapons;
- Failure to accommodate multiple community identities, especially at the local level, especially in fragile and conflict-affected areas;
- Limited state capacities leading to corruption lack of accountability and impunity, which restricts the provision of services.

⁵⁴ The 3rd High Level Dialogue on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in Africa held in Dakar, Senegal (30-31 October 2014)

AU instruments and decisions pertaining to peace, security and governance provide a solid framework to address the current challenges to peace and security. However, there is a serious lack of a culture of implementation of these instruments and decisions. In this respect, there is a crucial need for a scrupulous and systematic implementation of instruments and decisions adopted by AU and RECs policy organs⁵⁵.

The organization in response to the persistent problem of forced displaced developed landmark instruments as such as: (i) The 1969 *OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*; and (ii) the 2009 *AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa*, considered the first such legal instrument of its kind. Nonetheless, issues of forced displacement including many protracted refugee situation continue to plague many parts of the continent and urgent measures are needed to tackle the root causes as well as find durable solutions for those affected.

The importance of good governance and functional democracy in preventing and effectively managing conflicts cannot be overstressed. Most of the conflicts in Africa occurred due to deficiencies in ensuring accountable, transparent and inclusive governance systems, as well as inadequate efforts to address the challenges of poverty and inequality. It is clear that addressing poverty and deficits in governance will go a long way in reducing conflicts and strengthening peace and security of persons, communities and nations and contribute significantly to the socio-economic transformation of the continent envisaged under Agenda 2063.

3.2.5 An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics

*Agenda 2063 re-affirms Africa as a cradle of human civilization and **African cultural identity, values and ethics** as critical factors for Africa's re-emergence on the global stage. It envisages that by 2063, the fruits of the values and ideals of Pan Africanism will be manifest everywhere. Culture will flourish, there would be a strong work ethic based on merit and traditional African values of family, community and social cohesion would be firmly entrenched.*

Culture is a fundamental factor for defining and understanding the human condition. Culture affects how people think and act. It can be considered as the way humans and societies assign meaning to the world around them and define their place in that world. It is manifested in many ways including languages and words; ideas and ideologies; customs and traditions; beliefs and religions; rituals and ceremonies; settlement patterns; art and music; architecture and furniture; dress and fashion; games; images - in short, anything that is symbolic or representative of the values, norms, perceptions and interests of a people.

Threats to Africa's Cultures, Heritage & Values

- Cultural domination during the slave trade and colonial era led to the depersonalization on the part of African peoples, falsified their history, systematically disparaged and combatted African values and tried to replace progressively and officially their languages by that of the colonized. Work done by great African scholars and writers have contributed a lot to re-examining and restoring Africa's distorted and obscured place in the history of the world;
- Forces that are accelerating Africa's integration into a western global culture – news media, music, art - with a key part being played by educational systems. While these can be sources that can enrich the African cultural heritage, they can also be a source of erosion and ultimately can supplant and replace African values and ethics;
- Heritage sites: despite her rich cultural heritage, Africa is poorly represented in the list of protected world cultural heritage sites. This risks to hasten the erosion of these sites and their eventual loss not only to African but the entire world;
- Languages: language is at the heart of a people's culture and the acceleration of Africa's socio-economic transformation is impossible without harnessing in a practical manner the indigenous African languages. A major threat to African culture and heritage is the educational system which is marginalizing African languages; and
- The poor management of Africa's diversity – ethnic, religious, cultural – has often been a source of conflict, with considerable cost to the progress and harmony of the continent. Extreme expressions of this phenomenon is recently manifested in the rise of religious extremism has also fuelled much violence and social upheaval – Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, the LRA in Uganda.

⁵⁵ High Level Conferences and Retreats on Governance and Peace and Security

Culture plays a central role in the development process. The World Conference on Cultural Policies held in Mexico City in 1982 and the subsequent Declaration of the UN Decade of Culture (1988-1997) contributed much to raising global awareness on the centrality of culture to the development process. Cultural activities can contribute to social and economic advancement by generating employment and creating valuable resources of commercial and economic value. Culture is also a tool for social cohesion.

The 2013 UN Creative Economy Report acknowledges “*the importance of culture and cultural diversity for sustainable development*” and argues that “*investments in identity, innovation and creativity can help to build new development pathways...[which]...when nurtured [can] result in inclusive social development, inclusive economic development, environmental sustainability and peace and security*”⁵⁶.

The creative economy is a major contributor to economic growth and global trade. The 2013 Creative Economy Report reports that the world trade of creative goods and services totalled a record US\$624 billion in 2011. Between 2002 and 2011 the global average annual growth rate of the creative economy was 8.8per cent.

The contribution of culture to Africa’s development is still well below its potential, although there are areas of progress. The creative industry is starting to be recognized in Africa today: e.g. Nigeria’s Nollywood is estimated to earn between US\$200-300 million per year, is the second largest employer after agriculture and the second largest film industry in the world. African fashion designers are drawing on the continent’s rich cultural heritage and blending it with modern trends to acquire success at home and abroad. Because of this the fashion and apparel industry is proving to be a dynamic sector, particularly in small-scale enterprises. Similar trends are also evident in the leather, shoes, beads and other trendy African fashion. The rapid growth in music, TV and Film, fashion and lifestyle reflects a rising confidence in the African identity, especially among Africa’s young people.

African literature and art are of growing importance due to the rise of Africa’s middle class and new art markets are being established in Nairobi Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria. Estimates for internal African arts market are not easily available but have tremendous potential for growth in the coming decades. A growing phenomenon is in the growth of literature written so-called “Home” or “regional national” languages pioneered by early African writers.

Vehicular cross-border languages are powerful tools that can be used to foster the development and integration of Africa and facilitate the movement of people and goods. In fact, these languages do not respect the artificial colonial boundaries. In West Africa, for instance, a speaker of Mandinka can communicate and move freely throughout most of ECOWAS member states; a speaker of Fulfulde is free of any linguistic barriers from West to Central Africa. A Kiswahili speaker can move freely in Central and Eastern Africa. Taking all of this into account, the African Academy of Languages (ACALAN), which is the official language agency of the African Union, has been working in collaboration with the member states on the development of Vehicular Cross-Border Languages so that they are not only used in all domains of society in partnership with the former colonial languages, but also make a meaningful contribution to the implementation of Africa’s Agenda 2063.

African cultural diversity contributes to the expression of national and regional identities and more widely to the promotion of Pan Africanism and the building of inclusive societies. The promotion of cultural values and practices are known for their capability and potential for peace making and conflict resolution.

⁵⁶ Cited in “Concept Note: Africa Reimagination Creative Hub (ARCH). Developing the Identity, Heritage, Arts and Culture Chapter of Agenda 2063 (2014).

Culture has the power to transform societies, strengthen communities and foster a sense of identity and belonging. Of particular importance in this regard is the youth who can be a bridge between tradition and modernity. They have a tremendous thirst for information, are adept in using ICT, which allows them to transcend national boundaries, and thus can be potent agents for social change. However, work must be done to nurture a sense of pride and understanding of Africa's rich heritage among the youth. Investing in the creative industry can open up vast possibilities for young people, while at the same time providing a conduit for transmitting African values, heritage and culture to young people. It will also build understanding, respect for cultural diversity and engender a culture of peace and progress on the continent.

Religion plays a central role in the cultural life of African societies and religious groups are a major component of the African society. This is evident in the popular view that Africa is a religious continent and its people, are religious as well in an era when this is not evident in many other societies. Religion and religious expressions play a profound role in the construction of the African identity and social construct and interaction. However, Africa's culture, heritage and values are under threat from several forces, including religious extremism.

Despite all the threats to Africa's cultural heritage, the values of African people remain on a solid foundation both on the continent and in the diaspora. African renaissance and self-confidence is critical to the continent's progress. There is now a strong realization of the imperative of harnessing Africa's cultural heritage for the continent's socio-economic transformation, ending conflicts and promoting governance and democratization.

AU Policy Instruments on Cultural Heritage

- The Campaign for African Cultural Renaissance.
- The Languages Plan of Action for Africa (1986)
- The African Union Plan of Action on Cultural and Creative Industries
- Revival of the Development of the Encyclopedia Africana

All African cultures recognize and reward the virtues associated with hard work, industry and thrift, as well as taking care of kith and kin, and the less fortunate. However, it is important to recognize that in many African societies, these positive virtues exist side by side with some harmful social practices. This is particularly evident in practices that limit or restrict the rights of women to inheritance, access to land and other productive resources, social practices such as female genital mutilation and early child marriages. Thus while African culture, heritage, values and ethics are a source of strength and cause for celebration, certain harmful social practices need to be done away with in the march towards the Africa we want by 2063.

3.2.6 An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, particularly its women and youth, and caring for children

Agenda 2063 envisages under this aspiration, a continent that has equal participation, opportunity and access for all segments of the continent's population to development outcomes and social and political discourse regardless of gender, political affiliation, religion, ethnic affiliation, locality, age or other factors.

Gender equality and women's empowerment

Africa has made significant advances in reducing gender inequalities:

- Political participation: with an average of 21 per cent of parliamentarians as women, Africa is the only region to double women's political participation in one decade – at 64 per cent, Rwanda, is the country with the highest percentage of female parliamentarians in the world.
- Education: the number of girls out of school has dropped significantly from 24 million in 2000 to 9 million in 2013. Furthermore, nearly half of the African countries have attained gender parity in primary school enrolment in 2012.

However, these gains have not yet fully impacted on reducing inequalities between men and women, especially with respect to access and control of economic resources, as well as in terms of labour market participation or reproductive rights (maternal mortality and fertility). Women still constitute the majority of those holding vulnerable jobs (i.e. poor wages and working conditions); ILO classified 84 per cent of jobs held by women in 2012 as vulnerable as compared to 70.6 per cent for men.

The progress made by the continent in terms of women's representation in parliament is dampened by the fact that in many African countries women generally constitute a minority in some critical parliamentary committees tasked with drafting of bills which later become law.

Gender inequality is one of the most important structural root causes of Africa's poor performance with respect to the MDGs and poverty reduction. Better access to education for women, especially post-secondary education contributes to improved household livelihoods and human development. In general African countries with low gender inequality have higher enrolment rates for women in higher education than countries with higher gender inequality. However, even then, the enrolment of women in science, technology, engineering and mathematics is low.

Overall, the subsidiary roles of women in society remain a key hindrance to development and socio-economic transformation. The continued monopoly of power by male political elites, a lack of political will, socio-economic challenges, the non-recognition of unpaid care and domestic work, as well as patriarchal traditions and beliefs continue to limit the formal and meaningful involvement of women in governance, peace and security and development processes. The continent cannot meet its ambitious goals under Agenda 2063 while it limits a dynamic segment of its society, which women represent, from realizing its full potential. Investing in women and girls and their integration into the labour market, alongside delayed marriage and child bearing and expanded access to education for girls, family planning and sexual and reproductive health rights, has been attributed as the driving forces behind the economic successes of the "Asian tigers".

Further, there is a need to introduce mechanisms such as an African Gender Development Index or similar indices to ensure adequate monitoring and tracking of progress with respect to gender equality.

Youth engagement and empowerment

Africa has a very youthful population. In 2010 there were 364 million people on the continent aged 15–34 years and 209 million aged 15–24 years. These accounted for 35.6 per cent and 20.2 per cent of the total African population, respectively. Africa is therefore experiencing a youth bulge, defined as an "extraordinarily large youth cohort relative to the adult population".

The youth of the continent however face many challenges:

- **Education:** inadequate access especially at the secondary and tertiary levels.
- **Employment:** estimates put youth unemployment at under 5 per cent for Malawi and Rwanda, above 20 per cent in Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe and over 30 per cent in Mauritius, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Algeria and South Africa⁵⁷.

Continental Initiatives to Address Youth Issues

- The AU Second Decade of Education (2006 – 2015)
- The AU (2009 -2018) Ten year Plan for Youth development and empowerment
- The AU Youth Volunteer Corps Program
- Participation in decision-making (the African youth parliament, the Mano River Union youth Parliament, Youth Forums, representation at AU Summit, Conference of Ministers and Expert consultations)

⁵⁷ Regional Overview: Youth in Africa, UN 2011

- **Health:** the youth are the group most affected by the three major diseases - HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. Emerging challenges of alcoholism and illicit drugs have also led to the recorded cases of youth with mental disorders, disabilities and accidents amongst others.
- **Poverty:** poverty among youth is very high and it is estimated that 71 per cent live below US\$ 2 a day.
- **Violence and Conflict:** the youth bulge presents a myriad reasons for concern given indications of a strong correlation between countries prone to civil conflict and those with burgeoning youth populations.

Several regional and continental initiatives are in place to tackle youth issues and these could be expanded and improved. The “demographic dividend” – the result of an increase in size of the labour force and a decline in dependency ratios, could contribute to urban induced economic growth and increased national savings for development. Reaping the demographic dividend provides an opportunity for Africa to develop the skills of the youth in science, technology and innovation for global competitiveness.

Priority initiatives – An Africa Fit for Children

- An Africa free from child labor and trafficking.
- Healthy and well-nourished children in Africa
- Free, compulsory and child friendly education for all
- An Africa free from violence against children
- Children free from the impacts of armed conflicts
- Child participation becomes a reality
- An inclusive Africa
- Birth Registration for all children

Situation of children in Africa

Africa’s young, in particular her children are the foundation of Agenda 2063. Yet, despite the existence of legislations and policies adopted to protect children, the rights of thousands of children are being violated. In many parts of Africa, child rights face formidable obstacles:

- Recent studies show that globally, close to 250 million children are working in the world. More than 150 million of these children, including those in Africa, are working in dangerous conditions. These children are exploited in plantations, mines, or will become domestic workers;
- Every minute eight under-five children die in sub-Saharan Africa and **every 30 seconds a child dies from malaria**. Most African countries have under-five mortality rates above 100 per 1000 live births. Two thirds of the under-five deaths are due to preventable causes mainly pneumonia, malaria, diarrheal diseases, measles and HIV/AIDS, most of which are complicated by malnutrition. Furthermore, under-nutrition, according to WHO, is directly or indirectly responsible for 3.5 million child deaths every year;
- Sub-Saharan Africa has one of the highest prevalence of low birth weight ranging from 7-42per cent. Exclusive breastfeeding rate is low and complementary foods are inadequate and inappropriate;
- Lack of access to clean water and sanitation in Africa kills children at a rate equivalent to a jumbo jet crashing every four hours;
- Many children are still unable to access or benefit from education in a meaningful way. **33 million primary school-aged children in Sub-Saharan Africa do not go to school and 18 million of these children are girls;**
- Children are subjected to many forms of violence often perpetrated by family members, teachers and the police;

- Children are seriously affected during armed conflicts. They are recruited, abducted, and sexually abused during conflict. Moreover, many children are victims of forced displacement arising from conflict;
- Many children are subjected to child marriage and female genital mutilation. Africa has the highest incidence of child marriage and the highest prevalence of child marriage is concentrated in Western and Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent studies show that one in three girls get married before the age of 18. Female genital mutilation has a high prevalence rate in 28 countries in Africa. Overall, the subsidiary roles of women in society remain a key hindrance to development and socio-economic transformation;
- About forty per cent of Africa's population consists of people with disabilities, including 10-15 per cent of school-age children. However, school enrolment for the disabled is estimated at no more than 5-10 per cent; and
- In many parts of Africa, children are denied of their right to participation and freedom of expression due to cultural norms.

Africa must urgently scale up investment in its young people, especially children, as the highest rate of return Africa can realize is through investing in the young generation.

3.2.7 Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner

Under this aspiration, Africa will emerge as a strong, resilient and influential global player and partner, with a bigger role in world affairs.

The Assembly of the Union at its 21st Ordinary Session 26-27 May 2013 stated the following on Africa's place in the World: *"Our endeavour is for Africa to take its rightful place in the political, security, economic, and social systems of global governance towards the realization of its Renaissance and establishing Africa as a leading continent"*.

This section examines the situation of Africa today in the global context with respect to four key parameters, namely: global governance; global commons; partnerships; and development finance.

Global governance

Global governance matters a great deal for Africa as decisions made in global institutions and forums have a direct impact on the wellbeing of Africans and their continent. Yet Africa has to date been a marginal player in the governance of global institutions. This is particularly so with respect to international peace and security, economics, environment, and trade issues, and in other areas.

- **International peace and security:** will remain for Africa a key priority for the foreseeable future. In particular, the decisions of the UNSC have direct consequences on peace and security on the continent. For example, more than half the resolutions passed by the UNSC in 2011 were directed at Africa. Yet the continent is not among the Permanent Members, and African members of the Council have no veto power. For Africa, the reform of the UNSC is therefore an urgent priority.

AU - AFRICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

- Continue the global struggle against all forms of racism and discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerances;
- Act in solidarity with oppressed countries and peoples;
- Advance international cooperation that promotes and defends Africa's interests, is mutually beneficial and aligned to our Pan Africanist vision;
- Continue to speak with one voice and act collectively to promote our common interests and positions in the international arena;
- Reiterate our commitment to Africa's active role in the globalization process and international forums including in Financial and Economic Institutions; and
- Advocate for our common position for reform of the United Nations (UN) and other global institutions with particular reference to the UN Security Council, in order to correct the historical injustice with Africa as the only region without a permanent seat."

- **Global economic governance:** the Bretton Woods institutions have a huge impact on the economic affairs of nearly all African countries. Yet, despite some progress Africa's representation in the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions, does not correspond to or reflect the continent's importance.
- **Global trade negotiations:** while the EU represents 27 European countries in world trade negotiation, the African Union is not a member of WTO. This weakens the collective voice of Africa in WTO negotiations, and this must be corrected.

There are many other areas where global governance reform is needed; overall, African countries continue to stress the fact that there is a serious mismatch between global challenges and the global governance systems that are in place to address them.

Global commons

The global commons refers to the resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political reach of any one nation state and include the high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica and outer space⁵⁸. These are regarded as the common heritage of mankind and the advancement of science have made access to and exploitation of the resources of the global commons much easier. A critical area is outer space, which is of enormous economic, security and social importance to Africa.

AFRICAN SPACE INITIATIVES

- African resource Management (ARM) Satellite Constellation
- Regional African Satellite Communication Organization (RASCOM)
- African Reference Geodetic Network (AFREF) Program

The global economy is changing to a knowledge-based one and outer space is one of its critical areas. The market for space-based products is estimated at close to US\$ 300 billion annually. Though Africa owns less than one per cent of satellites in orbit, the continent has one of the highest demands for space products and services. There are over 1000 operating satellites orbiting the earth; about 45 per cent are from USA and less than one per cent from Africa. Thus African space capability is seriously limited⁵⁹.

Africa's economy is increasingly becoming space-dependent. Space based products include: communication technology (voice and data/imageries); defences/military; economic – financial transactions (e-banking, etc); navigation by GNSS; and use of space-based technologies for disaster management and climate change; health.

However, space capacity in Africa is gradually improving. Some countries have set up key strategic institutions such as National Space Agencies to manage their space program. Emerging countries in this respect include: Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Seychelles, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia. Many countries are also participating in a variety of space technology initiatives. There are also a number of organizations on the continent involved in space technologies and their terrestrial applications. This is contributing to building Africa's capabilities in space exploration, constellation programs, earth observation systems, navigation and positioning, satellite communication and education.

Outer space presents an opportunity for AU Member States to cooperate and share the enabling infrastructure and data and collectively manage programmes of mutual interest such as disease outbreaks; natural resources and the environment; hazards and disasters; weather forecasting (meteorology); climate change mitigation and adaptation; marine and coastal areas, agriculture and food security; peacekeeping missions and conflict prevention and management.

⁵⁸ UNEP

⁵⁹ Mohammed. S (2012) The Cost of Instability of Space: Impacts on End-Users in Africa

Although space technologies offer unique opportunities for the continent to collectively address socio-economic development issues, they are often complex, cost intensive with a high financial risk. Moreover, geographical and/or population size are often decisive factors for effective and efficient implementation of some space applications. A common continental approach that, in a coordinated and systematic manner, allows for the sharing of the costs, expertise, and the enabling infrastructure (including data), reduction of risks and collective management of strategic programmes, is therefore important. In this regard, the AU policy organs, sectoral Ministerial Conferences and the Executive Council have called upon the Commission to develop a common space policy and strategy as a continental framework for promoting the African civilian space agenda for socio-economic development.

The Commission, through an AU Member States-based Working Group is currently finalising the draft space policy document and strategy that outlines ambitious high-level goals to mobilise the continent to develop the necessary institutions and capacities to harness space technologies for socio-economic benefits, in order to improve the quality of lives and create wealth for Africans.

The development of the requisite human capital to sustain Africa's space program remains a critical gap. The Commission through the Pan African University, designated the southern African region to hub the institute of space to address this. The institute will capitalize on the achievements of the best universities on the continent and by creating regional knowledge satellites campuses around the space thematic area.

It is of urgent importance for African countries in the context of Agenda 2063 to build upon these on-going initiatives and strengthen their capability in space science and technologies for the continent's transformation; Africa needs to develop its technological capabilities to exploit outer space and to defend its interests.

Partnerships

To promote the continent's interests, the African Union has entered into **a number of strategic partnerships** such as: **Africa-European Union** partnership (or JAES - Joint Africa-EU Strategy), the **Africa-South America** partnership (ASACOF – Africa - South America Cooperation Forum), **Africa-China** partnership (FOCAC - Forum for China-Africa Cooperation), the **Africa-Japan** partnership (TICAD – Tokyo International Conference on Africa's Development), the **Africa-US** partnership, **Africa-Arab League** of States partnership (Africa-Arab Forum); **Africa – India** partnership (AIFS - Africa-India Forum Summit), the **Africa-Turkey** partnership (Africa-Turkey Cooperation Summit), **Africa-Korea** partnership (Korea-Africa Forum).

Strategic partnerships are different from traditional development cooperation, which are premised on a donor-recipient relationship. Africa's strategic partnerships are structured partnerships articulated, in a "win-win" and co-development approach, around addressing the challenges faced by the continent and realizing socio-economic development for Africa and its people. The transformational benefits are expected to be achieved via the implementation of industrialization and technology transfer, infrastructure development, trade and investment, social investment, and sustainable and inclusive growth policies, programs and projects of continental or regional dimension.

As a result of its increasing importance in economic and political terms, not only do Africa's partners want to deepen their relationship with the AU, but also a number of prospective partners have requested to forge similar relationships with the AU.

The importance of Africa to its partners is evidenced through the following:

- Oil and gas supply security for strategic partners (see table below);
- Mining resources supply security for strategic partners;
- EPC contracts in the huge infrastructure market of Africa;
- Growing market for consumer and industrial products; and
- Attractive investment destination across many sectors.

Table : Importance of Africa to its Top Five Strategic Partners + Brazil⁶⁰ Compared (2013 Figures rounded, USD billion unless otherwise expressed)

	EU	USA	JAPAN	CHINA	INDIA	BRAZIL
GENERAL						
Population (nb. inhabitants)	505 million	317 million	127 million	1.388 billion	1.2 billion	202.5 million
GDP, nominal	17,371	16,800	5,000	9,725	1,870	2,242
Global FDI Stock	EUR 5.206 (2012)	2,800	1,000	531	92.4 (2010)	181 (2010)
Global ODA/Aid provided ⁶¹	EUR 50.5	19	10.60 (2012)	7.1	1.2	1.2
TRADE						
Imports from Africa	EUR 180	50	12-13	113.1	23 (2011)	15.43
Export to Africa	EUR 100	35	9 - 10	85.3	43 (2011)	12.22
Two-way Trade	EUR 162 (2001) to 280 (13)	29.4 (2000) to 85 (2013)	9 (2000) to 24 (2010)	10.6 (2000) to 198 (2012)	6 (2004) to 66 (2011)	4.9 (2000) to 27.6 (03)
Africa's Share of P Oil Import	Oil (8%), Gas (21%)	18%	-	33%	20%	-
Africa's Share of P Total Trade	2% - 4%	1% - 2%	1% - 2%	4% - 6%	6% - 8%	5% - 7%
P Share of Africa's Total Trade	38.27% (2011)	11.46% (2011)	2% - 3%	16% - 18% (2011)	5.2% (2011)	5.32%
Asymmetric Trade Agreement	EBA	AGOA	-	Zero-tariff/LDCs	Zero-free/LDCs	-
INVESTMENT						
Stock of P FDI in Africa	EUR 250 (2012)	61 (2012)	6 - 7	21.3	14	1 - 2
Africa's Share of P Total FDI	4% - 5%	< 1%	< 1%	4% - 6%	15%	1% - 2%
ODA						
ODA/Foreign Aid of P to Africa	EUR 18 (2012)	12 (2012)	2.3 (2010)	1.2 (2008) ⁶²	0.043	0.022 (2010)
ADDITIONAL HIGHLIGHTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ITF generated 80 grants that resulted in 6.5 billion in infrastructure investment in 2012 - 2012 remittances from EU: EUR 60 billion - More Industrialization and technology transfer partnership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - USD 500 facility for African SME sector administered by AfDB - US 32 billion pledge of ODA + commercial finance under TICAD V - Strong follow-up mechanisms - Trade and investment - Technology transfer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - USD 40 billion EPC contracts in 2013 for Chinese firms - US\$2.385 billion in 61 projects in 30 African countries under CADF - Oil & gas investments in 12 African countries - Local content in China's Africa operations - Technology transfer - JV in industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OGM investments in 15 African countries - Strong offer for 78 TVET institutions & other excellence centers - Industrialization and SME development - PPP institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - South America strategic partnership with Africa not strong but Brazil bilateral cooperation strong in OGM and infrastructure. - Industrialization, SME, agriculture and health 	
IMPROVEMENT AREAS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In 2013, USD 6 billion of MCC investment for 20 countries - Pr. Obama's USD 8 billion Power Africa & Trade Africa initiatives announced in 2013 - Trade and investment outside oil sector. - Other untapped opportunities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Trade and investment - Technology transfer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local content in China's Africa operations - Technology transfer - JV in industry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Industrialization and SME development - PPP institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Industrialization, SME, agriculture and health 	

⁶⁰ Brazil which is not a strategic partnership is included for comparison purpose only; however, South America which includes Brazil is a strategic partner

⁶¹ Estimates for China, India and Brazil

⁶² Source: Brautigam (2011)

Despite the significance of the financial pledges of partners such as EU, Japan, China, and India, the overall implementation level of action plans agreed-upon is: low to nil (for Africa-South America, Africa-Arab League of States, Africa-Turkey); marginal in terms of significance (for Africa-Korea); largely under-target with good potential in technology transfer/TVET (for Africa-India), particularly good in infrastructure and resources sector investment but quite limited in technology transfer (for Africa-China); good in overall social infrastructure, agriculture and PSD and fair in economic infrastructures (for Africa-Japan); good in overall social infrastructure/MDGs, political governance and regional stability, private sector development and fair in economic infrastructures and industrialization (for Africa-EU); still marginal though bilateral cooperation is strong or potentially strong namely through AGOA, MCC, Power Africa (for Africa-USA).

As a result, the overall socio-economic and transformational impact of the activities implemented under Africa's strategic partnerships is yet to be maximized.

The management of Africa's strategic partnerships is constrained by number of challenges, including the following:

- Lack of a partnership policy and strategy framework, namely a strategy based on a specialization of individual partners on a limited number of activities with meaningful transformational benefits;
- AU-level technical capacity, procedural and knowledge gaps as well as financial resources challenges that limit the ability of the AU to contribute to the implementation of the agreed-upon action plans; and
- Weaknesses in the monitoring/follow-up, review, reporting and evaluation mechanisms of the quasi-totality of the strategic partnerships.

Africa's strategic partners have made a number of financial pledges and technical assistance-related support packages (in trade and investment, industrialization, regional integration, social and sustainable development and peace and security) to the AU, RECs and member countries that are yet to be fully leveraged.

Japan 2017-2013	China 2015 - 2013	India 2011-2014	EU 2014-2017/20
USD 32 billion	USD 20 billion USD 5 billion	USD 5.4 billion	EUR 30.5 billion (ACP-wide)

These financial pledges and technical assistance packages can be leveraged to support Agenda 2063 at four levels:

- Direct support to the domestic resource mobilization process;
- Provide catalytic finance;
- Direct finance to Agenda 2063 programs and projects; and
- Technical assistance and technology transfer support in a number of Agenda 2063 programs and projects.

In the context of Agenda 2063, Africa needs to phase out some of the rather low impact partnerships or re-orient them appropriately towards ensuring that they contribute to the implementation of Agenda 2063 and to the continent's transformation.

International cooperation and partnerships for development on both bilateral and global levels that are in line with national ownership, has a crucial role to play as enablers to support through

providing finance, technology transfer, capacity building to achieve Agenda 2063. In this regard as agreed in the Rio+20 Outcome Document, Africa's strategic partnerships should include the obligation of developed country partners to contribute to the realization of the continent's development through effective technology transfer.

Development finance

In 2012, Africa's GDP stood at US\$2 trillion with a population of over 1 billion. If Africa were one country these metrics would place the continent as the 8th economy in the world in terms of GDP and the 3rd most populous. In addition, African countries are wealthier than two decades ago, and 23 African countries are middle income ones according to the threshold of per capita greater than US\$1000. Yet individually, African countries continue to rely on outside sources to finance their development.

Worse still, currently donors contribute 96 per cent of the programme funding for the African Union Commission, a situation that is unacceptable. Africa needs to look inwards to mobilize domestic resources to finance and accelerate its transformation, integration, peace, security, infrastructure, industrialization, and democratic governance and strengthen continental institutions.

The Changing landscape of development finance

Over the last decade, the landscape for development finance has changed dramatically, in terms of actors, motives and financing instruments. From predominantly, DAC-donors based development cooperation, the development finance arena has evolved into a multi-polar system with the following architecture of actors:

- *Traditional development partners, their aid organizations and their export credit agencies* which conform to DAC norms and rules, are governed by the "Washington Consensus" and include largely OECD countries;
- *New and emerging partners*, regrouping the wide array of South-South co-operation actors often referred to as "non-traditional" donors. They include predominantly: BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa); but also MINT countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and countries such as Malaysia;
- *Arab countries and their multilateral organizations*, led by oil revenue-rich GCC countries;
- *Development finance institutions (DFIs)* which operates along the lines of the "Washington Consensus" and the UN system;
- *Private philanthropic organizations*, including foundations and international NGOs;
- *Private sector (banks and enterprises)*, which are motivated by commercial interests as opposed to other actors that can be considered as development finance actors;
- *Diaspora remittances*, which would also not be considered as development finance, but constitute in many cases important external resource flows, usually captured in the current account in the balance of payments statistics.

These major shifts in the international development finance landscape have created new opportunities and options; but also, new challenges for Africa - the AU, RECs and member states of the AU.

For the effective implementation of the African development agenda, it is critical for all parties to adequately mobilize resources needed from all funding mechanisms to strengthen the capacities of relevant institutions for the implementation of Agenda 2063.

The continuing challenge of Aid effectiveness

Despite the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, development cooperation continues to be driven by donor countries' priorities and interest. Current forms of development cooperation therefore are not optimally delivering meaningful socio-economic transformational benefits for Africa, which continues to be financially dependent, food insecure with a weak industrial base and the lowest average HDI as a region.

The Post-2015 Development Agenda and the Third International Conference on Finance for Development (FfD3)

The Post-2015 Development Agenda and Financing Implications: With the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the United Nations has initiated a process of defining a post-2015 development agenda. This agenda will be launched in September 2015 during the UN General Assembly Session.

The post 2015 development agenda is country-led with broad participation from major groups and civil society stakeholders. In particular, a High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLP) was convened to advise on the post 2015 development agenda. Other related activities include the formulation of a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by an Open Working Group of the UN General Assembly, an intergovernmental committee of experts reviewing sustainable development financing, General Assembly dialogues on technology facilitation and other related initiatives. Africa has articulated its inputs to the post 2015 process through the formulation of a comprehensive Common African Position (CAP).

Third International Conference on Finance for Development (FfD3): The Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD3) is scheduled to take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in July 2015. The FfD3 is expected to strengthen mutual commitments and mechanisms that will govern and determine financing and partnership framework for development over the next decades. The conference will assess progress made and identify the challenges to be addressed in relation to the commitments made and the targets set in the framework of its two predecessors frameworks: the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and the 2008 Doha Declaration. The anticipated review will cover external financing mechanisms for development (ODA, FDI, Portfolio Investment as well as the role and potential of Diaspora resource-based financing such as remittances) as well as domestic resource mobilization efforts of developing countries and related support from the international community (taxes, resource rents, illicit financial flows, domestic savings and capital market) and other enablers of development and development financing such as growth and trade performance, technology transfer, and capacity building,

The outcomes of both the Post-2015 Development Agenda and FfD3 will have important implications for Africa's development financing needs, particularly, for the low-income countries (LIC) of the continent. Both the Post-2015 Agenda and FfD3 will also impact the implementation of the socio-economic transformation agenda of Africa and related continental, regional and national programs and projects. Agenda 2063 transformation needs and related financing and partnership requirements will therefore be at the centre of African countries' negotiating positions in both the Post-2015 Development Agenda and FfD3.

Call for more focus on new forms of financing and domestic resource mobilization

Against this background, there is an emerging consensus that Agenda 2063 has to rely more on the mobilization of domestic resources. The AU has, with this objective in mind, has initiated a number of studies in this regard – see box below.

Current Domestic Resource Mobilization at Continental Level	
Initiatives	Key Highlights
<p>OBASANJO-LED HLPASF (High-level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding) proposal on alternative sources of stable funding for the AU (July 2012)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report evaluates potential for resource mobilization through levies on private sector activities: insurance premiums (rate of 1per cent); international travel (US\$2.5 for travel outside the Continent and US\$1 for travel within the Continent); Tourism and hospitality (US\$1 for each stay); v) Import levy (0.2per cent on goods imported from outside the continent); text messages (e.g. 5 cents per mobile phone text message) • Impact study was conclusive • Proposals have evolved from initial ones to two types of levies: <u>US\$2.00</u> hospitality levy per stay in a hotel; <u>US\$10.00</u> travel levy on flight tickets to and from Africa.
<p>MBEKI-LED GROUP / UNECA “Illicit Financial Flows: Why Africa Needs to Track it, Stop it and Get it” “Background paper of the High-level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, ECA, 2012”</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Study reviews challenges posed by Illicit Financial Flow and proposes solutions around the (1) shared responsibility of source country and destination country and (2) global governance to stop, track and repatriate the funds involved.
<p>III. NPCA/UNECA STUDY “Mobilizing Domestic Financial Resources for Implementing NEPAD National and Regional Programmes - Africa Looks Within” (January 2014)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Studies assesses the potential for DRM on: Illicit financial flow, remittances, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, banks, stock market • Proposes the setting-up of 2 DRM-based institutions: (1) Africa Infrastructure Development Fund (AIDF) and (2) Africa Credit Guarantee • Facility (ACGF) to support the implementation of NPCA programs
<p>AfDB-LED AFRICA50 FUND, a private equity fund to support PIDA (2013)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An initiative of the AfDB aimed at setting-up a private equity fund of USD 50 to 100 billion through DRM targeting foreign reserves, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and other African institutional investors

Domestic resources of a country could range from domestic financial capital, to ‘human capital’, to ‘social capital’ to ‘natural resources’. However, in the context of Agenda 2063 financing, domestic resource mobilization (DRM) refers to ***the savings and investments generated by households, domestic firms (including financial institutions) and governments.***

In contrast to mobilizing external resources (through FDI, aid, trade, and debt relief), DRM offers the advantages of greater domestic policy ownership and greater coherence with domestic needs, higher development impact. It does not suffer from the disadvantages associated with FDI and foreign aid, which are often tied to the objectives of foreign investors (e.g. exclusive focus on certain sectors, where profits will be maximized such as OGM and telecommunication to the detriment of the agriculture sector) and donors (e.g. sector and technology tied aid and conditional aid). But it also presents obvious challenges in many African countries, which makes attracting external resources seem like an easier option.

Hence, while DRM would not meet all financial requirements of the Agenda 2063, it has the potential to contribute, at 70per cent to 80per cent, to the financing of the Agenda 2063. The remaining needs of Agenda 2063 will be rightly financed through traditional mechanisms including the international financial market, FDI, official development assistance that needs also to be leveraged towards more adoption of African priorities.

Current DRM initiatives in Africa

Financing development continues to be a major challenge for the large majority of African governments, RECs and continental bodies such as the AU and its organs. As a result, the three levels of the continental governance system have initiated a number of DRM initiatives.

At the national level, an increasing number of countries have come to rely more on enhanced fiscal resource management through reallocation, expenditure control and a stronger revenue management authority to meet a larger portion of their development financing needs. This comes ahead of alternative development financing vehicles such as the local financial market, dominated by the banking sector and timid attempts to restructure the national contractual savings system (insurance and pension sector) towards a more robust management system. Domestic network of microfinance institutions (MFI) have also emerged in many African countries.

Regionally, a greater role has been given to regional development banks (AMU's new Investment Bank; ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID); Development Bank of Central African States (BDEAC); East African Development Bank (EADB); Preferential Trade Area (PTA Bank) which are key regional institutions working along other regional financial institutions (such as BOAD, West African Development Bank, Africa Re, the continental reinsurance agency); and attempts to fill the financial market gap is being considered by RECs such as COMESA which has contributed to establishing the African Trade Insurance Corporation (ATI) and ECOWAS which has planned to set-up the ECOWAS Investment Guarantee Agency.

At the continental level, the *Africa 50 Fund*, meant to contribute to the financing of infrastructure priority projects from domestic resources, is potentially a key milestone in development financing process of Africa. The AU-approved Africa Credit Guarantee Agency (ACGA) and African Investment Bank (AIB) are two major continental development financing vehicles that should enhance quite significantly the continental development finance architecture.

Yet, at national, regional and continental level; significant financing gaps still remain both in terms of products (private and public equity, risk management, growth capital and, more generally, long-term finance for SME and industrial projects) and markets and institutions (private equity fund, investment banks, asset management firms, stock exchanges, bond markets, derivatives market, and so on).

3.3 LESSONS FROM RESPONSES TO AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AT NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL LEVELS

The preceding sections have shown that while Africa has made tremendous progress, the continent also faces significant challenges in the social, economic and political fields. African countries through their national, regional and continental plans have deployed significant efforts to respond to these challenges. Reviewing these plans and identifying the priorities therein is therefore important, because while Agenda 2063 is a long-term strategic framework for Africa's socio-economic transformation, it must be grounded in the current and future realities of AU Member States and those of regional and continental organizations.

This section briefly highlights the main priorities, gaps and key lessons gleaned from reviewing some 33 national plans, several regional frameworks and continental ones, and which served to inform the formulation of Agenda 2063.

Priorities at national, regional and continental levels

Priorities at national level

Examples of some long-term visions as well as medium term plans extending from 3-5 years are presented in the box below.

COUNTRY	TIME FRAME	VISION STATEMENT
Kenya	Vision 2030	Globally competitive and prosperous Kenya with a high quality of life.
Uganda	Vision 2035	Transform Ugandan society from peasant to a modern prosperous country.
Tanzania	Vision 2025	High quality of life anchored on peace, stability, unity, and good governance, rule of law, resilient economy and competitiveness.
Rwanda	Vision 2020	Become a middle income country by 2020
Burundi	Vision 2025	Sustainable peace and stability and Achievement of global development commitments in line with MDGS.

From the national medium-term plans reviewed, the following focus areas appeared most frequently:

- Inclusive economic/wealth creation;
- Human capital development;
- Employment;
- Governance/public sector reform; and
- Gender, women and youth/social protection.

On the other hand issues related to: science, technology and innovation; culture, sports and arts; and peace and security were less frequently included in national plans of the Member States reviewed.

Focus Area/Goal	Frequency
Inclusive economic growth / wealth creation	27/27
Human Capital Development	26/27
Employment	25/27
Social Protection / Gender Women and Youth	22/27
Governance/Public Sector Reforms/Capacity	26/27
Environment/Sustainable Development	19/27
Infrastructure	18/27
Science Technology and Innovation	10/27
Peace and Security	5/17
Culture, Sports and the Arts	2/17

Regional level priorities

At the regional level, the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) arising from the Abuja Treaty, which called for the establishment of the African Economic Community and the Sirte Declaration of 1999, provides a common denominator for the core work of all the RECs, albeit allowing for different paces of development. Within the eight integration priority sectors of the MIP of: free movement of persons, goods, services and capital; peace and security; energy and infrastructure; agriculture; trade; industry; investment and statistics, the RECs have developed strategic plans that reflect the member states collective development priorities to be handled at the regional level. A review of the regional plans⁶³ indicates that the RECs are pursuing all the goals under the MIP but with varying emphasis reflecting regional specificities.

⁶³ Review of Regional Plans, (Draft), Agenda 2063 Technical Unit, SPPMERM Department, The African Union Commission May 2063

Beyond the MIPs, some RECs are pursuing other priorities in areas such as: political integration, economic and monetary integration, capacity development, harmonization of policies in delivery of basic social services- health, education and social protection and inter-connectivity of electricity.

Below are the examples of vision statements of some of the Regional Economic Communities.

RECs	VISION STATEMENT
COMESA	To have a fully integrated internationally competitive regional economic community within which there is economic prosperity and peace as evidenced by political and social stability and high standards of living for its people.
CEN-SAD	Collective security and sustainable development; preserve and consolidate peace, security and stability.
EAC	The Vision of EAC is to attain a prosperous, competitive, secure and politically united East Africa.
ECCAS	A peaceful area, with prosperity and solidarity; an economic and politically united space with inclusive development and free-movement of people
ECOWAS	To create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation
IGAD	The promotion of joint development strategies; the gradual harmonization of macroeconomic policies in the social, technological, and scientific fields; and the harmonization of policies on trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources.
SADC	A regional community in which the people of Southern Africa can realize economic well-being, improved living standards and quality of life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security.

Continental level priorities

The AU Constitutive Act, which identifies 12 priority areas, form the basis for the development of continental frameworks such as the PIDA, CAADP, the African Mining Vision, the African Governance Architecture and the African Water Vision amongst others. A review of these frameworks⁶⁴ identifies the following priority areas at the continental level:

- *Agriculture*: food security and rural development;
- *Human capital development*: health, nutrition, science, technology and innovation - driven education;
- *Social development*: social protection, access/participation/advancement of women, youth, the marginalized and the vulnerable to economic, social and governance opportunities;
- *Industrialization and manufacturing*: industrial policy framework/mechanisms; value additions to agriculture; increased control of natural resources; employment generating manufacturing; linkages of firms to regional / global value chains; increased intra-African trade; science, technology and innovation driven industrialization;

⁶⁴ Review of Continental Frameworks, (Draft), Agenda 2063 Technical Unit, SPPMERM Department, The African Union Commission May 2063

- *Integration*: free movement of people, goods, services and capital; a common monetary union; infrastructural interconnectivity- (road, rail, marine, air, voice, electronic);
- *Governance*: political governance, capable nations, democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and the rule of law/justice and humanitarian affairs; and
- *Peace and security*: standby force; alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Conclusions and lessons for Agenda 2063

From the review undertaken, a number of conclusions and lessons emerge.

- a) At national level, there is strong convergence on some of the key priorities that are addressed by plans of member states. The priorities reflected in most Member States plans include: inclusive economic growth/wealth creation; human capital development; employment; governance/public sector reform; and Gender, women and youth/social protection.
- b) However, there are areas unique to some Member States, reflecting their national circumstances and interests. For example, member states coming out of civil wars / national strife, tend to place greater emphasis on peace and stability and post conflict reconstruction; island countries focus on issues related to the blue economy; while landlocked countries pursue issues related to regional integration in transport infrastructure.
- c) At regional level, while RECs are seen as the implementing arms of the AU frameworks, the priority areas for RECs do not always correspond with those of the AUC strategic framework.
- d) Finally, vision statements at both national and regional levels provide a strong evidence of the level of ambition of African countries, and clearly show a determination to reach the same level of development as countries in other regions of the world. In effect these visions substantially validate and reflect the African aspirations for 2063 outlined in chapter 2.

Agenda 2063 must therefore take as its point of departure current priorities reflected in national plans, and the regional and continental frameworks, and take into account the desired destination reflected in the country and regional vision statements.

3.4 OVERALL CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR AGENDA 2063

3.4.1 General conclusion

As the analysis above demonstrates, there has been a remarkable turn-around in Africa's fortunes over the last decade and half. This change in fortunes is also reflected in the way the continent is now perceived. For example, in a 2000 edition, the *Economist Magazine* described Africa as the "Hopeless Continent". A decade later in 2011, the same magazine labelled Africa as "Rising Continent" and in March 2013, described Africa as "Hopeful Continent".

Policy makers and ordinary African citizens should not be taken in by such facile analysis of the situation on the continent and be lulled into a false sense of complacency. Nonetheless, they reflect the changed perceptions of the continent, the road Africa has travelled and the opportunities the continent now has to break with its past poor record in many areas, and set a new trajectory of growth, prosperity and peace for her citizens.

Africa today is at the cusp of a significant transition and actions taken now, individually and collectively will determine the fate of future generations.

- Today the African Union is better organized institutionally and making significant strides for peace and security on the continent.

- Democracy and good governance is consolidating, notwithstanding occasional reversals and challenges of managing elections; most people on the continent live in countries, which are better governed than two decades ago.
- Respect for human rights and other fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and association have improved.
- Major gains have been made in terms of sustainable economic development, gender equality, health and education. Collective response to HIV and AIDS has produced good results in terms of treatment and care as well better management of the epidemic.
- The vision of an integrated and prosperous Africa anchored on the RECS and NEPAD endures.
- Africa's economic performance has improved considerably and growth is rising.
- Africa has greater prospects for economic transformation with the discovery of immense mineral, gas and petroleum resources, and the unleashing of the potential of its people.

While these achievements should be a source of hope, Africa still needs to make radical policy commitments and be cognizant of the daunting challenges that remain, and which could impact on the realization of Agenda 2063 aspirations.

Alongside these challenges are also tremendous opportunities.

Based on the analysis undertaken in the preceding sections of the chapter, Annex 1 summaries the main action areas required for achieving Agenda 2063 aspirations. These have been used to inform Agenda 2063 goals, priority areas and targets presented in the following Chapter 4.

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of Africa over the past 50 years and the assessment of where the continent stands today shows remarkable progress but also many deep - seated challenges. At the same time, the continent has great opportunities and potential for tackling these challenges and achieving accelerated economic growth, social and economic transformation – see box below.

Examples of Opportunities in an Emergent Continent

- About a third of African countries had GDP growth rates above 6 per cent between 2000 and 2008. Only 24 per cent of that growth was associated with natural resources extraction.
- The average time to double incomes on the continent is 22 years and in several countries it will take just slightly more than a decade (11 to 13 years) to do so.
- Africa has a huge market to trade within itself and with the outside world. Africa has 52 cities with populations of over 1 million (about the same as in Western Europe), the percentage living in cities will be over 50 per cent by 2030, a middle class bigger than India and with discretionary spending power.
- There is increased stability on the economic, security and political fronts. There is increased macroeconomic stability, democratic reforms and significant declines in conflicts.
- Africa will soon have the largest labour force in the world, swelling to 163 million and by 2035 bigger than China's, and accounting for 25 per cent of the global workforce.
- Although intra-African trade stands at a paltry 11 per cent at the moment (in some regions it is 25 per cent) growth of Pan African companies and robust measures being taken at regional and continental levels will see marked improvement. The imminent launching of the Tripartite Free Trade Area of COMESA/SADC/EAC with a potential population of 625 million and 26 countries (nearly half the continent) and combined GDP of US\$ 1.2 trillion (58 per cent of the continent's GDP) will be a big boost for intra-African trade and free movements of people, goods, services and capital.
- Africa has 60 per cent of the world's potential arable land, which can make the continent an agricultural powerhouse while at the same time conserving Africa's ecosystems, unique wild species and genetic resources.
- On average African governments spend 20 per cent of their budgets on education (compared to 11 per cent in the OECD countries). Education and skills development will be critical in determining whether the demographic dividend and the projected growth of the continent's labour force will be a catalyst for growth and transformation, or lead to civil unrest.
- Mobile penetration was 2 per cent in 2000 and rose to 78 per cent today and it is projected to reach 85 per cent by 2015.
- The working age population 15 to 64 is expected to increase from 54.5 per cent to 62.8 per cent of the population between the two periods 2010 and 2030, and is estimated to be at 63.7 per cent in 2100. The increase in population can be the market driver for businesses/ Africa's private sector. A bulge in the working age population relative to children and the elderly, means a lower dependency burden which will free resources for old age care and for developing human capital.
- Africa is projected to enter its urban age by 2035 when 50 per cent of the population will live in urban areas, and reach 1.26 billion in 2100, nearly a quarter of the world's projected urban population. Given this demographic trend, Africa should not be left out in the creation of Smart Cities.
- A growing urban population and the largest workforce of the future provides an opportunity for Africa to transform itself into a global powerhouse and the next frontier market.

Achieving the long-term vision for Africa laid in Chapter 2 requires a bold and ambitious action agenda if the continent is to overcome the challenges seize the opportunities. This Chapter presents this agenda for action for attaining the vision for 2063. It covers the following aspects:

- Conceptual approach;
- Foundation of Agenda 2063;
- Goals, priority areas, targets and indicative strategies; and
- Highlights of Agenda 2063 Flagship Programmes.

4.1. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

The approach adopted in Agenda 2063 is based on recognizing the continent's diversity and building upon existing initiatives to fast track progress.

4.1.1 Recognition of Africa's diversity

It is important to stress that while Agenda 2063 provides an overarching framework, its implementation will require country specific actions. This is in recognition of the fact that Africa is a diverse continent:

- Coastal versus landlocked countries -- the latter with challenges related to access but can benefit significantly from investment in infrastructure linkages;
- Least developed versus middle-income countries;
- Natural resource and mineral rich versus natural resource and mineral poor countries;
- Countries with outstanding and good agricultural endowments and those less well endowed;
- Countries emerging from conflict with fragile institutions and low productive capacities, infrastructure deficit and unstable macroeconomic environment and those that are already experiencing the benefits of the absence of conflict and consistent investment in their economies;
- Small Islands Developing States (SIDS), which are challenged by similar issues as other developing/emerging market countries, but have to contend with the acuteness of combined risks such as rising seas related to climate change, isolation from contiguous land neighbours and markets, high populations density; in comparison to countries on the continent which can come together to manage risks – see box below.

Highlights of African Small Island States

Member States: Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles.

Their Endowments: These countries are endowed with economic and cultural wealth, and host some of the world's most precious biological resources, marine and coastal ecosystems renowned for their species diversity and endemism. In addition, they have strong social capital as manifested by: kinship networks; unique heritage, strong sense of identity and community.

Key Challenges: Like other SIDS (see Barbados Programme of Action – 1994; Mauritius Strategy – 2005; and Samoa Pathway – 2014), they encounter multiple predicaments: rapid rural – urban migration, pollution and illegal resource extraction; undue specialization on a narrow range of products and services because of their small geographic size, hence vulnerability to factors linked to: climate change, high debt/GDP ratio, limited domestic markets; excessive dependence on international trade and hence vulnerability to global developments; high income inequality; high population density, overuse of certain resources, costly public administration and infrastructure, including transportation and communication; pervasive poverty and political instability (for example, Madagascar).

Issues for Agenda 2063: While the most valuable asset of these states is the ocean, and their limited human capital, Agenda 2063 pursues three pronged strategies, all linked to the ocean:

- (i) Developing their human capital in a comprehensive manner and also empower it to contribute fully and meaningfully to national and regional development;
- (ii) Beneficiating sectors that have immediate potential for growth, job creation and poverty reduction, such as aquaculture in marine and fresh waters;
- (iii) Enhancing science, technology and innovations for sustainable management, and collaborative management of marine resources and conservation (marine protected areas (MPAs));
- (iv) Develop capacities to access global commons in areas beyond national jurisdiction and deep seas; and
- (v) Strengthen Africa's participation in the decision-making regarding the allocation and utilization of resources beyond Exclusive Economic Zones, in other words, on high seas.

These different categories of countries face distinct conditions and features which shape the development paths and strategies they pursue, although there are challenges that cut across the diverse country categories, such as high poverty levels; illiteracy; disease; and high child, infant and maternal mortality.

Consequently, it is reasonable for Agenda 2063 to be viewed as a shared vision within which African states, individually and collectively, will chart their respective common but adapted development paths to achieve the vision of an integrated, united and prosperous continent.

Each country and region must therefore define the optimum combination of policies and strategies to reach the goals and milestones proposed. What is important is to ensure robust monitoring and tracking systems, and putting in place a process of mutual learning.

Furthermore, there will also be differentiated responsibilities between Member States, Regional and Continental bodies in attaining these proposed milestones and targets. This is worked out in greater detail to ensure, coherence and unity of action, in the First 10-Year Implementation Plan.

4.1.2 Building upon existing initiatives

Agenda 2063 would be implemented through successive 10-year implementation plans. In the short term, Agenda 2063 will place emphasis on accelerating the implementation of key continental frameworks that have been adopted, key flagship programmes and fast tracking of regional integration. Additionally, African countries would expedite domestication of the relevant legal frameworks, protocols and similar instruments related to governance, democracy, human rights and peace and security.

Such an approach would provide the traction for long-term progress, as well as critical evidence of forward momentum to demonstrate impact and lend credibility to Agenda 2063.

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4.2 FOUNDATION OF AGENDA 2063

Agenda 2063, as depicted in the diagram below, is anchored on the Constitutive Act, the AU Vision, the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration and the African aspirations. It also builds upon national, regional and continental priorities reflected in these plans and frameworks.



4.3 GOALS, PRIORITY AREAS, TARGETS AND INDICATIVE STRATEGIES

The goals of Agenda 2063 are linked to the aspirations and are presented in the table below.

- ✓ A set of 20 goals has been identified based on the AU Vision, seven African aspirations and the 50th Anniversary Solemn declaration.
- ✓ The goals also take cognizance of the goals and priority areas contained in the Common Africa Position (CAP) and the post 2015 Sustainable Development Goals.
- ✓ The strategies in general reflect those contained in Member States/regional plans, continental frameworks, UNECA / AU Economic Reports⁶⁵ on Africa, the 2014 Africa Transformation Report and Africa Vision 2050, as well as others.
- ✓ Goals and priority areas have also been informed by the outcomes of the consultations and take into account existing continental and regional initiatives, as well as outcomes of reviews of Member States medium and long-term plans and visions.

The Agenda 2063 goals, priorities, targets and indicative strategies described in this chapter should, in this context, be considered as Africa's Development Goals or the "MDGs for Africa", and should therefore galvanize the concomitant political and financial commitments.

Annex 3 and 4 present in detail the goals, priority areas, targets and indicative strategies for the respective aspirations, at national and regional/continental level. Table 2 below presents an overall summary.

⁶⁵ Economic Report on Africa 2013-Making the Most of Africa's Commodities Industrializing for Growth, Jobs and Economic Transformation and Economic Report on Africa 2014 -----

TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF ASPIRATIONS, GOALS AND PRIORITY AREAS OF AGENDA 2063

Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas
<p>A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development</p>	<p>A high standard of living, quality of life and wellbeing for all citizens</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incomes, jobs and decent work • Poverty, inequality and hunger • Social security and protection, including persons with disabilities • Modern, affordable and livable habitats and quality basic services
	<p>Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education and STI driven skills revolution
	<p>Healthy and well-nourished citizens</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Health and nutrition
	<p>Transformed economies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable and inclusive economic growth • STI driven manufacturing, industrialization and value addition • Economic diversification and resilience • Tourism/Hospitality
	<p>Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agricultural productivity and production
	<p>Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marine resources and energy • Port operations and marine transport
	<p>Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainable natural resource management • Biodiversity conservation, genetic resources and ecosystems • Sustainable consumption and production patterns • Water security • Climate resilience and natural disasters preparedness and prevention • Renewable energy

Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas
An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance	A United Africa (Federal or Confederate)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frameworks and institutions for a United Africa
	Continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial and monetary institutions
	World class infrastructure criss - crosses Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communications and Infrastructure connectivity
An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law	Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and rule of law entrenched	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy and good governance • Human rights, justice and rule of law
	Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutions and leadership • Participatory development and local governance
A peaceful and secure Africa	Peace, security and stability is preserved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintenance and preservation of peace and security
	A stable and peaceful Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional structure for AU instruments on peace and security • Defence, security and peace
	A fully functional and operational APSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully operational and functional APSA all pillars
Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics	African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Values and ideals of Pan Africanism • Cultural values and African Renaissance • Cultural heritage, creative arts and businesses
An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential offered by African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children	Full gender equality in all spheres of life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women and girls empowerment • Violence and discrimination against women and girls
	Engaged and empowered youth and children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth empowerment and children's rights
An Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner	Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Africa's place in global affairs • Partnerships
	Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African capital markets • Fiscal systems and public sector revenue • Development assistance

4.4 THE AGENDA 2063 FLAGSHIP PROGRAMMES

The Bahir Dar (Ethiopia) Ministerial Retreat of the Executive Council of 24 - 26 January 2014, deliberated on the Agenda 2063 framework and agreed on actions to strengthen the sustainable management of African resources and accelerate transformation and development.

Specifically, it agreed to provide a big push to propel Africa's growth and transformation through fast tracking the implementation of programmes identified by Agenda 2063. Furthermore, at the Malabo AU Summit, June 2014, the Executive Council mandated the AU Commission to continue to explore and prepare concrete actions in the implementation of these fast track programmes and initiatives (EX.CL/Dec.821 (XXV)).

The Key Agenda 2063 Flagship programmes agreed to by Africa's political leadership are the following:

- (i) **The Integrated High Speed Train Network:** aims to connect all African capitals and commercial centres to facilitate movement of goods, factor services and people and also relieve transport congestion of existing and future systems.
- (ii) **A Pan-African E-University:** designed to accelerate development of human capital, science and technology and innovation through increasing access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa by reaching large numbers of students and professionals in multiple sites and developing relevant and high quality Open, Distance and eLearning (ODEL) resources; as well as ensuring that African students are guaranteed access to the University from anywhere in the world and anytime.
- (iii) Formulation of a **commodities strategy:** aims to enable African countries add value, extract higher rents from their commodities, integrate into Global Value chains, and promote vertical and horizontal diversification anchored in value addition and local content development, as part of a set of holistic policies to promote the development of a vibrant, socially and environmentally sustainable commodities sector.
- (iv) Establishment of an **annual African forum:** designed to bring together, once a year, Africa's political leadership, the private sector, academia and civil society to discuss developments and constraints as well as measures to be taken to realize the Aspirations and goals of Agenda 2063.
- (v) Fast track the establishment of the **Continental Free Trade Area by 2017:** aims to significantly accelerate growth of Intra-Africa trade and use trade more effectively as an engine of growth and sustainable development. It includes doubling of intra-Africa trade by 2022, strengthening Africa's common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations and establishing the financial institutions within agreed upon timeframes: African Investment Bank and Pan African Stock Exchange (2016); the African Monetary Fund (2018); and the African Central Bank (2028/34).
- (vi) The **African Passport and free movement of people:** aims to fast track continental integration, a common African Passport, free movement of people is a pillar of African integration and accelerated growth of intra-African trade. This programme aims at transforming Africa's laws, which remain generally restrictive on movement of people despite political commitments to bring down borders with the view to promoting the issuance of visas by Member States enhance free movement of all African citizens in all African countries by 2018.

- (vii) **Silencing the Guns by 2020:** aims to fulfil the pledge of the AU Heads of State and Government meeting on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee Anniversary of the founding of the OAU, “not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans, “to end all wars in Africa by 2020” and “make peace a reality for all African people and rid the continent free of wars, end inter- and intra-community conflicts, violations of human rights, humanitarian disasters and violent conflicts, and prevent genocide.”
- (viii) Implementation of the **Grand Inga Dam Project: aims to boost Africa’s production of energy.** Africa’s hydropower potential remains almost untapped with a mere 7 per cent of the hydropower currently exploited; and Africa continues to have the world’s lowest hydropower utilization rate. The optimal development of the Inga Dam will generate 43,200 MW of power (PIDA) to support current regional power pools and their combined service to transform Africa from traditional to modern sources of energy and ensure access of the African citizenry to clean and affordable electricity.
- (ix) **The Pan-African E-Network:** designed to boost services, it involves a wide range of stakeholders and envisages putting in place policies and strategies that will lead to transformative e-applications and services in Africa; improve physical infrastructure, especially the intra-African broad band terrestrial infrastructure; and cyber security, making the information revolution the basis for service delivery. Further, the African Internet Exchange System (AXIS); e-Transform Africa, which envisages transforming Africa into an e-Society and PIDA and the manufacturing component parts for e-devices merit priority consideration.
- (x) **Outer space:** aims to strengthen Africa’s use of outer space to bolster its development. Outer space is of critical importance to the development of Africa in all fields: agriculture, disaster management, remote sensing, climate forecast, banking and finance, as well as defense and security. Africa’s access to space technology products is no longer a matter of luxury and there is a need to speed up access to these technologies and products. New developments in satellite technologies make these very accessible to African countries. The Brazzaville meeting on aerial space technologies underlines the need for appropriate policies and strategies in order to develop regional market for space products in Africa.
- (xi) **A Single African Airspace:** This flagship project aims at delivering a single African air transport market to facilitate air transportation in Africa. **Continental Financial Institutions:** Establishment of the African Continental Financial Institutions aims at accelerating integration and socio-economic development of the continent, as they are important institutions for the mobilization of resources and management of the financial sector.
- (xii) The flagships described above will serve as catalysts for a wide-ranging transformation of the continent, with benefits across a wide cross section of the continent. The programmes will form the basis for the First 10 – Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063.

CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL FACTORS FOR SUCCESS, POTENTIAL RISKS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES

For Agenda 2063 to achieve accelerated growth, broad structural transformation and sustainable development desired by African citizens, it is important that the most critical factors and processes for success are clearly identified and acted upon. These factors are political, economic, social, environmental, technological, legal and institutional and they directly or indirectly contribute to or trigger a transformative change or serve as a catalyst for the realization of the African aspirations for 2063.

Further, in the next 50 years, new and unforeseen risks and threats (i.e. factors likely to have a disruptive influence on Africa's future) and/or opportunities for development are likely to emerge, while the ones we know today could assume new dimensions. In this context appreciating global mega trends and how these are likely to impact on Africa is of critical importance.

This chapter highlights these critical factors for Agenda 2063 success as well as potential risks/threats and mitigation measures, to facilitate the realization of Agenda 2063.

5.1 CRITICAL FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

- (a) **Leadership and political commitment:** this is a critical factor that would shape Africa's future and determine the success of Agenda 2063. The leadership challenge for accelerated economic growth, transformation and sustainable development that Africa faces today is more complex, albeit not less demanding, than at the time of the struggle for independence from colonialism. There is a need for visionary leadership in all fields and at all levels: politics, business, industry, science, religion, education, and culture. Experiences from across the world suggest that success comes from a political leadership that has vision and commitment as well as the will and capacity to implement it.
- (b) **Capable development state.** Effective, accountable and development oriented institutions, efficient and strong bureaucracy, clear and pragmatic development vision and planning, public policy that supports national entrepreneurial class and builds public trust, and governance structure based on transparent laws and rules are critical for the realization of Agenda 2063. In cases where structural transformation has succeeded, the state has played a crucial role in the process. State capacities and institutions need to be strengthened to build a vibrant private sector, mobilize the population and build national consensus around a common development agenda, and ensure that adequate resources are committed to achieve it. Above all, the African state must be accountable and responsive to the needs of its population.
- (c) **Participation, inclusion and empowerment of citizens.** Effective participation of all stakeholders in the conception, design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063 is a critical success factor. Thus, Agenda 2063 must be fully participatory and be owned by all the continent's stakeholders – the whole continent must be part of it to rekindle the spirit of working together to forge the destiny of the continent – the engagement of women and the youth in particular is critical. With empowered citizens, a responsive civil society, social and economic transformation can become a reality. The active engagement of the Diaspora can be one of the key drivers of change for Africa's development; contributing to strengthening of African economic independence through investment, expertise and general political, cultural and social solidarity.

- (d) **A results-based approach** with concrete targets that are measurable and can be tracked and monitored. While providing a general framework and a common set of goals and targets, Agenda 2063 also takes account of Africa's diversity and defines trajectories and addresses issues related to this diversity.
- (e) **Revitalizing strategic planning and ensuring effective interface among national plans, regional initiatives and Agenda 2063.** Integrated continental, regional and national planning based on series of short, medium and long term time horizons is vital for sound economic management, the pursuit of holistic and integrated (across sectors and physical space) development and, in a word, for ensuring the realization of Agenda 2063. Interface among national plans, regional development initiatives and Agenda 2063 is also critical for the success of Agenda 2063. While the ultimate responsibility for plan implementation rests with national governments, there is need for coordination and interface at all stages of the planning cycle, including in defining priority issues, setting of goals, plan formulation, implementation and monitoring and follow up.
- (f) **Making Agenda 2063 an integral part of the African Renaissance.** The African Renaissance calls for changes in attitudes, values and mindsets and inculcates the values of Pan Africanism, self-esteem, hard work, entrepreneurship and collective prosperity. Therefore, promoting the values of discipline, focus, honesty, integrity, an ethos of hard work are key for the realization of Agenda 2063, making it different from preceding continental frameworks and be successfully implemented. Agenda 2063 provides the opportunity for Africa to break away from the syndrome of "always coming up with new ideas but no significant achievements".
- (g) **Africa taking charge of its global narrative.** Africa needs to take charge of its global narrative and brand, to ensure that it reflects the continent's realities, aspirations and priorities and Africa's position in the world. In this regard, Agenda 2063 reaffirms African unity and solidarity in the face of continued external interference including by multi-national corporations, attempts to divide the continent and undue pressures and illegal sanctions on some countries.

5.2 RISKS, THREATS AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Existing and new threats faced by the continent, include scrambles for its resources in the face of changing global demands and demographics; undue external influence in the affairs of the continent; Africa's disproportionate burden of the impact of climate change; and the huge scale of illicit outflows of African resources and capital.

More specifically, the key risks/ threats are:

- (a) **Conflict, instability and insecurity:** in the past 50 years, many African countries have experienced varying degrees of conflict and insecurity caused by, among others,: (i) lack of sound governance and democracy; (ii) poor management of diversities – ethnic, religious; (iii) severe competition over scarce resources (land, minerals, water, timber, etc.); (iv) poor economic management; and (v) natural and man-made disasters. Although many African countries are stable and much stronger today compared to the immediate post-independence years, the threat of state fragility lingers on with potential to spill over to neighbouring countries. The new trend in politics associated with the "street" can have a destabilizing effect if not properly managed.

- (b) **Social and economic inequalities:** income inequality in Africa is high and reaches 60 per cent in some countries. The robust economic growth that Africa enjoyed over the past decades has increasingly concentrated wealth in the hands of a few with limited amounts trickling to the majority of the population. This combined with the huge urban youth unemployment and prevalence of poverty make social and economic inequality a major source of political, social and economic risks.
- (c) **Organized crime, drugs trade and illicit financial flows:** in the past decade, international drug cartels have used West Africa as a major transit route to Europe. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime has estimated that at least 50 tons of cocaine worth some US\$2 billion from Latin America transits through West Africa every year. The trade has corrupted government officials and the military in some countries. The proliferation of maritime piracy in Africa has also been closely related to state fragility. Today maritime piracy is staged mainly from two regions of Africa: the Horn and the Gulf of Guinea. Similar to drug trafficking, piracy also distorts regional economies. For example, Kenya's tourist industry was seriously affected by the activities of the pirates and the government was forced to take extraordinary measures. Illicit financial flows divert much needed finance away from development of Africa to elsewhere in the world.
- (d) **Poor management of diversities; religious extremism, ethnicism and corruption:** since the creation of the OAU, Africa has been successful in forging solidarity and building upon shared values and history while taking full cognizance of her diversity (economic wealth, stage of development and culture). However, religious extremism, ethnicism and corruption have compounded the challenges of managing diversity because of sharp economic and social rifts they create among groups.
- (e) **Failure to harness the demographic dividend:** In the next 50 years, Africa's biggest single asset but also its potential Achilles heel is the large and youthful population. In 1994, Africa had a total population of 697 million (12.5 per cent of the world's population); twenty years later in 2014, it reached 1.2 billion (15.1 per cent of the world's population) and by 2060 it is projected at 2.7 billion (close to one third of the world's population). Africa will also account for 28 per cent (1.2 billion) of the global youth population aged between 15 and 29. In many of Africa's so-called fragile states, almost three-quarters of the population are aged below 30 years. Strategies and policies are needed to harness the potential and convert potential threats and risks to opportunities. Governments must be willing to take comprehensive actions, including, expanding education and training, creating job opportunities, combating diseases, enhancing socially and environmentally responsible investment.
- (f) **Escalation of Africa's disease burden:** A combination of several factors including inadequate investments in public health system, its geographic location, i.e., largely tropical location, poverty, poor nutrition and sanitation have exposed Africa to disproportionately heavy disease burden compared to other developing countries. New viruses and diseases may also emerge in the future.
- (g) **Climate risks and natural disasters:** Climate change will continue to adversely impact Africa's development for many years to come. In 2007, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared Africa as one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of multiple stresses

at various levels and the continent's low adaptive capacity. Africa has also limited capacity for disaster preparedness and prevention, and every natural disaster leaves a trail of human and material destruction. There are also substantial risks of land grabs and privatization of the commons, which would accentuate vulnerability to climate risks.

- (h) **External shocks:** African countries have been and will continue to be vulnerable to the vicissitudes of global market forces. In the context of a 50-year time frame, changes in the global economic environment such as a collapse of commodity prices, financial crisis or some other developments in the political, social and environmental fields can potentially derail Africa's development trajectory.

These threats and challenges can however, be mitigated and turned into opportunities through mounting collective strategies and effective public policy responses and actions to counter the most disruptive economic, social and environmental changes facing Africa.

Overcoming risks and addressing fragilities entails several dimensions:

- Drawing on the resilience found in African societies – farming communities have shown a strong capacity to weather risks and create livelihoods in the most difficult environments; through civil society, communities are able to govern their affairs, manage disputes and protect the vulnerable; and African women play a vital role in forging peace and rebuilding livelihoods. Building upon these diverse forms of resilience can help Africa counter risks;
- Building interlocking partnerships and institutions at community, member states, regional and continental levels to help absorb these disruptive changes and reduce associated community and state fragilities. Building the capacities of RECs to find regional solutions to address drivers of fragility is of critical necessity.
- Promoting economic diversification, climate resilience and disaster preparedness and prevention. Already envisaged by Agenda 2063, value addition in the agricultural and mining sectors, diversification of African economies away from dependence on agriculture based exports and also dependence on one or two primary commodities will be crucial risk mitigation mechanism.
- Building human capital and promoting a skills revolution. Agenda 2063 accords priority to having well-educated citizens underpinned by skills revolution, science, technology and innovation combined with full access to quality health care. This has the potential to transform the risks of demographic and disease burdens into a demographic dividend and lead to the economic transformation of the continent.

These strategies and others will better position Africa to face up to global mega trends and forces discussed below.

5.3 GLOBAL MEGA TRENDS AND FORCES


Agenda 2063 is being implemented at a time of a fast changing Africa and the world. The key drivers of these changes are different forces originating within Africa (endogenous) and outside of Africa (exogenous). Drivers of these changes in 2063 will also be different from those of today given political, demographic, economic and social dynamics as well as shifts in societal interests and concerns.

Fifty years is a long time to meaningfully identify mega trends that are likely to significantly impact Africa's growth trajectory and transformation. However, based on what stakeholders' consultations on Agenda 2063 highlighted in terms of threats and opportunities, combined with literature review, the following mega trends have been identified:

Democratization, the rise and empowerment of the individual:

Rapid advances in technology and educational opportunities are producing smart, mobile, connected, borderless and informed citizens, which is unprecedented in human history. Africa's ICT broadband penetration rate has increased rapidly from a base of only 7 per cent in 2010; while the average number of internet users in Africa is about 12 per 100 people, with large variation among countries. Connecting the unconnected and the fast rising digital economy will create tremendous opportunities for growth and transformation that will reshape Africa's economic and social landscape. It will also have a significant impact on the practice of democracy and governance.

Democratic and participatory governance structures are expanding in many parts of the world, more so in Africa. In response to demand from these, citizens are in turn creating an enabling environment for empowerment and freedom to unleash their ingenuity and energies for growth and transformation.



Climate change and the low carbon economy

Climate change impacts on Africa are expected to be severe, pervasive, cross-sectoral, long-term, and in several cases, irreversible. IPCC estimates median temperature increases of 3°C to 4°C for Africa, one-and-a-half times greater than the global mean increase of 2.0°C and 4.5°C by the end of the century, which, among other things, will force Africa's fish to migrate to European waters.

It will also threaten Africa's fragile peace and security through worsening environmental stress, inducing population displacement, spontaneous large-scale migration, land encroachment, and creating refugees.

Sea level rise and erosion of coastal areas are predicted to severely impact major African cities: Abidjan, Accra, Alexandria, Algiers, Cape Town, Casablanca, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Djibouti, Durban, Freetown, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Luanda, Maputo, Mombasa, Port Louis, and Tunis. Small Islands are also particularly vulnerable.

Over all, the prevalence and severity of extreme events such as heat and cold waves, dust storms, severe winds, floods, droughts, greater rainfall variability and patterns are expected to distort traditional crop cycles, and diminish agricultural and industrial raw materials productivity as well as export earnings, and increase plant and animal pests and diseases.

Natural resource depletion and demand shifts

Deforestation results in significantly environmental degradation, diminished earnings with negative social and environmental consequences, including: deterioration of ecological systems with resulting negative impacts on soil fertility, water availability and biological resources and acute shortages of fuel wood and construction material in many parts of the continent.

While managing natural resource scarcities and abundance has the potential to define Africa's development, peace and security agenda, Africa's challenges and opportunities include:

- Water scarcity: which can trigger conflicts and crisis;
- The scramble for Africa's vast arable land resources;
- Mineral processing technologies - improving efficiency of resource exploitation (yield rate); and developing applications for lower grade ore; and
- Blue/ocean economy, including deep sea mining and reclaiming Africa's maritime heritage.

Demographics and urbanization

At current growth rates, Africa's population will reach 2.6 billion by 2063 - larger than that of India or China. The developed world's population is ageing, paving the way for developing economies, Africa in particular, with their younger population to fill the gap. Africa is, thus, well positioned to reap the demographic dividend in the years to come given its projected 1.2 billion youth population by 2063.

Africa has the highest urbanization rate (3.23per cent) in the world with an urban population of 400 million doubling in the next 20 years reaching 1.5 billion people. However, about 61.7 per cent of the continent's urban populations were living in slums in 2010, the highest rate in the world. Africa's megacities of today, i.e., Cairo and Lagos suburbs with population of 19 million and 15 million respectively will be followed by the soon - to - be mega cities of the coming 50 years: Gauteng (Johannesburg and Tshwane), Western Cape (Cape Town), Luanda, Accra, Khartoum, Dakar, Brazzaville/Kinshasa,; Addis Ababa; Maputo; Dar es Salaam, and Nairobi

New technologies and innovation

Among the technologies that are likely to impact Africa are:

- Agricultural biotechnology – which utilize gene-based techniques to improve agriculture productivity, farm management practices, produce more drought, water logging, and disease resistant varieties that help minimize the high costs of agrochemicals, pesticides, and water;
- Health and health innovation systems - inventing new drugs, vaccines, nuclear medicine, diagnostic tools, to cope with emerging diseases as well as treat the untreatable;
- Renewable energy and new technologies: driven by diversification of energy sources, enormous demand increase for energy arising from accelerated economic growth, carbon emissions become taxed and regulated, energy security, cleaner and affordable electricity with smart power meters and grids;
- ICT, robotics and automation: all likely to witness rapid changes in the world in the coming decades.

Changes in the global financial architecture

Issues raised in the WTO and multilateral trade liberalization negotiations suggest impending changes in global trade and financial regulations that would lead to increased financial integration - capital is used effectively and that safeguards are built against sudden halts and capital flow reversals.

Global political and economic power shifts

The European and US bilateral trade engagements with Africa: the end of preferential schemes for Africa (AGOA, Everything But Arms (EBA) replacement by Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), and end of the Cotonou Agreement) are possibilities that would impact Africa's development trajectory.

Aid policy could also change. By 2063 aid flows to Africa could diminish to zero with the withering away of the constituency for aid to Africa in Europe and the decline of the relative income differential between Africa and Europe.

To effectively deal with these megatrends and transform potential risks into opportunities, Africa needs to invest in building its knowledge base, fully understand dramatic shifts constantly taking place, anticipate what may come and put in place appropriate and timely policies and strategies.

In particular, there will be a need to:

- Ensure prevalence of human freedom and full connectivity while provisioning for growing numerous challenges to government structures and processes emanating from empowerment of the individual;
- Bring up Africa's science and technology to the frontiers of global change;
- Manage natural resource revenues; tackling illicit capital flows and developing innovative development financing such as sovereign wealth funds including inter-generational funds based on exhaustible natural resources;

- Build biotechnology into Africa's indigenous genotypes of flora and fauna and ensure that biotechnology including genetically modified organisms (GMOs) would not easily destroy the diversity, quantity, and quality of Africa's genetic resources;
- Invest heavily in transforming and expanding the African pharmaceutical industry, including nuclear medicine to free Africa from scourges of communicable diseases;
- Strengthen both domestic and regional financial markets, boosting resource mobilization and broadening access to financial services.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the creation of the OAU, several continental frameworks and initiatives have been launched: the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, African Economic Communities (Abuja Treaty), the African Alternative Framework to the Structural Adjustment Programme (AAFSAP), NEPAD as well as several sector frameworks covering almost all areas of development -economic, social and cultural. Implementation outcomes of these initiatives have in general been below expectation. The lessons from this exercise have been summarized in Chapter 3.

Key lessons learnt from past experiences together with review of national and regional plans, existing continental frameworks and consultations with continental stakeholder groups indicate that the following are prerequisites for the successful implementation of Agenda 2063:

- Ensuring a robust implementation, monitoring /evaluation arrangement as part of Agenda 2063 underpinned by clear coordination mechanisms at continental, regional and national levels.
- Fostering effective participation and inclusiveness by involving all stakeholders, and clarifying their roles and responsibilities at national, regional and continental levels in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the Agenda.
- Putting in place a resource mobilization strategy that is Africa - driven and owned to ensure funding for the implementation of the Agenda.
- Involving the African Diaspora in the solicitation of views, sharing of ideas, reporting on the progress through an Agenda 2063 communications strategy.
- Making proper use of existing institutions / structures as RECs, the Assembly, Executive Council, the STC, AUC, other AU Organs rather than creating new ones in the implementation / monitoring and evaluation.
- Making the regional level, spearheaded by the RECs as the hub for *Making It Happen*.
- Ensuring continuity by making national plans, regional and continental frameworks as the foundation for the Agenda to attain buy-in by member states and the RECs and also to avoid overlaps.
- Revitalizing, strengthening and building upon existing national / regional planning systems and processes as the mechanism for aligning national/regional plans to Agenda 2063, including sustained political commitment for planning.
- Ensuring that there is a focal point for operations at the continental level where all the stakeholders have a representation.

Regional Economic Communities and Agenda 2063

- Supporting Members States in the alignment of their visions /plans to Agenda 2063
- Coordinating of the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063 by Member States
- Leading in the execution of regional programs under Agenda 2063
- Providing implementation progress and monitoring and evaluation reports to Agenda 2063 Steering Committee
- Representing the Region on the Agenda 2063 Structures

Building upon these experiences and lessons, this chapter presents the following aspects of “Making it Happen”:

- Implementation, monitoring and evaluation arrangements;
- Stakeholder relationships;
- Financing Agenda 2063;
- Partnerships;
- Capacity development; and
- Communication strategy for Agenda 2063.

6.2 IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION ARRANGEMENTS

6.2.1 Objectives and principles

The objectives of implementation, monitoring and evaluation arrangements are to:

- (i) Identify all key stakeholders and assign tasks to be performed by each;
- (ii) Ensure that each stakeholder performs the task assigned on a timely basis; and
- (iii) Provide the platform for collective execution / attainment of the goals of Agenda 2063.

The underlying principles derived from consultations, review of national/regional plans and continental frameworks, in addition to the issues raised in 6.1, include: subsidiarity; accountability and transparency; participation/inclusion; integration; diversity; leveraging existing institutions and systems; and harmonization of policies and systems.

Subsidiarity

There are three layers for the implementation of Agenda 2063 and each layer should be assigned the task it is most efficient and effective in doing. Against that background:

- The national level led by Government will be responsible for the implementation of key activities under Agenda 2063;
- The regional level - the RECs will serve as the fulcrum for the implementation at the regional level. They will adapt the Agenda 2063 results framework to regional realities and facilitate / coordinate implementation by member states and develop/implement monitoring and evaluation framework at the regional level.
- The continental level, AU Organs, especially the AUC, will be responsible for setting the broad results framework and monitoring and evaluation based on inputs from the RECS.

Accountability and transparency

In order to ensure that all stakeholders play their roles, the implementation framework should be:

- (i) **Results driven:** realistic / measurable targets should be set for each stakeholder and a monitoring and evaluation framework put in place to reinforce compliance; and
- (ii) **Evidence driven:** all decisions relating to prioritization/ focus areas, allocation of resources amongst others should be based on objectively defined criteria to ensure convergence / acceptance by all stakeholders and the building of the African knowledge base and the collection of data and statistics, to underpin implementation and monitoring of plans.

Participation/inclusiveness and integration

The implementation of any plan or programme starts with the involvement of key actors in the formulation process. Participation and inclusion of all key stakeholders led and coordinated by the Government is a critical success factor, which will enhance awareness, ownership and knowledge of Agenda 2063 objectives and purpose and strengthen collective commitments.

Ensuring effective participation and inclusiveness by involving all stakeholders through:

- (i) **National level:** Government in the lead and with support from (as laid out in the national planning system), CSOs, business and service associations, women and youth groups, community groups.
- (ii) **Regional level:** RECs, business/service and professional associations; and
- (iii) **Continental level:** the AU Assembly, Executive Council, the Permanent Representative Committee, AUC/AU Organs and Agencies, STCs, business / service/ professional associations and the Diaspora in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the Agenda

Diversity

While providing a general framework and a common set of goals and targets, Agenda 2063 also takes account of Africa's diversity and defines trajectories and addresses issues related to that diversity.

Leveraging of existing institutions and systems

Agenda 2063 builds upon existing national / regional planning systems and processes as the mechanism for aligning national/regional plans to Agenda 2063. The mandates and strengths of existing institutions such as RECs, NEPAD, the PAP amongst others, would be built on, if need be, and used appropriately for the implementation monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063. In addition, Agenda 2063 builds upon existing infrastructure and systems as well as on the successes and failures of various political and socioeconomic initiatives launched by the continent.

Harmonization of policies, systems and processes

While Africa's diversities should be taken cognizance of, there is the need to ensure universality in certain areas if the integrity of process is to be maintained. Some of the areas of focus where harmonization will be required include indicators and targets for the results framework.

6.2.2 Stakeholder relationships for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063

The key stakeholders for *Making It Happen* are at three levels. The levels are continental, regional and national. These stakeholders have specific roles with respect to implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063.

The key stakeholders in order of relative hierarchy are the following:

The continental level

It comprises the AU Organs and continental level coordination mechanisms. These are:

The Assembly

Key responsibilities include approval of Agenda 2063 and the subsequent ten year plans, provision of broad policy guidelines on the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063.

The Executive Council

Key responsibilities include the provision of strategic coordination through the work of the Agenda 2063 Ministerial Committee on Agenda 2063; making recommendations to the Assembly on the results framework and approving monitoring and evaluation reports.

The Ministerial Committee on Agenda 2063

A committee of the Executive Council with co-opted members such as: The Chairperson of the AUC, the Chief Executives of NPCA, the RECs, the African Development Bank, The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and other AU Organs as appropriate.

Key responsibilities cover providing operational level oversight in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Agenda 2063 and directly supervising the AUC as the technical coordinating unit for Agenda 2063.

The AUC/Technical Unit for Agenda 2063

Under the direction of the Chairperson of the AUC, the unit will undertake the following tasks:

- (i) Coordinate and facilitate technical issues related to the development / review of the Agenda 2063 results framework, in particular the 10-year implementation plans;
- (ii) Develop continental frameworks to support Agenda 2063 implementation;
- (iii) Review monitoring and evaluation reports from the RECs;
- (iv) Develop/implement resource mobilization and communication strategies; and
- (v) Prepare progress / annual reports amongst others.

The Unit will in general act as the secretariat to the Ministerial Committee on Agenda 2063.

Regional level

The Regional Economic Communities

Their key responsibilities will include:

- (i) Provision of leadership at inception in the regional / national consultative process with respect to the implementation of Agenda 2063;
- (ii) Participation in continental level operational oversight in Agenda 2063 implementation;
- (iii) Adaption / alignment of continental long /medium term Agenda 2063 10 Year Plans;
- (iv) Issuing plan guidelines to Member States;
- (v) Coordination of preparation / implementation of regional programs;
- (vi) Integration of regional monitoring and evaluation reports and provision of leadership in resource mobilization for Agenda 2063.

National level

Members States

Member States have different planning systems law / processes but in general, there are national and sub-national (region, province, state and local) levels involved in thematic area groupings for policy formulation, plan preparation, plan execution, monitoring and evaluation and resource mobilization.

Key responsibilities

Led by Government, national and sub-national level stakeholders have functions to perform within the thematic areas / cluster. At the national level, government, private sector, national level associations etc through the national planning framework will:

- (i) Align national visions / plans to Agenda 2063/10 year plan perspectives;
- (ii) Lead / coordinate the resource mobilization process and allocation efforts; and
- (iii) Lead/coordinate the execution of Agenda 2063 driven national medium term plans. They will also participate in the setting of goals / targets and monitoring and evaluation.

At the sub-national level, led by sub-national government, and assisted by Civil Society Groups (for profit and not for profit groups), cross-sectoral groups participates in:

- (i) The alignment of national vision to Agenda 2063;
- (ii) The preparation of medium term plans based on Agenda 2063; and
- (iii) The setting of goals and targets and monitoring and evaluation at the grassroots level.

6.3 FINANCING AGENDA 2063

Agenda 2063 financing needs

Financing is required for all seven Aspirations of the Agenda 2063. However, considerable financial resources are required to finance the socio-economic transformational agenda in the following areas: regional integration; infrastructure; science, technology and innovation-based industrialization and processing of local-resources; agriculture, food security and environmental sustainability; intra-African trade; health and nutrition; education attainment and science, technology, engineering and mathematics-based education, research and centres of excellence; inclusive and sustainable growth, including support to women and youth entrepreneurship. Additional areas requiring financing include: peace, security, human rights and regional stability; cultural identity; support to low income; capacity building to AU and its organs, RECs and member states.

The typology of Agenda 2063 financing needs could range from grants to commercial finance from both public and private/commercial sources, including: grants, technical assistance resources, social impact resources, concessional loans, market price-based commercial loans, equity and other market-like instruments, FDI and portfolio investment by the private sector (debt, bonds, equity and other securities).

Strategy for financing Agenda 2063

The challenge of Agenda 2063 financing is:

- First and foremost about mobilizing a stable and predictable base of financial resources that can be achieved largely only through domestic financial resources.
- Secondly, within a regional context characterized by many levels of market failure, Agenda 2063 financing, is not only about mobilizing domestically-generated financial resources, but is also about leveraging and intermediating those resources for productive investments and program implementation within the framework of the Agenda 2063. In other words, Africa needs not only funds, but also a more effective and inclusive means of channelling these funds (including financial institutions and markets, financial instruments and financial services) to where they can be most effective and where there is market failure in the allocation of the needed resources.

- Thirdly, because the availability of financial resources does not guarantee their access by individuals, communities, MSME, infrastructure and industrial projects and players in priority sector such as agriculture due to market failures, a proactive access to finance support for these parties will be considered as part of the Agenda 2063 financing process.

Hence, Agenda 2063 financing strategy will be articulated around three dimensions: (i) domestic resource mobilization; (ii) intermediation of resource into investment; and (iii) access to finance.

Financing and Domestic resource mobilization and intermediation strategy

The types of financial resources needed to finance Agenda 2063 and the strategy to mobilize them are articulated below:

Agenda 2063 Financing Strategy National		
Potential Sources of Finance	How to Mobilize the Additional Resource Needed	How to Make it Happen
Government investment budget	Budget reallocation and/or increased taxes, customs, excise revenues	Agenda 2063 compact signing
Government expenditures budget	Budget reallocation and/or increased taxes, customs, excise revenues	Agenda 2063 compact signing
Crowd funding	Crowd funding campaign towards the relevant target group	Marketing, channel effectiveness
Illicit capital flows	Regulation, surveillance and enforcement	Efficient national service International cooperation
Carbon credits	Claims from international “Clean Development Mechanism” market maker	Completed emission reduction project
FDI	Targeted investment promotion and/or regional investment promotion	Agenda 2063 compact
Private investment (small PPP)	Project development, structuring and marketing and financial close under PPP	Strong PPP framework conditions
Private investment (PPP)	Project development, structuring and marketing and financial close under PPP	Strong PPP framework conditions
Diaspora fund	Intermediated via bonds, mutual funds or direct participation into project or business	Credible lead financial institution Sensitization/marketing campaign
Microfinance	Up-scaling (i.e. enhanced capitalization) of MFIs to be combined with the capacitation of MFIs in governance, management and operations areas	Attract investor into MFI capital Technical assistance, line of credit
DFI facilities	Up-scaling (i.e. enhanced capitalization) of DFIs to be combined with the capacitation	Agenda 2063 compact with DFIs

Commercial bank finance	Capacitation through training or advisory services and/or up-scaling through capitalization of banks	Agenda 2063 compact with banks Attract investor into bank capital Line of credit, technical assistance
Trade finance	(1) Capacitation through training/advisory services and/or up-scaling through capitalization of banks or other trade finance companies; (2) Capitalization of Afreximbank;(3) AfDB to extend line of credit	Idem as above
Credit/Investment insurance	Up-scaling (i.e. enhanced capitalization) of regional insurance/reinsurance (Africa Re + insurance companies), to be combined with the capacitation in managing new risks (OGM, Aviation, Climate Change)	Attract investors into companies
Political risk Insurance (PRI) service	Up-scaling (i.e. enhanced capitalization) of (Africa Re + ATI + ICIEC + IAIGC + insurance companies), to be combined with the capacitation in managing new risks (OGM, Aviation, Climate Change, etc.)	Attract investors into companies
ACGA guarantee services	African institutional investors (banks, central banks, pensions, insurance, etc.), African governments	Feasibility + Investment memo + Roadshow + credible sponsors
African Investment Bank services	African institutional investors (banks, central banks, pensions, insurance, etc.), African governments	Feasibility + Investment memo + Roadshow + credible sponsors
Africa 50 Fund	African institutional investors (banks, central banks, pensions, sovereign wealth funds, insurance, private equity funds, etc.), African governments	Feasibility + Investment memo + Roadshow

Agenda 2063 Financing Strategy REGIONAL / CONTINENTAL		
Potential Sources of Finance	How to Mobilize the Additional Resource Needed	How to Make it Happen
AUC operational/ program budget	Levies on African private sector firms as suggested by the report of the Obasanjo-led High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Funding of the AU (HLPASF) or equivalent member states contribution	Executive Council enforcement of proposal
RECs operation/ program budget	REC budget reallocation and/or member states additional contributions	Executive Committee decision
Private resource (from PPP)	Project development, structuring and marketing and financial close under PPP	Strong PPP framework conditions

Spin-off revenue or patent revenue	Successful commercialization of patent	Successful research
Fee revenue	Sold services	Quality service
Diaspora bond finance	Bond subscription from Diaspora	Bond structuring, successful marketing and distribution; credible market-maker
Regional bond finance	Regional bond subscription	Bond structuring, successful marketing of project and distribution; credible market-maker; regional enabling framework (legal, policy)
Regional stock exchange finance	Share subscription from a regional stock or right issues	successful marketing of project or company, and roadshow; credible market-maker; regional enabling framework (legal, policy)
DFI facilities	Up-scaling (i.e. enhanced capitalization) of DFIs to be combined with the capacitation	Agenda 2063 compact with DFIs
Commercial bank finance	Capacitation through training or advisory services and/or up-scaling through capitalization of banks	Agenda 2063 compact with banks Attract investor into bank capital Line of credit, technical assistance
Trade finance	(1) Capacitation through training or advisory services and/or up-scaling through capitalization of banks or other trade finance companies; (2) Capitalization of Afreximbank;(3) AfDB to extend line of credit	Idem as above
Credit/Investment insurance	Up-scaling (i.e. enhanced capitalization) of regional insurance/reinsurance (Africa Re + insurance companies), to be combined with the capacitation in managing new risks (OGM, Aviation, Climate Change)	Attract investors into companies
Political risk Insurance (PRI) service	Up-scaling (i.e. enhanced capitalization) of (Africa Re + ATI + ICIEC + IAIGC + insurance companies), to be combined with the capacitation in managing new risks (OGM, Aviation, Climate Change, etc.)	Attract investors into companies

Access to finance

The availability of financial resources and financial intermediation vehicles does not guarantee de facto access to finance. The following access to finance facilitation measures should be considered among others:

- a) Developing “framework conditions” (policy, legal, regulatory and institutional) and industry-specific development (PPP/infrastructure, SME finance/banking and microfinance);
- b) Setting-up relevant project development funds (PDF), viability gap funds (VGF), capitalization fund, blending facilities to address demand-side readiness –bankability, investment readiness of firms and projects;
- c) Establishing information infrastructure (informational finance infrastructure- country rating, analysts, corporate governance standards, accounting standards, credit bureau and collateral registries, etc.);
- d) Developing expertise and technical capacity in financial advisory, financial structuring and financial negotiations for large-scale infrastructure and industrial projects; addressing market failure on SME finance (SME life cycle funding, Industry-specific funding); and
- e) Putting in place risk sharing/enhancement facilities/enhancement.

Implementation of Agenda 2063 financing and DRM strategy

The implementation of Agenda 2063 financing and DRM strategy will involve the following schedule of activities:

- Definition of institutional responsibility among AU-level and external stakeholders in the implementation of Agenda 2063 financing and DRM strategy;
- Promotion campaign and domestication of Agenda 2063 financing and DRM strategy;
- Definition of the resources requirements for the implementation of the DRM strategy;
- Articulation of Agenda 2063 financing and DRM M&E and result framework;
- Start of implementation of the DRM Task Force around three inter-related fronts: (i) policy, knowledge and capacity building front (enabling environment front); (ii) funds mobilization and intermediation front (supply-side front) and (iii) access to finance facilitation front (demand-side front).

The implementation of Agenda 2063 financing and DRM strategy will involve a division of labour between key stakeholders such as the AUC, NPCA, AfDB and UN-ECA, RECs on the one hand, and Member States, Private Sector Organizations (financial sector players, PSOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) on the other hand.

6.4 PARTNERSHIPS FOR AGENDA 2063

As noted earlier, the AU is engaged in a number of strategic partnerships with both traditional and emerging partners. However, different levels of shortcomings have characterized the management of these partnerships.

Most of the shortcomings in the management of high-potential strategic partnerships were as a result of AUC-level challenges, which were due to lack of an AU partnership policy and strategy, as well as AU-level deficits in terms of, financial, technical and coordination capacity.

Going forward the following three levels of actions should be considered in order to take maximum advantage of AU's strategic partnerships:

a. Preparing a comprehensive AU policy framework and articulating a partnership strategy for all high-potential partners around two to three core areas of interventions

The potential of AU strategic partners can be assessed based on three sets of criteria: (i) alignment to Agenda 2063 and its 10-year implementation plan; (ii) the size/scope of the financial offer, the potential transformational impact embedded in the outcome document or action plan in terms of - technical assistance, trade and investment, industrialization and technology transfer, agriculture support program and social investment; and (iii) the “smart” nature of the deliverables.

b. Maximizing Africa's potential to exploit in full its partnership

Africa needs to **exploit the full potential of all five major strategic partnerships** through:

- 1) Articulation of a strategic partnership policy;
- 2) Establishment of a strategic partnership fund with contributions from AU member states;
- 3) Enhancement of strategic, governance, technical, logistical and financial support to the partnership management function of the AUC;
- 4) Clarity by the AU with regards to the implementation model of Africa's various continental programs (PIDA, CAADP/3ADI, AIDA/APCII/RADS/AMV, BIAT) to facilitate result-oriented cooperation with its strategic partners and the EU in particular; and
- 5) Improved involvement and coordination of/among Africa's various stakeholders of the partnership process: AUC, NPC, AfDB, RECs, Member States, PSO, CSO and other AU organs.

c. Deepening transformational benefits of the partnerships

There is need to deepen transformational benefits of all major strategic partnership through their alignment with Agenda 2063 priorities, namely, industrialization and technology transfer, intra-African trade and export development, PSD and SMME development, FDI and JV, and financial resource mobilization.

This can be achieved by rigorous prioritization and identifying areas where traction is (i.e. **economic transformation through industrialization; infrastructure, manufacturing, agro-industry, oil, gas and mining services** through genuine technology transfer namely, private sector development reforms and integrated business forum including for **FDI/JV** through, **intra-African-trade and export development and SME development** support; inclusive and sustainable growth; **transparency in natural resources management, local content development and beneficiation of mineral resources**).

This would ensure that the partnerships are focused on Agenda 2063-driven priorities and sustain needed progress and relevance of these partnerships.

6.5 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR AGENDA 2063

Huge efforts have been made in the post-independence period to build Africa's human and institutional capacities. These efforts have yielded significant results and today the continent, can boast of a significant stock of skills, institutions and policies at all levels to power its development.

However, when judged against the ambitious goals and targets of Agenda 2063 and in the context of the desired transformation of the continent, the lack of adequate and requisite capacities remains

a critical constraint. A key impediment is lack of a holistic approach to capacity creation, utilization and retention in relation to achieving the continent’s strategic long-term goals of assuming its rightful place in global economic, political, scientific and technological fields.

6.5.1 The Need for holistic and effective capacities

The AU/NEPAD Capacity Development Strategic Framework (CDSF) provides a holistic African approach to capacity development based on (see chart on the right) the following key elements: transformative leadership; citizen transformation; evidence - based knowledge and innovation; using African potential skills and resources; capacity of the capacity developer; and integrated planning and implementation for results. These elements converge with the critical success factors identified in chapter 5.


6.5.2 Types of capacity and needs of Agenda 2063

Agenda 2063 involves multiple actors at the continental, regional, national, sectoral, sub-national and local levels. The full realization of Agenda 2063 requires the development of capabilities and capacities across sectors and at various levels in three critical areas:

- a. **Individual (human capacity):** generally includes capabilities in terms of skills, training, performance, values, attitudes, motivation, professional integrity, relationships, and communication skills. Building these skills will strengthen the ability to conceptualize, design, develop, implement, monitor and evaluate the required and result oriented programs/ projects, policies and strategies to make Agenda 2063 happen. The success of Agenda 2063 in fostering socio-economic transformation and accelerated regional integration will be based on a critical mass of African countries adopting and adapting the agenda to national contexts. The human capacity should also foster the collective commitment to implementing Agenda 2063 through communication, consultation and collaboration.

Agenda 2063 calls for Africa to be competitive, transform its economy from commodity dependence to one that is driven by manufacturing/industry, value addition, effective participation in the global value chain as well as science and technology. Critical in this effort is the capacity to negotiate in all areas of Africa’s interest, most notably in trade, climate change, economic partnerships and related areas. In addition, Agenda 2063 requires capacity in the new frontiers of science, such as biotechnology, genetic engineering, space exploration and deep sea mining. A critical mass of trained engineers, doctors, technicians in a wide range of skill areas is required to build Africa’s infrastructure, man her factories, health centres and hospitals and power the continent’s development in all fields.

At the policy and planning levels, Agenda 2063 requires a new planning



culture and mindset that embraces visioning, results oriented thinking, participation in formulation and implementation, ensuring ownership of plans and commitment to achieving goals set. Along with the building of a planning culture is the issue of regularly monitoring and reporting on work done and building an evaluative culture. A robust M&E framework is one of the factors that distinguish Agenda 2063 from earlier continental frameworks (i.e., the Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty and NEPAD). Such an M&E framework requires, among other things, building an evaluative culture where all stakeholders are empowered and encouraged to undertake self-evaluation of work done both in process and result terms and where the youth, women, civil society, media and private sector participate in monitoring not only their respective activities; but also collaborate in monitoring government programs.

- b. **Institutional/ organizational capacity:** The implementation of Agenda 2063, given the different levels of development among Africa countries, demand that the institutions tasked with delivering rapid structural transformation and growth be able to act both effectively and in a coordinated manner. This will require an iterative approach of learning, relearning and flexibility, coupled with institutional capacities that are of relevance to the tasks defined.

As integral part of the capacity that resides in each institution is the importance of establishing horizontal and vertical linkages and feedback loops at each stage of Agenda 2063 implementation process. Continental and regional initiatives and programs need to be linked to and informed by national level actions and vice versa. System-wide institutional reforms might be needed to ensure sustainable inter-linkages between continental and regional governance and development institutions and also with national level institutions to ensure mainstreaming of agenda 2063 priorities at all levels.

Governance and public sector management reforms as part of state-building are key to effective implementation of Agenda 2063, with emphasis on the capacity of key public sector institutions, as well as private sector and civil society organizations.

- c. **Enabling policy, legal and regulatory environment.** The implementation of Agenda 2063 requires not only developing policies and putting in place the requisite legislations and regulations, but also the capacity to enforce them. The African development experience of the past 50 years suggests that while there has been quick response to identified challenges through developing continental and regional action plans and frameworks, creation of institutions with clearly articulated mandates, the capacity to implement them and the enforcement mechanisms for policies and legislations have, often, been lacking and ineffective.

6.5.3 Key stakeholders of Agenda 2063 and capacity needs

At continental and regional levels, Agenda 2063 envisages developing effective capacities, as a matter of priority, of the African Union (AU) Organs and the eight officially recognized RECs (COMESA, SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD, ECCAS, CEN-SAD, and AMU).

Member States have the ultimate responsibility of making Agenda 2063 happen through integrating it into their short, medium and long term plans, policies and strategies. Member states should therefore build the necessary human, institutional and legislative capacity to implement Agenda 2063.

Given the important role CSOs and private sector play in the implementation of Agenda 2063, strengthening their capacities should be accorded priority.

6.6 COMMUNICATION STRATEGY FOR AGENDA 2063

- Among the major shortcomings experienced in the execution of previous continental strategies and frameworks was the lack of effective use of communication tools. A robust framework such as Agenda 2063 needs to be backed by a robust communication strategy in order to galvanize all segments of African society and the diaspora into action.
- Consequently, an Agenda 2063 Communication Strategy has been developed linked to the overall Communications Strategy of the AU.
- The communication strategy will:
 - Generate sustained public awareness, involvement, support and ownership by the African population of the Agenda and its execution;
 - Ensure extensive outreach with up-to-date and accurate information. It will target AU Member States, staff, organs and agencies; RECs; African citizens both within the continent and in the diaspora and their institutions, including private sector, civil society etc.; as well as AU's partners.
 - Be executed by the AU Organs and Agencies (including NEPAD and APRM), RECs, Member States, close collaborators (AfDB and UNECA) and partners;
 - Include activities such as consultation meetings, promotion of debates, discussions, workshops, community forums, songs, poems, plays, teaching in school, certification of being Agenda 2063 compliant, AU clubs, volunteers, and
 - Incorporate radio and television programmes, Internet and social groups, memorabilia and paraphernalia, and sport events; and
 - Include the publication of newsletters; and preparation of promotional items such as CDs, DVDs, caps, pens, t-shirts, key holders, bags, bracelets, diaries, gold plated pins, scarf, ties; as well as branding, billboard banners, leaflets, flyers, awareness meetings and workshops and other promotional activities.

The table below highlights key elements of the Agenda 2063 Communication Strategy.

Rational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the strategic goals and objectives of Agenda 2063.
Overall Objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generate sustained public awareness, support and ownership by Africans of Agenda 2063
Specific Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain an up-to-date largest public awareness and media presence at the events and activities related to Agenda 2063; • Reach-out extensively to specific target and mass audience with quality information on activities of Agenda 2063; • Ensure consistent communication, key messages and information in ALL AU languages (Arabic, English, French & Portuguese as well as Kiswahili and Spanish); • Promote debates, discussions, dialogue and inspire action on Agenda 2063, including into the school curriculum; • Motivate participation and feedback of and from various Stakeholders; • Impart successfully the Vision of Agenda 2063 among all stakeholders; • Inspire and motivate the African citizenry and Diaspora to rally behind Agenda 2063 (infuse passion about Agenda 2063 and Pan Africanism); and • Develop communication strategies for promoting the implementation, monitoring and dissemination of information on the goals and targets of Agenda 2063.

Target Audience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INTERNAL: AU Member States, Staff, Organs and Agencies; APRM; and RECs. • EXTERNAL: African citizens; African Diaspora; African Institutions; Private Sector; Civil society; Media; Academics and Intellectuals; African Professionals; Bilateral and Multilateral Partners; Social Networks and Movements (Rotary club...); Strategic Development Partners; Arts and Culture Activists (Renaissance); Sports and Recreation Personalities and other Prominent People and Opinion Leaders
Branding and Visual Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Branding and Visual Identity, including logo, to be developed according to the AU Branding Rules
Key Messages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agenda 2063 slogan: “Unity, Shared Prosperity & Peace” • Key messages: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ An integrated and prosperous Africa at peace with itself ✓ A united and prosperous Africa at peace with itself ✓ A people centred strategy to realize the AU Vision. ✓ An agenda to undertake massive and bold industrialization of Africa ✓ For a prosperous socio-economic transformation and integration of the continent; ✓ For an accelerated development and technological progress ✓ An inclusive contribution of all for the wellbeing of each African etc.
Timeline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Five years to be reviewed annually.
Communication Channels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Workshops, relevant events and activities, community forums, songs, poems, plays, teaching in school, certification of being Agenda 2063 compliant, AU clubs, volunteers, advertisements, radios and television programmes, newspapers, internet and social groups, memorabilia and paraphernalia, sport events, etc.
Implementation of Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Member States:</u> Preparation and publication of newsletter; promotional items - CDs, DVDs, caps, pens, t-shirts, key holders, bags, bracelets, diaries, gold plated pins, scarf, ties, etc. • <u>AUC:</u> Development of communication strategies for the promotion of the implementation of goals and targets of Agenda 2063; preparation of branding, billboard banners, leaflets, flyers, awareness meetings and workshops, PowerPoint presentations for meetings etc. • <u>AU Organs, Agencies and Institutions:</u> Preparation of consultation meetings; promotional items, use the Agenda 2063 logo where appropriate. • <u>External Citizens and Institutions:</u> Preparation of radio and television Ads, talk shows and debates; news conferences; open and moderate media social media channels; billboards, banners, leaflets, discussions in different thematic areas (agriculture, industrialization etc), • Main Actors: AU Commission (Bureau of the Chairperson, SPPMERM, DIC); NEPAD, AU Organs (including Executive Council and PRC), RECs; Member States, AfDB and UNECA.

ANNEXES

Annexes 1. Highlights of African Initiatives for Economic Growth and Transformation

The Monrovia Declaration (1979): The Monrovia Declaration of 1979 provided a vision for the continent's development in the following terms: Africa "to have a high degree of self-sufficiency, a democratic national development which will translate the fruits of our efforts equitably; will have a strong African solidarity and that Africa will carry more weight in world affairs" (OAU, 1979 – What Kind of Africa in 2002?).t

The Lagos Plan of Action (1980): The LPA based its strategies on key principles for an alternative path of development to take Africa out of the crisis of the 1980s. These included: self-reliance as the basis for development; equity in wealth distribution; expansion of the public sector; and inter-African economic cooperation and integration. The LPA emphasized agricultural development, industrialization, mining development, human resources and science and technology, and was an inspiration for many of the subsequent continental initiatives.

The Final Act of Lagos (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991): The Special Act of Lagos was aimed at achieving an African Common Market by 2000. African leaders attached great importance to economic integration as without it, the small African economies would not achieve meaningful development or overcome the crisis prevailing. Thus within 10 years the Final Act was transformed to the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community in 1991. The Abuja Treaty laid down a detailed process of achieving the Economic Community in successive stages over 34 years. It was clearly built upon the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980).

OAU: Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (1986-1990): The OAU Assembly of Heads of State passed the Economic Recovery programme in July 1985. It was a 5-year programme seen as a means of accelerating implementation of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos, overcoming Africa's debt burden and improving the continent's food situation. The programme was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986 and renamed "United Nations Programme of Action of African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) – 1986-1890.

The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) – 1989: The AAF-SAP was forged in the context of the continuing economic crisis that affected African countries, and the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) by the Bretton Woods Institutions. It was founded on the view that SAPs were perpetuating the crisis by linking weak African economies to a global system, which was to their disadvantage. A lot effort was made to popularize the AAF-SAP but despite the strong support it received, it was marginalized and suffered the fate of earlier initiatives.

The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990): The basic thrust of the Charter was democratization of the development process to make it more people-centred, as opposed to the SAPs, which were viewed as undemocratic and foisted on African countries without consultation. In effect, the Charter represented a renewed effort to counter the SAPs.

The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990): The Declaration was motivated by the concern of the persistent crisis and deteriorating economic situation, the increasing number of conflicts and Africa's relations with the rest of the world. The Declaration marked a departure from the old ways of doing business in the sense that, it sought to address two issues: (i) a commitment to democracy as the preferred political system; and (ii) the recognition of the need to deal with political conflicts and democracy as preconditions for economic development – thus paving the way for the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

The OAU Re-launching of Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action (1995): As with earlier initiatives, the Cairo Agenda for Action was shaped largely by the continuing economic crisis in Africa. There was also concern regarding the lack of implementation of previous frameworks by African countries. While re-affirming the LPA, the Cairo Agenda for Action stressed: achievement of democracy, governance, peace and security; food security; human resource development and capacity development; structural transformation; resource mobilization and efficient utilization; and economic cooperation and integration.

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development: NEPAD was a merger of the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery (MPA) and Omega Plan and was approved in Lusaka July 2001. NEPAD's is a socio-economic flagship programme of the AU with primary objectives to eradicate poverty, promote sustainable growth and development, integrate Africa in the world economy and accelerate the empowerment of women. Equally, some AU Member States voluntarily initiated APRM in 2003, as a self-monitoring mechanism intended to promote political stability, economic growth, sustained development and regional integration through experience sharing. Both NEPAD and APRM are now in the process of being integrated into the AU system, as part of a wider transformation scheme to assist Member States achieves socio-economic development.

Annexes 2. Summary of Broad Issues and Action Areas for Agenda 2063

ASPIRATION	SUMMARY OF BROAD ISSUES AND ACTION AREAS FOR AGENDA 2063
<p>A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development</p>	<p>Improve standard of living of Africans by ensuring that the benefits of growth are widely shared:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reduce and eliminate poverty, increase incomes, create jobs and reduce inequalities ✓ Provide livable habitats and expand access to basic necessities of life; ✓ Provide social protection and security <p>Build Africa's human and social capital:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Invest in a skills revolution based on science, technology and innovation, ✓ Strengthen the continents health care system and financing, and strengthening social protection and safety nets;

ASPIRATION	SUMMARY OF BROAD ISSUES AND ACTION AREAS FOR AGENDA 2063
	<p>Transform African economies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Revitalize manufacturing, industrialization, value addition and putting in place commodity strategy to maximize beneficiation from the continent’s vast resource endowments, ✓ Develop the private sector; <p>Radically transform African agriculture, through capitalizing on the enormous endowment of Africa with 60per cent of the world’s arable land must be to rid the continent of food insecurity and endemic hunger:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Enhance production and productivity, and ✓ Sustainably develop the vast potential of its Blue/ocean economy; and Sustainably manage Africa’s natural resources: ✓ Put in place sustainable management of the continent’s land, forest, fresh water and marine resources ✓ Conserve biodiversity including forests, species, wildlife, wild and wetlands, genetic resources, and ecosystems (terrestrial and marine) through expanding and effective management of national parks and protected areas as well as integration of biodiversity in all its dimensions into the development process ✓ Tackle the impacts of climate change through adaptation and appropriate mitigation measures.
<p>An integrated continent, politically united based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance</p>	<p>Accelerate progress towards continental political unity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Agree on the form of continental political union ✓ Develop the legal instruments required ✓ Fast track adoption of instruments <p>Accelerate progress towards economic integration-at regional and continental level should be accelerated to meet the needs for sustained growth, trade and exchanges of services, capital and free movement of people.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Fast track realization of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) ✓ Improve connectivity in Africa through acceleration of implementation of PIDA (road, rail network) and develop the African air transport, as well as shipping and maritime transport; ✓ Accelerate development of Africa’s regional and continental power pools ✓ Expand access of ICT

ASPIRATION	SUMMARY OF BROAD ISSUES AND ACTION AREAS FOR AGENDA 2063
<p>An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law</p>	<p>Consolidate and strengthen the democratic gains that have been attained to deliver the democracy dividend in terms of deepening the culture of respect for human rights, justice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Strengthen and deepen the quality of democratic processes ✓ Strengthen deepen respect for Human rights and rule of law ✓ Fully implement continental instruments and norms governing governance, human rights, rule of law and democratic processes <p>Build strong developmental states:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reform public sector institutions to ensure vibrant national, regional and local institutions that are accountable and deliver public ✓ Services ✓ Improve public financial management <p>Facilitate the emergence of visionary and accountable leadership in all sectors and at all levels</p>
<p>A peaceful and secure Africa</p>	<p>Ensure peace and security at national level:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Put in place structures for mediation and conflict resolution ✓ Mechanisms for management of diversity ✓ Strengthen governance, democratic principles and respect for rule of law ✓ Relative stability prevails on the continent but greater and more concerted efforts are needed to secure Peace and Security that remains elusive in parts of Africa. <p>At continental level:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Fully operationalize APSA ✓ Secure domestic financing of Africa's peace and Security instruments ✓ Build assets needed for Africa to secure its interests ✓ Develop strategies to address root causes of conflict as well as emerging security threats
<p>An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics</p>	<p>Fast track realization of the African Renaissance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Inculcate appreciation of Pan Africanism and African culture among young people ✓ Build Africa's creative industry such that it contributes significantly to Africa's growth and transformation ✓ Secure and preserve Africa's cultural, linguistic and other heritage assets

ASPIRATION	SUMMARY OF BROAD ISSUES AND ACTION AREAS FOR AGENDA 2063
<p>An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children.</p>	<p>Africa's women</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Enhance, deepen and consolidate gains in political representation ✓ Move towards full gender parity ✓ Strengthen economic empowerment <p>Africa's youth</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Create opportunities for growth and self-realisation ✓ Address youth concerns related to access to education, health and training opportunities ✓ Develop strategies for youth empowerment, job creation and support start ups <p>Africa's children</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Ensure their safety and security ✓ Provide for early development needs including education, health and nutrition ✓ Effectively implement the African Charter on the Rights of the Child
<p>Africa as a strong and influential global player and partner</p>	<p>Africa's place in global governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Reform of the UNSC ✓ Reform of governance of global financial institutions, especially the Bretton woods Institutions ✓ Strengthen Africa's collective representation to WTO and Trade Negotiations ✓ Strengthen the AU to adequately represent the Continent <p>Africa's partnerships</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Review and reform partnership to make them a more strategic tool to help in achieving Agenda 2063 vision <p>Africa's development financing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Develop strategy for domestic resource mobilization to phase out ODA ✓ Secure resources for sustained financing of African institutions and programmes at regional and domestic levels.

Annexes 3. Agenda 2063 Results Matrix National Level: Goals, Priority Areas, Targets and Indicative Strategies
Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
<p>1.1 A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens</p>	<p>1.1.1 <i>Incomes, jobs and decent work</i></p>	<p>a. Per capita income is at least 10 times the 2013 level to average values of USD 17-20,000</p> <p>b. Unemployment level kept below 6per cent</p> <p>c. Reduce by 75 per cent the number of working adults holding vulnerable jobs</p> <p>d. Reduce youth unemployment to 6per cent or less</p> <p>e. Rural unemployment rate is reduced by 50per cent by 2030 and eliminated by 2050</p> <p>f. 20per cent of informal sector ventures graduate into small / medium enterprise annually from 2025</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop / implement prudent macro-economic and sectoral policies for a competitive private sector led growth • Expand productive capacities of the economy in particular the SMMEs • Fully implement Ouagadougou+10 (Revised Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation) • Develop/implement policies to enhance the entrepreneurial / business growth capacities of the informal sector including productivity improvements • <i>Develop and use of vulnerability index that promotes the ability of Island States to maintain their standard of living</i> • Provide / promote policies for employment creating transitions between small, medium and large scale enterprises • Promote labour-intensive diversification of African economies • Prepare rural migrants for entry into urban job market through education and health • Promote policies to absorb rural labour in productive off-farm activities • Improve worker productivity in the informal sector • <i>Increased access to financing, inputs and markets of the informal sector as well as small and medium scale enterprises through adoption of gender responsive modalities</i> • Facilitate women's entry into high productivity jobs and provide equal employment opportunities and to social protection • <i>Recognising, valuing, reducing and redistributing unpaid care work and domestic work, including through family-friendly policies for affordable child care, support for care of the elderly, ill and people living with HIV or disabilities and maternity and paternity leave policies</i> • Provide youth with skills that respond to the job market through vocational training, on-the-job training and apprenticeship • Increase access to financing, inputs and markets by the informal sector, small and medium scale enterprises • Provide skills /output based sustainable youth employment programmes

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	<p>1.1.2 <i>Poverty, inequality and hunger</i></p>	<p>a. End all forms of poverty by 2035 b. Reduce income disparities by 50per cent between: (i) urban and rural areas; (ii) men and women; and (iii) top and bottom 20per cent of the population c. End hunger by 2035</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement CAADP • Fully implement Ouagadougou+10 (Revised Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation) • Provide policies and programmes for equal access (opportunity) to resources for self-advancement, food and better nutrition • Promote inclusive and self-advancement rural development policies • Promote policies that will ensure access to affordable and quality food by all • <i>Put in place women's economic empowerment strategies</i> • Develop/implement nutrition programmes, especially for the poor, women, children and the marginalized • Provide training/programmes for self-advancement to the poor and the marginalized
	<p>1.1.3 <i>Social security and protection including persons with disabilities</i></p>	<p>a. All citizens have access to social security at affordable cost b. All socially disadvantaged and the vulnerable (including those with disabilities) are socially protected by 2030 c. All citizens are free from fear and want d. All public facilities and services have provisions for people with disabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement UN Social Protection Floor Initiative and the ILO Social Protection Norms • Implement the Social Policy Framework for Africa • Implement Action Plan on Continental Plan on Persons with Disabilities • Implement the AU Plan of Action on The Family • Implement the Addis Ababa Declaration on the Strengthening the African Family for Inclusiveness • Implement UN Conventions on Persons with Disabilities • Develop / implement sustainable national social security and protection policy especially for the vulnerable, marginalized, women and youth • Develop institutional and human capacity for implementing social security and protection policies • Develop and implement policies for the protection and care of the elderly • Promote social entrepreneurship in all levels of the society • Ensure sustainable funding for the social protection programmes

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	<p>1.1.4 <i>Modern and liveable habitats and quality basic services</i></p>	<p>a. All cities and in the case of small Island States all settlements are certified sustainable by 2035</p> <p>b. All cities 2 million and above have mass rapid transit system in place by 2035/ preparatory work completed by 2023</p> <p>c. All settlements in Small Island States are linked by frequent, efficient and effective, (where appropriate) land, air and sea rapid transit systems by 2020</p> <p>d. Eradicate city slums by 2045</p> <p>e. At least 75per cent of all households have access to housing by 2035 and all households have access by 2063</p> <p>f. Reduce 2013 level of proportion of the population without safe drinking water by 95per cent</p> <p>g. Reduce 2013 level of proportion of the people without access to improved sanitation facilities by 95per cent</p> <p>h. Access to electricity is increased by at least 50per cent of 2013 levels</p> <p>i. All citizens have affordable access to mass transit by 2063</p> <p>j. Communications improved in rural areas through linking of all towns/villages within local governance areas by tarred roads by 2035</p> <p>k. All citizens have access to a high speed internet connectivity and voice communication facilities by 2025</p> <p>l. 100 per cent of urban waste is recycled by 2063</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop / improve the regulatory framework, expand infrastructure, build the capacity of the citizenry for enhanced affordable access to the basic necessities of life: water, sanitation, electricity, transport, phone and internet services • Implement the Africa Water Vision • Establish tariffs systems for water, electricity and public transport that addresses cross-subsidy and the needs of the poor • Develop capacity for managing transition from rural to urban poles of growth (urban design, urban retrofitting) • Develop policies / programmes to facilitate the provision of affordable housing including financing and the elimination of slums • Develop national policy on human settlements of the 21st century and beyond • Develop policies / regulations and partnerships for the creation of sustainable smart cities • <i>Develop / implement policies and programmes for private, public-private partnerships in investment of transport systems in small Island States.</i> • Facilitate the creation of urban mass transit systems through public private and other financing mechanisms • Develop / implement slum eradication programmes including financing availability for individual • Provide access to financing for the reconstruction of rural homes • Build human capacity for the human settlement development • Develop national housing policy • Facilitate the development of housing mortgage institutions • Facilitate the creation of real estate development companies • Promote the use of the real estate market for housing delivery • Expand and improve access to water and sanitary facilities • Provide affordable and sustainable access to energy / electricity by all households • Facilitate affordable access to urban and rural transport • Promote policies to ensure access to internet connectivity by all • Develop/implement policies for the growth of urban waste recycling industries

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
<p>1.2 Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation</p>	<p>1.2.1 Education and science, technology and innovation-driven skills revolution</p>	<p>a. 100per cent literacy rate by 2025 b. Zero gender disparity at all levels of education by 2030 c. Enrolment rate for childhood education is 100 per cent per cent by 2035 d. At least 70 per cent of the population receive quality education at all levels e. Increase number of qualified teachers by at least 30per cent per cent with focus on STEM by 2023 f. Universal secondary school education with 100per cent enrolment rate by 2020 g. Universal high school education with 100per cent enrolment rate by 2025 h. At least 70per cent of high school graduates go on to tertiary education i. 10per cent of degrees awarded by universities/polytechniques are in computer science and information technology by 2040 j. 30per cent of all degrees awarded by universities/polytechniques are in the engineering sciences by 2040 k. 10per cent of degrees awarded by universities / polytechniques are in the bio / health sciences and biotechnology by 2040. l. 10 per cent of degrees awarded by universities are in the basic sciences. m. All secondary school students without access to tertiary education have free access to TVET education by 2030</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand educational facilities in primary and secondary schools with special focus on Science, Technology and Mathematics. • Expand access to good quality early childhood education with emphasis on rural areas and vulnerable children • Increase the supply of qualified teachers at all levels by improving training capacity and teacher incentives to ensure that they possess the relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes and motivation to teach effectively • <i>Strengthening the learning infrastructure for STEM that ensures increased incentives, access and quality learning for women and girls</i> • <i>Reviewing the curriculum and learning environment of TVET institutions to make them gender responsive and relevant to Agenda 2063</i> • Develop / adopt curricula at all levels of the educational ladder that promote self-reliant, creativity, entrepreneurship and global citizenship • Expand access to science, technology and innovation inclined quality and affordable education including early childhood education, especially for girls at all levels of the educational ladder • Enhance Science, Mathematics and Technology Education as a major input for industrialization and economic prosperity • Accelerate ratification and implementation of the continental and regional conventions for mutual recognition of academic qualifications • Work out alternative mechanisms to mobilize more financial resources for education to support government funding • Establish Continental Accreditation Agency that monitors high quality standards across Africa • Establish a pool of high quality TVET centres across Africa and promote national TVET systems that are aligned with labour market considering global economic trends. • Build research capacity of African Universities and develop high quality post-graduate programmes to promote research and original knowledge production. • Promote Pan Africa University with exemplifying excellence as model of African University and establish a continent wide network of centres of excellence. • Build world class research laboratories for computer, engineering and bio sciences, technology and innovations

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
1.3 Healthy and well-nourished citizens	1.3.1 Health and nutrition	<p>n. At least 70per cent of the public indicate improvements educational quality by 2023</p> <p>a. Universal access to quality health care and services by 2063</p> <p>b. Eliminate all communicable diseases by 2030</p> <p>c. Reduce to zero deaths from HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB by 2030</p> <p>d. Reduce the number of malaria deaths of children under 5 years by 80per cent by 2023</p> <p>e. Access to ARV drugs is 100per cent</p> <p>f. Reduce to zero deaths from dengue fever and chikungunya by 2030 (African Island States)</p> <p>g. End maternal and under five child mortality by 2030</p> <p>h. End all Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) by 2030</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build human capacity for science, technology and innovation programmes at the tertiary levels of education • Develop/implement programmes to govern tertiary institutions to ensure quality education • Put in place policies to nurture research and innovation culture • Increase financial support to research and development programmes in educational institutions • Develop/implement ICT policies for educational institutions. • Develop/implement systems for the monitoring of scientific and technological developments. • Introduce relevant innovation concepts in public sector policy instruments • Develop and implement strategies to enhance technical and professional competencies • Promote innovation entrepreneurship programmes in order to underpin the skills revolution
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement the proposed African Health Strategy • Implement the proposed African Nutrition Strategy • Strengthen health systems with the goal of enhancing affordable access to quality care and services. • Introduce ICT support in health service delivery • Build/expand the capacity of Health care systems to address new and emerging health emergencies such as Ebola • Develop / implement programmes to combat communicable and non-communicable diseases • Develop human capacity for the health sector • Promote policies for sustainable financing of the health sector • Promote policies that will enhance access to balanced diets • Promotion of nutrition surveillance and intervention programmes • Develop/implement programmes for the promotion of healthy lifestyles to minimize the incidence of cardiovascular diseases, hypertension, diabetes, etc

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
1.4 Transformed economies	1.4.1 Sustainable and inclusive economic growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Life expectancy at birth is 75 years j. Eliminate all forms of malnutrition by 2030 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop/impellent programmes for the elimination of dengue fever and chikungunya • Accelerate the training and deployment of health workers • Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health rights, including to reduce maternal mortality rates and end preventable maternal morbidities, and to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS • Develop/implement policies and programmes for expanding quality basic health services including access to quality, efficacious and affordable medicines. • Build human and financial resource capacities for health care delivery • Expand and improve (including adoption) public health education policies and programmes • Develop / implement programmes for the promotion of healthy lifestyles to minimize the incidence of cardio vascular diseases, hypertension, diabetes etc. • Introduce the use of ICT support in the delivery of health services
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Annual GDP growth of not less than 7per cent over the period b. Contribution to GDP by the bottom quintile poor, marginalized and the vulnerable is at least 5 fold of the 2013 levels c. Share of local private sector contribution to the GDP is not less than 50per cent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote macroeconomic stability • Develop/implement policies to increase savings and investment • Put in place policies to increase savings and investment rates for accelerated development: macro stability; efficient financial systems /institutions and markets; public sector savings including effective management and strategic use of resource rents; private sector profitability • Improve business environment, rationalize / minimize regulations and encourage entrepreneurship development and growth • Promote inter/intra-regional trade as conduit for growth • Develop infrastructure to support economic transformation • Develop human capacity and infrastructure for social and economic transformation based on inclusive growth and sustainable development

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	<p>1.4.2 STI driven manufacturing, industrialization and value addition</p>	<p>a. The 2013 value of manufacturing in GDP is increased by at least 5 fold and manufacturing absorbs at least 50per cent of new entrants into the labour market</p> <p>b. At least 90per cent of agricultural cash crops produced is processed locally (value addition)</p> <p>c. By 2035, the share of labour intensive manufacturing enterprises in total manufacturing output is increased 5-fold</p> <p>d. By 2063 the share of technology driven manufacturing firms in total manufacturing output is 50per cent</p> <p>e. Commodity exchanges in place for all major commodities produced by 2035</p> <p>f. All firms operating in the sector are listed on the local stock exchange</p> <p>g. At least 50per cent of the shares of each firm in the industry are held by locals</p> <p>h. Small scale and artisanal mining operators share of the sector output is at least 30per cent</p> <p>i. At least 80per cent value added (local content) is attained</p> <p>j. Gross domestic expenditures on R&D as percentage of GDP has reached 1per cent by 2023</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement BIAT/make expansion in Intra-African trade as a conduit for growth in the manufacturing / industrial sector • Create enabling environment for the growth and development of the manufacturing sector • Build capacities for small and medium industries linked into regional/continental/global value chains • Design/ implement programmes for reducing input (energy/electricity, water, transport) cost for competitive manufacturing • Invest in product / process Research & Development (R&D) for manufacturing • Invest in Science, Technology and Innovation/Skills for manufacturing, extractive and services sectors • Stimulate the adoption of modern working methods to improve productivity • Implement Boosting Inter African Trade (BIAT) policies • Improve the level / quality of country resource potential data • Introduce innovative tax regimes / licensing schemes that are responsive to economic circumstances and contribute to maximization of resource rents • Build national capacity for contract negotiation • Develop / implement laws and regulations for promoting up, down, and side stream / local content enterprises • Promote local listing of oil/gas/mining firms • Provide legislation / policies for promoting small scale / artisan mining companies in areas as infrastructure, technology, financing / working capital and markets • Expand / focus vocational and technical education to produce the human capacity for the extractive industry • Promote policies to obtain and manage a greater share of rents from extractive industries • Develop and put in place a framework for a functioning stock exchanges

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	<p>1.4.3 <i>Economic diversification and resilience</i></p>	<p>a. Improvement in the diversification index is at least 80per cent</p> <p>b. Increase 2013 tourism contribution to GDP by at least 5 fold</p> <p>c. 2013 contribution of the creative arts to GDP is increased by at least 10 fold</p> <p>d. Financial services contribute at least 20per cent of GDP by 2050</p> <p>e. New ICT platforms to support the growth of the productive sectors and social connectivity increase 10-fold</p> <p>f. 25 per cent of new businesses emanate from research and innovation outputs</p> <p>g. Per capita expenditure on research, development and innovation diffusion at least equal to the global average</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement BIAT • Implement the African Tourism Strategy • Implement the African Action Plan on the Development of the Creative Arts • Implement the proposed African Commodity Strategy • Develop / implement national long term economic diversification plans (including, tourism, blue economy, knowledge driven products and services) within the context the structural transformation of the economy • Design / implement proactive early warning systems to economic shocks • Create capacity to take counter cyclical measures to mitigate economic fluctuations • Develop national research development policy / strategy including short/medium term science, technology and innovation plans • Establish world class science, technology and innovation infrastructure for manufacturing, extractive processing knowledge driven products / services • Develop human capacity for science, technology and innovation • Provide an enabling environment for an entrepreneurship driven science, technology and innovation culture • Strengthen the intellectual property and regulation system • Provide incentives- taxes, regulatory environment to encourage private sector investment in science, technology and innovation for development
	<p>1.4.4 <i>Tourism/Hospitality</i></p>	<p>a. Contribution of tourism to GDP in real terms is increased by at least five fold</p> <p>b. Eco-friendly coastal tourism increased five fold with at least 20% of public revenues from it going to finance local development programmes of communities</p> <p>c. The level of intra-African tourism increases ten-fold.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement the African Tourism Strategy; • Create/nurture an African Tourism Organization

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
<p>1.5 Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production</p>	<p>1.5.1 <i>Agricultural productivity and production</i></p>	<p>a. Total factor productivity is at least 6 times the 2013 level</p> <p>b. At least establish 10 agricultural commodity value chains</p> <p>c. Increase and make local food crop production competitive enough to replace at least 70per cent of imports by 2040</p> <p>d. 100per cent of agricultural GDP is contributed by commercial agricultural producers</p> <p>e. Research outputs increase productivity by at least 5per cent per year from 2013.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacitate and fully implement the science agenda for agriculture and generate and disseminate the knowledge and technologies required to double agriculture total factor productivity by 2025 • Improving the agricultural institutions in terms of their capacity to effectively and efficiently implement agricultural plans and improving the quality of policies supported by evidence • Improving the quality of agricultural data to support sector planning and establishing mechanisms for tracking and reporting of agricultural sector performance • Develop / implement policies for accurate valuation of natural resources needed in agricultural production – land, labour, water and capital- to ensure their optimal usage / combination in the production process • Facilitate the creation of agricultural commodity exchange(s) • Facilitate funding availability for investment and working capital needs • Promote policies that provide necessary skills, knowledge and technologies required for increased productivity • Develop/implement policies for the creations of agribusiness ventures/ entrepreneurs for the domestic, regional and global markets • Develop / implement policies for accurate valuation of natural resources needed in agricultural production – land, labour, water and capital- to ensure their optimal usage / combination in the production process • Promote policies that contribute to value addition in agriculture through investments in agro-processing and infrastructure (irrigations, access roads) • Promote policies that will ensure better functioning of agriculture and food markets including lower costs of market participation and increase access to regional / continental and global markets • Effectively leverage the emergence and flourishing of a vibrant sector of small, medium and large scale joint venture agro-processing and agribusinesses which attract a core of young and skilled African women and men entrepreneurs in those value chains

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
1.6 Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	1.6.1 Marine resources Energy	<p>a. Increase value addition in the fishery sector 5 times the 2013 level in real terms</p> <p>b. At least quadruple in real terms the contribution of eco-tourism to GDP</p> <p>c. Coastal tourism increased by 20per cent by 2020 with at least 10per cent of the public revenues from it going to finance development programmes of the communities</p> <p>d. Build at least four giant aquaculture showpieces</p> <p>e. Marine bio-technology and seabed natural resources contribution to GDP is at least 4 times the 2013 levels in real terms</p> <p>f. At least 10per cent of renewable energy sources is from wave energy.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For African Island States: Provide policies / incentives and positive regulatory environment for the creation new businesses with platforms based on: (i) deep ocean water applications (ii) marine hydrocarbon and mineral exploration and exploitation (iv) marine biotechnology and off (vi) aqua-culture development • Develop/implement R&D policies in support of the growth of marine resources business • Develop skills and technological platforms for blue/ocean economy businesses • Develop/implement policies and programmes to increase research and development for the monitoring of the High Seas, particularly where ecosystem components straddle between areas of national jurisdiction and the High Seas. • Develop / implement policies for reduction pollution of the ocean environment from both land and sea-based sources • Conduct economic valuation of natural blue capital and potential for growth or value addition • Develop/ implement polices to support the application of marine spatial planning and integrated adaptive oceans policy/governance for EEZs_ • Develop / implement policies for marine spatial planning for sustainable development • Build valuation of blue / ocean capital into national accounting system • Implement the African Integrated Maritime Strategy • Develop / implement programmes for the growth of marine energy businesses • Build capacities including technology platforms for marine businesses • Conduct research in support of the growth of marine businesses

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
1.7 Environmentally sustainable climate resilient economies and communities	1.6.2 Port operations and marine transport	<p>a. At least quadruple in real terms the contribution of shipping / port operations services to GDP</p> <p>b. At least locally owned or a REC country owned shipping lines carry 40 per cent of annual tonnage of cargo.</p> <p>c. Average duration of ship call time is reduced by at least 30 per cent by 2020</p> <p>d. Average time for clearing of goods from ports is reduced by at least 50 per cent by 2020</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement the African Integrated Maritime Strategy • Develop/implement policies for the growth of port operations and marine transport • Build capacities for the growth of the port operations and marine transport • Conduct research and development in support of the growth of marine transport businesses
	1.7.1 Sustainable consumption patterns	<p>a. All companies are sustainability certificated and annually report to shareholders on sustainability practices</p> <p>b. All households/ communities, government entities are aware and leading sustainable life styles with respect to the use of water, electricity, design/construction of houses</p> <p>c. National income accounts are reformed to fully reflect changes in renewable and non-renewable natural resource wealth</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop / implement policies and standards including environmental laws and regulations, green procurement for sustainable production and consumption practices • Promote sustainable production patterns and consumption lifestyles through the creation of greater awareness and knowledge development • Establish grassroots mechanisms /create platforms for sharing of experiences and know how on environmental outreach and empowerment • Establish /enforce sustainability certification schemes • Build national capacity for environmental statistics and include new environmental courses / technologies in academic institutions • Build national capacity environmental statistics and new environmental courses / technologies in academic institutions • Develop / enforce sustainability regulatory frameworks • Domesticate Kyoto Protocol • Domesticate Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants • Domesticate Montreal Protocol for Ozone Depletion substances

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	<p>1.7.2 <i>Biodiversity conservation and sustainable natural resources management</i></p>	<p>a. Forest and vegetation cover restored to the 1963 level</p> <p>b. Halt and reverse land degradation and desert encroachment; and reduce by at least 90per cent loss of biodiversity and natural habitats</p> <p>c. Expand and protect national parks and protected areas to meet the IUCN recommendation of at least 10per cent of the land area protected and 17per cent of terrestrial and inland waterways conserved, with additional conservation areas such as community lands, conservancies and corridors created</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete the ratification of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in those countries that have not done so far and develop mechanisms for implementation as integral elements of national development policies, strategies and plans • Enact strict and punitive legislation for wildlife crimes including poaching and trafficking and enforce such legislation without any kind of bias (political, economic, social and ethnic) • Reduce dependence of the population on threatened species and ecosystems; thereby eliminate all forms of trade (domestic and international) in endangered species. • Integrate the economic, social, cultural, educational and ecological values of Africa's unique biodiversity including wildlife and wild lands into the development decision making processes and indicators of economic growth including national accounting systems • Build effective capacities for the conservation of bio-diversity including management of national parks and protected areas • Build strong natural resources governance systems at the community, national levels, including revitalizing commons management • Domesticate the Framework Guideline on Land Policy in Africa as well as the Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa to ensure sustainable land management practices, sound property rights and security of tenure, enforcement of corporate social and environmental (local and foreign investors) • For Small Island States <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Expand marine protected areas for the conservation of Africa's unique aquatic biodiversity and ecosystems ✓ Promote the sustainable use and management coastal zones and marine resources to build climate resilient and sustainable communities ✓ Establish bank of genetic marine resources to restore threatened species and degraded eco-systems.

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	1.7.3 Water security	<p>a. Increase 2013 level of water demand satisfaction by 100per cent</p> <p>b. Increase 2013 levels of water productivity from rain fed agriculture and irrigation by 60per cent by 2030</p> <p>c. At least 90per cent of waste water is recycled for agricultural and industrial use</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop/promote national frameworks within the context of IWRM for effective water harvesting, distribution and use • Promote and support development and implementation of frameworks for regional watershed management • Adopt new technologies to enhance water use efficiency / exploitation of new sources of water
	1.7.4 Climate resilience and natural disasters	<p>a. At least 90per cent of farmers, pastoralist and fisherfolks practice climate resilient production systems by 2035</p> <p>b. Reduce by 90per cent 2013 levels of emissions arising from agriculture, bio-diversity loss, land use, and deforestation by 2035</p> <p>c. Reduce deaths and property loss from natural and man-made disasters and climate extreme events by at least 60per cent by 2035</p> <p>d. All African cities meet WHO's Ambient Air Quality Standards (AAQS) by 2025.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop and implement policies/regulations for low carbon production systems • Mainstream/integrate climate resilience in planning, budgeting and monitoring in development outcomes and processes • Conduct climate change research including detection and attribution • Promote/support climate-smart agriculture including those under CADDP • Promote climate resilience practices in integrated coastal and marine ecosystem management systems • Promote development of energy efficient, low carbon mass transit systems • Strengthen national, regional and continental capacities to collect, analyse and evaluate climate related data and meteo-information • Strengthen intercontinental cooperation to deal with slow onset events related to climate change such as sea level rise and desertification • Promote/support disaster risk reduction, emergency response and climate resilient policies and programmes • Domesticating United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
	1.7.5 Renewable energy	<p>a. Raise the share of renewable energy (wind, solar, hydro, bio and geothermal) in total energy production to 50 per cent by 2063</p> <p>b. All urban buildings are certified as energy smart</p> <p>c. All urban mass transport operate on renewable and low emissions fuel by 2063</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop and implement policies, strategies and regulations to promote the sustainable growth of the energy sector • Promote the development and dissemination of energy efficient technologies and use of clean energy sources • Ensure financing for education, adoption and use of renewable energy technologies

Aspiration 2: An integrated continent politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
2.1 A United Africa (Federal or Con-federate)	2.1.1 Frameworks and institutions for a United Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. All protocols and treaties leading to the establishment of a United Africa domesticated by 2050 b. Intra- African trade is raised from 10.1per cent in 2012 to 60per cent by 2063 c. Trade with African Island States is at least 5 per cent of intra-African trade d. All protocols leading to free movement of persons, goods and service in each REC domesticated by 2023 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ratify/adopt treaties and protocols related to the creation of regional / continental Free Trade Areas, Customs Union, Common Market and Monetary Union • Review national constitution / laws against the background of adopted protocols / treaties • Undertake the legal / administrative processes required for domestication • Develop / implement communication strategy for the domestication process • Domesticate all protocols leading to free movement of persons within the REC • Fully implement BIAT • Develop/implement policies to increase trade with African Island States
2.2 Continental monetary and financial institutions established	2.2.1 Financial and monetary institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. All Financial and Monetary Institutions established by 2060 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promotion of national ratification of all treaties, protocols and instruments
2.3 World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa	2.3.1 Communication and infrastructure connectivity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Harmonize, ratify and domesticate treaties / protocols related to regional integration of all modes of communications by 2020 b. Complete all infrastructure for connectivity by road by 2030 (African Highway), air, marine, electronic by 2025 and by rail 2040 c. In country connectivity to the African High Speed Train Network is completed by 2063 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement /execute all legal, financial and operational requirements for in-country connectivity to the African High Speed Train Network (AH-STN) • Build the necessary skills, R&D and financing for the establishment of the AHSTN • Fully implement PIDA • Develop / implement Smart Corridors Strategy • Ratification and adoption of all treaties and protocols related to the liberalization of air transport and full implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration on Open skies • Implement high capacity oil refinery and oil and gas pipeline strategy • Develop / implement renewable energy generation policy

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> d. “Open Skies” fully operational by 2020 e. Quadruple access to internet services by 2030 f. Triple the contribution of ICT to GDP by 2040 g. By 2025 achieve 50per cent broadband access h. 100per cent mobile penetration by 2020 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare/ implement geothermal projects • Implement Summit Decision on Africa Bio Energy Policy Framework and Guidelines • Enhancing the enabling environment & Governance (spectrum, domain names and numbers)- requires strong continental cooperation whose outcome will make Africa Strong, United and Global Player and Partner: National Level (i) develop/ implement comprehensive e-strategies (ii) develop/ implement policies for the development of digital economy (iii) Promote policies for the harmonization / coordination of key ICT Institutions (iv) support the development of a digital economy (v) support youth and women entrepreneurship in the digital sector (v) develop / implement programs for the production of contents in national (indigenous) language and new modes of digital expression Continental (i) Promote the implementation of Legislation to ensure security and reliability of networks across the continent. • Development of Post & ICT Infrastructure: National (i) Build broad band infrastructures (ii) establish postal ICT networks (iii) promote access to ICT infrastructure in rural and underserved areas (v) Develop/implement strategies to exploit digital dividend Continental: Promote the development of regional and continental digital broadcasting network • e-Applications and Services: National (i) Promote mobile value-added services and applications industry (ii) Strengthen consumer associations and user groups Continental (i) include post offices in the African Institute of Remittances (AIR) • Capacity Development: National (i) Promote digital literacy (ii) increase R&D capacity in Post and ICT Sectors (iii) Harness Skills and expertise of the African Diaspora on ICT development • Resource Mobilization: Continental (i) Establish and operationalize the African ICT Development Fund • Industrialization: National (i) Promote ICT assembling and manufacturing plants (ii) promote development and production of software (iii) promote the development of business process outsourcing (iv) facilitate the creation of technological parks and incubators (v) provide micro-works across all sectors Continental (i) Promote the creation of large regional markets to attract investment. • R&D: Continental (i) establish regional or common research centres, programs and networks

Aspiration 3: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
<p>3.1 Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched</p>	<p>3.1.1 Democracy and good governance</p>	<p>a. Democratic institutions are independent and deliver their functions without fear or favour by 2030</p> <p>b. Elections at all levels are free, fair and transparent by 2020</p> <p>c. All citizens are empowered to hold the leaders accountable and are free from fear of their government by 2030</p> <p>d. Freedom of expression and association and a vibrant and responsible press that informs the public of their rights and obligations and holds accountable their government by 2025</p> <p>e. Zero tolerance for undemocratic / unconstitutional changes of government is the norm</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review / adapt national laws / constitution to reflect continental norms as contained in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and other regional / continental instruments regarding elimination of impunity, nepotism, corruption • Subscribe to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) • Develop/implement socialization programmes including adaptation of school curricula for the reinforcement of democratic values and practices • Develop capacity of national governance institutions • Promulgate laws that will regulate political financing which ensures level playing field for all political parties • Implement recommendations of electoral observation groups • Rationalize constitution / laws to guarantee freedom of association and the right to participate in the decision making in the national development process by relevant stakeholders • Develop/implement communication strategy to reinforce the freedom to associate and right to participate in the development process • Put in place mechanisms for sanctioning / rectifying infractions to freedom of association / expression in the development process
	<p>3.1.2 Human rights, justice and rule of law</p>	<p>a. Independent courts / judiciary that dispense / deliver justice without fear or favour in place by 2030</p> <p>b. Corruption and impunity eliminated</p> <p>c. Affordable, impartial and timely access to justice all by 2030</p> <p>d. Adherence to the rule of law and due process is the norm by 2040</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review /adapt national laws / constitution to reflect continental norms as contained in African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and others related instruments • Develop/implement socialization programmes on respect for human rights and the rule of law • Develop / implement communication strategy on adherence to democratic values / practices • Put in place systems for sanctioning violations in human rights and due process without fear or favour • Put in place systems respecting ethnic diversity, promoting religious tolerance and sanctions racial discrimination

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
3.2 Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place at all levels	<p>3.2.1 <i>Institutions and leadership</i></p>	<p>a. All levels of national government (local, regional/ state and national) have capacity to prioritize, design / implement development programmes by 2030</p> <p>b. A competent, professional and neutral bureaucracy is in place and capable state institutions to deliver effective and efficient services to the citizenry by 2030</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build capacities of national institutions in development management including monitoring and evaluation • Promote policies and programmes for efficient and effective service delivery of public institutions • Fully implement the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Administration
	<p>3.2.2 <i>Participatory development and local governance</i></p>	<p>a. Entrenched participatory and inclusive systems in decision making processes within the context of a social contract based on long term national vision by 2030</p> <p>b. Full capacity for management of risks related to natural disasters</p> <p>c. <i>Reduce local conflicts to zero by 2020</i></p> <p>d. All local governments have full administrative and institutional capacities and appropriate fiscal powers by 2025</p> <p>e. Local communities have a fair share of the exploitation of natural resources and are using it for the benefit of all by 2025</p> <p>f. Culture, values and norms of local communities are respected and protected</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote policies for stakeholder participation in local governance • Put in place measures to ensure full decentralization and rationalization of fiscal and administrative functions and build the associated capacities for municipalities and local government bodies • Develop / implement policies for disaster prevention and management • Develop / implement policies for conflict prevention and management • Develop / implement policies for decentralization and empowerment of local governments

Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
4.1 Peace, security and stability is preserved	4.1.1 <i>Maintenance and preservation of peace and security</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ratify/adopt African instruments on peace and security b. Effective mechanisms to address the root/structural causes of violent conflict are in place by 2025 c. Local and national mechanisms for prevention and resolution of conflicts in place before 2025 d. Entrench a culture of peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement the APSA that deals with the maintenance and restoration of peace and security • Develop/implement mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts at the local and national levels • Mainstream peace education in school curricula at all levels
4.2 A Stable and peaceful Africa	4.2.1 <i>Institutional structure for AU instruments on peace and security</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Silence all guns by 2020 b. Capable, professional and dedicated security services in place by 2030 c. Complete civilian control of security services within democratic practices, rule of law and due processes by 2025 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sign, ratify and domesticate normative frameworks on peace and security • Provide African CSOs with capacities at local, national and continental levels to address conflict prevention and peace building
	4.2.2 <i>Defence security and peace</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Security services fully trained in peace building and keeping by 2025 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domesticate Common African Defence and Security Policy
4.3 A Fully functional and operational APSA	4.3.1 <i>Fully Operational and functional APSA pillars</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Full compliance to funding Africa's peace and security institutions obligations b. Well-equipped, competent national security structures/mechanisms to participate in continental assignments c. Self – sufficient defence industry is established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement APSA

Aspiration 5: Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
5.1 African cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent	5.1.1 <i>Values and ideals of Pan Africanism</i>	<p>a. At least 80per cent of content in educational curriculum is on indigenous African culture, values and language targeting primary and secondary schools by 2030</p> <p>b. An Agency for Diaspora Affairs/Relations including harnessing their contribution to economic development is in place by 2020</p> <p>c. 2. Diaspora integrated into national democratic processes by 2030</p> <p>d. Dual citizenship for the Diaspora by 2020</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance • Implement the Algiers Declaration on the Harmonization and coordination of cultural policies and programmes • Pass law on dual citizen to the Diaspora • Implement the Declaration of the Global African Diaspora Summit – Johannesburg South Africa • Set up national level agency for Diaspora relations • Pass laws for dual citizenship to the Diaspora • Pass laws to integrate the Diaspora in national electoral/governance systems
	5.1.2 <i>Cultural values and African Renaissance</i>	<p>a. At least 90per cent of the citizenry appreciate / the creative arts</p> <p>b. At least 75per cent of tertiary institutions offer language and literature of at least 3 local languages as programmes</p> <p>c. National languages used as part of the administrative processes of the country 2025</p> <p>d. Culture for work ethics and reward based on merit is entrenched</p> <p>e. Traditional family values (family, community, social cohesion) are respected and entrenched</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance • Build the capacity of Pan African cultural institutions • Implement the Language Plan of Action for Africa • Develop / implement cultural preservation and promotion strategy including integration of culture into school education

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
		<p>f. All high school students have at least two years exposure of a major African language other than their own by 2035</p> <p>g. African history is a compulsory / core subject from the secondary to the tertiary level leading to the development of the Pan African spirit by 2035</p>	
	<p>5.1.3 Cultural heritage, creative arts and businesses</p>	<p>a. At least 60per cent increase in local content in all print and electronic production and media</p> <p>b. All technical and vocational training and education institutions have programmes on the creation / generation of cultural artefacts, skills development for the preservation of cultural assets and management of micro-cultural enterprises by 2035</p> <p>c. Creative arts, folklore, national languages/literatures flourish and contribute to the growth and preservation of national culture</p> <p>d. Identification and preservation of national oral history is completed by 2035</p> <p>e. Mechanisms In place for intergenerational cultural dialogue by 2020</p> <p>f. All national cultural treasures / patrimony that are identified are retrieved, protected, archived and valued</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement the African Plan of Action on Culture and the Creative Industries • Ratify all appropriate international conventions which focus on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions • Develop / implement policies including the protection of the creator's rights to support the growth of creative industries • Promote the creation of cultural driven businesses • Build the capacities of cultural practitioners • Develop cultural goods inventory to enable their preservation • Establish intergenerational dialogue forum on culture • Adopt and ratify regional and continental treaties and protocols related to the promotion of cultural exchanges • Create a national fora / framework for managing cultural adaption / change • Ratify all appropriate international conventions which focus on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions • Put in place measures to fight against trade in cultural possessions, including by enhancing regional cooperation, exchange of information and pursuit of culprits for their submission to the legal institutions, including from countries of their destination • Foster African solutions to African problems by promoting self-reliance

Aspiration 6: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
6.1 Full gender equality in all spheres of life	<p>6.1.1 <i>Women's empowerment</i></p>	<p>a. Equal economic rights for women, including the rights to own and inherit property, sign a contract, register and manage a business and own and operate a bank account by 2025</p> <p>b. Ensure 90per cent of rural women have access to productive assets, including land, credit, inputs and financial services by 2025</p> <p>c. 50per cent of all elected officials at local, regional and national levels are women by 2030, as well as in judicial organs</p> <p>d. At least 50per cent of management positions in government and private sector are held by women by 2030</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement the convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women • Fully implement the Protocol of the Rights of Women in Africa as contained in the African Charter of Human and Peoples Right and the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality • Develop / promote policies that will enhance access to productive assets (including financing) by women and the youth • Develop / implement mechanisms for tracking progress towards parity by women with respect to access to productive assets/skills, participation in all levels of governance and advancement in positions within the public and private sectors
	<p>6.1.2 <i>Violence and discrimination against women and girls</i></p>	<p>a. Reduce to zero all acts of violence against women and girls in all settings (private, public as well as in conflict situations)</p> <p>b. End all harmful social norms and customary practices against women and girls and those that promote violence and discrimination against women and girls by 2025</p> <p>c. Eliminate all barriers to quality education, health and social services for women and girls by 2020</p> <p>d. End all forms of political, social, economic, legal or administrative discrimination against women and girls by 2030</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement the convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Develop / implement national strategy for the promotion of the rights of women, youth, children, the vulnerable, the marginalized, the physically challenged • Eradicate all forms of gender-based violence and harmful practices against women and girls, especially child, early and forced marriages and female genital mutilation • Ensure that education systems provide the young generation with quality education that imparts key generic competencies, skills and attitudes that lead to a culture of lifelong learning and entrepreneurship. • Promote skills acquisition through competency-based training for employment, sustainable livelihoods and responsible citizenship. • Eliminate gender disparities and ensure gender equality, girls and women's empowerment throughout the education system.

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
6.2 Engaged and empowered youth and children	6.2.1 Youth empowerment and children's rights	<p>a. Reduce youth unemployment by 25per cent in 2020; by 50per cent in 2025 and by 90per cent in 2050, including in particular female youth</p> <p>b. Youth business Startups, including female youth in all business Startups is: 15per cent by 2020; 25per cent in 2030 and 35per cent in 2063</p> <p>c. Eliminate all forms of illegal migrations of youth by 2025</p> <p>d. All youth (male and females) have access to educational and training opportunities, health services and recreational and cultural activities by 2030</p> <p>e. At least double proportion of Youth representation (male and female) in political office at all levels – local, regional and national levels by 2035</p> <p>f. At least 50per cent of youth and children are engaged in an aspect of sports</p> <p>g. End all forms of violence against children by 2020</p> <p>h. End all forms of exploitative child labour by 2020</p> <p>i. End the phenomena of recruitment of child soldiers 2020</p> <p>j. End all forms of discrimination against children especially those that act as constraints to the enjoyment of their basic human rights.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create youth skills development and employment programmes • Promote the growth of youth businesses / start ups • Fully implement the African Youth Charter and the 2002 Alexander Youth Employment Summit Recommendations • Establish close links between educational institutions and the labour market through apprentice schemes and industrial placements / encourage and promote work related skills training • Promotion of youth volunteerism • Fully implement the provisions of the African Charter on the Rights of the Child • Encourage and support career counselling services so that skilled experience of young people match the demands of the labour market • Implement the Framework for Sustainable Development of Sports in Africa • Implement the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child • Implement Accelerated Action on the Implementation of the Plan of Action Towards Africa Fit for Children • Implement Algerian Common Position and Plan of Action on Strategies to support orphans, vulnerable children and children, including those infected with HIV/AIDS

Aspiration 7: An Africa as a strong and influential global player and partner

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
7.1 Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence	7.1.1 Africa's place in global affairs	a. National infrastructure for African networked space research and exploration in place b. National systems / infrastructure for research and development that will contribute to the stock of global intellectual property rights and patents is fully functional c. Increase 2013 level of exports by 20per cent in real terms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fully implement the proposed Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa Align national plans/systems to the regional and continental global development/economic frameworks (e.g. Agenda 2063, global development goals) Meet commitments to regional/continental and global development/financial institutions
	7.1.2 Partnerships	a. All commitments under global partnerships are adhered to and global partnerships scaled up for Africa's transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement the AU African Global Partnership Framework Implement all relevant global partnership agreements / frameworks
7.2 Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development	7.2.1 African capital markets	a. National sources including capital markets contribute at least 80per cent of development capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Put in place a regulatory framework for capital market operations- including a functioning capital markets regulatory authority Provide fiscal incentives for the development /growth of the capital market including foreign participation Facilitate the capacity development of capital market institutional operators to global level efficiency / effectiveness Promote policies that will lead to linkage of national capital market to regional, continental and global capital markets Facilitate the development of capital market infrastructural platforms Develop human capacity for capital market operations Maintain a prudent macro-economic policy to hasten the growth of the capital market Develop/implement strategies for strengthening the role of central banks in financing development

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	7.2.2 <i>Fiscal systems and public sector revenue</i>	a. Tax and non-tax revenues at all levels of government should at cover at least 75per cent of current and development expenditures from 2025 and beyond	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Put in place and effective, efficient and transparent national tax authority • Develop/ implement proactive frameworks for developing tax policies; public fee for service policies; profit maximizing behaviour policies of public enterprises • Develop infrastructural capacity for revenue collection maximization and accountability • Provide appropriate incentives to obtain revenue collection and accounting behaviour of staff • Put in place effective systems for revenue collection audits • Build human capacity for revenue collection • Educate public on their obligations / responsibilities towards payment of taxes • Put in place polices / frameworks that will widen the scope of tax collection at the informal sector • Set up Fiscal Research Institute to generate new ideas/evaluate existing policies
	7.2.3 <i>Development assistance</i>	a. Proportion of aid in the national development budget is zero by 2040	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eliminate illicit capital outflows • Promote policies to stimulate the tax revenues arising from the growth of the productive sectors • Negotiate good revenue sharing arrangement with investors in the extractive industry / promote policies to maximize revenues due to the state from the extractive industry

Annexes 4. Agenda 2063 Results Matrix on Regional & Continental Level: Goals, Priority Areas, Targets and Indicative Strategies

Aspiration 1: A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
1.1 A high standard of living, quality of life and well-being for all citizens	1.1.1 Incomes, jobs and decent work	<p>a. At least 50per cent of African countries are ranked in the high level category on the Human Development Index (HDI) scale</p> <p>b. At least a third of the top 10 countries with best global quality of life index are African</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure / facilitate the implementation by Member States Ouagadougou+10 (Revised Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation • Ensure / facilitate the implementation by member states the African Health Strategy, The African Nutrition Strategy and the Third Decade of Education Strategy /Plan for Africa
	1.1.2 Poverty, inequality and hunger	n/a	n/a n/a
	1.1.3 Social security and protection including persons with disabilities	<p>a. 3. At least 80per cent of African countries provide basic income security for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, in particular in cases of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability</p> <p>b. 4. All African countries provide basic income security for older persons</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitate / ensure implementation by member states the African Social Development and Protection Policy
	1.1.4 Modern and liveable habitats and quality basic services	a. Regional Institutes for Research and Practice of Urban Management in place by 2030	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare concept /framework document for Adoption by AU Policy Organs • Develop/implement Action Pla

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
1.2 Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science, technology and innovation	1.2.1 Education & STI driven skills revolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. African Education Accreditation Agency in place by 2025 b. Common continental education qualification in place 2023 c. Pan African Virtual University built by 2023 d. African Educational Observatory is fully operational by 2023 e. Pan African University consolidated by 2020, with at least 25 satellite centres f. At least 50per cent of Member States have National Accreditation Systems in place by 2023 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop / implement action plans for the African Education Accreditation Agency, Pan African Virtual University and the Pan African University • Develop/ Facilitate the implementation of the Third Decade of Education Strategy/Plan for Africa • Develop/implement frameworks that improve collaboration and knowledge flows between Member States in the area of innovation and entrepreneurship • Establish an STI/Education data base
1.3 Healthy and well-nourished citizens	1.3.1 Health and nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Common certification and practice standards for health professionals in RECs member states by 2030 and at the Continental level by 2035 b. African Centre for Disease Control in place by 2025 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop concept / action plan for the setting up of the African Centre for Disease Control is fully functional
1.4 Transformed economies	1.4.1 Sustainable and inclusive economic growth 1.4.2 Manufacturing, industrialization and value addition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Africa's share in global GDP is 15per cent a. Africa's share in global manufacturing output is 10per cent by 2050 b. Regional / continental hubs for industrialization/manufacturing linked to global value chains are defined by 2020 and fully functional by 2025 c. Centre for Africa Mineral Development is established and fully operational by 2025 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitate the implementation of the Africa's Accelerated Industrial Development Strategy • Facilitate the implementation of BIAT • Facilitate the harmonization of industrial polices of member states within the RECs • Develop / implement industrial hub concept • Develop / implement Action Plan African Centre for Mineral Development

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	1.4.3 <i>Economic diversification and resilience</i>	<p>a. Regional and continental centres of technology, innovation and competitiveness are established and generate ideas for novel businesses by 2035</p> <p>b. World class regional / continental research centres established and provide critical research outputs leading to the transforming of agriculture, manufacturing/industry and natural resources exploitation</p> <p>c. At least 2 Regional Commodity Exchanges in Place by 2025 and Continental Commodity Exchange in place by 2035</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop concepts for centres for technology innovation and research excellence /develop/implement action plans Develop concept for Regional/ Continental Commodity exchanges/ promote the implementation of the concept
1.5 Modern agriculture for increased productivity and production	1.5.1 <i>Agricultural productivity and production</i>	a. World class regional centres of excellence for agricultural research are in place by 2030	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement CAADP Implement Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa
1.6 Blue/ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	1.6.4 <i>Marine resource / industry</i>	<p>a. African Centre for Blue/ocean economy established by 2025</p> <p>b. Member States maritime laws are harmonized at regional level</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement the Action Plan on Africa Centre for Blue/ocean Economy
1.7 Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities	1.7.1 <i>Sustainable consumption patterns</i>	n/a	n/a

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
	<p>1.7.2 <i>Biodiversity conservation and sustainable natural resources management</i></p>	<p>a. Complete by 2020 the ratification of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (ACCNNR)</p> <p>b. The implementation of the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Nature Conservation, the Framework Guideline on Land Policy in Africa as well as the Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa fully integrated into regional and continental strategies, programmes, and M&E frameworks by 2020.</p> <p>c. Harmonized and binding legislations and regulatory frameworks put in place by 2025 to ensure fair, equitable and sustainable management and conservation of trans boundary natural resources, including eliminating poaching and trade in endangered species, protect wildlife and migratory paths, develop peace parks, expand marine protected areas)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote the ratification of the ACCNNR through media, conferences and AU Organs Promote and follow up the domestication of the ACCNNR, Framework Guideline on Land Policy in Africa as well as the Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa at the country level and ensure their integration into regional and continental strategies, programmes, and M&E frameworks Develop / facilitate the adoption of model agreements by member states AUC encourage and provide leadership to RECs to identify, cooperate and develop key trans frontier conservation areas for tourism, ecological services and peace Facilitate Member States enactment of strict policies to eliminate wildlife poaching and trafficking as well as observe international convention on trade in endangered species Develop mechanism for resolution of conflicts arising from the use of trans boundary natural resources.
	<p>1.7.3 <i>Water security</i></p>	<p>n/a</p>	<p>n/a</p>
	<p>1.7.4 <i>Climate resilience and natural disasters</i></p>	<p>1 An African Climate Fund (ACF) to address the continent's climate adaptation and mitigation concerns including technology development is in place by 2025</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop / implement Action Plan for the setting up of the African Climate Fund
	<p>1.7.5 <i>Renewable energy</i></p>	<p>n/a</p>	<p>n/a</p>

Aspiration 2: An integrated continent politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
<p>2.1 A United Africa (Federal or Con-federate)</p>	<p>2.1.1 Frameworks and institutions for a United Africa</p>	<p>a. All visa requirements for intra-African travel waived by 2018 and African Passport in place by 2025</p> <p>b. Draft legal framework for continental government developed by 2025</p> <p>c. Continental institutions for a United Africa) are in place by 2055</p> <p>d. Pan African Parliament with full legislative powers in place by 2025</p> <p>e. African Court of Justice in place by 2030</p> <p>f. Regional Courts all fully operational by 2023</p> <p>g. African Common Market established by 2025</p> <p>h. African Free Trade Area established by 2017</p> <p>i. Africa Custom Union is established by 2019</p> <p>j. Pan African Institute of statistics fully functional by 2023</p> <p>k. Pan African Intellectual Property Organization fully functional by 2023</p> <p>l African Observatory for Science, Technology and Innovation if fully functional by 2023</p> <p>m African Scientific and Innovation Council is fully functional by 2023</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop / implement strategies advocacy strategies / programmes for accelerated adoption and ratification of all Minimum Integration Plan Treaties and Protocols • Implement Malabo Decision on PIPO • Implement Malabo Decision on ASIC

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
2.2 Continental financial and monetary institutions established and functional	2.2.1 <i>Financial and Monetary institutions</i>	a. Africa Monetary Union established by 2025	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Accelerate measures to ensure convergence Promote ratification and adoption of related treaties, protocols and instruments.
2.3 World class infrastructure crisscrosses Africa	2.3.1 <i>Communications and infrastructure connectivity</i>	a. Regional Power Pools established by 2020 and Integrated Continental Power Pool by 2035 (e.g. Inga Dam) b. African communication infrastructure is completed by 2040 through PIDA c. African Islands communication infrastructure is completed by 2035 through PIDA d. Continental High Speed Train Network is completed by 2050 e. Continental TV Station / Network in place by 2025	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement DOT Africa Develop PIDA for African Island States Implement PIDA Monitoring and Evaluation reporting system Develop/implement continental framework for an integrated African Media Network

Aspiration 3: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
3.1 Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched	3.1.1 Democracy and good governance	<p>a. African Governance Charter is adopted and implemented by at 70per cent of Member States by 2030</p> <p>b. At least 15 Africa Nations are in the top 50 of the Global Democracy Good Governance Index.</p> <p>c. Framework for the computation of a governance matrix that reflects the vulnerabilities of African Island States is in place by 2025</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate the implementation of the African Governance Charter Develop / implement strategies / action plans for the development of African Island State Governance Metrics Develop/implement advocacy programmes for the adoption of the African Island governance metric computational methodology by relevant regional / continental and global institutions
	3.1.2 Human rights, justice and rule of law	<p>a. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Right fully implemented by at least 80per cent of Member States by 2020</p> <p>b. All Member states are implementing the APRM</p> <p>c. All Member States comply with the framework provision on the reporting of Article 62 of the ACHR</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate the implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Right
3.2 Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place at all levels	3.2.1 Institutions and leadership	<p>a. RECs, AUC and all AU Organs have capacity to prioritize, design, execute their mandates by 2017</p> <p>b. A competent, professional and neutral bureaucracy is in place at regional / continental levels to deliver services to the their Clientele by 2017</p> <p>c. Framework for computation of GDP / economic development measures that reflect the vulnerabilities/ uniqueness of African Island States is in place by 2025.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare and facilitate the adoption / ratification of the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Administration Develop / implement strategies / action plans for the development of African Island State economic / GDP metrics Develop/implement advocacy programmes for the adoption of the African Island economic development / computational methodology by relevant regional / continental and global institutions.
	3.2.2 Participatory development and local governance	<p>a. All Member States have implemented the AU decision on Good Governance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prepare and facilitate the adoption / ratification of the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Administration

Aspiration 4: A peaceful and secure Africa

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
4.1 Peace, security and stability is preserved	4.1.1 <i>Maintenance and preservation of peace and security</i>	<p>a. African Standby Force and the Rapid Deployment Capability to be in place by 2018</p> <p>b. Fully functional CEWS and early warning systems of RECs by 2018</p> <p>c. Panel of the Wise and PanWise fully operational and under taking conflict prevention initiatives</p> <p>d. An African Arrest Warrant System in place by 2020</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fully operationalize the pillars of APSA Update APSA to cover piracy, drug and human trafficking and transnational crimes Promote closer cooperation within Africa and other international institutions
4.2 A Stable and peaceful Africa	4.2.1 <i>Institutional structure for AU instruments on peace and security</i>	a. Silence all guns by 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensitize member states and RECs on Regional Mechanisms for Peace
	4.2.2 <i>Defence, security and peace</i>	a. Common Defence and Security Policy is fully operational by 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate the implementation of the Africa Defence and Security Policy
4.3 A Fully functional and operational APSA	4.3.1 <i>Fully operational and functional APSA Pillars</i>	<p>a. Self – reliance in funding Africa's peace and security institutions</p> <p>b. Well-equipped, competent regional and continental security structures/mechanisms to deal with emerging security threats</p> <p>c. Capable, equipped and professional security forces with continental capabilities</p> <p>d. Self – sufficient defence industry is established</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate the implementation of the Pillars of APSA

Aspiration 5: Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
<p>5.1 African cultural renaissance is pre-eminent</p>	<p>5.1.1 <i>Values and ideals of Pan Africanism</i></p>	<p>a. Pan Africa Cultural Institute is fully functional by 2020 b. All legacy projects are completed by 2020 c. The Encyclopaedia Africana is completed by 2018 d. Pan Africa Cultural Festivals (music, dance, film, couture, etc) are organized from 2020 biannually e. Africa lingua franca is in place by 2030 f. Pan African Congress and the Pan African Women's Movement are held bi-annually from 2016 g. 6th Africa Region created by 2035 h. Pan African Secretariat established in Dakar by 2030</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement AU Summit Decision on Encyclopaedia Africana Project • Design / promote strategies that will enhance AU Member states relationships with Caribbean and Latin American Nations. • Develop/implement frameworks for the integration of national and continental Diaspora programmes. • Facilitate the ratification by member states the protocols on the amendments to the Constitutive Act to enable the Diaspora participate in the building of the African Union. <p>Facilitate the implementation by member states the UN General Assembly resolutions on Permanent Memorial to and remembrance of the victims of slavery and the trans-Atlantic slave trade</p>
	<p>5.1.2 <i>Cultural values and African Renaissance</i></p>	<p>a. Africa's contribution to global output in the creative arts/fine arts (film, literature, theatre, music and dance, couture) is at least 15per cent b. Regional / continental associations for film, literature, theatre, arts, culture, oral tradition are in place by 2025. c. Varieties of creole languages in all African Island State is mapped by 2030</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement the Continental African Renaissance Strategy Campaign • Expand African Language Atlas Mapping to cover the creole language in the African Island States
	<p>5.1.3 <i>Cultural heritage, creative arts and businesses</i></p>	<p>a. African cultural assets and artefacts repatriated by 2025 b. Framework for Adoption of African Heritage Sites is in place by 2025 c. African Heritage Sites as a proportion of the World Heritage Sites is at least 10. times the 2013 level</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement recommendations on the Inventory of Cultural Goods Report • Develop / implement continental framework for African Heritage Sites • Develop/implement framework for the graduation of African Heritage Sites into the World Heritage Sites

Aspiration 6: An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential offered by African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
6.1 Full gender equality in all spheres of life	6.1.1 Women and girls empowerment	<p>a. Gender parity in terms of access, representation and advancement is attained in all AU institutions and the RECs by 2030</p> <p>b. Annual High Level Panel on Women Empowerment is functional by 2016</p> <p>c. Fund for African Women is established by 2017</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate the implementation of all charters and policies related to the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women Prepare / implement gender parity based policies Develop/coordinate framework for the setting up of a continental Gender Observatory Promote the setting up of a Gender Centre of Excellence in AUC/NEPAD Put in place an African Gender Parity Index
	6.1.2 Violence and discrimination against women and girls	a. All forms of violence and discrimination against women eliminated by 2030	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fully implement Assembly Decision on Gender Parity Facilitate the implementation of Africa's Women's Decade Programme Conduct comparative research between countries that have made progress in the elimination/reduction of all forms of violence against women and girls Develop strategies to protect and assist women and girls in conflict situations, including the persecution of perpetrators
6.2 Engaged and empowered youth	6.2.1 Youth empowerment	n/a	n/a

Aspiration 7: An Africa as a strong and influential global player and partner

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
<p>7.1 Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence</p>	<p>7.1.1 Africa's place in global affairs</p>	<p>a. Africa speaks with one voice by 2015</p> <p>b. Permanent seat(s) in the UN Security Council and representations / appointments to multilateral / global institutions</p> <p>c. Africa's continental, regional and national science, technology and innovation centres have at least 15 per cent of the world patents</p> <p>d. Africa's share in global trade / export is at least 10 per cent</p> <p>e. Africa reclaims her rightful share of the global commons (space, terrestrial, oceanic) by 2030</p> <p>f. African space missions start by 2030</p> <p>g. An African nation wins the World Cup by 2036</p> <p>h. Combined Maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (CEMZA) established by 2035</p> <p>i. Standardized Regional Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operational coordination centres in place by 2030</p> <p>j. All colonies free by 2020</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement Africa Maritime Strategy • Build / implement global advocacy relationships to promote Africa's greatness. • Rationalize / adhere to process of appointments to regional / continental / international bodies with including due recognition to the African Island States. • Implement the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa (STISA)
	<p>7.1.2 Partnerships</p>	<p>a. African global partnership platform is established and functional by 2017.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully implement the review on Africa's Global Partnership Recommendations

Goal	Priority areas for 2063	Targets for 2063	Indicative strategies
7.2 Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development	7.2.1 African capital markets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Render fully operational the Africa Remittance Institute by 2020. b. An integrated African capital market is in place by 2030 and funds at least 30per cent of Africa's development Agenda. c. African Credit Guarantee Facility is fully functional by 2025. d. Africa Investment Bank established by 2025 including a window for the promotion of blue / ocean economy. e. Africa Maritime Bank established by 2035. f. African Central Bank is established by 2034. g. Pan African Stock Exchange in place by2030. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop / implement strategies for the ratification of treaties /agreements / policies related to the establishment of continental financial / capital institutions and markets
	7.2.1 Fiscal systems and public sector revenue	n/a	n/a
	7.2.2 Development assistance	a. Aid dependency is reduced by 50per cent by 2030 and to zero by 2035	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop / facilitate the implementation of policies and programmes that will lead to elimination of aid dependency



Africa United in Action!

Contribute to, or follow the dialogue:

-  **Twitter:** @_AfricanUnion, #Agenda2063
- **Facebook:** AfricanUnionCommission
- **African Union Website:** www.au.int
- **Website:** www.agenda2063.au.int
- **Email:** agenda2063@africa-union.org
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KAMPALA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

ON MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

BY

MEMBER STATES OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD),
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC) AND STATES OF THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA

AT

THE INTER MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE
CHANGE

29 July 2022
Commonwealth Speke Resort Munyonyo
Kampala, Republic of Uganda

We, the Ministers of Environment, Ministers of Interior and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Governments of the Member States of the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC), and the States of the East and Horn of Africa, having gathered, together with high level representatives of African Union, UN and Development Partners and the Youth, at the Inter-Ministerial Conference on Migration, Environment and Climate Change on 27 – 29 July 2022 in Kampala, Republic of Uganda;

In the spirit of regional integration and friendship that ties the countries of the East and Horn of Africa Region, namely: Republic of Burundi, Republic of Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the State of Eritrea, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Rwanda, Federal Republic of Somalia, Republic of South Sudan, Republic of Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, and Republic of Uganda;

Deeply concerned by the adverse effects of the climate change crisis on our people and livestock, place an urgent call for enhanced cooperation and action to address the following:

- (a) The progressive desertification and land degradation creating forced mobility of people and livestock;
- (b) The unsustainable use of ecosystems and the impact of frequent and intense extreme weather events on people and livestock;
- (c) The unplanned migration of our people from rural to urban centres as a result of climate change and disasters;



- (d) The paucity of data and statistics on the impact of climate change on human and livestock mobility in the region;
- (e) The limitations of partnerships and financing to respond to the climate crisis adversely affecting the mobility of our people and livestock in the region;

Recognizing that the East and Horn of Africa Region is severely affected by environmental degradation, floods, landslides, sand storms, tropical cyclones, drought, water level rise and rainfall variability. Notably, in 2021 alone, 2.6 million new disaster displacements occurred in sub-Saharan Africa creating climate mobility crisis.

Determined to strengthen economic growth, sustain social cohesion and stability in our region;

Desirous of declaring our commitment to timely respond to critical matters of migration, environment and climate change and its adverse impacts on people and livestock through enhancing cooperation on the climate change mobility crisis;

Note with concern that groups including women, girls, youth, the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrants, displaced persons, pastoralists and minorities might be threatened with marginalization in exercising their rights to access climate action opportunities;

Guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966; UN Council Resolution 35/20; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement 2015; the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) 1994; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030; the Agenda for the Protection of Cross Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change 2015; the New Urban Agenda 2017 Article 28; the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1992; the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 2018; the Global Compact on Refugees 2018; UNILO International Labour Standards (ILS); the African Union Agenda 2063; and the Glasgow Climate Pact 2021;

Recalling previous Decisions of the Conference of Parties of the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on Long-term Cooperative Action to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels;

Recalling that the Paris Agreement acknowledges that climate change is a common concern of humankind; that adaptation is a global challenge faced at local, subnational, national, regional and global dimensions, and contributes to the protection of people, livelihoods and ecosystems; taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those small Island states and developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;



And the Paris Agreement FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Decision 50.” requesting the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force to complement, draw upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, to FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 8 develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;

Noting the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work program on the Global Goal on Adaptation with a view to enhance adaptation action and support in line with the Cancun Climate Change Adaptation Framework and the Decision 1/CMA.3 Glasgow Climate Pact (2021) acknowledging the rights of migrants when taking action to address climate change;

Aware of the progressive work of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in line with the Working Group II report on ‘Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’;

Recalling the mandates that emerged from the 26th UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow in 2021 to inform the preparations for the 27th UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm el-Sheikh in November 2022 towards robust climate action, deeper cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, enhanced resilience to adapt to the effects of climate change and financial support for developing countries, including preparations for the first Global Stocktake at the 28th UN Climate Change Conference (COP 28) at the end of 2023;

Recognizing and appreciating the leadership of the Government of the Republic Uganda, in this dialogue on climate change, environment and migration;

Further recognizing and appreciating the partnership between the IOM and the UNFCCC with the Member States, AU, EAC and IGAD in facilitating this important dialogue on the migration, environment and climate change;

In this context therefore, We, the Ministers of Environment, Ministers of Interior and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EAC and IGAD and States of the East and Horn of Africa, having gathered key messages and experiences from government experts, youth and community leaders as well as development partners, in the spirit of international cooperation and regional integration hereby commit to:

1. Build and strengthen climate resilience and adaptive interventions of all communities living in fragile ecosystems, flood prone water basins, low lying areas and mountain slopes including enacting urgent regional and national legislation, policies and strategies for actions;



2. Implement and domesticate the provisions of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) underscoring State role to address desertification, land degradation and drought as one of the drivers of poverty and forced mobility;
3. Facilitate a conducive regulatory and policy environment to harness the socio-economic benefits of remittances, trade and investment;
4. Engage multilateral development banks and financial institutions and development partners to create/extend financing relief for countries hosting migrants and disaster displaced persons;
5. Create and/or increase investment in the circular economy, renewable energy and energy efficiency, climate smart agriculture, green economy, blue economy, digital economy and nature based solutions;
6. Develop comprehensive urban plans to address population surges in urban arising as a result of adverse impacts of climate change in marginal rural areas including promoting rural-urban collaboration to reduce vulnerability and create adaptive mechanisms for safe migration and access to sustainable livelihoods;
7. Work with the private sector to improve urban-rural connectivity for the youth and traders through internet access, technological advancement, provision of energy and road/rail infrastructure;
8. Establish and strengthen regional and national weather and climate institutions and systems to generate accurate, timely data and information on climate change impacts on human mobility; and increase collaboration between/among Member States and with the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Climate Prediction and Applications (ICPAC).
9. Address knowledge gaps by understanding and applying indigenous knowledge and practices in the development of appropriate adaptation responses, to reduce the context-specific vulnerability of communities to the impacts of climate change.
10. Apply and integrate gender and human rights-based approaches in the design and implementation of policies relating to the climate change-migration nexus.
11. Establish an IGAD-EAC and States of the East and Horn of Africa, Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Climate Change, Environment and Migration; develop a Plan of Action for the implementation of this Declaration, and monitor and report regularly on progress of implementation by Member States.
12. Request the African Ministerial Conference on Environment (AMCEN), the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the G77 and China and the LDC Group of Negotiators to take forward the work of the IGAD-EAC and States of the East and Horn of Africa, Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Climate Change, Environment and Migration and request to launch this Kampala Ministerial Declaration at COP27 with the intention to continue the work up to COP28 and beyond;
13. We further request the Parties to:



- a) Take action to avert, minimize and address displacement in the context of climate change and disasters both across and within borders;
- b) Strengthen support to countries and communities most vulnerable to climate change impacts to access new and additional scaled-up climate finance;
- c) Strengthen cooperation at all levels of government and communities and implement treaties, pacts, protocols and regulations on free movement of people, labour mobility and transhumance;
- d) Facilitate capacity building and technology transfer for climate action and human mobility.
- e) Create a Multi-Partner Financing Instrument including for the Youth to avert, minimize and address loss and damage, and advance the Global Goal on Adaptation in the East and Horn of Africa.

We remain committed to address the climate change crisis and its effects on our people and livestock in the East and Horn of Africa.

DONE AT KAMPALA this 29th Day of July 2022 in two originals in English and French both texts being equally authentic.

Signed:



Name: Dr- Deb-Gode RUREMA (PHD)

Republic of Burundi:



Name: Mr. ABDOULATIF ABDOURAHMAN ARAB, Ministry of Environmental and Sustainable Development's Representative

Republic of Djibouti:



Name: MOLIFE MANDONGO Jean-claude

Democratic Republic of Congo:



Name:

State of Eritrea:



Name: *Ambassador Siraj Reshid*
Representing State Minister H.E. Ambassador
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: *Birtukan Axano*



Name: *Keriko Tobiko*

Republic of Kenya:

with Reservations as regards objectives of development countries to provide means of implementation and to reduce their GHG emissions align to 1.5°C goal



Name: *Ambassador Joseph Rutagamba*

Republic of Rwanda: *(High Commissioner)*



Name: *Abdirahman Abdirahman Warsame*

Federal Republic of Somalia: *Warsame*



Name: *Hon. JOSEPHINE NAPWON COSMOS*

Republic of South Sudan: *JN*



Name: *Ali Sadig Ali, FM of*

Republic of Sudan: *the Sudan*



Name: Kitwira Hamza Pitasira

United Republic of Tanzania: [Signature]



Name: SAM M-CHEPTORA

Republic of Uganda: [Signature]

In cooperation with:



Name: Idy NIANG

Republic of Senegal: Presidency of the African Union: [Signature]



Name: Ahmed Swelam (signing as witness to bring this declaration to attention of COP27)
AS:

The Arab Republic of Egypt: Presidency of COP27: [Signature]



Name: OUALID CHERIF [Signature]

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria: Guest of the Inter-Ministerial Conference



Name: MATEMBO DICKSON [Signature]

The Republic of Zambia: Chair of the African Group of Negotiators.

**DECISION ON THE REPORT OF THE COORDINATOR OF THE COMMITTEE OF
AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(CAHOSCC)**

The Committee of the African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change meeting on the 18th of February 2023, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopts the following decisions and recommendations:

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the Report of the Coordinator of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), H.E. William Ruto, President of the Republic Kenya;
2. **EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the Republic of Kenya for coordinating the work of- CAHOSCC and for the outstanding achievements in providing political direction and maintaining the unity of Africa as well as leading the continent during the 27th Conference of the Parties (COP27) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 17th Meeting of the Parties serving as the Conference of the Parties to its Kyoto Protocol (KP) and 4th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
3. **TAKES NOTE** with appreciation of the political guidance and preparatory meetings convened by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and meetings of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN) in preparation for COP27;
4. **CONGRATULATES** H.E Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, H.E. Sameh Shoukry, the President of COP27, and the people of Egypt for hosting a successful COP and delivering critical decisions to advance climate action and implementation;
5. **CONGRATULATES** the United Arab Emirates on being endorsed as the incoming host country for the 28th Session of the Conference of Parties (COP28) to the UNFCCC; **WELCOMES** the United Arab Emirates as the host of CoP28 and **COMMITTS** to support UAE towards a COP that delivers ambitious outcomes that accelerate climate action across the globe;
6. **CONGRATULATES** H.E. Mr. Denis Sassou N’Guesso, President of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the Congo Basin Climate Commission,
7. **WELCOMES** and **SUPPORTS** the initiative taken by the President of the Republic of Congo, on behalf of the Congo Basin Climate Commission, to launch the World Decade of Afforestation and the Preservation of the Planet, and to host, in June 2023 in Brazzaville, the “Amazon/Congo/Bornéo-Mékong, Summit of the Three

Basins and the World Decade of Afforestation” summit under the auspices of the African Union and the United Nations.

8. **RECALLS** the Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.723 (XXXII) and Assembly/AU/Dec.764 (XXXIII) requesting the Commission to Organise and African Climate Summit and calling upon African Union Member States to offer to host the proposed summit. In this regard, **WELCOMES AND APPROVES** the offer by Kenya to host the said Summit from 4th – 6th September, 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya;
9. **ACKNOWLEDGES WITH APPRECIATION** the role of H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission in coordinating and setting up climate change events at COP27, which promoted case studies and climate actions for Africa and thus elevated the profile of our continent;
10. **EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the African Group of Negotiators led by the Republic of Zambia for presenting the interests of Africa in the climate change negotiations, and **URGES** the Group to continue to represent the interests of Africa, in close consultation with Member States to ensure Africa speaks with one voice;
11. **WELCOMES** the decisions of COP27 and CMA 4 that recognises the limited access to early warning systems and call for scaled-up public grants for sub-Saharan Africa and for developed country Parties to provide additional resources in line with these decisions;
12. **URGES** the AGN to continue to work with Parties and the incoming COP28 presidency to reach decisions that recognise the special needs and special circumstances of Africa under the Paris Agreement;
13. **TAKES COGNISANCE** of the decision of COP27 that acknowledges the impacts of climate change exacerbated by the global energy and food production crises, and **CALLS** for additional resources up to \$4 trillion per year investments in renewable energy;
14. **STRESSES** the need for swift operationalisation of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) under the Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh work programme at COP26, and **URGES** Parties to work on delivering a substantive milestone outcome at COP28 that facilitates enhancing adaptation action and implementation and increasing the ability of Parties to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change through provisions of additional finance for adaptation;
15. **DEEPLY REGRETS** the inadequacy of adaptation financing for responding to the worsening climate change impacts in developing countries and **FURTHER STRESSES** the need for developed countries to deliver on their commitment to double adaptation finance by 2025 as decided in 1/CMA3 paragraph 18;

16. **EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN** over the adverse impacts of climate and extreme weather events on people, nature, and infrastructure, particularly in Africa, and **STRESSES** the urgent need to scale up the provision of finance, capacity building and technology for enhancing adaptive capacity and building resilience;
17. **REGISTERS DEEP REGRET** over the unfulfilled pledges of the USD100 Billion Goal by 2020, and recognises its impacts for delivering ambitious climate action and implementation, **URGES** developed country Parties to not only honour their pledges as soon as possible but also to increase climate finance to developing country Parties to restore trust in the multilateral process of addressing climate change;
18. **URGENTLY CALLS** for the launching of the work by the Transitional Committee to operationalise the Loss and Damage fund by COP28, and **FURTHER URGES** the Committee to be guided by the previous COP decisions while defining institutional arrangement, governance, and eligibility. the establishment of the Loss and damage financing mechanism and fund calls for swift operationalization of the fund;
19. **APPROVES** the submission by the AU Legal Counsel on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for the African Union to participate in the proceedings initiated by Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS) and **AUTHORIZES** the PRC to adopt the necessary budget for the implementation of these activities;
20. **URGES** developed country Parties to provide enhanced climate finance for climate action highlighting the needs of developing countries reaching up to \$6 trillion for the pre-2030 period, and **STRESS** our call to developed country Parties to allocate new financial resources, representing progression and highest possible ambition from previous efforts to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, in particular, the Green Climate Fund in the context of its replenishment this year;
21. **WELCOMES** the establishment of a work programme on just transitions pathways in the context of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, **RECALLS** its call for the recognition of the multiple forms and stages of Just Transitions, and **URGES** Parties to consider just transitions, including pathways to low emissions and climate-resilient development in the different IPCC sectors, and in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication while recognising the need for scaled-up climate finance for the transitions and transfer of technology and capacity building for the creation of new and quality jobs;
22. **WELCOMES** the progress of the first global stocktake that assessed the collective progress towards achieving the three goals of the Paris Agreement; (i.e the long term temperature goal, the global goal on adaptation and the climate finance goal) and **URGES** all Parties to progress towards reaching outcomes and

recommendations for the respective three goals to inform and guide Parties and subsequently Nationally Determined Contributions;

23. **ACKNOWLEDGES AND APPRECIATES** the work of the African Climate Commissions, namely the Congo Basin Climate Commission, The Sahel Climate Commission, the African Islands Climate Commission; **ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES AND APPRECIATES** the work of the Initiatives, namely the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI), the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), and the Adaptation of African Agriculture Initiative (AAA) in coordinating the implementation of Africa's response to Climate Change and **CALLS** for additional support to scale up the implementation of these initiatives;
24. **FURTHER EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the Arab Republic of Egypt for the successful operationalising the African Adaptation Initiative Technical Support Unit at the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG Africa) Northern Africa Regional Office in Cairo;
25. **NOTES** with appreciation the complementary support provided by all partners to the African Group of Negotiators, in particular by the African Union Commission, the African Development Bank, the ClimDev Africa Programme, the European Union, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme and the Federal Republic of Germany;
26. **COMMENDS** the African Union Commission, the African Development Bank, AUDA-NEPAD, Afrexim Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa for the establishment and effectiveness of the Africa Pavilion at COP27 and **APPRECIATES** the space provided by the Pavilion for African countries and institutions to showcase Africa's response to climate change **CALLS ON** Member States to support the continued mounting of an Africa Pavilion at future COPs;
27. **REQUESTS** the African Union Commission to support a broad-based and participatory process for the development of Africa's common position on climate change that will include women, youth, private sector, civil society, academia and governments;
28. **TAKES NOTE** of the implementation of the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032), **REQUESTS** the African Union Commission to enhance the capacity of member states to access climate finance required for implementation of multiple programmes for both adaptation and mitigation as well as **just transitions** including through the Africa Climate Change Governance programme;
29. **RECALLS** Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.723 (XXXII) for the Commission to develop the Rules of Procedure for CAHOSCC and **REQUESTS** the Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to follow due process in order to

finalise the development of the Rules of Procedure with the support of the AU Commission by the next CAHOSSC meeting.

30. **WELCOMES** the outcome of the Second Conference of Head of States and Government of the Sahel Region Climate Commission held on the 17th of February 2023 at the AU Headquarters under the presidency of H.E. Mohamed Bazoum, President of the Republic of Niger, and **ENDORSES** recommendations therein.

DECLARATION ON ACCELERATING THE PATH TO ACHIEVING THE GOALS AND TARGETS OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 2015-2030 IN AFRICA

We, the Ministers and Heads of Delegations responsible for Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa having met in Nairobi, Republic of Kenya on 19 November 2021 on the occasion of the Seventh High-Level Meeting on Disaster Risk Reduction, which was preceded by the Eighth Africa Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, 16-18 November 2021 on the theme, “*Towards disaster risk-informed development for a resilient Africa in a COVID-19 Transformed World*”:

Express appreciation to the Government and the People of the Republic of Kenya for hosting these events and for the hospitality and warm welcome accorded to the Delegates;

Further appreciate the efforts made and the support provided by the African Union Commission, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction to organize the Eighth Africa Regional Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Seventh High-level Meeting on Disaster Risk Reduction;

Recognize with deep concern the continuing negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Africa’s social and economic development, including the disproportionate impact on women, and **welcome** the efforts being made across the continent to respond to and recover from the pandemic;

Further appreciate Member States and Regional Economic Communities for their continued efforts to implement priorities and decisions in the Tunis Declaration and in the *Africa Common Position to the 2019 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction*, while the continent continues to grapple with the COVID-19 crisis;

Further recognize the systemic nature of risk, illustrated by interconnected and simultaneous disasters and their cascading and devastating impacts, including loss of lives and livelihoods, damage to infrastructure, and displacement, exacerbated by COVID-19, climate change, environmental degradation, unplanned and rapid urbanization, poverty, inequality and conflict, including disproportionate vulnerability and exposure on women and girls, all of which undermine efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want;

Express deep concern on the growing severity and frequency of climate related disasters and the increasing vulnerabilities of Member States, especially Small Island Developing States to such disasters and the resulting negative effects on their economies and development;

Recall the decision of the African Union Executive Council at its 30th Ordinary Session, January 2017 [EX.CL/Dec.943 (XXX)], endorsing the *Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa*

(Programme of Action), and the *Mauritius Declaration on the Implementation of the Sendai Framework in Africa*; and the *Ministerial Declaration on the Specialized Session of African Ministers of Environment and Natural Resources on the Challenges and Opportunities presented by the COVID-19 pandemic* (13 November 2020);

Further recall the decision of the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment of the African Union [STC3/ARDWE/MIN], endorsing the *Tunis Declaration on accelerating the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* and the *Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction*; and **urging** the African Union Commission to accelerate the establishment of a continental system for multi-hazard, impact-based and inclusive early warning and preparedness for natural hazards;

Commend the African Union Commission for its support and leadership in translating priorities and decisions contained in the Tunis Declaration and in the *Africa Common Position to the 2019 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction*, including institutionalization of Disaster Risk Reduction in its regular organizational structure, the development and launch of the *Biennial Report on the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa*, strengthening capacities for early warning and early action, as well as the establishment and operationalization of the Africa Science and Technology Advisory Group and a Youth Advisory Board on Disaster Risk Reduction;

Appreciate the role of stakeholders, including Parliamentarians, the Civil Society Organizations, Media, Academia, Youth, Women, Private Sector, Local Authorities and Communities in supporting and implementing the Sendai Framework, as well as regional, sub-regional, national, and local disaster risk reduction programmes and plans;

Further appreciate the work being carried out by the Africa Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduction in coordinating and guiding the implementation of the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action across the continent, including the revision of the Implementation of the Matrix of the Programme of Action (2021-2025);

Note the importance of ensuring coherence among global, regional, sub-regional, national and sub-national disaster risk reduction, climate change and sustainable development actions; and the need to ensure national development strategies and adaptation plans reflect disaster risk reduction;

Stress the important role of regional, sub-regional, national and sub-national disaster risk reduction platforms and institutions in coherently implementing, monitoring and reporting progress on the implementation of the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action;

Further stress the importance of the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action in providing guidance to sustainable, inclusive and resilient recovery from disasters, including COVID-19 across the continent, as well as identifying and addressing underlying drivers of disaster risk in a systematic manner;

Recognize the role of the African Regional Forum on Sustainable Development and Climate Change and Development in Africa Conference in promoting integrated actions for disaster risk reduction and in ensuring risk-informed interventions in implementing Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063;

Further recognize the partnership between the African Union Commission, Inter Governmental Authority on Development, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, World Meteorological Organization and other Development Partners to launch and operationalize the continental programme for the implementation of the *Africa Road Map for Improving the Availability, Access and Use of Disaster Risk Information for Early Warning and Early Action, including in the Context of Transboundary Risk Management*;

Appreciate the support provided by the Governments of Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, the European Union, and the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems initiative, as well as other Development Partners, United Nations agencies, and international and regional financial institutions to implement the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action for the implementation of the Sendai Framework in Africa in coherence with climate change, sustainable development, and other related actions for resilience;

Further appreciate the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction for its continued support, in partnership with the African Union Commission, in capacity building, including development of tools and guiding documents such as the Sendai Framework Monitor (including the regional module), as well as development, implementation, monitoring, and review of progress of disaster risk reduction strategies and plans at all levels;

Welcome the launch of Making Cities Resilient 2030 as a successor of the Making Cities Resilient Campaign to facilitate the implementation of the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action at the local level;

Acknowledge the support being provided by the United Nations Development Programme and other partners to develop the COVID-19 Recovery Framework for Africa under the leadership of the African Union Commission;

Aware of the UN General Assembly resolution 75/216 of 21 December 2020 on holding “a midterm review of the implementation of the Sendai Framework in 2023 to assess progress on integrating disaster risk reduction into policies, programmes and investments at all levels, identify good practice, gaps and challenges and accelerate the path to achieving the goal of the Sendai Framework and its seven global targets by 2030”;

Mindful of the outcomes of the COP-26 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change held in Glasgow, United Kingdom and **concerned** about the continued insufficient finance for adaptation to climate change including the increasing severity and frequency of climate change induced disasters particularly in Africa and Small Island Developing States;

Declare our determination to deliver on our commitments to the implementation of the Sendai Framework, the Programme of Action, the *Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction*, as well as sub-regional and national strategies and plans of action for disaster risk reduction as key instruments for the realization of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want; and

Hereby:

1. **Adopt** the *Matrix of the Programme of Action (2021-2025) to implement the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa*;
2. **Further adopt** the *Africa Framework for Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems and Early Action*;
3. **Call upon** Member States, Regional Economic Communities, Local Authorities, the Private Sector, Academia, Civil Society Organizations, Development Partners and other stakeholders to support the rollout and implementation of the *Matrix of the Programme of Action (2021-2025)*, as well as the *Africa Framework for Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems and Early Action* across the continent;
4. **Further call upon** the United Nations and other international and regional organisations, international and regional financial institutions to consider the matrix of the Programme of Action, as well as the *Africa Framework for Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems and Early Action* in multilateral and bilateral development assistance programmes;
5. **Request** the African Union Commission to continue to regularly prepare the *Biennial Report on the Programme of Action for the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa*;
6. **Further request** Member States, Regional Economic Communities, Local Authorities, the Private Sector, Academia, Civil Society Organizations, Development Partners and other stakeholders to support the development and implementation of disaster risk-informed, inclusive, holistic and gender-sensitive strategies, programmes and plans of action at all levels;
7. **Call for** Member States and Regional Economic Communities to increase the annual budgetary allocation, as well as establish innovative financing solutions, including by participating in the Africa Risk Capacity's innovative risk pooling mechanism, for the implementation of gender sensitive and inclusive disaster risk reduction strategies, programmes and plans of action, in coherence with climate change adaptation, biodiversity conservation, combating desertification and sustainable development actions and Great Green Wall initiative at all levels;
8. **Call upon** Regional Economic Communities, the African Union Commission, United Nations organizations, Parliamentarians, the Private Sector, Academia, Civil Society Organizations, Development Partners and other stakeholders to strengthen capacity for resource mobilization, implementation and mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into planning, budgeting, monitoring and reporting processes;

9. **Reiterate** the need for scaling up investments in nature-based solutions for disaster risk reduction, climate action and supporting sustainable land and biodiversity management, as well as ensuring the early and full implementation of the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan and the Africa Green Stimulus programme as key instruments for building resilience;
10. **Reiterate** the need for Member States to ensure stronger partnerships between institutions responsible for disaster risk reduction, environmental management, climate change action, planning and finance and other sectors to ensure a coherent, integrated and a whole-of-society approach to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation at all levels;
11. **Urge** Regional Economic Communities, the African Union Commission, the Private Sector, Academia, Civil Society Organizations, Development Partners and other stakeholders to strengthen the capacity of Member States to better prepare for, respond to and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic; and consider disaster risk reduction in the overall COVID-19 response, recovery plans and mechanisms for resilience;
12. **Request** Member States, Regional Economic Communities, the African Union Commission, the Private Sector, and Development Partners to strengthen financial and technical support to use the existing Sendai Framework Monitor system for monitoring and reporting on progress in achieving all targets of the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action;
13. **Urge** Member States to ensure the development and use of multi-hazard and multi-sectoral risk assessments, collection and analysis of disaster loss data disaggregated, where relevant, by income, age, gender, disability, and geographical location, as well as putting in place a mechanism for the exchange of disaster related data between institutions responsible for disaster risk reduction and management and other relevant sectors;
14. **Call upon** the African Union Commission, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction and other partners to support the integration of disaster risk reduction and the Sendai Framework Monitor into the African Peer Review Mechanism processes, methodology and questionnaire to facilitate the assessment of Member States' resilience, including the commitment to avail experts, as well as strengthen their capacities and mechanisms to effectively prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters, including COVID-19;

15. **Encourage** Member States to ensure the development and implementation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks that are risk-informed and aligned to the national development plans to support their efforts to achieve Sustainable Development Goals and the goals of Agenda 2063;
16. **Further encourage** the adoption of a whole-of-society approach that integrates women, children and youth, local communities, the elderly, people living with disabilities, displaced people, and other people in vulnerable situations, as well as considers indigenous and local knowledge systems and practices, age and cultural perspectives into the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies and plans;
17. **Urge** Member States to establish strong risk governance systems supported by regulatory and legal frameworks to buttress the implementation of the Sendai Framework and the Africa Programme of Action at all levels;
18. **Further urge** Member States and Regional Economic Communities to actively participate in and follow-up on the outcomes of the Africa Regional Forum on Sustainable Development and the Climate Change and Development in Africa Conference to strengthen the integration of disaster risk reduction, climate change and sustainable development actions, as well as consideration of disaster risk reduction in Voluntary National Reviews and Sub-National Voluntary Reviews;
19. **Call upon** the African Union Commission, United Nations organizations, especially the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Development Programme and other Development Partners to continue to strengthen their support to Member States and Regional Economic Communities through the provision of guidance, tools and technical assistance, and by facilitating the exchange of experiences, including for the strengthening of the multi-hazard and impact-based early warning systems for early action and for effective transboundary risk management;
20. **Urge** Member States, Regional Economic Communities, Regional Climate Centers, the African Union Commission, the Private Sector, Academia, Civil Society Organizations, Development Partners and other stakeholders to strengthen hydrological and meteorological systems and improve weather and climate information generation and outreach, for effective early warning and early action, and transboundary risk management at all levels;

21. **Call upon** Member States, Regional Economic Communities and the African Union Commission to consider disaster-induced displacement in regional, sub-regional, national, and local levels and integrate disaster risk reduction, climate change and development strategies and plans to reduce and prevent the risk of disaster displacement, and thus build the resilience of displaced people and host communities;
22. **Further call upon** Member States and other stakeholders to actively participate in and contribute through inclusive and evidence-based processes to the Mid-term Review of the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 in Africa;
23. **Request** Member States, Regional Economic Communities, the African Union Commission and Development Partners to strengthen support to the African Science and Technology Advisory Group, as well as the Youth Advisory Board on Disaster Risk Reduction as key instruments contributing to the realization of the outcomes of the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action;
24. **Call upon** the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, other United Nations organizations and Development Partners to strengthen partnerships and cooperation through enhancing regional, sub-regional and national coordination mechanisms, as well as North-South, South-South, and Triangular cooperation in support of the implementation of the Sendai Framework and the Programme of Action at all levels;
25. **Request** the African Union Commission to accelerate the development of the COVID-19 Recovery Framework for Africa for consideration and adoption by the 4th Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Water and Environment; and **urge** Member States, Regional Economic Communities and other stakeholders to support the process;
26. **Mandate** the Africa Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduction to coordinate the development of the Africa Position to the 2022 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction; and ensure that these processes are inclusive, participatory and Member States driven;
27. **Request** the Government of the Republic of Kenya, as the Chair of the Eighth Africa Regional Platform and the Seventh High-Level Meeting on Disaster Risk Reduction, to submit the Nairobi Declaration to the African Union Policy organ for endorsement and advocate for the follow-up and implementation of this Declaration.

DECISION ON ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNION AND ITS ORGANS INCLUDING THE SPECIFIC THEMATIC ISSUES BY THE HEADS OF STATES, CHAMPIONS

The Assembly,

1. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the report of the Union and its Organs including thematic issues by the Heads of State, Champions;
 2. **DECIDES** to rationalize the inclusion of the Leaders' reports in the Assembly agenda by retaining only two or three items related to the theme of the year and based on current situation. The remaining reports should be included in the Annual Report of the Union and its Organs.
- (i) **DECISION ON THE REPORT OF HIS MAJESTY LETSIE III, KING OF LESOTHO AND AFRICAN UNION CHAMPION ON NUTRITION AND BIENNIAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN LEADERS FOR NUTRITION (ALN) INITIATIVE**

The Assembly,

3. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the report of the African Nutrition Champion His Majesty King Letsie III of the Kingdom Lesotho, for the period 2019 to 2020 and the report on activities and progress African Leaders for Nutrition Initiative (2018 -2020) and their recommendations;
4. **RECALLS** African Union (AU) Decision on the appointment of an Africa Nutrition Champion, His Majesty King Letsie III of the Kingdom Lesotho (Assembly/AU/Dec.621(XXVIII)) and the extension of the Championship to 2019 ((Assembly/AU/Dec.739(XXXII)) and the Decision on the African Leaders for Nutrition (ALN) Initiative that endorsed the African Leaders for Nutrition (ALN) (Assembly/AU/Dec.681 (XXX));
5. **COMMENDS** the work of the Africa Nutrition Champion and the Africa Leaders for Nutrition Initiative in sustaining nutrition advocacy in the effort to ensure member states commit adequate financial resources to nutrition interventions;
6. **NOTING WITH CONCERN** that COVID-19 Pandemic has created major global health and economic shocks, with unprecedented impacts on people's health, nutrition and livelihoods, **URGES** member states to take note of the recommendations of the Position paper entitled "Embedding Nutrition within the COVID-19 Response and Recovery" calling all African Member States to ensure the incorporation and promotion of nutrition smart interventions within COVID-19 response and recovery action plans;

7. **REAFFIRMS** the continued importance of nutrition especially child nutrition as a major pillar in socio-economic transformation of Africa and calls on all member states to continue prioritizing nutrition through the implementation of Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods and the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy (2015-2025);
 8. **ENDORSES** to extend for another term (2022-2024) the mandate of His Majesty King Letsie III of the Kingdom of Lesotho as the African Union Nutrition Champion to continue to rally member states towards the implementation of Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy (2015-2025) and the commitment of the Malabo Declaration on Nutrition Security for Inclusive Economic Growth and Sustainable Development in Africa to ending child hunger and bringing down stunting to 10% and underweight to 5% by 2025;
 9. **WELCOMES** the progress made in the implementation of the Africa Leaders for Nutrition (ALN) Initiative, and **URGES** the Africa Leaders for Nutrition to continue to support dialogue with high-level political leaders at global and continental level to support and sustain the momentum gained on increasing nutrition investment;
 10. **CALLS UPON** African Governments to play a leading role in multi-sectorial and multi-stake holder coordination and collaboration, by putting leadership for nutrition at the highest political level and for political leadership to facilitate the mobilization of domestic resources for nutrition, through close engagement with the ministries of finance
- (ii) **DECISION ON THE REPORT OF HIS MAJESTY MOHAMMED VI, KING OF MOROCCO AND AFRICAN UNION CHAMPION ON MIGRATION**

The Assembly,

11. **WELCOMES** the Report presented by His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of Morocco and AU Champion on Migration;
12. **CONGRATULATES** His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, Champion of the African Union on Migration;
13. **COMMENDS** the work of the AU Champion on Migration and his initiatives to harness migration as a lever for community development in Africa, with the aim of establishing a responsible international partnership that promotes the safe and regular migration of people;
14. **NOTES** with concern the major impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration in Africa, which has exacerbated the vulnerability of migrants;

15. **REITERATES** the need to generate better knowledge of the migration issue in Africa, for accurate qualitative and quantitative data on migration in order to inform and promote the harmonisation of efficient migration policies;
16. **EXPRESSES** its satisfaction at the official inauguration, on 18 December 2020, of the African Migration Observatory in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco, which is expected to play a key role in the implementation of the recommendations of the African Agenda for Migration, presented at the 30th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, on 29 January 2018;
17. **REQUESTS** the AU Commission to expedite the recruitment process of the Observatory staff in accordance with its Decision *Assembly/AU/Dec. 750 (XXXIII)* of 10 February 2020;

(iii) **DECISION ON THE PROGRESS REPORT, OF H.E. HON. UHURU KENYATTA, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA AND CHAMPION OF THE AFRICAN LEADERS MALARIA ALLIANCE (ALMA)**

The Assembly,

18. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the 2021 Africa Malaria Progress Report” submitted by H.E. Mr. Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya, Chairperson of the African Leaders Malaria Alliance;
19. **COMMENDS** H.E. President Uhuru Kenyatta for his vision, leadership and advocacy as Chairperson of the African Leaders Malaria Alliance over the past two years, which has contributed significantly towards maintaining malaria high on Member States’ development agendas despite the challenges of COVID-19;
20. **RECALLS** its 2020 decision on the status of malaria in Africa (Doc. *Assembly/AU/13(XXXIII)*) adopted at the 33rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in February 2020;
21. **ALSO RECALLS** that “sound health and well-being” are essential to achieving our aspiration for a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development under the Agenda 2063 of the African Union;
22. **FURTHER RECALLS** its commitments to reduce malaria incidence and mortality by 75% in all Member States by 2025, compared with 2015, and to eliminate malaria in all Member States by 2030 as outlined in the Catalytic Framework to End AIDS, TB and Eliminate Malaria in Africa by 2030;
23. **ALSO TAKES NOTE** of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on “Consolidating Gains and Accelerating Efforts to Control and Eliminate Malaria in Developing Countries, Particularly Africa, by 2030” (A/RES/75/328) on 13 September 2021;

24. **FURTHER TAKES NOTE** of the World Health Organisation's World Malaria Report 2021, which notes that 10 million malaria deaths were averted in Africa since 2000 and a record number of children are protected by seasonal malaria chemoprevention, but also that 602,000 Africans died from malaria in 2020, an increase of 68,000 (68% due to COVID-19 disruptions), and that 80% of deaths were children under the age of 5;
25. **TAKES NOTE** of the World Health Organisation's approval of the first malaria vaccine, which provides an additional tool to help combat malaria, and the contributions of the Republics of Kenya, Malawi, and Ghana to the large-scale trials of this vaccine;
26. **ALSO TAKES NOTE** that the next replenishment of the Global Fund begins in 2022 and that its successful replenishment is necessary to sustaining essential malaria and broader health services;
27. **COMMENDS** Member States' efforts to sustain essential malaria services and activities, including Insecticide Treated Nets, Indoor Residual Spraying, and Seasonal Malaria Chemoprevention campaigns, despite operational and financial challenges caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic;
28. **ALSO COMMENDS** the Regional Economic Communities for supporting cross-border collaboration and sub-regional efforts to control and eliminate malaria;
29. **FURTHER COMMENDS** the Youth leaders who contributed to the continental Youth Strategy to Combat Malaria and are mobilising national Youth movements across the continent;
30. **COMMENDS** the twenty-two Member States championing "Zero Malaria Starts with Me!" including the Republics of Malawi, Mali, and Namibia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo which launched during 2021;
31. **ALSO COMMENDS** the fifteen Member states that have announced multisectoral councils and funds for domestic advocacy, action and resource mobilisation for the Fight Against Malaria, including Burkina Faso, the [Federal Republic of Nigeria], the United Republic of Tanzania, the Kingdom of Eswatini, and the Republics of [Botswana], Cameroon, [Gabon], Kenya, Mozambique, [Namibia], [Rwanda], South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia;
32. **FURTHER COMMENDS** Burkina Faso, the Kingdom of Eswatini, Republics of Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia for publishing national scorecards for accountability and action to the ALMA Scorecard Hub, including for malaria; reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health; and Neglected Tropical Diseases;

33. **EXPRESSES CONCERN** that many Member States are not on track to meet the continent's target of eliminating malaria by 2030;
34. **ALSO EXPRESSES CONCERN** that significant financial gaps in national malaria strategic plans and the risk or reduced domestic funding for malaria, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, substantially increases the risk of a sustained resurgence in malaria cases and deaths;
35. **FURTHER EXPRESSES CONCERN** about the increasing prevalence of insecticide resistance and the threat of resistance to essential malaria medicines;
36. **EXPRESSES CONCERN** that disruptions to global supply chains increases the risk of stock-outs of life-saving commodities and a need to accelerate procurement timelines and undertake to implement innovative approaches, such as pooled procurement;
37. **RECOGNISES** that investments in combatting malaria, including for community health workers, disease surveillance, digitalisation and use of data, are a pathfinder for strengthening the overall health sector and pandemic preparedness and response;
38. **REQUESTS** the Commission, the RBM Partnership to End Malaria, and other development partners to sustain technical assistance, advocacy, and financing, including for the replenishment of the Global Fund and the implementation of "Zero Malaria Starts with Me" and "High Burden to High Impact";
39. **CALLS UPON** Member States to:
 - a. Sustain essential malaria and health services during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic;
 - b. Mobilise additional domestic funding for malaria control and elimination, including through the establishment of multisectoral End Malaria Councils and Funds;
 - c. Invest in community health workers, digitalisation, and disease surveillance for malaria as a pathfinder for pandemic preparedness and response;
 - d. Implement "Zero Malaria Starts with Me" campaigns to help sustain malaria high on the national development agenda, engage and empower communities, and mobilise additional resources;
 - e. Improve the quality and sharing of malaria data, including through the dissemination and use of malaria scorecards so that all individuals are aware and empowered to act;
 - f. Participate in the replenishment of Global Fund, including by renewing commitments and engaging partners and the global community;

- g. Continue strengthening cross-border coordination and collaboration through the Regional Economic Communities and related initiatives;
- h. Accelerate the transition to next-generation malaria commodities to mitigate the impact of insecticide and drug resistance;
- i. Increase capacity for local manufacturing of health commodities, including essential malaria commodities;
- j. Mobilise Youth leaders to champion malaria control and elimination and contribute towards universal health coverage.

(iv) **DECISION ON THE REPORT OF H.E. MR. ABDELMADJID TEBBOUNE, PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA AND CHAMPION ON THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

The Assembly,

- 40. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** the report prepared by H.E. Abdelmadjid Tebboune, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, in his capacity as Coordinator on the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, and **COMMENDS** the President for his excellent leadership;
- 41. ALSO WELCOMES** the progress made in the exercise of his mandate as Coordinator on the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, and the proposals made in the letter of 31 August 2021, addressed to H.E. Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, then Chair of the African Union;
- 42. REQUESTS** the Commission to finalize the second African Plan to Combat Terrorism, in line with the proposals contained in the Memorandum on the Pillars of Joint AU Action against the Scourge of Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Assembly/AU/17/5XXXII);
- 43. FURTHER REQUESTS** the Commission to operationalize the African Special Fund for Combating Terrorism and to activate the Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism under the Peace and Security Council;
- 44. REAFFIRMS** the need to establish as soon as possible an African list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including foreign terrorist fighters, and to implement the African arrest warrant project;
- 45. WELCOMES** the contribution and role played by the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the African Police Cooperation Mechanism (AFRIPOL) in the effort to combat terrorism and violent extremism and **ENCOURAGES** Member States to further strengthen their cooperation with these bodies.

(v) **DECISION ON THE REPORT OF H.E. MR. PAUL KAGAME, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, CHAMPION OF THE AU INSTITUTIONAL REFORM**

46. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the progress made on institutional reforms and challenges on the implementation of the outstanding reform priorities and **COMMENDS** H.E. Mr. Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda for his leadership;

47. **ALSO TAKES NOTE** of the progress in the implementation of the 0.2% levy on eligible imports, adopted in July 2016 as an important mechanism for leveraging the capacities of Member States' treasuries to provide adequate and timely financing to the Union;

48. **URGES** Members States to accelerate implementation of the 0.2% levy on eligible imports, adopted in July 2016 with a view to reaching at least 35 Member States fully implementing the levy;

49. **DECIDES** to extend the deadline for submitting the outcome of the remaining reform priorities by one year to February 2023.

(vi) **DECISION ON THE REPORT OF H.E. MR. PAUL KAGAME, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, AU CHAMPION ON DOMESTIC HEALTH FINANCING**

50. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the progress that has been made by AUDA-NEPAD in preparation of a Regional Health Financing Hub (RHFH) design and operational manual which lays out overall operational framework of the RHFH,

51. Mindful of Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.810(XXXIV) of 6–7 February 2021 on domestic health financing (ALM-Investing in health), which requested the Commission to speed up the implementation of Item 6(v) of the February 2019 ALM-Investing in Health Declaration, regarding working with partners to create regional platforms to support Member States to increase domestic health financing, by assigning responsibility for coordinating this mandate to AUDA-NEPAD;

52. Recalling Assembly/AU/Decision. 619 (XXVII), **FURTHER TAKES NOTE** of **progress** made in in the development of the Africa Scorecard on Domestic Financing for Health that will help with financial planning for the health sector and with monitoring performance against AU commitments;

53. **WELCOMES** the support to SADC and EAC regions to secure ministerial endorsements to operationalize the pilot Regional Health Financing Hubs and the plans to develop a Private Sector Engagement Framework and Monitoring and Evaluation Plan;

54. **REQUESTS** the AUDA-NEPAD and AUC to facilitate the piloting of the Health Financing Tracker in order to optimise its domestication and identification of final set of indicators;
55. **URGES** Member States and RECs to proactively support the rollout of the Health Financing Tracker in order ensure that the tracker is in line with country needs and contexts; and **FURTHER URGES** Member States and RECs to participate in the design and implementation activities of the Regional Health Financing Hub (RHFHs).

(vii) **DECISION ON THE REPORT OF H.E. MR. NANA ADDO DANKWA AKUFO-ADDO, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA AND AFRICAN UNION CHAMPION ON THE AU FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS**

The Assembly,

56. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** the Report of the Champion for the Establishment of the African Union Financial Institutions, and **COMMENDS** H.E Mr. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, President of the Republic of Ghana for his leadership;

57. **FURTHER DECIDES** on the following:

- a) **Urges the Champion** to work closely with the Presidents whose countries are hosting the African Central Bank (Nigeria), the African Monetary Fund (Cameroun) and the African Investment Bank (Libya) to advocate jointly for signature and ratification of the legal instruments establishing the African Monetary Fund and African Investment Bank; and, in the case of the African Central Bank, advocate jointly for rapid attainment of macroeconomic convergence to lead Africa towards Pan-African economic and monetary union.
- b) **Requests the** African Union Commission to commission a technical study on the African Union Financial Institutions in the current economic and financial context of the Member States to address all the technical issues surrounding the establishment of the AUFIs. The issues to be covered in the technical study should include shareholding structure; optimal initial authorized levels of share capital; capital subscription formula; and, among others, the costs that Member States may incur as a result of setting up these institutions;
- c) **Decides that** the Terms of Reference reflecting the scope and other dimensions of the study must be developed and shared with Member States to validate before the commencement of the study. The study

should also answer to the questions posed by the Champion in his Report to the Assembly;

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- d) **Further Decides that** the Champion and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission reach out to the African private sector, the African Diaspora as well as the African pension, mutual and sovereign wealth funds to invite them to invest in the African Investment Bank in a model of strategic collaboration with African governments that should be mutually agreed upon.
- e) **Calls Upon** all Member States to work with renewed zeal towards generating signature and ratification of the legal instruments of the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank as well as attain consensus of levels of their initial capitalization so that an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and Government solely dedicated to the establishment of the African Union Financial Institutions is convened before the end of 2024.
- f) **Requests** the African Union Commission to work closely with the Association of African Central Banks to ensure that all the pending activities on the establishment of the African Monetary Institute are carried out before the end of the 2022 and the results of that engagement be part of the Champion's Report to the Assembly in 2023
- g) **Further requests** the African Union Commission to enhance collaboration with the African Securities Exchanges Association (ASEA) with strategic focus strengthening and scaling up the African Exchanges Linkage Project (AELP) toward its transformation as the Pan African Stock Exchange (PASE) and conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding and also **DECIDES** that the results of that collaboration be part of the Champion's Report to the Assembly in 2023.
- h) **Further-more requests** the African Union Commission to organize regular meetings chaired by the Ambassador of Ghana, representing the Champion, and with the participation of the Ambassadors host countries the African Central Bank (Nigeria), African Investment Bank (Libya), and African Monetary Fund Cameroon) to review periodically progress on establishing the African Union Financial Institutions and also **DECIDES** that the results of their work be part of Champion's annual report to the Assembly beginning in 2023.
- i) **Calls Upon** the African Export Import Bank, African Development Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to provide appropriate technical support to the African Union Commission for the speedy operationalization of the African Union Financial Institutions.

- j) **Adopts the** macroeconomic convergence criteria to allow for the monitoring of our path towards a common African currency and URGES Member States and Regional Economic Communities to apply them scrupulously.
- k) **Requests the** African Union Commission to ensure that the agenda for the forthcoming EU-AU Summit in Brussels, Belgium, scheduled for 17th-18th February 2022, includes the proposal that SDR allocation rights for Africa should be channeled through the African Development Bank and the Afreximbank, with particular reference to the SDR \$100 billion that European nations committed to Africa at the Paris Summit in May 2021
- 58. STRESSES the importance** of flanking measures to facilitate rapid establishment of the African Union Financial Institutions and to this end:
- a) **Calls upon all Member States** to enhance domestic resource mobilization with a view to meeting the target of using 75-90% of domestic resources to implement Agenda 2063 projects and programmes and encourages them to submit status report to the Champion which will be incorporated in his Report to the Assembly in 2023 under the section on flanking measures.
- b) **Requests the** African Union Commission, the African Development Bank and the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD to commission urgently an input action-oriented study focused on positioning African economies to attain and sustain 7-10% annual economic growth rates in the next ten to thirty years in line with the stipulations of the African Union Agenda 2063 and Calls upon the Champion to incorporate the findings and recommendations of that study in his Report to the Assembly in 2023 under the section on flanking measures.
- 59. REQUESTS** the Champion to submit the next status report to the Assembly in 2023.
- (viii) **DECISION ON THE REPORT OF H.E. DR. ABIY AHMED, PRIME MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA AND CHAMPION ON CAADP BIENNIAL REVIEW**

The Assembly,

- 60. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the third Biennial Review Report on the Implementation of the June 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods, and the highlights of its findings on Accelerating CAADP Implementation for a Resilient African Food System and **COMMENDS** H.E. Dr. Abiy Ahmed, Prime

Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, champion on CAADP Biennial Review, for his leadership.

61. **RECALLS** the Assembly Decision **Assembly/AU/ /Decl.1(XXIII)** adopting the Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods in Africa and which also calls on the AU Commission and NPCA, in collaboration with partners to conduct, on a biennial basis, beginning from year 2017, Agricultural Review Process, and report on progress to the Assembly at its January 2018 Ordinary Session.
62. **RECOGNISES** the efforts of the African Union Commission and the AUDA-NEPAD in mobilizing key stakeholders and development partners to build partnership with Member States and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to establish a mechanism for monitoring, evaluation and reporting, in a more aligned manner, on the progress made in implementing the commitments of the Malabo Declaration.
63. **COMMENDS** the positive response of Member States in conducting self-assessments, inclusive validation process and providing information for the preparation of the 3rd biennial review report to the Assembly of the African Union on the progress made in implementing the commitments for agricultural transformation in Africa; while noting challenges faced by member states in collecting and compiling quality data to report progress on all goals and targets set in the Malabo Declaration.
64. **CONCERNED** about the fragility of African food systems as demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic and other shocks such as climate change, desert locust and fall army worm infestation that have resulted in an increase in hunger and malnutrition on the continent;
65. **ALSO COMMENDS** the African Union Commission and AUDA-NEPAD for leading the development of a continental common position presented to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit;
66. **NOTES** with satisfaction the enormous efforts invested by Member States in implementing the Assembly Declaration [**Assembly/AU/ /Decl.1(XXIII)**] to accelerate achievements made in the Malabo Declaration; while recognizing that, for the insufficient performance shown by some member states in several cases to reach the common set goals, considerable effort and attention are still needed to rally ourselves to CAADP implementation by domesticating the Malabo commitments and outcomes of the UN Food Systems Summit in our National and Regional Agriculture Investment Plans;
67. **UNDERScores** the necessity take further actions in accelerating the implementation of the Africa Agriculture transformation agenda within the CAADP framework by increasing investment finance for agriculture, strengthening

institutional capacity for implementation, improving coordination mechanisms to achieve concrete results and impacts leading to shared prosperity and improved livelihoods for African citizens;

68. **CALLS UPON** all Member States of the African Union Commission, to mobilize adequate technical and financial resources in supporting agricultural data systems, monitoring and evaluation systems and strengthen mutual accountability structures to trigger evidence-based planning for agriculture transformation at all levels;

69. **REQUESTS** the African Union Commission to work closely with Member States, technical and financial development partners, the private sector and civil society to mobilize the required support to strengthen mutual accountability, agricultural data systems and knowledge management, institutionalize the biennial review mechanisms and the Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard to ensure peer learning and scaling up of the agriculture transformation agenda embedded in the Malabo Declaration.

(ix) **REPORT OF H.E. MR. JULIUS MAADA BIO, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE AU CHAMPION ON COMMITTEE OF TEN HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT ON THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (C10)**

The Assembly,

70. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the High-Level meetings of the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government, including the Ninth Ministerial Meeting held in Kampala, Uganda in January 2022 and high-level outreach with the P-5 and other stakeholders on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council;

71. **ADOPTS** the Twenty Second Report of the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council, by His Excellency Dr. Julius Maada Bio, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and Coordinator of the Committee of Ten while **COMMENDING** his leadership;

72. **RECALLS** previous decisions of the Assembly on the reform of the United Nations Security Council;

73. **ACKNOWLEDGES WITH APPRECIATION** the progress made by the Committee of Ten in promoting and canvassing support for the Common African Position as espoused in the Ezulwini Consensus and the 2005 Sirte Declaration on the United Nations Security Council Reform;

74. **WELCOMES** in that regard, the growing acceptance of the legitimacy of the Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council;

75. **ENCOURAGES** the Committee to continue holding its high-level and outreach meetings with a view to further intensify efforts aimed at promoting and canvassing the Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council;
76. **REAFFIRMS** that the Common African Position as espoused in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration, shall continue to serve as the only viable option that reflects Africa's legitimate right and aspiration to rectify, inter alia, the historical injustice endured by the Continent; as the only viable option for Africa's full representation at the UN Security Council;
77. **REITERATES** that full representation of Africa in the United Nations Security Council means: i) Not less than two (2) Permanent seats at the United Nations Security Council with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto; ii) Five (5) Non-permanent seats; iii) that the African Union reserves the right to select its representatives for election to the UN Security Council to act in its name and on its behalf;
78. **ALSO REITERATES** that even though Africa is opposed, in principle, to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all Permanent Members of the UN Security Council;
79. **FURTHER REITERATES** the firm commitment to preserve Africa's unity and solidarity on all aspects of the United Nations Security Council reform process, including participation within and outside the Inter-governmental Negotiations, and to continue to speak cohesively with one voice in unity of purpose on all aspects of the reform process;
80. In that regard, **REITERATES** that African Union Member States in New York with dual membership, should withdraw such membership from all other interest groups, in order to further consolidate the common African position as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration;
81. **REITERATES** that given the wide-ranging divergences in views and positions of the respective interest groups vis-à-vis the inter-connectedness of the five key clusters as set out in Decision 62/557, engaging in a text-based negotiation, at this stage, without agreeing on the principles will not only be premature but counter-productive;
82. **REQUESTS** the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government to continue to intensify its engagement at the highest level with other interest and regional groups and key stakeholders, including the five Permanent members of the UN Security Council with a view to building on progress made in advancing, canvassing and promoting the Common African Position contained in the

Ezulwini consensus and Sirte Declaration on the Reform of United Nations Security Council;

83. FURTHER REQUESTS the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on the reform of the United Nations Security Council to:

- i) Ensure that all outcome documents emanating from the on-going Inter-governmental Negotiation process relating to the Common African Position fully reflect the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration in all respects,
- ii) Continue to implore other African countries to withdraw their membership from other interest groups to enhance the cohesiveness of the Common African Position and remove the impression of a divided Africa,
- iii) Reiterates the imperative and legitimacy of the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration;
- iv) All AU Member States should continue to defend, canvass and promote the Common African Position on all facets of the reform at every opportunity,
- v) Reaffirms Africa's position on the Veto and oppose the creation of a third category of membership of the Security Council, which is not in compliance with the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration,
- vi) All African Union Member States, to reflect in their respective National statements at the opening of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021, a concise common language to promote and canvass the Common African Position, and to reiterate the call for a comprehensive Reform of the United Nations Security Council,
- vii) African Union Member States to include the issue of the United Nations Security Council Reform among their foreign policy priorities in their engagements with non-African partners, in particular, the need to correct without further delay, the historical injustice that the African continent continues to endure;

84. DIRECTS the Commission to make provision in the Commission's proposed budget for the purpose of funding and facilitating the activities of the Committee of Ten on UN Reforms;

85. DECIDES that the Committee of Ten remains seized of its mandate until Africa achieves its objectives on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council, and **REQUESTS** the Committee to present a Report to the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

(x) **REPORT OF H.E. MR. DENIS SASSOU NGUESSO, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO, AU CHAMPION AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE ON LIBYA**

The Assembly

86. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the report of H.E. Mr. Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the African Union High Level Committee on Libya;
87. **WELCOMES** the progress made towards restoring peace and stability in Libya since the establishment of the Berlin Process on 19 January 2020;
88. **ALSO WELCOMES** the efforts made at the continental and international levels to find a way out of the crisis in Libya;
89. **FURTHER WELCOMES** the international initiatives taken over the past two years, with a view to the successful completion of the electoral process, namely, the 2nd Berlin Conference on Libya, held on 23 June 2021, the Ministerial Meeting of Libya's Neighbouring Countries, held in Algiers on 30 and 31 August 2021, the Paris Conference on Libya, held on 12 November 2021;
90. **RECALLS** its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Libya;
91. **FURTHER RECALLS** its commitment to an inclusive political process led by Libyans and owned by Libyans;
92. **INVITES** the High Level Committee to continue its mandate and thus contribute, within the framework of the International Monitoring Committee, to the success of the presidential and legislative elections, initially scheduled for December, which have been postponed *sine die*;
93. **WELCOMES** the efforts made by His Excellency Denis Sassou N'Guesso, President of the Republic of Congo, Chairperson of the African Union High Level Committee on Libya, in the search for a political solution to the crisis in Libya.
94. **ENDORSES** the proposal for a rapid renegotiation with the United Nations to structure a real collaboration on the Libyan Reconciliation file.
95. **ALSO ENDORSES** the proposal for the immediate relocation of the African Union Liaison Office, still based in Tunis, to Tripoli.
96. **FURTHER ENDORSES** the recommendation for a joint visit to Libya by the Chairperson of the High Level Committee and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission before the elections.
97. **REQUESTS** the Commission to make the necessary contacts for the detailed elaboration of the operationalization plan of the Reconciliation Conference.

(xi) **REPORT OF THE CHAMPION OF THE AFRICAN HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE (CAHOSCC)**

The Assembly,

- 98. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION and COMMENDS** the Report of the Coordinator of the Committee of the African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta the President of the Republic of Kenya on the outcomes of the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP26) the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 16); and the 3rd session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 3);
- 99. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the outgoing CAHOSCC Coordinator, H.E Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa for coordinating the work of CAHOSCC from 2020-2021, and for the outstanding achievements in providing political direction and maintaining the unity of Africa in the pursuit of its interest in the climate change negotiations at COP26;
- 100. ACKNOWLEDGES** the utmost commitment of CAHOSCC in the provision of the political oversight and guidance in facilitating Africa to be stronger, unified in the spirit of Pan-Africanism and speaking with one voice in the global climate change negotiations;
- 101. TAKES NOTE** with appreciation of the political guidance and preparatory meetings convened by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and meetings of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN) in preparation for COP26;
- 102. ALSO EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to Excellencies coordinating the African Climate Commissions and Initiatives: - African Islands Climate Commission; the Congo Basin Climate Commission; the Sahel Climate Commission; the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) African Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) and Adaptation of African Agriculture Initiative (AAA) for their committed leadership in expediting the operationalization and scaling-up of these initiatives;
- 103. FURTHER EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the African Group of Negotiators for representing the interests of Africa in the climate change negotiations and **URGES** the Group to continue to represent the interests of Africa and speak with one voice to advance the interest of African countries;
- 104. CONGRATULATES** the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the successful outcome of COP26, and **WELCOMES** the Arab Republic of Egypt as the incoming president of COP27;

105. **ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES** with appreciation the on-going preparations by the Arab Republic of Egypt on the operationalization of the Africa Adaptation Initiative Technical Support Unit, with the views of a successful completion of its operationalisation ahead of COP27;
106. **REITERATES** our pledge to fully support the Arab Republic of Egypt in the preparation of the African COP and facilitation of successful outcomes, and **URGES** development partners and the private sector to provide resources to facilitate an ambitious outcome of COP27 that promotes the implementation of climate actions and support sustainable development;
107. **COMMITTS** to the multilateral process of addressing climate change, and the implementation of climate actions under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement to be guided by the prescribed principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;
108. **FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES** the importance of science for effective climate action, and the findings of the international scientific bodies, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); and the Africa State of Climate Report which is co-produced by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and African Regional Climate Centres with the support of the AU Commission, that highlighted that the African continent is facing unprecedented pressures owing to various extreme weather events and slow-onset events caused by climate change;
109. **REITERATES** our call to Parties under the UNFCCC to recognize the special needs and special circumstances of Africa in line with relevant previous decisions adopted by the COPs and reports of the 25th and 26th Session of the COP, and **COMMITTS** to continuing to work with Parties and the incoming COP27 presidency to reaching a decision that launches a consideration of the special needs and special circumstances of African countries under the Paris Agreement;
110. **AFFIRMS** our commitment to implement the Paris Agreements with the aim of enhancing the implementation of the Convention, through balanced and ambitious actions on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of national circumstance;
111. **REAFFIRMS** the importance of strengthening mitigation efforts to align with holding the increase in global temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, and **URGES** developed country Parties to revisit and implement their mitigation targets under the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs);

112. **APPLAUDES** all African countries for having submitted ambitious targets under their NDCs and aim to implement their mitigation efforts, with the necessary international support, based on equity, in the context of sustainable development, national circumstances and efforts to eradicate poverty;
113. **WELCOMES** the launch to elaborate the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) under the Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh work programme at COP26, and **URGES** Parties to work on delivering a substantive milestone outcome at COP27 to contribute to the full and sustained operationalization of the GGA for an adequate adaptation response in the context of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, including enhancing adaptation action and implementation, adaptation financing and assessment of progress towards achieving the goal in the first and subsequent Global Stocktakes;
114. **EMPHASIZES** the adverse impacts of climate and extreme weather events on people, nature, and infrastructure, particularly in Africa, and **STRESSES** the urgent need to scale up the provision of finance, capacity building and technology for enhancing adaptive capacity and building resilience;
115. **REITERATES** the concern underscored by the Glasgow Climate Pact of COP26 that registered the inadequacy of adaptation financing for responding to the worsening climate change impacts in developing countries, **WELCOMES** the agreement for developed country Parties to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, and **URGES** developed country Parties to provide additional climate finance for adaptation before COP27; and to pursue it through international cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.;
116. **URGES** developed country Parties to provide new, additional and predictable climate finance for adaptation and for those developed country Parties that have made pledges to increase their provision of climate finance to support adaptation in developing country Parties in response to their growing needs, to fulfil their pledges at least prior to COP27;
117. **EXPRESSES** its disappointment regarding the unfulfilled pledges of the USD100 Billion Goal per annum by 2020 from developed to developing countries, whereas the resource needs have increased to address the worsening impacts of climate change; and **URGES** developed countries to deliver on their pledge, including significantly increasing climate finance; and **STRESSES** the importance of delivering the USD 100 billion as soon as possible for building trust and faith in the multilateral process of addressing climate change;
118. **NOTES** with concern the challenges and additional conditionalities faced by African countries in accessing climate finance, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention,

119. **WELCOMES** the launch of deliberations on setting a new collective quantified mobilization goal prior to 2025 from a flow of USD 100 billion per year to take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries; and **STRESSES** that the consideration of the goal takes into account the reports of the UNFCCC that estimate the cumulative needs of developing country Parties to be up to USD 6 trillion until 2030, and **REITERATES** our call to developed country Parties to mobilizing jointly at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2030, of which 50% should be for mitigation and 50% for adaptation with a significant percentage provided on a of grant basis;
120. **ALSO WELCOMES** the recognition of the multiple forms and stages of Just Transitions by the Glasgow Climate Pact based on national circumstances and related COP26/CMA decisions, and **EMPHASISES** just transitions include the pathways to low emissions and climate resilient development, in the context of sustainable development and eradication of poverty, and on the basis of scaled-up climate finance for the transitions, including a guiding framework to support the process of making financial flows consistent with low emissions and climate-resilient development, and transfer of technology and capacity building for the creation of new and quality jobs;
121. **RECOGNIZES** the intrinsic relationship of climate change actions, responses, and the impacts on equitable access to sustainable development, and **STRESSES** the importance of ensuring adequate support for Africa sustainable pathways including through consideration of policies and ensuring that just transition financing is incorporated into approaches to align climate action with the goals of the Paris Agreement;
122. **STRESSES** that the measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral measures, should not constitute discrimination or a restriction on exports from African countries, taking into consideration African trade initiatives and the African continental free trade zone, to enhance trade between African countries;
123. **HIGHLIGHTS** the important role of youth as acknowledged in the Glasgow Pact and invites Egypt as presidency of COP27 to engage with African stakeholders in particular youth representatives; and **CALLS UPON** countries to ensure meaningful youth participation and representation in multilateral fora on climate change and that youth are part of member state delegations to these sessions at the multilateral, national and local levels;
124. **ACKNOWLEDGES** the need for additional support to the various climate Commissions and other African Climate Initiatives and **REQUESTS** the AU Commission to strengthen coordination of all the initiatives at continental level. **RECOGNIZES** the legal existence of the Congo Basin Climate Commission conferred through the signature by its members at the level of Heads of State

and Government, on 29 April 2018, of the Protocol establishing it; **SUPPORTS** the request for accreditation of the Congo Basin Climate Commission, as a sub-regional organization, to the African Union, with all the effects that this implies;

- 125. WELCOMES** the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan to guide, coordinate and support the Continent's response to Climate Change for the period 2022-2032 and the Integrated African Strategy on Meteorology (Weather and Climate Services) (2021-2030); and hereby **ADOPTS** these strategies and action plans;
- 126. TAKES NOTE** of the candidacy of His Excellency Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of the Republic of Mozambique, to be appointed to perform the role of Champion of Disaster Risk Management in Africa; and **DECIDES** to appoint His Excellency Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of the Republic of Mozambique as a Champion of Disaster Risk Management in Africa,
- 127. CONCERNED** by the exacerbated impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic that has **severely** impacted on the health, economy of the continent and increased indebtedness of African countries;
- 128. REAFFIRMS** the commitment to continue the efforts to conserve, protect and enhance the resilience of our environment and natural resources as part of our determined efforts in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and increase efforts to build a more sustainable and inclusive recovery including to future crises;
- 129. WELCOMES** the African Green Stimulus Programme and the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan which are intended to support the Continent's sustainable development recovery response to the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and **ADOPTS** these initiatives to contribute towards Africa's green recovery to the impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic.
- 130. COMMENDS** the work done and commitment of the African Union Commission, AMCEN, the AGN and Development Partners for their contribution in advancing Africa's negotiation positions and Climate Change programmes.

(xii) **REPORT OF H.E. MR. ISSOUFOU MAHAMADOU, FORMER PRESIDENT OF NIGER AND AFRICAN UNION CHAMPION ON THE CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA (AfCFTA)**

The Assembly,

- 131. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the Report of H.E. Mr. Issoufou Mahamadou, former President of the Republic of Niger and Champion of the AfCFTA, and its recommendations thereof on the progress achieved since the start of trading under the AfCFTA on 1 January 2021.

132. **WELCOMES AND APPRECIATES** the Report of the Champion to the 3rd Mid-Year Coordination Meeting which assessed and reviewed the status of implementation of pertaining to Inter-Africa Trade and continental integration and **DIRECTS** the implementation of Decision Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XII) of July 2019 and submission of an updated reports to the next Mid-Year Coordination Meeting.
133. **ALSO NOTES** of the upcoming 3rd Intra-Africa Trade Fair (IATF), to take place in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire in 2023 and takes note of the proposed theme of the year for 2023 as "**Acceleration of AfCFTA Implementation**" and **DIRECTS** the AfCFTA Secretariat and AUC to present the Concept Note to the relevant Sub-Committees and Policy Organs for consideration.
134. **DIRECTS** the AfCFTA Secretariat to intensify its collaboration with the African Export-Import Bank and African Developmental Bank as well as implement the AfCFTA Private Sector Engagement Plan.
135. **RECOGNISES** the critical importance of the role of the Assembly in advancing progress in the implementation of the AfCFTA and in the remainder of the AfCFTA negotiations and **APPROVES** the recommendation to convene a meeting dedicated to the AfCFTA.
- (xiii) **REPORT OF H.E. NANA ADDO DANKWA AKUFO- ADDO, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, AFRICAN UNION CHAMPION ON GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN AFRICA,**

The Assembly,

136. **TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION** of the 2nd report of H.E. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo- Addo, President of the Republic of Ghana and AU Champion on Gender and Development issues in Africa;
137. **ADOPTS** the Kinshasa Declaration and Call for Action of the African Union Heads of State on Positive Masculinity in Leadership to End Violence Against Women and Girls.
138. **DECIDES** to institutionalize the Office of the Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, with allocation of adequate and stable financial and human resources for the acceleration of the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda in Africa.

**DECISION ON THE REPORT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL ON ITS
ACTIVITIES AND THE STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA
Doc. Assembly/AU/5(XXXIII)**

The Assembly,

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa and **ENCOURAGES** the Peace and Security Council (PSC), working with the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs), with the support of the African Union (AU) Commission to continue enhancing efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and crisis situations. The Assembly further **URGES** the PSC to continue providing strategic guidance on the implementation of post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction and development programmes in countries emerging from conflicts;
2. **COMMENDS** the efforts being deployed by H.E. President Felix Tshisekedi and other leaders of the region to foster peace and stability in the DRC and also to promote good neighbourly relations with and between the countries of the region. In this context, the Assembly **REITERATES** the imperative of full implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. The Assembly **EXPRESSES** its gratitude to MONUSCO, bilateral and multilateral partners of the DRC, for their continued support for the stabilisation of the DRC, as evidenced by the recent peace and stability gains made in the Kasai region. The Assembly **CALLS** on AU Member States and the larger international community to continue to support the current efforts of the DRC, including in infrastructure development and socio-economic recovery, particularly in the regions affected by insecurity. The Assembly **ENCOURAGES** Member States to also support efforts in the fight against the Ebola Virus disease outbreak in parts of the DRC. The Assembly **CALLS ON** the international community to provide financial support to the DDR programme in DRC and encourage all partners to also participate in the Conference for Trade and Investment of the Great Lakes Region scheduled to take place in Kigali, March 2020.
3. **ACKNOWLEDGES** the steps taken by the Government of Burundi in addressing the country's challenges, particularly with regard to preparations for the upcoming elections in 2020, including the establishment, on 31 August 2018 of an Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), in line with the Burundian Electoral Code; and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of 13 members, in accordance with the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement; the adoption of the Kayanza Roadmap for the elections; and the publication of the electoral calendar by CENI, among others. The Assembly **COMMENDS** President Pierre Nkurunziza for honouring his commitment not to enlist his candidature in the upcoming 2020 presidential election. **INVITES** the Government and opposition groups to maintain dialogue aimed at strengthening

peace and security as well as creating an enabling environment for socio-economic development. The Assembly **ENCOURAGES** the East African Community (EAC), the AU and the United Nations (UN) to closely align efforts in order to give the much-needed impetus to the political process in Burundi. The Assembly **COMMENDS** the work of the AU Human Rights Observers and Military Experts deployed in the country since 2015 for contributing to promoting cohesion and peace in the country. The Assembly **REITERATES ITS CALL** on the European Union to lift the sanctions imposed on Burundi, in order to create conducive conditions for facilitating socio-economic recovery in the country.

4. **URGES** all Central African stakeholders to ensure that the 2020-2021 general elections are organized as scheduled, in strict compliance with Central African laws and the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of 6 February 2019. In this context, the Assembly **COMMENDS** President Faustin Archange Touadera for his efforts to build inclusive consensus in his country, notably through dialogue he initiated with the former Heads of State of CAR, namely, François Bozizé, Michel Djotodia and Catherine Samba-Panza, based on the Peace Agreement as the sole reference of this dialogue. The Assembly **ACKNOWLEDGES** the progress made in the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation; **COMMENDS** the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smaïl Chergui for his continuous efforts together with the United Nations Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping and **URGES** the Central African parties to intensify dialogue, with the support of the Guarantors of the Agreement. The Assembly **COMMENDS** the countries of the region for their support to the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the convening of the Joint Commissions to this end. The Assembly **URGES** the MINUSCA to support the deployment of the AU Observers; **FURTHER URGES** the Peacebuilding Commission in particular, Egypt, in its capacity as Vice-Chairman of the UNPBC and the Kingdom of Morocco, Chair of the UN Configuration of the Central African Republic (CAR), for their efforts in support of the CAR and in defending the interests of African countries on the UNPBC agenda, including through the African Group in New York, as well as the international partners to deliver the support promised to the AU Mission in Bangui and the launching of development projects. The Assembly **REQUESTS** the AU Member States and the larger international community to provide technical and financial support to the Central African authorities, in order to facilitate the successful organization of the upcoming elections and the economic reconstruction in the CAR.
5. **COMMENDS** the Government of Cameroon for adopting a set of measures to usher in peaceful solutions to the socio-political unrest in the North West and South West regions; measures which include the successful organization of a Major National Dialogue (from 30 September to 4 October 2019) involving all stakeholders from within the country and from the diaspora with a view to restoring lasting peace; sending a peace caravan led by the Prime Minister, Head of Government, to the two regions concerned; adopting a law to institute a general code of regional and local authorities which confers, in particular, a special status

to the two English-speaking regions of the North West and the South West to take into account their specificities in terms of the educational and judicial systems; setting up a National Commission on the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; adopting a law on the promotion of national (?) languages, as well as promoting the use of English and French as official languages of equal value; and establishing a National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee. **ALSO COMMENDS** the Government for releasing, on the one hand, certain political leaders or activists who were prosecuted before the military courts for their involvement in organizing irregular demonstrations, and, on the other hand, hundreds of other individuals who were prosecuted for crimes committed as part of the unrest in the two regions of the North West and the South West. **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the AU Commission to continue to support the efforts of the Cameroonian Government to find a lasting solution to the crisis in the two regions of the North West and the South West.

6. **REITERATES** the readiness of the AU to continue its facilitation role in The Comoros, with a view to strengthening and consolidating social cohesion. **ENCOURAGES** the PSC, with the support of the AU Commission, to continue to support the Comoros in its efforts to advance political dialogue. **ALSO ENCOURAGES** President Azali Assoumani for his commitment to launch an inclusive dialogue with all the actors of the country. **COMMENDS** the President of the Union of the Comoros and his Government for the appeasement measures taken by granting a presidential pardon to several prisoners, including common law prisoners.
7. **TAKES NOTE** of the steady progress in Somalia and, in this regard, **ENCOURAGES** the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as the Federal Member States (FMS), to continue to promote consensual solutions to the challenges facing their country. The Assembly **APPEALS** to international partners to continue to assist the Somalis and to refrain from any actions that may undermine current efforts to end the conflict in that country. The Assembly **UNDERSCORES** the need to expedite the generation of adequate Somali Security Forces to undertake joint operations with AMISOM, hold newly liberated territories, protect population centres, and secure the Main Supply Routes (MSRs), with a view to creating conducive conditions that will enable the Somali national defence and security forces to effectively takeover security responsibilities from AMISOM by 2021. The Assembly **COMMENDS** AMISOM and Somali Security Forces for downgrading the capacities of the Al Shabaab terrorist group and **LOOKS FORWARD** to continuing this close collaboration in the fight. The Assembly **STRONGLY CONDEMN** the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Somalia and against AMISOM. Furthermore, the Assembly **EXPRESSES** its condolences to the bereaved families and **WISHES** speedy recovery to the injured. The Assembly **FURTHER COMMENDS** the Troop and Police Contributing Countries of AMISOM for their sacrifices and commitments towards the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia.

8. **CONGRATULATES** The Sudan for having been elected as Chair of IGAD and reaffirm its support for the new role of Sudan and its continued cooperation in working for peace, stability and development of the region and the continent. The Assembly **COMMENDS** the Transitional Sovereign Council and the Transitional Government of Sudan for their ongoing cooperation, commitment and coordinated engagement in addressing the multiple challenges facing the country. The Assembly **ENCOURAGES** all Sudanese stakeholders to maintain the momentum thus far mobilized, particularly strong coordination and cooperation among the transitional authorities, as this would restore the confidence of the people of Sudan in national institutions. The Assembly **PAYS TRIBUTE** to the efforts deployed by the Chairperson of the Union, H.E. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi of Egypt, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, H.E. Dr. Abiy Ahmed, in his capacity as Chair of IGAD, as well as by the Chairperson of the Commission, H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat for their coordinated efforts towards finding a solution to the crisis in Sudan. The Assembly **WELCOMES** the hosting in the Republic of South Sudan, under the auspices of President Salvar Kiir Mayardit, of the negotiations between the Sudan Transitional Government and Sudan armed movements, and **EXPRESSES** its appreciation for the efforts being deployed by the IGAD and countries of the region. The Assembly **STRONGLY APPEALS** to those countries which imposed economic and financial sanctions on the Republic of Sudan to immediately and totally remove the sanctions. In this context, the Assembly **CALLS ON** the Government of the United States of America (USA) to remove Sudan from its List of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST), in order to facilitate the flow of investments in Sudan to promote sustainable peace and development. The Assembly also welcomes the steps being taken by the Government of Sudan to attract investors and in this context acknowledges the dialogue that has been opened between the Governments of USA and Sudan to address these issues. The Assembly **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the Commission, in coordination with IGAD, to continue with his efforts in supporting Sudan during the transitional period.
9. **COMMENDS** the Government of Sudan and UNAMID for their collaborative efforts and commitment in implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 2429 on the drawdown and also commend the PSC and the UN Security Council for extending the mandate of UNAMID until 31 October 2020. The Assembly **UNDERSCORES** the significance of sustaining peace in Darfur through investment in sustainable development projects. In this regard, the Assembly **STRONGLY ENCOURAGES** the AU Commission, together with the United Nations, to undertake strategic initiatives that will ensure effective resource mobilization, including funds for Darfur's stabilization and development. In this regard, the Assembly **STRESSES** that the draw down should be completed in such a way that it preserves the gains being made in Darfur, within the overall search for peace, stability and development in Sudan.
10. **ACKNOWLEDGES** the efforts deployed by H.E. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and the Head of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan, H.E.

Abdel-Fatah Al-Burhan in convening the Entebbe Summit in November 2019, which, among other, extended by hundred days the pre-transitional period for the South Sudanese stakeholders to address pending issues before the formation of a Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). The Assembly **COMMENDS** H.E. President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Dr. Riek Machar for reaching consensus during the Entebbe Summit. The Assembly **COMMENDS** the Government of South Sudan for the disbursements made for the implementation of the Peace Agreement and **ENCOURAGES** it to complete the disbursement. The Assembly **COMMENDS** the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) comprising its Members namely, South Africa as Chair, Algeria, Chad, Nigeria and Rwanda for their continued support to the South Sudan peace process, including through regular visits undertaken in the course of 2019. The Assembly also **COMMENDS** all Member States which have extended financial and material support to the Government of South Sudan, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa and, in this context, the Assembly **APPEALS** to other Member States to also make contributions. In the same context, the Assembly **ALSO APPEALS** to the larger international community to further extend financial, material and logistical support to the South Sudan Peace Process, especially the transitional security arrangements to facilitate the process of cantonment, screening, training and deployment of the South Sudanese Necessary United Forces (NUF), for the protection of officials during the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

11. **UNDERSCORES** the imperative of the formation of the Transitional Government by 22 February 2020 and **EXPRESSES CONCERN** over the delays in pending pre-transitional tasks that are crucial for the formation of the R-TGoNU, particularly those relating to transitional security arrangements and the determination of the number and boundaries of states. The Assembly **STRONGLY CALLS** on the South Sudanese parties to continue dialogue to address pending issues, critical to the full implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the establishment of the R-TGoNU. The Assembly **REAFFIRMS** the solidarity of the AU with the people and the Government of South Sudan in their aspirations to restore lasting peace and stability, and advance development in their country.
12. **WELCOMES** the cessation of hostilities by the Libyan parties and **ENCOURAGES** the parties to finalize a permanent ceasefire. The Assembly **ENDORSES** the Communiqué of the 8th Meeting of the AU High Level Committee for Libya, held on 30 January 2020, in Brazzaville, Congo, which, among others, underlines the imperative for an inclusive national dialogue and reconciliation strongly condemned the continued fighting in Libya that resulted in hundreds of civilian victims, and the external interference that undermines peace efforts in Libya. The Assembly **ALSO WELCOMES** the outcomes of the Conference on Libya held in Berlin in January 2020, especially the commitment by international partners to respect the embargo on arms and to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Libya. The Assembly **CALLS UPON** the AU High-Level

Committee for Libya to continue to support the all-inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process as a way forward to a permanent ceasefire, and also, as a prior condition to the reconciliation forum. The Assembly expresses its appreciation to H.E Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of Congo and Chair of the African Union High-Level Committee on Libya, for his tireless efforts towards finding a solution to the crisis in Libya. In this respect, the Assembly encourages him to remain seized with the matter. The Assembly **UNDERLINES** the role of the neighbouring countries of Libya, in the search for a solution to the current crisis, and **WELCOMES** the recent meeting held on 23 January 2020 in Algiers, Algeria. The Assembly **REAFFIRMS** the AU position that there is no military solution to the current crisis in Libya and **CALLS** for enhancement of efforts, including a permanent ceasefire, towards finding a political and peaceful settlement of the conflict in Libya in line with the provisions of the Agreement signed by the Libyan parties in 2015, in Skhirat, Morocco. The Assembly **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the Commission to play his role and to take the necessary concrete measures, in close consultation with the UN, to ensure the effective involvement of the AU, with a view to resolving the Libyan crisis.

13. **COMMENDS** the countries of the Southern Africa region for sustaining peace and stability, including through enhancement of good governance, combating corruption and illicit financial flows and reinforced inter-state cooperation, which manifests the collective commitment in the region to silencing the guns. The Assembly **ENCOURAGES** the countries of region to further enhance mitigation strategies against natural disasters and drought and to continue working together to countering terrorism, violent extremism, radicalization, trafficking and trans-national organized crime. The Assembly **APPLAUDS** the Mozambicans for the successful organization of peaceful elections in October 2019 and encourages them to continue their efforts in implementing the Peace Agreement and advance peace, reconciliation and stability in the country, which would generate conditions more conducive for socio-economic recovery and development.
14. **APPLAUDS** the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government for their continued commitment and efforts in finding a lasting solution to the prolonged political and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau. The Assembly **CONGRATULATES** the people and Government of Guinea Bissau for the successful holding of a peaceful first round of presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau on 24 November 2019 and the run-off on 29 December 2019. The Assembly **STRONGLY CALLS** for a genuine all-inclusive dialogue, among all political actors, as the only viable alternative for finding durable solutions and strengthen the institutions of the State. In line with the announcement made by the National Electoral Commission of Guinea Bissau.
15. **COMMENDS** the efforts of the Republic of The Gambia towards consolidating democracy in the country through the current reforms process which will significantly contribute towards promoting stability and economic growth. The

Assembly **ALSO COMMENDS** the AU Commission for its continued support, through the African Union Technical Support Team to the Gambia (AUTSTG) and other mechanisms, to the efforts of the Government of The Gambia, towards consolidating peace and security, particularly with regard to strengthening public institutions, in the country. The Assembly **ENCOURAGES** the Government of The Gambia to continue engaging in dialogue with the ex-coalition members and political parties, in order to promote political stability and create a conducive environment for peace and economic development in the country.

16. **EXPRESSES CONDOLENCES** to the countries of the Sahel region for the lives lost due to terrorist attacks and other incidences of inter-communal violence and **AFFIRMS** the continued support of the AU through its various Organs and programs. The Assembly **EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN** over the persistent acts of terrorism, the growth of banditry, trafficking of all types and cross-border crime in the Sahel region. The Assembly **COMMENDS** the Malian parties for the progress in the inclusive national dialogue and **ENCOURAGES** them to continue with the reforms process, with a view to building confidence among communities, within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, which emanated from the Algiers Process. The Assembly **URGES** the Malian parties to redouble efforts in the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The Assembly **EMPHASIZES THE NEED** for continued support and advocacy efforts for regional initiatives, notably the ECOWAS initiatives to counter the spread of terrorism in the Sahel, through enhanced financing with the pledge of 1 billion US dollars made during the Ouagadougou Summit held on 14 September 2019. In this context, the Assembly **ENCOURAGES** ECOWAS Member States to honour their pledges in order to enhance the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. Furthermore, the Assembly **URGES** the partners, on the basis of priorities defined by the AU, to continue providing support to the efforts against terrorism, banditry, trafficking and trans-national organized crime. In this regard, the Assembly **WELCOMES** the Bamako Declaration on Access to Natural Resources and Conflict between Communities adopted on 29 November 2019, in Bamako, Mali, as adopted by the AU Ministerial Meeting. **DECIDES** to organize an Extraordinary Summit focusing on the challenges of terrorism and violent extremism, with a view to taking urgent action and measures necessary to support the countries which are facing the severe effects of terrorism. **REQUESTS** the Commission, in coordination with the Chairperson of the Union, to carry out the consultations necessary for holding the Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, or in another Member State.

17. **COMMENDS** the PSC for its continued efforts towards the full operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF), including the continued provision of strategic guidance for the harmonization of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) within the ASF Framework. The Assembly **FURTHER COMMENDS** the Commission for the efforts deployed in the development of various policies for the functioning of the ASF, including the new Doctrine for Peace Support Operations and the new Concept of Operations, as well as for

efforts towards the establishment of the ASF Regional Logistic Depots. In the same context, the Assembly **COMMENDS** the ASF Regional Standby Brigades for the continued efforts to ensure readiness for deployment. **TAKES NOTE** of the proposal on forming a Special Unit within the African Standby Force for combatting terrorism and **DIRECTS** the AUPSC to consider all the aspects related to the proposed Special Unit and to present the conclusions and recommendations thereon at the next Ordinary Session in February 2021, while taking note of the offer by the Arab Republic of Egypt to host a future Extraordinary Summit dedicated to this subject.

18. **WELCOMES** the initiatives by AFRIPOL in combating transnational organized crime, including fighting trafficking of illicit arms, drugs, and contraband. The Assembly **CALLS UPON** the Commission to expedite the staffing of the AFRIPOL Secretariat to enable it to more effectively deliver on its mandate. In this regard, the Assembly **COMMENDS** Algeria for seconding officers to AFRIPOL Secretariat and **ENCOURAGES** all other Member States also to second officers to the AFRIPOL Secretariat.
19. The Assembly **ENCOURAGES** the Member States, with the support of the AU Commission, as well as the RECs/RMs to redouble their efforts in mainstreaming child protection in their programmes. In this regard, the Assembly **REQUESTS** the AU Commission to integrate child protection into Silencing the Guns campaign and the Theme of the AU for the year 2020, as well as to develop a comprehensive policy on child protection in AU peace support operations. The Assembly **REITERATES ITS CALL** for the Chairperson of the Commission to appoint a special envoy for children in armed conflict.
20. **COMMENDS** the Commission for the steps taken to fully operationalize the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FEM-WISE AFRICA) in particular the training and the deployment of young women mediators and **REQUESTS** the Commission to continue mobilizing support for the deployment of members of FEM-WISE in different AU Liaison Offices.
21. **REQUESTS** the AU Commission to institutionalize the Youth for Peace Program within the Peace and Security Department with the designation of dedicated desk to coordinate the efforts of all stakeholders and facilitate its full operationalization, with a view to meet the increasing expectations of youth across the continent. The Assembly **ENDORSES** the five African Youth Ambassadors for Peace representing each of the five regions of the AU and **ENCOURAGES** them to continue to promote the role of the youth in the Continent on peace and security issues in line with the relevant AU instruments.
22. **NOTES WITH DEEP CONCERN** the growing insecurity posed by the negative effects of climate change in Africa. In this regard, the Assembly **REITERATES THE CALL** for sustained support for international commitments and agreements on climate change, in particular the Paris Agreement. The Assembly **ALSO**

CALLS UPON the international community to fulfil the pledge of USD 100 billion per year, to finance climate change actions at national, regional and international levels. Furthermore, the Assembly **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the relevant AU Organs, working in consultation with Members States, to explore innovative means and ways of financing climate actions in Africa. In this context, the Assembly **UNDERScores** the importance of promoting on Member States territories the integrated pursuit of peace, security and development with a view to deactivating the root causes of conflicts and advancing mitigation of negative effects of climate change in the Continent. To this effect, the Assembly **ENCOURAGES** the PSC to continue providing strategic guidance. Furthermore, the Assembly **REQUESTS** the Chairperson of the Commission to submit an annual Report in the course of 2020 on the measures taken towards giving expression on the ground to this interlinkage.

23. **ENCOURAGES** enhancement of efforts towards resource mobilization towards the operation of the AU Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development; implementation of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), as well as Security Sector Reform (SSR) in countries emerging from conflict; sustenance of the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), in order to optimize successes in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa; building more synergy in the fight against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW);
24. **STRONGLY CONDEMNS** all violations of arms embargoes currently in force in Africa, particularly as they contribute to illicit supplies to terrorist groups and criminal networks, thereby undermining the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Member States. In this context, the Assembly **URGES** the PSC, working closely with the UN system, particularly its Security Council, to consider measures to be taken to curb violations of UN arms embargo in Africa. Furthermore, the Assembly **WARNS** that punitive measures will be taken against all those that continue to commit such violations, including naming and shaming, in line with PSC decisions.
25. **STRONGLY CONDEMNS** all forms of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the AU Member States, which undermines the efforts of the Continent to silence the guns and aggravate crises with devastating effects on Africa's development and stability; The Assembly **REQUESTS** the PSC to remain seized with the matter and activate its policy of "naming and shaming" the peace spoilers.
26. **COMMENDS** the PSC for holding of its 11th Retreat on the 'Comprehensive African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Study and the Working Methods of the PSC, from 29 to 31 October 2018, in Cairo, Egypt, and 12th Retreat on the theme "Strengthening the Work of the Peace and Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Peace Consolidation in Africa, from 24 to 26 June 2019, in Rabat, Morocco. The Assembly **ENDORSES** the Conclusions of the two Retreats and **REQUESTS** the AU relevant Policy Organs to follow up on the implementation of the contents of the Conclusions of the Retreats. Furthermore, the Assembly

COMMENDS the Commission for the successful conduct of the Comprehensive APSA Study. The Assembly **CONGRATULATES** the PSC for the development of the Manual on Working Methods of the PSC which was adopted by the PSC at its 861st Meeting held on 22 July 2019 and **ALSO ENDORSES** the Manual. Furthermore, the Assembly **WELCOMES** the convening of the PSC Annual High Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa on the theme “Silencing the Guns in Africa: Creating Conducive Environment for Children in Conflict Situations” from 13 to 14 January 2020, in Libreville, Gabon, and **ENDORSES** the Conclusions of the Seminar.

27. **COMMENDS** the African Members in the UN Security Council ((A3) Members) for a significant role played in bridging the gap between the AU and the UN, particularly, in articulating, defending and promoting African perspectives and common positions on issues of peace and security in the Continent. The Assembly **ALSO COMMENDS** the outgoing A3 Members, namely, Cote d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea, for their exemplary work during their tenure in the UN Security Council and **CONGRATULATES** Niger and Tunisia for their election as non-permanent members of the Security Council. The Assembly **ENCOURAGES** the A3 Members to continue strengthening their unity and coordination with a view to more effectively amplify and spearhead the African voice and common positions on African peace and security issues in the UN Security Council agenda.



**DECISION ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF AFRICAN HEADS OF
STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE (CAHOSCC)
Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XXXIII)**


The Assembly,

1. **TAKES NOTE** of the Report of the Coordinator of the Committee of the African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), H.E. Cyril RAMAPHOSA the President of the Republic of South Africa on the outcomes of the 25th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 25); 15th Meeting of the Parties serving as the Conference of the Parties to its Kyoto Protocol (CMP 15) and the Second Session Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 2) and **ENDORSES** the recommendations therein;
2. **FURTHER TAKES NOTE** with appreciation the preparatory meetings convened by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and meetings of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) in preparation for the COP, in particular, the two AMCEN meetings in Durban, South Africa and Madrid, Spain;
3. **EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the Republic of Gabon for coordinating the work of CAHOSCC from 2017-19 and **ACKNOWLEDGES** the utmost commitment of CAHOSCC in the provision of the political oversight and guidance in facilitating Africa to be stronger, unified in the spirit of Pan-Africanism and speaking with one voice in the global Climate Change negotiations;
4. **WELCOMES** the Republic of South Africa as incoming Coordinator of CAHOSCC and supports the ongoing work of CAHOSCC in advancing the interests of the African Continent; and **EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the Republic of South Africa as the President of the AMCEN, for the outstanding achievements in providing political direction and maintaining the unity of Africa in the pursuit of its interest in the climate change negotiations at COP25;
5. **FURTHER EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the Republic of Congo and the Republic of Niger, Presidents of the Congo Basin Climate Commission and of the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region, as well as to the Republic of Gabon and the Republic of Guinea, as Champion of the Africa Adaptation Initiative and as Coordinator of the Africa Renewable Initiative, for their committed leadership in expediting the operationalisation and scaling-up of Africa's climate initiatives;
6. **CONGRATULATES** Republic of Seychelles on the successful launch of the African Islands States Climate Commission on the margins of the 33rd Ordinary Session of Assembly of the African Union;

7. **RECOGNISES** the continued commendable role of the African Group of Negotiators in representing the interests of Africa in the UNFCCC negotiations, speaking with one voice to advance the interest of Africans and **NOTES WITH APPRECIATION** the support provided by the African Union Commission (AUC) and all the partners in particular by AfDB, UNDP, UNEP and the Republic of Germany;
8. **CONGRATULATES** the Republic of Chile for successfully leading COP 25/CMP15 and CMA2, and **WELCOMES** the holding of COP26 in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
9. **ACKNOWLEDGES** the importance of the recent findings of the international scientific community regarding climate change, including the three recent special reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); Report on Global Warming of 1.5 degrees, Climate Change and Land Report, Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, and **RECOGNISES** that the reports call for ambitious action to address climate change and its impacts on Africa;
10. **CONCERNED** that the total global emission has increased and Parties with historical responsibility to act and the capacity to respond to climate change have not fulfilled their commitments, while the African continent, a continent comprising of 55 countries, contributes only 4% of the total global emissions;
11. **REITERATES** the need to ensure a practical multilateral approach for addressing the global challenge of climate change through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), **REAFFIRMING** our commitment to implement the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, in the best interest of African countries, while ensuring eradication of poverty and promoting sustainable development; and **STRESSES** the importance of ensuring adequate support for Africa's sustainable development path including through policies to allow the sustainable use of Africa's stranded assets;
12. **EMPHASISES** that the African continent as a whole is facing unprecedented pressure owing to various extreme weather events and slow-onset events accentuated by climate change, including flash floods; heavy rainfall, water scarcity and drought, which has displaced thousands of people and caused deaths in North Africa; landslides, which have caused thousands of deaths in Central Africa; severe drought, affecting livestock, water, crops, wildlife and the energy sector in East Africa; extreme events in the Western Africa region, which have caused flash floods, resulting in the loss of lives, displacing thousands and destroying infrastructure; and cyclones and drought, which have caused the deaths of thousands and destroyed homes and properties in southern Africa, and **EXPRESS SOLIDARITY** with countries and people that have been impacted by climate related disasters around the world;

13. **FURTHER REITERATES** the mounting vulnerability of the African Continent to current and projected impacts of climate change, and associated economic and non-economic loss and damage under all temperature-rise scenarios, and **CALLS UPON PARTIES** to fully implement and strengthen the loss and damage mechanism under the Convention and its Paris Agreement, including through support to enable African countries to avert, minimise and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts;
14. **WELCOMES WITH APPRECIATION** the call by H.E. Minister SCHMIDT, Minister of Environment of Chile, as COP25 President, to UNFCCC Parties to consider the special circumstances and needs of Africa, and **URGES** parties to the Paris Agreement to recognise the particular circumstances and needs of African countries, in line with the relevant and previous decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and **CALLS** upon the incoming presidency of the COP to continue the consultations, to reach a decision in that regard by COP 26;
15. **EMPHASISES** that the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement depends on the fulfilment of the established pre-2020 obligations and **URGES** developed country parties to continue to fulfil their commitments under the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol;
16. **RECOGNISING** that the implementation of the Paris Agreement will begin in 2021, **STRESSING** the importance of balance in both the organisation and outcome of COP26, to reflect the three-goals of the Paris Agreement, that related and equally important aspects to ambition: ambition concerning Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs), ambition about the adaptation goal and ambition on means of implementation; to effectively implement the Paris Agreement;
17. **WELCOMES** the simple pledges of the first replenishment of the Green Climate Funds (GCF) of USD 9.658 billion for the next four years, and **EXPRESSES APPRECIATION** to the countries that have contributed to the GCF to promote low-emission and climate-resilient development. **FURTHER CALLS** upon developed countries to provide new, additional, adequate and predictable financial resources from both public and private entities to the climate-related funds, in particular, the Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the Green Climate Fund, for developing countries to reflect the level of ambition and climate action by African countries;
18. **URGES** developed countries to continue to scale up the mobilisation and provision of climate finance towards achieving the 2020 finance goal through public funds to deliver on the US\$100 billion, and **FURTHER URGES** all developed country Parties to the Convention to provide climate finance in line with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, and to initiate the discussion on the new collective goal on finance from a flow of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries;

19. **ACKNOWLEDGES** the decision of the UNFCCC that calls on Parties to revise and enhance NDCs in 2020 in accordance with 1/CP.21 and in line with Article 3 of the Paris Agreement. The NDCs should include mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, reflecting equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities of parties, and **CONCERNED** with the US\$ 3 trillion estimated finance gap to implement NDCs;
20. **HIGHLIGHTS** the urgency to adapt to the devastating impacts of climate change on the continent and its impact on national budget of African countries with regard to their efforts to eliminate hunger, eradicate poverty, improve health and better education in the context of achieving U.N. sustainable development goals;
21. **STRESSES** the need for further elaboration of adaptation planning and implementation under the Paris Agreement to address extreme weather events and slow-onset events, and **CALLS** upon Parties to continue the elaboration of article 7 of the Paris Agreement, including the operationalisation of the global goal of adaptation, adaptation needs and associated costs, and the recognition of the contributions made by African Countries from their own budgets, and **ENCOURAGES** African countries to report their adaptation needs, gaps, planning, efforts and action; and **FURTHER NOTES** that according to UNEP reports, African countries have already contributed some 20 per cent of the annual cost of adaptation from their own budgets;
22. **URGES** the consideration of the market mechanism of the Paris Agreement in terms of raising ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions and help to meet the cost of adaptation for developing countries, and to emphasise on the need for the market and non-market-based approaches to ensure environmental integrity, avoid duplication and double counting, and support fair regional distribution and inclusiveness, and **STRESSES** on the importance to ensure that no discrimination between the different new market mechanisms, and that all the market mechanisms should provide proceeds to adaptation primarily through the Adaptation Fund;
23. **STRESSES** that measures are taken to combat climate change, including unilateral measures, and such measures should not constitute discrimination or a restriction on exports from African countries, taking into consideration African trade initiatives and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, as means to enhance trade among African countries;
24. **WELCOMES** the initiatives of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) on climate change and convening the Climate Action Summit for enhancing ambition and accelerating action and **CALLS** upon the UNSG and partner organisations to follow up on the implementation of the initiatives;

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25. **RECALLS** Decision 28 of the 2019 Session of CAHOSCC, which urged the Commission in collaboration with Pan African Agencies to organize an African Summit on Climate Change in 2020 prior to COP26, as the year 2020 is critical in the global climate change calendar; and **REQUESTS** the involved institutions to operationalise this decision; and further **CALLS** upon African Union Member States to offer to host the proposed summit before COP26;
26. **WELCOMES** the holding of the Africa day on the margins of COP25 as an essential event to raise awareness among different stakeholders on Africa's efforts, priorities and needs in relation to climate change, and commends the AUC and African partners for their efforts in this regard; and further welcomes the holding of the side event on the Congo Basin Blue Fund by H.E. Mr. Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of Congo on the margins of COP25;
27. **ACKNOWLEDGES** with appreciation the work of the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI), the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA) Initiative and the African Climate Commissions (Congo Basin Climate Commission, the Climate Commission for the Sahel Region and the African Islands States Climate Commission) in coordinating the implementation of Africa's response to Climate Change; and **CALLS** for additional support to scale up the implementation of these initiatives;
28. **INVITES** the Republic of Niger, Chair of the Climate Commission of the Sahel Region and the Republic of Seychelles, Chair of the African Islands States Climate Commission, as well as the Republic of Gabon Chair of the Africa Adaptation Initiative and the Republic of Guinea, Chair of the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative to join the CAHOSCC with a view to strengthen the coordination and enhance synergies between these Initiatives;
29. **REITERATES** the 2019 Decision for the Commission to develop in consultation with AMCEN, as appropriate, the rules of procedures for CAHOSCC to enhance effective operations of this High Level Committee for the consideration of the CAHOSCC at its next Session.

